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INCREASE IN BLOC AID TO NORTH VIETNAM

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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W-A-R-N-I-N-G

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INCREASE IN BLOC AID TO NORTH VIETNAM

The dispute between the USSR and Communist China has benefited North Vietnam by encouraging a greater display of concern for its economic well being on the part of the disputants. A concrete manifestation of this has been the extension during the past year by the USSR and Communist China of large new credits amounting to $350 million for support of the first Five-Year Plan of North Vietnam (1961-65).

Although there are no indications that either China or the USSR is attempting to become a monopolist in providing aid to North Vietnam, it is apparent that neither is willing to leave the field to the sole influence of the other. It is of common interest to both the USSR and China that North Vietnam develop a well rounded economy, and the two large Communist powers have committed themselves to assist in a comprehensive and diversified economic plan. But, in view of its own economic deficiencies, the fact that China is providing any economic assistance at all to North Vietnam indicates concern that it not be deprived of influence in this bordering state; and the largeness of its program suggests the degree of its concern. Thus, the new Soviet commitments during 1960, even though they may have resulted from motives to which the Chinese could not object, have prompted China to extend additional credits in order to retain a prominent economic role in the economy of North Vietnam.

Economic assistance extended to North Vietnam by the Bloc since 1955 has totaled about $882 million. Of this amount Communist China has extended $457 million and the Soviet Union $365 million. Of the total, about 58 percent--$510 million--has been in the form of credits, with the Soviet Union providing about 50 percent and Communist China roughly 45 percent of the total. These two countries have also been the major sources of grants, supplying together about 90 percent of the total grants of $372 million. Communist China, however, has supplied about 60 percent and the Soviet Union about 30 percent of total grants. Other Bloc countries have given the remaining grants and credits to North Vietnam, some in substantial amounts, others in token amounts (see Table).

Extensions of economic aid to North Vietnam have increased greatly in recent months. The most recent agreement was announced on 31 January 1961 and calls for a long term credit from China amounting to $157 million, the largest credit extended by Communist China to any Bloc or Free World country, for the construction or expansion of 28 industrial and transport enterprises. 1/ Aid for a number of the enterprises covered by this agreement was provided by China under an earlier economic assistance agreement concluded in February 1959. Under the new credit, to be used from 1961 to 1967, China will provide aid for raising the output of the Thai-Ngyuen iron and steel plant to 200,000 tons per year and for

the construction of several smaller iron and steel enterprises. Other assistance will be provided to the chemical and cement industries and for railway and bridge installations. In the field of light industry China will construct three mills for the manufacture of sugar, paper, and cotton yarn.

In November 1960, Communist China signed its first Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement with North Vietnam. 2/ Under the agreement China will send to North Vietnam scientists and technicians, furnish technical data in various industrial fields, and train Vietnamese technicians and students in China. In the field of agriculture China had agreed in March 1960 to build eight farms and a middle agricultural technical school. 3/

On 23 December 1960 the Soviet Union extended a credit of $107.5 million to aid in the realization of North Vietnam's Five-Year Plan. 4/ Under the terms of the agreement the Soviet Union will provide economic and technical assistance over the plan period for the construction of 43 new industrial enterprises and projects. Soviet aid will be used to expand the fuel and power industry, lay the foundations for a modern machine-building industry, and strengthen the scientific research institutes in the country. This aid will include the construction of eight thermal and hydro-electric stations with a total capacity of 200,000 kilowatts; the expansion of the Hongay-Campha coal mines; the construction of eight machine-building factories; the construction and equipping of three scientific and research training institutes; and the exploration of mineral resources; as well as the planning of other industrial works. Soviet specialists will be sent to North Vietnam while Vietnamese workers will receive training in the Soviet Union. In addition to this credit, the Soviet Union extended at the same time a grant of $5 million for medicine, insecticides and equipment, and specialists for an anti-malaria program. Also during December 1960, the 1961 protocol of the Soviet-Vietnamese Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation was concluded under which the Soviet Union will provide North Vietnam with assistance in the machine tool, electrical equipment, automotive, construction and other industries. 5/

In mid-1960 the Soviet Union extended a credit of $87.5 million for expanding the production and processing of tropical crops (coffee, tea, rubber, fruits) in North Vietnam. 6/ The agreement envisages Soviet assistance in the setting up of a State farm, the reconstruction of existing State farms, the organization of supporting workshop facilities, and the construction of factories for processing tea, coffee, and fruit. Soviet specialists will be sent to North Vietnam and Vietnamese are to be trained in the Soviet Union so that eventually they may take over full operation of the projects.

Although Communist China has striven to maintain as prominent a role as the Soviet Union in the development program of North Vietnam, there has been no apparent effort to compete directly with

the USSR. In fact there are many indications of cooperation in planning and administering an overall aid program that will yield maximum benefits to the economy of North Vietnam. Aid and advice are given in the areas most appropriate to the capabilities of the contributing nations. The Communist Chinese assumed a leading role in the early rehabilitation of North Vietnam's transportation and communications facilities as well as in the reconstruction and development of its irrigation system. In more recent years, Communist China has undertaken the construction of several important light industrial projects, including 10 rice husking plants, two sugar refineries, a cigarette factory, a match factory and a rubber-goods factory, a soap factory, and a knitted-goods factory. A Chinese credit of $75 million, extended in February 1959, is being used to finance construction of several heavy industrial plants, including the Viet Tri and Thai Ngyuen power plants and Thai Nguyen iron and steel plant. In addition to the material assistance provided, the Chinese have provided a large number of technicians to install equipment, to manage operations, and to train indigenous personnel. 7/ It is estimated that about 1,000 Chinese advisers, technicians, and laborers were working in North Vietnam during 1960. More than 3,000 Vietnamese workers and students have gone to Communist China for training during the past five years.

While the Chinese have furnished large quantities of basic materials and manpower, the Soviet Union has sent machinery and equipment in the heavy industrial field. Soviet advisers have been particularly active in the mining and manufacturing industries. Soviet aid projects include the Hanoi Machine Tool Plant, the Lao Kay apatite mine, the Tinh-Tuc Tin mine, the Long-Cam coal mines, and the Viet Tri super-phosphate plant. 8/ In addition about 400 Soviet advisers and technicians were present in North Vietnam during 1960, and about 2,000 Vietnamese were studying at higher educational institutions in the Soviet Union.

Aid from Bloc countries other than Communist China and the Soviet Union has been small by comparison. Poland has built a sugar refinery and several power plants; East Germany has contributed a 500-bed hospital, some modern fishing trawlers, and automatic telephone equipment; and Czechoslovakia has given three plywood factories, a 600-bed hospital, and technical aid in the opening of two zinc mines and a plant for concentrating zinc ore. 9/ The other Satellites have given lesser amounts of technical aid, raw materials, and consumer goods.

Bloc aid to North Vietnam has averaged 12 percent of North Vietnam's GNP over the period 1955-59. Only because of this continuing large net inflow of goods and services from the Bloc has North Vietnam been able to support an investment program of increasing significance. The new credits will enable North Vietnam to continue to develop a diversified construction program and greatly improve the chances of success for the first Five-Year Plan.

SINO-SOVIET BLOC CREDITS AND GRANTS PROVIDED TO NORTH VIETNAM, BY YEAR OF EXTENSION[a] (MILLION US DOLLARS)

	Total Aid	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961
China	457	200*				75		157
(of which credits)	(232)					25*		
Soviet Union	365	100*	7.5	11.8	20.7	25	87.5	
(of which credits)	(260)						107.5	
							5 *	
Czechoslovakia		9*						
Poland	37	16 8*						
(of which credits)	(16)							
Rumania		4*						
East Germany	15	15*						
Bulgaria	4	4*						
Hungary	4	2*					2	
(of which credits)	(2)							
Mongolia	insig	insig*						
Albania	insig	insig*						
Total grants	372	385	7.5	11.8	20.7	125	202	157
Total credits	510							
Grand total	882							

a. Grants are followed by asterisks.

Analyst:

Coord:

Sources:

1. FBIS, Daily Report (Far East), no. 21, 1 Feb 61, p. AAA-14-15. OFF USE.
2. Ibid., no. 23, 3 Feb 61, p. EEE-2. OFF USE.
3. Army, Hong Kong, State Jt. Wka. 48, DA IN 63359, 3 Dec 60. OFF USE.
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5. FBIS, Daily Report (USSR and EE), no. 6, 29 Dec 60, p. BB-22-25. OFF USE.
6. State, Moscow, Dsp 427, 23 Dec 60. OFF USE.
7. CIA. FDD, External Economic Relations of Bloc Countries (27), Sum no. 2863, 25 Nov 60, p. 32. OFF USE.
8. JPRS: 7437, The Democratic Republic of Viet Nam Economy and Foreign Trade, by M.M. Avsenev, 8 Jan 61. (tr. of Demokraticheskaya Respublika V'yetnam--Ekonomika i Vneshnyaya Torgovlya, by M.M. Avsenev, Leningrad, 1960), p. 179-183. U.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.

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SNIE 58-2-61
Advance Copy of the Estimate
5 July 1961
TS 142343-c

SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

PROBABLE REACTIONS TO CERTAIN COURSES OF ACTION CONCERNING LAOS

NOTE: This is an advance copy of the estimate as approved by the United States Intelligence Board. The printed text will be circulated within five days of this issuance.

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DATE: JAN 2001

Central Intelligence Agency

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Submitted by the

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

on 5 July 1961. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y

5 July 1961

SUBJECT: SNIE 58-2-61: PROBABLE REACTIONS TO CERTAIN COURSES OF ACTION CONCERNING LAOS

THE PROBLEM

To estimate whether South Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia can maintain their independence if southern Laos should come under predominant Communist control; and to estimate the consequences of certain courses of action by non-Communist forces in the area.

NOTE

This estimate has been prepared in response to a request by the Department of State for answers to several specific questions relating to certain postulated courses of action. The questions and the courses of action are set forth below, and the paper is organized to correspond

directly to the terms of the request. The assumed courses of action here considered were provided for the purposes of this estimate and are not intended to represent the full range of possibilities.

THE ESTIMATE

I. CONSEQUENCES FOR SOUTH VIETNAM AND SOUTHEAST ASIA OF PREDOMINANT COMMUNIST CONTROL OF SOUTHERN LAOS

Question: If southern Laos falls under predominant Communist control, will it become impossible for South Vietnam to maintain its independence, and will all of Southeast Asia be opened to predominant Communist influence?

A. South Vietnam. The fall of southern Laos would radically increase the already very great difficulty of preserving South Vietnam's independence. The Communists would gain the advantage of a safe haven and secure lines of communications in Laos, and could greatly expand their support of the Viet Cong. This would open the possibility that the Viet Cong campaign in South Vietnam might come to resemble recent Communist tactics in Laos, with the Viet Cong operating from secured areas in which a Communist or ostensibly independent government had been established, militarily and

politically supported by the Bloc. There is, however, no simple correlation between the fall of southern Laos and the fall of South Vietnam. The latter might fall even if southern Laos did not. On the other hand, the Communists face in South Vietnam much more formidable armed forces and a less flabby political situation than they do in Laos. There would be no immediate collapse. The long-term chances for the maintenance of South Vietnam's independence, however, would rest principally on the nature and amount of US support, and on the ability of Saigon to develop the political, psychological, and security programs required to gain and retain popular support.

B. The Rest of Southeast Asia. The fall of southern Laos would greatly increase the difficulties of the non-Communist position in Southeast Asia, but would not of itself inevitably open the area to predominant Communist influence. Long-term developments would still depend not merely on the Communist threat, but on US actions and on those of the various governments in the area.

II. CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN GIVEN COURSES OF ACTION

Question 1. What would be the short-term and long-term reactions of the Communists (PL/DRV/Chicom/USSR) to the following military actions in southern Laos and along the Mekong:

A. Coordinated South Vietnamese-Thai-RLG military action, beginning gradually and on a small scale, designed to secure the Savannakhet-Tchepone-Lao Bao line (Route 9) and extending eventually to a cleanup of southern Laos?*

(1) The Communists would probably contest the allied action in the vicinity of Route 9 with whatever forces they considered necessary to resist it, including unacknowledged DRV forces. As the allied action progressed, the Communists at some point would probably declare that the non-Communist side had broken the ceasefire, and would resume military operations throughout the country. At the same time, the Bloc would almost certainly conduct a worldwide political-propaganda campaign to highlight and to condemn the US-backed intervention in Laos.

(2) The degree of Communist military counteraction would depend on the success of the allied operation, and on the Communist estimate of the allied objectives. If their earlier, small-scale responses did not frustrate or neutralize the allied course of action, the Communists would probably expand their military operations in Laos to include attempts to seize Vientiane, Luang Prabang, and other key points. DRV regular forces might be overtly introduced into Laos.

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* See full text of postulated course at Annex.

(3) The PL/DRV would meanwhile continue to attempt to infiltrate cadres and logistic support to South Vietnam through the mountain routes of eastern Laos.

(4) We do not believe that, in response to course A, DRV forces would make a military attack on South Vietnam, lest they provoke large-scale US counteraction. Neither do we believe that Chinese Communist armed forces would be committed in this circumstance, either in Laos or in South Vietnam.

B. In conjunction with Course A, temporary US occupation of Vientiane, Thakhek, and Savannakhet, together with coordinated actions by Thai, Lao, and Meo troops in the Mekong Valley and northern Laos?*

(1) Pathet Lao forces, with unacknowledged North Vietnamese participation and continued Soviet-DRV-Chinese Communist support, would probably step up the scale of their military actions throughout Laos, with the aim of confining US-allied control to the three towns, and of destroying RLG armed forces and political control elsewhere in the country.

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* See full text of postulated course at Annex. See also SNIE 10-2-61, "Likelihood of Major Communist Military Intervention in Mainland Southeast Asia," dated 27 June 1961.

PL forces, with DRV cadres, would harass US supply and communications lines, and Communist agents would probably undertake terrorist and sabotage activities within the US-occupied towns.

(2) Depending on the size and apparent intent of the US intervention, it is possible that DRV military forces would be overtly introduced into Laos. Even so, we believe these forces would not, at least initially, attempt to drive the US troops from the towns or otherwise seek direct engagement with US forces.

(3) The Bloc political-propaganda response to course B would be more intense than that estimated for course A above.

(4) The Chinese Communists would probably be more aroused by course B than by A, and might press for a more aggressive DRV response than that estimated. We believe that the USSR would not share the Chinese view, however, and would exert a restraining influence.

(5) The Communists would probably consider that over the longer term, confinement of US and allied forces to the towns in question, together with world pressures on

the US, would place the US in an awkward military-political predicament and might cause the US to withdraw from Laos. If, however, US-PL clashes expanded and the Communists came to believe that US forces threatened Communist-controlled areas of Laos, direct engagement with DRV forces would probably result. It is also possible in this circumstance that the Chinese Communists would introduce forces into Laos, and they would almost certainly do so if the US action appeared to constitute a threat which the DRV forces could not counter.

Question 2. What would be the reaction of the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) and principal political groupings in Laos to the foregoing courses of action?

A. RLG leaders without significant exception would be reluctant to accede to course A unless US forces were also committed. They would be aware that course A implied their having to give up northern Laos including the royal capital of Luang Prabang -- in return for an uncertain venture in the south, still with no guarantee that the US would intervene to save the RLG. General Phoumi's reluctance would stem also from a belief that this course would preclude his salvaging at least some political future for himself in a neutralist government. Nevertheless, with sufficient US urging, the RLG leaders would probably accept course A, in

part because many of these leaders and their troops are southerners. Indeed, many of them might stir themselves to a more effective effort in the south than the RLG has generally shown to date. There would be considerable chance, however, that if Course A did not immediately succeed, much RLG political and military resistance to Communist pressures would evaporate.

B. RLG leaders would strongly prefer that courses A and B be undertaken concurrently. Most of them would welcome course B, hoping that this first step in direct US military intervention in Laos presaged further steps which would restore RLG fortunes. The King would be concerned lest this course involve the loss of Luang Prabang, and his continued backing of US-RLG moves would probably require additional guarantees or assurances to him.

Question 3: What would be the attitudes of:

A. South Vietnam? Diem would probably agree without hesitation to participate in course A, although he would probably seek greater assurance than he now has of US assistance. He would welcome course B as tangible evidence of US determination, but would be aware that this course by itself

would not arrest the flow of Communist cadres and arms into South Vietnam through southern Laos.

B. Thailand? The Thais would be very reluctant to undertake course A. They would interpret it as a further sign of US intention not to commit its own combat forces to Laos, and it has been their position that they would not make a major commitment of Thai forces to Laos unless US military forces were there. Moreover, course A would appear to them to benefit only South Vietnam, while leaving Thailand open to Communist retaliation across the long border with PL-controlled northern Laos. Course B would be welcomed by the Thai because it promised some protection along this border. If they were convinced that course B would follow course A, they might be favorably inclined to the latter.

C. SEATO members? France would probably strongly oppose either course. The UK would probably object to either course as long as the Geneva Conference was continuing, but might not object if the Conference had broken down. Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, and the Philippines would in general applaud either course.

D. Other Asian states? India, Cambodia, Burma, and Malaya would almost certainly criticize course A, although

certain of their leaders might privately indicate sympathy with it. Their reactions would be more adverse in the case of course B. The GRC would welcome either course, but would be critical of the US for not making a greater intervention, especially if course A alone had been undertaken. The noisy Japanese Left would agitate against both, although the more so in the case of course B. The Japanese Government would be critical of course B, but would generally attempt to dissociate itself from either course.

Question 4: Would the Sino-Soviet Bloc be likely to consider these courses of action as not vital to their own interests and therefore only a limited war?

Yes. Communist reactions, as discussed above, would be based on confidence that the Bloc's capabilities in the Laos area could frustrate the design of courses A or B and preserve Communist assets there without incurring significant risk of unacceptable US responses. Accordingly, the USSR, the DRV, and China would almost certainly limit their response, seeking to force either a US withdrawal or the protracted commitment of US and allied forces to indecisive and humiliating action in a remote area. If the US should extend hostilities in Laos, however, the Bloc would respond vigorously but still almost certainly on a scale intended to avoid the spread of conflict beyond Laos.

Question 5. Would hostilities be limited to the type outlined in the courses of action and is it likely that they could be contained within the area of southern Laos and the Mekong Valley?

The Communists would believe themselves capable, through limited action, of preventing the US from accomplishing its objectives, and they would probably leave a decision to expand hostilities up to the US. Under course B, or in the event of large scale action under course A, the necessity to protect US or allied forces and their supporting lines would pose the constant danger of some expansion.

Question 6. What would DRV reaction be to a US threat or actual air attack against targets near Hanoi or Haiphong if the DRV stepped up its commitment of troops in Laos?

A. We do not believe that in present circumstances the Communists would take such a threat very seriously unless it were accompanied by evidences that the US was preparing for a major military effort in Southeast Asia. Accordingly we doubt that the threat would cause the DRV to alter its courses of action in any significant way. Moscow and Peiping would almost certainly announce their determination to defend the DRV against attack and stress that any such US action would carry the risk of general war.

B. An actual US air attack on the DRV would provoke a strong Bloc response and an entirely new crisis situation. Soviet or Chinese Communist aircraft would almost certainly be committed to the defense of the DRV, and Bloc aircraft might attempt to attack bases from which the US strikes had been mounted. At the same time the USSR would probably seek to keep hostilities from further expanding, and would attempt to marshal world opinion against the US. We cannot rule out the possibility that Communist China, considering the US action a threat to its security, might undertake major military action in Laos, or even in the Taiwan Strait or Korea.

Question 7. Could the recommended courses of action clean up, or effectively curtail, Communist (chiefly Viet Cong) infiltration into South Vietnam? Would they be successful without the commitment of US troops in southern Laos?

Most of the eastern two-thirds of Route 9 is now held by the Communists, with about 1,500 troops on or near the road. About 4,000 additional Communist forces are in Laos south of Route 9. Since the Thai and Vietnamese special forces together total only about 2,000 at present, we do not believe that they could secure the road and the surrounding area, either by themselves or with FAL assistance. To clear the Communists from all of southern Laos would of course be a

still more difficult task. Taking into consideration the Communist capability for reinforcement in the area, we believe that the stated objectives could only be accomplished by a major military operation (major certainly by Laotian standards), involving the commitment of substantial Vietnamese and possibly US forces. The Thai and Vietnamese special forces, by a long-continued harassment of Communist positions, could hinder but probably not effectively curtail Communist infiltration into South Vietnam. Additionally, the postulated courses of action would not solve the problem of continuing Viet Cong success in enlisting the majority of its strength locally in South Vietnam.

Question 8. How long would these recommended courses of action have to be continued in order to safeguard the security of South Vietnam? If the initial actions were successful, could the level of activity in southern Laos be reduced?

A. The Communists are capable of keeping up military and paramilitary pressures in southern Laos for an indefinite period, and they would probably do so.

B. If military action were sufficient to clear the Communists from Route 9 and southern Laos, these pressures would probably be relaxed for a time, as has been the Communist habit when faced with superior force. Given substantial

US, GVN, and Thai support, a Lao government confined to this southern part of the country would probably be able to resist internal and external Communist pressures for some time.

Question 9. Would the recommended courses of action prevent the Geneva Conference on Laos from reaching any agreement, assuming that these actions are taken while the Conference is still in session?

Course A in its initial, inconspicuous stages, would probably have little effect on Communist conduct at the Geneva Conference. Course B or the advanced stages of course A might cause the Communists to withdraw from the Conference, though we believe it more likely that the Communists would use the Conference as a platform for castigating the US intervention as obstructing a Laotian settlement, and would seek to gain political capital from the situation. We do not believe that either course would exert any significant pressure on the Communists to become more reasonable at Geneva.

Question 10. Would the Communist reaction be greater if these actions are taken after the Geneva Conference fails to agree on Laos?

We believe that the Communist response to courses A and B would be influenced more by the military-political situation in Laos and the world reaction to the US-backed moves than by the status of the Geneva negotiations.

ANNEX: GIVEN COURSES OF ACTION

"A. Coordinated moves by picked Vietnamese, Thai, Laos troops to push salients westward from Viet-Nam and eastward from Thailand along Route 9 for the purpose of securing this road and the surrounding area. The Vietnamese would use a four force clean up using (1) hunter-killer groups (whose training will be finished in early July) to locate Commie radio stations and concentrations without engagement. They would radio back the information. The killers would then tailor a force for the job which would smash the target and escape. If these forces were insufficient, ARVN elements would be used. Secretary Thuan reports they are eager to attack Communists in southern Laos. The Thais would use elements of the Thai PARU units who have already fought in Laos. Ambassador Young believes Sarit might be induced to use them in southern Laos in a coordinated effort. Encourage Phoumi to hold his present positions if he can and withdraw to the south if he cannot. Elements of FAL, with US advisers, can be used in the clean up of southern Laos. Continue to supply the Meos by air drop as a built-in force behind the enemy lines for so long as the Meos can hold out (in the forests of Laos this might be a long period). These moves would be supported by US arms and advice, but not by US troops. US air drops and airlifts would be used if necessary. The action would be undertaken quietly over a period of two or three months. The increase in pressure would be relatively gradual for the purpose of avoiding dramatic military confrontations and resultant international excitement. World opinion would be presented slowly with a situation of increasing Thai-Vietnamese strength in the area. This slow pace would be consonant with limited Thai-Vietnamese military potential. It should also be synchronized with increasing world acceptance of the fact that Lao independence and neutrality cannot be guaranteed at Geneva. But the action on Route 9 should be started as soon as possible and <u>not</u> be delayed until the end of the Geneva Conference. Delay will require a larger and internationally more dangerous operation.

"B. If the action along Route 9 succeeded or if it became clear that the Geneva Conference had failed (whichever came first), we decide whether to carry out plans now under consideration (Operation Porkchop) to hold the Mekong Valley and as much of Laos to the north as feasible. It is understood that US occupation forces would move temporarily into Vientiane, Thakhek, and Savannakhet and there would be coordinated actions by Thai, Lao, and Meo troops."

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12

6 July 1961

Basic Doctrine Re The Support of Violence Across Borders

1. The United States (and virtually all other nations) has always historically supported the doctrine of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other nations. It has occasionally been suggested that our vigorous, and often self-righteous, public support of this doctrine inhibits us in efforts to counter communist subversion and communist use of violence, especially in the underdeveloped nations, and that we should therefore consider some modification of the doctrine. The counter argument seems however not only to have more support within the U.S. Government but also to have greater validity. It is to the effect that the doctrine of nonintervention, even though universally flouted by the communists, nevertheless is more valuable to us than to them. The reasoning is that although the open societies of the West are less successful than the communist societies in practicing covert intervention while publicly adhering to a doctrine of nonintervention, nevertheless the public doctrine does exercise considerable restraint on the communists. Since it is alleged that the communists, if unrestrained, would have vastly greater capability of violent intervention than the West, the conclusion is that the West can well afford to accept a greater restraint on the use of its lesser capability in order to maintain a ~~greater~~ degree of restraint on the communists' very much greater capability.

2. This appears to be the reasoning behind what might be described as the cold-blooded case for continuing publicly to uphold the doctrine of nonintervention. A more powerful pragmatic case is simply that this doctrine has acquired such wide respectability and appeal that the U.S. could not propose publicly to modify or weaken it without paying an unacceptably heavy price. Accordingly, it is probably not worthwhile to debate whether if we threw off some of the restraints we could not develop a capability fully equal to that of the communists. Realistically, our public commitment to the doctrine of nonintervention has to be accepted as a fact of life.

3. Taking this as a starting point, however, an ingenious application and extension of the doctrine is proposed. It can be expressed in the following propositions:

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(a) Since all nations accept the doctrine of nonintervention, the U.S. is going to treat the activities of any nation which incites and supports violence within another nation as a form of aggression morally equivalent to the military crossing of a border.

(b) When a situation arises in which this subversive form of aggression is threatened or is being practiced, the U.S. will generally favor the use of international control machinery to halt it, provided such machinery can be made to operate with full effectiveness.

(c) If, however, in the face of clear evidence that violence is being supported across an international border, the establishment of international machinery to curb this type of aggression is opposed, or the machinery is ineffective, the U.S. reserves the right to employ force (or to support the employment of force) up to at least the same scope and level in defense of the threatened nation.

(d) Any such unilateral use of force by the U.S., or with U.S. support, will be strategically a defensive action. That is to say, it will have as its purpose to induce a cessation of the subversive aggression to which it is a response.

(e) Nevertheless, in taking such action the U.S. will not deny itself (or its friends) the advantage of the tactical offensive, nor will it limit itself to weapons of the enemy's choosing. Specifically, it will feel free to incite and support violence within the aggressor's territory and to use weapons in which it has an advantage, but will endeavor to avoid major escalation of the scale of violence or sophistication of weapons.

4. In the above form, this doctrine is proposed both as a policy to guide the U.S. response to situations of violence and as a rationale which would underly the public posture of the U.S. As a rationale this amounts to an assertion that the U.S. (a) takes the doctrine of nonintervention so seriously that it is going to treat violent intervention as the equivalent of overt aggression, and (b) recognizes the right of any country which is the victim of subversive violence to practice subversive violence in its own defense. It may well be asked whether this is not a justification for a declaration of war by the victim of subversion against the aggressor. It could, of course, be just that. But

the essence of the doctrine is that, because subversive violence involves the use of force for purposes of aggression but on a scale considerably less than that typical of a declared war, it is necessary to recognize the right of the victim to use force on a similarly limited scale in its own defense. It could well be argued that unless either this remedy of the unilateral limited use of force or the preferred remedy of effective international policing is available, then the doctrine of nonintervention operates one-sidedly to benefit the nation that undertakes violent subversion. In a situation like that existing between the DRV and South Vietnam, it would be difficult to justify to what is called "world opinion" a declaration of war by SVN as a response to the guerrilla activity of the Viet Cong within its own borders. A declared war would indeed involve a major escalation of the scale of violence as well as serious danger of a widening of the conflict. Under these circumstances, a persuasive case could be made to the effect that the doctrine of nonintervention should not deny South Vietnam any remedy against this form of aggression.

5. As an operational policy, this doctrine has important implications for U.S. action in situations of the type to which it is intended to apply.

(a) First, it puts a premium on acquiring persuasive proof that subversive violence is being employed in a particular situation. The test set up in this doctrine is that support is being provided and control exercised across a border. The aggressor country in such a situation has always claimed that the violent resistance is a purely indigenous revolution. Persuasive proof will presumably have to take the form of intercepting communications or of prisoners who can be produced in sufficient numbers or of captured boats, trucks, or aircraft. If the support being rendered across the border is in a mild enough form (for instance limited to money payments), it will usually not be worthwhile to try to invoke this doctrine.

(b) The most interesting concept in the doctrine is that of the tactical offensive and of the independent choosing of weapons. As to the former, the advantages of carrying the war to the enemy's country are obvious. It is particularly unjust that the population which supplies most of the victims in guerrilla warfare should be that of the victim of aggression while the aggressors people and lands

are untroubled. As to the latter, it is indeed high time that we applied ingenuity to the choosing or the development of weapons which involve no major escalation in the degree of sophistication but in which for one reason or another our friends have a relative advantage in a given situation. For instance, small boat operations may be much easier in certain situations than the infiltration of guerrillas into enemy territory by land. We may be able to develop weapons (other than conventional bombs) that could be used from aircraft with effects having some similarity to those of sabotage carried out by teams on the ground.

6. Finally, although the doctrine as here stated makes no specific reference to covert activities, it has an important application to them. It would lose much of its value as operational policy unless, in its aspect as a rationale, it became widely known. Accordingly, it must be assumed that, even if not in some official manner announced by the U.S. Government, public expression would be given to the rationale in various ways. This would have two implications. On the one hand, it would permit the U.S. to support more or less openly certain activities which, without such a rationale, can be supported only covertly. In this way, the adumbration of the doctrine would permit the realm of covert paramilitary action to be narrowed. On the other hand, the political risks of certain covert actions would be significantly reduced, since a rationale for such actions would have been made known publicly. Taking these two implications into account, it seems likely that it would still be desirable for tactically offensive actions, those involving the support of violence within the territory of the enemy, to be done in such a manner as to be at least officially disclaimable. The whole reason for limiting the scale and technical sophistication of a paramilitary action taken in response to violent subversion is to avoid escalation. This advantage is lost if an offensive operation against the aggressor is conducted in such a manner as to compel him to regard it as a formal act of war. Unless, therefore, the enormous advantages of being free to employ the tactical offensive are to be foregone, every precaution should be taken to make such acts symmetrical in form, as well as in scale and technical sophistication, to the strategic offensive originally mounted by the aggressor. This would usually require that the acts be disclaimable but, with the proposed new rationale, it is far less important that they be truly covert.

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NLK 77-657

STATUS REPORT
OF THE
TASK FORCE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

COVERT ANNEX - LAOS
(11-24 July)

1. On 21 July an estimated force of 1,000-1,500 Vietnamese Communist and Pathet Lao began a "mop-up" operation against the central Laos counterguerrilla force. These guerrilla forces were forced to withdraw to a predesignated rallying point. There is no indication at this time on the extent the enemy is or will follow up their initial success. Friendly casualties were three killed, six injured, and two missing. Enemy casualties were estimated at 40-50 wounded and killed. The enemy captured one radio and a 100-man weapons unit. The friendly force was able to destroy all their heavy weapons prior to their withdrawal.

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2. In order to prevent support to the Meo program being considered violation of the Geneva Accords, [redacted] has ceased all ammunition drops to the Meos with the signature of the Geneva agreements. Weapons drops were discontinued on 27 June. Rice and other non-military supply drops will continue.

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28 November 1961

COVERT ACTIONS IN VIETNAM

1. The following paragraphs summarize the program which CIA is now undertaking in liaison with the Government of Vietnam (GVN). Not included are those purely unilateral activities which are for the most part agent penetrations of government and opposition political parties and of the ministries and security services of the GVN.

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a. Establishment of intelligence, psychological warfare, political action, and paramilitary nets [redacted]

b. Rural reconstruction operations conducted in the eastern region of South Vietnam employing small teams of volunteers engaged in reactivation of village administration, medical assistance to villagers, establishment of village defense systems, and the formation of intelligence networks to report on Viet Cong agents and activities in villages.

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c. [redacted]

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d. Establishment, guidance, training, and financial support to the newly organized Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) which has been given over-all responsibility for collating and evaluating all intelligence from Vietnamese sources and acts as the central coordinating body for intelligence activities of all GVN services, both military and civilian.

e. Training of National Police and Surete Service (NPSS) in counter-subversion techniques and support and guidance of operations run jointly with the NPSS to penetrate the Viet Cong mechanism in South Vietnam. Plans are being developed for revitalizing a nationwide "Special Branch" for Viet Cong penetration operations when final transfer of the NPSS to the CIO is effected within the very near future.

f. Viet Cong penetration operations run jointly with the Military Security Service (MSS) in the Saigon-Cholon area and training of MSS personnel in counter-subversion techniques.

g. Covert political and psychological warfare activities targetted against the DRV and run jointly with the Vietnamese National Army Psychological Warfare Directorate. These include "black" and "gray" radio operations, propaganda leaflet drops over North Vietnam territory, and a letter-writing campaign through which anti-DRV propaganda material is forwarded to North Vietnam via the international mails.

h. [redacted]

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i. Special intelligence operations with the South Vietnamese Intercept Service against the DRV and Viet Cong targets in South Vietnam.

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2. As an adjunct to these liaison activities with the Vietnamese, both CIA and MAAG are also now entering into an expanded program of placement of intelligence advisors into the military and civilian components of Vietnamese intelligence and security services. In an effort to improve the functioning of the NPSS, CIA is in progress of placing one representative at each of six NPSS Directorates. These CIA officers are to be supplemented by U. S. Army military intelligence specialists who will work with and advise the NPSS at the provincial level, insofar as the NPSS intelligence function is concerned. The CIA officers at the directorate level will, in addition, regularly visit their provincial counterparts to exchange ideas and to improve the targetting and conduct of intelligence operations. MAAG, on its part, is placing intelligence advisors at General Staff J-2, Field Command G-2, Corps G-2, Division G-2, and Regimental S-2 levels. In addition to and separate from these advisors, an intelligence staff is being established under Chief, MAAG to supervise the operations of these advisors and to process information coming from them.

3. The Evaluation Center, which has heretofore existed as a means of collating all source information for use primarily in identifying military targets is also being expanded through contributions of personnel by all U. S. agencies engaged in intelligence collection in Vietnam. A fulltime CIA officer has been assigned to the Evaluation Center.

4. In addition, there has been established an intelligence committee with representatives from appropriate U. S. agencies in Saigon, chaired by CIA, the purpose of which is to provide regular reporting to Washington plus special reporting on emergency situations as they arise.

5. Provincial surveys designed to assess the criticality of intelligence collection, economic and programs, etc., are also now being organized under the direction of Ambassador Nolting.

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CIA is contributing to these surveys by the assignment of personnel now in Saigon and by the provision of TDY personnel. It is estimated that these surveys will begin early in December and will last approximately four months.

6. CIA is also exploring with the Department of State the possibility of obtaining policy authorization for the use of a small number of Chinese Nationalist personnel as pilots and Special Forces instructors for covert operations mounted from South Vietnam.

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VIENTIANE

Question	Answer
1. What is your assessment of the increase in the fighting capabilities of the FAL forces that will have been brought about during the cease fire and their prospective fighting capabilities as of end of this rainy season. In this connection would particularly like your comments on:	1. Unlikely to be substantially greater than as described in ML 2902 of 1 July. In absence of improved leadership, FAL will be incapable of more than delaying action against enemy at that time.
a. Morale, motivation and willingness to fight.	a. Function of leadership which seriously lacking in FAL.
b. Degree of improvement in technical proficiency.	b. Slow but steady progress with MAAG help. Overall improvement - 20%.
c. Quality of FAL troop commanders.	c. Officers lack leadership ability and competence. There is no short-term solution to this.
d. Areas where U.S. support would be required to provide more effective fighting force (e.g., logistics, communication, engineer, air support, etc.)	d. Cadre FAL using foreign resources, and provide USMTT's to command elements to Battalion level. Logistics a major FAL weakness. Encadrement will help here and MAAG studying best methods.
2. What is your assessment of the improvement in the fighting capabilities of the PL during this period?	2. Improving tactical positions; effecting logistical build-up; morale appears high; has capability of initiating offensive on all major fronts at a time and location of his own choosing.
a. What is your assessment of probable relative strengths of the two forces at the end of the rainy season?	a. FAL capability will continue inferior to pro-Communist forces in Laos.
b. In connection with foregoing, what explicit judgments do you make re extent of current Viet Minh support of PL?	b. VM cadres provided in required numbers; some artillery units 100% VM; some Bns believed to be completely VN as spearhead major enemy offensives.

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Vientiane (Cont'd)

c. What account could FAL give against PL, assuming no increase in current level of VM support, if Phoumi were to concentrate his forces in the South trying to hold roughly along the present cease fire lines and to mop up PL pockets in S. Laos including Tchepone area?

c. Concentration of FAL in South would enhance capability to delay PL/KL forces, but no scheme of maneuver can offset leadership weakness of FAL.

3. If you judge Phoumi's forces inadequate for foregoing mission, how large a supplement to those forces from SVN and Thai would be required to do the job?

3. If outside troops are well trained, well equipped, and properly employed, a division with supporting combat arms and adequate logistic support from each of the two countries, a wing of efficient fighter-bombers, and a troop carrier wing would be adequate, provided FAL leadership were improved. Air support should include reconnaissance capability. These forces would permit fairly rapid clearing of organized Communist forces in South, including Vientiane area and consolidation operations to suppress PL guerrillas. This response includes no reinforcement of Pro-Communist forces in Laos by Sino-Soviet cadre, volunteers, or combat units, an assumption which is believed to be unrealistic.

4. What are the current capabilities of Meos and what will be their capabilities by end of rainy season? Are more special forces men needed for Meo training?

4. Improvement of Meo irregular forces continuing at satisfactory pace. Organization deficiencies in hastily armed Meo groups are being corrected and new areas opened for recruitment.

These forces will possess a very substantial guerrilla capability if employed in coordination with effective regular forc in renewed hostilities.

To realize maximum Meo capability, addition of a special forces command and staff detachment and 5 12-man field training detachments are required. This requirement may increase if recruitment potential realized. PARU capability for stiffening Meos should be fully utilized.

Vientiane (Cont'd)

5. Other than major U.S. combat land forces, what level and nature of U.S. support would be required:

a. To generate sufficient willingness to undertake the operation described above?

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b. To maximize the operation's chance for success?

[redacted]

Do you see any special problems such as in command relationships or in planning and implementation of operations which might be anticipated given the diverse personalities involved?

What arrangements to you think most likely to be conducive to cooperative effective effort?

What would be the nature and extent of U.S. role in providing guidance or direction to this effort?

7. Is MAAG in Laos adequate in size and qualifications of personnel to meet requirements implicit in such an operation?

5. U.S. air support (see 3 above) and encadrement (see 1.d above). Air support to:
(1) Maintain air superiority
(2) Interdict supply routes
(3) Destroy enemy bases in Laos
(4) Close air support
Phoumi would undertake operation in South Laos if circumstances dictated but would continue to hope for U.S. support. He probably also feels reasonably sure of support from SVN and possibly Thai.

6. Most certainly.

Phoumi would wish overall command of a combined staff though his plans so far do not deal with this. Thai and Vietnamese would probably not like this arrangement in view of their investment in the enterprise and their past observation of FAL efficiency.

A combined staff nominally headed by Phoumi but with a U.S. officer as Deputy or C/S.

It is a question whether this would be acceptable to all concerned in the absence of U.S. ground forces.

7. Headquarters personnel sufficient if projected TD is met. Field representation another matter - need staff advisory team with adequate support, and special forces personnel will be required (see 4 above).

Vientiane (Cont'd)

8. Additional comments.	8. To hold Luang Probang would require perhaps another division. Believe also should consider steps to hold Sayaboury.

BANGKOK

1. What measures do you believe Sarit would be willing and able immediately to undertake in NE Thailand directed toward deterrence of the development of any guerrilla threat in that area which might be expected to arise from Lao situation?	1. If U.S. assures necessary support and if Laos situation requires action, Sarit would probably reorganise set-up in Thailand for better counter-guerrilla deterrence in North and NE Thai which are equally vulnerable to Communist infiltration. First priority is centralised control for intelligence and operations in special security areas. Measures recommended: Position aircraft and ground forces near border; organise Mekong R. patrol; train 2 battalions for specialised warfare; concentrate intelligence effort in NE; train border police.
In this connection, do you now have any specific recommendations on magnitude and nature of U.S. assistance in such a program? For example, do you believe Sarit would be receptive to MAP equipping Thai engineer construction battalion for construction of secondary and access roads?	U.S. to provide 1 squadron of helos and 1 squadron of transports such as Caribou, and field radios. Need U.S. Army Eng. Construction Battalion because Thai do not have such unit. Road network just adequate; to improve and maintain existing roads is large and time-consuming job. U.S. must also develop airfields for airlift capability, build field quarters and facilities for redeployment of Thais to Northern areas, deploy one U.S. Special Forces Bn. to NE, assist in move of Vietnamese minority to internment camps provide relief for Lao refugees, increase political communication capability.

Bangkok (Cont'd)

2. Would Sarit be willing to join a cooperative military action with Phoumi and Diem designed to hold roughly along present cease fire lines, mopping up pockets of PL resistance in S. Laos including Tchepone? If so, what types of support and guarantees would Sarit expect from U.S.?	2. Sarit would join if U.S. ground and air forces also engaged in cooperative military action in Laos. U.S. contribution to include logistic support of RTAF, U.S. ground units, U.S. air support and reconnaissance in Laos, and U.S. aid in air defense of Thailand, possibly U.S. advisor in RTG combat units in Laos, and share financial burden. U.S. to make commitment protect Thai unilaterally and outside SEATO if attacked. Believe fight in Laos would be on large scale, not mop-up unless partition possible.
3. Is the MAAG in Thailand adequate in size and quality of personnel to meet the requirements of the action described above?	3. JUSMAG needs 100 additional positions now for above program. Quality of personnel under review. JUSMAG not organized for operational task and need field headquarters.
4. What is your estimate of the capability of Thai troops if they should become engaged in joint operation with FAL and SVN as projected in 2 above?	4. Thai capabilities good. Would make good anti-guerrilla showing in Thailand and, with U.S. soldiers alongside, would fight well in Laos.
5. Do you see any special problems, such as in command relationships or in planning and implementation of operations which might be anticipated given diverse personalities involved? What arrangements do you think most likely to be conducive to cooperative and effective effort? What would be the nature and extent of U.S. role in providing guidance or direction to this effort?	5. The more U.S. assumes leadership, the less problems in command and intra-national differences. Do not believe Thai would accept command by Lao or Vietnamese, and vice versa. Suggest joint intelligence and planning group be set up - US/Thai/Laos/SVN.
6. Additional comments.	6. Emphasizes urgency due to coming dr season. Stresses need hold Lao Panhandl and all of Mekong Valley. If not hold, eventual U.S. commitment would be large salvage situation.

SAIGON

1. What is your assessment of the likely scale and character of the Viet Cong effort over coming months?

1. VC likely concentrate on increased number small-scale military attacks and political action in all parts of SVN. Stepped-up action in central VN, and near Lao border, and probably in Saigon area expected. Larger scale activity not likely without obvious increase in DRV aid which not expected. DRV overt aggression inhibited by possible ICC action and provocation of U.S. or SEATO intervention. We will emphasise organisation of national revolution [redacted]

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VC logistic base not sufficient to support large-scale military operations, but can gain objectives by successful guerrilla action to frustrate GVN armed forces to point of bringing about coup.

2. When are the Vietnamese likely to produce a plan for the systematic elimination of the Viet Cong; and what ideas does Task Force Saigon have about what such a systematic plan should look like?

2. Cannot predict when; continue to press for action. CIP action completed in areas of major command organisation. and concept of operation. Need statement of objectives, statement of responsibilities, machinery for coordination and execution, detailed annexes supporting concept of operation, annex showing geographic priorities for action and goals for pacification phases. Plans must be flexible and recognise prerequisite for military action in strong VC areas.

Saigon (Cont'd)

3. What are the possibilities of further action by Diem's forces against NVN: (1) by airdrops? (2) by coastal raids? What would be Diem's attitude to an enlarged program supported by U.S.?

3. Diem not impetuous man. Actions to date - build intelligence base and provide foundation for restricted harassment and sabotage. He seeks to avoid encouraging any premature violent uprising which would be repressed for lack of sufficient support from free world. Diem sees that larger scale attacks upon NVN would extend DRV's liberty of action against SVN when he has enough problems from DRV's covert attacks.

(1) Accepted tactic, but fears loss of few qualified pilots available to SVN. Within limits outlined above, he would probably accept an enlarged program, especially if modern aircraft and additional crews provided.

(2) Diem accepts coastal infiltration of agents. Any program of raids would be evaluated against above considerations and problems of DRV naval defenses (includes 25 modern Swatow class patrol gunboats).

4. Is the counter-guerrilla training adequate which is being conducted? Do we have the necessary U.S. Special Forces personnel for the job?

4. Quality of training excellent. Problem lies in ARVN making available sufficient forces for training. Success will depend on completion 20,000 increase which will free more operational units for this purpose.

Sufficient U.S. Special Forces personnel are available for the job.

Saigon (Cont'd)

5. What would be the effect upon Viet Nam troop requirements if Diem were encouraged to push out into Laos in order to control infiltration routes? Would Diem be willing to join in a cooperative action with Laos and Thailand to clean up the Panhandle of Laos?

5. Diem concerned with S. Laos and would like to see clean-up action there. His decision to join would have to consider broadening of SVN war and limited available forces to meet current military mean. Believe he would seriously consider some additional forces beyond small number of SVN Special Forces and regulars now engaged in Laos and along Lao border. Such additional forces would be small except might risk commitment larger forces to prevent intensified future VC infiltration through Laos as calculated risk. In latter case, probable only be considered in time frame required ready additional forces already authorized (late 1961). Should be recognized that commitment poses possible escalation (from small to sizeable SVN force). In this case keep in mind that the additional 30,000 increment is needed for internal counter-insurgency at present intensity.

Diem might not insist on actual involvement U.S. forces at outset of cooperative action but would seek commitment to send in U.S. forces if need developed.

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What is your assessment in Saigon of the likelihood that Sarit and [redacted] would cooperate in such an effort?

[redacted] Sarit might balk at emphasis on Southern Laos as against all of Mekong Valley (or Thai border). If both operations undertaken, Sarit would join.

6. Additional comments.

6. GVN not capable controlling rugged border infiltration points. Force required for this purpose prohibitive. It is possible, however, control sizeable Communist troop units or supply routes

Saigon (Cont'd)

by location GVN on major avenues of approach and on commanding terrain. Troop commitments for this purpose based same factors as above (see 5). MAAG studying R&D methods halt infiltration which are long range in effect and are expected reduce not stop infiltration.

GVN will have to depend on U.S. advisory capability to plan for large scale or combined operations.

Command should remain national, coordinated by U.S. headquarters. Possible major obstacle might arise in getting agreement on U.S. direction unless U.S. troops committed.

MOSCOW

1. What would be USSR and ChiCom reaction to U.S. action in Laos?

1. Embtell 1721 of 23 Jan 1961 still valid. If large scale hostilities resumed, USSR would seek keep ChiCom out of Laos by providing logistic support themselves, and rely on DRV to provide combat support to PL. However, if operations serious threat to PL, Soviets and ChiCom have analogous interests in seeking prevent Bloc loss of prestige.

Reference telegram states USSR would react, short of total war, if onus of situation could be placed on U.S.

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SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 58-62

RELATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF OPPOSING FORCES IN LAOS

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

on 11 January 1962. Concurring were The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

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RELATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF OPPOSING FORCES IN LAOS

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the relative military capabilities of the government and antigovernment forces now in Laos, assuming no change in the levels of aid and assistance that have obtained over the past several months.

THE ESTIMATE

1. Both government and antigovernment forces have increased their strength and improved their capabilities during the cease-fire.[1] The government forces, which in May were defeated, demoralized, and near collapse, have made relatively greater improvement. Their regular army strength has increased from about 39,000 in May to 51,500, and their total armed strength to over 71,000. Now they are much better trained and equipped, and they have established some self-confidence. They have extensive technical, logistical, and communications support from experienced US, Thai, and Filipino personnel. This has probably provided the government forces important advantages in supply and mobility. US encadrement of army units down to selected battalions and, in some instances to companies, provides stiffening and tactical guidance in combat. Moreover, in the Meo tribesmen the government forces now have for the first time an effective guerrilla force in the enemy's rear, an advantage previously enjoyed only by the antigovernment forces.

2. At the same time, the antigovernment forces have increased their strength from about 20,000 at the time of the cease-fire to about 34,000. This includes experienced North Vietnamese cadres who provide technical and tactical support and about 3,500 regular North Vietnamese combat troops held in readiness for the defense of key areas or for spearheading attacks on government positions. The rate of improvement of the antigovernment forces has probably been slower than that of the government forces. Training facilities available to the antigovernment forces are limited and many of the new troops, particularly those under Kong Le and Kham Ouane, are probably inadequately trained. There has been evidence of some friction between the Kong Le and Kham Ouane forces on one hand and the Pathet Lao on the other due to inequities in the distribution of supply and jealousy concerning command responsibilities in certain areas. This dissension, and lowered morale in some Kong Le units, has

[1] Estimated strengths

Government Forces		*Antigovernment Forces*	
Regular Army	51,500	Pathet Lao	19,000
Auto Defense	11,000	Kong Le	6,000
Meo Guerrillas	9,000	Kham Ouane (Phong Saly)	4,000
TOTAL	71,500	North Vietnamese cadres	1,600
		North Vietnamese combat troops	3,500
		TOTAL	34,100

contributed to the slower rate of improvement by the antigovernment forces as a whole. The antigovernment forces have received considerable additional equipment from the Bloc since the cease-fire. Most important is the recent arrival in the Plaine des Jarres area of 40–50 PT–76 light amphibious tanks, probably manned by North Vietnamese crews. We believe the most effective use of these tanks would be for the defense of the Plaine des Jarres. Outside this area their use would be limited by terrain to main roads. It is also possible that they could be used in support of operations against major lowland objectives, if a protected debouchment had previously been made.[2]

3. In the past there has been wide variation in capabilities among the units on both the government and antigovernment sides. This is still the case; each has its poor and its elite units, making difficult any overall assessment of relative capabilities. The critical weaknesses of the government forces in the past have been their lack of motivation, unstable morale, and poor leadership at all echelons of command. Recent successes in patrol activity and small-scale attacks, as well as formalized training of officers and NCOs, have increased the self-confidence of government troops and resulted in improved leadership by the commanders. However, the retrained and re-equipped government forces have not yet had a significant test, even in a localized skirmish, and their steadfastness under the strain of serious combat is still uncertain. There have been periods in the past when their morale appeared high in times of relative quiet or success, but deteriorated quickly in the face of adversity. Among the antigovernment forces, morale has not heretofore been a critical weakness. The Pathet Lao have maintained discipline and a relatively high degree of effectiveness over a number of years, in times of adversity as well as success. Their morale is probably good. Among the Kong Le and Kham Ouane forces, however, morale appears spotty and probably only a few of these units would perform well. The morale and combat capability of the North Vietnamese forces probably remain good.

4. Major factors in the present military situation are the changes which have occurred since the cease-fire in the deployment and the missions of the opposing sides. The government forces, with greatly reduced territory to control, can concentrate their strength and maintain some reserves for emergency. Their lines of communication are much shorter and, in general, reasonably dependable. The antigovernment forces, by seeking to control large and widely separated areas in Laos, have increased their logistics problems, lessened their mobility and diffused their strength. Their rear areas have poor lines of lateral communication, and some of those are under harassment by the Meo guerrillas.

5. The terrain and difficulties of conducting conventional military operations in Laos are such that it has always been relatively easy to deny control of territory to an enemy. We do not believe that either side has the capability to destroy the other or even to take over and hold key territory in the hands of the other. If either side were to initiate a concentrated offensive, it could probably make considerable initial gains at almost any point it chose to attack. How long and how well it could sustain its advance or retain control of what it occupied would depend in large part upon the extent to which, and the manner by which, the opposing force chose to challenge it.

6. On this basis, we believe that if the antigovernment forces were to concentrate an attack upon an important government stronghold (including almost any one of the major

[2] Weapons in the hands of the government forces capable of stopping the PT–76 amphibious tank are:

2.36 inch	Rocket Launcher	400
3.5 inch	Rocket Launcher	750
57 mm	Recoilless Rifle	300
75 mm	Recoilless Rifle	38
75 mm	Pack Howitzer	12
105 mm	Howitzer	25
M–24	Tank	19
	Grenade Launcher	7,800
	Antitank Mine	16,700

towns along the Mekong) they could probably succeed but could not hold it against a determined counterattack by government forces. Similarly, we believe that the government forces could make initial gains against antigovernment forces on the Tha Thom-Xieng Khouang perimeter or, with even greater effectiveness, in southern Laos. If defeated by sustained government attack, the Pathet Lao and Kong Le troops would quickly revert to guerrilla tactics of the type they have so successfully employed in the past and could continue to contest government authority over wide areas of the country. We believe that in this event the government forces could not establish firm control over presently held Communist territory, particularly in such critical areas as the Plaine des Jarres and Nhommarath-Mahaxay, and the Tchepone area.

7. In short, we believe that the government forces would have a slight edge if fighting were resumed on a pattern comparable to that prior to the cease-fire but intensified as a consequence of the strengthening of both sides over the past several months. This edge would be increased during ensuing months if the conditions of relative quiet which have prevailed during the cease-fire continue and if recent rates of improvement in the two sides are continued. We continue to estimate that the antigovernment forces have the greater capability for guerrilla warfare. We also believe that if the antigovernment position should be endangered or if the areas considered critical by the Communists were threatened by the government forces, the antigovernment forces would be quickly and effectively reinforced from North Vietnam to the degree necessary to protect the threatened area.

~~SECRET~~

Based on MAG. chief telegram report
based on two documents.

second - is conclusive:
CIA chief of station

this revision is based upon
performance in the field (victim spot)
dulled enthusiasm of Washington, D.C.

~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

FILE

COUNTRY [redacted] SOUTH VIETNAM

SUBJECT APPEAL TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE REBEL OFFICERS IN PHNOM PENH

REPORT NO. [redacted]

DATE DISTR. 24 JANUARY 1962

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE(C)

DATE OF INFO. 20 JANUARY 1962

REFERENCES IN-15274

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

PLACE & DATE ACQ. [redacted] (20 JANUARY 1962)

APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

1. ON 20 JANUARY 1962 MAJOR PHAM VAN LIEU, FORMER COMMANDER OF THE SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) MARINE CORPS AND MEMBER OF A GROUP OF SVN REBEL OFFICERS IN PROTECTIVE CUSTORY BY THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT, PRESENTED A PROPOSAL FROM HIS GROUP TO THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN PHNOM PENH ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY WITH A COVER LETTER TO AMBASSADOR TRIMBLE. THIS PROPOSAL SIGNED BY THEIR LEADER COLONEL NGUYEN CHANH THAI AND OTHER OFFICERS IN THE GROUP, CONTAINED A LIST OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE DIEM GOVERNMENT'S CORRUPT AND INEFFICIENT METHODS OF OPPOSING THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC). IT SUGGESTED THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY REAPPRAISE THE US POLICY TOWARD THE DIEM GOVERNMENT AND UNSEAT AND REPLACE IT WITH A GOVERNMENT TRULY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SVN PEOPLE. THE PROPOSAL WAS PRESENTED IN TWO COPIES, EACH ONE HAVING ONE ENGLISH, FRENCH AND A VIETNAMESE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	AID	DIA

(EXO)

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DOCUMENT #_18X

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: AUG 2008

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

LANGUAGE VERSION.

2. MAJOR LIEU TOLD AN EMBASSY OFFICER THAT "COMPETENT CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES" WERE PLANNING TO RELEASE HIS GROUP FROM CUSTODY BY THE END OF JANUARY. HE SAID PRINCE SIHANOUK HAD APPROVED, AND THAT A CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT SECURITY SERVICE WAS OBTAINING DOCUMENTATION FOR THE GROUP. WHEN ASKED WHAT THEIR PLANS WERE AFTER THEY WERE RELEASED, MAJOR LIEU SAID THAT THEY WERE STILL HOPING FOR ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES AND WOULD AT LEAST LIKE TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH US EMBASSY OFFICERS.

3. SINCE NOTHING COULD BE DONE TO REMEDY THE SITUATION IN SVN UNTIL DIEM WAS ELIMINATED, THEY WOULD FIGHT DIEM FIRST AND THE VC SECOND.

4. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT. SEE [redacted] AND [redacted] IN WHICH MAJOR LIEU SAID THAT HIS GROUP WAS CONSIDERING JOINING THE SOUTH VIETNAM LIBERATION ORGANIZATION.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, CINCPAC, PACFLT, ARPAC, PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

1

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In) CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS [redacted]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT COMMENTS OF [redacted] THE DESIRABILITY, PROBLEMS AND CONSEQUENCES OF A COUP D'ETAT

DATE DISTR. 28 JANUARY 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

REFERENCES IN 18150

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

APPRAISAL [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

This is UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. [redacted] CERTAIN GENERAL OFFICERS HAVE CONSULTED [redacted] ON THE POSSIBILITY OF ATTEMPTING A COUP D'ETAT. [redacted] SUCH A COUP WOULD BE TO PREVENT THE COUNTRY FROM FALLING INTO THE HANDS OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC).

2. [redacted] AGREEMENT WITH THESE GENERALS IN PRINCIPLE ON THE NECESSITY FOR A COUP D'ETAT, BUT WAS WORRIED BOTH ABOUT THE METHOD TO BE EMPLOYED AND THE CONSEQUENCES. [redacted] CERTAIN POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS WISHED TO [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS [redacted]

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	OER	OO	DIA	EXO
VTF														410	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

(1) / [redacted] (15)

A COUP WITH THE SUPPORT OF MILITARY ELEMENTS. HOWEVER, THESE GROUPS WERE TOO DIVIDED TO BE SUCCESSFUL. [redacted] THE ONLY SUCCESSFUL COUP WOULD BE ONE MOUNTED BY THE ARMY ITSELF. [redacted]

3. SPEAKING IN GENERAL TERMS, [redacted] SETTING UP SUCH A COUP TWO THINGS WERE IMPORTANT: TO AVOID BLOODSHED, AND TO ORGANIZE AS SMALL A FORCE AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER NOT TO ALLOW THE PLAN OF ACTION TO BE EXPLOITED BY THE VC. [redacted] THE GENERAL OFFICERS DECLARE THE WHOLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM TO BE IN A STATE OF SEIGE. THE TROOPS WOULD THEN BE FORBIDDEN TO MOVE WITHOUT AN EXPRESS ORDER FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE AND ALL ROADS LEADING TO SAIGON WOULD BE GUARDED.

4. IN CASE THE COUP WERE SUCCESSFUL, A REVOLUTINARY COMMITTEE OF THREE GENERAL OFFICERS WOULD DIRECT EVERYDAY GOVERNMENT BUSINESS WITH THE HELP OF TECHNICAL ADVISORS AND OF ALL THE SECRETARIES OF STATE, WHO WOULD HAVE REMAINED AT THEIR POSTS. DURING THIS PERIOD THE PEOPLE WOULD BE ABLE TO CHOOSE THE HEAD OF THE STATE.

[redacted]

6. [redacted] DISEM. STATE MAAG USOM CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

EXEMPT NLK-81-213

46 89

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT COMMENTS OF [redacted] THE DESIRABILITY, PROBLEMS AND CONSEQUENCES OF A COUP D'ETAT

DATE DISTR. 28 JANUARY 1962

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 18750

— [redacted]
— TAYLOR
— KAYSEN
— [redacted]
— JOHNSON
— [redacted]

RETAIN OR DESTROY

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

APPRAISAL [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

— GARDNER
— DUNCAN

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

— 1. [redacted] CERTAIN GENERAL OFFICERS HAVE CONSULTED ON THE POSSIBILITY OF ATTEMPTING A COUP D'ETAT. (FIELD COMMENT. [redacted] SUCH A COUP WOULD BE TO PREVENT THE COUNTRY FROM FALLING INTO THE HANDS OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC).

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

2. [redacted] AGREEMENT WITH THESE GENERALS IN PRINCIPLE ON THE NECESSITY FOR A COUP D'ETAT, BUT WAS WORRIED BOTH ABOUT THE METHOD TO BE EMPLOYED AND THE CONSEQUENCES. [redacted] CERTAIN POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS WISHED TO MOUNT

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	DIA	EXO

VTF AID

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

A COUP WITH THE SUPPORT OF MILITARY ELEMENTS. HOWEVER, THESE GROUPS WERE TOO DIVIDED TO BE SUCCESSFUL. [redacted] THE ONLY SUCCESSFUL COUP WOULD BE ONE MOUNTED BY THE ARMY ITSELF.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

3. SPEAKING IN GENERAL TERMS, [redacted] SETTING UP SUCH A COUP TWO THINGS WERE IMPORTANT: TO AVOID BLOODSHED, AND TO ORGANIZE AS SMALL A FORCE AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER NOT TO ALLOW THE PLAN OF ACTION TO BE EXPLOITED BY THE VC. [redacted] THE GENERAL OFFICERS DECLARE THE WHOLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM TO BE IN A STATE OF SEIGE. THE TROOPS WOULD THEN BE FORBIDDEN TO MOVE WITHOUT AN EXPRESS ORDER FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE AND ALL ROADS LEADING TO SAIGON WOULD BE GUARDED.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

4. IN CASE THE COUP WERE SUCCESSFUL, A REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE OF THREE GENERAL OFFICERS WOULD DIRECT EVERYDAY GOVERNMENT BUSINESS WITH THE HELP OF TECHNICAL ADVISORS AND OF ALL THE SECRETARIES OF STATE, WHO WOULD HAVE REMAINED AT THEIR POSTS. DURING THIS PERIOD THE PEOPLE WOULD BE ABLE TO CHOOSE THE HEAD OF THE STATE.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

5. [redacted]

6. FIELD DISEM. STATE MAAG USOM CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

END OF MESSAGE

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Document # 37

SECRET

SNIE 58/1-62
31 January 1962

3
(4)

SPECIAL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Number 58/1-62

(This estimate supplements and in some respects supersedes SNIE 58-62.)

Relative Military Capabilities of Opposing Forces in Laos

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
31 JANUARY 1962

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JAN 2001

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurring:

Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF
Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff
Director of the National Security Agency

Abstaining:

The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

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RELATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF OPPOSING FORCES IN LAOS

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the relative military capabilities of the government and antigovernment forces now in Laos.

THE ESTIMATE

1. In SNIE 58–62[1] we described substantial improvements in training, equipment, morale, and deployment of the Royal Laotian Army (FAR), which had occurred since the cease-fire in May. We estimated that the government forces would probably have a slight edge if fighting were resumed on a pattern comparable to that prior to the cease-fire. We also pointed out that lack of motivation, unstable morale, and poor leadership had been in the past critical weaknesses of the government forces, and that their steadfastness under fire was still uncertain despite the training and new equipment they had received. We also stated our belief that the antigovernment forces would be quickly and effectively reinforced from North Vietnam to the degree necessary to protect any important antigovernment position threatened by the government forces.

2. In recent weeks units of the FAR have had several military clashes with antigovernment forces and have been

[1] SNIE 58–62, "Relative Military Capabilities of Opposing Forces in Laos," dated 11 January 1962.

forced to withdraw each time: (a) between 7 and 10 January, FAR units of Mobile Group 11 on sweeping operations in the Nam Beng Valley region southwest of the antigovernment stronghold and supply depot of Moung Sai were hit and dispersed by enemy forces; (b) on 18 January, after a series of air strikes and of probing and sweeping operations in the Nhommarath-Mahaxay area, some 70 kilometers north and east of Thakhek, government forces mounted an attack on Mahaxay. The antigovernment forces in the region counterattacked and, in the ensuing action, the 8th Infantry Battalion of Mobile Group 14 was dispersed (though later reorganized about 10 miles to the rear) and the 24th Infantry Battalion of Mobile Group 12 withdrew under enemy pressure; (c) on 22 January, government forces attacking at Ban Nam Mo—35 kilometers east of Nam Tha in northern Luang Prabang Province—were repulsed and over the following week driven back to Nam Tha. General Phoumi has airlifted a battalion of troops from Paksane to reinforce his two battalions at Nam Tha, but the position of the government forces there is still seriously threatened. Although the evidence as to the numbers involved is inconclusive, North Vietnamese cadres and combat troops supplemented the Pathet Lao/Kong Le forces, and it is likely that they played an important part in the recent operations.

3. We now estimate that there are about 9,000 North Vietnamese troops in Laos (6,000 combat; 3,000 cadre and support) as compared with about 5,000 estimated in SNIE 58–62. Two battalions of North Vietnamese (as many as 1,000 men) may have entered Laos in recent weeks; the balance is attributable to a reassessment of indications previously available, and to new evidence. Our estimates of the numbers of North Vietnamese in Laos are highly tenuous because of the various possible interpretations of the available evidence. Moreover, the numbers may change quickly; the North Vietnamese are well organized and prepared to move units easily to and fro across the Laotian-North Vietnamese border.

4. The performance of FAR units in recent skirmishes was not as unsatisfactory as it generally was immediately before the cease-fire. It is clear, however, that problems of morale and leadership are still critical. We now believe it was too optimistic to estimate in SNIE 58–62 "that the government forces would have a slight edge if fighting were resumed on a pattern comparable to that prior to the cease-fire but intensified as a consequence of the strengthening of both sides over the past several months." In particular, we believe that the FAR is unable to deal with any substantial number of North Vietnamese forces, whom they greatly fear. The Communists are able to bring these forces into play where they wish or need to do so.

5. Although outnumbered by the Lao armed forces, the antigovernment forces now in Laos have a superiority in artillery and armor. They are generally capable of maintaining their main forward positions and of conducting local operations to counter aggressive actions by the government forces. Without further external reinforcements, they could, by concentrating their forces, seize and hold certain key positions now held by government troops. If reinforced by additional combat units from North Vietnam, they could quickly overrun the remainder of Laos.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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d. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), for the Department of the Navy
e. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
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Atomic Energy Commission
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NLK 01-203-5-3

~~TOP SECRET~~

(3

1 February 1962

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2001

STATUS REPORT
ON
COVERT ACTIONS IN VIETNAM
(Keyed to 8 December Report)

1. a. Montagnard (Highlander) Program:

Three hundred fifty trained Vietnamese in Thua Thien Province have been armed and are carrying out a program to identify Vietnamese Communist shadow village governments. Personnel are being divided into small teams which will live, work, and assist peasants. This program was begun in early December 1961 and the technique has proven to be an effective one.

b. Rural Reconstruction Operations:

No significant change.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

c. [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

Two newly formed Clandestine Action Service (CLAS) units of approximately 130 men have begun training.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

Copy 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

d. Central Intelligence Organization:

The first class of 40 officers who will form a basic cadre for the CIO returned from three months off-shore intelligence training. On-the-job training will be conducted in Saigon as the trainees are assigned specific jobs with the CIO.

e. through i.: No significant change.

2. through 5.: No significant change.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958
3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

6. [redacted]

7. Other Activities:

Arms have arrived for approximately 1500 of the programmed 3500 trained youth (Force Populaire) for nine provinces of Central Vietnam. Additional training is being given to the trained youth prior to dividing them into teams which will train small irregular defense forces in specific localities.

Two hundred Rhade irregulars are in training in Buon Enao near Ban Me Thuot. Fifteen 10-man action teams are ready to begin operations.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

A high level VC self-analysis of VC revolutionary effort obtained from captured document, which is a bulky document being pouched to CAS Headquarters.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

Copy 1

NLK 01-203-6-2

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2001

8 February 1962

STATUS REPORT
ON
COVERT ACTIONS IN VIETNAM
(Keyed to 28 November Report)

1. a through b: No significant change.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

c. Para-Military/Intelligence Operations Against Viet Cong [redacted]

The initial shipment of arms and support material has been delivered [redacted] Additional material has arrived in Saigon and will be sent to his area on the first available transport.

d through i: No significant change.

2 through 6: No significant change.

7. Other Activities:

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Pursuant to a presidential directive to the minister of civic action, Ngo Trong Hieu, ten civic action teams (ten men per team) [redacted] are operating in the new southwest province of Chuong Thien. Additional assistance for operations in this province is being obtained.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted] a meeting of the National Internal Security Council, 27 January 1962, which concerned the necessity of establishing over-all coordination of the strategic hamlets programs and that review of this program be given priority over all other programs.

[redacted] Ngo Dinh Nhu's policy statements regarding the creation of strategic hamlets [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

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#89 2

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT STRATEGIC HAMLETS (to combat communist influence)

DATE DISTR. 20 FEBRUARY 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

FIELD NO. [redacted] IN 30145

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

APPRAISAL [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. [redacted] THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' PROGRAM WOULD BE MORE THAN A METHOD OF AFFORDING DEFENSE FOR THE POPULATION OF VIETNAM, IT WOULD BE A BASIC STRATEGY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF VIETNAM. [redacted] A COMMON COMPLAINT IN VIETNAM WAS THE WEAKNESS OF ITS CADRES, WHO FAILED TO TURN THE GOVERNMENT'S REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM INTO REALITY. [redacted] THE COMPLAINT WAS ONLY PARTIALLY TRUE, AS THE OTHER ASPECT HAD BEEN THE INABILITY OF THE CADRE TO OPERATE IN THE CONDITION OF INSECURITY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO SO ORGANIZE THE SITUATION THAT THE CADRE COULD BE PLACED IN THE AREA OF HIS WORK AND AFFORDED THE NECESSARY PROTECTION AND FACILITIES FOR THE WORK. THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' PROGRAM WOULD PROVIDE BOTH OF THESE.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	[redacted]

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

(2)

[redacted] JAN 1998

(16)

2. THE PROGRAM [redacted] HAD THREE MAIN ELEMENTS WHICH WOULD MAKE IT PARTICULARLY APPROPRIATE FOR VIETNAM.

A. IT WAS FIRST OF ALL TRADITIONAL, RESTING UPON THE BASIC UNIT OF VIETNAMESE SOCIETY. THUS IT CAPITALIZED UPON THE INGRAINED HABITS OF THE POPULATION.

B. THE SECOND ASPECT WAS THAT IT WOULD AFFORD THE MEANS TO MODERNIZE VIETNAMESE LIFE. [redacted] IT WAS LESS A PROBLEM OF RAISING THE STANDARD OF LIVING THAN OF CHANGING THE MODE OF LIVING. [redacted] IF ATTENTION WAS GIVEN TO INSERTING NEW MODES OF LIFE INTO THE ORDINARY PEASANT'S EXISTENCE, IT WOULD INEVITABLY BRING SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN HIS ORIENTATION. [redacted] COMPARED THE RESULT OF THE INSERTION OF SMALL AUTOMOBILES, WASHING MACHINES, ETC., INTO THE LIFE OF THE EUROPEAN WORKING CLASS WHICH HE CLAIMED HAD DISRUPTED COMMUNIST INFLUENCE OVER THIS CLASS. AS A RESULT [redacted] MOST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES OPPOSED MODERNIZATION. [redacted] THE ASIAN COMMUNIST PARTIES WERE LESS INTELLIGENT IN THEIR APPROACH, AS THEY ADVOCATED MODERNIZATION OF ASIAN LIFE WITHOUT REALIZING THAT IT WOULD INEVITABLY REDUCE THEIR OWN ORGANIZATIONAL POWER. [redacted] A STUDY OF STEPS APPROPRIATE FOR VIETNAM ALONG THIS LINE SHOULD BE MADE AND A CONSCIOUS EFFORT DEVOTED TO INSERTING THESE NEW MODES OF LIFE INTO VIETNAM. AS AN EXAMPLE [redacted] THE EFFECT OF DISTRIBUTING BICYCLES WITH MICROMOTORS, THUS MAKING THE PEASANT MOBILE AND CHANGING HIS MODE OF LIFE. THE STRATEGIC HAMLET [redacted] WOULD AFFORD THE NECESSARY PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC BASE FOR SUCH A MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

C. THE THIRD ELEMENT, [redacted] WOULD BE DEMOCRATIZATION. [redacted] DEFINED IT AS THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND ORDER TO RURAL LIFE. [redacted] AT PRESENT THE PEASANTS WERE EXPOSED TO ILLEGALITY BY THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS AND BY GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) ELEMENTS, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVIL. THIS WAS IN PART A RESULT OF THE DISPERSION OF THE POPULATION AND ITS INABILITY TO ASSUME ITS OWN GOVERNANCE. AS AN INDUCEMENT TO FORM A STRATEGIC HAMLET [redacted] THE POPULATION SHOULD BE ASSURED THAT THE HAMLET WOULD BE GUARANTEED THE FULL APPLICATION OF LAW BY ITS OWN AUTHORITIES, THUS MOVING IT TOWARD A SYSTEM OF DEMOCRATIZATION APPROPRIATE TO THE COMMUNITY. HOWEVER, IT WOULD HAVE LITTLE OR NOTHING TO DO WITH CHANGES OF THE GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON. [redacted] ONE COULD CHANGE THE GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON 35 TIMES WITH NO EFFECT UPON THE REAL SITUATION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, BUT THAT THE APPLICATION OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' SYSTEM WOULD DEFINITELY AFFECT THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE COUNTRYSIDE IN A WAY WHICH TOUCHED THE POPULATION ITSELF. THE STRATEGIC HAMLET WOULD ALSO, [redacted] AFFORD A BASIS FOR THE BUILDING OF INSTITUTIONS IN VIETNAM TO GIVE ADDITIONAL STABILITY, E.G., COOPERATIVES, MEDICAL SERVICES, EDUCATION, WOMENS' MOVEMENTS, YOUTH MOVEMENTS, ETC.

3. [redacted] THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' [redacted] AND HAD MADE ONE VERY STRONG ADDITIONAL POINT TO THEM. [redacted]

[redacted] THAT THERE WAS MUCH DISCONTENT AMONG THE VARIOUS LEVELS OF THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH, [redacted] STEMMED FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO THE JOB. ANY LOCAL OFFICIAL WHO FACED A PROBLEM MADE A REQUEST TO HIS NEXT HIGHER AUTHORITY FOR ASSISTANCE AND WAS DISCONTENTED IF THE ASSISTANCE WAS INADEQUATE. THE NEXT LEVEL REQUESTED THE CHIEF OF PROVINCE, WHO REQUESTED ASSISTANCE FROM THE MINISTRY, AND HAD THE SAME REACTION. THE MINISTER MADE THE REQUEST OF THE PRESIDENT AND WAS DISCONTENTED AT INADEQUATE SUPPORT. THEORETICALLY, THE PRESIDENT SHOULD MAKE REQUESTS OF THE AMERICANS AND BE DISCONTENTED WITH THE AMERICANS FOR LACK OF ADEQUATE SUPPORT. [redacted] THE ENTIRE PROCESS WAS INFANTILE, AND A CHILDISH WAY OF DEPENDENCE UPON A SUPERIOR TO SOLVE ONE'S PROBLEMS. [redacted] IT WAS NECESSARY TO DEVELOP A MATURITY IN THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE SO THAT THEY WOULD TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOLVING THEIR OWN PRORLEMS, UTILIZING SUCH ASSISTANCE AS WAS GIVEN THEM, BUT NOT ATTEMPTING TO SHIFT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. [redacted] THE STRATEGIC HAMLET WAS THE WAY TO INTRODUCE THE PROCESS OF BEGINNING MATURITY TO THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND THE GOVERNMENT. [redacted] THE OFFICIALS WERE MUCH AMUSED AT THE DESCRIPTION OF THE DISCONTENT AND FOUND MUCH VALIDITY IN HIS STATEMENT OF HOW TO OVERCOME IT. [redacted] IT WAS NECESSARY TO KEEP REPEATING THE LESSON, AS OTHERWISE THE OLD HABITS OF DEPENDENCE UPON POWERS ABOVE WOULD RETURN AND THE WHOLE VICIOUS CYCLE OF DISCONTENT WOULD START AGAIN.

4. [redacted] THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' PROGRAM BE CONDUCTED UNDER THE FULL CONTROL OF THE NEW INTERMINISTERIAL COMMISSION. [redacted] THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT WISH A REPETITION OF THE ERRORS MADE IN THE INITIATION OF THE AGROVILLE PROGRAM. [redacted] THE NECESSITY OF EXPLAINING TO THE POPULATION WHAT IT WAS BEING ASKED TO DO AND OF FOLLOWING VERY STRICT RULES, FOR INSTANCE, THAT THE POPULATION BE ASKED TO ASSIST ONLY IN ITS OWN LOCALITY AND NOT BE REQUIRED TO WORK ON DISTANT AREAS. [redacted] THE PROVINCE CHIEFS WERE INSTRUCTED NOT TO LAUNCH OFF IN ALL DIRECTIONS, CREATING STRATEGIC HAMLETS ACCORDING TO THEIR OWN IDEAS, BUT TO FOLLOW THE PROGRAM AND PATTERN TO BE ESTABLISHED BY THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' COMMITTEE.

5. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR MAAG AID CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

NLK 01-203-8-3

1998

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2001

1 March 1962

STATUS REPORT
ON
COVERT ACTIONS IN VIETNAM
(Keyed to 28 November Report)

1. a. Montagnard (Highlander) Program:

Hand tools and medicines have been obtained and transportation arranged to deliver them to highlander tribes in Kontum Province under a joint USIS/CAS project.

b. Rural Reconstruction Operations:

No significant change.

c. Para-Military/Intelligence Operations Against Viet Cong [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

d. through i.: No significant change.

2. through 6.: No significant change.

7. Other Activities:

Several VC attacks have been carried out against 12 fortified Rhade villages near Ban Me Thuot. Trained Rhade from the training center pursued the VC and prepared an ambush in which one armed VC was caught and killed. Following the attacks friendly patrols from the Rhade training center visited each village, gave assistance, and helped to repair damage. As a result of the VC attacks and the support furnished by the Rhade training center, additional Rhade volunteers have approached the training center seeking arms and training.

[redacted]
Copy 1

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

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E0 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted] This delegate played a part in preventing domination of the conference by pro-leftist elements.

E0 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted] the GVN is assembling a mission to Noumea, New Caledonia, to investigate the repatriation of Vietnamese. The mission will include representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Civic Action, Interior, and SKPES (Presidential Security Service). [redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
E0 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(S)

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]
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NLK01-203-9-3

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2001

7 March 1962

STATUS REPORT
ON
COVERT ACTIONS IN VIETNAM
(Keyed to 28 November Report)

1. a. Montagnard (Highlander) Program:

Helicopter pads and landing zones have been completed at the highlander strategic hamlet of Buon Enao Village in Darlac Province.

Thirty (30) more highlander villages have furnished tribesmen for inclusion in the defense training program.

b. Rural Reconstruction Operations:

No significant change.

c. Para-Military/Intelligence Operations Against Viet Cong [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs (C)

[redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs (C)

[redacted]

d. Central Intelligence Organization:

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (S)

[redacted] CIO/NPSS regional survey teams have begun working at Hue, Nha Trang, and Bien Hoa. The survey teams are conducting inspections of NPSS provincial units with the purpose of improving current overt intelligence collection.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

[redacted]

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(3)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

e. [redacted] National Police and Security Service (NPSS):

The first training course in clandestine operations began on 5 March 1962 for 75 selected Domestic Intelligence Service candidates.

f. through i.: No significant change.

2. through 6.: No significant change.

7. Other Activities:

Thirty-nine (39) Vietnamese Army cadet officers have completed an 11-week airborne/ranger operation training course at Da Nang.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

Two hundred (200) civic action cadres graduated from the Da Nang training center on 28 February 1962 and were supplied with arms and ammunition [redacted] The cadres were immediately assigned duties in the delta area.

Catholic youth groups in six parishes in the delta provinces of Ba Xuyen and Phong Dinh have been provided with rifles, carbines, and sub-machine guns.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

[redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

[redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

Copy [redacted]

NLK 01-203-10-3

(2a)

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2001

14 March 1962

STATUS REPORT ON COVERT ACTIONS IN VIETNAM (Keyed to 28 November Report)

1. a. Montagnard (Highlander) Program:

174 Rhade highlanders completed training at Buon Enao in Darlac Province and returned to the villages. Three VC surrendered and are being interrogated. Training was initiated at Buon Enao for neighboring villagers. Each villager will be trained for four days. Seventy-Six men trained and dispatched to their home village; 60 additional men are in training. In Truong Hoa, 10 cadre previously trained under supervision of U.S. personnel, begain training 20 to 30 Vietnamese personnel selected from each village in the neighborhood.

A highlander intelligence net provided information which led to two Vietnamese Army operations in the first and second corps area. The results of both operations were highly pleasing to the corps commanders. CAS Saigon is being requested to furnish additional details on these operations.

b. No significant change.

c. Para-Military/Intelligence Operations Against Viet Cong [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

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Pa

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

d. Central Intelligence Organization:

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

[redacted] survey teams have completed operational surveys of five provincial National Police and Security Service (NPSS) units.

e. and f. No significant change.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

g. [redacted] Political and Psychological Warfare Operations Against the DRV.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Vietnamese Army psychological warfare directorate resumed daily broadcasts of black radio programs with new electric generator [redacted] after interruption of several months. General theme, directed at South Vietnam, is that it expresses true voice of National Front of Liberation of South Vietnam, countering recently established (1 February) Liberation Front radio which aims at sowing confusion among those seeking unification.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

Copy /

h. and i. No significant change.

2. through 6. No significant change.

7. Other Activities:

Additional rifles, carbines, and radios have been provided to [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

A draft of a booklet outlining the strategic hamlet program was reviewed by CAS at request of a Presidential Security Service (SEPES) political action officer prior to its being presented to Ngo Dinh Nhu. CAS officers who reviewed the booklet commented on its contents to the Presidential Security Service political officer. Reports made regarding reactions to Madame Nhu's speech and further investigations into the palace bombing.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

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(3)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2001

21 March 1962

STATUS REPORT
ON
COVERT ACTIONS IN VIETNAM
(Keyed to 28 November Report)

1. a. Montagnard (Highlander) Program:

Two additional decentralized defense areas have been established in Ban Me Thuot.

b. No significant change.

c. Para-Military/Intelligence Operations Against Viet Cong [redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
E0 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C) [redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
E0 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C) [redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
E0 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C) [redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
E0 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C) [redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C) [redacted]

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958
3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958
3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

Another Clandestine Action company (approximately 130 men) have completed airborne training.

d. Central Intelligence Organization:

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

[redacted] provincial survey teams have surveyed five more provincial NPSS headquarter areas.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

[redacted]

e. through i.: No significant change.

2. through 6.: No significant change.

7. Other Activities:

The Catholic youth in Ba Xieng successfully fought off several VC attacks. The youth were assisted by VNAF air strikes which were requested

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

(3)

by Vietnamese Special Forces teams operating in the area.

Arms and ammunition have been delivered to the villages of Rach Trang and Phan Rang.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Sixty-one (61) men from the Phan Rang area have begun a four-week training program. The men were sent to the training area by [redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Civic Action teams, [redacted] were transferred to Chuon Thien Province to organize strategic hamlets.

A CAS unilateral asset reported that the Director General of Information has been assigned the responsibility for training clandestine intelligence and political action teams using village youth.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2001

28 March 1962

STATUS REPORT
ON
COVERT ACTIONS IN VIETNAM
(Keyed to 28 November Report)

1. a. through b.: No significant change.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

c. Para-Military/Intelligence Operations Against Viet Cong [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

Enemy elements set off the mines a short time later killing and wounding an unknown number of their own personnel. The CLAS unit sent a platoon into the mined target area, which platoon later returned safely to the CLAS base area. (Details of the mining of the main trail are not yet available.)

d. Central Intelligence Organization:

Four Central Intelligence Organization officers have been assigned for training and on-the-job exercises in prisoner interrogation at the national level.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

Two additional provincial MPSS headquarter areas have been surveyed by the [redacted] surveying team. A total of 12 provincial headquarters have been surveyed to date.

e. through i.: No significant change.

2. through 6.: No significant change.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

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7. Other Activities:

The Catholic youth in Sa Keo, Ba Xuyen Province, carried out the following activities:

a. 14 March, killed four and captured one Viet Cong;

b. 19 March, killed five Viet Cong; and

c. 23 March, killed eight Viet Cong.

One department leader and one radio operator were included in the above Viet Cong killed, and various documents were also captured.

United States Air Force C-123 and U.S. Army H-21 helicopters delivered 100 M-1 rifles, 198 carbines, 1000 M-3-6 grenades, 56 tear-gas grenades, and 140 steel helmets to Father Hoa's Binh Hung village. Fifty (50) 9mm pistols, 300 Thompson SMG's and two swamp boats were delivered to Camau for early transshipment to Binh Hung village.

The Government of Vietnam has appointed a new Chief of the Directorate of Social Action in the mountain areas. This appointment will cause a short interruption in current programs and proposed expansion until the new chief is briefed on the activities to be carried out in these areas.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted] (This committee was established because of the confusion generated by press releases from different government departments relating to the palace bombing of 27 February 1962.)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2001

3 April 1962

STATUS REPORT
ON
COVERT ACTIONS IN VIETNAM
(Keyed to 28 November Report)

1. a. Montagnard (Highlander) Program:

A montagnard (highlander) communist deserter surrendered to pro-GVN highlanders at the training camp in Buon Enao village, Darlac Province. After interrogation the deserter was allowed to return to his parent unit, totaling 40 men, with a note which promised good treatment if the rest of the unit surrendered.

b. No significant change.

c. Para-Military/Intelligence Operations Against Viet Cong [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958
3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958
3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

d. Central Intelligence Organization (CIO):

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

A team of three CIO interrogators began the interrogation of several Vietnamese Communist (VC) defectors and cadre who had been captured in Vinh Binh Province, [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

Copy 1 of 14

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e. through i.: No significant change.

2. through 4.: No significant change.

5. Provincial Survey:

Seven additional joint surveys of provincial NPSS offices were completed, bringing the total surveyed to 19.

6. No significant change.

7. Other Activities:

Two hundred (200) civic action paramilitary trainees at the Danang camp underwent field exercises in the mountain area west and south of Danang.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

[redacted] had commented privately that most VNAF pilots had expected public animosity after the 27 February bombing attack on the palace and instead were surprised at the numerous comments regarding skill of the pilots. As a result, morale has gone up again but the officer feared many VNAF personnel were still hostile to the regime. (CS-3/507,039)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

[redacted] described three separate factions of senior civilian and military officials who, fearing a power vacuum in the event of President Diem's death, were determined to seize power in that event [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

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NLK01-203-14-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2001

18 April 1962

STATUS REPORT
ON
COVERT ACTIONS IN VIETNAM
(Keyed to 28 November Report)

1. a. Montagnard (Highlander) Program:

According to reports received by the Vietnamese Army tactical area commander, the VC in Darlac Province are disturbed over progress being made in the highlander village defense program and its eventual reduction of their operational freedom. The VC have decided on two countering measures: to overrun the villages by force, or convert the villagers to their side after they have been trained and armed.

A program to recruit a company of highland trail watchers in Quang Tri Province was initiated, and CVN authorities agreed to use the graduating class of the highlander school of the social action directorate at Hue for use as civic action cadre in conjunction with this trail watcher program.

b. Rural Reconstruction Operations:

On 13 April the second five-week civic action ministry paramilitary training course at Danang Training Base graduated 100 civic action cadres and 100 youth leaders. Most of the civic action group were then assigned to Binh Duong Province for duties with operation SUNRISE.

c. Para-Military/Intelligence Operations Against Viet Cong [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958
3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

In a field training exercise at An Chau near the Danang Training Camp, U.S. Special Forces training teams operating with some local republican youth trainees lost two men killed and two captured by a company of approximately 130 VC regulars on 8 April. The four Special Forces personnel had been assigned by MAAG to CAS to conduct these and other similar training exercises.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

(3)

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
E0 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
E0 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
E0 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
E0 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
E0 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

d. Central Intelligence Organization (CIO):

E0 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted] on 23 March President Diem signed a decree directing all ministries and other components of the GVN to channel all information usable in intelligence to the Vietnamese CIO. [redacted] President Diem ordered the CIO section responsible for centralized document study and exploitation to furnish documents needed in GVN psychological programs to the Directorate General of Information (DGI) and the Directorate of Army Psychological Warfare.

e. Joint Penetration Operations with National Police and Security Services (NPSS):

An additional 900 NPSS personnel completed psychological testing in five centers throughout the country during the past week. The tests were designed to provide better selection and placement of NPSS and DIS personnel.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Tradecraft seminars were begun for case officers of the NPSS Special Division which will concentrate on establishment and improvement of joint operations against local VC elements.

f. through i.: No significant change.

2. through 4.: No significant change.

5. Provincial Survey:

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

Four additional surveys of provincial units of the National Police and Security Service (NPSS) were completed by [redacted] CIO teams: two in the southwest, one in the south central area, and one in the highlands.

6. Use of Chinese Nationalist Personnel:

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

[redacted]

7. Other Activities:

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

Some 16,000 pounds of ammunition airdropped to [redacted] at Binh Hung on 4 and 7 April. In addition, [redacted] received map support from ARVN to equip with rifles an additional six full civil guard companies, approximating 800 men.

On 23 March, the plans service of the Directorate of Information was ordered to formulate plans for covert action to improve the public image of President Diem and the Nhus, and to popularize the women's paramilitary forces in the strategic hamlet forces.

Plans were drawn up for a joint attack by 77th Group (Vietnamese Special Forces) and civil guard against a VC training camp in the Thanh Tri area of Ba Xuyen. The VC Phu Loi Battalion, augmented by 676 men, has been operating into Sakeo from that area. Additional weapons were dropped to Catholic youth groups there and in other points in the delta where the 77th Group continues to train the groups.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

An additional 7,500 pounds of miscellaneous gear were airdropped to [redacted] on 14 April by C-46's, and USAF C-123's also airdropped five tons of rice and 1500 pair of shoes.

[redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted] Son Ngoc Thanh, Cambodian dissident leader, was being provided limited material and training assistance by Tran Quoc Buu, head of the CVTC Labor Federation. The aid was limited to Vietnam, however, and primarily designed, With Ngo Dinh Nhu's approval, merely to keep Thanh on a string in case the political situation in Cambodia were to deteriorate.

NLK 01-203-15-2

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2001

2 May 1962

STATUS REPORT
ON
COVERT ACTIONS IN VIETNAM
(Keyed to 2 May Report)

1. a. Montagnard (Highlander) Program:

On 24-25 April several of the fortified hamlets built by the Rhade ethnic tribesmen in the Buon Enao area of Darlac Province were again attacked by Vietnamese communists (VC) under the leadership of a NVN captain who was in uniform. Vietnamese National Army reinforcements helped the fortified village repulse the attack.

On 28 April approximately 3,000 Rhade from north of Buon Ho, which is in the 38 hamlet Rhade defense complex, came to Buon Enao seeking refuge from the Viet Cong and volunteered for resettlement and training against the Viet Cong.

An additional 330 Montagnard (Highlander) Commandos were recruited to be trained as commando teams in six of the CVN provinces; the provinces of Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa and Tuyen Duc were included.

b. Rural Reconstruction Operations:

200 additional civic action ministry cadres arrived at the Thu Duc training center (near Saigon) for a weapons familiarization course

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

c. Para-Military/Intelligence Operations Against Viet Cong [redacted]

At the Danang training center near Tourane, 350 members of the force populaire, an organization of the elite youth of CVN, also began a weapons familiarization course.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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(C)

[redacted] American special force team departed for Soc Trang, near the mouth of the Bassac River, to open another civilian irregular defense training group there on 21 May.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
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Contact was made with the enemy of approximately one company strength on 29 April, and an additional skirmish occurred on 30 April at YD [redacted] No casualities were reported.

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(C)

[redacted]

D. Joint Penetration Operations with National Police and Security Services (NPSS):

The first course for 73 Domestic Intelligence Service officers (DIS) was graduated the last week of April and further on-the-job training is carried out in the Saigon area.

Dr. Tran Kim Tuyen, Director of SEPES, stated that some coolness had developed between President Diem and his political advisor and brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, which resulted in delays and confusion in the implementation of joint programs. Further Dr. Tuyen described a developing mistrust by Diem of key government figures such as Assistant Minister of National Defense Nguyen Dinh Thuan. Minister for Civic Action, Ngo Trong Hieu has also described differences in policy in the President's family.

Buildings were obtained and rennovation will be started for the future headquarters of DIS and the National Interrogation Center. Temporary quarters have been obtained in order that interrogation center work could begin.

2. through 4.: No significant change.

5. Provincial Survey:

27 of the 39 surveys scheduled of provincial NPSS units have now

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

been completed.

6. [redacted]

No significant change.

7. Other Activities:

After considerable prodding through CAS liaison and unilateral channels, the GVN was influenced to permit the formation of the National Student Congress representing all university students. This is a reversal of policy heretofore strictly limited and monitored activities of a small national union of students.

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[redacted]

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Document # 52

SNIE 58-4-62
14 May 1962

5

SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

cve

THE CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION AND OUTLOOK IN LAOS

NOTE: This is the final version of the estimate and additional text will not be circulated.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JAN 2001

Central Intelligence Agency

Submitted by the

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the Director of the National Security Agency.

Concurred in by the

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

on 14 May 1962. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

CLASSIFICATION OF TITLE IS OFFICIAL USE ONLY WHEN USED SEPARATELY

WARNING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

14 May 1962

SUBJECT: SNIE 58-4-62: THE CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION AND OUTLOOK IN LAOS

THE PROBLEM

To assess the military situation and outlook and to estimate Communist short-run intentions in Laos.

THE ESTIMATE

I. THE SITUATION

1. Following the rout of Nam Tha, Laotian Government influence has been virtually eliminated from all of north and northwestern Laos. Although Luang Prabang is still in government hands, its last main avenue of supply, which ran from Thailand through Ban Houei Sai and down the Mekong, has been interdicted eastward from Pak Beng. Communist units have been for some time in key positions about the city and could take it at

will. Many of the Laotian troops defeated at Nam Tha have crossed the Mekong at Ban Houei Sai and are assembling in northern Thailand for airlift back to Laos. Among the eight Royal Laotian Government (RLG) battalions at Nam Tha were Phoumi's three best paratrooper units. The surviving troops will have to be regrouped, retrained, and largely re-equipped. Their morale has been shattered and their combat effectiveness is, at present, nil.

2. The defeat at Nam Tha and the subsequent forced withdrawal into Thailand following the military reverses during January further undermine the morale of the Laotian Government forces as a whole. Extensive North Vietnamese troop participation and unfounded government claims of direct Chinese Communist military involvement have almost certainly contributed to the demoralization of the Lao Army. Events of the past week demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the Laotian Army and emphasize its lack of motivation and will to resist. They underscore the continuing weakness of army leadership on all levels of command. The most effective element in fighting the Communists is the Meo guerrilla whose harassing efforts are pinning down several Communist battalions in northeastern Laos. We believe that the Laotian Army is not capable of resisting a determined enemy attack anywhere in the country.1/

1/ (See next page for footnote)

3. Over the past few months, the termination of US financial aid has had a considerable psychological impact on the Laotian Government leadership. It has also had an adverse effect on the urban economy. The Boun Oum government probably could limp along financially for a few months longer. Nevertheless, this US action and the US attitude since Nam Tha probably have convinced some key Laotian elements of the US determination to withdraw support from Phoumi and to bring about a coalition government. Moreover, we believe that the course of recent events must lead to some diminishing of Phoumi's prestige. Whereas his intransigent attitude had gained considerable support among the more vocal elements of the Laotian Government during the earlier part of the year, his failure to rally support abroad, particularly in Thailand, and his recent military defeats, particularly the one at Nam Tha, must result in considerable loss of confidence in his leadership. There is little chance that the present Laotian Government is capable of mustering sufficient enthusiasm or strength to overcome its recent military and political reverses. No opposition element has yet emerged, and Phoumi's control still appears to be intact. He will seek to salvage his position by pointing out that he was absent from Laos during the Nam Tha affair, that the rout was due to Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese military participation, and that the US has progressively withdrawn support from him and applied sanctions which have diminished his capability to act. Many Laotians will be disposed to accept

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(3)

16 May 1962

Effective this date, the "Status Report on Covert Actions in Vietnam" has been redesignated "Covert Annex to Status Report of Task Force Vietnam." The new format is designed to group CIA activities in accordance with their geographical area of activity and, where possible, activities of a similar nature will be reported on together.

In addition, subsequent status reports will be accompanied by a summary of significant developments as follows:

Highlights (1-15 May)

1. 612 of the highlander refugees camped outside of the Buon Enao Camp located near Ban Me Thuot, capital of Darlac Province, have requested self-defense training (paragraph IA,1a).

2. The NPSS Route Police Unit initiated effective operations against VC harassment units, eliminating several (paragraph IA,2b).

3. The Vietnamese Army Psychological Warfare Directorate grey radio station--purporting to be located within North Vietnam--began broadcasting 12 May from the Quang Tri area (paragraph IIIC).

4. [redacted] (paragraph IIIA,1).

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DATE: MAR 2001

Highlights (16-27 May)

1. Citizens Irregular Defense Groups training has mushroomed with 1054 new students in various courses.

2. Twenty-two new highland commando teams (330 men) began training.

3. One hundred twenty of the Bru tribe began training as a trail-watching contingent.

4. The Viet Cong stepped up military activities attacking and capturing 34 men from a defended hamlet near Buon Enao, Darlac Province.

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5. [redacted] officers completed surveying seven more provinces. CIO officers told [redacted] of a split between CIO Commissioner Nguyen Van Y and the Deputy Director of NPSS, Nguyen Van Hay.

6. Two sabotage and reconnaissance teams were dropped into NVN. Also 300,000 leaflets were dropped in NVN.

~~7. Confidential reports indicate a rift developing between CIO Commissioner Nguyen Van Y and his Deputy Director General at NPSS, Nuyen Van Hay.~~

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SNIE 58-5-62
31 May 1962
TS #0037365

Ads. Copy taken for week-end reading 5/26/62 (Pueblo)

SPECIAL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Number 58-5-62

Probable Communist Reactions to Certain Possible US Actions With Respect to Laos

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
31 MAY 1962

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JAN 2001

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF INCREASED US MILITARY AID TO GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

DATE DISTR. 13 JUNE 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

REFERENCES IN

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

APPRAISAL [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. SET FORTH BELOW IS A TRANSLATION OF AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) AS VIEWED BY THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC). [redacted]

2. THE REVOLUTION IN SVN IS PASSING NOW INTO THE PREPARATORY PHASE FOR A GENERAL OFFENSIVE TO LIBERATE IT (SVN) AND SET UP A PEOPLE'S UNION DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT, BUT AMERICAN INTERVENTION HAS POSTPONED THAT PHASE. THE US' HALF SUCCESS IS DUE TO USE OF COUNTERGUERRILLA TACTICS, BUT MOPPING UP OPERATIONS WILL LEAD TO DEFEAT BECAUSE (INDISCRIMINATE) KILLINGS WILL PUSH THE PEOPLE TOWARD THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY. IN THE FUTURE THE FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SVN, WITH

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO

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DATE: JUL 2000

EXEMPT NLK-81-122

25 JUN 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Special Group (CI)

SUBJECT : Intelligence Collection and Evaluation in South Vietnam

1. This memorandum represents an assessment report made at my request by the CIA Chief of Station in Saigon concerning existing United States and GVN intelligence collection mechanisms together with an assessment of existing intelligence evaluation processes. The assessment of the intelligence collection process in South Vietnam as expressed by the COS Saigon has also been coordinated with appropriate members of my staff.

2. <u>GVN Intelligence Mechanisms</u>:

A. Central Intelligence Organization (CIO): This fledgling national intelligence service, [redacted] appears to present some hope for a professional, coordinated, evaluated approach to the intelligence problems facing the GVN. Basic concepts of analysis, collation, source controls and coordination will be incorporated in this organization. The CIO staff numbers less than

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DATE: MAR 2001

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Highlights (13 June to 26 June)

1. There are 3,869 men in training under the Citizens Irregular Defense Groups program.

2. Over 400,000 leaflets were dropped in South Vietnam attributed to an independent anti-VC front group.

3. New Director of Information, Pham Van Tao tightens up information activities by releasing accurate ARVN casualty figures.

[redacted]

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COVERT ANNEX
TO
STATUS REPORT OF TASK FORCE VIETNAM
(29 May to 12 June 1962)

I. SOUTH VIETNAM

A. Counterinsurgency Programs

1. Citizens Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG's)

a. The Vietnamese Communist (VC) attack of 29 May at Kinh Quoc Gia in Father Hoa's area resulted in 27 "Sea Swallows" killed in action, 18 wounded in action and the loss of two BAR's. While only 17 VC bodies were found, an investigation revealed 60 new graves north of the Tan Hung Tay market, presumably VC victims of the battle with the "Sea Swallows".

b. Six steel matting helicopter pads were installed at Binh Hung and will be used for training Father Hoa's "Sea Swallows" in helicopter-borne operations and for delivery of supplies and transportation of personnel.

c. As of 10 June, a total of 1,580 Rhade villagers had been trained at Buon Enao. This brings the total of defended villages to 69, of which 35 have medical specialists trained at Buon Enao. Two ARVN platoons completed training and returned to their units in Darlac Province, making a total of six such platoons trained. Another two ARVN scout platoons and one Surete platoon entered training.

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d. A group of 300 raw recruits provided by the Presidential Liaison Office are being processed at the [redacted] Thu Duc training center to enter training. After completion of training they will be assigned to form two new Clandestine Action Service Airborne Companies (ARC), the 5th and 6th.

2. Joint Operations with GVN Intelligence and Security Services

a. The preliminary interrogation of a North Vietnamese Army Signal Corps Lieutenant who defected to the GVN on 24 May has been completed [redacted] A

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(When filled in)

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

SUBJECT [redacted] THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

APPRAISAL

REPORT NO. [redacted]

DATE DISTR. 3 JULY 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 21416

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. [redacted] STRATEGIC HAMLETS N CENTRAL VIETNAM AS AMERICANS WERE LARGELY CONTROLLING THE PROGRAM THERE AND WERE ESTABLISHING THE HAMLETS ON AN EXPERIMENTAL BASIS WHICH WAS NOT PROVING SUCCESSFUL. [redacted] CONCENTRATE ON THE MEKONG DELTA AREA WHERE THE HAMLETS REPRESENTED THE REAL GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM EFFORT.

2. [redacted] THE ENTIRE STATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM IS BEING

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STATUS REPORT
OF THE
TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA
COVERT ANNEX - LAOS
(13-27 JUNE 1962)

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1. Plans for an extensive reorganization for the CIA-directed Meo operation in north Laos, which were submitted in early May, are now being implemented [redacted] with the assistance of MAAG/Laos. This reorganization calls for the division of the Meo forces of approximately 14,500 into three basic types of units:

a. Special Units which will be volunteer, full-time, and mobile,

b. Ordinary Units which will be volunteer, full-time, local area or defense forces and,

c. Reserve units which will be volunteer, part-time duty reserve units responsible for local area security and initial defense.

This organization also touches on the command structure of the Meo operation, communications, and special operations.

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[redacted] has reported that this reorganization is now under way and is being implemented.

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2. CIA [redacted] continues to maintain its present capabilities in intelligence collection which are primarily in two fields:

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a. [redacted]

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b. [redacted]

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COVERT ANNEX
TO
STATUS REPORT OF TASK FORCE VIETNAM
(13 June to 26 June)

I. SOUTH VIETNAM

A. Counterinsurgency Programs

1. Citizens Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG's)

a. Fighting Fathers program in the Delta area now includes 1,831 persons trained and 1,185 armed. This does not include Father Hoa's "Sea Swallows."

b. There are 830 additional men of the Fighting Fathers group now being trained by the 77th Group as follows: Catholic refugee resettlement area at Cai San (WS 360230), 600 men; Father Day's parish at Hoa Thanh (WR 201109), 120 men; Father Tong's parish at Long Phu (WR 754664), 60 men; and Father Phuoc's parish at Rach Tranh (XR 382585), 50 men.

c. Among the Rhade tribesmen at Buon Enao, 1,802 villagers are now trained, 2,096 weapons have been issued, 77 villages are organized, 86 medics have been trained. Two platoons and one surete section have completed training, and a strike force of 101 Rhade is being trained. Over 4,000 Rhade await training. On 13 June, 26 low-level Viet Cong surrendered at Buon Enao.

d. At the Danang training camp of Hoa Cam, there are 1,355 men or women being trained as trailwatchers (499), airborne rangers (122), mountain commandos (393), Civic Action and Republican Youth cadres (626), and district volunteer cadre (105). Ten female mountain commandos are being given medical aid training.

[redacted]

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STATUS REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA

COVERT ANNEX - VIETNAM (8-21 August)

I. SOUTH VIETNAM

A. Unconventional Activities

1. Buon Enao:

a. Buon Enao complex now includes 130 villages of which 88 have trained medics. The strike force totals 965, all armed and trained. Refugees awaiting training number 2,016.

b. As of 10 August, Viet Cong (VC) attacks against the Buon Enao complex resulted in the following enemy casualties since February 1962: 122 VC killed, 148 VC captured, and 35 VC surrendered. Of captured personnel, 36 in confinement are being interrogated. The remainder are being resettled in a nearby area.

c. Two additional VC attacks on the Buon Enao complex occurred during the period. Both attacks were replused, one with support of Second ADVON strike aircraft.

2. Song Mao:

a. A strike force company of 113 men have completed advance training. 258 village defenders commenced training on 13 August. A strike force attack against a VC build-up in nearby Song Mao resulted in one VC killed, four captured, no friendly losses.

3. A site for a new Citzens' Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) training camp in Serienac Valley, of Tuyen Duc Province, was approved by the province chief on 15 August. A Special Forces team is to be assigned on 5 September.

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STATUS REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA

COVERT ANNEX - VIETNAM (25 July - 7 August)

I. SOUTH VIETNAM

A. Counterinsurgency Programs

1. Citizens Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG's)

a. The following developments in the Fighting Fathers program in the delta area are worthy of noting:

(1) On 1 August an alleged company-size Vietnamese Communist unit attacked the Binh Hung area. The attackers were driven off by 60 mm and 81 mm mortar fire. [redacted] estimated that 30-40 VC were killed or wounded, but no VC corpses were left on the battle field.

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(2) Since the arrival of the Chinese Nationalist training team in April 1962, a total of 597 personnel have been trained in the Binh Hung complex. The training programs have included eight weeks of basic training, seven weeks of advanced, five weeks of heavy weapons, two weeks of UDT, eight weeks of medical and eight weeks of psychological warfare training.

b. In the Rhade Buon Enao complex, the total number of villagers trained is 4,571; weapons issued, 5,005; and 112 villages organized; strike force strength, 776.

c. On 24 and 26 July Buon Trap Mewal (B. Trap) in the Buon Enao complex was attacked by two companies of VC. The village defenders were driven out after the first attack when their ammunition became exhausted. After receiving a resupply of ammunition and strike force reinforcement, the villagers returned the same day and drove out the VC. (For further details please see TDCS-3/518,485.)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Vietnam

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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT VIEWS OF BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH VIETNAM, H.A.F. HOHLER, ON A NEUTRALIST SOLUTION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

DATE DISTR. 14 AUGUST 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C) IN [redacted]

DATE OF INFO. EARLY AUGUST 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (7 AUGUST 1962)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

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SOURCE [redacted]

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DUNGAN
KAYSEN
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TAYLOR
BELK
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KOMER

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

1. BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH VIETNAM, H.A.F. HOHLER, TOLD A VIETNAMESE JOURNALIST ON 2 AUGUST 1962 THAT HE HAD BEEN READING SOME OF THE JOURNALIST'S ARTICLES AND WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN A LATE JUNE ARTICLE ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND THE SOVIETS OVER NORTH VIETNAM. AFTER DISCUSSING THESE DIFFERENCES AT LENGTH, THE AMBASSADOR STATED HIS BELIEF THAT A THIRD FORCE IN VIETNAM IS NOT ONLY POSSIBLE, BUT ACTUALLY EXISTS, AND THAT SUCH A THIRD FORCE IN NORTH VIETNAM, COMBINED WITH NEUTRALIST ELEMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, IS THE ONLY HOPE FOR VIETNAM. HOHLER EMPHASIZED THAT THE ONLY SOLUTION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM IS A NEUTRALIST COALITION SIMILAR TO

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FM CIA/OCI, [redacted]

TO WHITE HOUSE: ATTN BROMLEY SMITH

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

~~S E C R E T NOFORN~~ [redacted]

THE FOLLOWING IS WATCH COMMITTEE STATEMENT ON LAOS/ VIETNAM APPROVED BY USIB THIS MORNING: THERE IS NO CONFIRMATION THUS FAR OF REPORTS THAT A WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS FROM LAOS HAS BEGUN AND THAT SIZABLE NUMBERS OF THEM ARE BEING MOVED INTO SOUTH VIETNAM. WE BELIEVE IT LIKEELY, HOWEVER, THAT AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS THERE WILL BE SOME COVERT WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS FROM LAOS AND THAT INFLITRATIONS INTO SOUTH VIETNAM, WHICH HAVE PROBABLY INCREASED IN THE PAST TWO MONTHS, WILL BE ACCELERATED. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE VIET CONG MAY BE ACQUIRING ARTILLERY PIECES. ~~(SECRET/NOFORN)~~

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~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~ [redacted]

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5 JULY 1962
DATE

PRIORITY

FROM: CIA

TO : WHITE HOUSE

INFO :

CITE :

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

ATTN: MR. KAYSEN

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM CIA STATION IN SAIGON RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON AS IN 23562 IS IN RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST MADE ON 4 JULY BY MR. KAYSEN TO [redacted] OF CIA CONCERNING THE TRUMBULL STORY IN 4 JULY NEW YORK TIMES:

"1. THE CIA STATION, SAIGON, HAS MADE EXTENSIVE CHECK IN EFFORT DISCOVER SOURCES OF FIGURES AND INSPIRATION FOR SPECULATIONS IN TRUMBULL ARTICLE, BUT ALL WE HAVE ABLE FIND OUT WAS THAT FIGURE OF 8,000 TO 9,000 RECENT INFILTRATORS ORIGINALLY FILED BY UPI CORRESPONDENT ON BASIS BRIEFINGS HE RECEIVED FROM UNIDENTIFIED SOURCES IN KONTUM DURING RECENT VISIT. TRUMBULL PRESUMABLY PICKED UP FIGURE FROM UPI REPORT, TIED IT IN WITH HIS OWN PRECONCEPTIONS TO FASHION WHAT SEEMS TO US A HIGHLY EXAGGERATED AND SPECULATIVE REPORT.

"2. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE INDICATION FROM INFO AVAILABLE TO US HERE THAT TO DATE THERE HAS ACTUALLY BEEN ANY MASS TRANSFER OF PAVN

SECRET

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NLK 01-203-20-2 4237
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DATE: MAR 2001

CIA REPORT, June 27 - July 10, 1962

RECORDS SECTION

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

[redacted] CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS [redacted]

(When Filled In)

COUNTRY LAOS

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT LOCATION OF U.S. PRISONERS IN LAOS

DATE DISTR. 9 AUGUST 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. JUNE 1962

REFERENCES IN 42278

PLACE & DATE ACQ. [redacted]

APPRAISAL 6

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. IN JUNE 1962, [redacted] THE SECOND PARACHUTE BATTALION OF KONG LE WAS LEADING A CONVOY OF MATERIALS FROM MUONG SEN IN NORTH VIETNAM TO XIENG KHOUANG, LAOS. [redacted] WHEN THE CONVOY STOPPED OVERNIGHT IN NONG HET, NEAR THE LAO-NORTH VIETNAMESE BORDER, [redacted] SAW FOUR AMERICANS AND TWO FILIPINOS WHO WERE BEING HELD PRISONER BY PATHET LAO FORCES. ALL OF THE PRISONERS APPEARED TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH, EXCEPT FOR THE AMERICAN MAJOR, WHO HAD ONE ARM CUT OFF AT THE SHOULDER. [redacted] THE PRISONERS WERE BELIEVED TO BE SURVIVORS FROM A DC-3 WHICH HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN BY GROUND FIRE:

[redacted] CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS [redacted]

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	JISIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	DIA

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4 MAY 1993

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STATUS REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA

COVERT ANNEX - VIETNAM (22 August-4 September)

I. NORTH VIETNAM

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

II. SOUTH LAOS

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

III. SOUTH VIETNAM

A. Unconventional Activities

1. Buon Enao:

As of 31 August, villagers trained 5,185; villages trained, 130; 7,005 weapons issued, 88 villages have trained medical workers; total of 117 medics trained, 22 in training. Strike force strength 965. At four sub-bases of Buon Enao, an additional 2,015 villagers are trained, approximately 500 more in training.

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CASE # NLK- 98-107
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STATUS REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA

COVERT ANNEX - VIETNAM (22 August-4 September)

I. NORTH VIETNAM

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

II. SOUTH LAOS

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

III. SOUTH VIETNAM

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these explanations. On the other hand, dissatisfaction may reach such a point that there may be an attempt within the government and/or army to decrease the influence of Phoumi and his followers by a move to form a government more willing to come to an agreement with the neutralist and Communist elements.

II. COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

4. The Communist attack in the north was a calculated, well-planned move. It almost certainly was concurred in by the three Communist powers concerned -- Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow. In reaching their decision to mount the attack the Communist powers almost certainly considered that the risk of US intervention in Laos had lessened significantly and that they could increase the level of military operations in pursuing their objectives. They probably were fully confident that the military capabilities of the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces in Laos were superior to those of the Laotian Government forces. They had probably become impatient with the lack of progress toward the establishment of a coalition government. Furthermore, they are probably concerned over the implications of the sharply increased role of the US in South Vietnam.

5. We believe that the attack probably was designed to take advantage of a local tactical opportunity in northwest Laos. The Communists

probably calculated that the defeat of the Nam Tha garrison and the loss of the town would contribute to the demoralization of the Laotian Army and RLG. Moreover, Nam Tha is strategically critical for the control of north and western Laos. In addition, the Communists, particularly the Chinese, probably considered Nam Tha in Laotian Government hands as an impediment to the expansion of their influence in Phong Saly and among the hill peoples of northwestern Laos and northern Thailand.

6. It is possible that the Nam Tha attack may indicate that the Communist side has lost interest in a negotiated settlement and written off the idea of a coalition government under Souvanna Phouma in favor of a de facto partition, a campaign of gradual military conquest, or an all-out offensive. Peiping and Hanoi have been somewhat less willing than Moscow to settle for a coalition government. Moreover, in the light of the increased US commitment in South Vietnam, Moscow may have become convinced that more aggressive Communist military action in Laos was necessary. However, we continue to believe that the Nam Tha attack and the pursuit of the fleeing Laotian Army troops did not mark the beginning of an immediate military drive to seize all of Laos. Nor do we believe that the Communist side would, in terms of the present line-up of forces, be willing to settle for a de facto partition.

7. In the Communist view, the attack on Nam Tha probably did not foreclose further negotiations for a political settlement or compromise Souvanna as a potential leader of a coalition government. They could argue that Souvanna was not in Laos; he publicly "disapproved" of the attack; and his troops did not participate. Indeed, the Communists may have estimated that a victory at Nam Tha would enhance the possibilities of renewed negotiations and, in addition, improve their bargaining position.

8. Although the rout of the government forces at Nam Tha and thereafter may have been more sweeping than the Communists expected, their victory will very soon be reflected in their military and political policies. With respect to the resumption of negotiations and the terms for agreement, the Communists will probably leave the initiative to the other side and assume a stiffer attitude. In the absence of effective military response to the Nam Tha action, which we believe is beyond the capabilities of the Laotian Government forces, or of significant progress toward a coalition government, there will be an increasing likelihood that the Communists will undertake offensive operations on the scale of Nam Tha elsewhere in Laos.

9. The Communist forces will probably follow up their capture of Nam Tha by clearing the entire area of north and northeast Laos of government forces and consolidating their control over the area. The Communist

forces, perhaps with the Kong Le troops playing some role, may further tighten their circle around the lightly-held royal capital, Luang Prabang, increasing the pressure on the King who has, thus far, supported Phoumi. It is possible that Communist forces may cross the Mekong west of Luang Prabang and occupy Sayaboury province which lies between the Mekong and the Thai border. Such a move would sharply raise the level of Thai concern. Troop movements and attacks on outposts recently reported in south Laos suggest that Communist forces may soon seize Saravane and Attopeu to further secure the overland route between North and South Vietnam. These major outposts are already virtually surrounded and neither would be likely to hold out long under attack. We still do not believe, however, that the Communists will seize the major towns along the Mekong remaining in Laotian Government hands, at least until they have had time to assess the political and military effects in Laos of the recent moves and any US reaction.


CHINA
Road under const. by Red Chinese
Cheli
Mengla
BURMA
Muong Sing
Nam Tha
Vieng Pou Kha
NAMTHA
Ban Houei Sai
Muong Sai
Na Mo
Nong Saly
Boun Neua
Muong Yo
RHONG SALY
Lai Chau
Dien Bien Phu
Son La
Red River
Black River
NORTH VIETNAM
Hanoi
Thanh Hoa
Gulf of Tonkin
Vinh
Ha Tinh
Dong Hoi
Quang Tri
Hue
Nam Ou
Nam Beng
Muong Houn
Pak Beng
LUANG PRABANG
Luang Prabang
Phou Den Dinh
SAM NEUA
Nong Het
Muong Sen
Phou Khoun
XIENG KHOUANG
Vang Vieng
Namone
SAYABOURY
VIENTIANE
Ban Hin Heup
Pak Sane
Nam Khan
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Lak Sao
Nam Theun
KHAMMOUANE
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THAILAND
Udon Thani
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Government Forces
Meo operational areas
Kong Le Pathet Lao North Vietnamese Forces
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(3)

COVERT ANNEX
TO
STATUS REPORT OF TASK FORCE VIETNAM
(1-15 May 1962)

I. SOUTH VIETNAM

A. Counterinsurgency Programs

1. Citizens Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG's)

a. 612 of the highlander refugees camped outside of the Buon Enao Camp have requested self-defense training. The large number of highlander refugees in this area is being fed and cared for on an emergency basis. Toward this end, 105 village medical assistants have been trained by American Special Forces corpsmen assigned to CAS Saigon and 32 more are currently in training. To date, a total of 1346 personnel have been trained, 1217 weapons issued and 45 hamlets organized and equipped for defense in the Buon Enao complex.

b. To date, 614 Catholic youth from various parish projects in the delta and southwest provinces have had defense training; 278 more currently in training. 49 weapons were issued to Father Du's hamlet program in Tay Ninh.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

c. Supplementary training in weaponry was given at [redacted] Thu Duc Training Center 1-7 May to 180 civic action cadres who had just graduated from ARVN Quang Trung Basic Training Center.

d. 120 highlanders were recruited in Quang Tri Province to form a trail-watcher company there. 450 highlanders in Kontum were recruited to be used in a trail-watcher company and the intervention company for its backup support was trained. 40 highlander social action cadres who will be used as leader and intelligence cadres in highlander commando teams began training at [redacted] Da Nang Base.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

Copy 1

2. Joint Operations with GVN Intelligence and Security Services

a. Central Intelligence Organization (CIO):

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

18 CIO and NPSS officers in an on-the-job interrogation training program have begun the processing of six selected VC prisoners [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

[redacted]

b. National Police and Security Service (NPSS):

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

NPSS Route Police Unit, whose intelligence components were recently trained [redacted] began operations on major highways north of Saigon, encountering and eliminating several small VC harassment units.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

B. [redacted]

[redacted] continued to report GVN reactions to the 20 April Vinh Lac raid. The Directorate General of Information was reported to have relayed on 27 April a Presidential order that local press criticsm of Cambodia could be allowed. Ngo Dinh Nhu commented that the GVN intended to take a hard line toward Cambodia. Other reports concerned GVN discouragement of any further press comment linking Khmer Krom dissident Son Ngoc Thanh to the incident.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

II. [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

[redacted]

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(5)

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
E0 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C) Three other teams were dispatched to reconnoiter an area [redacted] No enemy contact was made, although traces and fire signs were reported on 12 May near the Laos-South Vietnam border.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
E0 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C) Another group of three teams was conducting reconnaissance and harassment operations [redacted]

III. [redacted]

A. [redacted]

E0 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
E0 12958
3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

1. [redacted]

2. [redacted]

B. Paramilitary

No significant developments during the reporting period.

C. Psychological Warfare

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C) The grey radio station of the Vietnamese Army Psychological Warfare Directorate began broadcasting 12 May from the Quang Tri area. Purporting to be located within NVN and representing the National Liberation Front, its programs are [redacted] and beamed at an audience of North Vietnamese civilian and military officials and middle class urban residents who may possess radios.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

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COVERT ANNEX
TO
STATUS REPORT OF TASK FORCE VIETNAM
(16-28 May 1962)

I. SOUTH VIETNAM

A. Counterinsurgency Programs

1. Citizens Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG's)

a. 406 trainees began a course at the new Citizens Irregular Defense Group training camp near Soc Trang 28 May 1962 under the direction of one CAS officer and a US Special Forces team. Installation of perimeter defenses and construction of a rifle range are in progress. The USMC Heliocopter Squadran based at Soc Trang rendered excellent support in setting up the camp.

b. 330 Highland Commandos (22 teams) reported to the Danang Training Base (Tourane) for a six-week training cycle. The first contingent of 120 Bru Highlanders of a trail-watching company, from Quang Tri Province, began an eight-week course at Danang 25 May 1962.

c. During the period, Vietnamese Communists (VC) stepped up activities against defended hamlets south of Buon Enao near Ban Me Thuot. On 19 May 1962, 34 defenders of one hamlet with their weapons were captured by the VC. Faster communications and larger defense groups are needed to repel VC company-size attacks.

d. The layout and construction of a training camp in Brother Bosco's village in Phuoc Thien in the Phan Rang area was begun 23 May 1962. The training cadre, one half of one US Special Forces team, set up temporary quarters there on 24 May 1962.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]
Copy 1

e. 60 Cao Dai youth at Tan Hoi Dong in Dinh Tuong Province were issued weapons on 17 May 1962. Two men from the 77th Group of Vietnamese Special Forces are carrying out a training program which includes an additional 300 Catholic youth volunteers. 60 Catholic youth in Long Phu in Chuong Thien Province and 40 at Dai Hai in Ba Xuyen Province received arms after training by the 77th Group.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

f. Father Hoa's Binh Hung special district [redacted] teams are conducting an eight-week basic course for 80 students, a six-week guerrilla staff course for 74 students, and a three-week heavy weapons course for 34 men.

2. Joint Operations with GVN Intelligence and Security Services

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

a. Seven additional provincial surveys were completed [redacted] Vietnamese CIO officers during the reporting period.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

b. [redacted] gave indications of a widening rift between the Commissioner and his Deputy Director General at NPSS, Nguyen Van Hay, who has increasingly attempted to usurp control of NPSS.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

c. [redacted]

d. The second course in basic intelligence operations for the intelligence section of the Route Police and NPSS Commandos began 28 May 1962 with 31 students.

e. On 16 May 1962 the Army Psywar Directorate began distributing leaflets attributed to a socialistic organization whose purported objective was to urge working for the defeat of the VC before pressing for government reforms.

[redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

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B. Unilateral Operations

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

1. [redacted] This was devoted primarily to a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the Strategic Hamlet Program and the Delta Pacification Plan. Ngo Dinh Nhu's ideas on the need for fixed military posts to protect key points from the foothills to the delta areas also were discussed.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

2. [redacted] The objective is to encourage other Asian countries to accept a greater responsibility in the counter-subversion effort.

II. [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs (C)

[redacted]

III. [redacted]

A. [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs (C)

[redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurring:

Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF
Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff
Director of the National Security Agency

Abstaining:

The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

WARNING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

~~TOP SECRET~~

SPECIAL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Number 58-5-62

Probable Communist Reactions to Certain Possible US Actions With Respect to Laos

~~TOP SECRET~~

PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN POSSIBLE US ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO LAOS[1]

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Communist reactions to certain courses of action by US and allied forces in Laos.

NOTE

The assumptions and courses of action here considered were provided by the Departments of State and Defense for the purpose of this estimate. The paper is organized to respond directly to the considerations raised by the given courses of action.

THE ESTIMATE

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. We believe that up to the present there have not been fundamental differences among the Communist powers concerned—Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi—with respect to the Communist campaign in Laos or in southeast Asia as a whole. There may have been disagreements as to tactics and timing, with Hanoi and Peiping tending to be more militant and less patient. The Sino-Soviet dispute concerning Bloc leadership and tactics has not appeared to prevent effective coordination of Communist policy in Laos. We believe that

[1] Other recent estimates bearing on the situation in Laos are: SNIE 10-62, "Communist Objectives, Capabilities, and Intentions in Southeast Asia," dated 21 February 1962; SNIE 58-2-62, "Consequences of Certain US Courses in Laos," dated 11 April 1962; SNIE 58-3-62, "Implications of the Fall of Nam Tha," dated 9 May 1962; and SNIE 58-4-62, "The Current Military Situation and Outlook in Laos," dated 14 May 1962.

Sino-Soviet differences are not likely materially to affect the Communist responses to the courses of action discussed in this paper. If, however, the situation threatened to reach a point of serious armed conflict, directly involving US and Chinese Communist forces, latent differences might become acute.

2. It is important to note that the Communists do not consider Laos in isolation from their other objectives in southeast Asia. In fact, the Viet Cong in South Vietnam and the Pathet Lao in Laos are both integral parts of North Vietnamese Communist military and party organizations, and both take their guidance from Hanoi. Hanoi, in turn, is supported and counseled by both Moscow and Peiping who, to some extent, are competing for influence over Hanoi. For this reason, Moscow probably feels under certain limitations in counseling patience and restraint on Hanoi, for the Soviets would not want to appear less willing than the Chinese to support the "national liberation struggles" in Laos and South Vietnam. The USSR has played the key diplomatic role for the Bloc and has provided extensive material support, including the airlift operation. We do not believe that the Soviets are likely to abandon their influence in Laos (and to that extent in North Vietnam) to the Chinese.

3. All the Communist powers probably suspect the US of insincerity or at least of procrastination in its proclaimed effort to bring General Phoumi to serious negotiations. The Communist side has probably lost some of its earlier interest in a coalition government, particularly as the Communist military situation in Laos has steadily improved at the expense of both the "neutralist" forces and the Laotian Government forces. They probably share our judgment that the Forces Armees Royales (FAR) cannot by themselves effectively defend any point remaining in government hands, and that the Pathet Lao, assisted by the North Vietnamese troops now in Laos, could quickly seize all the major towns still held by the FAR forces.

4. The Communists probably interpret the current US troop movement to Thailand as an attempt to deter them

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

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(When filled in)

[redacted]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT 1. OPPOSITION IN KHANH HOA PROVINCE TO ARMING MOUNTAIN TRIBESMEN AND TO THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM
2. CONFLICT AMONG PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES

DATE DISTR. 13 SEPTEMBER 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 21488

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

APPRAISAL [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. [redacted] KHANH HOA PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE AMERICAN POLICY OF ECONOMIC AID, TRAINING, AND ARMS FOR THE TRIBAL PEOPLE. THESE AUTHORITIES FEAR THAT THE TRIBESMEN MAY INDISCRIMATELY KILL INNOCENT VIETNAMESE, ESPECIALLY IN CASES WHERE THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS MINGLE WITH THE LOCAL POPULACE.

2. [redacted] THE PEOPLE IN THE PROVINCE ARE OPPOSED TO THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM, BECAUSE THEY ARE REQUIRED TO

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

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[redacted]

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	[redacted]	OCR	ONR	OSI	OO	[redacted]
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FORM 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-30)

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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(When Filled In)

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM CAMBODIA

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT POSSIBLE SEVERANCE OF CAMBODIAN-SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

DATE DISTR. 17 SEPTEMBER 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 23561

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

APPRAISAL [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. [redacted] THE ROYAL CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT /RKG/ IS PLANNING TO SEVER RELATIONS WITH SOUTH VIETNAM. THE DECISION IS TO BE FORMALIZED AT A CABINET MEETING ON EITHER 19 OR 20 SEPTEMBER, AT WHICH TIME THE RKG MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE WILL REQUEST THE SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

2. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

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Date [redacted]

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NLK-77-661

STATUS REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA

COVERT ANNEX - HIGHLIGHTS (6 September-19 September)

VIETNAM

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

Confidential Ministry of Interior figures concerning strategic hamlet construction list the number of hamlets to be completed by the end of 1962 as 4,446. To attain this total the Ministry is assuming that all hamlets begun in August (a total of 2,492) will have been completed satisfactorily.

THAILAND

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

LAOS

The Vietnamese Communist (VC) and Pathet Lao (PL) continued their attacks against Meo forces located near Sam Neua and the Plain of Jars during the reporting period. Attacks consisted mainly of the shelling of Meo positions with mortar and artillery fire. Ambushes of Meo patrols were also reported during the same period.

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DATE: JAN 2000

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DOCUMENT # 26

(2c)

COPY 1 OF 15

STATUS REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA

COVERT ANNEX - VIETNAM (5-17 September)

SEE SANITIZED VERSION NLK-77-661

I. NORTH VIETNAM

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

The air resupply of the reconnaissance and sabotage team is awaiting favorable weather.

II. SOUTH LAOS

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

III. SOUTH VIETNAM

A. Unconventional Activities

1. A third Catholic Youth Company at Du Tho Camp, Ba Xuyen Province, has been founded from 140 volunteers and began training on 17 September. The Presidential Survey Office has provided three lieutenants to command three strike companies.

2. Cung Son Camp, Phu Yen Province, completed training 412 republican youth on 11 September. The youth, who came from 27 villages, all were issued weapons. A VC bivouac site southwest of Qui Nhon was discovered by a camp patrol and attacked on 8 September.

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SEE SANITIZED VERSION
NLK-77-661

STATUS REPORT
TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA

COVERT ANNEX - LAOS
(5-19 September 1962)

1. The Vietnamese Communist (VC) and Pathet Lao (PL) continued their attacks against Meo forces located near Sam Neua and the Plain of Jars during the reporting period. Attacks consisted mainly of the shelling of Meo positions with mortar and artillery fire. Ambushes of Meo patrols were also reported during the same period.

[redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
E0 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

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STATUS REPORT
OF THE
TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA

COVERT ANNEX - HIGHLIGHTS
(23 August - 5 September)

VIETNAM

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

LAOS

Between 22 August and 4 September 1962 Vietnamese Communists (VC) and Pathet Lao)PL) units continued their attacks against Meo units in North Laos. The attacks were concentrated against Meo forces located east and south of Sam Neua village and northeast and northwest of the Plain of Jars. Prior to assaulting Meo portions the enemy employed artillery and mortar fire.

THAILAND

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

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FILE

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM CHINA (TAIWAN) LAOS

REPORT NO. [redacted]

DATE DISTR. 25 SEPTEMBER 1962

SUBJECT PROPOSED JOINT CHINESE NATIONALIST-SOUTH VIETNAMESE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN LAOS

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

DATE OF INFO. MID SEPTEMBER 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (21 SEPTEMBER 1962)

APPRAISAL 2

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 7977

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

✓ SMITH-BUNDY
DUNGAN
KAYSEN
KILDUFF
[illegible]
SCHLESINGER
TAYLOR
BELK
[illegible]
RASKIN
SAUNDERS

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

1. IN MID-SEPTEMBER 1962, TRAN KIM TUYEN, CHIEF, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE, PROPOSED TO HUANG TIEN-MAI, CHIEF OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAU INTELLIGENCE STATION IN SAIGON, THAT SOUTH VIETNAM AND NATIONALIST CHINA CONDUCT JOINT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN LAOS. TUYEN CLAIMED THAT THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN LAOS, AND THE STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM WOULD BREAK RELATIONS WITH LAOS, NECESSITATED IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION OF SUCH A PROPOSAL. TUYEN TOLD HUANG THAT HE ENVISIONED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STATIONS ON THE BORDER BETWEEN LAOS AND SOUTH VIETNAM, AS WELL AS IN LAOS, TO SUPPORT JOINT VIETNAMESE/NATIONALIST CHINESE AGENT OPERATIONS.

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26 September 1962

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SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

SHORT-RUN OUTLOOK FOR THE LAOTIAN COALITION GOVERNMENT

- **Current Situation**
- **Communist Intentions**
- **Coalition Elements**
- **Prospects**
- **Annex - The Laos Settlement**

NOTE: This is an advance copy of the conclusions of this estimate as approved by the United States Intelligence Board. The complete text will be circulated within five days of this issuance.

Central Intelligence Agency

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SPECIAL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 58-6-62

Short-Run Outlook for the Laotian Coalition Government

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
26 SEPTEMBER 1962

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JAN 2001

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TO WHITE HOUSE

ZEM JCS MAJOR GENERAL ROLLEN ANTHIS (SACSA)

ZEN STATE DEPARTMENT; ATTN: MR. WILLIAM P. BUNDY

ZEM

[redacted]

REF: DTG 01/2000Z FM DET 2, 35TH TAC GP UDORN

[redacted] 1.3 (a) (4) C

1. KLUSMANN DEPARTED UDORN FOR SAIGON 0815 LOCAL ON ORDER OF GEN MOORE OF SECOND AIR DIVISION. KLUSMANN ACCOMPANIED ON FLIGHT BY INTEL REP OF 13TH AIR FORCE.

2. [redacted] 1.3 (a) (4) C

[redacted] KLUSMANN SAID HE HAD SORE FEET AND A FEW SCRATCHES BUT WAS IN NO NEED OF IMMEDIATE MEDICAL ATTENTION. PICKUP PLANE LEFT BOUAM LONG AT 1835 ARRIVING UDORN 2000.

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[redacted]

COUNTRY LAOS

SUBJECT ACCOUNTS OF THE SHOOTING DOWN OF A SUPPLY PLANE IN SAVANNAKHET

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/560,051

DATE DISTR. 25 SEPTEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 26742

DATE OF INFO. 5-7 SEPTEMBER 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. [redacted]

APPRAISAL THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

APPRAISAL ALTHOUGH DETAILS OF THE INCIDENT VARY, IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT SOME OF THE CREW MEMBERS WERE CAPTURED ALIVE.

1. SUMMARY. SEPARATE ACCOUNTS OF THE 5 SEPTEMBER 63 CRASH OF A C-46 ON A RICE SUPPLY MISSION TO BAN HOUEI SANE INDICATE THAT IT WAS SHOT DOWN BY A PATHET LAO (PL)/ VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST (VC) UNIT ABOUT EIGHT KILOMETERS NORTHEAST OF MUONG PHINE AND THAT IT CRASHED ABOUT FOURTEEN KILOMETERS NORTHWEST OF MUONG PHINE. ONE ACCOUNT MENTIONS ONLY FIVE OF THE SIX CREW MEMBERS ABOARD. THE OTHER STATES THAT ONE CREW MEMBER WAS KILLED, AND THAT FIVE WERE CAPTURED, WITH THREE OF THE CAPTURED HAVING BEEN TAKEN ON 7 SEPTEMBER

[redacted]

STATE/INR | DIA | NMCC/JCS | NAVY | AIR | JCS | SECRET | USIA | NSC | AID | USIA

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-[redacted]-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	[redacted]
SUBJECT	STRATEGIC HAMLET SITUATION IN CENTRAL VIETNAM	DATE DISTR.	5 OCTOBER 1962
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	[redacted]	REFERENCES	IN
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]		
APPRAISAL	[redacted]	FIELD REPORT NO.	[redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. [redacted] SAID [redacted] THAT MOST OF THE PROVINCES HAVE PLACE THE ENTIRE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM (SHP) ON THE INDIVIDUAL DISTRICT CHIEFS, FEW OF WHOM ARE EQUIPPED TO COPE WITH IT. IN TURN, THE DISTRICT CHIEFS DEPEND ON THE LOCAL POPULATION TO FINANCE THE PROGRAM, INCLUDING THE PROVISION OF FOOD AND LODGINGS FOR THE CIVIC ACTION TEAMS AND SELF-DEFENSE CORPS MEMBERS CHARGED WITH SHP RESPONSIBILITIES. AFTER PAYING THE COST, THERE IS USUALLY VERY LITTLE LEFT OVER FOR THE OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PROGRAM. THE VILLAGERS, MOREOVER, BECOME IRRITATED AT BEING FORCED TO CONTRIBUTE TO SOMETHING THAT PRODUCES NO TANGIBLE RESULTS. HOWEVER, IT HAS NOT BEEN DIFFICULT TO PREVENT THE GOVERNMENT FROM FINDING OUT THE TRUE SITUATION. PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS AND OTHERS CONCERNED

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-[redacted]-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]

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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT ACCEPTANCE OF HOA HAO OFFER TO JOIN THE RANKS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

DATE DISTR. 5 OCTOBER 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 34476

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

APPRAISAL [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. IN EARLY OCTOBER 1962 THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) ACCEPTED AN OFFER FOR TROOPS OPERATING UNDER HOA HAO COMMANDER HUYNH CONG CUNG IN THE AREA FROM LONG XUYEN, AN GIANG PROVINCE, WEST TO THE CAMBODIAN BORDER, TO JOIN THE GVN. THE GVN ALSO ACCEPTED THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS STIPULATED BY THE HOA HAO IN CONNECTION WITH THE OFFER:

A. THEY WOULD BE PERMITTED TO RETAIN THEIR ARMS AND TO FIGHT AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC). THE HOA HAO WOULD AGREE TO FIGHT IN ZONES DESIGNATED BY THE GVN AND WOULD ACCEPT GVN MILITARY OR OFFICIAL PERSONNEL AS INSTRUCTORS OR COMMANDERS.

B. HOA HAO MEMBERS JOINING THE GVN FORCES WOULD RECEIVE, WITHOUT DISTINCTION FOR RANK, 900 PIASTERS PER MONTH, THE SAME

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-[redacted]E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT 1. LAND DEVELOPMENT CENTERS IN CENTRAL VIETNAM;
2. THE BUON ENAO STRATEGIC HAMLET COMPLEX

DATE DISTR. 8 OCTOBER 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

REFERENCES IN

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

APPRAISAL [redacted]

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SOURCE [redacted]

1. THE 74 LAND DEVELOPMENT CENTERS IN KONTUM, PLEIKU, DARLAC, AND QUANG DUC PROVINCES WERE SUPPOSED TO QUALIFY AS STRATEGIC HAMLETS BY THE END OF SEPTEMBER 1962. THE BASIC PLAN WAS THE SAME FOR ALL THE CENTERS, WHICH ALREADY HAD SCHOOLS AND DISPENSARIES. BAMBOO SPIKES, POINTING OUTWARD, WERE STUCK IN THE GROUND OUTSIDE THE FENCE SURROUNDING EACH CENTER, FOR A DEPTH OF TWENTY METERS. THE FENCE WAS MADE OF SHARPENED LOGS THREE INCHES IN DIAMETER PLANTED IN THE GROUND, ONE LOG POINTING SLIGHTLY OUTWARD, THE NEXT STANDING STRAIGHT UP, THE THIRD POINTING SLIGHTLY INWARD, WITH PATTERN REPEATED FOR THE ENTIRE FENCE. LOGS WERE USED BECAUSE THEY LAST ABOUT TWO YEARS, WHEREAS BAMBOO HAD TO BE REPLACED ABOUT EVERY SIX MONTHS. INSIDE THE FENCE, AROUND THE ENTIRE CENTER, WAS A DENSELY SPIKED TRENCH TWO METERS DEEP, TWO AND ONE-HALF METERS WIDE AT THE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-[redacted]E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]

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JAN 1998

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BUI DIEM

VIET-NAM

Bui Diem is Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; i.e., deputy to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Tran Van Do. To some extent his title is merely honorific, for his most substantive duties are as political advisor to Prime Minister Ky. Bui Diem likes to be called the "McGeorge Bundy of Viet-Nam". Many influential Vietnamese regard him with suspicion as an alleged opportunist and schemer. He has frequent contact with high American officials in Saigon, who have found him an effective intermediary to and from the Prime Minister.

Born in North Viet-Nam in 1923, Bui Diem studied at the Universities of Hanoi and Grenoble, France. Like General Thang, he has a baccalaureate degree in mathematics. He has long been connected with newspaper publishing: first with the newspaper Quoc Dan in Hanoi from 1951 to 1954, and since 1963 as publisher of the English-language Saigon Post. While he has not openly identified himself with the Dai Viet party, Bui Diem has long had the reputation of Dai Viet activist. He was a close associate of former Prime Minister Phan Huy Quat, serving in the latter's Cabinet during February-June 1965 as Minister of State at the Prime Ministry. In 1953 he was Director of Cabinet of the Defense Ministry, then headed by Quat. For some time he served as Quat's confidential secretary.

Although Bui Diem was not an openly active participant in political affairs during the presidency of Ngo Dinh Diem, he was considered to be in sympathy with the Buddhist protest movement and opposed to the Ngo family. During this period Bui Diem was president of a motion picture production company. After the coup d'etat of November 1, 1963, Bui Diem served on the Council of Notables, was reportedly engaged in attemps to form a

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM/NORTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT INDICATION OF PLANNING FOR THE REOCCUPATION OF NORTH VIETNAM

DATE DISTR. 20 NOVEMBER 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

APPRAISAL [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. [redacted] IN PLANNING FOR THE REOCCUPATION OF NORTH VIETNAM. THE PLANNING WOULD PROGRESS THROUGH MANY STAGES, [redacted] FIRST TO DRAFT A QUESTIONNAIRE THAT WAS TO BE FILLED OUT BY SELECTED PEOPLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM. IN ADDITION TO THIS FORM, PEOPLE WHO FORMERLY LIVED IN NORTH VIETNAM WOULD BE REQUIRED TO COMPLETE A SECOND QUESTIONNAIRE, WHICH WAS TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON ALL ACQUAINTANCES STILL KNOWN TO BE IN NORTH VIETNAM. THE DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE WAS LATTER SUBMITTED TO [redacted]

2. [redacted] COMMENT. [redacted] AT THE 5 OCTOBER MEETING OF THE INTERMINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC HAMLETS THAT THE SELF-DEFENSE CORPS MUST BECOME PART OF A

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]

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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT PROGRESS OF FREE ELECTIONS IN STRATEGIC HAMLETS

DATE DISTR. 26 NOVEMBER 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

REFERENCES IN 24323

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

APPRAISAL [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

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SOURCE [redacted]

1. [redacted] THE MOST SIGNIFICANT LONG TERM ASPECT OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM MAY WELL BE THE CONCEPT OF FREE ELECTIONS AT THE HAMLET LEVEL, AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE ELECTED ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEES AND ADVISORY COUNCILS INTO THE FIRST ORGANIZED ADMINISTRATIVE ENTITIES BELOW THE VILLAGE LEVEL. THE PROGRAM IN EACH AREA WILL BE ADVANCED OR RETARDED ACCORDING TO THE ABILITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL CIVIC ACTION PERSONNEL SENT INTO THE HAMLETS TO ORGANIZE INSTITUTIONS, INCLUDING ELECTIONS. MUCH ALSO WILL DEPEND ON THE ABILITY OF THE PROVINCE AND DISTRICT CHIEFS TO ADAPT THEIR THINKING TO THE NEW CONCEPTS. THUS, WITH

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from further military action in Laos. They recognize that the move puts the US in an improved position to intervene if fighting is resumed, but they probably believe that the US has not yet taken a firm decision on the particular circumstances which would require it to intervene. They probably have revised upward, however, their estimate of the chances that some major violation of the cease-fire in the future would produce such an intervention.

5. In these circumstances, we believe that the Communists will not alter substantially their current tactic of suspending major military action while waiting for the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) to accept their terms for a political settlement. They are unlikely at this point to move any Chinese combat forces or additional North Vietnamese troops into Laos. If the RLG does not make some substantial movement toward Communist terms, the Communists will probably renew their military pressures. However, the Communist side will probably seek to keep the level and incidence of its military operations below what it believes would prompt US intervention, particularly since it probably calculates that US intervention might, at some juncture, involve air operations against the highly important Communist bases of supply and LOC "safe-havens" of northern Laos and North Vietnam.

II. ASSUMPTION ONE

Neither side has openly repudiated the cease-fire or the principle of a negotiated settlement, but continuing Communist military activity constricts the territory under RLG control. US policy remains to seek a negotiated settlement based upon a neutralist coalition government.

COURSE A: The US provides the RLG and the FAR with assistance of the type and up to the level of that provided to South Vietnam.

6. If the US initiated this course of action, it is possible that the Communist side would see this as no more than a US attempt to strengthen the RLG negotiating position. We

believe it more likely, however, that they would suspect that the US had decided, whatever it might say publicly, to abandon the effort for a coalition government. They would probably believe that the US intended to establish effective non-Communist control over a substantial part of Laotian territory. They might even believe that this was a first step in a US plan to buttress the FAR, if necessary, with US combat forces. The Communist side would almost certainly increase its military investment in Laos, perhaps acknowledging openly the presence of North Vietnamese troops and increasing their number, providing them and the Pathet Lao with increased logistics support, more artillery, and, perhaps, a greatly expanded airlift. The Communists probably would not hesitate to respond to FAR encroachments on areas under their control in Laos with counteraction up to the scale of the Nam Tha operation. They would also probably increase sharply their infiltration and subversion efforts in areas under RLG control but would almost certainly not attempt to seize the major towns along the Mekong remaining in RLG hands.

COURSE B: In addition to the actions assumed in Course A, the US carries out a substantial buildup of its combat forces in Thailand to about 20,000 troops.

7. Although this additional course of action would not present any greater immediate threat to Communist interests in Laos, the Communists would probably take a more serious view of the situation because of the proximity of US forces capable of intervening in Laos. The North Vietnamese would probably reinforce their troops in Laos and the Chinese might move forces to their border with northern Laos. At the same time, the Communists would probably move for a resumption of negotiations.

COURSE C: Troops from the US and Thailand, and from those SEATO members willing to participate, are stationed in RLG-held areas to preserve the cease-fire and to prevent further Pathet Lao/North Viet-

namese military advances. The US and allied troops would initiate no offensive action against Communist-held positions. The limited US military intentions would be conveyed to the Communist side both privately and publicly.[2]

8. Under the assumption given, the cease-fire would still have been generally in force when the US took the given action, although limited Communist military encroachment continued. In these circumstances, the Communist side would probably suspect that the US intent went farther than the stated purpose—preservation of the cease-fire. Their judgment of the real US intention would rest to some extent on the size and disposition of the allied forces moving into Laos and the size and composition of the forces backing them up in Thailand. In any case, they would probably believe that the US, though still prepared to accept a satisfactory political settlement, was willing and ready to participate directly in the event of subsequent Communist military activity in Laos.

9. North Vietnam would almost certainly introduce additional forces into Laos. The Chinese Communists might take this opportunity to move "volunteers" into the northern provinces, and the North Vietnamese and Soviets, although they might not welcome this development, would probably accede. Soviet logistical support would be stepped up. The Pathet Lao, with North Vietnamese participation, would probably increase the scale of their military actions throughout Laos with the intent of confining US-allied control of the specific areas occupied. They would probably harass US lines of communications, outposts, and patrols. Communist agents would probably undertake terrorist and sabotage activities within the US-occupied towns.

10. We do not believe, however, that the Communist forces would attempt to drive the US troops from the areas they

[2] A lesser variant of this course would involve stationing allied forces only in the Mekong valley towns to free FAR troops from garrison duty for active operations against the insurgents (SEATO Plan 5).

occupied. The Communists probably would consider that over the long run, confinement of US and allied forces to these areas would place the US in an awkward military-political position, and might cause the US to withdraw. Meanwhile, they would probably revert to pressures for a negotiated settlement with the withdrawal of US troops as the initial objective of any agreement.

III. ASSUMPTION TWO

The Communist side attacks important RLG outposts—such as Saravane or Attopeu. US policy remains to seek ultimately a negotiated settlement, but immediate steps are required to prevent further cease-fire violations and to forestall the loss of additional RLG-held territory.

COURSE D: Troops from the US and Thailand and from those SEATO members willing to participate, are moved into RLG-held areas to indicate that further violations of the cease-fire will be resisted. US and allied troops would initiate no offensive action against Communist-held positions. The limited US military intentions would be conveyed to the Communist side both privately and publicly.

11. The assumed Communist military operations would probably mean that the Communists had decided to force the RLG into negotiations under more unfavorable conditions or to eliminate, bit by bit, effective RLG control. They would have estimated that, by refraining from an all-out attempt at military takeover, US intervention could, in fact, be avoided.

12. Despite the US assertion of limited military objectives, the Communists almost certainly would suspect that US intentions were broader, and they would take such steps as they deemed necessary to protect themselves and their positions in Laos against further US deployments and a US attack. They would almost certainly intensify their logistical

buildup, further strengthen North Vietnamese forces, and possibly introduce Chinese Communist "volunteers" into the northern provinces of Laos. However, as in the case of Course C, we believe that the Communist forces would probably press for a negotiated settlement with the withdrawal of US troops as the initial objective of any agreement.

IV. ASSUMPTION THREE

The Communist side resumes military activity with offensives against the major towns along the Mekong remaining in RLG hands. US policy shifts from seeking a neutralist coalition government to seeking a *de facto* partition of Laos.

COURSE E: Troops from the US and Thailand, and from those SEATO members willing to participate, enter Laos to establish a *de facto* partition of the country which would leave in RLG hands only that part of Laos south of approximately the 17th parallel. The allied forces would take offensive action to clear and secure southern Laos to the border with South Vietnam.

13. The assumed Communist military operations against the major towns remaining in Laotian Government hands would mean that the Communists had abandoned the idea of a neutral Laos under a coalition government and had determined to end the Laotian conflict by military means. Their intent would be to bring Laos under direct Communist control by achieving a quick and complete victory over the RLG.

14. The Communist decision to conduct such a general offensive would mark a major new step in Communist policy regarding Laos. We believe that such a decision, marking a substantial shift in Bloc policy, would have been based on a belief that the US would not respond by intervening and would have been preceded by considerable debate among the Communist partners. When the US intervened, the Communists

would be concerned to prevent the conflict from spreading beyond Laos. Nevertheless, they would take such steps as they deemed necessary to protect themselves and their positions in Laos against further US deployments and a US counterattack. They would resist strenuously a US effort to clear the area to the South Vietnamese border. They would almost certainly initiate a rapid logistical buildup, further strengthen North Vietnamese forces, and possibly introduce Chinese Communist "volunteers." They would probably assume that the US would not be willing to wage a prolonged and unpopular war, and that the US would in due course be prepared to negotiate a settlement.

COURSE F: In addition to the areas occupied under Course E, allied forces occupy Sayaboury Province and, with the exception of the city of Luang Prabang, the major towns along the Mekong.

15. Movement into these additional areas would increase the apprehension of the Communists about US intentions. They would offer vigorous resistance at points they had already occupied, almost certainly with North Vietnamese reinforcements. Further, the Chinese Communists would be more likely in this circumstance than under Course E above to commit their own forces, probably under the fiction that they are "volunteers."


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Road
Trail
Route number
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CHINA
BURMA
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
NORTH VIETNAM
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Gulf of Tonkin
Ssu-mao
Ou Neua
Ou Tay
Lai Chau
Phong Saly
Muong Yo
Boun Neua
Meng La
PHONG SALY
Muong Sing
Nam Tha
Na Mo
NAMTHA
Ban Houei Sai
Muong Sai
LUANG PRABANG
Muong Houn
Pak Beng
Mekong
Luang Prabang
Nam Ou
Dien Bien Phu
Son La
Red River
Black River
Hanoi
Sam Neua
SAM NEUA
Song Ma
Thanh Hoa
Plaine des Jarres
Ban Ban
Khang Khay
Nong Het
Phong Savan
Xieng Khouang
Phou Khoun
Muong Soui
Pa Dong
Muong Kassy
XIENG KHOUANG
Vang Vieng
Namone
Tha Thom
SAYABOURY
Nam Lik
Ban Hin Heup
VIENTIANE
Vientiane
Nong Khai
Udon Thani
Pak Sane
Nam Khut
Nape
Vinh
Ha Tinh
Lak Sao
Nam Theun
KHAMMOUANE
Nhommarath
Thakhek
Mahaxay
Dong Hoi
Seno
SAVANNAKHET
Pha Lane
Tchepone
Savannakhet
Muong Phine
Houei Sane
Quang Tri
Hue
SARAVANE
Saravane
Muang Ubon
Pakse
Bassac
CHAMPASSAK
Attopeu
ATTOPEU
Se Kong
Mekong

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Concurring:

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GROUP 1
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~~TOP SECRET~~

SNIE 58-5/1-62
12 June 1962
TS 0037384

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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 94-28
Document # 72

SPECIAL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 58-5/1-62

Communist Reactions to Additional US Courses of Action in Laos and North Vietnam

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
12 JUNE 1962

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JAN 2001

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 58-5/1-62

Communist Reactions to Additional US Courses of Action in Laos and North Vietnam

TOP SECRET

COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO ADDITIONAL US COURSES OF ACTION IN LAOS AND NORTH VIETNAM

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the likely Communist responses to certain courses of action by US and allied forces with respect to Laos which are in addition to those considered in SNIE 58–5–62, "Probable Communist Reactions to Certain Possible US Actions with Respect to Laos," dated 31 May 1962. These courses of action were provided by the Departments of State and Defense.

THE ESTIMATE

A. *US air attacks against Communist supply bases in Laos and against the Laotian parts of the main overland supply routes from North Vietnam.* This course of action might be taken in connection with or subsequent to occupation of the major Mekong River areas of Laos by 8,000–10,000 US troops supported by Thai forces.

1. The Communists would almost certainly conclude that the US was preparing for extensive military operations in Laos, particularly if reinforcements and supplies were being built up in Thailand. They would attempt to cope with the US air attacks by both passive and active means and would maintain their forces in the areas of Laos they now control. Therefore, it seems likely that North Vietnamese antiaircraft units in Laos would be reinforced. In addition, small numbers of fighter aircraft, flown by Chinese Communist and possibly Soviet pilots, perhaps in the guise of North Vietnamese, probably would be introduced into North Viet-

namese airfields. The Soviet airlift would almost certainly continue as feasible. To the extent of their limited capabilities, Communist aircraft would probably attempt some retaliatory action against US positions in Laos. However, as long as the US air attacks were confined to Laos, the Communists would almost certainly not extend their own air operations beyond the Laotian borders.

2. We believe that the Communist ground forces would probably intensify the actions we have already estimated they would take in response to the US occupation of the Mekong River valley areas: they would probably deploy to confine the areas under US control and harass US outposts, patrols, and lines of communications. North Vietnamese reinforcements would almost certainly be introduced. The Chinese Communists would reinforce their border garrisons and some forces might enter northern Laos. Moscow and Peiping would almost certainly increase their logistics support to North Vietnam.

3. At the same time the Communists would be concerned to keep the conflict from spreading beyond Laos, and would take vigorous political action, including intensified propaganda efforts, to obtain a cessation of hostilities and the resumption of negotiations.

B. *US air attacks against North Vietnam.* The US air attacks would be extended to include the North Vietnamese ends of the main supply routes into Laos, but not the principal population centers such as Hanoi. This course of action might be taken as part of a US offensive involving 45,000 US troops to occupy the panhandle area of Laos or might be undertaken in connection with the lesser action involving the occupation of the Mekong River valley only.

4. Attacks on North Vietnam territory would, in the Communist view, mark a major turning point in the situation. The Soviets and Chinese would declare their full support for Hanoi. In an immediate effort to obtain a cessation of the US attacks, they would orchestrate their political, diplomatic, and propaganda moves in the UN and elsewhere against what they would proclaim was an act of outright aggression.

5. Peiping and Moscow would almost certainly introduce air support to protect North Vietnamese territory. The chances of the introduction of Chinese Communist troops into Laos would increase significantly, but we do not believe that they would consider it necessary to introduce them into North Vietnam at this stage. The Communists would be concerned to keep hostilities from spreading and, initially, they would confine their action to the defense of North Vietnam. However, if the US attacks were intense and sustained, and particularly if they were associated with a US investment of the Laotian panhandle, the Communists would be likely to regard them as a forerunner of a general military offensive against North Vietnam. Under these circumstances, they would almost certainly attempt to extend their air attacks to include bases in Thailand and possibly in South Vietnam and US carriers. We do not believe that there would be significant differences between Moscow and Peiping insofar as the question of coming to the aid of Hanoi is concerned.

C. *Amphibious Operations Against North Vietnam.* This situation assumes a division-strength landing in the Vinh area followed by a drive west to the Laos border to link up with US forces in Laos. This course of action would be undertaken in connection with a US offensive involving 45,000 US troops to occupy the panhandle area of Laos.

6. Open invasion of North Vietnam would be considered by the Communist Bloc as a direct challenge to the integrity of the North Vietnamese regime and as a threat to the security of Communist China. Hanoi would take speedy and vigorous action to repel the invasion.[1] Communist China would almost certainly provide additional ground forces if they were needed. The Bloc would launch a violent propaganda campaign, warning of the danger of nuclear war, in an effort to obtain US withdrawal under international pressure and condemnation. If the US was undeterred and the invasion made headway, US ground and naval units in the immediate area would almost certainly be attacked by Com-

[1] The North Vietnamese Army consists of 280,000 regular troops supported by 100,000 militia.

munist air elements, perhaps under the guise of a North Vietnamese air force. In addition, it is possible that Communist submarines would be brought to bear. Supply and operational bases in Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand would probably be attacked by Communist air forces. The Communists would be highly unlikely to take the initiative to resort to nuclear weapons at this level of US action.

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

National Security Agency expert has arrived in Saigon to debrief this defector jointly with [redacted]

b. As of 12 June 1962, all provincial intelligence surveys have been completed. A total of 27 finished reports have been forwarded to Commissioner Nguyen Van Y, leaving 17 in various stages of completion.

c. A contract was signed for the construction of the CIO Interrogation Center and work has begun. The contract calls for completion of the main interrogation facility in eight weeks.

B. Covert Intelligence

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

1. Various [redacted] assets have reported projected changes in the Ministry of Civic Action. On 5 June Minister Ngo Trong Hieu stated that President Diem had directed that the three major elements of youth, civic action, and information revert to their former status of autonomous entities and that the Ministry Secretariat be abolished. Diem also directed that Civic Action teams cease functioning as aggressive combat units and be used only for self defense. The exact date for implementing these changes is not yet known but the changes are regarded as a blow to the prestige of Hieu.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

2. One [redacted] asset has reported that the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) was quite impressed and pleased with the establishment of the Joint Operations Center (JOC) and resultant improvement in operational effectiveness.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

3. Limited public opinion sampling in Phong Dinh Province (SW of Saigon) confirms previous reporting that the peasant, for the most part, is hostile or has adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude toward the regime. Reasons were: injustices of GVN officials, shelling of village by GVN forces, inadequacy of GVN aid to villages. These reports constitute initial results of a continuing unilateral program designed to better determine rural attitudes and reactions. [redacted] Saigon will attempt to determine the reaction of the population to aerial strikes.

TS 182485

Copy 1

II. SOUTH LAOS (Paramilitary Operations)

On 5 June a special Clandestine Action Service six-man team with two Laotian guides was launched to conduct reconnaissance and harassment operations in the vicinity of Muong Nong, located about 15 miles south of Route 9 (XD 605100).

III. NORTH VIETNAM

A. Intelligence

1. A singleton agent was putashore by junk in the Phat Diem area on the night of 1 June. The agent is to proceed overland to Hanoi to reestablish former contacts with Catholic groups and report on possible sabotage targets, as well as political and economic conditions. The agent is scheduled to return in one month.

2. Another singleton agent was put ashore by junk in Thanh Hoa Province on 10 June. This agent is also to proceed overland to Hanoi in an attempt to recontact persons formerly employed with him in intelligence activities. Targets are order of battle and political and economic information.

B. Paramilitary

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

A [redacted] junk transporting a team of underwater swimmers (UDT) was launched on 30 May on a mission whose objective was to destroy one or more Swatow class gunboats moored near Ba Don, located approximately 75 miles north of the 17th parallel. Within 35 kilometers of the target the junk was challenged and then pursued by two larger enemy vessels. The junk escaped but was unable to reach the target. Excellent reconnaissance support was rendered by COMSUBPAC.

C. Psychological Warfare

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

A black radio, purporting to be voice of the Front for the Liberation for South Vietnam (FLSVN), but long off the air for technical reasons, again began broadcasting. Its objective will be to sow discord between the FLSVN and the Vietnamese communist party (Peoples Revolutionary Party). Thematic guidance and technical help has been provided by [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Highlights (29 May to 12 June)

1. The preliminary interrogation of a North Vietnamese Army Signal Corps Lieutenant, who defected to the GVN on 24 May, has been completed (paragraph I A 2a).

2. Limited public opinion sampling in Phong Dinh Province (SW of Saigon) confirms previous reporting that the peasant, for the most part, is hostile or has adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude toward the regime. (Paragraph I B 3)

3. Construction of the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) Interrogation Center has begun (paragraph I A 2c).

4. Two singleton agents were infiltrated via junk into North Vietnam on 1 June and 10 June respectively (paragraphs III A 1 and 2).

TS 182485

Copy /

ITS HIGH-SACRIFICE SPIRIT AND ITS HATE-AMERICA IDEALS, WILL GET 90 PERCENT SUPPORT FROM THE PEOPLE. ON THE MILITARY SIDE, THE US HAS USED ULTRA-MODERN MECHANIZED WEAPONS TO DESTROY ARMED UNITS BY TACTICS OF AREA PACIFICATION. THUS HARRASSED, THE VC ARE NEVER SECURE. THEIR POLICIES MUST NOW AIM AT THE INTERNAL SITUATION AND AT UPHOLDING THE HARDSHIP-BEARING SPIRIT. MEANWHILE, VC ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS DO NOT YET EXIST, BUT THE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN INSPIRED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT OF THE PARTY. ECONOMICALLY, VC AGRARIAN REFORMS HAVE SOLVED THE LAND PROBLEM FOR THE PEASANTS AND NOW CONSTITUTE THE FOOD SOURCE FOR THE TROOPS AND CADRES. [redacted] COMMENT. "VC AGRARIAN REFORMS" REFER TO THE DE FACTO LAND EXPROPRIATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE VIET MINH DURING THE 1945-54 WAR.) FOREST AND SEA RESOURCES ARE STILL SECONDARY AND BRING IN ONLY SOME SUPPORT IN THE FORM OF TAXES. THE VC ARE MEETING GREAT DIFFICULTIES AT THE PRESENT TIME, BUT THE SVN PROBLEM WILL BE SOLVED BY INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND INTERNAL MILITARY MEASURES, I.E. STRONG ATTACKS. [redacted] COMMENT. THE SOLUTION THROUGH "INTERNATIONAL POLITICS" REFERS TO THE BELIEF THAT, IF THE VC CAN MAINTAIN THE PRESENT RELATIVE STALEMATE LONG ENOUGH, THE US WILL TIRE OF THE STRUGGLE AND SEEK SOME KIND OF NEUTRALIST SOLUTION.)

3. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID CINCPAC PACAF PACFLT ARPAC

END OF MESSAGE

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

#1337

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT [redacted] POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT

DATE DISTR. 15 JUNE 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

REFERENCES IN

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

APPRAISAL [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. [redacted] THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM WERE GETTING TIRED OF THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THAT SOME ACTION WAS GOING TO BE TAKEN TO CHANGE IT. THIS TIME, HOWEVER, THE PLANS WERE NOT GOING TO BE COMMUNICATED TO THE AMERICANS BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES, A BASICALLY LAW-ABIDING NATION, IS OPPOSED TO UNLAWFUL ACTS. SINCE A COUP D'ETAT IS CONSIDERED BY AMERICAN OFFICIALS TO BE AN UNLAWFUL PROCESS, THE US IS FORCED TO DISCOURAGE SUCH ACTIONS, AND THEREFORE, THE AMERICANS WILL NOT BE NOTIFIED OF ANY FUTURE ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF THE VIETNAMESE TO UPSET THE CURRENT REGIME UNTIL THE ACTION IS ACCOMPLISHED.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

(7)

(21)

2. [redacted]ISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF.

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NLK-92-179

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

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20 JUNE 1962
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DOCUMENT # 13



E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(T)

1. Communist China

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(T)

Ground and air movements into the Foochow-Amoy area continued yesterday. [redacted] there are some indications that civilians are being evacuated from the coastal area. [redacted]

2. Thailand

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(T)

The King of Thailand, besides calling publicly for even tempers on the temple issue, is doing what he can in private to hold back the hotheads. [redacted] suspects that the announcement of a boycott of the Geneva conference and SEATO meetings is a device to release pressures and win time for the government to work its way out of its quandary.

3. Brazil

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(T)

President Goulart will probably propose that foreign minister Dantas be moved up to prime minister. The nomination is certain to encounter conservative opposition in the Brazilian congress but stands a fair chance of going through. [redacted] are not enthusiastic about the prospect. They rate Dantas head-and-shoulders above the present prime minister, Tancredo Neves, in skill and effectiveness, but consider him a political trimmer and something of a demagogue. He was a Fascist in the 30's but now stands on the left wing of Goulart's Labor party and has sought and received Communist backing for the prime ministry.

4. Moscow lowers draft age

The Soviet government has reduced the draft registration age from 18 to 17. This will probably be followed by the lowering of the induction age to 18 from the present 19. We think this measure results directly from the sharp decline in birth rate during World War II. (The number of 19 year-old males has fallen from 2.4 million in 1958 to about one million this year.) By inducting two classes in one year, the Soviets will hold their forces at the present levels.

5. Argentina

President Guido is facing a new crisis in the form of heavy pressure from a hard-line military faction which wants him to move further to the right in domestic policy. Guido is ready to reshuffle his cabinet to placate the group, which is described as small but determined, but our people in Buenos Aires are not sure this will be enough to avert a move to supplant him.

6. Laos

The argument over whether the National Assembly will be mentioned in the King's investiture decree continued through yesterday. Souvanna has also taken exception to what he believes to be an implication in the decree, as it now stands, that his coalition government will have only nominal authority until military and administrative integration of the opposing factors has been achieved. Phoumi is being urged [redacted]--and even by the King--to give in on these points.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(T)

7. South Vietnam - Cambodia

From what we have learned from the [redacted] representative on the ICC, the commission's investigation will support Cambodia's charge that South Vietnamese forces violated the Cambodia border last Saturday and that the incursion resulted in Cambodian civilian casualties--three, according to the preliminary report. [redacted] that there were three US military advisors and three US newsmen with the South Vietnamese who were in pursuit of suspected Viet Cong elements. Witnesses to the incidents are reporting the presence of "white men" and we take it for granted that Communist propaganda will play this to the hilt.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(T)

8. East Germany

We have been reporting recently in general terms that the East German government is increasingly uneasy over signs of popular discontent [redacted]



E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(T)

NOTES

A. On the eve of yesterday's action in the US House, the Dominican government had become so worked up over its sugar quota prospects that it suspended drawings from the $25 million US loan. Ambassador Martin reports that "the Alianza, as of the moment, is at a dead stop."

B. Nehru's daughter has admitted that he has a prostate condition, which she fears may be malignant, and thinks he may undergo surgery, possibly in September.

C. Ghana feels it will reap more prestige from the World Peace Assembly opening in Accra tomorrow if the gathering steers clear of ideological extremes. The generally leftist orientation of the attending delegations gives pretty good assurance, however, that whatever emerges on the disarmament question will be more pleasing to Moscow than to us.

DOCUMENT OF INTEREST

I. French attitude on British EEC accession.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

For The President Only—~~Top Secret~~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUL 2000

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

100, [redacted] We are hopeful that the CIO will represent eventually an intelligence asset, but realistically we cannot expect professional results from it for a considerable period of time.

B. National Police and Security Service (NPSS): In addition to an overt collection function, NPSS is expanding, throughout the country, its special police branch for semi-covert intelligence operations, and is creating, [redacted] a special operations corps for VC penetration. On the whole, NPSS reporting has lacked good sourcing and coverage outside of Saigon, and needs a great deal of improving. The NPSS is frequently capable of detecting VC intentions within Saigon in advance, particularly regarding terrorist attacks. NPSS does have a studies bureau for the correlation of intelligence but the personnel are self-trained and generally not very competent.

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C. Service des Etudes Politiques et Sociales (SEPES): This is the political intelligence arm of the Presidency and is engaged in both collection and operations. However, we consider this service to be insecure, mismanaged, and filled with bureaucratic pettiness. It is not considered an effective

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tool for collection of intelligence on the VC.

D. Vietnamese Military Intelligence Service (J-2): This service is improving under the guidance of American advisors but its intelligence product is still fragmentary, badly sourced and is often not disseminated with the speed necessary to make it tactically useful. The joint general staff remains reluctant to cooperate with other services and the CIO and these interservice disputes slow down and confuse dissemination. This organization's most serious deficiency is exploitation of prisoners, defectors and captured documents although there has been a small improvement in the field. The evaluative processes employed by J-2 are rudimentary and it is seldom possible for J-2 to identify the ultimate source in even routine reporting.

E. Vietnamese Military Security Service (MSS): In general, training of MSS officers has been good, and the service could, but does not, make a real contribution to the over-all GVN collection and evaluation effort. Its activities have been limited by Ngo Dinh Nhu to loyalty investigations of Vietnamese Army personnel and to the detection of VC within army ranks. The MSS has no effective intelligence evaluation center and is still steadfastly non-cooperative with the CIO. On the other hand, individual MSS field officers are often

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DATE: JUL 2000

better qualified and more interested in intelligence correlation than the Vietnamese Army G-2 or the civilian security representation.

F. Vietnamese Army Special Telecommunications Exploitation Service: This service is a part of the Joint General Staff and [redacted] it operates a studies bureau whose proficiency in locating some clandestine VC transmitters is improving. This bureau has prepared very practical and useful intelligence for use in planning attacks against VC transmitters. The studies bureau has also recently taken the initiative in interrogating and exploiting two VC defectors and the rapidity with which the defectors were made available for professional interrogation is a promising sign. The evaluative process of the studies bureau is good but is slow and limited.

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3. United States Intelligence Organizations:

A. CIA: Although the CIA Station has expanded very rapidly over the past year, the majority of this expansion has been directed toward action projects in paramilitary and psychological warfare fields. Although the intelligence capability of the Station has improved in the past year [redacted]

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DATE: JUL 2008

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[redacted] the collection capability of these personnel is not yet fully developed. The Station is making a major effort to improve the collection of intelligence [redacted]

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The evaluative process of the Station is generally very good primarily because of the presence at the Station of many officers with considerable experience in Vietnam and also because of the wide variety of contacts available to Station personnel.

B. J-2 USMACV: J-2 now has 130 personnel in Saigon headquarters and nearly 100 more American advisors in the

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DATE: JUL 2000

provinces. It is doubtful if adding more United States military intelligence personnel would significantly increase the capabilities of this service.

C. CIC: Its mission is the security protection of USMACV and components, including the collection of information on significant military figures in the GVN and the VC, and the collection of data on civilians who may have aspirations toward the violent seizure of power. An important CIC activity is the briefing and debriefing of selected military advisors concerning their Vietnamese counterparts. CIC, with a staff of 30 officers, coordinates with the CIA Station regarding liaison with the GVN intelligence and security services.

D. The 500th Military Intelligence Group (MIG): This element of the United States Army's clandestine service is charged with regular reporting on political, military, and propaganda activities of the GVN and the VC. The sources of most of its information appear to derive from liaison with Vietnamese services and from a few agent contacts.

4. CIA Station Chief comments:

A. Intelligence on the VC is still unsatisfactory, particularly with reference to adequate sourcing, evaluation,

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DATE: JUL 2000

collation, and timing. The most important failure in the system is the lack of GVN effective interservice coordination and the haphazard exploitation of prisoners and defectors. With respect to this latter point, interrogators are being trained, a CIO interservice interrogation center is under construction and improved interrogation guides in English and Vietnamese are being provided.

B. The presence of the American intelligence advisors now in each province, [redacted] may help remedy defects on the Vietnamese side. This will, however, be a slow and arduous task. Where possible, the Station is encouraging establishment of provincial councils including representatives of all local United States and GVN services, operating under province chiefs.

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C. Difficulties continue to exist in the flow of intelligence from the provinces into Saigon. A province chief, for example, who usually is a military officer has more than one information reporting channel; he may forward his information by direct communication to the Palace, avoiding any evaluation process, or he may submit it through military echelons to Saigon. By the latter means, his reporting will go through some evaluation process, but there remains the possibility

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DATE: JUL 2000

that the province chief will submit less information through military channels.

D. The feasible pace of improvement within the GVN intelligence community depends on President Diem's willingness to make obviously needed changes at a risk, from his point of view, of steadily increasing United States influence within GVN military and internal security establishments. Diem apparently concurs fully in the need for a complete overhauling of the GVN intelligence community but he will continue to set the pace of change and the terms of liaison relationships, in accordance with his estimate of the degree to which United States influence within the internal security establishment poses a possible political threat to the stability of his regime. However, pressure on Diem to increase the pace of improvement would undoubtedly be interpreted by him as evidence of a United States desire to increase its influence in internal affairs, whereas a slower and steadier increase in the GVN intelligence capability, within politically palatable limits, may encourage him gradually to step up the pace. With the United States personnel now present and the plans now in

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DATE: JUL 2000

process of implementation, it can be expected that the GVN intelligence structure should reach its improved capability by early 1963.

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e. At the Thu Duc training camp, two 200-man airborne ranger companies, six teams of three to seven men each, who are to be sabotage specialists, are in training. A 100-man ranger company completed a six-week course. Also two 15-man operation teams for patrol and document collection completed training.

f. At the Soc Trong training camp there are in training a 400-man commando force, a 150-man strike force. Newly constructed barracks will house 720 trainees.

g. At the Song Mao training camp 353 men have completed training, 216 are in training and 200 weapons have been issued.

h. At the Phan Rang training base, camp and range facilities are being constructed.

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2. [redacted] GVN Intelligence and Security Services

a. The NPSS Special Operations Corps (formerly DIS) has been activated at Nha Trang. This unit will cover five provinces.

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b. [redacted] CIO operation located and penetrated a VC installation which housed a VC special zone committee for Saigon. However, ARVN after receiving information failed to move due to CO III Corps instructions because he doubted validity of information. CIO attempting reschedule a strike against the installation.

c. The ARVN Psywar Directorate initiated a domestic aerial leaflet campaign 22 June. Over 400,000 leaflets were dropped in SVN which were attributed to an independent front group seeking support of the peasantry against the VC.

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B. [redacted]

1. [redacted] the new Director General of Information, Pham Van Tao, is tightening up information activities with the specific result that accurate casualty figures on the 19 June Ben Cat ambush were released. Pham Van Tao is also briefing the Vietnamese press on the propaganda line for the ICC report.

[redacted]

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II. SOUTH LAOS

Nothing to report.

III. NORTH VIETNAM

Nothing to report.

is further envisaged that military intelligence capabilities will cover to some extent compliance with or violation of the Geneva Agreements by enemy forces. The latter would include such items as withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Laos and possible violations of the cease fire by enemy forces.

3. On 16 June Colonel Vang Pao, the Meo commander, addressed a number of Meo commanders and members of his own staff. Colonel Vang Pao spoke of the accomplishments of the Meos in the past 18 months and spoke of the current situation. Colonel Vang Pao told his commanders that Meo troops should keep their unit integrity and retain their organization and weapons. However, the Meos should not launch attacks of any kind against the Communists or Kong Le forces except as ordered by Vang Pao. If a Souvanna government were replaced by a Communist government, the Meos should, said Vang Pao, if the Meo-held area became completely untenable, be prepared to relocate to other parts of Laos, Thailand, or South Vietnam.

4. Plans are continuing for a Laos staybehind headquarters in Thailand in implementation of previous policy guidance. These plans call for a staybehind headquarters in northeast or central Thailand with radio communication from Meo intelligence cadres in Laos to the staybehind command post in Thailand.

5. [redacted]

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6. A total of approximately 700 Lao and tribal people formed into six counterguerrilla groups are currently operating [redacted] in areas of central and south central Laos. The groups, based at Thakhek, have the mission

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of harassing enemy supply lines on and near Routes 8 and 12 in central Laos and collecting intelligence on enemy activities. Heavy enemy pressure forced three groups to return to Thakhek from the Route 12 area in early June, and these groups are being retrained. One group which is in process of establishing a base north of Tchepone (in south central Laos) appears better qualified to fulfill its mission because of better leadership and motivation. The other groups have a limited capability for harassment and intelligence collection which it is hoped can be improved with training and better leadership.

SABOTAGED BY MILITARY FIELD COMMANDERS AND, MOST DANGEROUSLY, BY THE PROVINCE CHIEFS. [redacted] THE MILITARY VIEW THAT THESE HAMLETS FORCED TOO MUCH OF THE ARMED FORCES INTO STATIC DEFENSE, [redacted] OPPOSED TO THE PRACTICE OF IGNORING CHAINS OF COMMAND AND PROPER COORDINATION PRACTICED BY THE MILITARY COMMANDERS, PARTICULARLY THE FIELD GENERALS AND THE REGIONAL AND ZONE COMMANDERS. [redacted] THE INDEPENDENT APPROACH OF THE PROVINCE CHIEFS, RATHER THAN THE MILITARY ATTITUDE, IS WHAT MAY WRECK THE WHOLE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM. [redacted] AS AN EXAMPLE THE FIRST CLASS OF TRAINEES AT THE THI NGHE STRATEGIC HAMLET TRAINING CENTER FOR WHICH PROVINCE CHIEFS SELECTED PERSONNEL FROM THE LOWEST ELEMENTS POSSIBLE. THE TRAINEES WERE ILLITERATE PEASANTS, THE LOWEST RANKS OF THE SELF DEFENSE CORPS AND THE CIVIL GUARD, CRIMINAL ELEMENTS, JUVENILE DELINQUENTS, AND OTHERS WHO CONSTITUTED A CONTROL PROBLEM OR WERE PERSONS OF WHOM THE PROVINCE CHIEFS SIMPLY WANTED TO BE RID. THIS INDICATED THAT THE PROVINCE CHIEFS HAD PAID NO ATTENTION TO THE INITIAL REQUESTS FOR TRAINEES IN GOOD STANDING IN THEIR COMMUNITIES AND HAVING ENOUGH PRESTIGE TO INFLUENCE THE PEOPLE WHEN THEY RETURNED FROM THE TRAINING COURSE. [redacted] THE PROVINCE CHIEFS SELECT TRAINEES OF THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE CALIBER

FOR THE SECOND TRAINING CLASS, SPECIFYING THAT THEY BE CHOSEN FROM AMONG DISTRICT CHIEFS, ASSISTANT DISTRICT CHIEFS, AND GOVERNMENT BUREAU CHIEFS. IF SUCH PERSONS COULD NOT BE DESIGNATED TO ATTEND THE CLASS, TRAINEES WERE TO BE DRAWN FROM RESPECTED ELEMENTS OF THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY OR FROM THE EDUCATED CLASSES. [redacted] THE PROVINCE CHIEFS HAD POINTEDLY IGNORED [redacted] ORDERS AND THAT THE SECOND CLASS AT THE NGHE WOULD PROBABLY PROVE TO BE LITTLE BETTER THAN THE FIRST.

3. [redacted] THE PRESIDENCY IS CONCERNED OVER THE CONTINUED MISUSE OF THE PEASANTS BY THE PROVINCE CHIEFS IN BUILDING THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS. THE FAILURE HERE IS NOT SO MUCH A QUESTION OF THE NECESSITY FOR USING THE PEOPLE AS IT IS OF THE HARSH, DICTATORIAL APPROACH BY THE PROVINCE CHIEFS, WHICH IS TURNING THE PEASANTS MORE AND MORE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND ENCOURAGING A DEEP-SEATED HATRED AMONG THE PEASANTS AND THE ENTIRE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC HAMLETS. [redacted] THERE HAS BEEN EXTENSIVE CORRUPTION IN THE USE OF FUNDS AND SUPPLIES PROVIDED THE PROVINCE CHIEFS FOR SETTING UP THE HAMLETS.

4. [redacted] PRESIDENT DIEM IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATED WITH THE STRAGEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM AS CONCEIVED AND IMPLEMENTED [redacted] DIEM IS ALSO CRITICAL OF [redacted] APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM IN CENTRAL VIETNAM AND [redacted] HE DOES NOT REALLY CARE WHAT THE AMERICANS DO. DIEM RECENTLY TOLD [redacted] THAT

HE IS BECOMING TIRED OF HEARING ABOUT THE DOCTRINE OF PERSONALISM AND REMARKED THAT HE APPARENTLY WAS EXPECTED TO BELIEVE WHAT HE REFERRED TO AS "THIS NONSENSE."

5. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMAC USOM MAAG CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC.

END OF MESSAGE

ELEMENTS FROM LAOS TO SOUTH VIETNAM. ALTHOUGH THIS ALWAYS POSSIBILITY AND IS OF COURSE SOURCE SERIOUS CONCERN GVN, SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT BULK OF PAVN ELEMENTS ACCEPTED AS BEING CURRENTLY DEPLOYED IN LAOS ARE BELIEVED BE LOCATED EITHER ALONG ROUTE 7 OR IN NORTHERN LAOS. THEIR REDEPLOYMENT INTO SOUTH VIETNAM WOULD SEEM POSE AT LEAST AS MANY DIFFICULTIES AS INFILTRATION FRESH ELEMENTS DIRECTLY FROM NORTH VIETNAM VIA LAOS. MOREOVER MOST THESE UNITS PROBABLY COMPOSED NORTHERNERS, WHO WHILE PERHAPS SUITABLE FOR OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN LAOS WOULD BE FAR LESS SUITABLE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM THAN LARGE POOL REGROUPED SOUTHERNERS MANY OF WHOM INCORPORATED INTO 305TH, 324TH AND 338TH DIVISIONS.

"3. RE TRUMBULL'S SPECULATION ON "REPORTED PLAN" FOR "LIBERATED AREA," THIS OF COURSE SOMETHING WHICH MAY EVENTUALLY MATERIALIZE; HOWEVER, HANOI'S CURRENT PROPAGANDA STANCE CONTAINS NO HINT OF EARLY ESTABLISHMENT RIVAL GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH NOR IS THERE ANY SUGGESTION OF THIS IN OTHER REPORTING ON SUBJECT. STATION INCLINED THINK EARLY MOVE THIS DIRECTION WOULD BE ILL-TIMED FROM COMMIE STANDPOINT, COMING AS IT WOULD ON HEELS OF ICC DECISION ON SUBVERSION, ESTABLISHMENT OF LAOS COALITION AND IMPENDING 14-NATION GENEVA AGREEMENT ON LAOS. QUESTION SETTING UP RIVAL GOVT MAY WELL HAVE BEEN SUBJECT CONVERSATION BETWEEN HO CHI MINH AND RUSSIANS AT MOSCOW, BUT WE TEND TO DOUBT RUSSIANS WOULD BE VERY KEEN ON ITS EARLY ESTABLISHMENT SINCE IT WOULD VIRTUALLY FORCE THEM PROVIDE OPEN AID TO

VC, THUS LEADING TO ESCALATION IN TERMS OF CONFLICT HERE WHICH WE WOULD NOT THINK SOVIETS AT THIS JUNCTURE PREPARED ACCEPT.

"4. RE ESTIMATE RECENT INFILTRATIONS WHICH TRUMBULL ATTRIBUTED TO GVN, THE CIA STATION IS UNABLE ASCERTAIN WHAT ELEMENT GVN GAVE HIM FIGURE, BUT TOTAL CONSIDERABLY IN EXCESS WHAT MACV CARRYING. OF POSSIBLE INTEREST IS FOLLOWING MACV ESTIMATE MONTHLY FLOW INFILTRATIONS FROM JUNE 1961 UNTIL PRESENT: FROM JUNE TO DEC 1961, 500-1000 PER MONTH; FROM JAN TO APRIL 1962, 100-200 PER MONTH; MAY AND JUNE, 800-1000. ESTIMATE BASED ON ANALYSIS CERTAIN CIA REPORTS (MAINLY FROM ARVN G-2 REPRESENTATIVES IN LIAISON AT SAVANNAKHET WITH FAR G-2), ON-THE-SPOT CONVERSATIONS IN PLEIKU WITH II CORPS INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND THE MAAG ADVISOR THERE, AND ESTIMATES GVN JOINT GENERAL STAFF J-2. ALTHOUGH MACV J-2 READILY AGREES HARD INFO ON SUBJECT DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN, ITS ESTIMATE APPARENTLY MADE ONLY AFTER CONSIDERABLE STUDY OF PROBLEM AND IS PROBABLY FAR CLOSER TO TRUTH THAN CONSIDERABLY HIGHER GVN ESTIMATES."

CIA HEADQUARTERS COMMENT:

WE BELIEVE THE FIGURES USED BY THE NEW YORK TIMES ARE GROSSLY EXAGGERATED THOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF INCREASING INFILTRATION SINCE EARLY MAY. EVEN THESE REPORTS ARE TENUOUS ALTHOUGH THEY DO SUGGEST SOME MOVEMENT IS TAKING PLACE ALONG THE TRAILS. THERE HAS

BEEN NO CONFIRMATION THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS HAVE BEGUN WITHDRAWING FROM LAOS. WHILE WE BELIEVE THERE WILL BE SOME COVERT WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FROM LAOS FOLLOWING AN AGREEMENT AT GENEVA AND THAT INFILTRATION INTO SOUTH VIETNAM PROBABLY WILL BE ACCELERATED, WE DO NOT THINK THAT THE BULK OF NORTH VIETNAMESE IN LAOS WOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO SOUTH VIETNAM. PAST EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE NORMALLY PUT INFILTRATORS THROUGH SPECIAL TRAINING AND INDOCTRINATION BEFORE SENDING THEM SOUTH.

DTG: 052150Z

Highlights (27 June - 10 July)

1. The Fighting Fathers program in the delta area of South Vietnam now includes 1831 persons trained and 1217 armed.

2. The Rhade program in the Buon Enao complex has now trained a total of 2308 villagers and 2968 weapons have been issued.

3. President Diem approved a reorganization of the police complex creating a Directorate General of Police.

4. All paramilitary activities [redacted] have been ordered stopped by President Diem pending the outcome of the 14-nation Geneva Conference.

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STATUS REPORT
OF THE
TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA

COVERT ANNEX - VIETNAM
(27 June - 10 July)

I. SOUTH VIETNAM

A. Counterinsurgency Programs

1. Citizens Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG's)

a. Fighting Fathers program in the delta area now includes 1831 persons trained and 1217 armed. This does not include Father Hoa's area. Key developments during the period are as follows:

(1) 32 Thompson submachine guns and grenades were delivered to Father Tung's parrish in Long Phu.

(2) 100 grenades and a flare pistol were delivered to Father Phuoc's parrish in Rach Trang.

(3) 15 new recruits and their families, eight tons of rice and eight tons of lumber were transported to Binh Hung for Father Hoa.

(4) In Kien Giang Province, a conference was held on 5 July to implement an extension of the Catholic Youth program in that province. 30 of the Catholic Youth were armed as a nucleus for future expansion.

b. In the Rhade Buon Enao complex there are now 2308 villagers trained, 2968 weapons issued, 83 villages organized and a strike force of 576 men trained and armed. The VC have raided two villages in the Buon Enao area and have captured small quantities of rice. The VC have also attempted to propagandize the Rhade villagers upon the return from their training program at Buon Enao. An ex-VC village was established six kilometers east of Buon Enao in which 38 re-educated ex-VC are building homes and planting crops.

c. At the Thu Duc Training Camp a 40-man ranger and a 30-man combat police training course have commenced. Two 15-man montagnard commando teams began a seven week course on 2 July and an additional 133 trainees of the Clandestine Action Service, which falls under the Office of the Presidency, began a program of training.

d. At the Soc Trang Training Camp a class of 10 village medics completed training on 9 July. 28 VC suspects were arrested who admitted that they had been intimidated by the VC to obtain the order of battle of the Soc Trang camp and to steal ammunition. The VC have stepped up their propaganda in this area with the theme "You killed French. You can do same to Americans."

e. At the Song Mao Training Camp the third class of 216 villagers completed a three week course in village defense. They then received a 70 percent complement of weapons and returned to their villages for further on-the-job training. Three 11-man combat intelligence teams will begin a two week accelerated course on 25 July. Medical kits and modest funds for village first aid stations have been turned over to the village chiefs of Hoa Da and Phan Ly. This medical aid program will be integrated into the USOM village aid system on 1 August.

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2. [redacted] GVN Intelligence and Security Services

An encouraging step in the development of the Vietnamese Students' Organization took place in Quebec, Canada, in early July when the Cosec International Conference voted to grant full delegate status to the National Union of Students (NUS) of Vietnam.

B. Covert Intelligence

1. President Diem on 26 June approved the reorganization of the police complex by creating a Directorate General of Police. The National Police and Security Service)NPSS) was absorbed into the new directorate as was the Special Operations Corps (SOC) which was transferred from the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO). SOC now has a clear and exclusive charter for covert penetration of key VC apparatus.

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(C)

II. [redacted]

On 6 July President Diem ordered cessation of all [redacted] pending the outcome of the 14-nation Geneva Conference in Laos.

III. NORTH VIETNAM

No report.

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STATUS REPORT
OF THE
TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA

COVERT ANNEX - THAILAND
(28 JUNE - 11 JULY)

1. Capabilities continue to exist as set forth in the previous status report.

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2. [redacted]

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STATUS REPORT
OF THE
TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA

COVERT ANNEX - CAMBODIA
(28 JUNE - 11 JULY)

No change since last report.

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STATUS REPORT
OF THE
TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA

COVERT ANNEX - LAOS
(28 JUNE - 11 JULY)

No change since last report.

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STATUS REPORT
OF THE
TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA

COVERT ANNEX-BURMA
(28 JUNE - 11 JULY)

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CIA has no counter-insurgency action assets or capabilities in Burma. [redacted]

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downgrading and
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2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT WARNING TO PRESIDENT DIEM OF A POSSIBLE COUP D'ETAT ON NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962

DATE DISTR. 1 AUGUST 1962

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. 1 AUGUST 1962

REFERENCES

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (1 AUGUST 1962)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO.

SMITH BUNDY DUNGAN KAYSEN KILDUFF PETERSEN SCHLESINGER TAYLOR BELK

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS

SOURCE [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

1. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT. ALTHOUGH THE COUP D'ETAT DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT DID NOT OCCUR ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962, THIS REPORT IS BEING DISSEMINATED SINCE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED MIGHT EVOLVE A PLAN FOR A FUTURE COUP AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME. SEE [redacted] APPRAISAL IN PARAS. 10 THROUGH 14.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

2. ON 1 AUGUST 1962 LIEUTENANT COLONEL NGUYEN VAN CHAU, CHIEF OF THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SERVICE, STATED AT APPROXIMATELY 2100 HOURS THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM HAD BEEN WARNED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT OCCURING ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962. [redacted] COMMENT. CHAU DID NOT NAME THE INDIVIDUAL FROM

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

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STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	[redacted]	OCI	ONE	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	DIA	CIB
VTF															EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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WHOM HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION.)

3. CHAU ADDED THAT THE COUP WAS ALLEGEDLY BEING PLANNED BY A GROUP OF SENIOR ARVN OFFICERS LED BY ARVN CHIEF OF FIELD COMMAND MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH. CHAU ALSO STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL MAI HUU XUAN, CHIEF OF THE QUANG TRUNG TRAINING CENTER, MIGHT ALSO BE INVOLVED. CHAU INDICATED THAT XUAN'S INVOLVEMENT WAS INFERENTIAL AND NOT EXPLICIT.

4. CHAU COMMENTED WITHOUT FURTHER EXPLANATION THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT ALSO BE INVOLVED. CHAU CONJECTURED THAT NOT MORE THAN TWO ARVN BATTALIONS WERE INVOLVED. HE DID NOT EXPLAIN THE BASIS OF HIS CONJECTURE.

5. AT APPROXIMATELY 2200 HOURS ON 1 AUGUST, MAJOR LONG, CHIEF OF THE CAPITAL REGION MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE (MSS) STATED THAT A CENTRAL TELE-COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER OF THE GIA DINH PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT HAD INTERCEPTED ON 1 AUGUST A VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST (VC) RADIO MESSAGE IN PLAIN TEXT ADDRESSED TO THE VC SAIGON/CHOLON ZONE COMMITTEE INSTRUCTING ALL VC MILITARY UNITS TO BE PREPARED FOR AN UPRISING AT MIDNIGHT ON 1 AUGUST. [redacted] COMMENT. MAJOR LONG DID NOT IDENTIFY THE ORIGINATOR OF THE MESSAGE.) (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT. [redacted] REPORTED THAT ON 23 JULY 1962 THE VC IN THE SAIGON AREA WERE ORDERED TO CEASE ALL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND TO PREPARE FOR A POSSIBLE COUP D'ETAT.)

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(C)

6. MAJOR LONG ADDED THAT GENERAL XUAN HAD INFORMED THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ON 25 JULY 1962 THAT HIS INTELLIGENCE SECTION HAD INTERCEPTED A VC DOCUMENT INSTRUCTING VC PERSONNEL TO BE READY FOR AN UPRISING IN ABOUT ONE

WEEK. [redacted] COMMENT. MAJOR LONG DID NOT KNOW THE ORIGINATOR OR THE ADDRESSEE OF THE INTERCEPTED DOCUMENT, NOR DID HE STATE TO WHICH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCY GENERAL XUAN HAD REPORTED.)

7. MAJOR LONG ALSO REVEALED THAT AN MSS AGENT PENETRATION OF THE VC OF UNTESTED RELIABILITY HAD REPORTED ON 1 AUGUST THAT HIS VC SUPERIOR IN CHAU HIEP (THIRTY KILOMETERS WEST OF SAIGON) HAD INSTRUCTED HIM ON 31 JULY TO BE ALERT FOR A COUP, AND TO MEET HIS VC SUPERIOR IN SAIGON FOUR HOURS AFTER THE COUP BEGAN. E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

8. MAJOR LONG ALSO STATED THAT A HAND GRENADE HAD EXPLODED IN THE GO VAP AREA OF SAIGON ON THE NIGHT OF 1 AUGUST INJURING SEVEN VIETNAMESE WOMEN AND CHILDREN. [redacted] COMMENT. THE RELEVANCE OF THE EXPLOSION TO A COUP ATTEMPT IS NOT CLEAR, BUT MAJOR LONG BELIEVED THAT THE EVENTS MIGHT BE CONNECTED.)

9. THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (SEPES) INTERCEPTED CODED RADIO MESSAGES ON 1 AUGUST ON UNUSUAL FREQUENCIES. THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGES WHEN DECODED WERE IN VIETNAMESE AND FRENCH, AND STATED THAT A COUP WOULD OCCUR ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST. ARVN UNITS HAVE BEEN ALERTED IN THE SAIGON AREA.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C) 10. [redacted] COMMENT. [redacted] WHO HAS PREVIOUSLY STATED THAT OF ALL THE ARVN OFFICERS, GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH WAS THE MOST LIKELY TO LEAD A COUP ATTEMPT. GENERAL MINH HAS BEEN A VOCAL CRITIC OF THE DIEM REGIME INSOFAR AS DIEM'S EFFICACY AGAINST THE VC IS CONCERNED. GENERAL MAI HUU XUAN, FREQUENTLY RUMORED TO BE A MEMBER OF VARIOUS COUP GROUPS,

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

IS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN DISSATISFIED WITH HIS PRESENT ASSIGNMENT AND TO HAVE HARBORED RESENTMENTS AGAINST DIEM FOR ALLEGED SLIGHTS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT DIEM PROMOTED HIM FROM COLONEL TO BRIGADIER GENERAL SEVERAL YEARS AGO. MAJOR LONG HAS EXHIBITED PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE IN HIS PRESENT POSITION.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

11. [redacted] COMMENT. [redacted] THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (CIO) WAS UNAWARE OF ANY POSSIBLE COUP SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT ON 1-2 AUGUST. HOWEVER, AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME, THE NORMAL PRESIDENTIAL GUARD HAD ALREADY BEEN REINFORCED AND POLICE CHECK POINTS ALSO SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN REINFORCED. GIVEN THE ADVANCE ALERT BY THE GVN MILITARY AND SECURITY ELEMENTS, IT IS PROBABLE THAT ANY INTENDED COUP WOULD BE ABORTIVE.

[redacted] COMMENT.

12. /AT 0200 ON 2 AUGUST, SAIGON WAS QUIET AND THERE WERE NO SIGNS APPARENT OF ANY COUP ATTEMPT, EXCEPT FOR THE ALERT OF SOME OF THE GVN ELEMENTS STATED IN PARA. 11.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

13. [redacted] COMMENT. THE INTERCEPT OF A PLAIN TEXT VC RADIO MESSAGE REFERRED TO IN PARA. FIVE IS NOT CONVINCING, AND RAISES THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE VC MIGHT BE ENGAGED IN A CONFUSION MANEUVER. SEPES CAPABILITY TO INTERCEPT AND DECODE A MESSAGE IN THE SAME DAY, AS REPORTED IN PARA. NINE, IS QUESTIONABLE.

14. FIELD DISSEM. STATE CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PAFLT.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

END OF MESSAGE

2c

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

A fragmentary report received by [redacted] indicates that Buon Trap Mewal was under attack again by 6 August. No further details are available at this time.

d. On 24 July a Special Forces "A" team completed the construction of a Buon Enao sub-base located at Buon Ea Khit. Since the initiation of a 12-day training cycle begun on 28 June, a total of 438 villagers have been trained. Buon Ea Khit now comprises 28 armed villages with nine more in process of being organized. Medical personnel at the sub-base treated 1,478 Rhade in the first 25 days of operation.

e. A Special Forces "A" team has begun construction of a CIDG training site at the village of Cong Sum, Phu Yen Province. Facilities of the camp will be used to train Republican Youth as hamlet defenders. During VC probing actions aimed at slowing down construction of the camp, one hand grenade was thrown into the camp on 1 July. However, no casualties have been reported.

f. Since the establishment of the Hoa Cam training camp on 9 January 1962, 3,445 persons have completed training. As of 24 July, an additional 1,137 personnel are in training. These include two trailwatcher companies totaling 360 persons; civic action group, 221; Force Populaire contingent, 417; scout company, 139.

g. At the Du Tho (Soc Trang) training camp a camp security and strike force of three companies consisting of 182 men each has been approved by appropriate GVN authorities. One company is presently in training; a second being assembled; and a third, which is to be made up of Catholic youth, is being recruited.

h. A total of 28,318 patients were treated by all CIDG installations during the month of July. Participating in the program, in addition to Special Forces medical personnel, are 54 indigenous medical personnel who have completed training and 30 additional who are presently undergoing training.

2c

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
E0 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

2. [redacted]

a. As of 31 July, each province in central Vietnam had at least one full company of Force Populaire, which was either in training or had finished training and operative in the villages. A total Force Populaire complement of 4,625, which was approved by President Diem during the month of July, will permit the establishment of four companies consisting of 500 men in each of the nine coastal provinces as well as one company for the autonomous city of Danang. As of 26 July, Ngo Dinh Can has been expecting the Presidential decree which will allocate Self-Defense Corps (SDC) funds for the Force Populaire in the high plateau provinces. This decree would result in an increase of 1,938 men to the Force Popualire.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
E0 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

B. Covert Intelligence

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted] reported extensively on the number of non-Communist oppositionists picked up for questioning. Most of them were released after a short time. It is believed that the interrogations were the GVN's method of keeping oppositionists off balance and as a means of warning them not to engage in anti-regime plotting.

2c

II. SOUTH LAOS

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

III. NORTH VIETNAM

No report.

IT WAS THOUGHT THAT THE MAJOR'S ARM WAS INJURED IN THE CRASH.)
[redacted] GAVE THE PRISONERS SOME CIGARETTES AND MEAT FROM THE CONVOY SUPPLY. SINCE THESE ITEMS WERE NOT AVAILABLE IN NONG HET. AMONG THE PRISONERS WERE ALSO THREE LAO FROM GENERAL PHOUMI NOSAVAN'S FORCES WHO HAD BEEN CAPTURED BY THE PATHET LAO.

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, CINCPAC, PACFLT, ARPAC, PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO: OCS, DCSOP
DA IN 253988

NND 937601-9

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

THAT WORKED OUT FOR LAOS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE AMERICANS ARE NOT TRAINED IN GUERILLA WARFARE AND CAN NOT WIN THE WAR AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC) IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

2. THE CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE AT THE HOME OF PETER ROBERTS, INFORMATION OFFICER AT THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN SAIGON, WHERE ROBERTS ARRANGED A MEETING BETWEEN THE JOURNALIST AND AMBASSADOR HOHLER. THE JOURNALIST HAS KNOWN ROBERTS FOR SOME TIME THROUGH PRESS CONFERENCES AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS AMONG JOURNALISTS. HE WAS SURPRISED TO LEARN THAT ROBERTS HAD ARRANGED THE MEETING AT THE REQUEST OF THE AMBASSADOR, WHO HAD EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO TALK WITH HIM.

3. NEITHER THE JOURNALIST NOR ROBERTS HAD MUCH OPPORTUNITY TO STATE THEIR VIEWS DURING THE CONVERSATION. THE JOURNALIST ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR THAT, FAR FROM BEING NEUTRALIST MINDED, HE FEARS NEUTRALISM FOR SOUTH VIETNAM MORE THAN ANY OTHER SOLUTION SINCE HE BELIEVES NEUTRALISM TO BE NO MORE THAN A MAJOR STEP TOWARD ULTIMATE TAKEOVER AND CONTROL BY THE COMMUNISTS. ROBERTS POINTEDLY DISAGREED WITH AMBASSADOR HOHLER'S STATEMENT THAT THERE IS NO CHANCE OF WINNING THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM, INDICATING THAT IT IS MUCH TOO EARLY TO MAKE SUCH A BLUNT STATEMENT, ALLUDING TO THE HUGE EFFORT UNDER WAY AND THE GAINS ALREADY APPARENT. ROBERTS DID SAY, HOWEVER, THAT THE SURFACING OF THE OPERATIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM AT NGHE AN AND HOA BINH SHOULD DEMONSTRATE TO THE AMERICANS AND TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM THE FUTILITY OF SUCH OPERATIONS.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

ROBERTS ALSO COMMENTED THAT HE WAS SURPRISED AT THE FAILURE OF THE VC TO REACT EARLIER IN THE PROPAGANDA FIELD TO OBVIOUSLY EXPLOITABLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM AND THE AMERICANS.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

4. [redacted] COMMENT. THE JOURNALIST SAID THAT HE THINKS THE ARTICLE THAT CAUGHT THE INTEREST OF AMBASSADOR HOHLER MAY HAVE BEEN ONE DATELINED SAIGON, 29 JUNE 1962, APPEARING IN AN EARLY JULY ISSUE OF THE PHILIPPINE HERALD, ENTITLED "INTRA-PARTY RIFT IN RED NORTH VIETNAM - MOSCOW HAS AN EDGE ON PEIPING?" THE JOURNALIST SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE AMBASSADOR HAD READ OUT OF THE CONTEXT AND MISINTERPRETED VARIOUS STATEMENTS IN THE ARTICLE TO WHICH HE REFERRED, WHICH LED HIM TO CONSIDER THE JOURNALIST A NEUTRALIST. THE STATEMENTS BELIEVED INVOLVED, WHICH APPEAR IN LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE ARTICLE, ARE AS FOLLOWS: "STUDENTS OF COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAM HERE WERE OF AGREEMENT THAT THE REPORTED GAINS - AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING - BY THE PRO-SOVIET GROUP, WILL EXERT A TEMPERATE INFLUENCE ON THE COURSE OF EVENTS. UNLESS THE SCALES ARE TURNED BY PEIPING IN FAVOR OF ITS PUPPETS AND IF THE FREE WORLD KNOWS HOW TO CASH IN ON THE RED DISPUTE, THE CHANCES WERE NOT DISMISSED OF A LONGER TRUCE IN TOTTERING LAOS, AND EVEN OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO EMBATTLED VIETNAM.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

5. [redacted] COMMENT. IN A LATE JULY CONVERSATION WITH AN AMERICAN OBSERVER, THE COUNSELLOR OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN SAIGON, R.A. BURROWS, ATTACKED THE DIEM GOVERNMENT, STATING THAT

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

THERE COULD BE NO HOPE OF PROGRESS AGAINST THE VC UNLESS DIEM WERE REMOVED. IN CRITICIZING THE ILLIBERALITY OF THE DIEM REGIME, BURROWS APPLIED STANDARDS OF CRITICISM THAT EVEN THE MOST ADVANCED WESTERN DEMOCRACY WOULD FAIL TO MEET. DURING THE SAME CONVERSATION, COLONEL HENRY LEE, MILITARY ATTACHE TO THE BRITISH EMBASSY, EXPRESSED HIS OPINION THAT THE WAR AGAINST THE VC WAS NOT PROCEEDING FAVORABLY FROM THE WESTERN POINT OF VIEW. HE APPEARED CRITICAL OF DIEM AND SEEMED INCLINED TOWARD A MILITARY JUNTA, POSSIBLY UNDER MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH.)

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

6. [redacted] COMMENT. US AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH VIETNAM, FREDERICK E. NOLTING, COMMENTED ON 8 AUGUST THAT AMBASSADOR HOHLER HAS NEVER GIVEN THE SLIGHTEST INDICATION THAT HE HOLDS THE VIEWS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM IN THIS REPORT. ON 8 AUGUST, AMBASSADOR HOHLER TOOK A COMPLETELY CONTRARY LINE IN A DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR NOLTING, EXPRESSING OPTIMISM REGARDING THE PROSPECTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM. AMBASSADOR NOLTING SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE INFORMATION SHOULD BE TREATED WITH GREAT RESERVE, AND WITH THE POSSIBLILITY IN MIND THAT IT MAY REPRESENT A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT TO CREATE MISTRUST BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN.)

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

7. [redacted] COMMENT. NGO DINH NHU, BROTHER AND POLITICAL ADVISOR OF PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM, TOLD AN AMERICAN OBSERVER

(3c)

4. The Cung Son Camp in Phu Yen Province initiated two training cycles of two groups of 105 village defenders on 12 and 19 August.

5. Hoa Cam:

1,446 trainees are undergoing instruction, including 450 civic action trainees, 278 Mang Buk village defenders, 265 village development trainees from Danang sector, 400 montagnard commandos, 30 nurses, and 23 interpreters being given basic paramilitary training. Training completed: 139 Tama scouts, 425 Force Populaire, 227 Quang Tri trail-watchers, 223 civic action, and 250 Kontum trail-watchers.

6. Camp Du Tho (Soc Trang):

A second strike company of 120 men has completed training. A third company has entered training. On 9 August a medical team from Du Tho about to visit a nearby village warned of VC presence by a villager. Between 125-135 VC attempted an ambush utilizing mortar, two automatic weapons and small arms. The ambush was overrun by standing charge of a strike force company. Battle persisted approximately two hours, was eventually joined by Self-Defense Corps company. Enemy casualties: 12 killed, 10 wounded; friendly casualties: 4 killed, 4 wounded.

B. Covert Activities

1. The interrogation of a VC prisoner indicates the possible existence of a VC Provincial Committee for Kien Phong Province located in Cambodia two and a half kilometers from the Vietnam border. The VC prisoner was a student there from July 1960 to April 1961. A detailed report is being drawn up.

2. [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

3. [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

a. In GVN coastal area VC will concentrate attacks upon provinces of Quang Ngai, Quang Nam, Binh Dinh and Phu Yen; principal targets are railroads, bridges, telephone lines and roads.

b. In the high plateau VC objectives will be the destruction of GVN military installations and capability near the Laos frontier.

c. In Nambo (southern) region, the VC will reinforce forces in central and eastern zones and concentrate attacks against military posts in Duc Hoa as well as Long An and Tay Ninh Provinces.

d. In special capitol zone, principal activities will be propaganda by tracts, and terrorist activities, using grenades and other explosives.

4. [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

II. SOUTH LAOS

56 Kha were selected for stay-behind missions in the eastern Plateau de Bolvens. Twelve of this group are undergoing radio operator training in Thailand, while the remainder are receiving leadership training. Two base camp locations have been identified and basic preparations made for their establishment. Reassessment of the Kha units trained by MAAG Laos indicates that many more units are reliable and capable enough to include in the stay-behind plan. Operations from South Vietnam into Laos are in abeyance pending policy approval.

3c

III. NORTH VIETNAM

[redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

2. Binh Hung:

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted] Civil Guard control team now at Binh Hung. Five C-46 airdrops made. Total armed personnel at Binh Hung, 1,516.

3. Fighter Worker Force, Phuoc Tuy Province:

As of 28 August, 100 Springfield rifles, 4 caliber 30 LMGS, four 60mm mortars, and ammunition for all weapons delivered. Weapons will be used for training and operations.

4. On 30 August, President Diem reviewed CIDG programs, indicated satisfaction with progress to date, and gave instructions that in future he will personally approve each new CIDG camp. President also instructed that in future province chiefs or their representatives to be responsible for actual payment of CIDG trainees and strike force. President ordered contracts for construction new camps to be subject joint approval province chiefs, presidential survey office and U.S. representatives. It also was decided to place representatives appropriate divisional commanders in CIDG camps. Ngo Dinh Nhu, in letter to Ambassador 30 August, stated Buon Enao is "realization of an idea which has always been dear to me."

B. Covert Activities

1. [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

(1c)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

2. [redacted]

C. Covert Intelligence

1. Available information indicates:

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

2. [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

(16)

~~SECRET~~

2. Binh Hung:

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

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B. Covert Activities

1. [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

(1c)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

2. [redacted]

C. Covert Intelligence

1. Available information indicates:

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

2. [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

BURMA — The National Liberation Alliance, an organization of all minority groups opposing the Burmese Government, reportedly plans to launch wide-range operations against the Burmese during the month of September.

CAMBODIA — Nothing significant.

PROVIDE TOO MUCH WORK, MATERIAL, AND MONEY. THIS OPPOSITION HAS BECOME SO STRONG THAT PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES HAVE ISSUED ORDERS FORBIDDING ADDITIONAL DEMANDS FOR LABOR, MATERIAL, OR CASH.

3. [redacted] CONFLICT BETWEEN COMPETING FACTIONS IN THE PROVINCE, WHICH THE PROVINCE CHIEF, [redacted] IS UNABLE TO HANDLE. THE DEPUTY PROVINCE CHIEF [redacted] IS MORE INFLUENTIAL [redacted] WAS ASSIGNED TO THE PROVINCE [redacted] FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF BRINGING ALL MAJOR PROVINCIAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES UNDER THE CONTROL OF [redacted] HE CAN LAO PARTY. [redacted] THE DEPUTY PROVINCE CHIEF FOR ADMINISTRATION, [redacted] AS A GOOD MAN BUT COMPLETELY LACKING IN AUTHORITY.

4. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION.

END OF MESSAGE

(2c)

3. Camp Phi Ma, Binh Thuan Province. Citizens Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) Class No. 5 graduated 143 men on 15 September; Class No. 6 commenced training on 10 September. Strike Force No. 2, 114 men, commenced four-week second phase training on 10 September. 24 medics also completed their training on 10 September. A strike force raid on a VC patrol was conducted on 5 September about 15 miles southwest of Phan Thiet. Three VC were killed in action. There were no friendly casualties.

4. Camp Da Mpoa in the Serienac Valley of Tuyen Duc Province is now under construction. 79 refugees of the Koho Tribe began training as a strike force on 10 September. A dispensary has been established. Three Special Forces medics had treated 517 patients as of 13 September. An AID American doctor is cooperating in more serious cases.

5. Camp Dak To, Kontum Province. This camp is also under construction. Communications have been established with Saigon. Special Forces "A" Team is in place. A dispensary is being built. A Vietnamese camp commander has been assigned by the Presidential Survey Office.

6. Camp Phuoc Thien, Ninh Thuan Province. Strike Force Company No. 1, 83 men, and Strike Force No. 2, 134 men, completed training. 150 village defenders began training on 17 September.

7. Camp Thu Duc, Gia Dinh Province. As of 17 September 1,143 personnel were on duty, including 779 special assault troops for South Laos ops. 603 more troops were undergoing training, and in addition 4 special teams numbering 46 men have received demolitions and sabotage training. Due to an expansion of Saigon University, a relocation of Camp Thu Duc has been required. A new site, about a mile and a half north of Thu Duc in the direction of Bien Hoa is awaiting approval by President Diem.

8. Danang Area Program. Half of Special Forces "A" Team moved to Phu Hoa on 17 September with 300 civic action cadre and two strike force companies trained at Hoa Cam. The objective is the establishment there of an area development complex.

9. Patients treated by Special Forces medics during the month of August number 30,133.

B. Covert Activities

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
E0 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

1. [redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
E0 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

2. [redacted]

C. Covert Intelligence

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

1. [redacted]

2. Confidential Ministry of the Interior figures concerning strategic hamlet construction list the number of hamlets to be completed by the end of 1962 as 4,446. To attain this total the Ministry is assuming that all hamlets begun in August (a total of 2,492) will have been completed satisfactorily.

SECRET

BURMA

As previously reported (Covert Annex-Burma, 9 August-22 August) the Burma Army is continuing its operations against the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). The First and Fourth Kachin Rifles were transferred to the Kachin State in late August for action against the KIA insurgents. The Burma Army's plan reportedly is to contain the KIA movement by isolating them in the Sinlum area (N 24-15, E 97-30). Thus far the Army forces have avoided major engagements with the KIA, firing back only in self defense, but have kept the pressure on to force the KIA to retreat to the remote areas of Sinlum.

CAMBODIA

Nothing Significant

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

2. HUANG CONCURRED IN PRINCIPLE, BUT ADVISED TUYEN THAT HE HAD TO OBTAIN THE APPROVAL OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT BEFORE ENTERING INTO DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS. ON 19 SEPTEMBER HUANG TELEGRAPHED HIS HEADQUARTERS IN TAIPEI, OUTLINING TUYEN'S PROPOSAL, AND REQUESTING EARLY APPROVAL.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACE USOM MAAG CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION.

END OF MESSAGE

Submitted by the

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA.

Concurred in by the

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

on 26 September 1962. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

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This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

26 September 1962

SUBJECT: SNIE 58-6-62: SHORT-RUN OUTLOOK FOR THE LAOTIAN COALITION GOVERNMENT

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the pospects for the Souvanna Phouma coalition government in Laos over the next six months or so.

CONCLUSIONS

A. The Souvanna Phouma coalition government has made virtually no progress in establishing effective control throughout Laos, let alone in implementing its policies. Armed forces of the three factions remain in control of and administer the areas they held prior to the formation of the government. (Para. 1)

B. The coalition regime will almost certainly not be able to establish any significant political authority throughout the country during the

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

period of this estimate. Moreover, the "principle of unanimity" requiring concurrence of the three factions on all government decisions will prevent or postpone resolution of most key issues. Nevertheless, Souvanna, as the instrument of both East and West for a decrease in tensions in Laos, is not without leverage and assets. (Paras. 2, 8, 15, 25)

C. The coalition government will be forced to seek foreign aid not only for economic development, but for the relief of immediate, acute financial problems. It will accept this aid from all countries, though Souvanna will probably look especially to the US for budgetary and foreign exchange support. (Para. 17)

D. The Communists will seek to expand their influence and power in Laos with the ultimate aim of achieving effective control over all the country. To this end, they will nominally support the Souvanna-led government, proceeding toward their goal mainly through political and subversive means. (Para. 13)

E. Phoumi will probably continue to cooperate with Souvanna, however reluctantly, in the conduct of government. He will play an important role in the coalition, having a veto power over those actions of the government which are distasteful to him. (Paras. 9-10)

F. The Communists will almost certainly seek to retain as many North Vietnamese forces and military advisers in Laos as they can do with safety. Souvanna will almost certainly be unable to prevent Communist use of southern Laos as a corridor for assisting the Viet Cong effort in South Vietnam. (Paras. 5, 18, 21)

G. In the absence of an acceptable compromise candidate as a successor, Souvanna's disappearance would probably result in an increase in the strength and influence of the Pathet Lao/Neo Lao Hak Xat (PL/NLHX). (Para. 24)

H. The Souvanna coalition will probably still be in existence six months from now. The longer the coalition is able to stay in existence, the greater its chances for continuance as the new status quo. Nevertheless, Communist influence will continue to grow, especially in those areas where the PL has military control, unless vigorous efforts are made to unify and strengthen the non-Communist elements in Laos. (Paras. 15, 25)

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurring:

Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF
Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff
Director of the National Security Agency

Abstaining:

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SPECIAL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 58-6-62

Short-Run Outlook for the Laotian Coalition Government

~~SECRET~~

SHORT-RUN OUTLOOK FOR THE LAOTIAN COALITION GOVERNMENT

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the prospects for the Souvanna Phouma coalition government in Laos over the next six months or so.

CONCLUSIONS

A. The Souvanna Phouma coalition government has made virtually no progress in establishing effective control throughout Laos, let alone in implementing its policies. Armed forces of the three factions remain in control of and administer the areas they held prior to the formation of the government. (*Para. 1*)

B. The coalition regime will almost certainly not be able to establish any significant political authority throughout the country during the period of this estimate. Moreover, the "principle of unanimity" requiring concurrence of the three factions on all government decisions will prevent or postpone resolution of most key issues. Nevertheless, Souvanna, as the instrument of both East and West for a decrease in tensions in Laos, is not without leverage and assets. (*Paras. 2, 8, 15, 25*)

C. The coalition government will be forced to seek foreign aid not only for economic development, but for the relief of immediate, acute financial problems. It will accept this aid from all countries, though Souvanna will probably look especially to the US for budgetary and foreign exchange support. (*Para. 17*)

D. The Communists will seek to expand their influence and power in Laos with the ultimate aim of achieving effective control over all of the country. To this end, they will

nominally support the Souvanna-led government, proceeding toward their goal mainly through political and subversive means. (*Para. 13*)

E. Phoumi will probably continue to cooperate with Souvanna, however reluctantly, in the conduct of government. He will play an important role in the coalition, having a veto power over those actions of the government which are distasteful to him. (*Paras. 9–10*)

F. The Communists will almost certainly seek to retain as many North Vietnamese forces and military advisers in Laos as they can do with safety. Souvanna will almost certainly be unable to prevent Communist use of southern Laos as a corridor for assisting the Viet Cong effort in South Vietnam. (*Paras. 5, 18, 21*)

G. In the absence of an acceptable compromise candidate as a successor, Souvanna's disappearance would probably result in an increase in the strength and influence of the Pathet Lao/Neo Lao Hak Xat (PL/NLHX). (*Para. 24*)

H. The Souvanna coalition will probably still be in existence six months from now. The longer the coalition is able to stay in existence, the greater its chances for continuance as the new *status quo*. Nevertheless, Communist influence will continue to grow, especially in those areas where the PL has military control, unless vigorous efforts are made to unify and strengthen the non-Communist elements in Laos. (*Paras. 15, 25*)

DISCUSSION

1. The Souvanna Phouma coalition government in Vientiane has made virtually no progress in establishing effective control throughout the country, let alone in implementing its policies. Although the three Princes agreed to unify their armed forces at their meeting in Zurich on 22 June 1961, their forces still remain in control of and administer the areas they held prior to the formation of the government.* Despite the government's decision that "in principle" there would be freedom of movement throughout the country, the Pathet Lao (PL) continues to deny access to areas under its control. The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos (ICC) has stationed inspection teams at the withdrawal checkpoints, but has been given an opportunity to observe the withdrawal of only 15 North Vietnamese personnel. In spite of a formal commitment to work out a cease-fire, clashes continue between PL and FAR (anti-Communist) forces, and the North Vietnamese and PL continue to attack tribal Meo guerrillas. Although some North Vietnamese troops and technicians appear to have been covertly withdrawn, we believe substantial numbers still remain in Laos. Moreover, the US Government probably will not be able to ascertain by 7 October 1962, the withdrawal deadline, how many have left the country.

2. Meanwhile, the three factions in the coalition government remain widely divided and Premier Souvanna Phouma avoids showdowns on touchy questions. Souvanna's establishment of effective government is further inhibited by the agreement to the "principle of unanimity," reached by the three Princes prior to the formation of the coalition. Under this "troika" provision, all decisions must have the concurrence of the three major factions. Although the actual application of this principle has not yet been completely worked out, this rule will almost certainly prevent or postpone resolution of most key issues.

3. In effect, Laos is at present virtually partioned: in the segments it controls, the PL/Neo Lao Hak Xat (NLHX) is consolidating its authority unmolested while attempting elsewhere to disrupt stabilization of the new situation and sow discord among the non-Communists. Immediate prospects in Laos depend principally upon Communist intentions, and upon Souvanna Phouma's ability to develop a neutral and effective government.

Communist Intentions

4. The fact that the Communist Bloc negotiated a settlement rather than attempting a military solution in Laos appears to indicate its desire to avoid the risk of large-scale US-Communist hostilities in southeast Asia, and to win Laos by political-military nibbling. Although the Communists are confronted with some obvious problems and difficulties, a number of factors justify an optimistic Communist outlook: the country is divided and lacks a sense of nationhood, the Communists control and are indoctrinating many areas, the anti-Communist armed forces are weak and will be further weakened by the withdrawal of the US military presence, the coalition government is feeble, and the economy of the country is in serious straits.

5. Soviet—and Bloc—policy in Laos is probably to appear to respect the Geneva Accords, to profess support of Souvanna, and to provide showy economic aid to his government; to avoid the development of such sudden, abrupt challenges to the Laos "solution" as

* See map at Annex.

might lead to the establishing of a major US military presence in or near Laos; to hold and consolidate those areas, including the corridor to South Vietnam, now controlled by the PL; to expand such control into other areas wherever possible; and to bring about an increasingly Communist cast to the coalition government's domestic complexion and international orientation. The Communists will seek to retain both PL and North Vietnamese military forces in Laos for some time. The PL/NLHX will continue to depend chiefly upon Hanoi for support and guidance, though an increased Soviet and Chinese Communist presence in Laos will probably occur, and, with it, more Soviet and Chinese contacts and influence with the PL/NLHX. Sino-Soviet differences evidently have not had a significant effect upon the coordination of Bloc policy regarding Laos.

Factors Affecting Souvanna Phouma's Ability to Develop a Neutral and Effective Government

6. *The Neutralists.* The success or failure of the coalition government will, in large measure, depend on Souvanna's ability to establish a stable and genuine neutralist center and induce the other two factions to cooperate with that center sufficiently to permit the government to function. This is an enormously difficult task which will require a skillful balancing of conflicting interests. Even the neutralists do not agree on the same definition of "neutralism" for Laos. Some, like Foreign Minister Quinim Pholsena, have a long history of anti-West sentiment and activity which has led to clearly pro-Communist views and affiliations; others who initially believed in a policy of neutrality for Laos have found their views compromised in varying degree by their association with the PL and by Bloc blandishments; and the attitudes of still others remain basically hostile to communism.

7. The neutralist military forces are beset by differences and there is friction and dissension within their ranks. Souvanna's present relations with Kong Le are not clear but Kong Le appears to have drifted closer to the PL. Neutralist General Khammouane Boupha appears still loyal to Souvanna but his troops are confined primarily to Phong Saly Province and his ability to provide effective military support to Souvanna is, therefore, limited.

8. Despite this lack of neutralist cohesion and strength, Souvanna is not without assets. He is the instrument of both East and West for a decrease of tensions in Laos. Both the anti-Communists and the NLHX recognize that he is a key element in the situation, and Souvanna is in a position to pressure them by threatening to resign. He has some freedom of maneuver in manipulating NLHX and Bloc support to his own ends. There is considerable public support in Laos for neutrality, however vaguely comprehended, which proides Souvanna with a large, latent, and unorganized reservoir of potential backing. He enjoys the support of the US Government and of remaining French personnel and French interests in Laos. He has already demonstrated that he can at times work with Phoumi and the anti-Communists in offsetting pro-Communist pressures. PL/NLHX organization and influence is probably still minimal in many outlying areas, including certain places where they claim military control. Neutralist or anti-Communist elements thus have a chance to counter Communist influence in many areas of the country. Moreover, Souvanna appears determined to prevent a Communist takeover.

9. *The Phoumi Faction.* The anti-Communist faction of General Phoumi Nosavan joined the coalition government with great reluctance. Only the insistent pressure of the US brought Phoumi to the negotiating table. He is almost certainly not in sympathy with the policies of Souvanna, and his per-

sonal prospects in the new order of things must appear limited to him. Phoumi's sincerity remains questionable and his intentions ambiguous. His popular support is limited and restricted to those areas under the control of his military forces. He does, however, hold many cards. He has a veto power over those actions of the government which are distasteful to him. He is the unquestioned leader of the anti-Communist faction. He and his forces continue to occupy important strategic areas in Laos—the Mekong lowlands—and will attempt to consolidate control there in the face of PL/NLHX pressures. For the moment at least, he dominates the 64,000-man FAR, through the personal loyalty of the army leaders, and he has not despaired of some continuing US support.

10. He will, therefore, play an important role in the coalition government. He will probably continue to cooperate with Souvanna, however reluctantly, in the conduct of government. He will insist on reciprocity by the PL/NLHX in any concessions he may be willing to make, and is not likely to give up control of areas now held by his forces without equivalent territorial concessions from the Communist side. Like Souvanna, he may occasionally seek to exert pressure by threatening to withdraw from the coalition. He will almost certainly continue to maintain close, covert contacts with the Thais, and Marshal Sarit's counsel will carry considerable weight with him. Phoumi will also continue to turn to the US for guidance and support, but will not necessarily follow US advice and on occasion will ignore it. He might even consider a coup, but his control of the FAR and his overall influence in Laos will almost certainly decline as American support is channeled to the coalition government rather than to him directly.

11. *The NLHX.* The Communist presence in Laos is far greater than it was in 1957 when the NLHX participated in an earlier coalition government, also headed by Souvanna Phouma. Since that time the Communist side has defeated the anti-Communist FAR, greatly expanded those areas in Laos under Communist domination, effected an international settlement which by no means precludes further Communist penetration in Laos, more than doubled NLHX 1957 representation and influence in the government, and opened the way for direct Soviet and Chinese Communist influence in an area formerly delegated to North Vietnamese activity. The leadership of the PL/NLHX appears to rest with certain "old guard" Lao Communist Party leaders, mostly civilians, who have worked together for many years, and NLHX participation in the government means direct Communist influence. The top-ranking Communists in Laos, and real leaders of the PL/NLHX, appear to be Nouhak Phoumsavan, Kaysone Phomvihan, and Phoumi Vongvichit, Minister of Information in the coalition government. The exact status of Prince Souphanouvong, titular head of the NLHX, is not clear, but he appears to be more than a figurehead. In any case, his national reputation, leadership ability, skill in administration and negotiations, and family relationship with Souvanna Phouma are valuable assets to the Lao Communist movement.

12. The NLHX is currently by far the strongest political organization in Laos. It has province, county, district, and village organizations in many of the areas dominated by the PL; and it maintains a clandestine hierarchy of "politico-administrative committees" in some areas occupied by neutralist or anti-Communist forces. It also has a newspaper, radio broadcasting facilities, and is able, as demonstrated during the supplementary elections in 1958, to turn out the vote. However, there is some doubt as to how complete NLHX control is in many PL areas and the

extent of its influence in neutralist territory. Harsh PL occupation measures have apparently alienated many villages, and North Vietnamese intervention has associated the PL/NLHX with the much disliked Vietnamese.

Prospects

13. *Communist Policy.* The objective of the Communists will continue to be to expand their influence and power in Laos with the ultimate aim of achieving effective control over all the country. To this end, they will nominally support the Souvanna-led government as the best alternative to a potentially explosive renewal of hostilities. They will probably proceed mainly through political and subversive means since sharply increased Communist military pressures might cause Souvanna to oppose actively the PL/NLHX.

14. It is likely that the Communists will be able to maintain this strategy for some time. Ramifications of the Sino-Soviet dispute, however, could have a significant effect on the conduct of an agreed Communist policy in Laos. Because of the key role of North Vietnam in the area, both the Chinese and the Soviets are concerned to exert their influence over Hanoi. A deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations probably would intensify this competition, and Moscow might find it expedient to give North Vietnamese views greater weight, even if this meant adopting a policy of greater risks. At present, however, the Soviets out of consideration for their broader East-West interests and their stake in a "Laos solution," will probably resist any Chinese or North Vietnamese pressures for a more militant line in Laos and continue to urge a cautious and flexible tactical approach. On the other hand, Moscow will be reluctant to apply unilateral restraints on the PL and North Vietnam in Laos, unless it was convinced the risks of substantial US military involvement were high.

15. *The Souvanna coalition* will probably live out the period of this estimate. Souvanna may make some headway in asserting his influence within the cabinet and, possibly, in extending his government's activities into some PL areas in fields such as health, public works, and transportation. The government will almost certainly not be able, during the period of this estimate, to establish any significant political authority in those areas of Laos now under the control of the PL. Consequently, a loose, informal partition of Laos will probably persist, unacknowledged by any of the principals, but probably not unacceptable to all for the near future.

16. *Political Orientation.* Souvanna will attempt to follow a policy of genuine neutrality in foreign affairs during the period of this estimate, but because of Communist pressures within and upon Laos he may find this increasingly difficult. The government will establish formal diplomatic relations with most Communist states and other countries which wish to have relations with the coalition government.

17. *The Economy.* Souvanna must resolve the serious financial situation confronting the government before any approach to the formidable economic problems of the country is possible. Even in the unlikely event that substantial demobilization of military forces permits a reduction of military expenditures and the coalition government displays a high, and most un-Lao, degree of financial responsibility, it will continue to need substantial foreign aid to stabilize the economy and to avoid headlong inflation. The fact that Phoumi is Finance Minister while NLHX Prince Souphanouvong is Minister of Economy and Plans does not suggest prompt and decisive action in financial and economic matters. The coalition government will be forced to seek foreign aid not only for economic development, but for the relief of immediate, acute financial problems. It will accept this

aid from all countries, though Souvanna will probably look especially to the US for bugetary and foreign exchange support.

18. *Withdrawal of Foreign Communist Armed Forces.* Although a few more technical and noncombat personnel may check out through the ICC, it is highly unlikely that all North Vietnamese forces in Laos will be removed. The PL/NLHX almost certainly will obstruct and obfuscate both the issue itself and ICC verification of the presence of North Vietnamese forces. As many North Vietnamese forces and military advisers as the Communists believe they can safely retain in Laos will almost certainly remain illegally to train and otherwise assist the PL, to establish arms caches, and to support the infiltration of personnel and military equipment into southern Laos and South Vietnam. Many North Vietnamese combat units will probably be moved surreptitiously to North Vietnam or areas of Laos bordering North Vietnam where they could be quickly reintroduced into key areas of Laos. The North Vietnamese will continue to support the Communist forces in Laos.

19. *Withdrawal of Western Military Forces.* The Geneva Accords provide that the Laotian Government may request a French Military Mission (FMM) to train the armed forces of Laos. Unless arrangements with the French are worked out by 7 October 1962, the date by which the US MAAG is to be withdrawn, there will be a hiatus in the Western military presence in Laos. Whether or not the FMM is established, the removal of US forces from Laos will substantially decrease Western military influence on the Laotian Armed Forces.

20. *Demobilization and Integration.* It is unlikely that any substantial progress toward the demobilization and integration of the various Lao armed forces will be achieved in the next six months. A token integration of some forces of each faction may take place, but PL leaders and Phoumi will almost certainly obstruct the solution of this issue, each side insisting on terms which would provide it with a relatively favorable position in an integrated military force. Throughout the period under review, both the PL and Phoumi will probably disperse veterans in their military forces throughout the country to engage in political action.

21. *Use of the Corridor.* Souvanna will almost certainly be unable to prevent Communist use of southern Laos as a corridor for assisting the Viet Cong effort in South Vietnam. It is unlikely that the ICC will be able to carry out effective inspection in this area. Although Communist activity in the corridor would be made somewhat more difficult by the occasional visits of ICC teams, we do not believe the Communist capability to support Viet Cong operations in South Vietnam is likely to be seriously impaired.

22. *Tribal Minorities.* Despite Souvanna's assurances that minorities would receive better treatment in the future, it is unlikely that this will come to pass. The principal sufferers will be the Meos and the Khas who have successfully maintained armed bases within PL territory. The PL will continue to attack the Meos in particular, refusing to recognize them as part of the FAR, although they might agree to their disarmament and resettlement. Souvanna will probably seek to effect this latter solution, but its prospects are dim.

23. *General Elections.* The three factions have pledged themselves to eventual nationwide general elections to a National Assembly, but we do not believe there will be national elections within the period of this estimate.

24. *Souvanna's Departure.* In the event Souvanna disappeared from power, because of death, disability, or voluntary withdrawal, the coalition would probably collapse and hostilities might again break out. In such a case, the danger of the Communists taking over all of Laos would be great. East-West interest

in preventing Laos from becoming an arena of international conflict might suffice to permit a compromise candidate to continue as Premier but no one on the Laos scene at this time, including the King, appears readily acceptable to all interested parties as a successor. Thus, Souvanna's disappearance from power would probably result in an increase in the strength and influence of the PL/NLHX.

25. In sum, during the period of this estimate, we see virtually no chance of the emergence in Laos of an effectively functioning coalition government exercising power throughout the country. At the same time, there is no sufficient reason to estimate that so long as Souvanna remains, the present coalition will collapse, or that Laos will become a Communist state in the near future. The Souvanna government will probably still be in existence six months from now. This estimate is based on the fact that all the principals, local and international, seem at the moment reasonably satisfied with the present arrangement. Moreover, Souvanna has demonstrated a remarkable ability to survive politically. The longer his coalition is able to stay in existence, the greater its chance for continuance as the new *status quo*. Nevertheless, Communist influence will grow, especially in those areas where the PL has military control, unless vigorous efforts are made to unify and strengthen the non-Communist elements in Laos.

ANNEX

THE LAOS SETTLEMENT

1. A new phase in the struggle over Laos opened when the coalition government of Prince Souvanna Phouma was sworn in on 23 June 1962 after 13 months of intermittent negotiations, in Switzerland and Laos, among the three contending factions. The formal agreement on the coalition cabinet was signed on 12 June. The negotiations, which had been interrupted by Souvanna's departure for France in late March, were renewed after his hasty return to Laos in May when the northern town of Nam Tha fell to Communist forces. Prior to his departure, the negotiations had been deadlocked over the distribution of key portfolios in the coalition cabinet. After consulting with the King on 4 June, Souvanna reopened talks at the Plaine des Jarres with Prince Boun Oum representing the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) and Prince Souphanouvong, the Pathet Lao (PL). On 11 June, compromises finally brought about agreement on the 19 individuals to fill the cabinet posts.

2. Seven of the posts are held by Souvanna's Xieng Khouang neutralist group, and four each by the Vientiane neutralists, General Phoumi's rightwing faction, and Prince Souphanouvong's leftwing faction represented by the Neo Lao Hak Xat (NLHX), the political arm of the PL. In addition to his designation as Prime Minister, Souvanna holds the portfolios of Minister of Defense, Minister of Veterans Affairs, and Minister of Civic Action. General Phoumi and Prince Souphanouvong are both designated Deputy Prime Ministers and fill the posts of Minister of Finance and Minister of Economy and Plans respectively.

3. The international aspects of the Laotian settlement were concluded in Geneva on 23 July 1962 with the promulgation of the Geneva Agreements on Laos. These agreements consist of two documents: a "Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos" which is made up of a "Statement of Neutrality by the Royal Laotian Government," and a responsive declaration by the 13 other nations participating in the conference, and a "Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos." The "Statement of Neutrality" by Laos and the responsive "Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos" together are regarded as constituting an international agreement.

4. The Declaration provides for the signatories to respect the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity, and territorial integrity of Laos. It contains 10 "undertakings," including respect for the wish of Laos not to recognize the protection of any military alliance or coalition, including SEATO; an undertaking not to introduce or connive in the introduction of foreign troops or military personnel into Laos; and an undertaking to the effect that Laos will not be used as a corridor for infiltration into South Vietnam. The Declaration does not contain a commitment by Laos to demobilize and integrate its armed forces or to refrain from taking reprisals against Laotians, including the Meos, for their activities prior to the agreements. However, Souvanna, in his address to the final plenary

session of the Geneva Conference, pledged his government to a policy of military integration and "elimination of enmities of the recent past."

5. The Protocol consists of 20 articles and is primarily concerned (Articles 9–18) with the terms of reference for and functioning of the International Control Commission for Laos (ICC). However, it does contain other significant articles: Article 2 obliges all parties to withdraw all foreign military personnel, both regular and irregular, from Laos and Article 4 prohibits the introduction of such personnel. As an exception to this rule, Article 5 provides for an arrangement to be made between France and Laos for the presence in Laos of French military instructors, if the RLG considers it necessary. Article 8 provides that the cochairmen of the Geneva Conference "exercise supervision over the observance of this Protocol and the Declaration," placing responsibility on the Soviet cochairman to see that the Communist signatories abide by their commitments. In spelling out the functions of the ICC, a number of the concerned articles—specifically, Articles 9, 11, 15, and 16—contain the qualifying phrase "with the concurrence of the Government of Laos." This concurrence is considered to have been given upon signature of the Geneva Agreements by the coalition government.

6. The principal policies of the coalition government had been previously outlined in the Zurich communique issued by the three Princes on 22 June 1961. These policies have been reaffirmed subsequently by the leaders of the three factions and the coalition government itself. They are: (a) to establish and enforce a cease-fire; (b) to enforce democratic liberties benefiting the people and, specifically, to restore the 1957 electoral law; (c) to preserve and secure respect for the independence, neutrality, unity, and sovereignty of Laos; (d) to assure justice and tranquility with a view to national reconciliation without discrimination for ethnic or political reasons; (e) to unify the armed forces of the three factions into a national army; and (f) to develop the economy and raise the standard of living.

LAOS
Government forces
Meo operational areas
Kong Le-Pathet Lao forces
Kong Le-Pathet Lao areas
SECRET
32671 9-62
Road
Trail
Route number
Road under construction
CHINA
NORTH VIETNAM
BURMA
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
SOUTH VIETNAM
Gulf of Tonkin
Mekong
Red River
Black River
Ssu-mao
Ou Neua
Lai Chau
Phong Saly
PHONG SALY
Muong Sing
Nam Tha
NAMTHA
Na Noi
Muong Sai
Ban Houei Sai
LUANG PRABANG
Muong Houey
Luang Prabang
Dien Bien Phu
Son La
Hanoi
Thanh Hoa
SAM NEUA
Nong Het
Phong Savan
Xieng Khouang
XIENG KHOUANG
Vang Vieng
Namone
VIENTIANE
Ban Hin Heup
Vientiane
Nong Khai
Pak Sane
SAYABOURY
Vinh
Ha Tinh
Nape
Lak Sao
KHAMMOUANE
Thakhek
Mahaxay
Dong Hoi
Seno
SAVANNAKHET
Pha Lane
Savannakhet
Quang Tri
Hue
Muang Phine
Saravane
SARAVANE
Muang Ubon
Pakse
CHAMPASSAK
Attopeu
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3. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID 9TH FIELD STATION CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

END OF MESSAGE

SALARY PAID TO SELF DEFENSE CORPS MEMBERS.

C. MUNITIONS WOULD BE FURNISHED THE HOA HAO AS REQUIRED.

D. THE APPROXIMATELY 30 HOA HAO SOLDIERS RECENTLY CAPTURED BY GVN FORCES WOULD BE RELEASED.

2. [redacted] THE REASON GIVEN FOR THE HOA HAO DESIRE TO JOIN THE GVN RANKS WAS THE HOA HAO COMMAND'S BELIEF THAT IT COULD NOT SURVIVE THE CONTINUED AND INTENSIFIED VC ATTEMPTS TO INCORPORATE OR DESROY HOA HAO MILITARY UNITS. THE VC HAVE BEEN SENDING REPRESENTATIVES TO CUNG SEEKING TO PERSUADE HIM TO SUPPORT THE FORMATION OF A NEUTRALIST COALITION GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD SHORTLY REPLACE THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

3. HOA HAO FORCES SEEKING TO JOIN THE GVN TOTALED APPROXIMATELY 300 PEOPLE AND 500 ARMS, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING: APPROXIMATELY 80 UNDER CUNG, ARMED WITH ONE MACHINE GUN, EIGHT SUBMACHINE GUNS, AND 180 RIFLES; BATTALION NUMBER 118 UNDER NGUYEN TRONG NHAN, WITH 35 ARMED TROOPS; BATTALION NUMBER 116 UNDER PHAM HONG CHIEU, WITH 6 ARMED TROOPS; AND A LARGE NUMBER OF POLITICAL CADRE.

4. THE REASON THE HOA HAO WANTED TO RETAIN THEIR ARMS WAS THAT PREVIOUS GROUPS JOINING THE GVN HAD BEEN FORCED TO TURN IN THEIR ARMS AND RETURN TO CIVILIAN LIFE WHERE, HAVING NO

PROTECTION, SOME OF THEM WERE ASSASSINATED BY THE VC, OR WERE FORCED TO JOIN OR TO SUPPORT THE VC.

5. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION.

END OF MESSAGE

TOP, AND ABOUT TWO METERS WIDE AT THE BOTTOM. A SMALL BAMBOO SPIKE FENCE FORMED THE INNERMOST DEFENSIVE RING. THE HOUSES WERE IN ROWS, WITH A BAMBOO FENCE SURROUNDING EVERY TWO HOUSES, SO THAT, IF THE ATTACKERS PENETRATED THE DEFENSE OF ONE SET OF HOUSES, THE RESIDENTS COULD MOVE INTO THE NEXT DEFENSIVE UNIT. BETWEEN EACH PAIR OF HOUSES WERE COVERED PITS, WHERE THE WOMEN, CHILDREN, AND OLD PEOPLE COULD HIDE DURING A BATTLE.

2. THE PROGRAM WAS NOT BEING COORDINATED AND DID NOT FALL UNDER THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM FOR THE 23RD TACTICAL ZONE, WHICH WAS UNDER COLONEL LE QUANG TRONG, COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE 23RD INFANTRY DIVISION. THE 74 LAND DEVELOPMENT CENTERS RECEIVED SOME WEAPONS FROM THE PROVINCE CHIEFS, BUT MOST OF THE WEAPONS CAME FROM ARMY UNITS IN THE AREA. THE ARMY WAS ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR TRAINING THE MALE INHABITANTS OF THE CENTERS. WHEN A CENTER QUALIFIED AS A STRATEGIC HAMLET, IT WOULD BE UNDER THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM FOR THE 23RD TACTICAL ZONE FOR SUPPORT, AND WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE OVER-ALL STATISTICS OF THAT SECTOR FOR COMPLETED STRATEGIC HAMLETS.

3. A 12 SEPTEMBER AGREEMENT SPECIFIED THE GENERAL LINES FOR MERGING THE BUON ENAO VILLAGES WITH THE STRATEGIC HAMLET DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR THE SECTOR. THREE OF A GROUP OF THIRTY DEFENDED VILLAGES OF BUON ENAO, IN AN AREA EAST AND SOUTH OF BAN ME THUOT, WERE CLASSIFIED AS STRATEGIC HAMLETS, AND WERE INCLUDED IN THE TWELVE COMPLETED STRATEGIC HAMLETS IN DARLAC PROVINCE. [redacted]

[redacted] THE DARLAC PROVINCE CHIEF, MAJOR HOANG TRONG, WAS TRAVELING ALMOST CONSTANTLY DURING MID-SEPTEMBER IN CONNECTION WITH THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM.

4. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID 9TH FIELD STATION, CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

REARMED POPULACE, WHICH WOULD CARRY THE BATTLE FORWARD INTO LAOS, CAMBODIA, AND NORTH VIETNAM.



3. DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID 9TH FIELD STATION CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

DEARTH OF HIGHLY CAPABLE ADMINISTRATORS FREE FROM TRADITIONAL AUTOCRATIC PROCEDURES, THE PROBLEM WILL BE ONE OF TRAINING AND INDOCTRINATION. [redacted] NOT YET SURE WHETHER THE STRATEGIC HAMLET TRAINING SCHOOL AT THI NGHE WAS GETTING ACROSS TO THE STUDENT ADMINISTRATORS THE FULL SCOPE AND INTENT OF THE PROGRAM. [redacted]

2. AS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN STRATEGIC HAMLETS, [redacted] CANDIDLY ADMITTED THAT RESULTS HAVE BEEN UNEVEN. IN SOME AREAS ELECTIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE DESIRED SPIRIT OF FREEDOM, WHEREAS IN OTHER AREAS ADMINISTRATORS HAVE BEEN OVER-ZEALOUS IN EXERTING CONTROL EVEN AFTER COMPLETION OF THE SECURITY SCREENING PROCESS. WHILE THEIR INSTRUCTIONS REQUIRE A CLEAR CHOICE BY SECRET BALLOT BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATES ON AT LEAST TWO SLATES, THEIR ARBITRARY ACTIONS HAVE IN SOME INSTANCES VITIATED THE SPIRIT OF EDUCATING THE PEOPLE ON THE PRIVILEGES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF FREE ELECTIONS.

3. ELECTIONS OF ANY TYPE HAVE BEEN HELD IN ONLY ABOUT 600,

AND NOT MORE THAN 700, OF THE APPROXIMATELY 1800 STRATEGIC HAMLETS THAT MAY ACTUALLY BE CONSIDERED AS COMPLETED, I.E., WHERE PERIMETER DEFENSES HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTED AND WHERE BASIC ORGANIZATIONAL TASKS HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.

[redacted]

4. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION 2ND AIR DIV USIS.

END OF MESSAGE

Buddhist political party, and supported the Buddhist opposition which brought down the Tran Van Huong Government in January 1965.

Bui Diem visited the United States for two months in the summer of 1964 under a Department leader grant. In March 1966, he visited Tokyo on a goodwill mission. In May and October 1966, Diem visited the United States on diplomatic assignments.

Bui Diem speaks fluent English and French. He is a witty and entertaining conversationalist. He seems to have a wide range of interests and to enjoy the company of Americans. Bui Diem is married and has two daughters.

~~SECRET~~

2-19-63

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

Hamlet
Defense

F(b)(1)
F(b)(3)
(S)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. B. Chalmers Wood
Director, Working Group, Vietnam

SUBJECT : Transmittal of Memorandum Concerning Manpower Utilization in South Vietnam

Attached for your background information you will find a paper setting forth the various groups involved in the CIDG activities in South Vietnam. We have attempted to set forth as clearly as possible the various objectives and missions of each of these activities with some emphasis on how they are coordinated and how they fit into the over-all picture.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

[redacted]
William E. Colby

Attachment - 1 cy

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2000

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NSA 991586 - Doc. 7

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. B. Chalmers Wood
Director, Working Group, Vietnam

SUBJECT : Transmittal of Memorandum Concerning Manpower Utilization in South Vietnam

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FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

[redacted]
William E. Colby

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

~~SECRET~~

13 February 1963

SUBJECT: Manpower Utilization in South Vietnam

I. Summary

1. Some [redacted] Citizens' Irregulars are participating in the protection of their home areas in Vietnam. This figure is expected to increase to approximately [redacted] by the end of calendar year 1963. Since there are 16,000 hamlets approximately in Vietnam this works out to a rough average of approximately [redacted] per hamlet. This is a minuscule figure for the job of local hamlet protection even when supplemented by the approximately 383,000 regular and semi-regular forces and 92,000 police services. As the regular forces must concentrate on offensive actions, the protection of the population rests in the hands of the irregular forces. The task of protection is a difficult one for a province chief, who is responsible for an average of 300,000 persons in an average area of 2,400 square miles.

There is attached hereto a brief description of the various counterinsurgency activities being conducted in South Vietnam.

II. Discussion

2. The recent rapid increase in strength of the Citizens Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) elements (from approximately [redacted] in September 1962 to [redacted] in January 1963) and the fact that they appear under a variety of different organizational titles has given some concern as to the effects of this manpower drain on the available resources of Vietnam. It has also raised some concern at the possibly uncoordinated aspect of these different organizations which might lead to a wastage or misuse of available manpower resources. A review of the specifics of the situation however will reveal a coordinated concept in the development of these forces and the fact that they will not work in adverse effect upon the total use of manpower in Vietnam, especially in relation to the character of battle going on there at this time.

3. In 1960 the regular Army, Navy and Air Force of Vietnam totalled 150,000. These were supplemented by a poorly trained and equipped 60,000 Civil Guard and approximately 80,000 Self-Defense Corps. These forces were given priority in augmentation, stepped-up training and improved equipment, so that they are today at the following strengths:

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Army	188,000
Navy	6,595
Air Force	5,817
Marines	5,281
Civil Guard	75,909
Self-Defense Corps	95,828
Total	385,787

Experience during this build up period revealed, however, that these forces were barely able to hold their own by acting as regular forces and using conventional tactics.

4. Since the nature of the war became clearly a 'people's war' rather than a 'soldier's war', it became essential to engage the population actively in its own defense. For this reason the program of developing the Citizens' Irregular Forces was initiated in 1961. In order to increase the "people's" content of these forces and to avoid the delays and failures which had accompanied efforts to build many national organizations, it was decided that this effort to develop Citizens' Irregular Forces should begin at the bottom rather than the top. An intensive search thus took place for individuals and leaders capable of participating in the development of the Citizens' Irregular Forces. It was apparent however that some coordination was needed in the development of such forces, among other things to maintain GVN approval of their growth. Since the "people's" character was paramount, and since the organizational structure of the Vietnamese Government as it affects the population is centered around the province and district chiefs, it was decided that this coordination function should best be exercised through and with these officials. As a result each and every Citizens' Irregular Defense Force which was discussed in detail with the local province and district chief and extensive efforts were made to maintain their full awareness, control and support of the activity.

5. In order to provide the mechanism for national organization of such forces a variety of national level units was used, such as the Presidential Survey Office, the Directorate General of Youth, and the Directorate of Social Affairs for the Highlands. In all cases their contributions to a particular area situation were funnelled through the province and district chief. Since the province and district chief also controlled the Self-Defense Corps and Civil Guard and police in their areas, this brought about an automatic coordination between these semi-regular forces and the irregular groups. Since 38 of 41 province chiefs are military men, they are well equipped to employ and coordinate these various groups. At the national level a similar total view was held by President Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu.

6. Concurrently with the development of the above two categories of forces, regular and irregular, the GVN itself undertook a number of programs in the irregular field. These were later consolidated into the Strategic Hamlet Program under which local defense forces were built in many areas, in part using weapons and other equipment available to the GVN which had been freed by the reequipping of regular forces with more modern U.S. equipment. We do not have precise figures available as to the total numbers involved, but we are aware that they are substantial. These activities are also included in the automatic coordination process, as they too are conducted through and by the province and district chiefs.

7. In the irregular field, the basic concept is one of citizens providing their own local defense. Available resources make it impossible for every citizen to be provided with the means for his own defense and consequently efforts are made to group these citizens, provide them with protective shields, and a nucleus of armed and trained men in their community. As a typical example a hamlet which might comprise 500 people would be surrounded by a protective defense and would contain a group of 40 young men trained in defense techniques. Of this 40 approximately 10 to 15 might be armed with guns, the others being armed with homemade weapons, and the remainder of the population participating in the defense work in other ways. Where possible and where sufficiently concentrated effort can be made, it has proved desirable and in some cases essential to organize more formal units among neighboring hamlets to operate in patrols in the areas between the defended hamlets. (Strike Forces). In some more uninhabited areas it has been essential to organize roving patrols or teams to penetrate mountain or jungle areas on a transient basis within a general territory of familiarity to them. (Mountain Scouts). Since most of these forces are essentially local, they obviously will involve more people than would be necessary in a more regular force available for transfer among various areas, wherever the threat might be the greatest at the moment. An idea of the total figures involved can be gained from the fact that there are approximately 16,000 hamlets in Vietnam organized into approximately 2,550 "villages". The average population of the latter "village" is approximately 4,800. Even an average of 10 men per hamlet then would total some 160,000, although both of these figures are obviously open to considerable variation one way or the other.

8. The question is asked why the more regular forces could not supply this type of protection or at least a substantial degree of it. A review of the arithmetic again would indicate

that the Self-Defense Corps which normally is under the control of the "village" chief, has a total strength of approximately 95,000. Taking the figure of 2,550 villages, this would give approximately 40 Self-Defense Corps men per village. Recalling that the average population of a village above is approximately 4,800, this displays the basis for the frequently heard complaint that the Self-Defense Corps is well named since it generally confines its activity to the occupation of a fort at the village center and the defense of its own security. The Self-Defense Corps thus obviously gives the village chief very little handle for the protection of his entire village, and is instead used as a protection for the administrative nucleus. The protection of the population is consequently in the hands of the Irregular Forces. The Civil Guard, some 75,000, is generally under the control of the Province Chiefs (approximately 40 in total) and thus each Province Chief could normally hope to have somewhat less than 2,000 Civil Guardsmen or a battalion and a half to cover his area (average population 300,000 average area 2,400 square miles). The Regular Forces are obviously used as the mobile reserve with an offensive mission against the enemy wherever he can be found. To the extent the above Irregular Forces can protect areas against enemy attack, the Regular Forces are freed for offensive roles rather than static defense duties.

9. The Police Services obviously offer a possible tool for population control in areas where sufficient security can be provided to permit them to operate on other than military or self-defense basis. As in the Soun Enao complex, when a degree of security is provided to an area the government can be expected to recover a substantial amount of the weapons given to the population of their local defense. A police force would then fill the need for a local control mechanism.

10. Against this background the Attachment will identify the various types of Citizens' Irregular Forces which have been developed over the past two years. Despite their variety of nomenclature they are brought into a coordinated whole by the province and district chiefs.

Attachment

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ATTACHMENT

13 February 1963

SUBJECT: Counterinsurgency Activities in South Vietnam

Since the CIDG program involves a wide variety of programs (see below) all designed to meet specific needs of various rural areas in South Vietnam, the CIDG approach to a particular region is called an area development program. CIDG training installations are thus called Area Development Centers (ADC). At present, there are [redacted] ADC, and by April 1963, [redacted] are scheduled to be in existence. At each ADC, all of the CIDG programs directed toward a particular area are carried out. In some cases, specific CIDG groups are trained at some distance from their home areas, but as the number of ADC increases, more and more CIDG training can be carried out close to the home areas of the various trainees.

A. CIDG Activities to be Given Over to Special Forces Control

1. Hamlet Militia

By 31 December 1962, [redacted] had been trained and armed. The hamlet militia are simply people living in Vietnamese villages who have volunteered to accept training and weapons in order to participate actively in defense of their village and immediate areas. In addition to defensive duties, hamlet militia carry out aggressive patrolling in the general area of their villages.

2. Strike Forces

These troops are full-time paramilitary forces which have been recruited from local volunteers and have been given more advanced training than that given the hamlet militia. They are organized and trained aggressive patrol elements but can be committed in platoon or company strength as required. Strike force units patrol continuously throughout areas in which CIDG programs are in progress checking village defenses, weapons, and re-training hamlet militia. Strike forces are prepared to move quickly to assist any village under attack. They are capable of conducting large-and small-scale raids and ambushes in VC controlled areas and long suspected routes of VC movement. Most strike force personnel are paid (currently by CIA) on the same scale as the civil guard. Over 5,900 strike force personnel have been trained as of 31 December 1962.

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3. Fighting Fathers/Catholic Youth

This is a local designation applied to Catholic priests who have brought their parishes into active participation under area development programs. Their parish centers become combat villages with the youth of the villages serving as the paramilitary force. [redacted] "Sea Swallows" in An Xuyen Province and [redacted] group in Ninh Thuan Province are examples of these groups. Approximately [redacted] men have been trained under this program. (This does not include [redacted] man Sea Swallow force, which is currently being trained and supported by a [redacted]

The eventual goal of the CIDG/SWITCHBACK program is to train 100,000 people in the programs listed above. By the end of FY 1963, it is anticipated that more than fifty percent of this goal will have been achieved. By that date, approximately [redacted] hamlet militia and [redacted] strike force personnel should have been trained.

B. CIDG to be Retained by CIA

The activities included under the CIDG/non-SWITCHBACK category and those either of a clandestine nature or those which have political overtones and thus fall within the range of CIA's responsibilities. The main categories of CIDG/non-SWITCHBACK activities are defined below:

1. Mountain Commandos

The mountain commandos, which operate in 15 to 18 man teams, are men locally recruited by province and district chiefs from among montagnard tribes in their areas. Their mission is to act in areas influenced or controlled by the Viet Cong (VC) in which GVN military or civilian presence is rarely found, and is to penetrate deeply into enemy-controlled territories, particularly in the central highland region of South Vietnam adjacent to the border of Laos/Cambodia. These teams act as hunter-killer units which seek out VC units, for either interdiction or reporting purposes. A civic action capability has also been built into each of the mountain commando teams in teams of three men who have had specialized training. The teams thus act as a pro-GVN presence in areas normally under VC control, and seek to counter VC cadre who on their part try to win the montagnard

people to their cause. The mountain commando program also has a related intelligence network which is coordinated through the Vietnamese province and district chiefs. As of 31 December, approximately [redacted] of these mountain commandos had been trained with approximately [redacted] more in training.

2. Popular Force

The popular force (PF), also known as the Force Populaire, is an attempt to establish a pro-GVN presence in Vietnamese villages which have not yet been fortified under the strategic hamlet program. Specially selected youths, many of whom have had relatives killed by the VC, are given weapons and civic action training prior to being sent to villages removed from their home areas, where they help defend the villages against VC incursions and establish a pro-GVN presence. This program has been implemented in central Vietnam and, approximately [redacted] PF personnel have been trained.

3. Trailwatchers (border surveillance units)

Members of the border surveillance units (BSU) are recruited from more promising elements of the strike forces (see above) and other CIDG groups. It is planned that these units will be used to check and report on infiltration of VC cadre into South Vietnam from Laos and Cambodia. These units will remain in place along the border only until border residents themselves can be recruited and integrated into a comprehensive border surveillance net. In those border areas where there is no permanent population, the BSU will remain in place, establishing ties with those ethnic groups which constantly shift back and forth across the ill-defined border. Four units of [redacted] men have been trained.

4. Republican Youth Movement (RYM)

The RYM was started in October 1956 and now numbers approximately [redacted] youths of both sexes. Of this number, [redacted] have received basic paramilitary training while approximately [redacted] RYM members have received advanced military and civic action training from CIA. The main contribution of the RYM has been and will continue to be assisting in the defense of the Strategic Hamlets. In the delta region the RYM have replaced many civil guard units in defending recently constructed Strategic Hamlets. In order to exploit the psychological potential of the RYM, a civic action cadre program supported by both AID and CIA has been developed in conjunction with the RYM. Selected RYM members are trained at various area development centers in medical, economic, social and recreational techniques in order to assist the peasantry to improve their living standards.

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5. Combat Intelligence Teams

These teams are the activated units of what was originally intended to be a staybehind mechanism. (Planning for this program was implemented at a time that it was thought all of South Vietnam might be lost to the communists.) These teams are selected and recruited by an area organizer and given special training at one of the area development centers. They are directed by Vietnamese area organizers who use them to collect and act on their own intelligence and that which is provided by other clandestine parts of the staybehind mechanism. Combat intelligence teams are composed of 18 men each. By 31 December, [redacted] of these men had been trained.

6. The number of personnel to be trained by the end of FY 1963 under CIDG/non-SWITCHBACK activities are as follows:

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Wood

Rec'd 2/20/63

[redacted]



42.85
26.40
24.00
33.20
45.80
60.00
27.30
15.10
49.80
15.30
18.10
3.80
16.90
16.40
24.90
49.10
26.00
23.40
11.70
40.00
8.60
17.20
30.20
10.80
1.60
2.00
27.60
9.00
32.10
22.40
25.00
9.10
24.30
14.64

804.59

TOTAL HAMLET + MILITIA YOUTH

Mr. Wood
Rec'd 2-21-63

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

COFROR/SR/46

COMMITTEE ON PROVINCE REHABILITATION

SUMMARY REPORT OF MEETING FEBRUARY 11, 1963
(Meeting originally scheduled for February 8)

At the request of General Adams, MACV, the following is to be inserted in lieu of the first paragraph, page 4, Summary Report of the meeting of February 1, 1963:

> "General Adams reported that General Harkins had sent a command letter to Chief MAAG and the four Corps Senior Advisors. This letter placed command emphasis on the Province Rehabilitation Program and pointed out the necessity for close cooperation between the U.S. military and U.S. civilian agencies involved."

Mr. Trueheart complimented Colonel Schaad, MAAG, on the latest issue of the Status Report prepared by Colonel Schaad's section.

Agenda Item I -- Interim report by Subcommittee on resources control.

Mr. Adkins, USOM, reported that although PSD was in possession of some items of information as a result of a survey conducted on resources control, he believed it would be preferable to postpone the interim report until the February 15 meeting. The Committee so agreed.

Agenda Item II -- Discussion and acceptance of such province plans as are ready for submission.

Discussion of the plan for Kontum province (the HAP portion was approved at the February 1 meeting) continued. Mr. Phillips, USOM, stated he was satisfied with the proposed relocation effort involving several thousand montagnards and satisfied also that the plan had been coordinated with Special Forces representatives. He added that it was his understanding that the montagnard program would be tailored to fit montagnard needs and that the Ministry of Interior had already issued guidance on this approach to province officials. More specific instructions and guidance will be issued in the future. Following this discussion, the Kontum province plan was approved.

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Major Steinberg, MAAG, opened the discussion of the Pleiku province plan. He summarized the information given at the prior meeting as to the number of hamlets to be built; the number of barbed wire fences to be erected; the number of steel fence posts to be used, etc. Mr. Trueheart inquired why the 2,240 militia were to be trained for thirty days whereas militia recruits in other provinces have received fifteen days' training. Mr. Phillips, USOM, and [redacted] believed that the additional training period stemmed from the province chief's desires to give the trainees additional political indoctrination. During the discussion, the Committee was informed that the province chief wanted to train more than 2,240 militia and that the excess over this number were to be trained by Special Forces at Plei Mrong. Colonel Calloway pointed out that the Special Forces capability at Plei Mrong, and at other camps in the area, was such that they could not absorb more trainees without additional cadres. Mr. Phillips stated that at a meeting attended by Minister Hieu (Civic Action) a plan for the training of additional cadres was outlined. It appeared, therefore, that additional cadres would be available in the future should Plei Mrong be called upon to undertake militia training over and above the 2,240 scheduled by the province chief.

The Committee approved the Pleiku province plan with the understanding that the thirty-day training cycle for the militia would be utilized fully and profitably.

Major Steinberg then introduced the plan for the province of Phu Bon. He outlined the MAP support material to be furnished and the number of hamlets to be constructed in the two phases. Although weapons would not be required, since Special Forces projects had made sufficient weapons available, the province chief did want fifty shotguns and fifty carbines to hold in reserve should the need for them arise. Colonel Patton, MACV, commented that Special Forces were getting more deeply into the hamlet militia training and observed that the "B" team commanding officer in each province has to adapt himself to the province chief, the population, and the specific problems. Therefore, a set approach was not possible since no two provinces or province chiefs or province populations were the same.

The Committee approved the Phu Bon province plan.

Discussion of the Darlac province plan was reopened by Major Steinberg who pointed out that regroupment had reduced the number of defended villages to 162 and that this figure was included in the total of 316 planned strategic hamlets in this province. MAP support

would be

would be allocated for the excess over 162, that is, 154 strategic hamlets. The 154 would be broken down into 61 in the A Zone, each with one squad of militia, and 93 in the C Zone, each with two to three squads of militia. The 162 were broken down into 20 in the A Zone and 57 in the B Zone and 85 in the C Zone. When completed, the total of 316 will break down into 81 in the A Zone, 57 in the B Zone and 178 in the C Zone.

It was noted that 77 strategic hamlets had been completed in addition to the 31 defended villages turned over to province control. However, it is not planned to turn over any more Special Forces-created units until the procedures for the turnover process proposed by MACV J-5 have been accepted. Mr. Trueheart inquired as to the amount of money earmarked for the teacher training school. Mr. Phillips reported that there was an extreme need for teachers and unless montagnards were trained as teachers, it would be necessary to bring in outside Vietnamese teachers which are also in short supply. During the discussion, the Committee was informed that the 31 villages turned over to province control would not be eligible for emergency relief or grant in kind for the construction of hamlet defense perimeters.

The Darlac province plan was approved.

Major Blake, MAAG, outlined a plan to construct 15 new strategic hamlets in Binh Duong and 7 in Tay Ninh province. He summarized the forces to be involved and the construction phases. The purpose of the new hamlets is to clear the highway from a point south of Ben Cat to Tay Ninh. Also, a start will be made to clear the highway from Ben Cat north to Binh Long. The additional funds required are necessary for the additional teams, trainees, self-help projects and supplies for the bulldozers to be used to clear the land.

Mr. Glaser, USOM, outlined the economic projects planned for the new hamlets. USOM would make available livestock, fertilizer, etc., in an effort to make the villagers more self-sufficient.

Mr. Pike, USIS, reported that his agency had been asked to produce two editions of Kien Quoc for these two provinces. He stated that this effort would place an extremely heavy burden on his agency's capability. Mr. Trueheart suggested that USIS might get an agreement to do one edition for both provinces. Colonel Schaad, MAAG, suggested that the publication might be alternated weekly between the two provinces. Given this guidance, Mr. Pike will proceed to work out a mutually acceptable agreement with the province officials concerned.

The proposal for construction of 22 new strategic hamlets in Binh Duong and Tay Ninh was approved.

Agenda Item III -- Discussion of revised memorandum re MACV Concept for Approach to the GVN Takeover of CIDG Areas.

Colonel Cleland, MACV, submitted the revised memorandum and requested additional comments. Mr. Trueheart stated he would examine the memorandum and that if a Committee member had comments or suggestions, he should phone them to Mr. Trueheart. The memorandum will then be submitted to the GVN under cover of a letter addressed to the Minister of Interior as Secretary General of the Interministerial Committee on Strategic Hamlets.

Agenda Item IV -- Other Business

General Adams, MACV, circulated a copy of a letter to Chief MAAG and to the Senior Advisers in which General Harkins expressed the desire that the addressees direct their attention to the Clear-and-Hold Operations in progress and planned within their respective areas. They should make every effort to insure that military forces provided are adequate, operational plans are sound, MAP supplies are properly utilized and that there is continuous coordination between U.S. military and U.S. civilian agencies involved. General Adams said that the letter had been discussed with the GVN but a copy had not been made available to them. The Committee was of the opinion that a copy might be sent to General Te for his information.

Colonel Cleland reported on the JCS briefing. His notes will be put into memo form for circulation to the Committee.

Colonel Kendrick, Special Forces, submitted an interim report on the overall CIDG effort. He stated the report would be up-dated in the near future.

Colonel Schaad informed the Committee that carbines were to be released to hamlet militia.

The Committee agreed to hold its next meeting in the USOM Conference Room on Friday, February 15 at 1000 hours.

1.5(c) 36

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT THE SEEKING OF AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE DIEM REGIME [redacted]

DATE DISTR. 20 MARCH 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

REFERENCES IN 89614

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

APPRAISAL [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. AMERICAN AID IS ESSENTIAL TO AN OVERTHROW OF THE DIEM REGIME, [redacted] THE COMMITTEE IS ENGAGED IN A STUDY OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND MAKING PLANS FOR ITS IMPROVEMENT. [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	STATE/DIR

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

(36)

Date JAN 1999

FORM 3-62 1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

50

[redacted] IF AMERICAN AID IS NOT FORTHCOMING, OTHER SOURCES WILL BE CONTACTED. IF THE AMERICANS HELP THE NATIONALIST CAUSE OF THE OPPOSITIONISTS, THEY WILL HAVE SOME MEASURE OF CONTROL OVER THE RESULTS; OTHERWISE, THEY WILL HAVE NONE. [redacted]

2. [redacted] THE COUNTRY HAS REACHED A COMPLETE IMPASSE AND SOMETHING MUST HAPPEN SOON. IF DIEM SHOULD DIE SUDDENLY, THE RESULT WOULD BE CHAOS, OUT OF WHICH THE COMMUNISTS WOULD EMERGE AS THE ONLY BENEFICIARIES. DIEM REMAINS IN POWER ONLY AS THE RESULT OF AMERICAN MILITARY SUPPORT, WITHOUT WHICH HE WOULD BE COMPLETELY LOST. THE DIEM GOVERNMENT IS WORSE THAN IMPOSSIBLE. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF GROUPS IN THE COUNTRY, SUCH AS THE HOA HAO AND THE CAO DAI, THAT ARE COMPLETELY OPPOSED TO COMMUNISM BUT CANNOT POSSIBLY SUPPORT THE PRESENT REGIME, WHEREAS THEY COULD SUPPORT SOME OTHER NATIONALIST TYPE OF GOVERNMENT. PRESIDENT DIEM IS PERSONALLY A DECENT AND HONORABLE MAN, BUT NGO DINH NHU AND HIS WIFE MUST BE ELIMINATED; WITHOUT THEM, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO RE-ORIENT DIEM.

3. THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM IS HIGHLY DANGEROUS BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM ARE EITHER

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

IN 89614

PAGE THREE

UNAWARE OF OR UNWILLING TO FACE IT, THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS ARE HEAVILY INFILTRATED WITH VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC), WHOSE PRESENCE WILL MAKE ITSELF KNOWN IN DUC COURSE. THE REPUBLICAN YOUTH MOVEMENT IS ONLY A LONG SERIES OF MEETINGS AND IS COMPLETELY LACKING IN DEPTH AS AN ORGANIZATION; IT IS A SUPERFICIAL VENEER, GOING THROUGH VARIOUS FRUITLESS MOTIONS. THE PRINCIPAL CRITERION FOR SELECTION OF PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT LEADERS IS PERSONAL OBEDIENCE TO THE REGIME; COMPETENCE IS ONLY AN AFTERTHOUGHT.

4. IF THE SITUATION CONTINUES IN ITS PRESENT VEIN, THERE WILL BE A RENEWED VC OFFENSIVE ON A LARGER SCALE SOON AFTER THE ONSET OF THE RAINY SEASON, WHEN BAD WEATHER REDUCES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HELICOPTERS AND AIR CAPABILITY IN GENERAL. THIS WILL BEGIN NEAR THE SAIGON AREA, AND, AT THE SAME TIME THE VC WITHIN THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS WILL GO INTO ACTION.

5. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID USIA CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION 2ND AIR DIVISION.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CONFIDENTIAL — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS [redacted]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT REPORTED ARREST OF NGO DINH CAN [redacted]

DATE DISTR. 28 AUGUST 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

REFERENCES IN 08598

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

APPRAISAL [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. [redacted] NGO DINH CAN, THE PRESIDENT'S BROTHER, HAD BEEN PLACED UNDER HOUSE ARREST IN A SMALL MOUNTAIN RESORT NEAR HUE. THE ORDER TO ARREST CAN WAS ISSUED BY NGO DINH NHU.

2. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 2ND AIR DIV 9TH FLD STA CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT.

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS [redacted]

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FORM 4-60 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-30)

SECRET
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NIE 11-63
22 May 1963

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 11-63
(Supersedes NIE 11-9-62)

Main Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf

22 MAY 1963

ACCOUNTABLE DOCUMENT
RETURN TO C/DDI REGISTRY
[illegible]-47 [illegible]

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA.

Concurring:

Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF
Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff
The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB
Director of the National Security Agency

Abstaining:

The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.

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Date 2/24/94

HRP 94-3

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

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Main Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy

SECRET

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
THE PROBLEM	1
PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS	1
DISCUSSION	3
I. THE BACKGROUND OF PRESENT SOVIET POLICY Setbacks to the Soviet cause—the present mood in Moscow—reasons for the Cuban missile venture	3
II. THE SITUATION IN THE LEADERSHIP Characteristics of Khrushchev's policy—nature of his opposition—emergence of a conservative consensus	5
III. THE SOVIET VIEW OF PRESENT OPPORTUNITIES Limits of detente policy—dangers of forward moves—attempts to improve military position—likelihood of continued probes—chances of another high-risk move	7
IV. SOVIET TACTICS IN THE NEAR TERM Negotiations on Berlin and disarmament—compromises with Castro—military intentions in Cuba—attitude to revolutions in new nations—attempts to limit Sino-Soviet dispute	9
V. THE LONGER RUN Influence of unforeseen events—level of disaffection inside the USSR—erosive effects of Communist divergences—consequences of foreign success or failure	14
VI. THE QUESTION OF SUCCESSION Importance of the individual leader—likelihood of a succession struggle—role of party, state, police, and military—probable policy disputes—foreign policy in the succession struggle	17

MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

THE PROBLEM

To estimate main trends in Soviet foreign policy, with attention to the influence of political developments within the USSR and the world Communist movement.

PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS

A. The forced withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba last fall was the most dramatic in a series of disappointments and setbacks which have been plaguing Soviet policy. It is true that these have been offset somewhat by space successes, by advances in the development of missiles and nuclear weapons, and by the retention of a foothold in the Western Hemisphere. Nevertheless, the fundamentally optimistic outlook of the Soviet leaders seems overlaid at present with a sober appreciation of obstacles and dangers and a realization that earlier expectations of rapid advances must be stretched out into the future. The current mood of the Soviet leadership must also be adversely affected by the continuing Chinese challenge to Soviet authority in the Bloc and the Communist movement. *(Paras. 1–7, 30–32)*

B. Largely as a result of these frustrations to Soviet hopes, Khrushchev's leadership appears to have come into question in recent months. Although his colleagues probably have not been seeking his downfall, they have apparently been trying to com-

NOTE: A detailed examination of Soviet military and economic policy appears in two recent estimates: NIE 11–4–63, "Soviet Military Capabilities and Policies, 1962–1967," dated 20 March 1963, TOP SECRET, and NIE 11–5–63, "Soviet Economic Problems," dated 20 March 1963, SECRET.

pel him to take greater account of their collective opinions; Khrushchev has responded with policy revisions which seem to reflect their advice. While Khrushchev's freedom of action may thus be somewhat restricted at present, we believe that his essential authority remains intact. *(Paras. 8–12)*

C. In the present phase, we think that the Soviets are unlikely either to make serious attempts to resolve cold-war tensions or to undertake a vigorous new offensive against non-Communist positions. Instead, they seem to see the present period as one which can best be used to build up their strength and to fortify existing positions in preparation for future opportunities. They apparently do not plan any early moves either toward agreement or toward a heightened crisis over Berlin. We believe that their approach to disarmament will be primarily agitational. In Cuba, their primary present aims are to induce the US to move toward *de facto* acceptance of Castro and to consolidate the Soviet foothold, from which they mean to pursue the longer term struggle for Latin America. *(Paras. 13–29)*

D. We do not mean to imply, however, that Soviet foreign policy in the present phase will be passive. The USSR will be alert to search out vulnerabilities in the non-Communist world which it believes it can usefully exploit. It will also continue efforts to make its influence felt throughout the underdeveloped areas. Furthermore, while we think that the Soviets will take a sober view in the present period of the opportunities for a major advance, there is one important caveat to this judgment. We have identified the need for a major triumph which would reverse a trend of adversity as an important part of the motivation for deploying missiles to Cuba. This need still remains; therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility of some new and audacious move. *(Paras. 17–18)*

E. A key uncertainty surrounding future Soviet policy arises from the problem of the succession to Khrushchev. The initial tendency after his departure would probably be for more conservative elements to gain predominance, but the longer a succession struggle remains unresolved, the more tendency there would be for a wider range of alternative policies to be given active consideration. *(Paras. 42–47)*

F. We see some prospect that, over the long run, the element of ideological hostility in the Soviet outlook might gradually diminish. This depends upon many uncertain factors, however, and even if it should come about, the requirements of Soviet national security, prestige, and ambition would still bring the USSR into frequent collision with the interests of other states. *(Paras. 34–41)*

DISCUSSION

I. THE BACKGROUND OF PRESENT SOVIET POLICY

1. The position in which the Soviet leaders find themselves in 1963 is not the one which they anticipated five years ago. Soviet thinking in 1958 was pervaded by a general optimism arising from a number of factors and calculations. Khrushchev, who had recently obtained a commanding position, apparently judged that he had overcome both economic dislocations and the political turbulence unloosed by de-Stalinization and could look forward to steady and substantial internal progress. His view of relations among Communist States seems to have been that, freed of the burden of Stalinist excesses, Soviet policy could guide the Bloc more effectively with a looser hand while preserving the essentials of Moscow's leadership.

2. Looking out upon the non-Communist world, Khrushchev probably had considerable hopes that trends in the underdeveloped areas would continue to run in his favor and that the USSR's earlier successes in the Middle East could be extended in that area and repeated in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Most important of all, the USSR's early sputnik and ICBM successes evidently persuaded him that the image and perhaps even the substance of Soviet physical power would soon overbear that of the US and bring the West to the conference table ready for concessions to his demands. In short, Khrushchev in 1958 saw the "world relation of forces" shifting rapidly in favor of the USSR and believed that history, with vigorous assistance from Moscow, would in the coming period reward the Soviet cause with regular, tangible advances.

3. Almost none of this has come to pass. In the relations of military power, regarded by the Soviets as an indispensable element in their general calculation of forces, US military and intelligence programs have led to a situation in which both sides, and indeed much of world opinion, understand that strategic advantage does not lie with the USSR. The Berlin ultimatum of 1958 remains unfulfilled and, save for the constriction of East Germany's refugee flow, basic Soviet aims in the key area of Germany are no further advanced. Although the So-

viets may expect some benefits from present strains in NATO, over the last five years the strength of the West as a whole has almost certainly assumed a more formidable aspect in their eyes. In the underdeveloped countries, postcolonial nationalism has in most areas openly diverged from the hoped-for association with Soviet policies, and the USSR has not succeeded in establishing patronage, much less control, over the new nations.

4. Over the same period, the USSR's relations with its major ally have fallen into acute disarray, and the Soviets must now defend themselves throughout the Communist movement to preserve a leadership which had not been effectively challenged for four decades. At home, economic progress has faltered for a variety of reasons, of which the most important is the impact of military and space spending. At the same time, intellectual circles have used Khrushchev's attacks upon Stalin to raise painful questions which tend to challenge the authority of the party and its present leaders.

5. This is by no means to say that the last five years have brought an uninterrupted series of defeats for Soviet policy. During this period, for example, a procession of space feats has regularly revitalized Soviet prestige and sustained the USSR's lead in this important field of competition. Both nuclear and missile development have recorded notable technical progress. The Berlin Wall has greatly eased the problems of the client state of East Germany. Cuba's accession to the Communist camp remains a major gain despite the October backdown and the subsequent problems and dangers encountered in dealing with Castro and the US. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership seems to recognize the last five years as a period in which problems accumulated.

6. There is no sign that this trend has caused the Soviets to revise their fundamental assumptions or that they regard these setbacks as more than temporary. There are many signs, however, of a recognition that earlier expectations were overoptimistic. Their unwillingness to turn over Berlin access to East Germany and their precipitate withdrawal of strategic missiles from Cuba are the most striking instances testifying to a sober appraisal of their opportunities under the present relation of forces between East and West. A similar concern can be observed in their treatment of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the importance of which they no longer attempt to deny, and of their military position, where assertions of absolute superiority have given way to claims of parity and expressions of anxiety about US intentions and the future relation of military forces. Similarly, the indiscriminate optimism of Soviet pronouncements concerning new countries and independence movements is now heavily tempered by criticism of the bourgeois and anti-Communist tendencies of nationalist leaders. Domestically, the regime has had to issue warnings to consumers that defense priorities will

cut into the program to raise living standards, and Khrushchev does not seem confident that former rates of general economic growth can be quickly regained. In sum, the leadership appears to realize that the disappointments of recent years are not isolated but in fact represent a series of related setbacks stemming in part from mistaken appraisals of the possibilities open to Soviet policy.

7. In our view, the attempt to deploy strategic missiles in Cuba was in considerable part due to Soviet recognition of this trend. We think that the Soviet leaders, as they pondered this venture, were highly conscious of the failing momentum of their offensive and therefore put a very high premium on a dramatic triumph which they could turn to account in many ways—to alter both the image and the substance of relative power, to prepare a fruitful ground for Berlin negotiations, to undermine US influence in Latin America, to disarm Chinese criticisms. They may have judged the chances of failure as high but nevertheless felt it necessary to take a calculated risk, or the need for a victory may have led them to persuade themselves that the chances of failure were in fact low. In any case, we believe that the accumulated discouragements of recent years contributed to a decision which did not reflect the caution usually characteristic of Soviet foreign policy moves.

II. THE SITUATION IN THE LEADERSHIP

8. The failure of the Cuban missile venture has aggravated all the problems which the Soviets meant it to resolve. There are various signs that it has also affected Soviet top-level politics. Analysis of the workings of the Soviet leadership must always involve considerable speculation, but our tentative conclusions suggest that, at the present time, Soviet foreign policy may be influenced in more than usual degree by internal disagreements.

9. Khrushchev occupies the central position in Soviet politics, and his personality and conceptions give a strong stamp to both the internal and foreign policies of the USSR. He is capable of revising ideology to suit his purposes, but he is a great deal more than merely pragmatic. Compared to his predecessor and apparently also to some of his present colleagues, he is an imaginative innovator in both doctrine and policy, prone to change course rapidly in his incessant search for results. Approaching each new tactic with his characteristic energy, he tends to outdo others in boldness and often to assume considerable risk, trusting to his political skill to retrieve a situation somehow if difficulties ensue, even by reversing himself completely if necessary. The prime move of this type which can be directly associated with Khrushchev is the daring stroke of de-Stalinization, but the same traits can be observed in such disparate moves as the New Lands campaign, the Berlin challenge of 1958, the 1960 military reorganization plan, the

cultivation of a "spirit of Camp David," and the two reconciliations with Tito. This pattern suggests to us that Khrushchev either initiated the Cuban missile venture himself or adopted it early and supported it against any doubters.

10. Because of these tendencies, any opposition to Khrushchev within the Soviet leadership has tended to be a conservative opposition, that is, one which both prefers greater caution in the appraisal of risks and shies away from novel departures in doctrine or policy. Khrushchev is accessible to the ideas of others, but it appears that most of his innovations originate either with himself, younger associates, or specialists rather than with his colleagues in the top leadership. While he is usually able to muster majorities for his proposals, some of them have at various times encountered opposition which has limited or even undone them. And when several of his programs encounter difficulties simultaneously, the restraints exerted by his colleagues accumulate. If the coalescence of opinion is strong, Khrushchev reacts by shifting ground to place himself at the head of the new and more conservative consensus which is forming. But he often returns to his original conceptions when he deems that a propitious moment has arrived.

11. The recent period appears to be one in which Khrushchev has been on the defensive and has had to move away from venturesome positions with which he had clearly identified himself in the past. In February, he all but abandoned his longstanding proposals for a substantial increase in allocations to agriculture and light industry; these had been continually opposed by the military and probably by some political leaders as well. In March, Khrushchev's chastisement of rebellious writers and artists abruptly checked the de-Stalinization campaign which he had himself revived last fall. Khrushchev in the past has used de-Stalinization as a means of direct attack upon political opponents, and it is possible that this latest reversal represents a successful defense by his intended targets. At a minimum, Khrushchev's judgment has probably been discredited by the strong antiregime overtones which emerged when the intellectuals responded to his earlier encouragement to renewed attacks on Stalin.

12. These moves are logical responses to real problems, but they also comport better with the predilections of some of Khrushchev's colleagues than with his own earlier views and this, along with several ambiguous indications of current uncertainty in Moscow, suggests that his predominance has diminished somewhat. The difficulties with China, the frustrations over Berlin, and the humiliation in Cuba have probably worked in the same direction. We think it unlikely that any faction is actively seeking Khrushchev's downfall. Instead, such leaders as Kozlov and Suslov have probably wished to bring about a greater practice of collectivity in Soviet policymaking and, by this route, to tighten central controls, insist upon ideological conformity, and eschew

radical and risky departures in domestic and foreign affairs. Khrushchev's temperament is not amenable to collectivity, however, and he is likely to respond to checks of this kind by moving to reassert his dominance. Kozlov's illness is in this respect convenient; whether real or political, it undermines his present strength and may lead to further personnel shifts which Khrushchev could turn to his own advantage.

III. THE SOVIET VIEW OF PRESENT OPPORTUNITIES

13. We believe that a phase in regime politics of the sort described above has contributed to the relative immobility which seems to characterize current Soviet foreign policy. Even without this factor, however, there are important reasons for the Soviets to avoid major new moves. From the leadership's viewpoint, no major change in Soviet policy, such as a serious attempt to reduce cold-war tensions drastically or a vigorous new offensive against non-Communist positions, seems to offer much promise at present.

14. The Soviets would not expect that they could improve their position through negotiated agreements at a time when they are relatively weak and their enemy feels relatively strong. In such periods, the task of Soviet diplomacy is primarily to pursue defensive tactics until a more favorable correlation of forces can be brought about. Khrushchev's post-October advocacy of negotiation and compromise was intended primarily to buttress his version of the missile withdrawal as a victory for peace rather than a defeat for the Soviet Union and to forestall possible US efforts to follow up with pressures on other Soviet positions. The Soviets did offer one concession which seemed important, probably also to them, when Khrushchev accepted the principle of on-site inspection of a test ban. But the USSR soon indicated, by its conduct of the negotiations which followed and its refusal to go beyond three inspections, that it required greater counterconcessions than were forthcoming from the US before it would actually sign a treaty. The requirement to sustain some commitment to Cuba in the face of continued US hostility to Castro raised a further barrier against any general relaxation of tensions, as did the need for an external threat to justify continuing deprivations at home.

15. In fact, while statements praising the method of mutual concessions have not dropped out of Soviet propaganda altogether, they are now overshadowed by charges that the West remains hostile and has no genuine interest in reaching settlements. This does not mean, however, that aggressive Soviet actions are to follow. In the first place, the USSR recognizes that the world situation currently presents no opportunities for major advances at tolerable levels of risk: indeed, in 1963 it has suffered distinct reverses in the Middle East and is having difficulty in holding its own in some areas of Africa. In the second

place, the Cuban episode has demonstrated to the Soviets that forward action is not without peril. Current Soviet pronouncements betray a keen appreciation of US power, and the October crisis has almost certainly persuaded them that they had underrated US determination to use that power.

16. In these circumstances, the Soviets seem to see the present period as one which can best be used to build up their strength and to fortify existing positions in preparation for future opportunities to make new advances. They seek in the first instance to strengthen their military power in hopes of gaining a position which repairs their prestige and lays greater inhibitions on Western policy.[1] Recent strong reaffirmations of military priorities reflect a determination to proceed with existing programs and, beyond this, a possible decision to increase military spending above previously planned levels. These programs already include the introduction of protected strategic missile systems, the development of very-high-yield warheads, and a major antiballistic missile effort which has already led to the deployment of a first-generation system at one location. The USSR is also pursuing a vigorous research and development effort aimed at technological advances which could radically enhance both the war-fighting capability and the political value of its military establishment. As an important aspect of these efforts, the Soviets are conducting a space program aimed at prestigious accomplishments and are almost certainly investigating the feasibility of military space systems.

17. We do not mean, however, that the Soviets consider that, unless they can achieve some sort of military advantage over the West, their political advances have reached final limits. Military power remains only one ingredient, albeit a very important one, in the Soviet concept of the forces which determine their prospects. Still less do we believe that Soviet foreign policy in the present phase will be passive. The USSR will be alert to search out vulnerabilities in the non-Communist world, to exploit the differences which have arisen in the NATO alliance, and to make its influence felt throughout Asia, Latin America, and Africa. But the Soviet leaders' outlook is not one of high confidence that events can readily be made to move in their favor, and we think it likely that they will take a sober view in the present period of the opportunities for major advance.

18. There is one important caveat to this judgment. We have identified the need for a major triumph which would reverse a trend of

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[1] The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not consider the reasons listed sufficiently describe the basis for Soviet military policy decisions. He would insert the following sentence at this point:

This would be in furtherance of a basic Soviet military policy objective of building by such means as become available toward achievement of a military superiority over the West.

adversity as an important part of the Soviet motivation for deploying missiles to Cuba. This need still remains; in fact, it has been magnified by the Cuban failure itself and by subsequent problems, such as the Communist setback in Iraq, the Western gain in India, and the renewed Chinese onslaught on Soviet leadership of the Communist movement. While we think it probable that the Cuban venture has strengthened the counsels of caution in Moscow, we cannot exclude the possibility of some new and audacious move. Such actions are essentially incalculable, although we think they are somewhat more likely when Khrushchev's ascendancy is high than when collectivity, that is, his need to defer to the opinions of others, has been strengthened. Nor can we predict where such a move might be launched. We note, however, that Berlin would offer a field for a far-reaching Soviet victory, although it is obviously an extremely risky area in which to pose a major challenge.

19. It is also conceivable that Khrushchev will react to present frustrations in the opposite way, that is, by focusing upon a major agreement with the West, rather than a major encroachment against it, as the means of restoring movement to Soviet policy and scoring a personal triumph. Given the present status of such issues as a nuclear test ban and Berlin, it is difficult to see how he could expect to achieve an early settlement without making visible concessions or reductions in earlier Soviet demands. If he nevertheless chose to pursue this course, and to represent the results as important advances for the USSR, he would thereby set up a powerful momentum for general detente and bring new confusion into official ideology. This in turn would intensify the strains in the international Communist movement and magnify present doubts within the Soviet Party about his leadership. For these reasons, and because of Khrushchev's own ambitions to achieve the kind of victories abroad which are clear defeats for the West, we think it very unlikely that he will proceed in this direction, although we cannot entirely exclude this possibility.

IV. SOVIET TACTICS IN THE NEAR TERM

20. *Berlin and Germany.* We believe that the USSR does not intend in the near future to pose a sharp and direct challenge to the Western position in Berlin. Khrushchev's remarks in East Berlin last January seemed designed to put Ulbricht on notice that his regime, protected by the Wall, must now concentrate upon a policy of internal stabilization and growth and not expect early progress toward the objective of ejecting the Allies. Similarly, the manner in which the USSR has resumed Berlin conversations with the US suggests that it does not intend an early showdown. We think it unlikely, however, that the Soviets expect these talks to lead to any early agreement on Berlin. Instead, we believe that their motives are, first, to avoid the impression

of weakness which would be conveyed by allowing the issue to die entirely and, second, to get into a position to sow distrust and suspicion among the Allies and West Germany. In pursuing these ends, they are likely to resort to sporadic local harassments.

21. It is possible, however, that the Soviets will in fact seek some sort of mutually acceptable Berlin agreement as a way of discharging Khrushchev's longstanding commitment on this matter and collecting such concessions as can be extracted in return for an easing of pressures on the Allied position in the city. In such an effort, they would presumably have to accept a continued Allied presence in West Berlin and some form of guaranteed access. The USSR for its part would be primarily interested in extracting as much recognition as possible for the GDR, perhaps by involving it in the administration of Allied ground and air access in a way which did not entirely extinguish formal Soviet responsibility. Once such an agreement was achieved, the Soviets would probably feel free to fulfill their long-adjourned promise to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR. The USSR would of course wish to set a predetermined duration on a Berlin agreement and, if this proved impossible, to obtain a formula sufficiently vague on this point to allow them to renew pressures at some future time.

22. Recent developments in the Western Alliance affecting the control of nuclear weapons and the present check to the European unity movement seem to have focused Soviet attention once again on Europe. The prospects for changes of political leadership in West Germany and Britain probably reinforce this tendency. We do not foresee any particular Soviet initiative aimed at European problems, but the possibility of promoting disarray in the Western camp may be more strongly present as a factor affecting Soviet policy than it has been for some time past. Both the Franco-German treaty and the plans to admit West Germany to a larger role in NATO's nuclear policy have already provoked a sharp verbal Soviet response. The vague threat to take countermeasures against West German participation in a multilateral force probably has no more substance than the long series of threats which have accompained the whole process of German rearmament. It is possible, however, that the Soviets will respond by increasing their efforts to extract from the West some formal recognition of the existence of two Germanies, reasoning that this would offset the dangers of a nuclear-armed Federal Republic by making it more difficult for Bonn to mount heavy pressures against East Germany. There may also be a revival of Soviet interest in limited arms control measures affecting Germany.

23. *Disarmament.* The Soviets probably still see certain advantages to themselves in more general measures of arms control and disarmament. They would doubtless count it an advance, for example, if they could find a means of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons or reducing the chances of accidental war. The burden of modern arma-

ments on the Soviet economy is an increasingly important argument for the stabilization of the arms race. On the other hand, the Soviets set great store by the political usefulness of great military power. Furthermore, they are aware that broad disarmament or arms control measures would have profound implications—intimate cooperation with the enemy and recognition of a higher sovereignty in an international control organ—running contrary to their assertions of inevitable hostility between the two world camps. As a result, they have regarded disarmament questions primarily as an opportunity to capture peace sentiments and to mobilize pressures against Western military measures.

24. Present Soviet behavior indicates that post-October reappraisals have not altered this approach, and that the USSR does not regard the present period as a favorable one for reaching arms control agreements which would advance Soviet interests. Such a conclusion seems to be reflected in the announcement of economic policies which recommit the Soviets to an intense military competition. Moreover, in the present context, it would be difficult to move on to further significant advances in the field of disarmament and arms control without first concluding a test ban agreement. The Soviets have evidently decided that the gap between Soviet and US positions on this matter, while narrowed, is still too wide to be bridged. In this, we believe that they are influenced by the desire not to encourage hopes for a detente which would be generated inside the USSR by a major East-West agreement. During the present phase, therefore, we believe that the Soviets approach to disarmament will be primarily agitational and will focus on those measures which offer one-sided rather than mutual advantages.

25. *Cuba.*[2] The outlines of a post-October Soviet policy toward Cuba have now emerged. The USSR's immediate objective is to preserve the position it won in 1960–1962, in the face of pressures from the US and problems in dealing with Castro. To this end it is continuing a substantial flow of economic assistance which appears sufficient to maintain the Cuban economy at least at present levels. It regularly reiterates a commitment, albeit undefined, to the security of the regime. While the Soviets of course would prefer a disciplined puppet to take charge in Havana, they have accepted Castro, put up with his periodic public barbs at the USSR, and apparently agreed that the Moscow-oriented Communists should avoid conflict with him. Similarly, they are trying to reduce the chances of heightened US pressures by not firing upon overflights, by withdrawing some personnel, and probably also by urging Castro to soft-pedal the fomentation of armed revolution in Latin America. One purpose of these actions is to induce the US to move toward *de facto* acceptance of Castro.

[2] A fuller discussion will be given in the forthcoming NIE 85-63, "Situation and Prospects in Cuba," SECRET.

26. The pattern of Soviet policy toward Cuba described above probably means that the primary Soviet aim at present is to consolidate communism in Cuba with a view to using it as a foothold from which to pursue the longer term struggle for Latin America which the Soviets foresee. If this is so, it is unlikely that the Soviets would prejudice this aim by again attempting to use Cuba as a strategic base, thus courting violent US action against the Castro regime. This is not to say that the Soviets will never again attempt the introduction of some sort of offensive weapons system into Cuba. The time might come when they would again calculate that the net of advantages and risks would favor such an attempt. For at least the near term, however, the Soviets almost certainly estimate that the risks of such an attempt would be excessive.

27. If this is their present judgment, the Soviet must reconsider the usefulness to them of those forces which went to Cuba as part of the missile deployment. There are some signs that they intend to make gradual further withdrawals, but we would expect a significant number of Soviet military personnel to remain in Cuba indefinitely, in training and advisory roles at least. We expect the Soviets to hand over to Castro their advanced weapons as the Cuban forces are trained to operate them, possibly including control over the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. We are unable to estimate a date by which Cubans would acquire complete control of the SAM system, but we do not exclude that this could occur as early as the latter part of 1963. This would, in the Soviet view, involve some risk of Cuban attacks upon reconnaissance aircraft which could touch off a new major crisis, but they may regard this risk as preferable to the political cost of either withdrawing the system or trying to keep it indefinitely under their own command.

28. *The Underdeveloped Areas.*[3] The USSR's understanding of the "national liberation" movement identifies the emergence of new, independent nations as an important gain for the Soviet world position. The Soviets go on, however, to argue the necessity of a second stage, that of "national democracy," the hallmark of which is the participation of local Communists in a governing national front. This in turn creates the prerequisites for "completing" the revolution, with or without violence, by installing the Communist Party in power. Events of the last five years, however, have not followed this pattern. Cuba has reached approximately the predicted destination, but by an unpredicted route and in a manner which leaves the USSR with economic and military leverage but without full disciplinary control. The Indonesian Communist Party has successfully practiced the tactics of building political

[3] For a detailed discussion of Soviet policy in the Middle East, see the recent NIE 11-6-63, "The Soviet Role in the Arab World," dated 24 April 1963, SECRET. The USSR's approach to Africa is examined in NIE 11-12-62, "Trends in Soviet Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa," dated 5 December 1962, SECRET.

weight and respectability and shows some promise of leading its country into the phase of "national democracy." But the Cuban experience, and the Indonesian Party's behavior in the Sino-Soviet dispute, cannot give the Soviets much assurance that the Indonesian Party in power would follow Soviet guidance in a disciplined way either. Elsewhere, nationalist leaders have generally rebuffed or even repressed the Communists; in some cases, Soviet state relations with the new governments have not escaped damage.

29. One of the features of the general line of policy described in this paper will probably be an increased emphasis, in areas where this is feasible, on efforts to build subversive capabilities and tangible political assets within the underdeveloped countries. The challenge of the Chinese Communists, and in Latin America the competing appeal of Fidelismo, reinforce the reasons for a greater Soviet effort in this direction. Nevertheless, we do not expect any radical turn in Soviet policy stressing early Communist attempts to come to power. The Soviet leaders continue to give evidence that, in most cases, they regard such attempts as premature, more likely to set back rather than advance the fortunes of the local parties, and prejudicial to other Soviet interests. Meanwhile, they will continue to rely upon diplomacy and material assistance; even though stringencies in the domestic economy and their growing awareness of the limited political returns on aid programs may lead them to become more selective in assuming new economic commitments, they do not wish to abandon this field to the West.[4]

30. *Communist China.* At the present stage of the Sino-Soviet dispute, neither Moscow nor Peiping entertains much hope of pressuring or persuading the rival leadership to alter its stand. The stakes in the conflict are therefore the allegiance of other Communist parties and radical movements in the non-Communist world. Because China has made gradual but regular gains in this competition over the last two years, particularly in Asia, the Soviets have a strong interest in gaining some sort of respite, especially at a time when the accumulation of problems elsewhere has lowered their prestige. The clearest example of this interaction occurred last October when the Soviets, foreseeing the possibility of a retreat in the Cuban missile crisis, made a vain bid to forestall Chinese criticism by momentarily supporting Peiping in its border dispute with India. The same tendency is evident in Khrushchev's call for a truce in polemical warfare and efforts to arrange bilateral talks.

31. But while the Soviets can shelve an issue like Berlin simply by ceasing to agitate it, they have no means of unilaterally shutting off the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Chinese show no disposition to stop pressing their case, and Khrushchev is unwilling to make concessions important

[4] For an examination of Soviet aid to these countries, see NIE 10-63, "Bloc Economic and Military Assistance Programs," dated 10 January 1963, SECRET.

enough to allow the two to compose their differences for a time. The present attempts to convoke a meeting have been carried on in a remarkable public correspondence filled with uncompromising restatements of position and veiled threats and insults. We think that a conference, if it comes about, will at most result in a superficial compromise which would be highly vulnerable to the next turn of international events. Beyond these maneuvers, the general outlook is for a continuing and widening estrangement between the two powers in which both Soviet and Chinese nationalism will become increasingly prominent.

32. In southeast Asia, differences with China, which include differences over the tactics of "national liberation" struggle, have worked to complicate Soviet policy. Because of the important position of the North Vietnamese as the prime movers of Communist policy in both Laos and South Vietnam, the Soviets are probably increasingly reluctant to oppose North Vietnamese interests. The Soviets probably do not want to dissipate what influence they have in Hanoi by constant intervention over secondary questions of local tactics, particularly if in doing so they appear to be giving way to Western pressures. On the other hand, the Soviets have broader interests and problems which transcend those concerning Laos. Hence they would be loath to give the North Vietnamese or Chinese a free hand to decide Communist policy. On balance, even though the Soviets still probably prefer to maintain the Geneva settlement, we think that they will be unable to respond to US and British efforts to stabilize the Laotian situation unless US pressures induce the local Communists to seek Soviet support.

V. THE LONGER RUN

33. It is wholly uncertain how long Soviet policy will focus on the tasks of consolidation designed to prepare for a renewed offensive against the non-Communist world. This depends on a number of factors, such as the situation in the top leadership, the success of the USSR's efforts to improve its relative military position, and the opportunities for forward action opened up by developments abroad. An aggravation of divisions in Europe and between Europe and the US, for example, would encourage the Soviets to pursue more actively the exacerbation of differences in the Western camp. General policy, moreover, might be heavily influenced by the need to respond to some unexpected turn of events, such as a successful Communist revolution in Latin America, the flaring up of a new Cuban crisis, or an escalation of armed conflict in southeast Asia.

34. In our last estimate of the future course of Soviet foreign policy,[5] we examined the possibility of a gradual evolution in the Soviet world outlook which would diminish the importance of those conceptions of

[5] NIE 11-9-62, "Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy," dated 2 May 1962, SECRET.

hostility derived from Communist ideology. At that time, we judged it possible that, over a quite unpredictable period of time, certain factors might force the Soviet leaders to adopt a more "normal" approach to world politics, one giving greater weight to national interests and conventional modes of international behavior as these are understood in the West, and less to the effort to expand indefinitely the area of Moscow's control. In this section, we reconsider the nature and influence of these factors: the course of developments inside the USSR, changing relations within the Bloc and the Communist movement, and the movement of events in the East-West competition.

35. *Internal Developments.* A year ago, we concluded that there was some prospect of an evolutionary trend inside the USSR which, by allowing public opinion to acquire a larger influence, would have some moderating effect on the Soviet world outlook. We have seen no significant movement over the last year, however, in the direction of involving wider circles of opinion, presumably closer to the aspirations of the general population, in Soviet policymaking. The regime has laid new economic burdens on the consumer and, in Cuba, carried the country into a risky and remote adventure irrelevant to the concerns and desires of the people. These actions have probably cost the regime some of the popular confidence and loyalty which it seeks, and the relatively bleak outlook for the consumer in 1963 raises the possibility that demonstrations of discontent may recur on the considerable scale of 1962. But these reactions do not endanger the bases of regime control, and the recent reaffirmation of military priorities in the allocation of economic resources confirms that they remain only one factor, and evidently not a decisive one, in the leadership's choice of policies.

36. We attach considerable long-run importance, however, to the climate of opinion which, making use of the opportunities of de-Stalinization, has manifested itself among Soviet writers and artists. The recent works of the cultural intelligentsia, and their responses to critical attack, implicitly and sometimes even explicitly reject the legitimacy of party authority in the arts. More than this, in their strong affirmation of human values and their condemnation of the Stalinist past, they have formulated the hitherto unspoken question of the present leadership's responsibility for the crimes of the 1930's and 1940's and, consequently, its fitness to rule today. Implicit in their revolt is also a repudiation of the way in which the party defines its historic mission and its allegation that the Western world is inevitably hostile to the USSR.

37. The regime has shown a special sensitivity to the intellectuals' contention that the older generation does not deserve the respect of its sons. It senses in this not only a criticism of individuals, but a repudiation of the political achievements of the revolution to date. Current measures of repression reflect party fears that these attitudes are spreading to other groups, and there are signs that some students and scien-

tific-technical workers share the artists' outlook. In the face of the present crackdown and demands for recantation, many of the rebellious artists may not be able to sustain the collective insubordination which their current silence represents. We believe, however, that their alienation from the party leadership as presently constituted is profound, and that it will continue to find expression so long as the regime remains unwilling, as it appears to be at present, to resort to repressions which truly terrorize.

38. *Relations in the Communist World.* In the past year, events have forced the Soviet leadership to move considerably further away from the traditional Communist view of Moscow as the undisputed center and order-giver for the entire world movement. Even as they look beyond Mao Tse-tung to his successors, they have little hope of being able to restore unity of action with Communist China or to be relieved of the necessity to combat its independent influence in parties and movements which earlier were exclusive Soviet preserves. By force of various circumstances, they have had to extend a special status to Cuba in the socialist camp and to watch Albania, North Korea, North Vietnam, and the parties in non-Communist Asia move varying distances out of their sphere of influence. In pursuing a rapprochement with Tito, they have had to compromise their old demands of hegemony.

39. In all these ways the Soviets, responding to a pluralistic and contradictory world, are practicing a political give-and-take which has less and less relation to traditional techniques of Stalinist manipulation and to the blacks and whites of Stalinist thought. We believe that this process within the Communist movement has an eroding effect upon the basic Soviet view of world politics as essentially a bipolar struggle of camp against camp. The private discourse of Soviet citizens and officials frequently reflects a recognition that, in some matters, Soviet interests parallel those of the West rather than those of Communist China. It would be wrong, we think, to interpret this trend as leading in the direction of a common Soviet-Western front against China. But it is not unreasonable to expect that the loosening of relationships inside the Communist world will be a significant factor tending to diminish the ideological ingredient in the Soviet outlook upon the non-Communist world.

40. *The Course of East-West Competition.* In our last estimate, we singled out the success or failure which the USSR's foreign policy encounters as perhaps the most significant factor affecting the Soviet outlook on the outside world. Since that time, the record contains much more failure than success, but we do not perceive signs of any fundamental Soviet reappraisal of the validity of their key doctrines. We continue to believe, however, that the prolonged frustration of Soviet objectives, particularly the more ambitious aims having to do

with a world-wide conflict of systems, holds some promise over the long run of bringing the USSR around to a view which accepts the permanence of a pluralistic world. Conversely, it seems certain that successes in expanding Soviet influence, major weakenings in Western positions, and in particular any further advances of direct Communist rule will act to confirm the more far-reaching hopes and expectations of the Soviet leaders.

41. It is possible, however, that the experience of prolonged failure to advance toward Communist objectives would bring to the fore the more dogmatic elements in the Soviet outlook. But even if ideological hostility should diminish in the long run, this would not bring an end to international conflicts of interest or necessarily reduce the danger of general war. On the contrary, even in these circumstances the requirements of Soviet national security, prestige, and ambition, as seen by the Soviet leaders and people, would still bring the USSR into frequent collision with the interests of other states. The most that could be expected would be that some issues would become more tractable and negotiable, particularly those not deeply rooted in the national interests of the Soviet state, and that the occasional recognition of a measure of common interest with the West would not invariably be stifled by ideological hostility.

VI. THE QUESTION OF SUCCESSION

42. A key uncertainty surrounding future Soviet policy arises from the problem of the succession to Khrushchev. The style, skill, and conceptions of the top leader still play a major role in determining Soviet choices and in the effectiveness with which policies are prosecuted. We think, for example, that Khrushchev's personal views and attributes have been of major importance in shaping Soviet policies over the past decade, and that the USSR under a different leader might have posed significantly different problems to the US.

43. The Soviet Party appears to be no better equipped with an accepted mechanism for the designation of a successor and his orderly assumption of power than it was a decade ago. The most likely sequence of events, in our view, is a repetition of the post-Stalin experience, in which the late leader's senior associates conduct a struggle for supremacy behind a facade of collectivity. The main arena of conflict will be the leading party organs, but unless a single figure can gain control fairly soon, the contenders will probably try to bolster their strength by appealing to important interest groups outside the professional party apparatus. Of these groups, we believe that the economic administration, weakened by continuing reorganizations, will be an even less important political counter than when Malenkov tried to use it after 1953, and the police would probably become a significant factor

only in the event that a succession struggle was prolonged and was accompanied by popular unrest which enlarged the role of the security forces.

44. There is some reason to believe, however, that the military leadership will be a substantial factor in post-Khrushchev maneuvering for power. The special efforts to rehabilitate Stalin's military victims and military attempts to maximize their own credit for World War II victories point to a strong sense of corporate identity among the senior officers, although we also have evidence of conflicts among the marshals. More important, the military leadership in the last two years has increasingly asserted its own views, not always unanimous, on questions of military doctrine and strategy; at times it has seemed even to be giving its opinions a more general political import as well. We do not believe that the military aspires to an independent political role in Soviet politics, but if, as we expect, the military and economic choices facing the USSR become more acute, the senior officers will probably find themselves more deeply involved in matters of general policy. Indeed, there are some present indications of party alarm on this score, and it is possible that, before the succession question arises, steps will be taken to restrict the political role of leading military personalities.

45. We know little about the individual policy views of Khrushchev's colleagues. It is clear, however, that the leadership is frequently divided over policy issues, and the record of the succession struggles after Lenin and Stalin indicates that divergent views on policy are heavily involved in innerparty competition. So long as present trends continue in the economy, in the relationship of East-West military power, in Bloc relations, and in Soviet fortunes abroad, Khrushchev's heirs will confront a number of acute issues and decisions. His departure would make it easier to ditch some policies to which his personal prestige has been attached. But it would aggravate most problems by bringing about an inevitable temporary reduction of Soviet prestige, a loss of authority in the Communist movement, and a general uncertainty in the country.

46. In such circumstances, it is normal for Soviet politicians to subordinate their own views to expediency and to espouse those policies which seem most likely to serve their personal ambitions. At the same time, a powerful weapon in this competition is a comprehensive program which a leader can represent as promising solutions to a broad range of problems confronting the regime; to be without a program is a grave weakness. Thus contenders for power are under pressure to formulate competing proposals, designed to appeal to politically important groups, on a number of issues. Initially the tendency would probably be for more conservative elements to gain predominance, but the longer a succession struggle remains unresolved, the more tendency there would be for a wider range of alternative policies to be given active

consideration. This tendency creates the likelihood that, if the struggle was protracted, the circle of political participation would also widen as rivals reached out beyond the party elite for support.

47. Because of these factors, the period ushered in by Khrushchev's departure may present special opportunities and dangers to the US. Relations with the non-Communist world, and particularly with the leading rival power, are likely to be among the prime issues in any political competition, since these are intimately related to military problems, economic difficulties, and the key questions of China and Germany. We think it very unlikely that a "war party" will emerge in the Kremlin; there is no evidence that other leaders take a less sober view than Khrushchev of the consequences of nuclear war, and indeed some information indicates that the military regard the USSR as inadequately prepared at present to engage in one. But a faction may form which seeks to meet the problems of internal discontent and Chinese pressure by placing greater stress on factors of tension in East-West relations. It is also possible that a succession struggle would generate arguments for some accommodation with the West as a means of coping with these same problems. At any rate, the US will almost certainly be assailed with contrary indications, all of them difficult to interpret, and some of them suggesting that important changes are possible depending on the attitude adopted by the West. If Khrushchev's departure occurs at a time when existing policies are enjoying poor results, the succession period may in fact offer unusual chances for movement in Soviet policy.

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No. 203

Economic Intelligence Memorandum

TRANSPORTATION IN THE COMMUNIST FAR EAST
1962

CIA/RR EM 63-13

June 1963

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FOREWORD

The significant developments in transportation in the Communist Far East in 1962 are discussed in this memorandum. The transportation situation in Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam is examined in the light of current economic and military developments, and some tentative predictions for the future are made. The information was derived mainly from official publications and announcements [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

CONTENTS

		Page
Summary		1
I.	Communist China	3
	A. Railroads	3
	B. Motor Trucks	5
	C. Water Transport	7
	D. Civil Aviation	9
II.	North Korea	10
III.	North Vietnam	11

Appendix

Statistical Appendix		13

Tables

1.	Communist Far East: Estimated Freight Traffic Performance of Modern Inland Transport, 1957-62	15
2.	Communist China: Estimated Freight Traffic Performance of Modern Inland Transport, 1957-62	16
3.	Communist China: Growth of the Merchant Fleet, 1957-62	17
4.	Communist China: Type, Number, and Tonnage of Vessels in the Merchant Fleet, 1958-62	19
5.	North Korea: Estimated Freight Traffic Performance of Modern Inland Transport, 1957-62	20
6.	North Vietnam: Estimated Freight Traffic Performance of Modern Inland Transport, 1957-62	21

Maps

Page

Figure 1. Communist China: Railroads and Selected Roads, July 1962 inside back cover . . . . . .

Figure 2. China-India Border: Transportation Routes following page 6

TRANSPORTATION IN THE COMMUNIST FAR EAST*
1962

Summary

The transportation system of Communist China during 1962 played an important role in the support of military operations. In May and June the railroad system performed very capably in the movement of additional troop reinforcements to the Fukien coastal area. In October and November, motor truck transport provided substantial support to the Chinese troops taking part in the attack on India. Water transport played a supporting role in the Fukien coastal troop movement, as it was able to carry some of the civilian traffic that could not move by rail because of floods and the military utilization of the rail system. In general, because of the low level of economic activity in the country as a whole, the transportation system supported the economy with much less difficulty than during the 1950's.

The transportation authorities of Communist China made little effort in 1962 to improve operating efficiency or to increase the size of the inventories of transportation equipment. The freight car park probably declined slightly, whereas the locomotive park may have been maintained at the level of the previous year. Because of the failure to allocate resources for producing or importing spare parts, it is believed that the size of the civilian motor truck park was reduced compared with the previous year. Only one vessel was added to the Chinese merchant fleet in 1962 compared with 9 ships added in 1961 and an average of 19 ships added during each of the 4 previous years.

The pace of new transportation construction activities in China did not increase appreciably in 1962. Little progress was made on the Trans-Sinkiang rail line or on other major lines under construction in the southern part of the country. The Chinese did devote considerable effort, however, to the construction of forestry and industrial railroads. Roadbuilding activities continued along the western and southern borders of the country and in some cases even extended across the border. On the inland waterways a rehabilitated 400-kilometer (km) section of the Grand Canal was placed in operation.

* The estimates and conclusions in this memorandum represent the best judgment of this Office as of 15 May 1963. For the estimated freight traffic performance of modern inland transport in the Communist Far East during 1957-62, see Table 1, Appendix, p. 15, below.

The transportation system of North Korea did not achieve the rate of growth in performance in 1962 necessary to meet the goals of the Seven Year Plan (1961-67), in spite of the fact that the railroad network was improved and the inventory of railroad rolling stock increased. The growth of the transport sector, however, kept pace with growth in other sectors of the economy because of a 5-percent underfulfillment of the over-all annual plan for the national economy. In North Vietnam the apparent stoppage of work on the new standard-gauge rail line from Hanoi to P'ing-hsiang in Communist China delayed the provision of added rail capacity for use in moving domestic and international military and economic traffic. In addition, little progress was noted on the restoration of the Ham Rong bridge over the Song Ma, a major Chinese aid project. New road construction in 1962 was concentrated in the rugged northwest section of the country and along the North Vietnam-Laos border in order to provide better support to the Communist elements in Laos and South Vietnam.

I. Communist China*

A. Railroads

Because of the low level of economic activity in Communist China in 1962, the railroad system supported the modern industrial economy with much less difficulty than during the 1950's. Although there have been no official announcements concerning railroad performance in 1962, it is probable that performance was somewhat below the level achieved in 1958 (see Table 2**). Lack of cargo was the reason most often given for the fact that existing rail facilities were not being used to capacity. [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

In spite of the fact that the railroad system was not fully utilized in 1962, the system experienced some difficulties in meeting all demands placed on it in some locations during certain time periods. Normal rail movements in southeast China, for example, were interrupted in May, June, and July by the usual seasonal floods and by what appeared to be the high-priority movement of additional troop reinforcements to the Fukien coastal area opposite the Chinese Nationalist stronghold on Taiwan. Although there were many reports of passengers being stranded and economic traffic being shunted aside, the railroad system apparently performed very capably in the purely military phases of the redeployment. Troop trains moved from various parts of the country and delivered the military units at their destinations with little interruption in a regularly scheduled sequence.

Available evidence indicates that the reduction in train speeds which was first observed in 1961 continued through 1962. Numerous press announcements related the addition of many small passenger and freight stations. These stations, which probably were not justified in terms of the volume of shipments, were ostensibly added to "support" agriculture. In terms of railroad operations, these additional stations undoubtedly resulted in a reduction in train speeds, increased turnaround time, higher costs, and generally less efficient operations. [redacted] freight cars arriving in Kowloon and numerous reports

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

* See the map, Figure 1, inside back cover.
** Appendix, p. 16, below.

in the press indicate a level of maintenance somewhat lower than in previous years. It is possible, although not probable, that the freight car park may have deteriorated to the point that accidents and breakdowns may be interfering with operations. If the deterioration of the park [redacted] is allowed to continue and if production of freight cars is not resumed in the near future, the capacity of the railroad system may be reduced substantially below the peak level achieved in 1959-60. 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

During 1962 the inventory of railroad freight cars in Communist China probably declined slightly to approximately 130,000 cars. [redacted] no freight cars have been produced in Communist China for internal use since mid-1961, although it is quite possible that at least some types of specialized cars were manufactured or imported. Information on the production or import of locomotives is not available, although it is possible that enough steam locomotives were completed to take care of normal replacements. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it seems likely that the Chinese locomotive park remained static during 1962. 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

Little additional trackage was added to the main-line railroad network in 1962. Although more than enough time has elapsed for completion of the Trans-Sinkiang line to the Soviet border, about 500 kilometers (km) west of Urumchi, there is no evidence that this has occurred. Early in 1963, however, the line reportedly was open to traffic as far as Urumchi, about 60 km beyond Yen-hu, the point reached in 1959. Work possibly is proceeding on the roadbed and structures west of Urumchi so that the line can be opened to the petroleum refinery at Tu-shan-tzu, a distance of about 260 km from Urumchi. In the southwest, work on the Yunnan-Kweichow line probably has been suspended, whereas work on the Ch'eng-tu - K'un-ming line probably is continuing, although no announcements have been made concerning its progress. Reports of a planned rail line from Lan-chou to Lhasa continue, but confirmation of its alignment and firm plans for the initiation of its construction are lacking. The only announced completion of a rail line was a 40-km line in Shantung, which brought the total rail network to about 33,400 km at the end of 1962.

Although main-line railroad construction continued to be almost nonexistent in 1962, the Chinese Communists devoted considerable effort to the construction of forestry, industrial, and local railroads. On the basis of Chinese announcements it is estimated that more than 400 km of forestry railroads were completed in 1962. For the most part, these were light-duty (probably narrow-gauge) railroads located primarily in the mountainous forest regions of the provinces of Inner Mongolia and Heilungkiang. At the end of 1962, more than 1,000 km

of forestry railroads were in service in these two provinces alone. Other forestry railroads were in service in Fukien province and elsewhere. In addition to the forestry railroads, numerous industrial and local railroads were constructed. These varied from heavy-duty, standard-gauge spur lines serving major mines and industries to light, narrow-gauge lines serving communes or small industries. It is not possible to arrive at a total figure for the amount of this type of rail construction, but it may have been relatively substantial.

B. Motor Trucks

The most significant achievement in the performance of motor truck transport took place in connection with the Chinese Communist invasion of India in October and November.* This invasion required the supplying of about 103,000 troops in Tibet and along the Sino-Indian border from railheads in the rear over distances varying from 500 to 1,800 miles (800 to 2,900 km).** The total supply requirement for troops in combat and garrison units was estimated to be nearly 400 metric tons*** per day. The extreme length of the supply lines from the railheads to the areas of troop concentration on the Indian border caused both the amount of gasoline required and the number of trucks needed to be of significant proportions. [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

[redacted] Therefore, it appears that the amount of motor fuel required to move supplies for the troops during the invasion of India was relatively small compared with the total available. It is also possible that the Chinese had stockpiled considerable amounts of supplies during the summer in anticipation of their fall offensive against India, and the amount transported to Tibet during November therefore could have been considerably less than 400 tons per day. If, however, the fighting had continued at that level for any length of time, the requirement for road transport would eventually have reached the [redacted] level. 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

* Unless otherwise indicated, figures in this paragraph are based on the situation as of 19 November 1962.

** See the map, Figure 2, following p. 6.

*** Unless otherwise indicated, tonnages are given in metric tons throughout this memorandum.

The performance of motor truck transport on a nationwide basis during 1962 appears to have been at about the level of 1961, primarily because of the activity connected with the invasion of India. Otherwise, it might have been slightly below performance in 1961 because of the low level of economic activity and the poor road conditions brought on by bad weather. Much of the road net seems to have been more affected by rain, floods, and snow than during 1961.

The Chinese Communists appear to have had some difficulty in 1962 in obtaining spare parts and tires to keep all their trucks in operating condition. There are indications that this may have been due to a distribution problem, however, rather than to any actual shortage of parts and tires. Regional and national conferences on this subject were held in an attempt to solve the distribution problem. Some success seems to have been achieved by an interchange of specific parts between regions with a surplus and those with a shortage. A serious effort was also made to reduce the need for spare parts by giving more attention to preventive maintenance. A similar effort was made to reduce tire requirements by getting all the mileage possible out of each tire. There also is evidence to indicate some difficulty in obtaining sufficient gasoline and oil to keep all trucks operating. This, again, may have been due to a distribution problem as much as to an actual shortage of these products.

Because of the failure to allocate resources for producing or importing spare parts, it is believed that the size of the civilian truck park was reduced compared with the previous year. It is probable, however, that production and imports of trucks and spare parts were sufficient to maintain the combined military and civilian park at approximately 200,000 vehicles, about equally divided between the two parks. The [redacted] trucks required to supply the troops involved in the invasion of India, therefore, would represent [redacted] It is believed that in November 1962 there were more military trucks available in Western China than the [redacted] required, and in addition there were several thousand civilian trucks in the area which could have been diverted to supply the troops had they been needed. 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

The total length of the highway network of Communist China probably did not increase significantly during 1961. Road maintenance, rather than new road construction, continued to be the most important feature of highway activity throughout most of the country. From the Free World point of view, the most spectacular and significant activity took place along the western and southern borders of China. Roadbuilding in these areas since 1957 has continued at a relatively faster rate than in the rest of the country. In some cases this roadbuilding has been extended across the border, sometimes with and sometimes without

Figure 2

TRANSPORTATION ROUTES

SELECTED AIRFIELDS
- 6000 FEET AND OVER
- 6000 FEET AND UNDER

RAILROAD — ROAD — TRAIL

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES SHOWN ON CHINESE COMMUNIST MAPS

0 50 100 150 200 250
Statute Miles
0 50 100 150 200 250
Kilometers

SECRET

U. S. S. R.
TIEN SHAN
SINKIANG
TARIM BASIN
TAKLIMAKAN DESERT
TSAIDAM BASIN
KUNLUN MOUNTAINS
KOKO NOR
TSINGHAI
CHANG THANG
TIBET
SZECHWAN


SINKIANG
TARIM BASIN
TAGHLIMAKAN DESERT
KUNLUN MOUNTAINS
KUN-LUN SHAN
NANSHAN
TSINGHAI
CHANG THANG
TIBET
KOKO NOR
KARAKORAM
SZECHWAN
YUNNAN
BURMA
INDIA
NEPAL
BHUTAN
SIKKIM
NORTH EAST FRONTIER AGENCY
ASSAM
INDIA
SECRET

the consent of the other country involved. Construction in Yunnan continued in the areas bordering on Burma and Laos. Extensive roadbuilding continued in southern Tibet along the border near Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan and in some cases into areas claimed by India. The achievements of this roadbuilding program contributed substantially to the success of the Chinese Communist invasion of the Towang area in the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA) in 1962.

C. Water Transport

Performance by inland and coastal water transport in Communist China improved considerably during the last 6 months of 1962, possibly reflecting some improvement in the economic situation at least in sectors and areas that find the use of water transport advantageous. Total annual performance by coastal water transport (including performance by chartered foreign vessels), and possibly also by inland water transport, is estimated to have returned about to the 1959 level (see Table 2*). Although all modes of transportation were given the objective of supporting agriculture by the delivery of necessary supplies and consumer goods to rural areas, particular emphasis was placed on the use of water transport. In areas where both land and water transport were available, the authorities directed that preference be given to water transport.

The increasing use of water transport resulted in the return to service of most of the larger coastal ships and possibly some of the inland vessels that had been laid up during the previous year. Coastal ships once again began carrying goods directly between coastal ports and Yangtze River ports as far upstream as Wuhan. As a result of the improved harvest in Szechwan Province and all along the Yangtze River during the fall of 1962, the transport of agricultural products returned to the normal pattern of rice moving down the river rather than a major movement of food into Szechwan such as had occurred in the spring of 1962.

The upturn in coastal traffic began in May and June, when civilian transport by rail was curtailed because of floods and the military utilization of the rail system. Traffic in the ports between Shanghai and the Formosa Strait became unusually heavy as civilian traffic normally carried by the railroads was shifted to water transport. Although high water in the middle of the year and the unusually cold winter weather hampered water transport activities during some months, [redacted] the Chinese ships were very active during the rest of the year. The Shanghai Sea Transport Bureau announced that performance goals for 1962

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

* Appendix, p. 16, below.

had been completed by mid-November and that the volume of goods transported in support of agriculture was much greater than in 1961. The major increase in traffic took place at the smaller coastal ports, particularly those in the major agricultural provinces just to the north and south of Shanghai. Foreign trade ports were congested occasionally during the year, reportedly as a result of poor coordination between the ports and rail transport involved in moving goods to and from the ports.

The use of chartered foreign ships in the Chinese coastal trade declined for the second straight year and reached a very low level. During 1959-60 the large number of foreign vessels involved in the coastal trade principally carried Hainan Island iron ore to the north coast, a movement in which Chinese ships do not participate, because the Chinese Nationalists have the ability to disrupt Chinese Communist shipping moving over this route. In 1961-62, movement of Hainan Island ore decreased considerably and probably took place principally on the railroads from South China ports. During mid-1962, when coastal traffic was unusually heavy in the Shanghai area, several chartered British ships were assigned especially to help move coal south from Shanghai.

Throughout the year, passenger traffic on both the inland and coastal waterways remained almost continuously at a high level. No explanation is available for this development except that the government was continuing to move workers who had arrived in the cities during the "leap forward" back to rural areas to help the agricultural sector.

Only 1 vessel, the Leap Forward (Yüeh-chin), was added to the Chinese merchant fleet in 1962 compared with 9 ships added in 1961 and an average of 19 ships added during each of the 4 previous years. At the end of 1962 the fleet included 157 ships totaling about 752,000 deadweight tons (DWT) (see Tables 3 and 4*). The Leap Forward, which was hastily constructed and launched at the height of the "leap forward" movement in late 1958, cost China an amount estimated to be at least $7.5 million. Many problems were encountered during 1958-62 while the ship was being fitted out at the Dairen shipyard. After the vessel was commissioned in October 1962, it was limited to the coastal run between Shanghai and Dairen until the start of its first international voyage on 30 April 1963. The following day the vessel ran aground and was lost in the East China Sea, probably because of faulty navigation.

During 1962 a rehabilitated 400-km section of the Grand Canal extending from the Yangtze River port of Yangchow northward nearly to

* Appendix, pp. 17 and 19, respectively, below.

the boundary of Shantung Province was put into operation. Although this section represents only about 30 percent of the full restoration which was planned to be completed by 1962, the new portion in operation should be an economic asset of considerable importance to the area. The reconstruction is reported to have improved the canal for the most part to a depth of about 4 meters (m) and a width of 60 m compared with a previous depth of 1 or 2 m and a width of 10 to 30 m. In addition to improving navigation on the canal, the reconstruction also was reported to have improved the means for flood control throughout the area.

D. Civil Aviation

The most significant events in civil aviation in Communist China in 1962 were the upgrading of the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) to a bureau directly subordinate to the State Council, and the reports of China's continued interest in the purchase of non-Bloc aircraft. In March 1962 it was reported that the State Council had adopted a resolution to change the status of the CAAC from a subordinate of the Ministry of Communications to a bureau directly under the State Council. This change, which restored the CAAC to its original status, may indicate that renewed attention will be given to civil aviation in the near future.

In spite of current economic difficulties the Chinese Communists have apparently been interested in purchasing additional non-Bloc aircraft ever since the Vickers Viscount sale contract was negotiated in 1961. During 1962, officials of Communist China reportedly inspected such aircraft as the De Haviland Comet and Sud-Aviation's Caravelle. In early 1963 it was reported that Chinese representatives had arrived in the UK to inspect 14 turboprop Bristol Britannia aircraft offered for sale by British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC). Apparently the Chinese are still dissatisfied with the three Soviet Il-18 turboprop aircraft first introduced into domestic service in 1960. These aircraft, which were withdrawn from regular service in 1961, are currently used only for weekly scheduled international flights to Irkutsk, USSR, and for special VIP or nonscheduled flights on domestic routes.

[redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

[redacted] These aircraft will likely be used on domestic as well as on international routes.

Although little information concerning the performance of the civil air fleet is available, it is unlikely that civil air transport performed at a significantly higher rate in 1962 than in the previous year. In addition, there were no reports of extensive improvements

of air facilities and, as far as is known, the network of civil air routes was not expanded significantly. During 1962, Chinese Communist negotiations for air agreements were again confined to countries of the Far East. Negotiations with the "neutralist" government of Laos were concluded in January 1962, and an air agreement was signed providing for flights, scheduled or irregular, along agreed air routes. Although the Chinese also discussed air agreements with Cambodia and Indonesia in 1962, no agreements with these countries were announced, and it is unlikely that negotiations were successfully concluded.

II. North Korea

The North Korean transportation system failed to achieve during 1962 the rate of growth necessary to meet the goals of the Seven Year Plan (see Table 5*). In the case of the railroads, an increase of only 2.9 million tons was achieved compared with a planned increase for 1962 of 6.5 million tons. The distribution of tons carried among the various modes of transportation remained almost unchanged. Despite the failure of the transport sector to achieve planned rates of growth, the Central Statistical Board announced that "the rapidly growing transport requirements of all the branches of the national economy were satisfactorily fulfilled." This statement indicates that the growth of the transport sector kept pace with growth in other sectors of the economy and that transportation requirements proved to be smaller than expected because of a 5-percent underfulfillment of the over-all annual economic plan.

Announced increases of 8 percent in freight cars and 4 percent in locomotives indicate a park of about 11,660 freight cars and 374 locomotives at the end of 1962. Since it appears that only 14 locomotives were added to the park, the goal of producing 20 electric locomotives in 1962 apparently was not achieved. The truck park may have increased by as much as 4,000 units to a total of 27,000 units. Increases in performance in 1962 in both rail and highway transport probably were due primarily to increases in the number of freight cars, locomotives, and trucks available rather than to any significant improvements in operating efficiency.

In 1962 the North Koreans claimed that the railroad network was both expanded and improved. According to official announcements, a 42-km section of line from Kimch'aek to Tanch'on along the central section of the east coast was electrified. This achievement is substantially less than announced plans for electrification in 1962 and much less than the rate necessary to achieve the goal of the Seven Year Plan which calls for 1,500 km of main-line to be electrified. The regime also announced the conversion from narrow to standard gauge

* Appendix, p. 20, below.

of the line extending to Sinch'on in the southwest and claimed that construction of the 78-km line from Ch'ongjin to Najin along the northeast coast near the Soviet border was successfully carried out. There is some evidence, however, to indicate that the Ch'ongjin-Najin line was not in operation as of December 1962. There were no claims of expansion of the highway or water transport networks in 1962.

III. North Vietnam

In view of the general lack of information on transportation in North Vietnam in 1962 as well as a report that the transport sector was "encountering difficulties" as late as the end of October, it is probable that the sector did not achieve notable results during the year (see Table 6*). Aside from poor crop years in North Vietnam, the apparent slowdown in the rate of growth of transport performance during 1961-62 may have been due in some measure to the decline of economic activity in Communist China, since China-to-China rail traffic via North Vietnam and Chinese - North Vietnamese trade constitute a large percentage of North Vietnam's rail traffic.

Of considerable significance in the transportation picture in North Vietnam in 1962 was the apparent stoppage of work on the new standard-gauge rail line from Hanoi to P'ing-hsiang, China. Some sections of the new roadbed for this line, which was being reconstructed with Chinese Communist aid, reportedly have been turned over to agricultural purposes. In 1961 it was reported that at least 4,000 workers were employed on this project, which was due to be completed in 1964. Another Chinese aid project, the reconstruction of the Ham Rong bridge over the Song Ma south of Hanoi on the east coast, which reportedly was scheduled for completion in late 1961, has progressed slowly if at all since preliminary work was reported in 1961. Most new road construction and rehabilitation in 1962 was concentrated in the rugged northwest section of the country and along the North Vietnam - Laos border in order to provide better support to the Communist elements in Laos and South Vietnam. Nearly 2,000 km of narrow earth roads or tracks, usable mainly by carts, were constructed in the northwest. Along the Laotian border, road reconstruction reportedly was underway on routes 8 and 12 leading into central Laos. In addition, it is likely that some road construction or improvement was underway in North Vietnam in the area bordering the Sam Neua region and the Phong Saly province in northern Laos. In spite of considerable investment in network rehabilitation, the primary road system of North Vietnam remains of limited capacity and subject to deterioration during the wet season.

* Appendix, p. 21, below.

The main effort in transportation in 1963 reportedly will be the development of inland waterway transportation. In addition, the port of Haiphong, North Vietnam's most important port, will be improved with aid from the USSR. Soviet aid in the form of equipment and technical assistance probably will also be extended to improve civil air transport.

STATISTICAL APPENDIX

PAGE #

14

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Table 1

Communist Far East:
Estimated Freight Traffic Performance
of Modern Inland Transport a/
1957-62

Area	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
	Billion Metric Ton-Kilometers					
Communist China	172.92	236.39	344.20	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
North Korea	5.30	6.58	8.20	9.59	10.35	10.83
North Vietnam	0.19	0.37	0.65	0.90	0.94	0.95
Total b/	178.41	243.34	353.05	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
	Million Metric Tons Carried					
Communist China	411.70	633.75	1,009.20	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
North Korea	36.45	47.68	66.76	75.98	76.95	86.15
North Vietnam	1.62	2.22	3.35	5.66	6.28	6.59
Total b/ c/	449.77	683.65	1,079.31	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

a. Including the performance of railroads, motor trucks, and the inland water and merchant or coastal fleets of Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. For limitations of the data presented for North Korea, see Table 5, p. 20, below.
b. Totals, as measured in both ton-kilometers and tons carried, include domestic, export, import, and transit traffic.
c. In addition to the duplication of tonnage created when traffic is carried by more than one mode of transportation, totals also include duplication of foreign trade traffic moving between Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam.

Table 2

Communist China:
Estimated Freight Traffic Performance
of Modern Inland Transport
1957-62

Mode of Transportation	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
	Billion Metric Ton-Kilometers					
Railroads	134.59	185.52	263.40	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Motor trucks	3.94	6.96	12.00	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Inland water fleet	20.12	25.07	40.20	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Merchant fleet a/	14.27	18.84	28.60	31.50	21.60	27.90
Total b/	172.92	236.39	344.20	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
	Million Metric Tons Carried					
Railroads	274.20	381.09	542.00	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Motor trucks	83.73	176.30	344.00	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Inland water fleet	40.49	56.66	91.40	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Merchant fleet a/	13.28	19.70	31.80	35.00	24.00	31.00
Chinese ships	N.A.	N.A.	26.70	29.90	22.80	30.40
Foreign ships	N.A.	N.A.	5.10	5.10	1.20	0.60
Total b/ c/	411.70	633.75	1,009.20	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

a. Coastal traffic only, carried in Chinese and chartered foreign ships. In 1961 the two Chinese cargo ships used in international trade carried a total of about 150,000 tons along a shipping line established between South China ports and the Bay of Bengal.
b. Totals, as measured in both ton-kilometers and tons carried, include domestic, export, import, and transit traffic.
c. Totals reflect duplication of tonnage when traffic is carried by more than one mode of transportation.

Table 3

Communist China:
Growth of the Merchant Fleet a/*
1957-62

	Number of Vessels	GRT	DWT
Fleet status, 31 December 1957	87	229,836	298,325
Acquisitions in 1958	22	97,042	126,154
From domestic sources	6	18,068	23,488
From Bloc countries	6	19,628	25,516
From Free World countries	10	59,346	77,150
Fleet status, 31 December 1958	109	326,878	424,479
Acquisitions in 1959	19	98,793	128,431
From domestic sources	10	35,337	45,938
From Bloc countries	2	14,626	19,014
From Free World countries	7	48,830	63,479
Fleet status, 31 December 1959	128	425,671	552,910
Acquisitions in 1960	20	97,399	136,614
From domestic sources	7	21,346	25,017
From Bloc countries	1	5,614	9,520
From Free World countries	12	70,439	102,077
Sold in 1960			
To Bloc country	1	6,785	8,820
Fleet status, 31 December 1960	147	516,285	680,704
Acquisitions in 1961	9	47,503	55,572
From domestic sources	4	11,408	13,617
From Bloc countries	2	22,488	21,635
From Free World countries	3	13,607	20,320

a. Data refer to vessels of 1,000 GRT or more (approximately 1,300 DWT or more).

Table 3

Communist China:
Growth of the Merchant Fleet
1957-62
(Continued)

	Number of Vessels	GRT	DWT
Fleet status, 31 December 1961	156	563,788	736,276
Acquisitions in 1962	2	19,160	25,790
From domestic sources	1	12,090	15,790
From Bloc countries	1	7,070	10,000
Transferred in 1962			
To Bloc country	1	7,070	10,000
Fleet status, 31 December 1962	157	575,878	752,066

Table 4

Communist China:
Type, Number, and Tonnage
of Vessels in the Merchant Fleet a/
1958-62

Year	Tankers b/			Dry Cargo and Passenger Vessels			Total		
	Number	Thousand GRT	Thousand DWT	Number	Thousand GRT	Thousand DWT	Number	Thousand GRT	Thousand DWT
1958	10	18.2	23.7	99	308.7	400.8	109	326.9	424.5
1959	10	18.2	23.7	118	407.5	529.2	128	425.7	552.9
1960	11	21.8	27.3	136	494.5	653.4	147	516.3	680.7
1961	13	40.0	55.0	143	523.8	681.3	156	563.8	736.3
1962	13	40.0	55.0	144	535.9	697.1	157	575.9	752.1

a. Data refer to vessels of 1,000 GRT or more (1,300 DWT or more).
b. In addition, the tanker fleet includes at least one and possibly two tankers of less than 1,000 GRT.

Table 5

North Korea:
Estimated Freight Traffic Performance
of Modern Inland Transport
1957-62

Mode of Transportation	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
	Billion Metric Ton-Kilometers					
Railroads	5.07	6.30	7.80	9.12	9.85	10.25
Motor trucks	0.19	0.21	0.30	0.33	0.34	0.38
Inland water and coastal fleets a/	0.04	0.07	0.10	0.14	0.16	0.20
Total b/	5.30	6.58	8.20	9.59	10.35	10.83
	Million Metric Tons Carried					
Railroads	21.46	28.20	35.13	38.64	41.00	43.90
Motor trucks	13.89	17.50	28.88	34.35	32.60	38.80
Inland water and coastal fleets a/	1.10	1.98	2.75	2.99	3.35	3.45
Total b/ c/	36.45	47.68	66.76	75.98	76.95	86.15

a. Data for performance by the inland water fleet in North Korea cannot be separated from performance by the coastal fleet. Performance by the inland water fleet, however, is only a small part of the total water transport performance.
b. Totals, as measured in both ton-kilometers and tons carried, include domestic, export, import, and transit traffic.
c. Totals reflect duplication of tonnage when traffic is carried by more than one mode of transportation.

Table 6

North Vietnam:
Estimated Freight Traffic Performance
of Modern Inland Transport
1957-62

Mode of Transportation	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
	Billion Metric Ton-Kilometers					
Railroads	0.14	0.29	0.52	0.70	0.71	0.72
Motor trucks	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.07	0.07
Inland water fleet	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.08	0.08	0.08
Coastal fleet	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.08
Total a/	0.19	0.37	0.65	0.90	0.94	0.95
	Million Metric Tons Carried					
Railroads	1.02	1.43	2.23	2.92	3.09	3.25
Motor trucks	0.33	0.41	0.57	1.94	2.29	2.40
Inland water fleet	0.21	0.23	0.36	0.60	0.67	0.70
Coastal fleet	0.06	0.15	0.19	0.20	0.23	0.24
Total a/ b/	1.62	2.22	3.35	5.66	6.28	6.59

a. Totals, as measured in both ton-kilometers and tons carried, include domestic, export, import, and transit traffic.
b. Totals reflect duplication of tonnage when traffic is carried by more than one mode of transportation.

COMMUNIST CHINA
RAILROADS
AND SELECTED ROADS— JULY 1962

BROAD-GAUGE RAILROADS (5'6" in India, 5'0" in U.S.S.R., China, and Mongolia)
- Double-track
- Single-track
- Under construction
- Projected

STANDARD-GAUGE RAILROADS (4'8½")
- Operable, double-track
- Operable, single-track
- Inoperable
- Under construction
- Projected

NARROW-GAUGE RAILROADS (various widths)
- Operable, single-track
- Inoperable

SELECTED ROADS (western and southern border regions only)
- Major road
- Minor road or trail
- Road under construction

GENERAL BASIC INFORMATION
- International boundary, demarcated
- International boundary, delimited only
- International boundary, indefinite
- Internal administrative boundary
- ⊛ National capital

NOTE: Minor industrial, mining, and logging railroads are not shown. Alignments of all projected railroads are approximate.

0 100 200 300 400 500 Statute Miles

0 100 200 300 400 500 Kilometers

PEIPING AND ADJACENT

0 5 10 0 5 10 20 K.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)


ND ADJACENT AREA
INDIA
BURMA
LAOS
THAILAND
VIETNAM
NORTH VIETNAM
PEIPING (PEKING)
Lan-chou
Chung-king
Batang
Lashio
Kung pu chiang-ta (Ta-chao)
Nagonthu Dzong (Thei-hoi)
Yu-shu
Yu-men-hsien (Yu-men)
Yu-men (Lao-chün-miao)
Chiu-ch'üan
Lang-hu
Chang-yeh
Wu-wei
Huang-yang chen
Wu-chung
Yen-ch'ih
Chung-wei
Chung-ning
Ning-hsia
Ta-ch'eng
Ku-yuan
Ching-yuan
Lin-t'ao
Min-hsien
T'ien-shui
Pao-chi
Hsien-yang
Sian
Hu-hsien
Sung-p'an
Chao-hua
Kuang-yüan
Mao-hsien
Mien-yang
Te-yang
Nan-ch'ung
Ya-an
O-mei
Nei-chiang
Tzu-kung (Tzu-liu-ching)
Chiang K'ou
Wan-shou-ch'ang
Kan-shai-ch'ang
I-pin
Hsi-ch'ang
Te-ch'ang
I-liang
Wei-ning
Shui-ch'ang
Kuei-yang
Kuei-ling
Tu-yun
Hui-shui
Tu-shan
Tung-ch'uan (T'ung-tan)
Hsüan-wei
An-shun (Jung-feng)
Yüan-mou
Ta-li
Hsia-kuan
Kuang-yung (P'ing-lang)
Pao-shan
Ch'i-hsiang
An-ning
K'un-ming
Chan-i
Tang-ch'uan
Hsing-i
Lo-tien
Ma-wei
Nan-tan
Ho-ch'ih (Chin-ch'eng-chiang)
Yung-fu
Ling-lo
Pai-se
Shih-p'ing
Chi-chieh
K'ai-yüan
Pi-se-chai
Meng-ting
P'u-erh (Ning-erh)
Yün-ching (Ch'ing-chen)
Te-lo
Yün-hsien
Meng-kuang
Ha Giang
Cao Bang
Lao Kay
Ha Chanh
Ma-kai Kan
Dong Dang
Thai Nguyen
Nan-ning
Li-t'ang
Pei-hai
Dien Bien Phu
Hanoi
Haiphong
Thanh Hoa
Vinh
GULF OF TONKIN
Meltkyina
Myitkyina
Kang-chuang
Huai-jou
Nan-k'ou
Niu-lan-shan
Shun-i
Sha-ho
Yen-ch'ih-ts'un
San-chia-tien
Men-t'ou-kou
Shih-ching-shan
Hsi-tao-k'ou
T'ung-chou (Dong-hsien)
Ch'ang-hsin-tien
Feng-t'ai
Te-hsing (Nan-yuan)
T'o-li
Liang-hsiang
Fang-shan
Ch'ing-yüan-tien
Li-i-ho
Chu-chou (Chü-hsien)
Lang-fang
Pei-tai-ho
Chiengmai
Salween
Mekong
Red River
Black River
Lo River
Yangtze
Hsia-tung
An-pei
Tun-huang
Ta-ch'i-tan
T'a-erh-tung
Te-ling-ha
Ka-erh-mu
Golmud
Pa-lung
Hsing-hsing-hsia
Pa-yen-kao-lo (San-shang-kung)
Chi-lan-t'ai
San-tao-k'an
Pao-t'ou
Tung-sheng
Yin-ch'uan
Ta-t'ung
Yu-lin
Lung-hai
Lung-yu
Ch'in-ling
Ta-pieh
Wu-tang
Ch'in-ling
Ta-pieh
Wu-ling
Ch'ien-chiang
Wu-ling
Ch'ien-chiang
Ch'ang-chiang
Ch'ang-chiang
Ch'ang


SEA OF JAPAN
NORTH KOREA
KOREA
KOREA BAY
GULF OF CHIHLI (PO HAI)
YELLOW SEA
EAST CHINA SEA
SOUTH CHINA SEA
TAIWAN (NOMINAL)
HONG KONG (U.K.)
MACAO (Port.)
HAINAN
LUZON
PHILIPPINES
PEIPING (PEKING)
Demarcation Line
Taiwan Strait
Formosa Strait
Boundaries and names are not necessarily those recognized by the U.S. Government.
36
30
24
18
0
114
120

Figure 1

120
126
132
138
48
42
36
30
SEA OF JAPAN
EAST CHINA SEA
YELLOW SEA
GULF OF CHIHLI
Po Hai
KOREA BAY
NORTH KOREA
SOUTH KOREA
DEMARCATION LINE
KOREA
PEKING (PEKING)
Tientsin
Port Arthur (Lü-shun)
Dairen (Lü-ta)
Harbin
Changchun
Kirin (Chi-lin)
Mukden (Shen-yang)
Anshan
Fushun
Hsinking (Ch'ang-ch'un)
Taonan
Solun
Hailar (Hai-la-erh)
Manchouli
Zabaykal'sk
Dzhalinda
Skovorodino
Belogorsk
Blagoveshchensk
Poyarkovo
Raychikhinsk
Svobodnyy
Khabarovsk
Komsomol'sk
Sovetskaya Gavan'
Chegdomyn
Urgal
Zeya
Amur
Bureya
Ussuri
Lake Khanka
Ussuriysk
Nakhodka
Vladivostok
Sergeyevka
Dunay
Kraskino
Hunchun
Wonsan
Hamhung
Pyongyang
Seoul
Inchon
Taegu
Pusan
Cheju-do
Quelpart Island
Tsingtao (Ch'ing-tao)
Lienyunchiang (Lien-yun)
Nanking
Shanghai
Soochow
Hangchow
Ningpo (Yin-hsien)
Wenchow (Yung-chia)
Foochow
Amoy
Swatow
Canton
Kowloon
Hong Kong
Macao
Taiwan
Tamsag Bulag
Dosatuy
Kalgan (Chang-chia-k'ou)
Shih-chia-chuang
Tsinan
Hsuchow
Lanchow
Sian
Chengchow
Hankow
Changsha
Kiukiang
Nanchang
Foochow
Amoy
Swatow
Canton
Kowloon
Hong Kong
Macao
Taiwan


96
102
108
114
UNION OF SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MONGOLIA
LAKE BAIKAL
Nizhneudinsk
Cheremkhovo
Irkutsk
Baykal
Ulan-Ude
Chita
Nerchinsk
Tarskiy
Borzya
Naushki
Alton Bulag
Selenge Gol
Uuldza
ULAN BATOR
Halayha
Choybalsan
Dzuon Bulag
Sayn Shanda
Erh-lien
Su-chou (Chiu-ch'uan)
Ha-mi
Hsia-tung
An-pei
Yu-men-hsien (Yu-men)
Tun-huang
Yu-men (Lao-chun-miao)
Chiu-ch'uan
Chang-yeh
Ta-ch'ai-tan
Te-ling-ha
Ko-erh-mu
Golmo
Pa-lung
Lan-chou
Ku-yuan
Ching-yuan
Lin-t'ao
Min-hsien
T'ien-shui
Pao-chi
Hu hsien
T'ung-ch'uan
Yu-shu
Sung-p'an
Chao-hua
Kuang-yuan
Mao-hsien
Mien-yang
Mao-wen (Wen-ch'uan)
Kuan-hsien
Te-yang
Nan-ch'ung
Ch'eng-tu
Ya-an
Batang
Tatsienlu
Nei-chiang
Chungking
Ch'ang Chiang
Ta-hsien
Ch'ü-hsien
Wan-yuan
Kuang-yuan
Kuang-hua (Lao-ho-k'ou)
Nan-yang
Lo-yang
Hsi-an
Yen-an
Ning-wu
Yuan-p'ing
Hsin-hsien
T'ai-yüan
Lin-fen
Ch'ang-chih
An-yang
Hsü-chou
Pao-t'ou
Ta-t'ung
Chi-ning
Shih-kuai-tzu
Hu-ho-hao-t'e (Kuei-sui)
Pa-yen-hao-lo (San-chang-kung)
Chi-lan-t'ai
San-tao-k'an
Tung-sheng
Yin-ch'uan
Wu-chung
Wu-wei
Ch'ing-t'ung-hsia
Hsiang-yang-chan
Chung-wei
Chung-ning
Yen-ch'ih
Ta-ch'ai-tan
Te-ling-ha
Ch'ang-yeh
Yung-teng
Ta-t'ung
Hsi-ning
Huang-yuan
Pa-yen-o-po
Erh-lien
Su-chou (Chiu-ch'uan)
Hung-liu-ho
Hsing-hsing-hsia
Yellow River
Yangtze
Amur
Lena
Yablonovyy
Stanovoy
Vilyui
Bukachacha
Starry Olov
Shilka
Sretensk
Olekma
Yakutsk
Yenisei
Khatanga
Hokugol Dalay
Gobi Altay
Inner Mongolia
Manchuria (Lu pin)
Ho-lun Ch'ih
Hsingan (Khingan Ho)
Yellow River
Yangtze
Mekong
Salween
Irrawaddy
Brahmaputra
Ganges
Indus
Tsangpo
Kunlun Shan
Nan Shan
Tsaidam Basin
Qaidam Pendi
Tsinghai Hu
Koko Nor (Ch'ing Hai)
Ch'ang-tu
Fang-ch'eng
Ch'ang-chou
Ni-hsien
Lo-yang
Ch'in-yang
Ch'ao-tso
Hsü-chou
Ho-nan
Ying-hsien
Shih-chia-chuang
Ho-chien
Ta-ch'ing Shan
Yin Shan
Hsing-an Ling
Ta Hinggan Ling
Hsiao Hinggan Ling
Changbai Shan
Yalu
Tumen
Sea of Japan
Yellow Sea
East China Sea
Korea Bay
Korea Strait
Ryukyu Islands
Taiwan
Hainan
Gulf of Tonkin
Luzon
Philippines
Sulu Sea
Celebes Sea
Borneo
Java
Java Sea
Timor
Arafura Sea
Timor Sea
Gulf of Carpentaria
Coral Sea
Solomon Islands
Bismarck Archipelago
New Guinea
Caroline Islands
Marianas
Guam
Wake Island
Midway Islands
Hawaiian Islands
Johnston Island
Phoenix Islands
Gilbert Islands
Marshall Islands
Nauru
Ocean Island
Ellice Islands
Fiji Islands
Tonga Islands
Samoa
Tuvalu
Kiribati
Tokelau
Cook Islands
Niue
Society Islands
Tuamotu Archipelago
Marquesas Islands
Pitcairn Island
Easter Island
Juan Fernandez Islands
Chile
Argentina
Paraguay
Uruguay
Brazil
Peru
Bolivia
Ecuador
Colombia
Panama
Costa Rica
Nicaragua
Honduras
El Salvador
Guatemala
Mexico
Belize
Cuba
Jamaica
Haiti
Dominican Republic
Puerto Rico
Virgin Islands
Lesser Antilles
Trinidad and Tobago
Barbados
Grenada
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Saint Lucia
Martinique
Guadeloupe
Dominica
Antigua and Barbuda
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Montserrat
Anguilla
Saint Martin
Saint Barthelemy
Saba
Sint Eustatius
Sint Maarten
Aruba
Curacao
Bonaire
Venezuela
Guyana
Suriname
French Guiana
Falkland Islands
South Georgia
South Sandwich Islands
South Orkney Islands
South Shetland Islands
Antarctic Peninsula
Ross Sea
Ross Ice Shelf
Weddell Sea
Amundsen Sea
Bellingshausen Sea
Pine Island Glacier
Thwaites Glacier
Marie Byrd Land
Ellsworth Land
Antarctica
Australia
New Zealand
Tasmania
Great Australian Bight
Gulf of Carpentaria
Arafura Sea
Timor Sea
Coral Sea
Tasman Sea
Great Barrier Reef
Lake Eyre
Lake Torrens
Lake Gairdner
Lake Frome
Lake Callabonna
Lake Blanche
Lake Amadeus
Lake Mackay
Lake Gregory
Lake Disappointment
Lake Macleod
Lake Argyle
Lake Nash
Lake Woods
Lake Nash
Lake Mackay
Lake Amadeus
Lake Gregory
Lake Disappointment
Lake Macleod
Lake Argyle
Lake Nash
Lake Woods

66
72
78
84
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SOVIET
U
LAKE BALKHASH
JAMMU AND KASHMIR
(Control in dispute)
INDIA
NEPAL
Tselinograd
Ulanesy
Pavlodar
Kamen
Semipalatinsk
Zhanaozen
Zhanaozen
Mainly
Balkhash
Akmola
Zaysan
Chuguchak
Taldy-Kurgan
Takeli
Kharkas
Chuchi
Alma Ata
Rybach'ye
Narynkol
Sary Ozek
Ochamchir
Frunze
Osh
Kok-Yangak
Andizhan
Yarkand
Kashgar
Aksu
Korla
Turfan
Karashahr
Urumchi
Yen-ki
Hami
Lop Nur
Yarkand
Khotan
Gartok
Dehra Dun
Rishikesh
Delhi
Takiakbar
Yang-Ba-ching
Zhikatse
Gyangtse

TH 4 56

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE BUDDHIST CRISIS ON THE PROVINCIAL PO[illegible]

DATE DISTR. 2 AUGUST 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

REFERENCES IN 03233

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

APPRAISAL [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. SUMMARY AND APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: ALTHOUGH THE CONCLUSIONS HEREIN ARE BY NO MEANS DEFINITIVE, THIS IS PROBABLY A VALID ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION BASED ON THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME. IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT PEASANT ATTITUDES ON THIS AND OTHER ISSUES ARE DIFFICULT TO ASSESS AS INFORMATION IS GENERALLY REFRACTED THROUGH SOUTH VIETNAMESE SOURCES WITH VARIOUS AXES TO GRIND. ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE THAT THE BUDDHIST ISSUE TO DATE HAS HAD ONLY A MODEST IMPACT ON THE RURAL POPULATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THAT THE PEASANTS HAVE NOT BEEN MARKEDLY AFFECTED, THE LONGER THE BUDDHIST/GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM IMPASSE LASTS, THE MORE LIKELY IT IS THAT REPERCUSSIONS WILL RADIATE FROM URBAN AREAS, WHERE THE AFFAIR IS LARGELY CENTERED, INTO THE REMOTER RURAL AREAS. [redacted] COMMENT. THIS REPORT WILL BE SUPPLEMENTED AS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND VIEWS BECOME AVAILABLE.)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	XXX	DD
STATE/DIR																

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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[illegible] JAN [illegible] 1998

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2. IN CENTRAL VIETNAM, THE UNREST AMONG THE PROVINCIAL POPULATION AS A RESULT OF THE BUDDHIST CRISIS IN AUGUST 1963 IS CENTERED IN COASTAL CITIES, AND THE BUDDHIST COMMUNICATION BREAKDOWN PREVENTS NEWS AND ORDERS FROM BEING SENT TO THE WESTERN PORTIONS OF THE PROVINCES. AS A RESULT, THE PEOPLE IN THE WESTERN PORTIONS ARE CONFUSED BY DISTORTED RUMORS OF INCIDENTS IN HUE, SAIGON, HOI AN, NHA TRANG, ETC., WHICH CONFLICT COMPLETELY WITH GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) RADIO REPORTS, PROVINCIAL STATEMENTS, AND PRESS COVERAGE OF THE SAME INCIDENTS. THE UNREST IS PROBABLY STRONGER IN CENTRAL VIETNAM AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT SUICIDES IN PHAN THIET, NHA TRANG AND HUE, AND THE RESULTANT GVN REACTION; BUT THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION CANNOT BE JUDGED FROM JUST A FEW VISITS AND REPORTS. THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) EFFORT IN THE FIRST CORP AREA AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC) HAS UNDOUBTEDLY BEEN CURTAILED AS MANY OF THE TROOPS ARE GARRISONED RATHER THAN DEPLOYED AGAINST THE VC AS USUAL, RESULTING IN A DEFINITELY LOWERED MORALE THAN PRIOR TO THE 8 MAY HUE INCIDENT. IT IS MORE DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE ANY CHANGE IN THE GENERAL POPULATION ATTITUDE; HOWEVER, A SMALL DEGREE OF UNREST DOES NOW PREVAIL THROUGHOUT THE PROVINCES OF NORTH CENTRAL VIETNAM. THIS PROBABLY POSES NO IMMEDIATE THREAT TO THE GVN, BUT IT WILL MAKE THE GVN'S TASK MORE DIFFICULT ON THE LONG RANGE BASIS AS IT HAS PROBABLY AFFECTED WHAT HAD BEEN AN ENCOURAGING TENDENCY, SMALL BUT PERCEPTIBLE, OF THE PEASANTRY TO RELY ON THE GVN AND MORE ACTIVELY TO OPPOSE THE VC. IT IS NOT UNREASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT MANY OF THESE PEOPLE WILL RETURN TO INDIFFERENCE TOWARDS THE VC.

3. COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC PROVINCES AND CITIES FOLLOW:

A. DA NANG. ALTHOUGH UNDER MARTIAL LAW FOLLOWING THE INCIDENTS ON 18 AUGUST, MAYOR (LIEUTENANT COLONEL) TRAN NGOC CHAU HAS DEMONSTRATED CONSIDERABLE ADROITNESS IN HANDLING THE BUDDHIST PROBLEM. BARRING ANY MAJOR INCIDENT OR COLLOSSAL GVN BLUNDER IN HUE OR SAIGON (OF THE CHAIN REACTION TYPE), CHAU WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE SITUATION.

B. QUANG NAM PROVINCE. THE HOI AN INCIDENT OF 31 JULY HAS PLACED THIS PROVINCE IN THE WORST SITUATION SINCE 8 MAY. THIS IS LARGELY THE RESULT OF THE INEPTITUDE OF THE PROVINCE CHIEF WHO IS PROBABLY AN EXCEPTIONAL ARMY G-2 OFFICER AND IS [illegible] AND MORALLY COURAGEOUS OFFICIAL, BUT IS NAIVE, INDECISIVE, AND UNSURE IN ADMINISTERING HIS PROVINCE. ALTHOUGH HE IS PROBABLY MORE ON GUARD AS A RESULT OF 31 JULY INCIDENT, HE CANNOT BE RELIED UPON TO PREVENT FUTURE OUTBREAKS FROM GETTING OUT OF HAND. THE SITUATION IS NOW RELATIVELY QUIET, BUT RESENTMENT IS STILL STRONG IN HOI AN AND IN THE IMMEDIATE ADJOINING VILLAGES.

C. QUANG TIN. THERE IS VERY LITTLE BUDDHIST ACTIVITY EVIDENT IN QUANG TIN, MAINLY BECAUSE THE PROVINCE HAS THE MOST SERIOUS SECURITY SITUATION OF ANY IN NORTH CENTRAL VIETNAM. THE VC HAVE JUST ABOUT PARALYZED VEHICLE TRAVEL WITHIN THE PROVINCE AND ARE OTHERWISE MAKING THEIR PRESENCE KNOWN THROUGHOUT THE PROVINCE. QUANG TIN IS ALSO BADLY HAMPERED BY EXTREMELY WEAK, AND QUITE OFTEN CORRUPT, OFFICIALS FROM THE PROVINCE CHIEF TO THE LOWEST LEVEL. THE ONLY BRIGHT SPOT IN THIS PROVINCE IS THAT FATHER HAO CONTINUES TO EXERT HIS INFLUENCE OVER THE COASTAL AREA AND HAS MADE A POINT OF NOT [illegible]NIZING THE BUDDHISTS IN ANY

WAY, THUS A BIG SOURCE OF FRICTION HAS BEEN REMOVED HERE.

D. QUANG NGAI. THE PROVINCE CHIEF HAS RULED WITH A STRONG AND RUTHLESS EFFICIENCY AND THEREBY PREVENTED ANY MAJOR [illegible]. THERE IS PROBABLY WIDE RESENTMENT AGAINST HIS AUTHORITARIAN METHODS, BUT THIS IS NOT CONSIDERED ANY IMMEDIATE THREAT TO THE GVN.

E. KONTUM. THIS PROVINCE IS VERY SPARSELY SETTLED AND THUS [illegible]LY LITTLE INTEREST IN THE BUDDHIST MOVEMENT HAS BEEN EVIDENCED HERE. THE PROVINCE CHIEF STATED ON 5 AUGUST THAT IF TROUBLE DID START HE WOULD TAKE HIS CUE FROM THE QUANG NGAI PROVINCE CHIEF AND BAN ANY GATHERING OF OVER THREE PEOPLE. HE DOUBTED VERY SERIOUSLY IF SUCH A BAN WOULD BE NECESSARY AS THERE IS VERY LITTLE BUDDHIST AGITATION EVIDENT.

F. HUE. HUE IS THE MAIN TROUBLE SPOT AND PROBABLY WILL CONTINUE TO BE. PAST REPORTING ON HUE ADEQUATELY COVERS THIS CITY.

G. QUANG TRI. THIS IS ANOTHER PROVINCE WITH A STRONG CHIEF. IN JUNE, QUANG TRI CITY HAD SIGNIFICANT UNREST, BUT TIGHT CONTROLS HAVE STOPPED IT, AND HAVE PREVENTED ITS RECURRENCE.

H. THUA THIEN. LITTLE UNREST IS APPARENT IN THUA THIEN PROVINCE EXCEPT IN THOSE VILLAGES ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF HUE, WHOSE INHABITANTS HAVE BEEN GOING INTO HUE TO DEMONSTRATE.

I. NHA TRANG. THE BONZESS SUICIDE CAUSED A BRIEF FLAREUP IN NHA TRANG. ALTHOUGH CURFEW IS STILL IN FORCE, THE SITUATION IS RETURNING TO NORMAL ACCORDING A SECURITY SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE. THE POPULATION IS GENERALLY APATHETIC TO THE

BUDDHIST ISSUE AND THEIR ROLE IN THE RECENT DEMONSTRATIONS WAS LARGELY THAT OF INTERESTED ONLOOKERS WITH NO NOTICEABLE APPEARANCE OF EMOTIONAL INVOLVEMENT. BECAUSE OF THE HEAVY AMERICAN EXPENDITURES IN THIS RESORT TOWN, THE LOCAL BUSINESSMEN ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE TOO MUCH AT STAKE IN A CONTINUED CALM THAN TO SUPPORT THE BUDDHISTS THROUGH SHOP CLOSINGS, ETC. ONE OF THE MAIN PROBLEMS IN NHA TRANG IS THE BANDS OF LATE TEEN-AGER "COWBOYS" WHO ENJOY HARASSING AND TAUNTING THE POLICE AND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) SECURITY FORCES. GVN OFFICIALS IN NHA TRANG STATE THAT THE BUDDHIST LEADERSHIP IS WORKING HARD TO GENERATE VILLAGE-LEVEL SUPPORT IN THE RURAL AREAS OF THE PROVINCE, BUT THE OFFICIALS CLAIM THAT THEIR EFFORTS ARE BEARING LITTLE FRUIT. THE OFFICIALS INSIST THAT THIS IS STILL ALSO THE CASE IN OTHER PROVINCES IN THE SOUTH CENTRAL COASTAL AREA.

4. IN THE SOUTHEASTERN PROVINCES TO THE NORTH OF SAIGON, THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE PUBLIC MANIFESTATION OF SENTIMENT ABOUT THE BUDDHIST ISSUE, EITHER IN THE TOWNS OR IN RURAL AREAS. A REGIONAL SECURITY SERVICE OFFICIAL CLAIMS THAT HE AND HIS SECURITY SERVICE COLLEAGUES HAVE THE SITUATION WELL UNDER CONTROL, ARE IN DISCREET CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL BUDDHIST LEADERSHIP, AND DO NOT EXPECT ANY SERIOUS TROUBLE TO DEVELOP IN THEIR REGION.

5. IN THE DELTA AREA, THERE HAS LIKEWISE BEEN LITTLE OUTWARD EXPRESSION OF POPULAR SENTIMENT ON THE BUDDHIST ISSUE, WHICH IS TO BE EXPECTED IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT BUDDHISM HAS NEVER BEEN AS ORGANIZATIONALLY STRONG OR AS DEEPLY FELT BY

THE POPULA[redacted]E AS IN CENTRAL VIETNAM.

6. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

END OF MESSAGE

#5 59

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS [redacted]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM CONTROL PLAN FOR VIOLENT BUDDHIST DEMONSTRATIONS

DATE DISTR. 7 AUGUST 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

REFERENCES IN 94890

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

APPRAISAL [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. [redacted] THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM HAD ESTABLISHED THREE-PHASE PLAN TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN THE EVENT OF VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS ON THE PART OF BUDDHISTS. IN THE FIRST PHASE ONLY REGULAR AND COMBAT POLICE WOULD BE ENGAGED. IF THESE FORCES WERE UNABLE TO CONTROL THE SITUATION, THEY WOULD BE REINFORCED BY CIVIL GUARD UNITS IN THE SECOND PHASE. THE THIRD AND FOURTH MARINE BATTALIONS WOULD BE COMMITTED IN THE THIRD PHASE IF NECESSARY. [redacted] COMMENT. THESE TWO BATTALIONS ARE CURRENTLY IN SAIGON ON AN ALERT BASIS AND ARE NOT BEING USED IN ANY MILITARY

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS [redacted]

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/CSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	STATE/DIR

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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OPERATIONS.)

[redacted]

2. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 9TH FLD STA 2ND AIR DIV CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC.

END OF MESSAGE

#15

TELE AM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

63

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT BUDDHIST OPTIMISM IN OVERTHROW OF DIEM REGIME; TRAINING OF MONKS, NUNS AND STUDENTS; AND, TENTATIVE LIST OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

DATE DISTR. 17 AUGUST 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN Ø1Ø26

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

APPRAISAL [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. [redacted] BUDDHIST LEADERS WERE OPTIMISTIC THAT PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM COULD BE OVERTHROWN WITHIN SIX MONTHS AND WERE ORGANIZED FOR A STRUGGLE OF SEVERAL MONTHS. MONKS AND NUNS WERE BEING GIVEN INSTRUCTION IN POLITICAL MATTERS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF BOTH HIGH SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY STUDENTS WAS BEING STRESSED.

2. THICH THIEN MINH, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE GENERAL ASSOCIATION OF VIETNAMESE BUDDHISTS (GAVB) IN CENTRAL VIETNAM, AND THICH TRI QUANG, HEAD OF CENTRAL VIETNAM GAVB, BOTH STRONGLY OPPOSED TO NEUTRALISM, HAD DRAWN UP A TENTATIVE LIST OF MEN WHOM THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE IN THE GOVERNMENT IF DIEM WERE OVERTHROWN. IT INCLUDED PHAM KHAC SUU

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OER	ORR	X	CO

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

(63) [redacted] JAN 1990 (77)

FORM 1KG OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-30)

A KEY FIGURE OF THE CARAVELLE PETITION OF APRIL 1960 AND ORGANIZER OF THE "BLOC FOR FREEDOM AND PROGRESS" (KHOI TU DO VA TIEN BO), SEVERAL OTHER SIGNERS OF THE CARAVELLE PETITION, BUT NO BONZES. [redacted] COMMENT. A BONZE WAS EXCOMMUNICATED FROM THE GAVB BECAUSE HE INSISTED ON RUNNING FOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN THE 31 AUGUST NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS. PHAM KHAC SUU IS HIGHLY REGARDED FOR HIS COURAGE AND INTEGRITY, ALTHOUGH HE IS CONSIDERED TOO EASILY INFLUENCED.)

3. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID USIA 2ND AIR DIVISION 9TH FIELD STATION CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC.

END OF MESSAGE

[redacted]

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECRET (When filled in) CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS [redacted]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT INDICATION OF A 25 AUGUST COUP D'ETAT

DATE DISTR. 22 AUGUST 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

REFERENCES IN 04670

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

APPRAISAL [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. [redacted] A GROUP OF HIGH-RANKING OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM WOULD ATTEMPT A COUP D'ETAT AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME ON 25 AUGUST. SIMULTANEOUS ACTION WAS SCHEDULED THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM. [redacted]

2. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE (CHARGE D'AFFAIRES), MACV [redacted], CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS [redacted]

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	[redacted]	DD [redacted]

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

(65)

Date JAN 1996

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FORM 10-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-30)

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

[redacted]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT 1. BACKGROUND ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MARTIAL LAW
2. PROBLEMS OF GENERAL DON

DATE DISTR. 23 AUGUST 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

REFERENCES IN 05574

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

APPRAISAL [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. SUMMARY. [redacted] THE PLAN TO DECLARE MARTIAL LAW FOR SOUTH VIETNAM WHICH WAS DEVELOPED ABOUT 6 AUGUST 1963 DURING A MEETING OF SEVERAL HIGH-RANKING ARMY OFFICERS HEADED BY MAJOR GENERAL TRAN VAN DON. GENERAL DON HAD BEEN ASSURED THAT NO CASUALTIES WOULD OCCUR DURING THE ROUNDUP OF BUDDHISTS.

2. [redacted]

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

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STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY	ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	ORE	OO	[redacted]
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

(68)

Approved For Release
Date JAN 1998

FORM 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(82) (15-30)

[redacted] THE PLAN EVOLVED ABOUT 10 AUGUST DURING A MEETING OF THE FOLLOWING: MAJOR GENERAL TRAN VAN DON, COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES; BRIGADIER GENERAL TON THAT DINH, III CORPS COMMANDER; BRIGADIER GENERAL TRAN THIEN KHIEM, CHIEF OF STAFF, JOINT GENERAL STAFF; BRIGADIER GENERAL TRAN TU OAI, DIRECTOR OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE, WHO HANDLED THE PRINTING REQUIREMENTS; COLONEL LE QUANG TUNG, HEAD OF THE VIETNAMESE SPECIAL FORCES; NGUEYN VAN Y, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE; AND POSSIBLE ONE OR TWO OTHERS. AT THIS MEETING GENERAL DON WAS ASSURED THAT NO ONE WOULD BE HURT IN ACTIONS AIMED AT THE BUDDHISTS. DESPITE THIS ASSURANCE, 65 POLICE AND COMBAT POLICE WERE INJURED, SIX OF THEM CRITICALLY. BUDDHIST CASUALTIES WERE NOT KNOWN BUT APPROXIMATELY 1,400 BONZES AND LAY PERSONS WERE UNDER DETENTION BY 22 AUGUST; MOST OF THESE WERE TO BE RELEASED.

3. ON 22 AUGUST A PETITION INDICATING THAT THE SITUATION HAD DETRIORATED TO THE EXTENT THAT ACTION AGAINST THE BUDDHISTS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MARTIAL LAW WERE BOTH NECESSARY, SUPPOSEDLY SIGNED BY ALL GENERAL OFFICERS AND PRESENTED TO PRESIDENT DIEM BEFORE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MARTIAL LAW, WAS BEING CIRCULATED THROUGHOUT THE GENERAL STAFF FOR SIGNATURES BY THOSE WHO ACTUALLY HAD NOT SIGNED IT. MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH, MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT, SIGNED IT ON

22 AUGUST AND SEVERAL OTHER GENERALS OFFICERS HAD SIGNED IT AFTER THE MOVE WAS MADE AGAINST THE BUDDHISTS ON 20-21 AUGUST. [redacted] COMMENT. THIS WOULD SEEM TO IMPLY THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NOT BEEN PRESENTED WITH A PETITION SIGNED BY A MAJORITY OF THE GENERALS.)

4. GENERAL DON EXPLAINED TO GENERALS DUONG VAN MINH, TR[illegible]N MINH, LE VAN NGHIEM, AND LE VAN KIM ON 22 AUGUST EVENTS THAT HAD TRANSPIRED SINCE 20 AUGUST STATING THAT ASSURANCES TO HIM THAT NONE WOULD BE HURT HAD NOT BEEN FULFILLED. HE TOLD THEM THAT THE SITUATION WAS GRAVE, THAT HE NEEDED THEIR HELP AND THAT HE WISHED TO MEET WITH THEM EVERY MORNING. HE SAID THAT THE ARMY COULD HANDLE ONE SERIOUS OUTBREAK BUT IF MULTIPLE MAJOR DISTURBANCES ERUPTED, (PORTION GARBLED, BEING SERVICED)*

5. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG 9TH FLD STA 2ND AIR DIV. USOM USIS CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

6. [redacted]

END OF MESSAGE

#34

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

70

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT FRUSTRATION AND DISCOURAGEMENT AMONG VIETNAMESE ARMY OFFICERS

DATE DISTR. 23 AUGUST 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

REFERENCES IN 056[redacted]

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

APPRAISAL [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. [redacted] THE OFFICER CORPS OF THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) WAS DISCOURAGED AND FRUSTRATED, THAT MANY OFFICERS WANTED CHANGES MADE BUT WERE AFRAID TO SUGGEST THEM TO AMERICANS BECAUSE OF FULL AMERICAN SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT DIEM, AND THAT MANY OFFICERS BELIEVED THAT CHANGES WERE NEEDED IN ORDER TO PROSECUTE THE WAR AGAINST THE VIET CONG SUCCESSFULLY. [redacted] ACCORDING TO RUMORS, THE AMERICANS PLANNED THE 21 AUGUST OPERATION AGAINST THE BUDDHISTS. [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS [redacted]

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY	CSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	[redacted]	OO
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FORM 4-43 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

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(15-30)

[redacted]

2. [redacted] THE ATTITUDE PREVAILING WITHIN THE ARVN OFFICER CORPS, PRINCIPALLY BEFORE, BUT ALSO TO SOME EXTENT AFTER THE 21 AUGUST EVENTS.

A. THE OFFICERS ARE DISCOURAGED AND FRUSTRATED; THIS FEELING IS WIDESPREAD AND INTENSE, AND HAS BECOME WORSE SINCE THE ATTACK ON THE PAGODAS AND THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW.

B. THE WILL TO FIGHT THE VIET CONG (VC) HAS NOT DIMINISHED BUT MANY OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO WIN THE WAR AGAINST THE VC GIVEN THE PRESENT SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

C. THE GENERAL OFFICERS SHARE THE ATTITUDE ON FRUSTRATION AND DISCOURAGEMENT. [redacted] BRIGADIER GENERAL TRAN THIEN KHIEM, CHIEF OF STAFF, JOINT GENERAL STAFF AS ONE OFFICER WHO BELIEVED THAT IF CHANGES WERE NOT MADE, THERE WOULD BE NO CHANCE OF WINNING THE WAR.

D. AS EXAMPLES OF DISCOURAGEMENT AMONG THE OFFICER CROPS, [redacted] MAJOR (FNU) PHU, COMMANDER OF THE VNSF 78TH (ALSO RCVD 77TH) GROUP, AN UNIDENTIFIED VNSF CAPTAIN SERVING UNDER MAJOR LE QUANG TRIEU, AND A MAJOR (FNU) MAU (PHONETIC), RECENTLY ASSIGNED AS CHIEF OF THUA THIEN PROVINCE. [redacted]

E. ONE ESPECIALLY DISCOURAGING FACTOR IS THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL TON THAT DINH, COMMANDER OF THE III CORPS, IS IN CHARGE OF THE SAIGON AREA. [redacted]

F. ANOTHER DISCOURAGING FACTOR IS THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SO FIRMLY SUPPORTS DIEM THAT THE MILITARY CANNOT MAKE NECESSARY CHANGES AND MANY OFFICERS ARE AFRAID OF GIVING FRANK OPINIONS TO AMERICANS.

G. [redacted] THERE IS A WIDESPREAD RUMOR THAT THE AMERICANS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR PLANNING THE 21 AUGUST OPERATION. MANY BELIEVED THIS BECAUSE THE VIETNAMESE SPECIAL FORCES (VNSF), NOT THE ARMY, ATTACKED THE PAGODAS ON THE MORNING OF 21 AUGUST AND, AS EVERYONE KNOWS, THE AMERICANS SUPPORT THE VNSF.

H. [redacted] VNSF COMMANDER COLONEL LE QUANG TUNG KNOWS NOTHING ABOUT MILITARY AFFAIRS AND SOME OFFICERS ARE AFRAID THAT TUNG'S TROOPS WILL SHOOT THEM.

3. [redacted] THE IDEAL SOLUTION WOULD BE TO GET RID OF NGO DINH NHU AND MADAME NHU AND BRING NEW PEOPLE INTO THE GOVERNMENT. HE REALIZED THE AMERICANS WERE AFRAID OF A CHANGE BECAUSE OF WHAT THIS MIGHT MEAN TO THE WAR EFFORT AND, IN FACT, IT MIGHT LEAD TO THE LOSS OF CONTROL OF SEVERAL PROVINCES. NEVERTHELESS, [redacted] FAVORED A CHANGE SO THAT THERE WOULD AT LEAST

BE SOME CHANCE OF ULTIMATELY WINNING THE WAR.

4. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 2ND AIR DIV 9TH FLD STN CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT.

(END OF MESSAGE)

~~SECRET~~

OCI No. 2703/63

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
28 August 1963

McGeorge Bundy Notes re WH Meeting (Filed separately)

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Cast of Characters in South Vietnam

Decision - Lodge Board Cable
Subic Bay
not to evacuation.

agreed by Rusk Ball Harriman

GWB
Nhus in control intolerable.
"Terrible damage"

Nothing - a bad principle and a bad precedent.

(let it go as it is)

GWB
Promises broken by them

+ McN
Are you going to back the
- borderline press
- Diem
-

How to make the thing work.

Three alternatives

To make it work.

Worst thing we can do is leave it that way.

Principle of Action: We should never encourage this and then let it

fail

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLK-94-43

CAST OF CHARACTERS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Civilian Officials, Advisers, Security Heads

Ngo Dinh DIEM	President and Secretary of National Defense
Ngo Dinh NHU	Political Counselor to the President, Head of the Strategic Hamlet Program, Supreme Leader of the Republican Youth Movement. The President's brother and key thinker. Heads the semi-clandestine Can Lao party.
Mme. Ngo Dinh NHU	Nhu's wife, official hostess for the President, head of the Women's Solidarity Movement and Women's Paramilitary Youth Movement. Daughter of ex-Ambassador to US Tran Van CHUONG.
Ngo Dinh CAN	Brother of the President and boss of central Vietnam from Hue. Always a rival of Nhu, said to be on the decline since the crackdown.
Truong Cong CUU	Newly appointed Foreign Minister, also Coordinating Secretary of State for Social and Cultural Affairs. Former National Assembly President; apparently a loyal pro-regime, Can Lao member; possibly able, but chiefly political appointee.
Vo Van HAI	Diem's personal secretary. Probably loyal to Diem, but voiced extreme concern over events of 20 August which he blamed on Nhu.
Nguyen Van HAY	Special Police Assistant at Directorate General of National Police. Considered loyal to Diem regime.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLK-76/167 CIA (MFD 6/76)
By mmb NARA, Date 9/1/94

Duong Van HIEU	Chief of Special Police Bureau, Directorate General of National Police. Appointed early 1963 by Nhu and considered Nhu's man. Reported arrogant.
Ngo Trong HIEU	Civic Action Minister. Activist and apparently loyal to Ngos. Served as Nhu's man in Cambodia for anti-Sihanouk plotting.
Dang Duc KHOI	Able head of Press Service in Ministry of Information. Has been reported close to Tuyen and at times disaffected but appears to serve regime loyally. Was assigned by Nhu personally to assist Gen. Oai in press censorship function under martial law.
Bui Van LUONG	Interior Minister. Considered Nhu's man.
Ngo Dinh LUYEN	Diem's youngest brother, ambassador to UK and other European capitals.
Vu Van MAU	Foreign Minister who resigned on 22 August. Buddhist who now seems have considerable popular sympathy. Possibly under arrest although this is denied.
Nguyen Ngoc THO	Vice President. Buddhist. Generally kept on the outside by the Ngos, but headed Interministerial Committee for negotiating with Buddhists. Generally considered weak leader but not permitted key role.
Nguyen Dinh THUAN	Presidential secretary and Assistant Minister of Defense, also defense coordinator. Close to Ngo family and key contact man with US officials. Appears shaken by recent events, but still emotionally if not rationally committed to Ngos.

Ngo Dinh THUC	Diem's brother, Archbishop of Hué. Considered influential with Diem and now more so than Can.
Tran Kim Tuyen	Former head of presidential security service (SEPES), GVN's intelligence and dirty tricks outfit. Long considered extremely close to Ngos, especially Nhu, and possibly still is. Concerned in anti-Sihanouk ops. Recently reported in disfavor and removed from SEPES, but said to be a political adviser to presidency. Reported coup-plotting since early July, possibly in earnest or to provide a smokescreen.
Cao Xuan VY	Director of Youth and Sports. Loyal to Nhu.
Col. Nguyen Van Y	Director General of National Police and Commissioner of the Central Intelligence Organization. Believed disliked by the regime as too close to US and not a Ngo man. Recently has been under some veiled attack from within regime as alleged contact of VC.

Military

Brig. Gen. Huynh Van CAO	Commander IV Corps south of Saigon. Considered loyal to regime, regarded generally as able commander. Catholic, US C&GS trained.
Brig. Gen. Van Thanh CAO	Political general, not to be confused with IV Corps commander. Is Govt. Delegate for Southeast Provinces, identified as Nhu follower in past.
Brig. Gen. Pham Xuan CHIEU	Also appointed as assistant to Gen. Don for martial law after being on shelf in capacity of Inspector in Strategic Hamlet Program. Buddhist. Was CoS to JGS until '60 coup attempt, removed for suspected sympathies with rebels, although played no role. Was in US for C&GS until recently.
Lt. Col. Bui Dinh DAM	Cdr., 7th Inf. Div, My Tho (IV Corps) about 40 miles southwest of Saigon. Said to be close to some GVN officials and "Little Minh" but not known to be Nhu man.
Brig. Gen. Ton That DINH	Commander III Corps (north of Saigon) and military governor of Saigon. Nominal Catholic (apparently rice-bowl convert). Aggressive, arrogant officer, reported by some to be effective commander. Never known as strong critic of regime, but probably basic opportunist who was among key officers in plan to bring about martial law.
Maj. Gen. Tan Van DON	Now Acting Chief, Joint General Staff, ARVN, and supreme commander of military government under martial law. Also Army Commander. Buddhist. Don may be out of his

	depth in current role, but appears to have been one of key officers through whom military rule brought about on 20 August. Real loyalty uncertain and probably opportunist. Seems to be in all camps: reported close to French, to Nhu, impressive to many Americans, and close to chief military critics of GVN, but not fully trusted by them. Claims not informed about raid plans.
Col. Huynh Huu HIEN	Commander, Air Force. Buddhist. Hien was once Diem's personal pilot and considered loyal, but appeared somewhat shaken by GVN's early handling of Buddhist crisis. Considerable disaffection reported in air force.
Maj. Gen. Thai Quang HOANG	Commander, Command and General Staff School. Out of favor as possible pro-'60 rebel since he was captured by the paratroops.
Lt. Col. Nguyen Ngoc KHOI	Commander, Presidential Guard Brigade, Saigon, (est. strength 2,500). Picked for loyalty, although once rumored possibly disaffected along with some of his troops.
Brig. Gen. Nguyen KHANH	Commander, II Corps, north-central South Vietnam. Good aggressive troop commander. Buddhist. Apparently uninvolved in events leading to martial law. From Nov '60 to late '61 was Chief of Staff, JGS, a job given as a reward for helping rescue Diem in 1960. Reported disaffected during JGS tenure.
Lt. Col. Le Nguyen KHANG	Commander, Marines (subordinate to navy). Recently given award by GVN. Marines loyal in past, but recently reportedly some disaffection and Khang in late '61 claimed ARVN being hamstrung by politics.

Brig Gen. Tran Thien KHIEM	Chief of Staff to the JGS, ARVN. Buddhist. Current loyalties uncertain. Apparently one of few generals with advance knowledge of martial law plan, although probably unwitting about pagoda raid plans. One of key generals rescuing Diem in 1960 coup attempt, to which he owes his current job; also, however, reported disaffected since present appointment (late 1961). One of younger officers.
Brig Gen. Le Van KIM	Now serving as a martial law deputy to Gen. Don, who is his brother-in-law. Has been Inspector in Strategic Hamlet Program. Buddhist, close to "Big Minh." Considered one of SVN's most capable military officers, but long put on shelf because he is known critic of regime. One of those who has claimed army was "duped."
Brig Gen. Nguyen Van LA	CG, Saigon-Cholon Zone; now under Gen. Dinh. Believed loyal to regime. Ex-police chief, unfriendly to US.
Col. Duong Ngoe LAM	Commander of Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps. Buddhist.
Brig. Gen. Nguyen Ngoc LE	Appointed deputy to Gen. Don for martial law, reported in charge of Veterans' Affairs until appointed by Nhu to role in Strategic Hamlet Program this summer. Reported pro-French.
Lt. Col. Do Khac MAI	Chief of Staff, Air Force. Recently given citation by GVN, probably to win loyalty. However, has been privately extremely critical of regime during entire Buddhist crisis.

Col. Do MAU	Director of Military Security Service, Defense Ministry. Probably loyal to regime. Was in some disfavor for allowing himself to be captured by rebels in 1960.
Col. Nguyen Van MAU	Director Military Justice, Gendarmerie, Ministry Defense.
Maj. Gen. Duong Van MINH	Military adviser to President. (Paper job only). Known as "Big Minh", is considered popular and capable officer who has frequently been critical of the regime. Has not been fully trusted by regime and has no command responsibility. Buddhist.
Maj. Gen. Tran Van MINH	Permanent Secretary General for National Defense. Known as "Little Minh." Close to "Big Minh" but loyalty to regime unknown. Respected but not highly dynamic general.
Brig. Gen. Le Van NGHIEM	Nominally in command of I Corps (northern SVN), but not effectively so. Buddhist, strongly disaffected in Buddhist crisis and probably actually on shelf. Probably not dynamic.
Col. Bui Huu NHON	Cdr, 21st Inf. Div at Can Tho, about 75 miles south of Saigon.
Capt. Nguyen Quang NGUYEN	Dep. Chief of Opns, Armor Command, who stated mid-July that command would not defend regime against a coup.
Brig. Gen. Tran Tu OAI	Director of Psychological Warfare, Ministry Defense. Initially appointed military censor under martial law and claims to have been one of few generals aware of the martial law plan in advance. Catholic and believed to be close to Nhu and Diem.

Lt. Col. Nguyen Huu PHUOC	Said to head Republican Youth Mvt in Saigon, but has been reported disaffected and replaced from a command at the palace.
Lt. Col. Nguyen Van PHUOC	Chief of Intelligence (J-2), ARVN.
Capt. Ho Tan QUYEN	Commander, Vietnamese Navy. Buddhist. Loyal in past to regime. One source claimed some disaffection in navy in July '63, but no past history of this.
Brig. Gen. Tran Ngoc TAM	Inspector in Strategic Hamlet Program, reported in past as close to Nhu.
Lt. Col. Pham Ngoc THAO	Assigned to Strategic Hamlet Program. Was chief of Kien Hoa Province but apparently reassigned as he began to be public figure in his own right. Said to be aggressive and dynamic, recently reported coup plotting in two camps. Was ex-Viet Minh (with a brother an official in DRV) but is not known to be pro-Viet Cong as alleged by some of his enemies.
Lt. Col. Nguyen Van THIEN	Chief, Armor Command (Armored Brigade). Loyalty unknown. He was awarded an honor by GVN in July. Considerable disaffection among armored troops was reported by Dep CoS for Opns in mid-July.
Col. Nguyen Van THIEU	Commander, 5th Inf. Div, Bien Hoa about 20 miles north of Saigon in III Corps. Reported to be Catholic and close to Nhu.
Brig. Gen. Do Cao TRI	Commander of 1st Division in I Corps and military governor in Hué. Also defacto commander of I Corps. Young, dynamic and capable, believed

	to be Catholic. Appears extremely ambitious; recently promoted from Colonel.
Col. Le Quang TUNG	Commander, Special Forces. Catholic loyal to Nhu. Reported generally disliked by most of army. Once alleged to be number-three man in GVN after Diem and Nhu.
Lt. Gen. Ly Van TY	Chief of Joint General staff of Vietnamese Armed Forces (ARVN), elderly and largely figurehead, currently in US for medical treatment. Buddhist.
Col. Cao Van VIEN	Commander, Airborne Brigade. (6 bns, 1 mortar bty). Appointed to post after paratroops attempted coup in '60 and deemed personally loyal to regime. Reported, however, to have indicated some sympathy recently with student demonstrators he was trying to discipline. Considerable disaffection alleged among paratroops.
Brig. Gen. Mai Huu XUAN	Commanding Officer, Quang Trung Mil Training Center north of Saigon. Buddhist. Has been reported close to Gen. Don.
Col. Nguyen Van Y	Director General National Police and Commissioner of Central Intelligence Organization.

Political Figures Outside Government

1. Buddhists

(Rev.) Thich Tinh KHIET	Supreme High Priest in General Association of Vietnamese Buddhists (GAVB). From Hué. National leader, but in his 80's. Prisoner of GVN and reported ill in hospital.
Thich Tinh MINH	Also from central Vietnam and leader in Hué. Identified with militant clergy. Reported arrested.
Thich Tri QUANG	Militant head of clergy in central Vietnam (Hué) who was instrumental in initial 8 May incident and increasingly prominent in direction of Buddhist campaign, possibly with some political motivation. Young and politically aware, but reported tubercular. Apparently eluded GVN capture.
Mai Tho TRUYEN	Head of lay organization of GAVB (Buddhist Studies Association) at Xa Loi Pagoda, Saigon. Official of World Fellowship of Buddhists. Believed to be moderate and respected leader. Relations with GVN in past not known, but not considered close to regime. Apparently played relatively minor role in Buddhist campaign after initial stages, but this uncertain.

2. Other Oppositionists, or Persons Outside Government

Tran Quoc BUU	President of General Confederation of Labor. Considered one of ablest Vietnamese leaders, intelligent and runs the only effective labor union. Can Lao member who has stayed on good terms with Nhu, but has frequently expressed criticism of the Diem regime and of Nhu.

Bui DIEM	Dai Viet member, purported force behind Dan Van Sung, has claimed to have ties with Buddhist Tri Quang.
Pham Huy CO	An exile in Paris since 1954 and once the representative abroad of oppositionist Dr. Pham Quang Dan. Has now proclaimed his own "Revolutionary Council" dedicated to regime's overthrow and claims support inside SVN where some leaflets apparently were work of his followers. A physician who has frequently sought US backing, believed relatively capable but not forceful and somewhat arrogant.
Pham Quang DAN	Physician, now imprisoned for active endorsement of '60 coup attempt which he attempted to take lead in after it began but was not in on plot. Known as head of opposition parties and as elected assemblyman not permitted to take his seat in 1959. One of better known public opposition figures, but another with arrogant and probably Mandarin-type tendencies.
Tran Van DO	Brother of recent Ambassador to US Chuong and uncle of Mme. Nhu. Was Diem's first Foreign Minister, but broke with regime in 1955 and formed largely discussion-type opposition group. Signed Caravelle petition and has variously been briefly arrested by GVN but exonerated in recent July trials. Respected opposition figure but not considered activist.
Lt. Col. Vuong Van DONG	Leader of paratroop coup in 1960 and exile in Cambodia until recently went to Paris; may now reside in Geneva. Politically somewhat navie, and recently joining forces with Co and Tran Van Huu, who pushes a neutralist line.

Tran Trung DUNG	Diem's Defense Minister until mid-1961 but a casualty of the '60 coup aftermath. Has long record of anti-French, nationalist activity, one-time Can Lao member backing Diem, but now on outs. Reported to be intelligent, able, and a figure of some prestige.
Nguyen Ton HOAN	Paris exile and leader of southern faction of Dai Viet who has frequently drummed for US support. Once served in Bao Dai cabinet, but became early disaffected. Believed to be fairly capable and to enjoy some support in SVN, but no organized backing on the scale claimed.
Tran Van HUU	Enjoys some following among Paris exiles as a former Prime Minister of Bao Dai's. However, is now playing footsy with several exiles believed to be working with DRV and is openly advocating neutralist solution.
Huynh Van LANG	Former close ties with regime as Can Lao finance chief and Head Foreign Exchange. Fired by Nhu after agitating against Cabinet Ministers, Luong and Thuan in lottery scandal. Now reported coup-plotting against crackdown on Buddhists with alleged ties in academic circles.
Phan Huy QUAT	Dai Viet (northern faction) and founder of Front for National Unity, opposition movement permitted to organize under GVN's eye (and control) in 1961 as attempt to indicate reforms in wake of '60 coup. Quat was signer of Caravelle petition and considered relatively moderate oppositionist who appears reasonably capable, also self-seeking, but probably not too dynamic.

Dan Van SUNG	Dai Viet leader who also organized an opposition movement, the Front for Democratization, in the wake of the '60 coup. Movement has not been active and appears have little real organized following. Physician.
Pham Khac SUU	Diem's first Agriculture Minister who soon split with the regime. Was only important oppositionist allowed to sit in National Assembly, but was imprisoned in wake of 1960 coup and still detained (sentence heaviest given civilian in SVN this July--8 years) although he apparently was totally uninvolved. Was a key figure behind Caravelle petition but did not sign. One of best-known opposition figures.
Hoang Co THUY	Now in exile in Switzerland where he fled after playing role of leading civilian adviser to paratroop coup group. Thuy was prominent Saigon oppositionist and lawyer for many oppositionists in trouble with Diem regime. Also was instrumental in many efforts to forge unified opposition movements. Not now reported politically active.

fig. 73

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

COUNTRY LAOS SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT PLANS OF HANOI TO INCREASE MILITARY PRESSURE IN SOUTH VIETNAM

DATE DISTR. 24 AUGUST 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

PLACE & DATE ACQ. [redacted]

REFERENCES IN 06240

APPRAISAL [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. (SUMMARY: ORDERS TO WITHDRAW A VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST BATTALION FROM TCHEPONE AND SEND IT TO SOUTH VIETNAM WERE ISSUED IN CONNECTION WITH NORTH VIETNAM'S PLAN TO INCREASE MILITARY PRESSURE IN SOUTH VIETNAM DURING THE BUDDHIST CRISIS. HANOI HOPES THIS WILL CONVINCE THE UNITED STATES THAT IT MUST HELP RETAIN THE NGO DINH DIEM GOVERNMENT WHILE SOUTH VIETNAM IS UNDER FIRE FROM VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS. HANOI FEARS THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL TRY TO DEPOSE DIEM, AND IF THIS SUCCEEDED, THE BUDDHIST AND OTHER ISSUES USEFUL TO HANOI WOULD EVAPORATE.)

CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS [redacted]

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	[redacted]	CO
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

(73)

Date JAN 1998

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FORM 4-62 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(15-30)

2. [redacted] ON 22 AUGUST THE NORTH VIETNAMESE EMBASSY IN VIENTIANE RECEIVED A WIRELESS MESSAGE FROM HANOI WHICH SAID THAT THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST (VC) BATTALION NOW STATIONED AT TCHEPONE HAS BEEN ORDERED TO PROCEED IMMEDIATELY INTO SOUTH VIETNAM TO HELP THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY IN ITS GUERRILLA EFFORTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. HANOI IS ACCELERATING ITS ARMED GUERRILLA ATTACKS IN SOUTH VIETNAM DISPITE THE RAINY SEASON AND THE CONSEQUENT TRANSPORATION DIFFICULITIES. HANOI ADVISED THAT MORE VC TROOPS WILL BE TRANSITING LAOS FOR EVENTUAL USE IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THAT FRESH REPLACEMENTS FOR THE TCHEPONE BATTALION WILL BE FORTHCOMING SOONEST VIA THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL.

3. [redacted] THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE NOT NOW AIDING THE BUDDHISTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM OR TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE BUDDHIST SITUATION TO GET THE PEOPLE TO RALLY AGAINST PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM AND HIS GOVERNMENT. HANOI PREFERS TO KEEP DIEM IN OFFICE BECAUSE HE PROVIDES MANY ISSUES WHICH HANOI CAN ATTACK AND USE AS A RALLYING POINT FOR THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY.

✓ 4. [redacted] HANOI AND PEIPING FEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT INTERFERE IN THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE POLITICAL SCENE AND TRY TO ATTEMPT A COUP TO ELIMINATE DIEM. HANOI AND PEIPING BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN NOW STAGE A COUP SUCCESSFULLY BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES HAS 13,000 TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND IS

MORE FULLY INTEGRATED INTO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY GENERAL STAFF THAN IN 1960 WHEN, [redacted] THE UNITED STATES UNSUCCESSFULLY TRIED TO GET RID OF DIEM BY A MILITARY COUP. THE ORDER TO MOVE THE TCHEPONE BATTALION WAS BASED ON A JOINT HANOI-PEIPING DECISION TO INCREASE MILITARY PRESSURE ON THE DIEM GOVERNMENT IN THE HOPE THAT THE PRESSURE WILL INDUCE THE UNITED STATES TO FEEL THAT IT MUST RETAIN DIEM WHILE SOUTH VIETNAM IS UNDER DIRECT FIRE FROM THE VC GUERRILLAS. [redacted] IF THE UNITED STATES SUCCEEDED IN DEPOSING DIEM, THE BUDDHIST AND OTHER ISSUES WOULD EVAPORATE. THIS WOULD REDUCE THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY, THEREBY REDUCING IMMEASURABLY THE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS OF THE VC GUERRILLAS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS WELL AS THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY RECRUITMENT PROGRAM.

5. HANOI HAS POINTED OUT THAT SO LONGER DIEM REMAINS HEAD OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT, THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY CHANCES OF ATTAINING ITS OBJECTIVES ARE GREATLY IMPROVED. HANOI HOPES THAT THE CONTINUANCE OF THE BUDDHIST ISSUE WILL INDUCE COMPLETE UNITS OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY TO DEFECT TO THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY, THEREBY WEAKENING THE ARMY AND UNITED STATES MILITARY STRENGTH NOW FIGHTING THE GUERRILLAS.

6. [redacted]

[redacted]

7. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE ARMY AIR USAID CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC.

END OF MESSAGE

#71

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

76

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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT COMMENTS OF NGO DINH NHU ON POSSIBLE CHANGES IN U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTH VIETNAM

DATE DISTR. 27 AUGUST 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

REFERENCES IN 07669

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

APPRAISAL [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. [redacted] NGO DINH NHU TOLD AN ASSEMBLY OF GENERAL OFFICERS AND SERVICE AND STAFF CHIEFS THAT THERE MIGHT BE AN IMPORTANT CHANGE IN THE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) WITHIN THE NEXT THREE MONTHS. [redacted] COMMENT. ALL GENERAL OFFICERS WERE PRESENT EXCEPT LIEUTENANT GENERAL LE VAN TY AND BRIGADIER GENERALS DO CAO TRI, TON THAT DINH AND TRAN NGOC TAM.) NHU CITED THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY SAYING THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WAS ADOPTING A POLICY OF APPEASEMENT TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES WHICH COULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM OR AN INDICATION OF A

CONFIDENTIAL — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS [redacted]

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

(76)

Page [illegible] of [illegible] Pages
Date [illegible]

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(13-30)

U. S. POLICY CHANGE TOWARD VIETNAM. ACCORDING TO NHU, THE U.S. MIGHT WELL REDUCE ITS MILITARY AS WELL AS ECONOMIC AID. FOR THIS REASON THE GVN MUST, IF NECESSARY, STAND INDEPENDENT OF THE U.S.; THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) SHOULD BE CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED FOR ECONOMY AND ALL EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE CAREFULLY DEPLOYED TO ASSURE ITS MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS. NHU COMMENTED THAT THE GVN WAS IN A POSITION TO ASSERT ITSELF BECAUSE OF THE TREMENDOUS SUCCESS OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM.

2. NHU TOLD THE OFFICERS THAT IT WAS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT THE ARVN WORK CLOSELY WITH THE REPUBLICAN YOUTH AND THE WOMEN'S SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT BECAUSE THE MEMBERS OF THESE GROUPS WERE EAGER TO COLLABORATE WITH THE ARVN AND WERE UNDERSTANDABLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE ANTI-GVN MOVEMENTS DEVELOPING WITHIN THE CITIES.

3. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 9TH FLD STA 2ND AIR DIV CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

END OF MESSAGE

457

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

80

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CONFIDENTIAL — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS [redacted]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT COUP PLANS AND HESITATIONS OF GENERALS [redacted]

DATE DISTR. 7 SEPTEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

REFERENCES [redacted] IN 15091

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. TOP VIETNAMESE GENERALS ARE STILL CONSIDERING A COUP, BUT THEY HAVE THUS FAR FAILED TO TAKE ACTION BECAUSE THEY WANT TO BE ALMOST COMPLETELY CERTAIN OF SUCCESS BEFORE ACTING AND BECAUSE THEY ARE HESITATING BETWEEN 3 OR 4 ALTERNATIVE PLANS OF ACTION. [redacted] CHARACTERIZED GENERALS [redacted] AS "ALMOST TOO INTELLIGENT" THEY SEE THE DIFFICULTIES AND DANGERS TOO CLEARLY.

2. THE BASIC PROBLEM FOR THE GENERALS IS THAT THEY HAVE NO TROOPS. ONE WAY TO OBTAIN THEM WHICH THE GENERALS ARE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING WOULD BE TO PERSUADE ONE REGIMENTAL OR DIVISION

CONFIDENTIAL — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS [redacted]

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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COMMANDER WITH A SECURE TERRITORIAL BASE TO GO INTO DISSIDENCE. GENERAL [redacted] WITH HIS FOLLOWERS WOULD MOVE INTO THE REBEL ZONE AND CALL UPON THE ARMY TO RALLY TO HIM AS CHIEF OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, AGAINST THE DIEM GOVERNMENT. [redacted] COMMENT. WITH GENERAL LE VAN TY NOW IN THE US AND PROBABLY DYING OF CANCER, GENERAL MINH IS THE SENIOR GENERAL OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMY.) [redacted] THE AIR FORCE WOULD NOT BOMB SUCH A REBEL ZONE. [redacted] THE GENERALS CONSIDERED THIS PLAN WORKABLE, AS BEING MORE SURE OF SUCCESS THAN A PLAN TO SEIZE SAIGON BY SURPRISE. [redacted] COMMENT. THE CHANCES OF SUCH A PLAN SUCCEEDING WOULD, [redacted] BE 70 TO 80 PERCENT.) ITS PRINCIPAL DISADVANTAGE WAS THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY INVOLVE CONSIDERABLE BLOODSHED, AS IT WOULD HAVE TO BE ASSUMED THAT TROOPS LOYAL TO DIEM AND NHU WOULD DEFEND SAIGON.

3. [redacted] DID NOT DISCUSS ANY OTHER OF THE 3 OR 4 PLANS FOR A COUP WHICH ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION. [redacted] DID INDICATE THAT WHILE [redacted] IS THE PRINCIPAL DAI VIET CONTACT WITH THE GENERALS, [redacted] WAS THEIR MAIN CONTACT WITH FIELD GRADE OFFICERS.

4. TRAN QUOC BUU, PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL FEDERATION OF VIETNAMESE WORKERS (CVTC) WAS, [redacted], A FOLLOWER MORE THAN A LEADER. HE WOULD ONLY ACT AFTER GENERALS HAD ACTED. THE DIFFICULTY WAS THAT EVERYONE SEEMED TO WAITING FOR

SOMEONE ELSE TO MAKE THE FIRST MOVE.

5. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE (THE AMBASSADOR ONLY) USMACV [redacted]

CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

#137

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

82

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CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS [redacted]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT VIEWS OF NGO DINH NHU ON POSSIBLE REDUCTION IN FOREIGN AID AND ON "PROCOCATIVE ACTS" BY FOREIGNERS

DATE DISTR. 12 SEPTEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

REFERENCES IN 18343

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

APPRAISAL [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. SUMMARY. [redacted] NGO DINH NHU SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) HAD SUFFICIENT RESERVES TO CONTINUE OPERATING FOR TWENTY YEARS. HE ALSO ORDERED VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS TO OPEN FIRE ON AMERICANS OR FOREIGNERS INVOLVED IN ACTS HOSTILE TO THE GVN.

2. [redacted] NGO DINH NHU CALLED A MEETING OF ALL SENIOR TROOP COMMANDERS IN THE SAIGON/CHOLONG AREA INCLUDING AIRBORNE AND MARINE BRIGADE COMMANDERS. NHU

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS [redacted]

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

(82)

Date [redacted]

FORM 4-43 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(96)

(15-30)

MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS:

A. THE CESSATION OF FOREIGN AID WOULD NOT BE DISASTROUS BECAUSE THE GVN HAS SUFFICIENT FOREIGN RESERVES TO CONTINUE OPERATING FOR TWENTY YEARS.

B. REFERRING TO THE BEATING OF A VIETNAMESE SOLDIER OF NUNG ORIGIN BY AMERICANS (BEING SERVICED)* ON THE EVENING OF 7 SEPTEMBER, NHU ORDERED THAT VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS SHOULD OPEN FIRE ON ANY FOREIGNERS INVOLVED IN SUCH PROVOCATIVE ACTS.

3. THE TROOPS COMMANDERS, NOT WISHING TO PUT THE EXACT WORDS OF NHU'S ORDER INTO PRINT, WROTE ORDERS TO THEIR SUBORDINATE OFFICERS THAT THE LATTER SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR ANY DISTURBANCE AND, IF NECESSARY, SHOULD OPEN FIRE.

4. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACVHTAAG USOM USIS 9TH FLD STA. 2ND AIR DIV. CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

5. [redacted] COMMENT: SERVICED PORTION WILL BE DISSEMINATED ONLY IF IT MATERIALLY AFFECTS THE SENSE OF THIS REPORT.

END OF MESSAGE

NLK 01-317-1-2

~~SECRET~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: APR 2001

OCI No. 2352/63

14 September 1963

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MEMORANDUM: The Possibility of a GVN Deal with North Vietnam

1. We have received a number of recent reports which raise the possibility of a GVN deal of some kind with North Vietnam:

a. Polish ICC Commissioner Manelli has reportedly presented a Ho Chi Minh proposal to Nhu for a de facto cease-fire by the Viet Cong; Nhu is allegedly studying this proposal, believing that it might become relevant in three to four months.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
E0 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(S)

b. [redacted] has told Ambassador Lodge that Nhu has always thought of negotiating with the North and believes himself clever enough to bring it off.

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E0 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(S)

c. [redacted] have warned American officials in Saigon of Manelli-Nhu conversations regarding a possible deal with North Vietnam.

d. Nhu has admitted to our Chief of Station, Saigon, that he has talked with Manelli, and that he (Nhu) has been in contact for some time with Viet Cong agents in South Vietnam, maintaining that his purpose is not to explore a deal with the North but to wean senior Viet Cong cadre in the South away from the Communist cause.

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e. [redacted] appears to be at least prepared to serve--if he is not already doing so--as a Nhu-Ho communication link.

f. President de Gaulle's recent initiative concerning Vietnam reiterates long standing

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

French interest in a possible "neutralized" solution there.

2. Although we do not feel that there is great danger of an imminent GVN arrangement of some form with the North, we do believe that there is enough of a possibility of such a deal, at some time in the near future, to warrant special US watchfulness and concern. In our view, the problem is not one of Diem or Nhu's "going over" to Ho or wittingly surrendering their country to Communist domination. Instead, the dangers lie in the fact that Diem and Nhu consider their own interests to be those of their country, and might feel that they could successfully manipulate political dealings with Hanoi. Thus, they might at some juncture seek to work out a modus vivendi with the North, out of belief that a deal with kindred peoples was better than submitting to foreign (US) pressures.

3. The chances that Diem and Nhu might indeed attempt to seek some negotiated solution with the North would probably rise if they felt that US pressures had become so intense that they were backed into a corner. If they felt their only other alternatives to be either the end of their own primacy, or humiliating acceptance of a much greater US voice in the political direction of South Vietnam, they might opt for an "opening to the North." Their success in effecting such a deal would in large measure depend on their method and timing. If it became known that Diem and Nhu seriously intended to seek an accommodation with the North, this might well precipitate a coup attempt by certain South Vietnamese military leaders. However, if Diem and Nhu were able to make it appear that their dealings with the North were intended to serve, and not endanger, South Vietnamese interests, they might then succeed. In any event, there might be considerable public acquiescence in a North-South "solution" in the event that the military and political situations had declined sharply from present levels.

SEE SANITIZED VERSION + DOWNGRADED
NLK-90-41

(1)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Memorandum

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: APR 2001

THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

~~(Information as of 1200 EST)~~

(Information as of 1000 EDT)

16 Sept 63

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(U)

[redacted]

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(U)

EO 12958 6.1(c)>25Yrs
(U)

SC No. 06489/63

16 September 1963

THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(Information as of 1000 EDT)

SUMMARY

The lifting of martial law and other regime moves to demonstrate that the crisis is over have given an appearance of reduced tension to South Vietnam, but in fact there has been little relaxation of security measures. Censorship of news dispatches from Saigon appears to have been halted.

The Diem regime apparently intends to retain some military units in Saigon indefinitely on security assignments. Diem reportedly agreed only reluctantly to the recommendation of South Vietnamese generals that martial law be terminated.

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3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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Neither our field station nor the South Vietnamese Central Intelligence Organization is able to cite any hard evidence of significant Viet Cong control or penetration of the Buddhist or student movements. Both consider some Viet Cong influence probable, however. [redacted] Buddhist monk Tri Quang, now in asylum in the US Embassy, a pro-Communist and extremist, with devious political objectives going beyond the overthrow of the Diem regime.

There has been no significant military activity over the weekend. Reports that "75-calibre" artillery has been captured from the Viet Cong probably refer to a 75-mm. recoilless rifle. The Viet Cong recently have been making increased use of recoilless rifles and heavy mortars in engagements north and south of Saigon, and increased numbers of weapons of Bloc origin have been captured.

North Vietnamese has stepped up its propaganda effort to focus attention on the Buddhist problem in South Vietnam, and Pravda in Moscow has printed a supporting editorial. The editorial accuses US forces of waging war against the Vietnamese people.

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I. GENERAL

1. The Diem regime is attempting to demonstrate that the political crisis is over by lifting martial law and rescheduling the postponed elections for the National Assembly, but there has in fact been little relaxation of security precautions.

2. A CBS correspondent today described his report as "uncensored." A government announcement said censorship had been lifted.

3. Security troops were still much in evidence in Saigon following the termination of martial law at noon today. Paratroopers were still mounting heavy guard near Saigon's central market, according to press reports, and marines were still stationed around high schools in the suburbs. General Khiem, chief of staff of the Joint General Staff, reportedly has stated that some military units will remain on security duty at Saigon schools.

II. THE REGIME

1. South Vietnamese Secretary of the Presidency Thuan reports that the Vietnamese generals recommended the lifting of martial law, and that Diem agreed with some reluctance.

2. The decree setting 27 September as the new date for national elections contains a provision that if elections cannot be held on this date in any electoral district because of "an insurmountable problem," the local authorities will hold elections as soon as possible thereafter. (Comment: This suggests that elections will not be attempted in some areas.)

3. The Diem government is reshuffling its secret police organization, known as SEPES, which has recently been criticized in the world press. SEPES has been undergoing changes for many months. Reports on the latest changes vary, but it appears that the organization has been placed under the command of Colonel Pham Thu Duong, chief of military cabinet to Ngo Dinh Nhu. (The former SEPES director, Dr. Tran Kim Tuyen, was another Nhu protege, but fell into disfavor and has been ordered to Cairo as consul general.)

Colonel Duong reportedly intends sweeping reforms to improve the poor performance record of

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SEPES. The organization apparently will become a service with responsibility only for internal political activity. External operations, including those jointly run with the Chinese Nationalists, reportedly are to be transferred to the Central Intelligence Organization, which has hitherto concentrated on Viet Cong matters.

4. Professor Buu Hoi, South Vietnamese Ambassador to a number of African countries, is to head the Vietnamese UN delegation. He has asked to be heard if the General Assembly, convening Tuesday, decides to debate the treatment of Buddhists in South Vietnam. Buu Hoi is himself a Buddhist; his mother is a Buddhist nun and reportedly was considering burning herself to death in the series of self-immolations earlier this summer.

III. OPPOSITION

1. The CIA station in Saigon says there is no hard evidence of significant Viet Cong penetration or control of Buddhist or student movements in South Vietnam.

The station, however, believes it probable that a few Buddhist and student leaders may be Viet Cong, are accepting guidance or support from the Viet Cong, or are at least Viet Cong- or Hanoi-oriented. There are reports that the Viet Cong have been trying to exploit Buddhist and student unrest, and the station considers it likely that some opportunistic opposition leaders would accept any help obtainable.

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A 17 August report to Diem [redacted] noted that "confiscated Viet Cong documents do not mention the role of the Viet Cong as instigator of any occurrences, but spoke only of their plans to take advantage of any opportunity when events caused by the US or opposition might occur."

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On 15 September [redacted] admitted to a station officer that he still had no specific evidence of a Viet Cong hand in the disturbances, but commented defensively: "What is evidence? We know these people."

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EO 12958 6.1(c)>25Yrs
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2. [redacted] believes that Tri Quang, the chief Buddhist critic of the Diem regime, currently in asylum in the US Embassy, is neutralist-oriented and probably pro-Communist. The source became convinced in the course of many talks with Tri Quang and other Buddhist leaders that Tri Quang was completely political in his purpose and was the acknowledged leader of extremist elements. The source considers Tri Quang's political objectives devious and not limited simply to overthrow of the Diem regime.

The station notes that the [redacted] report is an opinion rather than hard evidence, [redacted]

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3. North Vietnam is trying to exploit the current world outcry over the situation of the Buddhists in South Vietnam. On 14 September, it broadcast a letter from South Vietnam's Liberation Front--the Viet Cong political arm--to the UN General Assembly, reiterating the Front's demands that the US withdraw from South Vietnam, and that the parties concerned in South Vietnam stop the war, settle their differences among themselves, and set up a neutral, coalition government. The same theme was contained in a note sent by North Vietnam to the fourteen countries sponsoring discussion of the South Vietnam question in the UN.

4. TASS, on 14 September, broadcast in English to Europe a Pravda editorial strongly associating the USSR with "the struggle of the South Vietnamese people against the repressive Diem regime." The article accuses the armed forces of the US of conducting active military operations against the South Vietnamese people. It also mentions the Liberation Front's demand for an immediate end to "foreign military aggression" in South Vietnam as prerequisite to a peaceful solution of the Vietnamese problem.

The Pravda editorial states that the Soviet people "cannot look with indifference upon the sufferings of the peace-loving peoples of South Vietnam," and quotes Ho Chi Minh on the inevitability of victory for the liberation movement in South Vietnam.

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EO 12958 6.1(c)>25Yrs
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IV. MILITARY SITUATION

1. No significant military developments have been reported since the previous Vietnamese Situation Report at 1000 Saturday.

2. In recent engagements just north and to the south of Saigon, government forces have noted increased enemy use of recoilless rifles and mortars. They have also captured increased quantities of equipment of Bloc origin in this area, including infantry weapons, foodstuffs, and printed matter. (One Chinese Communist periodical found last week was dated June 1963.)

Secretary Thuan last week told Ambassador Lodge that the first ".75-calibre artillery piece," apparently introduced by raft from North Vietnam, has just been found in the delta. This is not confirmed by MACV, which instead reported the capture last week of at least one 75-mm. recoilless rifle. MACV has identified this as a weapon of Chinese manufacture.

Thuan's stress on the serious situation in the delta, which he considers the key to control of South Vietnam, appears to reflect his recent general pessimism. He pointed out that in the delta there is unlimited food and manpower. Thuan stated that the government had made very little progress in the delta, and that it was unlikely that it could.

V. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

1. The Ceylon delegate at the UN claims that the 14 Afro-Asian nations sponsoring debate on the South Vietnamese question are determined to press for priority treatment during general debate in plenary, and will oppose allocation to committee. Ambassador Stevenson comments that allocation to plenary might make it easier to keep debate brief and perhaps less contentious.

2. The Cambodian Press Agency, on 14 September, reports an appeal by the Association of Vietnamese Buddhists in the US for Cambodia's assistance against the Saigon Government's repression of Buddhists.

EO 12958 6.1(c)>25Yrs
(U)

#118

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

RF 86

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CONFIDENTIAL [redacted] CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT DETERIORATION OF THE MORALE OF THE PEOPLE IN HUE AS A RESULT OF THE GOVERNMENT REPRESSION OF THE BUDDHISTS

DATE DISTR. 17 SEPTEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

REFERENCES IN 21453

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. MORALE OF THE PEOPLE IN HUE HAD DETERIORATED SERIOUSLY BY 12 SEPTEMBER 1963 AS A RESULT OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION OF THE BUDDHISTS. SEVERAL REFUGEES FROM NORTH VIETNAM HAD CLAIMED, IN FACT, THAT THE SITUATION WAS WORSE IN SOUTH VIETNAM THAN IN THE NORTH, INDICATING THAT THEY COULD "FEEL THE FEAR" EXISTING IN THE HUE AREA.

2. CIVIL SERVANTS WERE DISGUSTED WITH THE REQUIREMENT THAT THEY BE ON 24-HOUR DUTY, EXCEPT FOR MEALS AT HOME. FURTHER MORE, THE CIVIL SERVANTS HAD BEEN DIRECTED TO SEND THEIR CHILDREN TO SCHOOL

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted] CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	. 1	DD
STATE/DIR																

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 43 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

Date JAN 1996

(100)

(13-70)

SO THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD DEFEAT THE NONATTENDANCE MOVEMENT IN CITY SCHOOLS. MANY STUDENTS HAVE SWORN ABSOLUTE OPPOSITION TO THE NGO FAMILY AND A NUMBER HAD ALREADY JOINED THE VIET CONG WHICH WAS REGARDED AS THE ONLY AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVE.

3. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 9TH FLD STA 2ND AIR DIV CINCPAC PACFLT-ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

186

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT [redacted] CLAIMS THAT NHU IS RUNNING THE GOVERNMENT [redacted]

DATE DISTR. 20 SEPTEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

REFERENCES IN 23169

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. SUMMARY. [redacted] SAID ON [redacted] SEPTEMBER 1963 THAT NGO DINH NHU WAS RUNNING THE GOVERNMENT AND THAT PRESIDENT DIEM WAS UNAWARE OF AFFAIRS OF STATE. [redacted] CLAIMED THAT THERE WAS A SPLIT BETWEEN DIEM AND NHU AND THAT DIEM NO LONGER TRUSTED NHU, ADDING THAT THE FAMILY WAS "FINISHED."

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

STATE/INR	DIA	AMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	OSR		CO	
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

Date [redacted]

FORM 1-63 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

104

(15-30)

2. [redacted] MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS [redacted] SEPTEMBER:

A. NHU IS IN CHARGE. OFFICIAL REPORTS ARE SENT DIRECTLY TO NHU, WHO DOES NOT PASS THEM ON TO DIEM; THEREFORE, [redacted] DIEM WERE AWARE OF CURRENT MATTERS.

B. DIEM NO LONGER TRUSTS NHU. NHU TRICKED DIEM INTO AUTHORIZING THE 20–21 AUGUST PAGODA RAIDS BY SHOWING HIM A SECRET REPORT PURPORTING TO DISCLOSE A NATIONWIDE BUDDHIST PLAN FOR A COUP D'ETAT. [redacted] CLAIMED THAT THIS DOCUMENT WAS A FORGERY AND THAT THE ARMS "DISCOVERED" IN THE PAGODAS HAD BEEN PLANTED.

C. A REAL CLEAVAGE EXISTS BETWEEN PRESIDENT DIEM AND NGO DINH NHU.

D. [redacted]

E. THE FAMILY IS "FINISHED".

3. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 9TH FLD STA 2ND AIR DIV. CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

NLK01-204-4-16

FROM: CIA Saigon 24 September 1963
TO: CIA
NR: DA IN 108950
SUBJECT: TRAN KIM TUYEN PREDICTS DIRE PROSPECTS FOR THE DIEM REGIME IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Summary. Tran Kim Tuyen, exiled without his family to a consulate post in Cairo, claimed on 17 September 1963 that if the Diem Regime in South Vietnam continued for six more months, all would be lost; then not even a coup d'etat could save Vietnam. If a new Regime is installed fairly soon, however, it might have a fighting chance, but with Ngo Dinh Nhu's skillful divide and conquer tactics fragmenting the opposition, it is unlikely. Tuyen claimed that Nhu is now trying to delude American Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., into believing that the Regime plans real reforms and that its faults have been exaggerated by its enemies among the American officials in Saigon. Tuyen's friends, such as Lieutenant Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao, inspector of strategic hamlets attached to the Presidency, are in danger as suspected subversives. Pressure meanwhile is mounting among young Buddhists, students, and junior army officers; General Tran Van Don and several colleagues realize they played into Ngo Dinh Nhu's hands but are now helpless. As the situation deteriorates, extremists fearing the considerable risks of a coup attempt, will turn to assassination plots in desperation. This would lead to retaliation by loyalists against Americans and to hopeless civil war.

2. Up to the time of Dr. Tuyen's hurried departure on 12 September, the Government of Vietnam (GVN) was trying to restore appearances of normalcy and to portray itself as laboring under difficulty of Communist plots among students and Buddhists. Under Ngo Trong Hieu, known now among the Saigon populace as "The Pope of the False Bonzes", the GVN has placed docile Buddhist priests and monks in all pagodas. His talk of releasing arrested students and lifting martial law however impressed many Westerners. The lifting of martial law is purely nominal; many of the allegedly "Communist student plotters" manhandled and arrested were younger brothers and sons of prominent government officials and military officers; GVN repression and brutality has actually driven many embittered students who were not Communists to flee to the countryside to seek the Communists as the lesser of two evils; most Buddhists repudiate the GVN's bonzes, and attendance at pagodas has dwindled. With the closing of Tudo, ordinary Vietnamese no longer trust the press or radio Saigon; those who can do so listen to the Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts.

3. Nhu has decided to flatter Ambassador Lodge by making grudging concessions supposedly as a result of the Ambassador's negotiating pressure (sending Madame Nhu overseas, ostensible ending martial law, restoring schools and temples.) Nhu has tried to blame American-GVN difficulties on American CIA plots against the Regime, personal hatred of journalists and incumbent American officials of Nhu and the family, and American misunderstanding of the Communist and anti-regime subversive uses of the Buddhists and students. Nhu's charges of American plotting were set with derision by Vietnamese but Americans have lost much face with many sincere Nationalists because they take these accusations and yet are not guilty of blame when many Vietnamese wish they were.

4. The Vietnamese army has suffered most from the current stalemate, both in morale and in reputation. The generals who succumbed to Nhu's wily schemes for a sham military takeover are now helpless and discredited. General Tran Van Don, Commander in Chief, sarcastically related on two occasions recently his young son's derisive comment that Don is Commander in Chief of everything but can command nothing. Only Major General Doung Van Minh and Brigadier General Nguyen Khanh retain any

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DATE: APR 2001

prestige; those hoping for a military-dictated change of policy as some stopgap salvation do not trust the army leaders any more. The VOA announcement that the army was not responsible for ordering the 21 August attacks on the pagodas temporarily saved the army's reputation but General Dinh's immediate denial squelched this. Fortunately for Nhu, Duong Van Minh however discontent still abides by his officer's oath of loyalty and shuns politics. He does so not out of stupidity, as Nhu often charged in denigrating him. (Field comment. Tuyen recalled bitterly his own past support of Nhu in publicizing this picture of Minh.) Nguyen Khanh, the man whom Tuyen considers next to himself as most able to plan a successful coup, is hampered as is Tuyen by distrust as a provocateur arising chiefly from vigorous support both gave the Regime in 1960. Nhu's agents have furthered this image of Khanh and Tuyen among other suspect malcontents to present any coalition against the regime.

5. The Regime has the ability to keep the army in line by threats of Communist advantage by constant surveillance of suspect elements and limitation of their command authority and by ruining the reputation of his enemies and of well-meaning compromisers like Don. There is nevertheless a strong current under the surface in the Armed Services, civilian bureaucracy, police, and professional classes, people less known than the top figures suspected by the GVN's spies under Le Quang Tung and Duong Van Hieu. These persons hope for a coup within the next few months as Vietnam's only salvation. Not all of them are willing to risk it, though they would welcome it; the big problem is unity and trust of each other in an atmosphere abounding with provocateurs and rumor mongers. If the stalemate continues another six months, the Regime will last as long as Vietnam does, but that will not be long since no one will have the will to fight. If a well-planned coup comes soon, it might succeed and under tremendous handicaps could still save Vietnam. Its survival otential decreases as time goes by. Nhu knows that his main strength is the reluctance of his patriotic opponents and of the Americans to give the VC a sudden advantage by precipitious action against the Regime which might evolve into a protracted conflict. He is skillfully playing against that and turning one enemy against another.

6. This policy may frustrate a coup. There is a growing number of junior officers, especially majors and captains, who will not count the cost of desperate action if their superiors do not move. Even they may turn away from the increasing high risks of a coup to the relatively simple desperation move of assassination. Nhu has already made it clear through the Saigon underground where provocateurs and plotters meet that the Regime is prepared to retaliate with counter assassinations of numerous personnel already earmarked by Colonel Tung for such a dire eventuality, including Americans, on whom any assassination plot will be blamed. The only further result would be a hopeless three-cornered civil war. Nhu thus hopes to forestall such attempts, but is increasingly worried even about the Presidential Guard and even some officers of Tung's special forces.

7. Tuyen stated that the only real hope, and even it is risky, would be firm American indication that it will help the Vietnamese people (with specific omission of mentioning the Regime) in their struggle, and American efforts by every gesture possible to help rebuild the army's reputation and to distinguish between it and the Regime.

8. Field disseminated.

POSSIBLY TO TCHEPONE. THE STATUS OF THE OTHER TWO IS NOT CLEAR.

2. A VILLAGER FROM THE BAN PALUNG (WD 7522) AREA VISITED BAN THO (WD 7528), ABOUT 35 KILOMETERS EAST OF MUONG PHINE, AND ATTENDED A MEETING CALLED BY KAI XIENG RY, THE RECENTLY PL-APPOINTED TASSENG. XIENG RY STATED THAT THE VC TROOPS BASED AT XD 1634, EIGHT KILOMETERS NORTHEAST OF MUONG PHINE, SHOT DOWN AN AMERICAN AIRCRAFT ON 5 SEPTEMBER AT XD 8939, ABOUT 14 KILOMETERS NORTHWEST OF MUONG PHINE. XIENG RY SAID TWO MEN BAILED OUT AT WD 9841, ABOUT 18 KILOMETERS NORTHWEST OF MUONG PHINE. THREE MEN WHO BAILED OUT WERE CAPTURED BY VILLAGERS AT BAN KHAMSAGI WD 9818 AND MOVED TO A VC POSITION AT XD 1636. [redacted] COMMENT. PRESUMABLY THIS IMPLIES THAT FIVE MEN BAILED OUT IN THE SAME GENERAL AREA AND THAT THREE OF THEM WERE CAPTURED. NOTE THAT PARA 3 BELOW STATES THAT THE PL CAPTURED FIVE MEN, BUT REPORTS THAT ONLY THREE CAPTURED MEN WERE MOVED ON 7 SEPTEMBER.)

3. TWO VILLAGERS WHO RETURNED TO BAN MOUNG KAO (XD 1365) ON 13 SEPTEMBER FROM THA KHOUNG REPORTED THE FOLLOWING:

A. A PLANE LOADED WITH RICE AND MEAT ENROUTE TO BAN HOUEI SANE WAS SHOT DOWN BY A MIXED PL/VC UNIT AT BAN HOUEI AKAI (XD 1637).

B. THE PLANE WAS HIT, A WING BROKE OFF, AND THE

[redacted]

[redacted] | TDCS-3/560,051 | n 26742 | PAGE 3

PLANE CRASHED ON A SMALL RICE PADDY AT BAN NA SENG MAY (XD Ø139)

C. THE PL CAPTURED FIVE MEN. ONE MAN WAS DEAD. RICE, MEAT, AND DOCUMENTS WERE RECOVERED FROM THE PLANE.

D. TWO AMERICANS, TWO CHINESE, AND TWO THAIS CREWED THE PLANE. [redacted] COMMENT. THE CREW CONSISTED OF THREE AMERICANS, ONE CHINESE NATIONALIST, AND TWO THAIS.) ONE AMERICAN WAS KILLED. THE REST OF THE CREW WAS CAPTURED AND MOVED TO MUONG PHINE.

E. ON 7 SEPTEMBER THREE OF THE CAPTURED CREWMEN WERE MOVED TO THA KHOUNG. [redacted] COMMENT. THA KHOUNG MAY REFER TO THA KHONG, ANOTHER NAME FOR TCHEPONE.)

4. [redacted] DISSEM STATE ARMY AIR USAID CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC

END OF MESSAGE

[redacted]

CONTINUATION OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

~~SECRET~~ NLK 01-204-2-2

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted] to White House

[redacted] 3 October 1963

1. On 2 Oct 63 Lt Colonel Conein accidentally encountered Major General Tran Van Don at Tan Son Nhut Airport. Don stated he had been attempting to make contact with Conein for sometime. Requested that Conein come to Nha Trang on night of 2 Oct for private discussion. Conein was noncommittal in his reply.

2. Col Conein's visiting Nha Trang to take with Don was approved by Truehart.

3. Trueheart's guidance to Conein was that he neither to encourage nor discourage any coup thinking or action to elicit information only and not to commit the USG to any action whatsoever.

4. Conein met with Don in Nha Trang on night of 2 Oct for approximately one hour. No other persons were present during the meeting. Don made the following points:

a. Doung Van Mink desires to see Conein for private conversation.

b. Meeting with Minh will take place at 0800 hours, 5 October at Joint General Staff Headquarters, Saigon.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

c. At that hour Conein is to present himself in uniform at Don's office. Cover topic of conversation will be possible relocation of United States Special Forces headquarters. (Comment: This is a cover topic only suggested by Gen Don. [redacted]

d. Conein will speak to Minh alone.

e. Gen tone that Dinh has realized he was played for a fool during his tenure as military governor of Saigon. For this reason "may join our side."

f. Gen Tran Van Kim and Gen Phan Xuan Chieu have been given staff positions under Gen Don on the JGS.

g. The generals (specific personalities not identified) have requested President Diem to accord them positions of Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior, Minister of Education, Minister of Civic Action and the Prefector of the Police for Saigon/Cholon. In addition, generals asked President Diem to appoint a general officer Military Governor Saigon/Cholon to insure defense of area. Generals are convinced Diem has no repeat no intention of making these appointments.

5. Conein attempted to elicit additional details from Don who refused all attempts at elicitation with statement "you must talk to Minh." Don did volunteer, however, that generals know have a plan. Don was emphatic with respect to this last statement.

6. Don also stated that two days prior to Gen Dinh's first press conference (29 Aug) Vietnamese civilian, otherwise unidentified, visited Ngo Dinh Nhu stated that Americans were contacting various Vietnamese in order to encourage a coup. Thereupon Nhu had called in Don and Don was shown list of Americans engaged in such coup plots. Don stated Conein's name was not repeat not on this list.

7. Ambassador has approved Conein's contact with Don and Minh on 5 October.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: APR 2001

~~SECRET~~

#85 102

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT **TELEGRAM**

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT PLANNED SUICIDE OF AMBASSADOR BUU HOI'S MOTHER, DIEU HUE [redacted]

DATE DISTR. 4 OCTOBER 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

REFERENCES IN 32958

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

APPRAISAL [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. [redacted] THE BUDDHIST NUN, DIEU HUE, MOTHER OF BUU HOI, VIETNAMESE SCIENTIST, AMBASSADOR TO SEVERAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND CURRENTLY THE GOVERNMNT OF VITNAM (GVN) OBSERVER AT THE UNITED NATIONS (UN), HAD DECIDED TO COMMIT SUICIDE, PROBABLY ON 5 OCTOBER. THREATWAS TIMED FOR IMPACT ON THE UN BUT WAS NOT TO BE BY BURNING.

2. DIEU HUE HAD PREPARED A LETTER DENOUNCING HER SON AND CLIMING THAT BUDDHISM WAS STILL BEING PERSECUTED IN VIETNAM, COPIES OF WHICH WERE TO BE DISTRIBUTED TO THE FORIEGN PRESS AND TO THE "CLANDESTINE" OPPOSITION BY HER COMPANION AND ATTENDANT, A [redacted]

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	[redacted]	ORR		OO	STATE/DIR

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT **TELEGRAM**

IMMEDIATE TO: STATE (RCI) (FOR HUGHES: PLS PASS TO MR. HILSMAN)

[redacted]

Approved for Release Date JAN 1998

#116

FORM 1-63 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-80)

YOUNGER NUN.

3. JUST PRIOR TO THE SUICIDE, THE COMPANION PLANNED TO DELIVER A COPY OF THE LETTER TO THE U..S. EMBASSY FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE AND TO SEEK ASYLUM THERE. SHE BELIVED HER LIFE WOULD BE IN DANGER AS THE GVN WOULD KNOW THAT ONLY SHE COULD HAVE DISTRIBUTED THE LETTER.

4. THICH THIEN HOA, PRESIDENT OF THE PRO-GVN UNION COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF PURE BUDDHISM AND MOST OF THE OTHER MONKS AND NUNS AT THE AN QUANG PAGODA, WHERE DIEU HUE AND HER COMPANION RESIDE, WERE UNAWARE OF THE SUICIDE PLAN.

5. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 9TH FLD. STA. 2ND AIR DIV. CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

SANITIZED COPY

SECRET

CIA

8 October 1963 DRAFT

At your Wednesday press conference you will undoubtedly be questioned about CIA's role in South Viet Nam. This as you know has been the subject of countless erroneous and misleading news articles and editorials, the most violent of which have been introduced into the Congressional Record with equally violent speeches condemning CIA as "irresponsible", and winding up with a demand for a Joint Watchdog Committee.

The principal accusations are:

1. CIA makes policy independent of State Department.

2. CIA's estimates and reports on South Viet Nam have been erroneous and many have been willfully withheld from our Ambassador and from U.S. policy makers.

3. CIA has undertaken activities beyond its area of competence, in secrecy and in contradiction of the desires of the Ambassador.

4. CIA is in violent disagreement with the Embassy, the military and other United States agencies in South Viet Nam.

As you know the facts contradict these and a variety of other equally irresponsible statements made in the press or on the Floor of the Congress, the details of which I will not burden you with.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLC-92-219
By NARA, Date 5/14/97

30 JAN 1997

The facts are:

1. CIA does not make policy nor do we express ourselves on policy except to the extent that I do personally as a member of your Executive Committee.

2. CIA estimates and reports on South Viet Nam have been consistently correct. They have reflected the autocratic character of the Diem regime for the past 9 years. They have reflected the tarnishing of the regime's image in the eyes of the people of South Viet Nam and in world opinion for the past 18 months. They have reported on countless coup d'etat rumors and evaluated them as improbable of coming off because of a lack of unanimity among the military. They have reported favorable progress in the war, at the same time pointing out trouble spots such as the Delta.

In fact CIA's reporting supports the logic of your decisions reached following the McNamara-Taylor mission. I might add that [19 Spaces] who has been under such criticism recently has in my opinion been consistently right in his observations.

John Richardson (16 spaces)

3. CIA has undertaken no activities of any nature which have not been approved by the Ambassador and agreed to by the Country Team. Moreover CIA's activities, together with those of the military, USOM, AID, USIA, etc., are held under review by the Southeast Asian Task Force and the special Interdepartmental Counter Insurgency Group, hence there seems no foundation for the allegations that CIA operates without control.

4. Prior to about the first of September there had been no reports of conflicts between the CIA station in Saigon and the Embassy, the military or other agencies. Quite to the contrary, reports of a proper working relationship have been received by me from the Ambassador, from the innumerable missions which have gone to South Viet Nam, i.e. General Wheeler, Gen. Krulak, Mr. Forrestal, Adm. Felt and, indeed, my own observations on my visit there. Additionally a senior CIA officer and our Saigon Station Chief have attended every one of Secretary McNamara's Honolulu meetings and at those meetings the station's activities have been reviewed and approved subject to modifications agreed to at the meeting.

There is no doubt that the criticism which has found its way into hundreds of news articles and editorials is seriously eroding the spirit of this organization which I have now spent two years trying to rekindle. I suggest in view of this it might be timely for you to put the entire matter in focus at your press conference and, if you do so, I believe the problem will disappear.

JAM/mfb

#78-104

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECRET (When Filled In) — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS [redacted]

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT: SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT PLANS FOR AN ASSAULT ON THE U.S. EMBASSY CHANCERY

DATE DISTR. 9 OCTOBER 1963

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

REFERENCES: IN 36189

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (8 OCTOBER 1963)

APPRAISAL: SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: [redacted]

1. [redacted] NGO DINH NHU HAD ORDERED [redacted] ARRANGE A DEMONSTRATION AGAINST THE AMERICAN EMBASSY SIMILAR TO THAT MOUNTED IN SEPTEMBER AGAINST THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN DJAKARTA. [redacted] TO USE ELEMENTS OF THE REPUBLICAN YOUTH, THE SELF DEFENSE CORPS, AND THE CIVIL GUARD IN THE DEMONSTRATION. QUESTIONED AS TO NHU'S REASON FOR SUCH AN ACTION, [redacted] ANSWERED THAT NHU FELT THAT HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO "HANDLE" AMBASSADOR LODGE NOW OR IN THE MONTHS TO COME AND THEREFORE WISHED TO HAVE HIM ELIMINATED FROM THE SCENE.

SECRET — CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS [redacted]

STATE/INR | DIA | ARMY/ACSI | NAVY | AIR | JCS | SECDEF | NSA | NIC | [redacted] | ONE | ACR | [redacted]
STATE/DIR

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

IMMEDIATE TO: DIRNSA (PROD WG)
STATE (RCI) (FOR HUGHES)
JCS
CNO (OP 922 Y 1)
AFSSO
DIA/CIIC
NIC
DFI/ACSI
WHITE HOUSE SIT ROOM

FORM 14-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

Date JAN 1958

(15-00)

2. [redacted] COMMENT. IT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT NHU HAD [redacted] A PROGRAM TO SUBSIDIZE BUDDHIST MONKS IN THE SOUTHWESTERN PROVINCES TO CREATE A PRO-GOVERNMENT BONZE ASSOCIATION.)

3. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR LODGE), USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT RECOMMENDATION BY CABINET OFFICERS THAT NHU BE MADE PRIME MINISTER

DATE DISTR. 15 OCTOBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

REFERENCES IN 39851

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

APPRAISAL [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. SUMMARY. [redacted] VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN NGOC THO [redacted] AT A MEETING OF CABINET OFFICERS IN EARLY OCTOBER IT WAS DECIDED TO RECOMMEND TO PRESIDENT DIEM THAT NGO DINH NHU BE APPOINTED PRIME MINISTER. [redacted] THIS PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT WHICH WOULD BE VOTED BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WITHOUT DIFFICULTY.

2. [redacted] VICE PRESIDENT THO [redacted] IN EARLY OCTOBER HE HAD CALLED A MEETING OF ALL CABINET MEMBERS TO

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

STATE/INR	DIA	AR/FACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SPECIAL	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	[redacted]	OO	STATE/OIR

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FOR

FORM 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. [redacted] (15-30)

120

DISCUSS THE STATUS OF NGO DINH NHU IN THE GOVERNMENT. THO SAID THAT THE CABINET DECIDED TO RECOMMEND TO PRESIDENT DIEM THAT NHU BE APPOINTED PRIME MINISTER, REASONING THAT IF THE PRESIDENT DID NOT INTEND TO REDUCE NHU'S INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, THE LATTER'S APPOINTMENT TO AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT POST WOULD AT LEAST MAKE HIM ACCOUNTABLE FOR HIS ACTIONS.

2. [redacted] IF THE PRESIDENT ACCEPTED THIS SUGGESTION, A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT WOULD BE REQUIRED BUT THAT THIS WOULD POSE NO PROBLEM AS THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WOULD VOTE THE CHANGE WITHOUT DIFFICULTY.

3. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 9TH FLD STA 2ND AIR DIV CINPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

#81

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

108

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SECRET (When Filled In) CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS [redacted]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT REASON FOR FAILURE OF [redacted] COUP D'ETAT WAS LACK OF TRANSPORT

DATE DISTR. 25 OCTOBER 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

REFERENCES IN 47267

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

APPRAISAL [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. [redacted] CANCELLED AT 1330 HOURS ON 24 OCTOBER 1963 THE COUP D'ETAT [redacted] PLANNED AND ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED AT 1300 HOURS ON THE 24TH BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE TO ARRANGE FOR THE NECESSARY TROOP TRANSPORT. [redacted]

SECRET CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS [redacted]

TE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	X9EX	OO
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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JAN [redacted] 128

(15-30)

[redacted]

2. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG 2ND AIR DIVISION 9TH FIELD STATION AID USIA CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

BUNDY

EYES ONLY

Read at
10:00 AM 11/1
Saturday

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Memorandum

THE COUP IN SOUTH VIETNAM

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JAN 2008

JFK LIBRARY
MANDATORY REVIEW
CASE # NLK 98-12
DOCUMENT # 1

SECRET

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OCI No. 3238/63

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
1 November 1963

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Progress of the Coup d'Etat in Saigon (As of 0800 EST)

1. At 1345 Saigon time today, General Don telephoned General Stilwell, MACV J-3, stating that all the Vietnamese generals were with him at Joint General Staff (JGS) Headquarters and that a coup was under way. Soon after that, reports were received that the coup forces had seized control of such key installations as the defense ministry, the central police station, the communications ministry and the radio station. Coup troops involved in these actions appeared principally to be marine, airborne, and armored elements. Conein reported from the JGS that General Ton That Dinh was the key to the generals' coup; when he agreed, the coup began.

2. The Presidential Guard barracks were occupied by the coup forces after some slight fighting. The Special Forces compound at Saigon airport was similarly occupied with some fighting. Special Forces Commander Tung was captured as were other pro-Diem figures such as Police Commissioner Tu, Air Force Commander Hien, Airborne Commander Col. Vien, and Marine Commander Khang.

3. Thereafter, seige was laid to the palace and the coup generals began contacting Diem and Nhu by phone, demanding their immediate resignation. The coup generals were seeking a yes or no answer from the president. On the first call to the palace in mid-afternoon Diem allegedly was not present, and General "Big" Minh spoke to Nhu. In order to show Nhu the strength of the coup movement, the various

participating generals spoke on the phone. The prisoners, including Colonel Tung, were forced at gun point to tell Nhu the situation. Nhu was then told by General Minh that if he and Diem did not surrender, the palace would receive massive bombardment.

4. General Minh called President Diem again at 1715 Saigon time, but Diem hung up without further comment. Minh at that time was reported to have given orders to bomb the palace. At about the same time there were reports that Diem was preparing to announce imminent surrender, but there has been no firm development on this point as yet. There was also a broadcast from the palace suggesting that Diem was trying to rally support.

5. Coup troops began attacking Gia Long Palace, and expected to take possession by 1900 hours Saigon time. At 1915 hours Saigon time, General Minh was reported to have given Diem one last chance to surrender or face being "blasted off the face of the earth." Commencing at 1900 hours four loud explosions were heard in the vicinity of the palace within a ten-minute period.

6. Earlier in the afternoon, Diem called Ambassador Lodge at 1630 hours Saigon time, asking what was the position of the US. Lodge took refuge in the confusion of the situation and expressed concern for Diem's physical safety. Lodge told Diem that he had heard that the coup leaders had offered Diem and Nhu safe conduct out of the country and he asked Diem about this. Diem's only comment was that he was the Chief of State, that he had tried to do his duty, and that he was trying to reestablish law and order.

7. General Minh says it is planned to have an entirely civilian government replace the present one. Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho and Pham Huy Quat, prominent Dai Viet opposition leader, have so far been designated for this new cabinet. Minh hoped to turn over the government to civilian hands in two or three days. The generals also hope for early recognition of their new government by the US and the Western powers.

8. The troop movements reported by the generals indicate that all major combat units adjacent to the capital are supporting the coup. Elements of the 5th division north of Saigon, including its headquarters at Bien Hoa, are activitely participating; the 7th division south of the city with headquarters at My Tho, reportedly is also supporting the coup. Two marine battalions from Bien Hoa, one airborne, and one infantry battalion from Vung Tau (Cap St. Jacques), and two airborne battalions from Binh Duong Province just north of Saigon have moved into the city to participate in the coup.

9. The II Corps command in central Vietnam is sympathetic to the coup as are major elements of the IV Corps in the delta; the status of I Corps in the far north is uncertain. The navy apparently was not sympathetic, but seems to have been neutralized. One report states that Navy Commander Quyen has been killed. Air Force elements are participating. Major pro-government forces, including the police, Special Forces, and the Presidential Guard Brigade appear largely to have been neutralized or suppressed except in the immediate palace area. Unless there is some wavering on the part of units participating in the coup, the generals appear to have the situation under control.

10. Careful planning by the coup group is further indicated by reports from several provincial cities that the military appear to be in charge; at Nha Trang leaflets signed by General Minh have already been distributed acclaiming the new government. There are also reports of popular jubilation in the provinces as well as in Saigon.

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

110

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SECRET (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT HIGHLIGHTS OF SAIGON POPULAR REACTION FOLLOWING THE COUP [redacted]

DATE DISTR. 2 NOVEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

REFERENCES IN 52827

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. THE PUPULATION OF SAIGON POURED INTO THE STREETS IN AN EXHILERATED MOOD, PILING ONTO MILITARY VEHICLES, GIVING FRUIT TO SOLDIERS AND BLOCKING ALL DOWN-TOWN TRAFFIC.

2. THE TRUNG SISTERS STATUE WAS PULLED DOWN, THE WOMEN'S SOLIDARITY HEAD-QUARTERS WAS BURNED, THE SAIGON MOI AND TIME OF VIETNAM NEWSPAPERS WERE SACKED, THE POLICE OFFICE AT LE VAN KEN STREET AT THE CENTRAL MARKET WAS SACKED AND BURNED AND THE HOMES OF SOME FORMER MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT WERE BEING SACKED.

3. THE SOLDIERS ARE EXERTING LOOSE CONTROL OVER THE CROWDS. NO REAL MOB ACTION HAS DEVELOPED AS OF 1200 HOURS LOCAL TIME, 2 NOVEMBER.

4. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

[redacted]

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	[redacted]	OO	STATE/DIR

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

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Date JAN 1963

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Memorandum

THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(Information as of 0700 hours)

2 Nov 63

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLK-91-82
By NNB NARA, Date 6/17/94

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)
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[redacted]

Additional material has been released as a result of this review.

14
1.3(a)(4)
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SC-0[redacted]63

2 November 1963

THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(Information as of 0700 EST)

1. Saigon is celebrating the success of the coup, with some retaliatory outbreaks against installations close to the Diem regime. Organized resistance has ended, and there are conflicting reports of the fate of Diem and Nhu after their reported surrender at Gia Long palace just before 0700 Saigon time (1800 EST 1 November in Washington.)

2. Diem telephoned General Don at the Joint General Staff at 0620, according to a reliable source at JGS, and offered to surrender "with honor." General "Big" Minh accepted, and was trying to arrange a ceasefire. Coup forces were even then reported to have entered Gia Long. Half an hour later, according to the source, Diem again called Don to surrender "unconditionally," and added that he had given the ceasefire order.

3. The coup generals had planned to bring Diem and Nhu to JGS headquarters and offer to fly them to the country of their choice. Saigon Radio announced at 1045, however, that Diem and Nhu had committed suicide while being taken to JGS. One source reported Vietnamese photographers had taken pictures of the bodies at JGS headquarters. Other rumors contend that they have escaped and are in hiding.

4. We have still detected no reaction--other than propaganda--from the Communists. Hanoi has labeled the coup a US move to substitute "one puppet for another."

5. The General's Council has announced a six-point program for the new regime: to fight the Communists, permit free function of political parties, release all non-Communist political prisoners, grant freedom of religion, permit a free press, and resume diplomatic relations with neighboring countries (i.e., Cambodia.) For the time being, however, martial law continues with censorship and curfews.

1.3(a)(4)
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1.3(a)(4)
C

6. It still appears that the generals will not be able to create an all-civilian government as rapidly as they had hoped. Vice President Tho is to head a new cabinet as Prime Minister, but at least four of the key posts will be filled by military officers. Pledges of support are coming in from Vietnamese organizations, including the Republican Youth, a mass organization which was one of Nhu's vehicles. One of the principal labor leaders visited an American friend in jubilant mood.

7. A roundup is under way seeking some police officers and other officials of the former regime still at large. Early Saturday morning small arms fire was still heard occasionally, but some of this could be ammunition exploding in fires at the palace.

8. Troops are in only loose control over the celebrating population of Saigon. The headquarters of Madame Nhu's Women's Solidarity Movement and homes of several former government members have been burned. The police station at the central market and the offices of two pro-Diem newspapers, including the Times of Vietnam, have been sacked. The statue of the Trung Sisters, Madame Nhu's favorite symbol, has been pulled down.

9. There have been no reports of US casualties. There appear to have been up to a total of 100 casualties among coup troops and those defending Diem in the palace.

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117

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

115

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

COUNTRY CAMBODIA/SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT VIEWS OF VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS [redacted] CONCERNING THE MILITARY COUP OF 1 NOVEMBER AGAINST THE NGO DINH DIEM REGIME

DATE DISTR. 4 NOVEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE

REFERENCES IN

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

PLACE & DATE ACQ. [redacted]

APPRAISAL [redacted] FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. SUMMARY. VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS /VC/ [redacted] REGARDED THE MILITARY COUP D'ETAT OF 1 NOVEMBER 1963 AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME AS AN AMERICAN MOVE TO GET RID OF THE NGO DINH FAMILY. THE VC WERE SURPRISED BY THE RAPIDITY OF THE COUP. HAD IT LASTED LONGER THEY WOULD HAVE TAKEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO STEP UP ATTACKS, AS THE VC RADIO CALLED UPON THEM TO DO IN BROADCASTS ON THE NIGHT OF 1 NOVEMBER. VC PROPAGANDA LINE IS THAT THE COUP WAS ONLY A CHANGE OF AMERICAN "PUPPET" REGIMES. [redacted] COMMENT. THE VC ARE BELIEVED TO BE UNHAPPY

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OER	ORR		OO
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

129

FORM 5-62 1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-80)

ABOUT THE COUP AND THE CHANGE OF REGIME, SINCE THE UNPOPULARITY OF THE DIEM REGIME WAS ONE OF THEIR GREATEST PROPAGANDA ASSETS./

2. ON THE EVENING [redacted] NOVEMBER, A VC CELL [redacted] HELD A MEETING PRESIDED OVER BY THE CELL LEADER. THE CELL MEMBERS WERE TOLD THAT THE COUP OF 1 NOVEMBER WAS AN AMERICAN INSTIGATED ACTION AND THAT THE ARMY OF VIETNAM /ARVN/ OFFICERS WHO STAGED IT WERE ONLY "LACKEYS" OF THE AMERICANS. THE CELL LEADER SAID THAT THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT WOULD BE TORN APART BY A STRUGGLE FOR SUPREME POWER AMONG ITS MEMBERS. HE SAID THAT THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR LIBERATION /NFL/ TOO, HAD LONG FORSEEN THIS COUP, SINCE THEY KNEW THAT THE AMERICANS WISHED TO "CHANGE HORSES." [redacted] COMMENT. BROADCASTS OF THE VC RADIO IN SOUTH VIETNAM /SVN/ ON THE NIGHT 1 NOVEMBER CALLED ON THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, THE FIGHTERS OF THE NFL AND ELEMENTS WITHIN THE ARVN TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE COUP AND DESTROY STRATEGIC HAMLETS AND GUARD TOWERS, AND TO RISE UP UNDER THE BANNER OF THE NFL. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE RAPIDITY WITH WHICH THE COUP WAS CARRIED OUT, THIS LINE OF ACTION PROVED IMPOSSIBLE./

3. THE CELL LEADER SAID FURTHER THAT THE COURSE OF THE VC WAS CLEAR- I.E. TO CONTINUE THE BATTLE, SO LONG AS THE AMERICANS REMAINED ON VIETNAMESE SOIL, UNTIL THE FINAL VICTORY WAS WON. HE SAID THAT ORDERS HAD BEEN GIVEN TO THE VC FORCES TO KILL OR CAPTURE AS MANY AMERICANS AS POSSIBLE, IN ORDER TO SHOW THE AMERICANS

THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONTIVING TO ''FORCE THIS FILTHY WAR'' UPON THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. HE SAID THAT THE VC MUST REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS TO CAUSE THE AMERICANS HEAVY LOSSES IN MEN AND MATERIAL.

4. [redacted] DISSEM STATE ARMY MAAG USAID CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

END OF MESSAGE

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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

117

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT FORMATION OF MILITARY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE TO SUPERVISE THE NEW GOVERNMENT [redacted]

DATE DISTR. 6 NOVEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

REFERENCES IN 55220

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. SUMMARY. [redacted] A MILITARY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE HEADED BY MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH WAS FORMED TO SUPERVISE THE NEW GOVERNMENT UNTIL ELECTIONS CAN BE HELD.

2. [redacted] THE GENERALS WHO INITIATED THE COUP D'ETAT AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME FORMED A MILITARY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (MEC) WHICH WILL BE THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THE MEC'S PRIMARY FUNCTION WILL BE TO SUPERVISE THE NEW GOVERNMENT UNTIL ELECTIONS ARE HELD. THE COMPOSITION OF THE MEC FOLLOWS:

A. CHAIRMAN: MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH

B. VICE CHAIRMAN: MAJOR GENERAL TRAN VAN DON

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR		OO	STATE/OIR

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PRIORITY TO: STATE (OCT)
WHITE HOUSE SIT ROOM

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131

(13-30)

C. VICE CHAIRMAN: MAJOR GENERAL TON THAT DINH

D. OFFICE OF ECONOMIC COORDINATION: MAJOR GENERAL TRAN VAN MINH

E. FOREIGN AFFAIRS: MAJOR GENERAL LE VAN KIM

F. MILITARY AFFAIRS: MAJOR GENERAL TRAN THIEN KHIEM

G. SECURITY AFFAIRS: BRIDAGIER GENERAL PHAM XUAN CHIEU

H. POLITICAL AFFAIRS: BRIGADIER GENERAL DO MAU

I. MEMBERS AT LARGE: MAJOR GENERAL LE VAN NGHIEM AND BRIGADIER GENERALS MAI HUU XUAN, NGUYEN HUU CO, AND NGUYEN VAN THIEU.

3. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 9TH FLD STA 2ND AIR DIV CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. [redacted]

SUBJECT DISSENSION AMONG MILITARY OFFICERS CONCERNING PREPONDERENCE OF SOUTHERN GENERALS AND LACK OF THOROUGH REFORMS

DATE DISTR. 8 NOVEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 57594

DATE OF INFO. [redacted]

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. (SUMMARY. [redacted] FRICTION HAD DEVELOPED BETWEEN GENERAL OFFICERS OF SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL VIETNAMESE ORIGIN. IN ADDITION, JUNIOR OFFICERS WERE DISSATISFIED WITH THE COUP LEADERS AND DESIRED MORE THOROUGH REVOLUTION. SOME JUNIOR OFFICERS WERE DISCUSSING THE POSSIBILITY OF STAGING ANOTHER COUP IN THE EVENT THAT THE GENERALS ACTED AGAINST THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY.)

2. [redacted] MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS:

A. NGHIEM, MAJOR GENERALS TON THAT DINH AND NGUYEN NGOC LE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	.	OO
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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

[redacted] Declassified Date JAN 1 1998

(137)

FORM 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

AND BRIGADIER GENERAL DO MAU, ALL FROM CENTRAL VIETNAM, ARE VERY APPREHENSIVE OVER DOMINATION OF THE MILITARY BY SOUTHERNERS.

B. SOUTHERNERS ON THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF INCLUDE DUONG VAN MINH, TRAN VAN MINH, TRAN VAN DON, TRAN THIEN KHIEM, NGUYEN KHANH, NGUYEN VAN LA, TRAN NGOC TAM, MAI HUU XUAN, LE VAN KIM, NGUYEN GIAC NGO, DO CAO TRI, AND VAN THANH CAO. THREE OF THE FOUR GENERALS PROMOTED AFTER THE COUP ARE SOUTHERNERS.

C. MORE SIGNIFICANT HAS BEEN THE SPLIT BETWEEN THE OLDER AND YOUNGER OFFICERS. THE GENERALS ARE FRENCH-ORIENTED AND TEND TO BE SELF-SATISFIED WHILE THE YOUNGER OFFICERS ARE AMERICAN-TRAINED AND ARE MORE IDEALISTIC, NATIONALISTIC, AND CONCERNED OVER THE FUTURE OF SOUTH VIETNAM. THE YOUNGER OFFICERS DESIRE A THOROUGH REVOLUTION AND REFORMS AND ARE RELUCTANT TO SETTLE FOR A MERE CHANGE OF REGIME. ONE OF THE NEW GENERALS, NGUYEN HUU CO, IS IDENTIFIED WITH THE YOUNGER OFFICERS.

D. THE JUNIOR OFFICERS ARE DISTURBED OVER THE POWER WIELDED BY GENERAL DINH AS MINISTER OF PUBLIC SECURITY AND BRIGADIER GENERAL MAI HUU XUAN AS DIRECTOR OF GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE. THEY ARE ALSO UNHAPPY OVER THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT DIEM, FOR WHOM MANY RETAIN HIGH REGARD.

E. EACH GENERAL IS BEING KEPT UNDER SURVEILLANCE BY ONE OR MORE OFFICERS ON HIS STAFF, GENERALLY A LIEUTENANT COLONEL. IF

THE JUNIOR OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT THE GENERALS ARE SEEKING TO MAINTAIN THEMSELVES IN POWER OR ARE WORKING AGAINST WHAT THEY CONSIDER THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY, THEY ARE PREPARED TO STAGE ANOTHER COUP, ASSASSINATING SOME OF THE GENERALS, IF NECESSARY.

3. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 9TH FLD STA 2ND AIR DIV CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

6364

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy

The attached is in response to your request this weekend for comment on press versions of the death of Diem and Nhu.

RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

12 Nov 63
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

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OCI No. 3213/63

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
12 November 1963

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Press Version of How Diem and Nhu Died

1. The latest "inside" press account of how Diem and Nhu met their end is that they were killed in the presence of the coup leaders at the Joint General Staff (JGS) after an angry exchange of words. This allegedly occurred sometime after 1000 hours, Saturday morning (2 November), shortly after their capture at a Cholon church. According to this version, Diem and Nhu had left Gia Long palace by car about 2000 hours on Friday and spent the night at the home of the Republican Youth Movement leader in Cholon.

2. We still have no hard information on the time or circumstances of Diem and Nhu's departure from the palace, or indeed whether they even left there alive. There have been numerous variations on the theme of a flight to Cholon and subsequent capture. Except for minor details, this latest press version resembles the most recent "official" account issued by the coup leaders, i.e., Diem and Nhu died from "accidental suicide" in a struggle in an armored car after their arrest at church Saturday morning.

3. There are several troublesome aspects to this particular story: If Diem and Nhu had left the palace Friday evening, how can we explain the two telephone calls of surrender made by Diem to the JGS at 0620 and 0650, Saturday? These calls were reported by [redacted] Also, General Harkins reported that at 0600 on 2 November a surrender plea by General Dinh, in charge of the assault forces on the palace, was stonily rebuffed by Diem.

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NLK-81-192
BY [illegible] NARS, DATE 6/85

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4. It would also seem strange that having successfully fled to Cholon, the two brothers would eschew further escape and instead calmly attend church in full public view.

5. Finally, the photographs of the bodies, seen by CIA personnel and judged apparently genuine, showed Diem and Nhu with their hands tied behind their backs. Yet this latest version says the fateful argument ensued after Diem had angrily thrown down a microphone proffered for his resignation statement.

6. The version of events on the afternoon of the coup, including the telephone conversation between Diem and Ambassador Lodge, comports with known facts, but this information already was in the public domain.

7. On the basis of available information, our best judgment is that Diem and Nhu may well have been killed by a junior officer or enlisted personnel acting unilaterally, possibly provoked by the captives' haughtiness. It is possible, however, that General Dinh or some other senior officer may have ordered their execution. In any case, it seems likely that Diem and Nhu never reached the JGS alive.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: APR 2001

SEE SANITIZED VERSION
NLK-80-86

~~SECRET~~

Do 6a

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

PREPARED BY: [redacted]

14 November 1963

SUBJECT : Recent MAC(V)/[redacted] Discussions Concerning the Transfer of Certain Programs

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Summarized below are the discussions between MAC(V) and [redacted] regarding the possible transfer of [redacted] paramilitary and other programs to MAC(V) [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

a. Border Surveillance

MAC(V) has agreed to assume responsibility for in-country border surveillance assets and programs to be effective on 26 October. As a result all in-country border surveillance assets would be transferred and absorbed into CIDG formations by 1 November.

U.S. Special Forces detachments at Khe Sanh, Kham Duc, Dak Pek and Dac To would revert to MAC(V) operational control on 1 November.

b. Mountain Scouts

The entire mountain scout program will be taken over by MAC(V) effective 31 October. All mountain scout units would be directed to report to the nearest CIDG formation in their localities.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

c. Combat Intelligence (CI) Teams

A planning paper prepared by MAC(V) dated 23 August was discussed between MAC(V) [redacted] As of 31 October discussions concerning the transfer of CI teams were still underway. In the joint Embassy/MAC(V)/[redacted] message (Saigon 2441) sent to you today, it was stated that MAC(V) has the capability to absorb the CI teams (650 individuals operating in teams of approximately 18 men each) as a part of the CIDG strike forces and it was felt that this action would enhance U.S. management and control of these assets.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

d. [redacted]

[redacted]

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E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

E0 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

e. Funding

Discussions have been held with [redacted] concerning the funding, during FY 1964, of the border surveillance program and the mountain scout program after transfer to MAC(V). It has been agreed that [redacted] should be earmarked for the border surveillance program and [redacted] should be earmarked for the mountain scout program, and that these funds would be added to Operation Switchback funds for use by MAC(V) during FY 1964. No agreement has yet been reached for the funding of the above programs or the funding for the combat intelligence teams for FY 1965. This presumably will be discussed at the 20 November Honolulu conference.

E0 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

For your information, it is estimated that as of 31 October [redacted] had spent [redacted] for the border surveillance program and [redacted] for the mountain scouts. Thus, these latter amounts would be subtracted from the larger figures listed above which represent total figures for FY 1964.

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TS# 185702-b

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 96-77
Document # 54

2 January 1964

REVISED MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Probable Reactions to Various Courses of Action with Respect to North Vietnam

The attached revised edition of our Memo of 30 December 1963 contains no changes of judgment; but, in response to several queries, seeks to elaborate on certain of these earlier judgments: see Paras. 2-e, 3-c, 10, and 11. Please destroy or return your copies of earlier Memo.

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~~SENSITIVE~~

TS# 185702-b

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

2 January 1964

REVISED MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Probable Reactions to Various Courses of Action with Respect to North Vietnam

REFERENCE: MACV-[redacted] Op-Plan No. 34 A-64/TIGER, of 15 December 1963

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1. In response to General Krulak's request, we assess below the probable Communist and international reactions to 13 specific operations given us from among those of the referenced Op-Plan. With one exception, the given operations are small unit (South Vietnamese) airborne or maritime sabotage efforts against specific targets (bridges, railways, dumps, etc.) in various areas of North Vietnam. The one exception is a three company (plus) raid against a small island just north of the 17th parallel DMZ. All of the 13 operations are part of general Krulak's Phase I: i.e., to be mounted within about four months'time from the Op-Plan's activation. We note that except for the island raid

This memorandum has been prepared with the assistance of O/CI and DD/P.

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noted above and a few other of the 13, most of these operations [redacted] have already been approved. 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

2. In sum, we believe that:

a. Communist reactions to most of these operations would be slight.

b. Communist reactions would be sharper in the cases of (1) Haiphong (No. 33, below); (2) Ile Du Tigre (No. 34); and (3) the railroads near the borders of China (Nos. 54 and 55). The reactions would be felt primarily in South Vietnam and Laos but would not be so extreme as to change the character of hostilities in those countries.

c. The operations under review would not be likely to lead to appreciably increased Chinese Communist involvement in the area. Neither would these operations -- with the possible exception of the Ile du Tigre raid -- lead the Soviets to believe that the US had made a significant change in its policies.

d. The 13 operations under review, taken by themselves, and even if all were successful, would not "convince the DRV leadership that their continued direction and support of insurgent activities

in the RVN (South Vietnam) and Laos should cease" -- this, according to the reference Op-Plan, being their stated goal.

e. It is possible, however, that the North Vietnamese Government might see these operations (especially if that against the Ile du Tigre were included) as representing a significant increase in the vigor of US policy, potentially dangerous to them. If so, they would probably wish to halt the new developments at an early date, and would therefore try to arouse international pressure for a conference to settle the problem of Vietnam before it expanded into a more general conflict in the Far East.

f. In general, such operations as the 13 here considered would probably be viewed with disfavor by most of our major allies. Taipei and Bangkok, of course, would probably support the US strongly. British officials in South Vietnam would probably see these operations' merit and consider them worth trying, but London's reaction -- particularly to any international political complaints engendered -- would be complicated by the UK's position as co-chairman of the Geneva Conference and hence (with the USSR) principal guarantor of the terms of the 1954 Geneva Accords, which such operations

would violate. France would almost certainly be opposed to any US/RVN attempt to carry the war to the North, and would probably cause the US the most difficulty. Canada would probably find it difficult to support the US in any North Vietnamese complaints formally submitted to the ICC. If such operations helped generate a Communist call for an international conference, this call would probably find much support elsewhere in the Free World.

g. The principal determinant of DRV prosecution of the war will not be damage suffered from such small-scale operations, but the course of the war in the South and the degree of risk Hanoi believes will be involved in its prosecution.

3. We assess the various operations below, under their designated Op-Plan categories of I, II, or III. We note, however, that these categories of increased expected <u>damage</u> to the DRV do not necessarily correspond to what we believe to be increased <u>reactions</u>. We believe, in general, that:

a. Those small unit airborne and maritime operations not far north of the 17th parallel (all, that is, except Nos. 33, 34, 54, and 55 below, and whether category I, II, or III) would probably provoke the least response.

b. The Haiphong channel operation (No. 33) and the large raid against the Ile du Tigre (No. 34) would provoke greater response.

c. The sabotage efforts against the Hanoi-Lang Son (No. 54) and Yen Bay-Lao Kay (No. 55) railroads would probably provoke little if any overt response at first, but if successfully continued would probably provoke the Chinese to more threatening outcries, increased offers of support to the DRV, and attempts to increase the Chinese presence in North Vietnam and northernmost Laos.

SPECIFIC RESPONSES BY CATEGORIES

CATEGORY I - HARASSING OPERATIONS

4. General Description. This category includes small, unspectacular demolition operations and small-scale intelligence collection actions, including tactical reconnaissance probes by small military units, temporary interdiction of lines of communication, and general low level harassment. These operations may be launched and effected by land, sea, and/or air.

5. Specific operations under consideration.*

a. (29) Interdiction of Route 7 about 50 miles from Lao border by airdropped 15-man team to exfiltrate through Laos.

b. (30) Interdiction of Route 8 southwest of Vinh by 8-man airdropped team.

c. (31) Interdiction of Route 12 by 15-man airdropped team.

d. (43) Amphibious raid by 4-man team on Ly Hoa Bridge across the Rao Da River near Badon.

e. (45) Amphibious raid by 13-man team on security post at mouth of Dong Hoi River.

6. In essence, operations of this category have been taking place since June 1963. Additional such operations will probably evoke reactions similar to those prompted by past operations: e.g., propaganda complaints and spy trials, but little more. We share the view expressed in the Op-Plan's Appendix 6 that Hanoi might

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* For more details, see Annex. The operation numbers are those used in Appendix 3 to Annex C of Op-Plan 34 A-64/TIGER.

begin preparing a formal protest to the ICC. With the Op-Plan, we think it unlikely that non-Communist nations or the UN would become concerned with operations in this category, and Communist China's reaction would probably remain confined to denunciations of the US and its "puppets."

7. We believe, however, that operations launched from Laos against targets well north of the 17th parallel and/or operations involving the exfiltration of teams through Laotian territory -- i.e., operation No. 29 -- are not of the same order as the others in this category. Some such activity is already going on, of course, and if the level and success of present activity are not markedly increased, Hanoi's reaction is not likely to change in any major respect. On the other hand, should Laos-based or Laos-exfiltrating teams begin achieving some substantial success, the Communists would probably attempt strong local reaction and would try to seize -- or, at least, to destroy -- the bases from which such operations were being mounted, using whatever force was necessary. Should this force require additional introduction of North Vietnamese units into Laos, such units would probably be introduced. The chances of a general Communist offensive in Laos would increase, but this is probably not the course the North

Vietnamese would initially follow. Charges of new US intervention would almost certainly be made, especially if the US made extensive use of helicopters or STOL aircraft for infiltration or resupply. Such charges would probably create additional difficulties for Souvanna Phouma and might prompt certain of our European allies, especially the French, to assert that US actions were jeopardizing the LAOS settlements.

CATEGORY II -- ATTRITIONAL OPERATIONS

8. General description. These include small-scale resistance operations, airborne and seaborne raids by small forces on important military and civil installations, and demolition of important facilities.

9. Specific operations under consideration.

a. (32) Seaborne 12-man team strike on Vinh Son radar installation.

b. (34) 3-company amphibious raid on Ile du Tigre (north of 17th parallel about 20 miles off the NVN coast).

c. (42) 14-man team amphibious raid on security post and coastal defense battery north of Dong Hoi.

d. (44) 10-man team emphibious raid to sabotage bridge on Route 1 north of Dong Hoi.

e. (54) Airdropped 10-man long-term team for hit-and-run attacks on Lang Son-Hanoi railway.

f. (55) Airdropped long-term 5-man team to operate against Yen Bay-Lao Kay railway northwest of Yen Bay.

10. In accord with Appendix 6 of the Op-Plan, we believe successful Category II operations will evoke DRV propaganda and complaints to the ICC; but we do not agree with its judgment that the DRV would be likely to respond by requesting any appreciable increase in Chinese material assistance. Hanoi probably would increase the intensity of Communist activity in Laos, though probably not to the point of launching an all-out offensive. We would not anticipate any major new pressures in the south, since we believe Hanoi and the Viet Cong are already doing all they are capable of doing there without changing the nature of the war. However, the Communists might undertake some specific retaliatory measures: e.g., more intensive attacks upon South Vietnam's rail system, increased terrorism aimed particularly at Americans. etc.

11. We do not believe, however, that all of the operations in this category would produce similar degrees of Communist reaction. For example, operations against the Lang Son-Hanoi and the Yen Bay-Lao Kay railways -- if repeated and successful -- are much more likely to evoke a sharp Communist reaction than operations against objectives in the southern portion of North Vietnam. With respect to the Ile du Tigre, a three-company amphibious assault on a fortified island over 20 miles off the coast -- unlike the sabotage of a railroad bridge -- could not be plausibly represented as the work of indigenous dissidents. Whatever be the uniforms worn by the attacking troops, the Ile du Tigre raid would be construed by Hanoi, and the world, as a deliberate incursion into North Vietnamese territory by RVN regular forces -- an incursion made with US consent. Some traffic and memoranda relating to the Op-Plan suggest that the Ile du Tigre is part of the De-Militarized Zone (DMZ). If this were the case, international political reaction to a raid against it would be very sharp indeed. Even if attacking GVN forces could prove conclusively that the island had been fortified and was being used as an infiltration training and staging base -- in contravention of the Geneva Accords -- to the world, the GVN's guilt in launching a military attack against part of the supposedly sacrosanct DMZ

would probably be interpreted as greater than Hanoi's guilt in making improper use of this plot of ground. However, we are convinced [redacted] that the Ile du Tigre is clearly North Vietnamese territory and is not located within the DMZ.* 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

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* No specific mention of the Ile du Tigre is made in the 1954 Geneva Accords or any of the protocols, appendices and annexes to those Accords. The precise boundaries of the DMZ are spelled out in a Ruling issued on 15 September 1954 by the Joint Central Commission for Viet-Nam in accordance with Articles 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 32 of the Geneva Agreement, paragraph I of the Agreement's Annex, and a supplementary Ruling of 13 August. (The text of the applicable ruling is given in the Department of State's International Boundary Study No. 19, "Viet-Nam 'Demarcation Line'," 10 September 1962.) The Northern Boundary of the DMZ commences with "An East-West line running from the mouth of the /Sen Hai/ river (2.8 km north of Cua-Tung) (251-850) to the village of Yen-Giu-Bac...." Hence the point on the coast 2.8 km north of Cua-Tung may be taken as the northeasternmost point of the DMZ. The Ile du Tigre is 14.5 miles east and 9 miles north (or, on a direct line, about 17 miles northeast) of this point. The Geneva Agreement and its related amplifying documents make no mention of any seaward extension of the DMZ. However, even if the "territorial waters" of the DMZ were presumed to be covered by a three mile -- or even a twelve mile -- extension of its land boundaries, the Ile du Tigre would still not fall within its purview.

We understand that the GVN asserts that the island is within the DMZ. In the light of circumstances set forth above, this ascertion would seem to have no basis.

CATEGORY III - PUNITIVE OPERATIONS

12. General description. These are semicovert resistance/sabotage actions designed to damage and/or destroy facilities or installations critical to the economy, industrial development, and internal security of the DRV. These actions include raids by company or battalion size military or paramilitary forces, airborne or seaborne, sabotage by small teams of important targets, and the active organization, recruitment and employment of resistance movements within North Vietnam. Such actions are to be as covert as possible, but the duration of such operations and size of the forces required for their execution may result in their becoming basically overt attacks on the Hanoi regime.

13. Specific operations under consideration:

a. (33) 6-man seaborne team strike (by UDT) on dredges and buoy tender in Haiphong harbor channel.

b. (35) 4-6-man seaborne team strike on Ben Tuy POL dump (near Vinh) designed to destroy it by use of incendiary rockets.

14. The probably reaction to Category III operations must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The attack on the channel of

Haiphong harbor (33) would probably evoke a vociferous response. For some time the Viet Cong have been building their strength in the Rung Sat area along the Saigon River (Saigon's outlet to the sea). As a retaliatory gesture, Hanoi might order the VC to harass shipping coming into Saigon. However, this is something the VC are likely to do anyway, if they acquire the ability. Hence a successful attack upon Haiphong would not in itself generate any new threat to Saigon, though in retaliation the VC would probably intensify their efforts in this area.

15. A successful ground attack against the Vinh POL storage depot (35) would probably produce a barrage of Hanoi, and Peiping, propaganda. Hanoi might try to launch a retaliatory Viet Cong attack in the south (e.g., an attack against the storage facilities at Nha Be near Saigon). The RVN operation might produce some neutralist grumbling and nervousness, but so long as the attacks were launched by RVN forces on the ground at the time of the attack (regardless of how they arrived in the target area), we doubt if there would be any Free World reaction likely to cause the US serious difficulty.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

Sherman Kent

SHERMAN KENT
Chairman

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~~SENSITIVE~~

ANNEX

30 December 1963

NORTH VIETNAM OPERATIONS PRESENTLY
UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION

(Numbers keyed to Appendix 3 to Annex C to COMUS MACV/[redacted] OPLAN 34A-64)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

CATEGORY I

29. (Airops 1) Interdiction of Rte 7 by Abn Sp Fcs, 15-man team (App 25 to Anx E to OPLAN 34-64) and/or Air Opns #1, 15-man team.

Airdrop 15-man team for hit-and-run attack on Route 7 bridge (VG 486 276) southeast of Cua Rao. Team to exfiltrate into Laos.

Description of targets: bridge, 23' x 10', wood
bridge, 46' x 10', concrete

30. (Airops 6) Interdiction of Rte 8 by Abn Sp Fcs, 15-man team (App 24 to Anx E to OPLAN 34-64) and/or Air Ops #6, 8-man team.

Airdrop long term 8-man team to operate against bridges and traffic on Rte 8 between WF 3088 402 and 400 455.

Description of targets: Bridge, masonry, arch
Bridge, 20' x 7', masonry, arch
Bridge, 33' x 10', masonry, arch

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Ferry Point, State of
bridge, 30' x 9' maso-
nry, arch, undetermined
Bridge, 36' x 10', masonry,
arch
Bridge, 157' x 7', masonry,
arch
Ford

31. Interdiction of Rte 12 by Abn Sp Fcs, 15-man team (App 23 to Anx E to OPLAN 34-64)

43. (Marops 4) *War Ops #4, Amphibious raid, 4-man team, bridges

Sabotage Ly Hoa bridge (XE 615 505). 4-man team

Description of target. An 8 span, deck type bridge, of steel and concrete construction, extending SE/NW across the Rao Da. The bridge is single lane, approximately 480 x 15 feet, with a central span approximately 19 feet wide.

Defense. A guard tower is located at the SE end of the Ly Hoa bridge and it should be noted that a Swatow Patrol Boat base is located near Badon in the Song Giang approximately 10 NM from the Rao Da.

45. (Marops 7) *War Ops #7, Amphibious raid, 12-man team on Security Post

Sneak attack on security post at mouth of Dong Hoi River (XE 732 338). 12-man team.

CATEGORY II

32. SEAL Team strike on Vinh Son, 12-man team (App 7 Anx E to OPLAN 34-64)

34. Amphibious raid Ile du Tigre by 2 Marine Cos, 1 Recn Co, UDT/SEAL, accompanied by mining of Quang Khe (App 1& 5a to Anx E OPLAN 34-64)

42. (Marops 3) *Mar Ops #3, Amphibious raid 10-man strike force, 4-man boat crew on Security Post.

Raid on security post (XE 593 552) and four coastal defense guns (XE 596 553). 10-man team

44. (Marops 5) *Mar Ops #5, Amphibious raid, 10-man team, bridges

Sabotage Route 1 bridge (XE 599 542).

Description of target: 44' x '3', deck type bridge

54. (Airops 2) *Air Ops #2, Abn drop 10-man team on RR.

Airdrop 10-man long-term team for hit-and-run attack on Lang Son-Hanoi railway (between XJ 505 825 and XJ 509 811). Team to remain in area for long-term operation.

Description of targets:
Bridge, 65'
Culvert (previous bridge, 23')
Culvert (previous bridge, 23')

55. (Airops 3)

*Air Ops #3, Abn drop 5-man team on RR

Airdrop long term 5-man team to operate against Yen Bay - Lao Kay railway northwest of Yen Bay. Exact area depends on drop area used.

Description of targets: Approximately 100 targets ranging from culverts t 3 track railroad siding

CATEGORY III

33. (Marops 15)

SEAL Team strike on dredges on buoy tender in Haiphong Channel (App 15 to Anx E to OPLAN 34-6 and/or Mar Ops #15, 6-man team.

Sneak attack to destroy channel buoys and navigational aids. Mining Haiphong harbor approaches. Sink dredge or ships. 4 UDT swimmers and 2-man boat crew.

Description of target: Two 300-ton, bucket type, barge loading dredges (approximately 25 x 160 feet) and numerous buoys and navigational lights.

Defenses: In addition to military and security activity in the area it has been reported that the harbor and channel are regularly patrolled by naval patrol craft.

35. (Marops 2)

SEAL Team strike on Ben Thuy by 4-man force (App 9a to Anx E to OPLAN 34-64) and/or Mar Ops #2 6-man team.

Incendiary rocket attack on Vinh Ben Thuy POL dump. (WF 761 648) 6-man team.

Description of target: Walled POL storage area contains 5 large and 6 small revetted vertical tanks, 2 semiburied tanks, 5 small horizontal tanks and 13 storage/support buildings. Petroleum pier observed on Song Ca River south of POL storage area.

Defense: There is likely to be a night patrol along the length of the river until reaching the port of Ben Thuy, which is above the target.

WC 13

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Case # NLJ 95-28
Document # 13

27 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with the President at 1:00 o'clock, February 26th; No one was present

1. Briefly discussed the trip to South Vietnam. President indicated he expected that I would be with the McNamara/Taylor group. He did not specifically ask that I go nor did I ask him whether I should. It seemed a foregone conclusion in his mind that I was going and he was looking forward to an objective and independent judgment of the situation in South Vietnam from me.

2. He expects me to brief Eisenhower in the near future. He had so told Eisenhower. He did not wish me to make a special trip for this purpose but suggested that I meet with Eisenhower as soon as convenient. I explained that if McNamara's trip was timed, as I expected it would be, I could leave on Wednesday, March 4th, see Eisenhower for about one day, proceed commercially by plane to Honolulu and join the McNamara party there. The President thought this was a good plan . Otherwise he thought I should brief Eisenhower at the earliest convenient time.

3. I told the President we had completed an extended coverage of the Soviet Union involving the photographing of Soviet landmass. This gave me an opportunity to discuss the development. I said that the photography had not been completely studied but the evidences were that the Soviets were slowing up or stopping construction of soft ICBM sites and were emphasising the construction of hard sites. 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

Khrushchev knew that through satellite photography we were learning the exact location of missile sites. He was not relocating them - what he was doing, he was hardening them, and this was costing them an enormous amount of money. The President expressed great interest in the subject of satellite photography and I asked for an hour's time to go over the program, the pictures and other details. He agreed. I suggested perhaps when he was flying some place I go with him and we could spend an hour or so together on this one subject. This he felt might be a good idea.

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ACTION: Remind me to follow this up and to make arrangements on a Presidential trip in the near future. 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

4. I then [redacted] advised him that Chairman Vinson and Senator Russell felt that their Committees should be fully informed by them and they wished to do this in advance of the announcement and also stated that Mr. Cannon wished me to meet with his Subcommittee prior to the announcement and that George Mahon wished to inform his committee prior to the announcement. I recommended that this be done but it be timed so the Committees would be advised practically concurrently with the announcement so that the press would not get the news before the President announced it. I said that if, for instance, he was to make the announcement Saturday morning (which he did not confirm as the time), then all of the Congressional actions should be taken Saturday morning. Thus the Congressmen would know in advance but not so much in advance that the press would get hold of the story. The President was very much against this. He felt that if the announcement was made on Saturday, we could inform the Committees on Monday. I stated that this would cause the Committee Chairmen and the Committees a great deal of trouble. With this Johnson picked up the phone to call Senator Russell; however the call was not returned and I did not get a final decision.

ACTION: Later I mentioned the question to Bundy and he said that he would have to get to the President and get a decision. Until this decision is forthcoming we should take absolutely no action with respect to the Hill. Bundy and I discussed the problem several times during the day, including a brief discussion at Mrs. J. F. Kennedy's residence when the President was there. However, Bundy did not think it appropriate to discuss it with the President on the particular occasion at Mrs. Kennedy's residence. This should be followed up with Bundy today. 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

5. I then referred to the [redacted] This item refers to the withdrawal of the Soviets from Cuba and the turning over of the SAM sites to them. I said there was a high probability that the SAM sites would be placed in the hands of the Cubans who would have absolute control over them. I said that other evidence convinced us there would be a continuing withdrawal of Soviets from Cuba, but not a total withdrawal; however we could not gauge the exact numbers. I said that this, in my opinion, represented probably the next important crisis that we would face because Castro in his rather amicable but long press conference had raised the question of our penetrating illegally Cuban air space. I therefore recommended that this subject be discussed with Secretaries of State and Defense; that they be ordered to prepare contingency plans for such a situation, otherwise we would be confronted with an emergency.

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all the lights in town would be on, and our course of action would have to evolve under an atmosphere of emergency. I pressed this point hard. The President asked if I had discussed it with McNamara and Rusk and I told him I had, on many occasions, but they seemed wholly preoccupied with the problem at hand and had never come to grips with this particular hypothetical but possible situation. The President gave me no satisfactory answer as to any action he would take. In fact, he seemed more preoccupied with the withdrawal of Soviets and the "numbers remaining" than he did with the issue I was confronting him with.

6. We were then joined by Secretary Rusk, Harriman, Edgar Kaiser and Mr. Calhoun and engaged in a long discussion on Ghana. Kaiser reported on his conversations with Nkrumah and his absolute and positive insistence that Nkrumah stop the anti-American actions in his country or else he, Kaiser, could not proceed with the work. Furthermore, under the climate that Nkrumah had developed Kaiser could not raise a single cent toward additional investments in Ghana. Nkrumah seemed to agree and said he was writing President Johnson.

[redacted] The President asked Kaiser what he wished to do. Kaiser stated that he had a contract that had not been broken by Ghana despite the exasperating situation and that he intended to fulfill his contract. He reviewed the situation about as follows: Volta Dam will cost about $200 million of which Ghana is putting up half and the other half is being put up by AID, the World Bank, the British, and the Export-Import Bank in varying amounts and for differing components or parts of the project. The aluminum plant will cost about $150 million, about $100 million has been put up by the Export-Import Bank and about $50 million by the Kaiser-Reynolds Syndicate (Kaiser, 90% - Reynolds, 10%) but all of this is guaranteed by the United States Government. The entire $350 million in the form of loans, there are no grants made. The power that Kaiser will take, representing half of the power generated at the dam, will pay for the entire project in 30 years. Kaiser stated that he could not forecast the permanence of his position in the project. It was entirely possible that Nkrumah would take it over. This was a risk and represented a very serious problem to him because he was proceeding with manufacturing outlets in Europe to utilize the raw aluminum produced. Despite this risk he was going forward. The President was noncommittal.

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(6)

7. Later Governor Harriman stated he wanted to get together with me to reach a conclusion on our policy concerning the Volta Project. He was in favor of proceeding -- there were many who wished to cut and run. He sensed that I would favor staying with the project. What he was seeking was a partner to support his position.

8. [redacted]

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(6)

[redacted]

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(6)

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16

2 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting

1. I briefed the NSC on the following items as per the attached briefing notes:

a. Soviet Space and Missile Developments
b. Sino-Soviet Dispute
c. South Vietnam
d. Brazil

2. I then asked Col. King to brief in further detail on developments in Brazil which he did, utilizing the teleconference report of 1500Z, April 2nd, between Secretary Ball and Ambassador Gordon. A copy of this telecon is in the file.

3. With respect to the Soviet VENUS shot, I called the President's particular attention to the security breach which appeared on March 31st in the NEW YORK TIMES' Finney article entitled "Soviet Fails in Two VENUS Probes", and a parallel article using practically the same text which appeared in the Washington Post. I stated that USIB were considering recommendations on an investigation and I would present such recommendations to the President. The President responded that I should go forward with any investigations I felt appropriate and he would approve any actions I desired to take.

NOTE: In a later conversation with Bundy and Alexis Johnson, they explained that both of them, together with Spurgeon Keeny, had considered releasing the substance of the Finney article but after talking with Dr. Wheelon had decided against doing so. All three were very much surprised that the article appeared in the paper and disclaimed any responsibility.

ACTION: Depending upon USIB's decision, I should instigate a USIB investigation or an FBI investigation. In the event of the latter, the subject should be discussed with the President. Also I agreed informally to review the USIB decision with Mr. Bundy prior to proceeding.

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4. Secretary Rusk stated that Amb. Bohlen was meeting with de Gaulle today to discuss South Vietnam.

ACTION: We should be on the alert for Bohlen's report.

5. Rusk stated that it was his and the Department's opinion that CIA was in no way overstating the depth of the Sino-Soviet split, indicating that the Department was studying carefully any evidence of actions by one party of the controversy against the other. He said no physical actions were discernible as yet but Rusk raised the question of the possibility of the abrogation of the Soviet-ChiCom Mutual Defense Treaty.

ACTION: We should continue to study this problem in depth and confer from time to time with State. I should be kept informed for personal discussions with Rusk.

6. Rusk then brought up the question of the UAR relationship. He said that the Department believed that no benefits had as yet been derived from our attempts to reach an understanding with Nasser. Nasser had failed in his commitments in the Yemen; there were now more troops in the Yemen than ever before and furthermore he had taken overt action against Aden. Furthermore Nasser had stimulated Libya's efforts against the U.S. and British bases and was continuing to agitate this issue. Additionally Nasser had been uncooperative in our numerous efforts to bring the Middle East arms race under control. Rusk said he raised this question with, and informed the Consul, that U.S. policies towards the UAR and Nasser were under penetrating study by the Department.

ACTION: DDI should give this matter continuing consideration and should discuss the subject with appropriate people in the Department and also with me.

7. Rusk then reported on Panama, stating that status quo remained, that there was a possibility that today or tomorrow there would be a break which would permit us to move to the conference table. There was no change in our position.

NOTE: In a previous conversation with the President and others, it appeared that the Panamanians were moving away from their intransigent position and they themselves were creating a more favorable climate. In this conversation, which took place on April 1st, the President asked me personally if I thought we were acting correctly on this Panama issue. I replied that I felt his position was defendable and would not recommend any changes.

JAM/[redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

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Case # NLJ 96-77
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY — ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM / NORTH VIETNAM [redacted]

DATE OF INFO. 10 APRIL 1964

DISTR. 5 MAY 1964

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

SUBJECT

INFILTRATION INTO SOUTH VIETNAM OF 2,000 VIET CONG FROM NORTH VIETNAM

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (4 MAY 1964)

REF IN 75990

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

APPRAISAL: ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO AVAILABLE INFORMATION TO CONFIRM THIS REPORT, A LARGE NUMBER OF TROOPS MAY HAVE INFILTRATED FROM NORTH VIETNAM. PREVIOUS REPORTS HAVE MENTIONED THE PRESENCE OF CHINESE COMMUNIST ADVISORS IN TAY NINH PROVINCE AND THE EXTENSIVE CONTROL WHICH THE VIET CONG ENJOY THERE.

1. ON 10 APRIL 1964 ABOUT 2,000 FULLY ARMED VIET CONG (VC) TROOPS FROM NORTH VIETNAM ACCOMPANIED BY THREE CHINESE COMMUNIST ADVISORS AND 18 MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE VC NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM ENTERED TAY NINH PROVINCE AND STATIONED THEMSELVES AT DON THUAN (APPROXIMATELY XT 380420), KHIEM HANH DISTRICT, IN THE BOI LOI SECRET ZONE. SUBSEQUENTLY ABOUT 1,000 OF THESE VC TROOPS MOVED TO TRA VONG (COORDINATES UNAVAILABLE), PHUOC NINH DISTRICT. (FIELD COMMENT. [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[redacted]

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(SVN) OD/I AD/CI 2

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[redacted] ABOUT 28 (ALSO RCVD 20) APRIL [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

28 (ALSO RCVD 20) CHINESE COMMUNIST CADRES [redacted] ENTERED TAY NINH IN THE VICINITY OF XT 280250 DROO CAMBODIA.)

2. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 2ND AIR DIV. 9TH FLD. STA. CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC.

END OF MESSAGE

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TO WHITE HOUSE (MR BUNDY)

STATE SECRETARY RUSK MR SULLIVAN, MR BUNDAY, MR HUGHES

DEFENSE SECRETARY MCNAMARA, GENERAL TAYLOR, MR MCNAUGHTON

DIA GENERAL HALL

ZEN

~~S E C R E T~~ SECRET

CAS SAIGON 6304

1. ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 MAY [redacted] LEARNED [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1) [redacted] THAT DO MAU WOULD, WITH GEN NGUYEN KHANH'S CONSENT, BECOME PRIME MINISTER WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. [redacted] KHANH WOULD SIMPLY TURN OVER THE REINS OF GOVERNMENT TO DO MAU AND KHANH WOULD ASSUME SOME LESSER UNSPECIFIED POST. [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1) [redacted] VICE PREMIER NGUYEN TON HOAN HAD SUBMITTED HIS RESIGNATION ON 13 MAY BUT HAD BEEN PREVAILED UPON TO KEEP HIS RESIGNATION SECRET FOR AT LEAST 48 HOURS. [redacted] LT GENERAL WILLIAM WESTMORELAND, DEPUTY COMMANDER OF MACV, WAS AWARE OF AND [redacted] APPROVED KHANH'S AND MAU'S AGREEMENT. 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

2. [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

3. [redacted]

4. AMBASSADOR LODGE CALLED THE CAS STATION CHIEF TO FORMER'S RESIDENCE AT 1800 HOURS 15 MAY TO RELATE THAT A VIETNAMESE WOMAN WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS IN HIGH GVN CIRCLES HAD TOLD MRS LODGE AT ABOUT NOON ON 16 MAY THAT THERE WOULD BE A CHANGE IN THE LEADERSHIP OF THE GVN BY 19 MAY AND WAS SURPRISED THAT MRS LODGE WAS NOT AWARE OF THIS. THE VIETNAMESE WOMAN DID NOT GIVE DETAILS OR SPECIFY HER SOURCES.

5. THE CAS STATION CHIEF RELATED THE FIRST THREE PARAGRAPHES ABOVE TO AMBASSADOR LODGE. THEY AGREED THAT KHANH SHOULD BE INFORMED AT ONCE, BE TELEPHONE CALL TO DALAT WHERE HE WAS WEEKENDING. THEY DID SO AT ABOUT 1900 HOURS. KHANH SAID HE WOULD TELEPHONE GENERAL KHIEM, [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[redacted] KHIEMS REACTION WAS QUITE CASUAL, ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE MANY RUMORS ABOUT DO MAU, THAT THEY (KHANH AND KHIEM) KNEW THAT HE WAS OPPOSED TO KHANH, AND THAT HE IS CONSTANTLY INTRIGUING AND PLOTTING, BUT CONCLUDED BY SAYING DO MAU HAS BEEN DELIBERATELY ISOLATED, THAT DO MAU COMMANDS NO FORCE, AND THAT HE IS

INCAPABLE OF SEIZING POWER. KHIEM STATED [redacted] HE DID NOT CONSIDER THE SITUATION DANGEROUS, AND THAT EVERYTHING WAS UNDER CONTROL. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AT HAVING BEEN INFORMED. [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

[redacted]

KHANH SAID HE PROBABLY WOULD RETURN TO SAIGON ON THE MORNING OF 17 MAY, AND ASKED THAT WE PHONE HIM IN DALAT AT 0900 HOURS 17 MAY.

6. [redacted] WILL ADVISE YOU FURTHER AFTER [redacted] 17 MAY [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1) [redacted] ASSUME YOU WILL INFORM STATE. WILL DISCUSS ENTIRE MATTER 17 MAY WITH [redacted] GEN HARKINS. END TEXT OF CAS SAIGON 0304.

7. CAS HQS COMMENT: PARAGRAPHS 1-4 ABOVE SEEM TO CONTAIN A CONSIDERABLE PROPORTION OF RUMOR. SINCE THE KEY OFFICIALS (KHANH AND KHIEM) HAVE NOW BEEN INFORMED, THEY WILL PRESUMABLY TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO PREVENT THE REPORTEDLY CONTEMPLATED ACTION FROM TAKING PLACE.

[redacted]

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3. AT UDORN KLUSMANN WAS FED AND GIVEN INITIAL SHORT DEBRIEFING IN OFFICE OF AIR AMERICA STATION MANAGER. REPRESENTATIVES OF SECOND AIR DIVISION, 6499TH SUPPORT GROUP, THAI HQS 333 [redacted] 1.3(a)(4) C WERE PRESENT. KLUSMANN WAS THEN GIVEN MEDICAL CHECKUP AND PUT TO BED IN AIR AMERICA AIR CREW TRANSIENT QUARTERS. AIRCRAFT FROM SAIGON WAS ON HAND TO PICK HIM UP WHEN HE AWOKE THIS MORNING.

4. DETAILS OF INITIAL DEBRIEFING CONTAINED IN REF MSG FROM DET 2, 35TH TAC GP UDORN. RESUME THIS DEBRIEFING REPORT PLUS SEVERAL ADDITIONAL ITEMS MENTIONED BY KLUSMANN [redacted] 1.3(a)(4) C FOLLOW IN SEPARATE MESSAGE.

5. KLUSMANN HANDLED WITHOUT PUBLICITY HERE WITH ONLY SMALL GROUP AIR FORCE OFFICERS [redacted] BEING AWARE HIS PRESENCE. [redacted] 1.3(a)(4) C

6. PL SGT WHO CAME WITH KLUSMANN IS BEING HELD AT SITE 98 PENDING HIS REMOVAL TO VIENTIANE FOR INTERROGATION.

7. EMB VIENTIANE REQUESTS ABOVE INFO BE PASSED STATE DEPT WASH.

GP-1

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[redacted]

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72 [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

PRIORITY

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

Mandatory Review Case #NLJ 96-111 Document # 72

DATE OF INFO. [redacted] DISTR. 1 OCTOBER 1964 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

SUBJECT

COMMENTS [redacted] INDICATING PRESENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN NGUYEN KHANH AND THE "YOUNG TURKS" AND THE URGENT NEED TO SOLVE THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF THE COUNTRY

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted] REF IN 84630

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: [redacted]

1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

1. (SUMMARY. A VIETNAMESE [redacted] OFFICER SPOKE [redacted] OF THE NEED TO GET GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH MOVING TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF THE COUNTRY. THE YOUNG TURKS WERE IMPATIENT WITH KHANH AND A FEW DAYS EARLIER WERE TALKING OF REMOVING KHANH, AND THE TRIUMVIRATE BY FORCE. HOWEVER, AN AMICABLE CONFERENCE ON 29 SEPT AT VUNG TAU WITH KHANH AND SEVERAL OF THE "YOUNG TURKS" BROUGHT AN AGREEMENT. THE AGREEMENT INVOLVED SENDING GENERAL TRAN THIEN KHIEM ABROAD ON A GOODWILL TRIP, EVENTUAL TRIAL OF THOSE INVOLVED IN THE 13 SEPTEMBER ABORTIVE COUP AND RETIREMENT OF THE DALAT GEMERALS FROM

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~~SECRET~~ [redacted] [redacted]

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SVN AD/CI 2

EXO

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 29 JUL 1997

1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

MILITARY SERVICE. THE VUNG TAU CONFERENCE ALSO TALKED OF POLI-
TICAL MATTERS. THE GROUP ENVISAGED KHANH RETURNING TO STRICTLY MILITARY
DUTIES ON 27 OCTOBER.
AT THIS TIME DUONG VAN MINH WOULD INHERIT
BY DEFAULT THE POSITION OF PRIME MINISTER. EVENTUALLY
THE GROUP ENVISAGED A REFERENDUM FOR
THE PURPOSE OF SELECTING A PRIME MINISTER, IF IN THE INTERVAL
MINH HAPPENED TO PERFORM WELL HE MIGHT EVEN BE THE CHOICE.
[redacted] SPOKE OF THE NEED FOR THE US TO SUPPORT KHANH.

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2. NO TOP LEVEL LEADERSHIP EXISTS TODAY IN VIETNAM. POWER
IS SO DIFFUSED WITHIN THE RULING TRIMVIRATE AND THERE IS SUCH
PREOCCUPATION WITH PERSONAL VENDETTAS AND SLANDER CAMPAIGNS THAT
NEITHER SINGLY NOR COLLECTIVELY CAN THE TRIMVIRATE RENDER DECISIONS
ON IMPORTANT ISSUES. NGUYEN KHANH IS THE BEST OF THE THREE, EVEN
THOUGH HE IS WAVERING AND INDECISIVE. HE DESERVES MORE TIME IN
WHICH TO ESTABLISH AND DISPLAY HIS GOVERNING POWER IN A DYNAMIC,
CONSISTENT MANNER. SUCH A DISPLAY WOULD SATISFY THE "YOUNG TURK"
MILITARY COMMANDERS, WHO ARE MOST IMPATIENT. BEFORE A MEETING WITH
KHANH ON 30 SEPTEMBER, SOME OF THE YOUNG TURKS WERE CALLING FOR
REMOVAL BY FORCE OF KHANH AND THE TRIUMVIRATE; A DISPLAY OF POWER
ON KHANH'S PART WOULD ALSO DIMINISH AND HOPEFULLY
STOP THE SLIDE OF THE COUNTRY INTO CHAOS.

3. ON 30 SEPTEMBER NGUYEN KHANH INVITED THE "YOUNG TURK" GROUP

TO VUNG TAU FOR DINNER AND A TWO HOUR DISCUSSION OF POLITICAL PROBLEMS BESETTING THE GVN. THE INVITATION WAS KHANH'S RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR A MEETING WHICH THE "YOUNG TURKS" HAD SENT KHANH. THE FOLLOWING WERE PRESENT: KHANH, AIR FORCE COMMANDER NGUYEN CAO KY, NAVY COMMANDER CHUNG TAN CANG, MARINE COMMANDER LE NGUYEN KHANG AND AIRBORNE COMMANDER COLONEL DU QUOC DONG.

4. NO ULTIMATUMS, OR ANYTHING RESEMBLING AN ULTIMATUM, WERE GIVEN KHANH. INSTEAD, VARIOUS VIEWS WERE EXCHANGED IN A RELAXED AND OBJECTIVE ATMOSPHERE. AMID THIS ATMOSPHERE, KHANH MADE THE FOLLOWING PROMISES:

A. GENERAL TRAN THIEN KHIEM WOULD BE SENT ABROAD WITHIN 48 HOURS ON A TEMPORARY MISSION FOR SEVERAL MONTHS TO CONVEY OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) THANKS TO COUNTRIES ACTIVELY SUPPORTING THE FIGHT AGAINST THE VIET CONG.

B. THE FIVE DALAT GENERALS (TRAN VAN DON, TON THAT DINH, LE VAN KIM, MAI HUU XUAN AND NGUYEN VAN VY) WERE TO BE REMOVED FROM ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE AND BE ASSIGNED UNSPECIFIED OFFICIAL CIVILIAN POSITIONS. AT KHANH'S INSISTENCE, TO PRESERVE "FACE" FOR THE GENERALS AND CONSEQUENTLY FOR THE ARMED FORCES HIGH COMMAND, NO IMMEDIATE ACTION ON THIS ISSUE WAS TO BE TAKEN AND THE EFFORT WAS TO BE SPACED GRADUALLY OVER A PERIOD OF TIME.

C. A TRIAL OF THOSE MILITARY OFFICERS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE

ABORTIVE 13 SEPTEMBER COUP EFFORT MUST BE ARRANGED.

5. BY THE END OF THE MEETING, KHANH APPEARED TO BE MUCH MORE RELAXED AND CONFIDENT THAN HE HAS BEEN IN RECENT WEEKS.

6. ALSO DISCUSSED AT VUNG TAU WAS A PLAN TO RETURN KHANH TO THE STRICTLY MILITARY ARENA AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES ON 27 OCTOBER, THE END OF THE 60 DAY PERIOD SET FOR THE TRIUMVIRATE RULE. UNDER THIS PLAN GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH WOULD BY THAT TIME BE MANEUVERED INTO THE POSITION OF PRIME MINISTER. THIS WOULD FORCE MINH TO ACCEPT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF GOVERNING THE COUNTRY, A RESPONSIBILITY HE HAS SO SKILLFULLY AVOIDED AS A MEMBER OF THE TRIUMVIRATE. THUS MINH WOULD BE FORCED TO DO AN EFFECTIVE JOB, ONE WHICH WOULD PLEASE EVERYONE, INCLUDING THE MILITARY AND THE YOUNG TURKS, OR MINH WOULD BE PLACED CLEARLY IN THE PUBLIC SPOTLIGHT AS AN INCOMPETENT WHO NO LONGER DESERVED BEING THE PUBLIC IDOL. IF THE LATTER WERE TO EVENTUATE, IT WOULD ELIMINATE ONE MORE OF THE TRIUMVIRATE AND PERMIT A CONSOLIDATION OF POWER. ANOTHER ASPECT OF THIS OVERALL PLAN IS TO HAVE EVENTUALLY A PUBLIC REFERENDUM WHEREIN THE PEOPLE WOULD SELECT A CIVILIAN LEADER.

7. WITH KHANH RETURNED TO MILITARY DUTIES, THE ARMED FORCES WOULD AGAIN BE UNITED AND REMOVED FROM DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE POLITICAL SCENE AS AT PRESENT. KHANH AND THE YOUNG TURK LEADERSHIP WOULD, HOWEVER, BE IN AN EXCELLENT POSITION, SINCE

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

IT IS THEY WHO ARE DOING THE FIGHTING AND SHEDDING OF BLOOD FOR THEIR COUNTRY. THEY COULD EXERT INDIRECT PRESSURE ON A CIVILIAN PRIME MINISTER TO INSURE AN HONEST AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT. IN THIS FASHION THE FULL POTENTIAL OF THE VIETNAMESE MILITARY FORCES CAN ONCE AGAIN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR AGAINST THE VC. THE POTENTIAL CAN, IN FACT, BE STRENGTHENED BY VIRTUE OF RENEWED MILITARY CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTURE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE SUPPORT OF A POPULATION WON OVER BY A POLITICAL LEADERSHIP WHOSE PRIMARY AIM IS TO IMPROVE THE LOT OF THE PEOPLE.

8. THE US VIEW OF KHANH SHOULD BE TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT HIM WHILE ATTEMPTING TO PERSUADE HIM HE CANNOT BE ALL THINGS TO ALL MEN WHILE SOLVING DIFFICULT PROBLEMS WHICH ARISE. HE MUST MOVE MORE DECISIVELY NOT ONLY TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS BUT ALSO TO CONSOLIDATE ACTUAL GOVERNING POWER IN HIS HANDS.

9. FIELD DISSEM . STATE (AMB TAYLOR AND DEPUTY AMB JOHNSON) USMACV (GEN WESTMORELAND) CINCPAC (ADM SHARP).

TOP SECRET

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SENSITIVE

TS#185793

VN file

PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO US OPTION C OR C-PRIME MEASURES

A. To Initial US Moves (as described in the sequential graduated actions, Nos. 3-b-(1) to (6), p. 9, of JCSM 982-64, of 23 November 1964)

1. We consider it highly unlikely that these moves would cause Communist China to react in any extreme fashion at this juncture.

2. We consider it unlikely that the DRV would react in any extreme fashion at this juncture.

3. We also consider it unlikely that the DRV would yield or take any significant steps in that direction.

4. The most likely DRV course would be to hold firm.

a. The DRV would attempt to defend DRV territory. Defensive action by aircraft from Phue Yen airfield would be possible but we consider it unlikely because of the nature of the contemplated US actions and the distance of these actions from the Phue Yen airbase. In Laos, PL/VM forces would attempt to counter US/GVN air attacks and cross-border operations; the DRV would probably raise its level of assistance to these PL/VM forces, though would probably not introduce any significant numbers of PAVN units.

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b. Hanoi would probably direct the VC to continue its pressures in the South but might make some moves toward negotiation or ostensible compliance. We doubt that the VC would launch any large-scale frontal assaults, but they probably would undertake reprisals on US personnel and facilities identified with US/GVN activities, and on other targets in South Vietnam.

c. Hanoi and Peiping would meanwhile almost certainly do their utmost to stimulate condemnation of the US attacks in world opinion, and, if negotiations began, would take tough initial positions.

d. Hanoi and Peiping would increase their threats to counterattacks and both would probably undertake force deployments designed to add to the credibility of these threats. Hanoi would certainly appeal for additional Chinese Communist defensive assistance -- radar, anti-aircraft, artillery, combat aircraft, patrol craft, and technical personnel -- which Peiping would probably supply. We doubt that Hanoi would request Chinese Communist ground troops at this juncture.

5. The USSR would make propaganda and political efforts on behalf of the DRV, and perhaps consent to furnish some military equipment, but would almost certainly take steps to insure that Hanoi and Peiping were kept aware of the limits of Soviet support.

B. To Higher-Scale US Option C or C-Prime Moves (as described in items (7) to (11), p. 9, of JCSM 982-64, of 23 November 1964)

We cannot make a confident judgment of enemy reactions in these situations, although we incline to these views:

6. To the first categories of such US moves (i.e., items (7) to (9): air strikes against selected targets in the DRV, aerial mining of certain DRV ports, and imposition of a naval quarantine blockade):

a. DRV reactions would probably be essentially defensive in character: that is, employing all available air defense, including aircraft, in defense of DRV territory. DRV forces would probably also attempt to harass naval blockade vessels. The DRV would probably not attempt any overt invasion of Laos or South Vietnam, although they might re-deploy some units to southern North Vietnam.

b. The DRV would probably make some moves toward apparent compliance, but would probably not be prepared to make any early significant concessions.

c. The DRV would nevertheless probably modulate VC pressures, feigning innocence, by turning VC pressures up or down,

depending on the prospects for negotiations, US punishment, and the course of the war in the South. Unless the collapse of GVN authority seemed imminent, we doubt that the DRV would direct the VC to attempt to administer a military coup de grâce.

d. The DRV, with Communist bloc support, would attempt to raise a hue and cry in the world against the US, including propaganda, diplomatic actions, and incitement of mob demonstrations. Hanoi and Peiping would probably consider that US mining and/or blockading of DRV ports would be especially susceptible to propaganda exploitation.

e. Extreme Chinese Communist reaction -- such as introduction of large-scale ground force combat units into North Vietnam -- would be possible at this juncture, though unlikely. Peiping would probably make its threats of intervention stronger and more specific. If it had not already done so, it would almost certainly deploy large forces to areas near Vietnam and Laos. It is possible that Chinese Communist air units, under the guise of "volunteers," would at this point be introduced into North Vietnam, for use from North Vietnamese airfields. It is also possible that Peiping would commit units of its air force based in China to defensive action over NorthhVietnam at this point, but

in view of the magnitude of US air and naval superiority we doubt that Peiping would do so.* There is a fair chance, however, that Peiping would introduce limited numbers of Chinese Communist ground forces as "volunteers," both to prepare for further escalation and to make clear Peiping's commitment to assist the North Vietnamese.

f. As the scale of operations increased, the USSR also would be strongly and publicly on the side of the DRV, would probably give it additional military and economic assistance, and might issue dire threats against the US. We believe nevertheless that the USSR would be careful to avoid an appreciable risk of becoming directly involved in military conflict, and would greatly prefer that the Indochina problem be settled by compromise. To this end the Soviets would seek to augment international pressures on the US to bring it to the conference table.

g. We do not believe that either Communist China or the USSR would stir up another major crisis threatening military confrontation elsewhere in the world while the proposed US actions in North Vietnam were underway.

* The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that the increasingly severe US air strikes contemplated against DRV targets north of the 19th parallel would probably evoke the employment over North Vietnam of Chinese air from Chinese bases. The Chinese decision to construct the new Ming Ming airstrip, carefully located just over the DRV border and operationally ready in early 1965, already strongly suggests Chinese preparation to test US adherence to the privileged sanctuary concept.

7. To the Upper Categories of Option C or C-Prime Moves (i.e., items (1) and (12), p. 10, of JCSM 932-64, of 23 November 1964: attacks on the balance of the 94-List Targets, and amphibious or airborne operations to seize coastal lodgments in the DRV):

a. In response to the moves in Item 10 Communist reactions would probably hinge in important measure on Peiping's decisions. We believe that Communist China would be very reluctant to become directly involved in the fighting in Indochina lest this be taken by the US as a cause for major retaliation against the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, at this point Chinese Communist aircraft operating from Chinese bases would probably assist in defending North Vietnam against the US attacks. We still believe that there would not be high risk of the introduction of large-scale Chinese ground combat units into Vietnam. Nevertheless, there is always a chance that Peiping might so intervene either for reasons that seem irrational to us or because it miscalculated the objectives of US moves in the area. Communist China's capability for conducting a ground war in adjacent areas of Southeast Asia is formidable.

b. If the US actions proceeded to the moves in Item 11 and involved major US/GVN ground units occupying territory in northern Laos, the risk of introduction of large-scale Chinese Communist ground combat units into Vietnam would materially increase.

These risks would be similarly increased if the Chinese had committed their air forces from Chinese bases, and had subsequently suffered US attacks on these bases.

c. In the circumstances of Items 10 and 11, and if Peiping had refrained from extreme rescue measures, the DRV's leaders would probably intensify their efforts to negotiate. Here again their particular negotiating game would depend heavily on how the course of events had gone meanwhile in the South; if the GVN were getting along fairly successfully, Hanoi would probably seek to negotiate as good a settlement as it could, hoping to subvert it at a later date; if, however, non-Communist authority had about been caved in, Hanoi would probably stall, seeking to salvage a position of strength in the anomolous situation of US success in the North, DRV in the South.

d. In the event Hanoi felt assured of Chinese Communist rescue, it would probably fight on. In such a situation, there would be considerable risk of DRV invasion of South Vietnam or Laos, of Chinese Communist extreme action at various places in Southeast Asia, and of an entirely new war situation developing.*

* INR believes that the Chinese Communists, despite their reluctance to become involved in fighting the US, would feel it necessary to assure Hanoi of its support and to come to Hanoi's assistance as the situation required. INR believes, therefore, that there is a greater chance that the DRV would at this point respond as described in paragraph (d) than as described in paragraph (c).

PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO US OPTION B MEASURES

8. We are similarly unable to estimate confidently what Communist reactions would be to Option B measures. The quickness and severity of the US actions would doubtless shock the DRV and sharply lessen its capability to react in sudden extreme form. The risks of further escalation in Southeast Asia would be considerable. We are unable to make a confident estimate as to whether the risks of such escalation would be greater in the case of Option B, C, or C-Prime. All things considered, we incline to the view that although the DRV and Communist Chinese leaders might have attempted to increase the Communist military commitment substantially in the Vietnam area, in response to US Option B measures, they would in the end result react substantially as described in paragraph 7 above (reactions to C or C-Prime upper-level measures).*

* INR reserves its position on this paragraph.

NON-COMMUNIST REACTIONS

A. Reactions in South Vietnam

1. The initial reaction would probably be one of elation, in the belief that the US was at last bringing its great power to bear against the enemy. Such attitudes would persist in the event that VC activity noticeably diminished or if the DRV soon indicated a serious interest in a cease-fire and negotiations. The South Vietnamese would be given a great psychological boost, and we would probably see at least a spurt of much more effective GVN military and administrative performance.

2. Initial South Vietnamese elation and support would almost certainly quickly wane, however, if the war seemed to drag on despite the new US moves, and especially if the VC were able to increase their military and terrorist pressures. In such event, the belief would almost certainly rapidly spread that eventual DRV/VC victory was inevitable, that the US was unable or unwilling to save the situation, and that prudence dictated early accommodation. In such an atmosphere, VC exploitive efforts would bear considerable fruit.

3. VC Tactics and Capabilities. The general level of VC activity -- whether more, less, or about as at present -- would of course be the result of Hanoi's basic decision of the moment as to

how to respond to the US attacks. Involved in such decision would be Hanoi's estimate of the fragility of the political situation in the South and whether "victory" might be quickly attained by a short, sudden burst. Available intelligence data do not warrant a confident estimate of VC "burst" capabilities, but we incline to the view that the VC does have military capabilities it has not yet committed. This may also be the case with VC terrorism, subversion, and political action, though we feel that any "unused" capabilities in these fields are less than in the case of the military. In any event, the VC would be hesitant to commit large-scale VC forces for fear that the GVN, with US assistance, could chew up such military units much more effectively than it has small VC groups. The VC, accordingly, would probably not attempt to administer such a coup de grâce unless the demise of Saigon's authority appeared to be imminent.

B. Reactions Elsewhere in the World

4. The reactions of the non-aligned states, and even of some US Allies, to increased US military initiatives would tend to be adverse. The more severe the attacks were, and the longer they lasted, the greater and more articulate the adverse reaction would be. Such reactions would be mitigated considerably if the moves appeared to achieve US objectives, and in any case some governments would be privately more sympathetic to the US than would appear in their public stance or in public opinion media.

5. The most important non-Communist reactions would be those of the Asian states and of France and the UK.

a. In the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China, the Philippines, and Thailand there would be considerable elation that the US had adopted a tough new line which might check or cut back Communist expansion. These Allies could probably be counted upon to lend some active support, use of bases, etc., to the US effort, but to balk at any US efforts to enlist their support for a negotiated settlement. The Japanese Government, and conservative opinion in Japan, would be pleased by US action against the DRV that was both successful and limited. The Japanese Government would probably attempt to avoid any direct involvement which would be likely to provoke strong adverse domestic pressures and complicate relations with Communist China. To this end, it would probably seek to minimize the direct use of US bases in Japan in support of such an operation.

b. The Indian Government, and considereble informed opinion in India, would probably be quietly pleased by the US toughness, but the official Indian line would doubtless be one pressing for a quick end to hostilities and for US entry into negotiations. Prince Sihanouk would probably be the most troublesome neutralist, but his position would largely depend on his estimate of

which was the stronger side. Sukarno can be confidently expected to lend at least verbal support to the Communist cause.

c. In the event US actions against the DRV were accompanied by an apparent US willingness to negotiate, the UK would probably give us strong private support and would probably avoid taking any public stance which would tend to undermine the US position. The French would be likely to criticize US military action and would reassert their long-standing proposal for reconvening the Geneva conference.

6. Longer-term world reactions would be influenced by the success of the US sanctions: if they halted Communist expansion in Indochina and led to an easing of tensions, US firmness would be retrospectively admired, as in the Chinese offshore islands and Cuba missile showdowns.

7. The US would probably find itself progressively isolated in the event the US sanctions did not soon achieve either a Communist reduction of pressures in South Vietnam or some progress toward meaningful negotiations, and would almost certainly find itself substantially alone in the event that the crisis developed to the point where a US-Communist Chinese war seemed imminent. The GRC would probably back the US wholeheartedly and wish to participate.

Such Allies as the Philippines and Thailand would probably go along with the US, seeing no acceptable alternative open to them. Reactions of other US Allies would depend in part upon the manner in which the situation had developed.

NLJ.139.024.009/21

4675

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: OCT 2008

Dear Bus:

I want to let you know of my concern over indications we have been seeing of a considerable and probably increasing Chinese Communist military presence in North Vietnam. We are, of course, watching all these signs closely and will keep you informed.

I am enclosing here a recent intelligence memorandum on the question of the Chinese presence in North Vietnam. I am also enclosing a copy of this week's Watch Report of the United States Intelligence Board.

Sincerely,

W. F. Raborn
Director

Enclosures

General Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Department of Defense

SC No. 12026/65
Copy _____

OCI No. 2865/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Cuurent Intelligence
7 January 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Northeast Thailand

1. The nine provinces of northeast Thailand have long been a problem to the Bangkok government. Economic backwardness, geographic isolation, cultural and ethnic ties to Laos, and Bangkok's historically weak authority in the region, have provided fertile ground for Communist subversion.

2. Communist activity in the northeast has been noted since the end of World War II. It has been confined largely to recruitment, training and propaganda, and conducted on a relatively modest scale. An increase in the tempo of activity coincident with Communist gains in Laos, was noted in 1961, but stepped up government countermeasures, including widespread arrests, helped to keep it in check.

3. In the past few months, however, there have been indications pointing to the possibility of an increase in Communist subversion. These include the appearance of relatively sophisticated propaganda material, the surfacing of a new Communist front organization called the Thai Independence Movement, and an apparent increase in terrorism.

4. Communist propaganda and recruitment in the northeast is targeted at ethnic minorities including the Vietnamese community of some 40,000 and various tribal groups with close ties to Laos. Propaganda has sought to exploit the population's traditional animosity toward the central government and local functionaries, particularly the police. It has played upon latent separatist sentiment, holding out the prospect of reunification with Laos.

NND 941536 --- 406

5. The principal Communist propaganda effort has been through the clandestine radio Voice of the Thai People. Since early 1962 the Voice has been broadcasting five daily programs from transmitters located along the Laos-North Vietnam border. The basic theme is anti-American. The "US-Thanom" clique is blamed for the northeast's poverty and for the corruption of local officials.

6. On 8 December 1964 the Voice announced the formation of the Thai Independence Movement. A manifesto of the new movement, calling for the withdrawal of US forces in Thailand, the overthrow of the Thanom government and the establishment of a neutralist regime, was carried by Communist China's New China News Agency (NCNA) five days later. Hanoi radio also took note of the new front.

7. The formation of a Communist front is not in itself unusual. There have been at least 15 front organizations reported operating in the country since 1960. Some of these have had apparently little more than paper substance. Some, such as the short-lived Thai Neutralist Movement, have put out propaganda remarkably similar to the "manifesto" of the new Thai Independence Movement. There is no evidence that the new movement has any organization in place in Thailand.

8. The attention Peiping and Hanoi have given to the latest front is unusual, however. The reason for this is not known. It may be part of an effort to unite the various fronts under one banner in anticipation of the promulgation of a new Thai constitution scheduled for later this year, which might provide for early elections. It may signal, however, a new Communist subversion effort.

9. The formation of the Thai Independence Movement coincides with a reported step-up in Communist activity in the Northeast. Three apparently politically inspired assassinations in late 1964 punctuated a Communist campaign against government civic action programs.

10. The recrudescence of Communist activity appears to be largely limited to Nakhon Phanom Province, across from Thakhek in Laos. This province has lo

NND 941536 --- 406

been a center of antigovernment sentiment and activity. Unconfirmed reports indicate that there are as many as 200 guerrillas located in the hills of the province. Most of the guerrillas are reported to be members of the Soh tribe, a Lao ethnic group with a long history of disaffection. Government sweeps have failed to flush out any of the guerrillas and so far the dissidents have refrained from overt insurgent activity. A Mobile Development Unit has made scant progress in winning the loyalty of the disaffected population.

12. In the final analysis, the tempo and direction of subversion depends on Communist intentions. So far, the Communists have kept the northeast on the back burner, while husbanding their resources and building for the future. Any change in Communist strategy will almost certainly be related to the developing situation in the primary target areas of today, South Vietnam and Laos.

NND 941536 --- 406

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX XX

THE CONJUNCTIVE USE AND MANAGEMENT
OF TRANSBOUNDARY
RESOURCES (TUMTR)

ANNEX IX

THE COMMUNIST VIEW AND APPLICATION OF LESSONS LEARNED IN FIGHTING THE FRENCH

The attitude of the North Vietnamese leadership toward the current military situation in South Vietnam is shaped to a considerable extent both strategically and tactically by their experience in fighting the French. Drawing heavily upon this experience, they have carefully plotted their actions in the current war to duplicate as far as possible their successes against the French and to avoid mistakes committed in the earlier war.

I. The Three Phased War

Their experiences in the Franco-Viet Minh war doubtless convinced the Communists that the predictions on the course of this conflict made in 1947 by the then Party Secretary General Truong Chinh had proved valid, and could probably be applied in the planned takeover of South Vietnam. In essence, Truong Chinh's blueprint for victory called for a protracted struggle through three stages which would enable the small and weak forces of the Viet Minh to defeat the more numerous and better-equipped French forces.

According to Truong Chinh, the first phase of the war would see the French in control of the cities using primarily "conventional" tactics. In this period the French would be on the "offensive." The Viet Minh, on the other hand, were small, poorly armed forces and therefore had to fight a "defensive" type of war. The chief strategy for the Viet Minh during this period, argued Truong Chinh, should be to attack the enemy using guerrilla tactics, i.e., ambushes, sabotage, and small-scale attacks on French units of smaller size than the local Viet Minh unit. The Viet Minh during this period, he said must avoid pitched battles with the enemy and must build its strength.

Truong Chinh took the position that, although the Viet Minh would be strategically on the defensive, tactically they should always be on the offensive. Since the French would be strategically on the offensive, they would overextend themselves, thus giving the Viet Minh opportunities

for attacking isolated and small units. During this first stage of the "people's war," he said, the Viet Minh must also concentrate on gaining the support of the peasants. Political efforts, Chinh held, were in some respects even more important than military efforts, because without the support of the people there could be no military effort.

At some point, Truong Chinh asserted, the enemy would extend his position as far as he could. At that time, the harassing action of the guerrillas would combine with the enemy's inherent weaknesses to create an equilibrium. During this stage of the war, the enemy would concentrate on consolidating his overextended positions with particular emphasis on his lines of communications and supply. He would continue to launch attacks on the Viet Minh strongholds. In the political sphere, the enemy would concentrate on setting up "puppet" local adminstrations, infiltrating the Communist zones with spies, and repressing the Viet Minh political movement.

The Viet Minh, during this period, should employ to the maximum the tactic of guerrilla warfare to harass the enemy day and night. This would be designed to force the enemy to disperse his forces, to overextend his area of operations further, and to use up his manpower and resources. The key tactic during this period would be a combination of guerrilla and mobile warfare, with the guerrilla taking the lead at first, followed by later and stronger efforts at mobile warfare. The tactic of positional war was given only a limited role at this stage, since the enemy would still be able to bring superior force to bear on static defensive positions.

During the second phase of the struggle, the Viet Minh forces would swing from a defensive strategy to an offensive one. This stage should see not only military defeat of the enemy but also a collapse of morale on his home front, i.e., in metropolitan France. Economic and morale problems at home would have a decisive effect on France's will to fight. On the battle front, the French would be forced to withdraw from their advanced positions in order to defend their major bases. The Viet Minh would depend primarily on mobile warfare tactics supported by guerrilla activities. Finally, in the third phase near the end, mobile warfare would often be transformed into positional warfare for the decisive battles.

Truong Chinh's analysis proved an amazingly accurate prediction of the actual course of the war with the French. Chinh's assessment of the weaknesses of the French was unerring and his program for the development of both tactics and strategy for the Viet Minh proved effective. His views permeated the outlook of the Viet Minh leadership and particularly that of General Vo Nguyen Giap. It was largely Giap's responsibility as commander of the Viet Minh army to put into practice Truong Chinh's military concepts. He did just that and led the Viet Minh to final victory at the famous battle of Dien Bien Phu.

The extent to which the Vietnamese Communists still rely on this basic design for victory is evidenced in the writings of their leaders. On several occasions in the last two years Giap, in his articles, has applied Truong Chinh's concepts of military analysis to the situation in the South. In remarkably similar terms, Giap has stressed the need for a prolonged war, emphasized that the US would become overextended in its ability to supply its troops in the field, and predicted that popular dissatisfaction with the war in the United States would undermine the determination of the administration to continue the war. Giap has claimed that the tendency of both French and US strategists to fix short deadlines for accomplishing major goals is proof of their inability to outlast the Communists.

According to Truong Chinh's criteria, the Viet Cong presumably would have reached the point of equilibrium with the ARVN in 1964 or early 1965 and would have gone over to the offensive relying more and more on mobile rather than guerrilla tactics. However, the use of US forces in a combat role has since then probably removed any notion from the Communists' minds that they have managed to move into an advanced part of Truong Chinh's second phase, one in which the opponent is forced to withdraw from his advanced positions to defend his bases. This is evidenced in their discussions of the large and successful US/ARVN offensive raids into Viet Cong base areas this year.

Apparently the Hanoi high command believes that its forces in the South, at least in the northern half of South Vietnam, are in the first part of Truong Chinh's phase two, that is to say, that the US and ARVN are now overextended and are concentrating on keeping open lines of communication to their exposed outer posts. To some

extent, of course, this is true. What is new in the situation, however, is the fact that with its improved intelligence, extreme mobility, heavy firepower, and tremendous air-support capability, the US can also attack Viet Cong strongholds and thus by spoiling actions throw Communist tactical planning and movements off balance.

Moreover, there has now developed a serious challenge to what the Communists regard as one of the keys to their ultimate victory, their own rear base. In the war with France, this safe rear was first in China, then in the highlands of North Vietnam. In the current war, the Communists have made it clear that they regard North Vietnam as the rear area for the war. Since February 1965, however, this base for the movement of men and supplies to the Viet Cong has come under heavy aerial attack by the US. While these air strikes have as yet not prevented North Vietnam from continuing to send men and material to the South, they have made the process much more costly and time consuming.

II. Tactical Military Lessons

The lessons learned in fighting the French are being applied in a myriad of practical steps by the Vietnamese Communists in the current war. The reliance on the tactic of ambush, for example, results in large measure from the successful development of this technique against the French. The Viet Cong have frequently set up ambushes against the South Vietnamese and US forces on almost exactly the same spots where French elements were ambushed nearly twenty years ago.

Another lesson, learned the hard way against the French, is the need to avoid precipitous military action against superior forces. In 1951 and 1952, Vo Nguyen Giap launched several major attacks on French forces only to have his units shattered by superior French firepower. Giap drew back, reformed, re-equipped, and retrained his units, and from then on faithfully followed the advice of Truong Chinh who urged that such actions be undertaken only when the Communists positively enjoyed the superior position. Giap's dedication to this formula led ultimately to Dien Bien Phu, where his forces had the superior position. That the Vietnamese Communist High Command learned its lesson is evident in Communist tactics in the present war. The Viet Cong/PAVN forces rarely venture out on an attack now unless they

are virtually certain that they will have the advantage. The Communists instead, attempt to draw friendly forces into remote areas where terrain, transportation, and weather tend to neutralize the superior firepower and mobility of the allied side.

The success of the North Vietnamese in keeping their transportation routes open is also due in some measure to their experience in the Franco - Viet Minh war. In addition, they appear to have drawn heavily upon Chinese and North Korean experiences in the Korean War. The extensive use of coolie labor for bomb-damage repair is not something uniquely Vietnamese, but the Hanoi leadership has had great experience, due to the war with France, in forming and operating coolie labor units. The mobilization of rudimentary forms of transportation is also a technique learned well in the war against France.

III. Political Lessons

Experiences gained in the political sphere in the war against the French are also being used by the Communists in the present conflict. They continue to put heavy emphasis on the "political struggle" and to express confidence that enemy military superiority cannot in the long run prevail in a "people's war." To the extent that it is more than propaganda, this line partly reflects adherence to Marxist dialectic principles that "contradictions" in the opposing forces (referring here to "contradictions" between the Americans and their "puppets" as well as to conflicts among the South Vietnamese themselves as evidenced by the recent succession of internal coups) will inevitably work in the Communists' favor. The Communists are mindful of the fact that in the earlier war the lack of positive support by the majority of non-Communist Vietnamese for the French was a major factor contributing to the ultimate defeat of France.

On the practical level, the Communists have in their current "struggle" sought to apply their political view of the war through methods which parallel those used earlier by the Viet Minh. In addition to propaganda which seeks to foster South Vietnamese hatred for the Americans as the true "aggressors," the Communists set out to repeat the combined tactics of terror and benevolence used successfully by the Viet Minh. Thus they have revived the terrorist bombings in Saigon and conducted terrorist reprisals

against supporters of the Saigon government at all levels throughout the countryside, while at the same time they have tried to ingratiate themselves with the general populace by various good works--helping with the harvest, improving sanitation, conducting educational programs, etc. Land reform, a technique used with some success by the Viet Minh through simply granting ownership outside the colonial administration, became a platform of Viet Cong's Liberation Front.

The Hanoi leadership also learned in part from the Franco-Viet Minh war to proceed cautiously on the matter of negotiations, even while not rejecting the idea of talks at an appropriate point. Premier Pham Van Dong was the primary agent for the Vietnamese Communists in the series of negotiations with the French between 1945 and 1954. He stated in 1965 that the Vietnamese Communists had learned from their negotiations with the French that the "imperialists" merely use discussions as a technique to gain a pause in the shooting so that they can prepare for further fighting. Dong went on to state that they do not intend to make the same mistake with the Americans. Instead, they intend to wear the US down to the point of accepting the bulk of their terms for a settlement through the tactic of protracted war.

The Vietnamese Communists do have some reason to feel that the various negotiated agreements reached with the French were used to the disadvantage of the Viet Minh. The French moved against Ho's self-proclaimed Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1946 despite an agreement signed with representatives of his government recognizing its autonomy. The aftermath of the Fountainbleau conference in 1946 at which a cease-fire agreement was reached, showed the French moving to escalate the war. The final proof of Western perfidy, in the eyes of the Vietnamese Communists, was the failure of the Western powers to implement the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina, agreements which the Hanoi leaders felt would assure their peaceful takeover of all Vietnam.

Although chary of actually entering into negotiations with the US from a position of relative weakness, the Vietnamese Communists also realize that the tactic of "talk, fight, talk," was in some respects used effectively by both sides in the Franco - Viet Minh war. Thus they have been

reluctant to close the door completely to possible negotiations with the US; a talk stage in the "struggle" could prove attractive to Hanoi itself at some point to gain a respite from allied military pressure.

This is probably in part why the North Vietnamese have continued to receive a fairly steady flow of visitors from Western and nonaligned countries with various ideas for getting talks started between Hanoi and Washington. North Vietnam probably has at least two aims in accepting these visitors. One aim is to encourage the notion that the Communists are reasonable, although firm, in their attitude toward what it would take to reach a settlement of the war. The second, and probably more important purpose, has been to put increased pressure on the US to cease its bombings of the North. A number of foreign visitors have come away from Hanoi believing that they had received intimations that if the bombings ceased, talks could begin.

DAILY 1643 3000

SECRET (When Filled In)

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1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

● ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

COUNTRY INDONESIA

TDCS-314/02882-65

DATE OF INFO. 1 MARCH 1965

DISTR. 4 MARCH 1965

SUBJECT

SUKARNO'S INSTRUCTIONS FOR HARASSMENT OF OFFICIAL AMERICANS AS MEANS OF INDUCING U.S. SUPPORT FOR INDONESIA AGAINST MALAYSIA

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

PLACE & DATE ACQ. [redacted] (2 MARCH 1965)

REF IN 15386

FIELD REPORT NO.

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: [redacted]

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(6)

[redacted]

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(6)

1. PRESIDENT SUKARNO HAS GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS FOR SUSTAINED HARASSMENT OF AMERICAN OFFICIALS IN INDONESIA. CHIEF OF ARMED FORCES STAFF INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (DINSAB) GENERAL MAGENDA TOLD A GROUP OF HIS OFFICERS ON 2 MARCH THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS ARE TO GRADUALLY STEP UP THIS HARASSMENT UNTIL A PEAK IS REACHED IN JUNE. SEPARATE EFFORTS ARE TO BE AIMED AT AMERICAN MAIL, HOUSING, AND SERVANTS, THE LATTER TO BE MOUNTED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE NATIONAL FRONT. (SOURCE COMMENT: MAGENDA GAVE NO ASSIGNMENTS FOR HARASSMENT

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

[redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

SECRET

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO EXO

AD/CI 2 CIA/NMCC

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
JUN 25 1997

OF AMERICANS, NOR FROM THE CONTEXT OF HIS REMARKS DID IT APPEAR THAT DINSAB WOULD OTHERWISE BECOME INVOLVED.) 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

2. MAGENDA SAID THAT SUKARNO BELIEVES THAT A GRADUAL WORSENING OF U.S. - INDONESIAN RELATIONS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH INDONESIAN MOVES TOWARDS THE CHICOMS, WILL INDUCE THE U.S. TO STEP IN ON THE SIDE OF INDONESIA IN ITS CONFRONTATION AGAINST MALAYSIA.

3. (FIELD COMMENT: FND 7511(TDCS-314/00496-65) FROM AN INDEPENDENT SOURCE QUOTED SUKARNO AS SAYING THAT, FACING THE PROSPECT OF ALL-OUT WAR WITH CHINA OVER VIETNAM, THE AMERICANS WILL FIND IT NECESSARY TO REPAIR THEIR RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA. THE PRICE OF THIS , SUKARNO MADE CLEAR, WOULD BE SUPPORT FOR BREAKING UP MALAYSIA.)

4. FIELD DISEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT. (ALSO SENT: SINGAPORE, KUALA LUMPUR.)

END OF MESSAGE

DIST: J3-1 J5-1 SACSA-3 SAMAA-1 SECDEF-7 J1-1 GC-1
ASD/ISA-5 DIA-15 CS-[redacted] ASD/PA-1
CJCS-1 FILE-1(40) [redacted]

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ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

IN -27245
CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/JC
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
SERVICE

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR CS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC
EXO, DDI

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[redacted]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

221246Z CITE [redacted]

DIST 22 MARCH 1965

1.3(a)(4)

Deputy TPMG
Exec. Officer
Admin - Mgt
Correction
MP & Plans
Secty & Invest

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM/SOUTH VIETNAM/UNITED STATES

DOI 1965 AND 1966

SUBJECT NORTH VIETNAMESE POLICY TOWARD UNITED STATES PRISONERS OF WAR.

501-08(6)

File: ~~502-023~~

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

SOURCE [redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

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[redacted]

DA IN 118503 0000

Approved for Release
Date August 1993

NND 927660-107

[redacted] N -27245

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

1. NORTH VIETNAM (NVN) POLICY FOR THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR (POWS) STIPULATED THAT ALL UNITED STATES (U.S.) PERSONNEL WHO WERE CAPTURED IN A SPECIFIED AREA WERE TO BE TAKEN TO REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS. ONLY REGIMENTAL CADRES WERE AUTHORIZED TO INTERROGATE U.S. POWS. THE CAPTURING UNIT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LIVES OF THE PRISONERS FROM THE TIME THEY WERE CAPTURED UNTIL THEY WERE DELIVERED TO A HIGHER AUTHORITY. THE UNIT USUALLY ASSIGNED MEMBERS OF A LABOR YOUTH GROUP TO ACCOMPANY THE POWS IN ORDER TO PROTECT THEM FROM THE PEOPLE, MILITIA, AND GUERRILLAS, BECAUSE IN SOME AREAS THE PEOPLE WOULD ATTEMPT TO BEAT AMERICANS. THE COMMAND SECTIONS OF BATTALIONS AND REGIMENTS TOOK CARE OF FEEDING U.S. CAPTIVIES. RATIONS USUALLY CONSISTED OF CANNED FOOD WHICH HAD BEEN SEIZED IN BATTLE. CAPTIVES DID NOT REMAIN WITH A BATTALION OR REGIMENT FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME.

2. U.S. PILOTS, AS WELL AS OTHER PRISONERS, RECEIVED GOOD TREATMENT. THEY COULD BE TAUGHT THE VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE, AND WERE PERMITTED TO HOLD POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS, IF THEY WISHED. THEY WERE GIVEN A SPECIAL DIET, AND WERE PROVIDED WITH CLEAN LIVING QUARTERS AND A RESTRICTED RECREATIONAL AREA. ALL U.S. POWS WERE EVENTUALLY TAKEN TO HANOI TO ENSURE THEIR SAFETY AND 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

DA IN 118503

1ST INDICATION OF THIS!

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NND 927660-108

1.3(a)(4)

(classification) (dissem controls)

AN ADEQUATE DIET. PRISONERS WHO WERE CAPTURED IN SOUTH VIETNAM WENT PART OF THE WAY ON FOOT, BUT THOSE CAPTURED IN NVN COULD GO TO HANOI BY TRUCK OR TRAIN.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USAID JUSPAO USMACV USARV NAVFORV 7TH AIR FORCE DIST 50/OSI 525TH MIG CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

1.3(a)(4)

ACTION: CIA (ARMY ACSI)
DISTR : OCOFSA, DCSOPS, OSA
DA IN 118503

ADDED DISTR: TPMG
(PER MRS. SMITH)

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NND 927660-Ing

TOP SECRET [redacted]

ANNEX III

THE EFFECTS OF SOVIET AND CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN THE WAR ON THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS

[redacted]

ANNEX II

THE EFFECTS OF SOVIET AND CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN THE WAR ON THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS

I. Introduction

There is substantial evidence that the political positions of the Soviet Union and Communist China on the war, and the amount of their material assistance to the war effort, are highly significant influences on Vietnamese Communist policy. The importance of Soviet and Chinese support and assistance has been readily admitted by the Vietnamese. In his April 1965 speech setting forth the situation and tasks facing the Vietnamese after the US began bombing the North, Premier Pham Van Dong said simply that the "more" the Vietnamese are "supported and assisted in all fields by the socialist camp, the more they will be able to struggle vigorously and resolutely" against the enemy in Vietnam. In April of 1966, Dong re-emphasized the significance of bloc backing in a declaration that the "victories" of the Vietnamese people are not only the results of their own efforts, but are also the "result of the infinitely valuable sympathy, support and assistance by the fraternal socialist countries."

The Vietnamese view bloc support as valuable in sustaining and, in some ways, increasing the military pressure the Communists can bring to bear in South Vietnam. They also see it as a protective umbrella which partially inhibits direct allied military pressure on the DRV and helps to negate the effects of the bombing of the North. Firm Soviet and Chinese backing also helps complete the ideological equation in the conflict so important to the Communists, i. e., this is a "war of liberation" and it is the duty of all Communists to support and encourage such wars.

II. The Significance of Economic and Military Aid

A. General Level of Aid

In an apparent response to the allied air offensive, military and economic assistance provided by the

USSR and Communist China increased sharply in 1965. Although the total amounts of aid extended during 1965 are not known, reasonably firm evidence enables us to estimate that military aid amounting to about $250 million and economic aid of about $100 million was probably delivered in 1965. The Communist allies have undoubtedly undertaken commitments to provide additional assistance but we are unable to make any meaningful estimates of the total value of these commitments. There is reliable evidence that the USSR in 1965 did commit itself to extend additional assistance of at least $160 million. We do not know if this extension is for military or economic programs. The weight of available evidence suggests that it is not for weapons but is probably intended as assistance in the rebuilding of bomb damaged facilities or for defense related activities.

The immediate significance of the military and economic aid provided by other Communist countries is that it provides North Vietnam the material means to carry out its aggressive programs. North Vietnam is significant militarily as a logistic base for the transmission of military supplies to South Vietnam, as a source of manpower, and as the center for control of the insurgency. As a primitive economy it has a capability to produce only minor items of military equipment and relies on other Communist countries for all of its heavy military equipment and most of its small arms and ammunition. Material assistance to North Vietnam is also significant as an apparent commitment of other Communist countries to underwrite the material costs of the war and to assist in the reconstruction of North Vietnam's economy. These assurances undoubtedly underlie North Vietnam's apparent willingness to lose its economic facilities to air attack and to persist in its pursuit of the war in South Vietnam. This attitude is undoubtedly strengthened by the knowledge that even more assistance will be forthcoming in 1966. Preliminary data on shipping to North Vietnam show that imports continue to rise above 1965 levels. At the same time exports are continuing to decline so that the growing import surplus can only be financed by additional assistance from Communist countries.

B. Economic Aid

Known economic credits and grants extended by Communist countries through 1962 amounted to more than $956

million. (See Table II-1). About 40 percent of the total was in the form of grants. By the end of 1964 from $550-800 million or 60-80 percent of the extension had been drawn. The USSR accounted for $370 million (40 percent) of total extensions and Communist China provided $457 million (48 percent). The remaining $130 million was supplied by the European Communist countries and token amounts were provided by Albania, North Korea, and Mongolia.

After an apparent hiatus of two years the Soviet program for economic assistance to North Vietnam was revived in February 1965 when Premier Kosygin visited Hanoi. As the war expanded substantial new extensions of economic aid were made in mid-1965. The only public statements about the value and composition of the aid has come from Hungary which is reported to have granted a modest $5.5 million for trucks, telecommunications equipment, medical supplies, and machine tools. Rumania is also reported [redacted] to have extended a credit of $4.4 million.

In December 1965 and January 1966 new aid agreements were signed with all Communist countries, suggesting that the mid-1965 agreements were small. Since then other Communist countries have promised increased assistance for North Vietnam. In May 1966, Moscow reported an agreement to provide technical assistance; additional Chinese aid for agriculture was announced in July. All the Warsaw Pact members also pledged increased economic aid to North Vietnam in July 1966.

We estimate that deliveries of economic aid in 1965 were in the order of $100 million or from 20-40 percent above the average annual level in 1955-1964. In the last nine months, however, an unusually large number of new Soviet industrial aid contracts with North Vietnam were noticed [redacted] In June 1966 Soviet specialists were reported in North Vietnam to determine equipment needs for constructing new enterprises and rebuilding those destroyed by US air attacks.

All of these developments foreshadow a substantially increased aid in 1966 and 1967, a trend already confirmed by our intelligence on the volume and composition of North Vietnamese imports.

Table II - 1

Communist Economic Aid Extended to North Vietnam a/
1955-64

Million US $

	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963-64	1955-64
Communist China	200	b/	b/	b/	100	b/	157	b/	b/	457
USSR	100	8	12	21	25	200	4	N.A.	b/	369
Eastern Europe	50	8	7	b/	2	Negl.	62	b/	b/	130
Total	350	16	19	21	128	200	223	N.A.	b/	956

a. This is the minimum of economic aid extended by the Soviet Bloc and Communist China. In addition, insignificant amounts of aid have been extended by Albania, Mongolia, and North Korea. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
b. No extensions are known to exist, although some may have taken place.

TOP SECRET [redacted]
TOP SECRET [redacted]

C. Military Aid

Military aid to North Vietnam which had previously been on a relatively small scale reached [redacted] in 1965.* About three-fourths of this aid, by value, was provided by the USSR as the supplier of North Vietnam's modern air defenses, particularly its SAM system and jet interceptors. The approximately [redacted] provided by Communist China was limited principally to conventional arms.

1. Soviet Military Aid

By the end of 1965 Soviet military aid to North Vietnam approached $450 million. The sequence and value of Soviet arms aid to North Vietnam was as follows (in million US $):**

1953-63	222
1964	[redacted]
1965	
Total	

Military aid extended after August 1964 and in early 1965 probably was completely delivered by the end of 1965. Major deliveries included equipment for [redacted] surface-to-air missile firing battalions, [redacted] IL-28 light jet bombers, [redacted] MIG-21 jet fighters, [redacted] MIG-15/16 jet fighters, [redacted] AA guns ranging from 37-100 mm., and hundreds of vehicles. (See Table II-2).

The USSR has also provided military technicians to instruct the North Vietnamese in the operation of the SAM system. In addition the North Vietnamese have received pilot training in Soviet jet fighters both in North Vietnam and the USSR. We estimate that the number of military technicians may have been as high as 1,500 in mid-1965, but diminished when the North Vietnamese began to

*The value of military aid is expressed in Soviet foreign trade prices.

**Values, reported in rubles, have been converted to dollars at the official exchange rate: 1 ruble = US $1.11.

Table II-2

Estimated Soviet and Chinese Deliveries of Military Equipment to North Vietnam
1953 - June 1966

Million US $

Equipment	USSR		Communist China		Total	
	Quantity	Value	Quantity	Value	Quantity	Value
SAM Firing Battalion	24	127.0	-	-	24	127.0
Aircraft	163	55.4	44	5.7	207	61.1
IL-28 light jet bomber	8	2.8	-	-	-	-
MIG-21 jet fighter	25	20.0	-	-	-	-
MIG-15/17 jet fighter	35	4.5	44	5.7	-	-
MI-6 helicopter	6	12.0	-	-	-	-
Other	89	16.1	-	-	-	-
Naval Craft	20	8.2	34	21.6	54	29.8
SO-1 subchaser	4	4.0	-	-	-	-
P-4 motor torpedo boat	12	3.0	-	-	-	-
Small minesweeper	4	1.2	-	-	-	-
Swatow-class PGM	-	-	30	18.0	-	-
Shanghai-class PTF	-	-	4	3.6	-	-
Artillery (mostly AA guns)	2,800	68.0	200	4.3	3,000	72.3
Armor (tanks, A.P.C.'s, S.P. guns)	150	5.4	-	-	150	5.4
Radar	49	5.0	126	7.5	174	12.5
Trucks and Vehicles	1,500	7.5	1,500	7.5	3,000	15.0
Small Arms and Infantry Weapons	Large Quantities	50.0	Large Quantites	50.0	Large Quantities	100.0
Ammunition	Large Quantities	50.0	Large Quantites	30.0	Large Quantities	80.0
Total		376.5		126.6		503.1

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assume operational control of the SAM system. The cost of this technical assistance was probably less than $10 million.

Following North Vietnam's active confrontation with the US in the Tonkin Gulf incidents of August 1964, the Soviets extended Hanoi the reported [redacted] grant listed above for antiaircraft and including [redacted] for surface-to-air missile systems and missile and flight training for North Vietnamese crews. Shortly after Kosygin's visit to Hanoi in February 1965, another [redacted] was reportedly granted for aircraft and additional antiaircraft and SAM equipment.

An indication of continued military aid in 1966 is contained in reports on the "Gratuitous Aid and Technical Assistance Agreement" signed in Moscow in December 1965. Reportedly, the USSR agreed to provide large quantities of 130-mm antiaircraft guns, other ground equipment, and possibly [redacted] additional MIG-21 jet fighters. Although not enough is known on types and quantities of equipment to permit an estimate of the value of the arms portion of the agreement, the cost of the antiaircraft guns and jet fighters alone will exceed $80 million.

2. Chinese Military Aid

There is little information on Chinese military aid to North Vietnam, but we estimate that total aid by the end of 1965 was on the order of $125 million of which [redacted] was delivered in 1965. Although the North Vietnamese armed forces are structured basically on Chinese rather than Soviet lines, until 1960-61 they were equipped largely with weapons from the USSR. From 1960 to the Gulf of Tonkin incidents in August 1964 Chinese arms aid to Hanoi probably increased to a point where it equalled--if it did not exceed--Soviet arms aid. Following the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, the Chinese continued to provide some weapons, including [redacted] MIG-15/17 jet fighters and [redacted] Shanghai-class fast patrol boats, but fell far behind the USSR as the major arms supplier. The major Chinese contribution to Hanoi's war effort has been as a provider of military construction units and materials and, possibly, operational antiaircraft elements.

Some elements of Chinese military units are positioned in Northeast and Northwest near the main railroad

lines leading to Yunnan and Kwangsi. Elements of two railway engineer divisions of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and an antiaircraft division are known to be in these areas. Although little is known regarding the size of this force, it is estimated that from 25,000 to 45,000 Chinese may be involved.

Aside from these operational units, Chinese military technicians in North Vietnam may exceed 1,000. Unconfirmed reports state that 200 North Vietnamese pilots and ground crews trained in China in 1961-64. Although little is known on the numbers of Chinese technicians advising North Vietnam in the period 1961-64, they are believed not to have been so large as to move the cost of this military technical assistance above the $10 million spent by the USSR.

3. Other Communist Military Aid

Military aid supplied to North Vietnam by the Communist countries of Eastern Europe before 1965 was negligible. The major items of military and emergency reconstruction aid extended or delivered by these countries since then may be summarized as follows:

Donor Country	Nature of Aid
Czechoslovakia	Small Arms, Ammunition
East Germany	10 Field Hospitals
Hungary	Medicines, Hospital
Poland	Barges, Trucks, Hsopital
Rumania	Vehicles, Trucks

East European aid primarily is of a quasimilitary, defense support nature (even the Czechoslovakian small arms were mainly sporting rifles for training purposes). This aid has gained impetus in 1966 and may be expected to increase substantially in the future.

D. Bloc Aid as a Critical Factor in Continuing the War

Although Soviet and Chinese military and economic aid has been small in terms of their capabilities, it is absolutely vital to North Vietnam's ability to adequately

defend its territory and to support the insurgency in South Vietnam. A cessation of bloc military aid would, in fact, almost certainly make it impossible for the Vietnamese to sustain the war in South Vietnam at its present level of intensity.

North Vietnam has no productive capability to produce heavy military equipment or the new family of weapons with which the VC Main Forces are being equipped. The NVA and VC Main Forces are totally dependent on outside sources for the 7.62 family of weapons and the heavier weapons being introduced into South Vietnam. If these sources were denied, the VC/NVA forces would be deprived of their major offensive capabilities, and once stockpiles were exhausted these forces would be compelled to revert to a much lower level of military activity.

Since the available evidence points not only to a continuation, but to a probable increase in bloc aid during the last half of 1966, it does not appear likely that the Vietnamese Communists will be faced with devising any substitutes for it or of altering their policy to take account of its cessation during the foreseeable future. Moreover, so long as Soviet and Chinese support continues at least at its present levels, it does not appear that the Vietnamese Communists would view it as a critical factor in any basic determination they might make on whether to continue the fighting. Vietnamese Communist assertions that, in the final analysis, they must rely mainly on their own resources to prosecute the revolution appear to reflect a genuine and deeply held belief. The theme of "self-reliance" has been a persistent one in Vietnamese Communist statements, and has not at all been abandoned or dampened down in the face of the increasing allied military pressure on the Viet Cong and on the DRV.

In March of 1966, for example, DRV party spokesman Truong Chinh declared that the "strategic line" of the revolution was still to rely "mainly on our own forces" while fighting a protracted war. In April, Ho Chi Minh told a Cairo newsman that the Vietnamese people, while "highly appreciating" the assistance of the socialist countries would "basically depend on their own forces." In May, another North Vietnamese politburo spokesman, Pham Hung, reiterated that, even while employing assistance from the bloc, "our dictum is to rely principally on our own strength."

III. The Rationale For Chinese Support

There appear to be several important considerations in the Vietnamese view which tend to reinforce their "do it yourself" attitude. They apparently believe, for one thing, that there are distinct limits to the amount of political and materiel support which can be counted upon from Peking and Moscow. Vietnamese documents and statements indicate that they believe Peking is willing to make a considerable contribution of military, economic, and political assistance to keep the fighting going along its present lines--a protracted struggle by proxy, fought if necessary to the last Vietnamese. Hanoi is also well aware that the conflict provides a test case of Mao's theory that "wars of liberation" can be fought without provoking a US nuclear response against either the local Communists or their sponsors. This war, moreover, is taking place in an area close to China and in a region which the Chinese believe to be their rightful sphere of influence.

However, the Vietnamese also appear to believe that there are limits to the price Peking is willing to pay to keep the conflict going. This is implicit, in part, in the DRV's handling and comment on public Chinese pledges of assistance. For example, a 28 December 1965 editorial in the DRV party daily, which dealt with Chinese assistance, was formulated in a manner which made it clear that the latest pledges of Chinese support were not as strong as those earlier issued by Peking, prior to the escalation of the air war against North Vietnam. The editorial also treated the question of Chinese volunteers for Vietnam in a fashion which suggested some doubt in Hanoi over the ultimate willingness of Peking to bring in combat troops should the situation deteriorate to the point where they might be needed. The editorial followed a new aid pact between the Chinese and the North Vietnamese signed in early December. The pact was treated in the press of both countries with caution and without the usual fanfare. The aid, moreover, was in the form of a loan and not a grant. This, in itself, suggested limitations on the Chinese interest in supporting the Vietnamese.

Peking's caution is not, however, entirely a negative factor in Hanoi's view. The Vietnamese themselves wish to prevent the introduction of such massive Chinese assistance as would undercut Vietnamese Communist control

and direction of the insurgency, unless it was required to prevent the extinction of the Communist regime in the DRV. This was underscored by DRV politburo member, Le Duc Tho, in an article published in the North Vietnamese party journal in February 1966. The "lines, strategy, and methods" of the revolution, wrote Tho, are a "responsibility which our party must assume, as we ourselves and alone can realize most clearly the problems concerning the revolution in our country."

Tho was doubtless addressing both Peking and Moscow in his remarks, but he probably had mainly in mind the persistent Chinese political pressure on Hanoi designed to keep the Vietnamese steadfast in the war and block any possible move toward negotiations. One prime example of this occurred in June when the Chinese lashed out at a Soviet-sponsored World Peace Council proposal on negotiations to end the war. Although the proposal closely echoed the DRV's own four points, the Chinese maintained that because it did not insist on the "immediate and total withdrawal of US troops from South Vietnam," it had left out the key element in a Vietnam settlement. Hanoi itself has never insisted on immediate withdrawal as a condition for negotiations and did not make any comment on the proposal by the council. Peking, however, was clearly anxious to make it appear that the Asian Communist position on ending the war was tougher than indicated in the Council proposal to which the North Vietnamese had been a party. Peking's quick attack denied Hanoi the opportunity to voice any approval of the proposal lest it indicate an open difference of opinion with the Chinese.

Even given the Chinese willingness to pressure Hanoi, however, it is probable that the pressure would not be sufficient to force the Vietnamese to stay in the war if they decide on their own volition to end the fighting. The Vietnamese Communists probably estimate that, in view of the limitations on the Chinese commitment, Peking would do little more than complain if the conflict were terminated short of an insurgent victory. The Chinese, in fact, seem to recognize this, for they have repeatedly left themselves an out by emphasizing that all decisions on the war are "strictly" up to the Vietnamese.

IV. Vietnamese View of Soviet Support

The Vietnamese Communists probably judge, on the basis of Moscow's assistance so far, that the Soviet commitment

in the war is considerably more restrained than that of the Chinese. This can be seen, in part, in North Vietnamese statements dealing with Soviet assistance. Although Hanoi has, in the main, carefully attempted to express equal gratitude for the help of both bloc powers, some remarks implicitly critical of Moscow have occasionally come forth. In mid-1965, for example, at a time when the North Vietnamese signed aid pacts with both Peking and Moscow, DRV spokesmen were much warmer in their description of Chinese assistance than of Soviet. Peking's support was termed at the time the "firmest, the most powerful, and the most effective," while China was hailed as the "most enthusiastic and resolute comrade in arms of all nations fighting against the imperialists."

Hanoi is fully aware that Moscow, like Peking, has also displayed an overriding concern in its actions on the war to avoid steps which might lead to a direct Soviet-US military confrontation. For example, Moscow has throughout the conflict avoided sea delivery to Haiphong of sensitive military shipments. Moreover, important Soviet officials have gone out of their way in private to disavow the significance for Soviet-US relations of the presence of Soviet military-technical personnel in the DRV.

It is doubtless clear to the Vietnamese that the Soviets would like an early end to the war. Evidence suggests that the Soviets did cautiously advise Hanoi to move toward a political settlement of the conflict in early 1965. Following Kosygin's visit to the DRV in February, the Chinese charged that Moscow had sent a formal proposal to Hanoi and Peking suggesting a reconvention of an international conference on Indochina. During the bombing pause early this year, party secretary Shelepin apparently took further soundings on Hanoi's attitude toward possible political alternatives to the conflict. In recent months, in view of the continuing hard-line stand of the Vietnamese, the Russians appear to have avoided applying most of the pressures they could exert on the DRV, probably judging them to be marginal at best. Soviet party chief Brezhnev displayed this cautious attitude during recent talks with De Gaulle. He told the French president that Moscow would be ready to attend a conference only "if and when Hanoi agrees."

Despite the limitations on Soviet assistance and support, it is probable that Soviet backing has, on balance, the effect of buttressing the Vietnamese Communist will to

persist in the conflict. The Vietnamese probably judge that they can continue to count indefinitely on Moscow's assistance along present lines so long as the war continues in its present context. They probably believe, in fact, that the Soviets are now locked into the struggle in view of the pretensions Moscow still holds to leadership of the Communist camp, and that it cannot afford to step completely aside.

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233

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY • PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

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NLJ 96-111
Document # 233

COUNTRY LAOS [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

DATE OF INFO. 18 MARCH - 12 APRIL 1965 DISTR. 14 APRIL 1965

SUBJECT

ENEMY ATTACHS ON FRIENDLY POSITONS IN SOUTHERN PHONG SALY AND WESTERN LUANG PRABANG PROVINCES

PLACE & DATE ACQ. LAOS, VIENTIANE (13 APRIL 1965) REF IN 44724

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: [redacted] FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

1. (SUMMARY: IN LATE MARCH AND THROUGHOUT THE FIRST WEEK OF APRIL 1965, ADC UNITS IN SOUTHERN PHONG SALY AND NORTHWESTERN LUANG PRABANG PROVINCES WERE BEING ATTACKED BY ENEMY GROUPS RANGING IN SIZE FROM ABOUT 200 TO NEARLY 800 MEN. THE MAJORITY OF THE ATTACKING FORCES WERE PATHET LAO REINFORCED WITH TROOPS FROM THE PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM (PAVN) AN ADC COMMANDER ESTIMATED THAT 200 OF THE TROOPS INVOLVED IN ATTACKS ABOUT 40 KILOMETERS NORTHEAST OF NAM THA TOWN WERE REGULAR CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES BUT THIS IS NOT CONFIRMED. A LOCAL RESIDENT OF THIS AREA REPORTED THE MOVEMENT OF A CHINESE COMMUNIST BATTALION FROM SHANGYUNG (QD 8058) TO 49 KILOMETERS NORTHEAST OF NAM THA TOWN. THE 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 29 JUL 1997

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1.5(c)
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AREAS UNDER ATTACK WERE IN THE VICINITY OF SJ 9038, 65 KILOMETERS NORTHEAST OF NAM THA TOWN, AND IN THE VICINITY OF QD 9323, 41 KILOMETERS EAST OF NAM THA. THE ENEMY HAD OVERRUN THE POSITIONS OF AT LEAST FOUR ADC COMPANIES AND HAD EITHER DISPERSED OR CAPTURED THE ADC TROOPS. BY 12 APRIL BOTH ADC AREAS WERE UNDER HEAVY ENEMY PRESSURE.)

2. AN INFORMANT WITH ACCESS TO MUONG SING (QD 2445) GAVE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON THE ENEMY TO MEMBERS OF A FRIENDLY UNIT:

A. ON 18 MARCH ABOUT 250 ENEMY TROOPS MOVED FROM MUONG SING TO NAM THA (QD 5118) THESE TROOPS WERE DRESSED IN GREEN UNIFORMS AND WERE ARMED WITH THREE UNIDENTIFIED HEAVY WEAPONS. (FIELD COMMENT: THESE MAY HAVE BEEN TROOPS OF THE 408TH PL BATTALION WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE (NVN) ATTACHED WHICH WAS LISTED IN THE 1 APRIL ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE ESTIMATE FOR LAOS AS BEING HEADQUARTERED IN MUONG SING.)

B. ON 28 MARCH THERE WERE ABOUT 109 ENEMY TROOPS, INCLUDING POLICE, IN MUONG SING. ALL HEAVY WEAPONS EMPLACEMENTS HAD BEEN FILLED WITH DIRT.

C. THE ENEMY PROPAGANDIZED THAT THEY WERE BEGINNING A MAJOR OFFENSIVE AGAINST FRIENDLY TROOPS.

3. A VILLAGER WHO HAD ACCESS TO NAM THA TOWN TOLD A LAO ARMED FORCES (FAR) SERGEANT THAT ON 28 MARCH 120 PAVN/ETHNIC BLACK THAI TROOPS MOVED EAST FROM NAM THA TOWN. THESE TROOPS WERE ARMED WITH ONE 81MM MORTAR AND FOUR RECOILLESS RIFLES. FIFTY COOLIES CARRIED AMMUNITION AND SUPPLIES FOR THIS UNIT. (FIELD COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE INFORMANT IDENTIFIED SOME OF THESE TROOPS AS PAVN, IT IS POSSIBLE THEY WERE

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

PART OF THE FORCE REFERRED TO IN PARA 2 A OR WERE FROM THE 5TH PL BATTALION, LISTED IN THE 1 APRIL ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE ESTIMATE FOR LAOS AS BEING HEADQUARTERED IN NAM THA TOWN.)

4. THE COMMANDER OF AN ADC UNIT AT QD 9323, 41 KMS EAST OF NAM THA TOWN, REPORTED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON THE ENEMY:

A. ON 31 MARCH ABOUT 300 PL/PAVN TROOPS ATTACKED AND CAPTURED AN ADC COMPANY POSITION AT QD 9019, 39 KILOMETERS EAST OF NAM THA TOWN. EIGHT ADC SOLDIERS WERE KILLED OR WOUNDED. THE ENEMY TROOPS SHOUTED IN VIETNAMESE DURING THE ATTACK.

B. ON 4 APRIL AN ENEMY FORCE OF UNDETERMINED SIZE ATTACKED AND CAPTURED AN ADC COMPANY POSITION AT QD 9228, 40 KILOMETERS EAST OF NAM THA. TWO ADC SOLDIERS WERE KILLED. THE ADC COMAPNY RETREATED TO QD 9331, THREE KILOMETERS TO THE NORTH.

C. ON 5 APRIL AT 1920 HOURS ABOUT 200 ENEMY TROOPS ATTACKED AND OVERRAN AN ADC COMPANY'S POSITION AT QD 9334, 45 KILOMETERS NORTHEAST OF NAM THA. THE ADC SOLDIERS WERE DISPERSED AND ONLY 18 ARRIVED AT THEIR HEADQUARTERS AT QD 9323.

D. ON 8 APRIL AT 20000 HOURS ABOUT 300 ENEMY TROOPS WITH 400 LOCAL VILLAGERS AS COOLIES ATTACKED AND OVERRAN AN ADC COMPANY AT QD 9339, 48 KILOMETERS NORTHEAST OF NAM THA. THE ENEMY CAPTURED THE ENTIRE COMPANY AND FORCED IT TO CARRY SUPPLIES.

E. ON 9 APRIL THE ADC HEADQUARTERS AT QD 9323 MOVED TO RD 0121, 11 KILOMETERS TO THE EAST.

F. ON 10 APRIL THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 400 CHINESE COMMUNIST

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AND PAVN TROOPS AT QD 9331. (FIELD COMMENT: FURTHER EVIDENCE ON THE PRESENCE OF REGULAR CHINESE COMMUNIST TROOPS AT QD 9331 WITH THE PATHET LAO IS LACKING AND THIS IDENTIFICATION OF THE UNIT AS A REGULAR UNIT FROM CHINA SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WITH RESERVE AT THIS TIME.)

5. THE ADC BATTALION COMMANDER AT DOI SANG (SJ 9038) HAD THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON THE ENEMY:

A. ON AN UNREPORTED DATE A TOTAL OF 779 ENEMY TROOPS ARMED WITH ONE 12½MM MORTAR, TWO 75MM HOWITZERS, THREE 82MM RECOILLESS GUNS AND THREE 57MM RECOILLESS RIFLES ATTACKED AND ROUTED ADC TROOPS IN THE VICINITY OF QD 9431. (FIELD COMMENT: THIS IS PROBABLY THE ACTION REPORTED IN PARA 4 C.)

B. ON 7 APRIL AN ENEMY FORCE OF UNREPORTED SIZE WAS MOVING TO SURROUND DOI SANG.

6. THE ADC COMMANDER FOR THE NORTHERN LUANG PRABANG AREA REPORTED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:-

A. AN ADC COMPANY IN THE VICINITY OF RD 0239, 64 KILOMETERS NORTHEAST OF NAM THA TOWN, WAS ATTACKED AND DISPERSED ON AN UNREPORTED DATE IN THE SECOND WEEK OF AFRIL. ONLY THREE MEN FROM THE COMPANY REACHED ADC TROOPS IN THE VICINITY OF RD 1138.

B. ONE ADC COMPANY AND A LARGE NUMBER OF CIVILIAN REFUGEES WERE AT QD 9525, 35 KILOMETERS NORTHEAST OF NAM THA, WERE ALMOST CUT OFF FROM ADC FORCES TO THE EAST ON 12 APRIL.

C. ON 12 APRIL ENEMY CONTROL EXTENDED TO A LINE RUNNING FROM TJ 0527, 78 KILOMETERS EAST OF NAM THA TOWN, SOUTHWEST TO MUONG LA

(TJ Ø111) TO MUONG SAI (RC 129Ø), 67 KILOMETERS SOUTHEAST OF NAM THA. (FIELD COMMENT: [redacted]) REPORTED A PROBABLE ENEMY ATTEMPT TO CUT OFF THE ADC HEADQUARTERS AT DOI SANG FROM ADC UNITS TO THE SOUTH.) 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

D. BY 12 APRIL ABOUT 8ØØ ENEMY TROOPS WERE IN THE QD 9331 AREA, 43 KILOMETERS NORTHEAST OF NAM THA TOWN. THE SUPPLY LINE FOR THESE TROOPS RAN FROM BATENE (QD 7744), 36 KILOMETERS NORTHEAST OF NAM THA.

E. AN ESTIMATED 2ØØ REGULAR CHINESE COMMUNIST TROOPS TOOK PART IN THESE ATTACKS. ACCORDING TO THE ADC COMMANDER, THE CHINESE TROOPS WERE IDENTIFIED BY THEIR UNIFORMS AND THEIR LANGUAGE. ADC TROOPS INVOLVED IN CLOSE QUARTERS COMBAT SAID THAT THE CHINESE WORE UNIFORMS WITH FOUR INCH LONG RED STRIPES ON THE RIGHT EPAULET AND GREEN OR BLUE BERETS. THE ADC SOLDIERS CLAIMED THEY HEARD SHOUTS IN CHINESE. (FIELD COMMENT: ADC TROOPS IN THIS AREA HAVE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED HEARING CHINESE WHEN THE LANGUAGE INVOLVED WAS UNFAMILIAR TO THEM. FURTHER EVIDENCE ON THE PARTICIPATION OF REGULAR CHINESE COMMUNIST TROOPS IN ATTACKS IS LACKING AND THE INFORMATION SHOULD BE TREATED WITH RESERVE UNTIL VERIFICATION IS POSSIBLE.)

7. ACCORDING TO A VILLAGER WITH ACCESS TO THE AREA DESCRIBED, ON AN UNREPORTED DATE ONE BATTALION OF CHINESE TROOPS MOVED FROM SHANG-YUNG (QD 8Ø58) IN CHINA, 49 KILOMETERS NORTHEAST OF NAM THA TOWN, TO VANG NA TOUI (QD 7631) IN LAOS, 28 KILOMETERS NORTHEAST OF NAM THA TOWN AND JOINED WITH TWO PL COMPANIES WHICH ATTACKED FRIENDLY TROOPS IN THE QD 9323 AREA.

(FIELD COMMENT: FURTHER EVIDENCE ON THE PARTICIPATION OF REGUALR CHINESE COMMUNIST TROOPS IN ATTACKS WITH THE PATHET LAO IS LACKING AND THE INFORMATION SHOULD BE TREATED WITH RESERVE UNTIL VERIFICATION IS POSSIBLE.) 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

8. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY AIR USAID CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF USMACV-SAIGON 2ND AIR DIVISION-SAIGON [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

(END OF MESSAGE)

253

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THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(8 April - 14 April 1965)

C O N T E N T S

		Page
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE		iv
Map, South Vietnam, following page		
I.	SITUATION WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM	1
A.	POLITICAL SITUATION	1
	Provisional replacement of naval commander Admiral Cang upsets military and political balance (p. 1); Premier Quat hopes to exert greater control over armed forces (p. 1); Catholic fear of Buddhist hand in recent events reflected by Catholic hierarchy in Saigon (p. 2); Buddhists refrain from overt political involvement (p. 2); President Johnson's address welcomed by GVN officials and Saigon press (p. 3); Military tribunal sentences terrorists (p. 4); Da Nang's harbor channel is opened (p. 4); No improvement has been made in urban rice situation (p. 4)	
B.	MILITARY SITUATION	5
	Two of three large-scale Viet Cong attacks turned into significant	

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Page

Communist defeats (p. 5); Viet Cong retain capability of striking in force at times and places of their choosing (p. 5); Some indications noted Viet Cong are feeling effects of long war (p. 5); Also some evidence Viet Cong being given minimum training before assignment (p. 6); Recent GVN military achievement may be tonic for ARVN (p. 8); For first time both enemy casualties and weapon losses surpass those of government forces (p. 8).

C. RURAL RECONSTRUCTION 8

Little progress made in rural reconstruction effort (p. 8); Central Vietnam continues to be faced with refugee problem (p. 8); Hop Tac program reportedly has lost ground during past two weeks (p. 9).

II. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS 10

World reaction to President Johnson's speech was generally favorable (p. 10); Cambodian press reports a Cambodian was killed by GVN forces on Cambodian territory (p. 10).

III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC 12

Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow denounce President Johnson's offer for unconditional talks (p. 12); Communist China, North Vietnam and Liberation Front reject nonaligned 17 nations' conference proposal (p. 14); North Vietnam has not changed its terms for over-all settlement (p. 14); Communist China maintains public position that "Vietnamese people" must settle Vietnam problem (p. 15); Soviet Union's attitude reflects pressures for support of Hanoi and Soviet regard for USSR-US

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relations(p. 16); US-GVN air-strikes on 3 and 4 April evoked first intervention by enemy aircraft (p. 16); SAM site under construction southeast of Hanoi (p. 16).

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THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

Last week's naval mutiny in Saigon, which led to the provisional replacement of naval commander Admiral Cang, has had unsettling effects on both the military and political equilibrium. It has set a possible precedent for junior officers to take matters into their own hands. In addition, the suspension of both Cang and of Saigon area commander General Dong, accused of encouraging gambling, has raised Catholic fears of a Buddhist-inspired military purge. Cang is Catholic and Dong reacted firmly to Buddhist street agitation against the former Huong government.

Premier Quat, who considers Dong a troublemaker, and probably encouraged his suspension, now hopes to carry out a major command reorganization to bring the military under tighter civilian control. Quat's proposals, which would leave only one Catholic officer in a top command post, could risk a serious Catholic reaction if not the eventual opposition of the military in general. Although it is possible that the views of the Buddhist hierarchy have influenced Quat's thinking, the Buddhist clergy continues to refrain from open political activity except for the further promotion of anti-Communist themes among their followers.

The Viet Cong, despite recent government military successes which may have caused a temporary disruption of enemy plans in some areas, retain the capability of striking in force at times and places of their choosing and of maintaining a high rate of violence throughout the nation. The reported buildup of Communist forces and the advent of the rainy season, which favors the Viet Cong, indicates that a major effort can still be expected. The Viet Cong probably consider that successes are now required to offset both recent reverses and increased US participation in the war.

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
NORTH VIETNAM
DEMARCATION LINE
QUANG TRI
1st Division
THUA THIEN
I CORPS
QUANG NAM
THAILAND
2d Division
QUANG TIN
QUANG NGAI
KONTUM
22d Division
PLEIKU
BINH DINH
II CORPS
PHU BON
PHU YEN
CAMBODIA
DARLAC
KHANH HOA
23d Division
Phuoc Binh Thanh Special Zone
QUANG DUC
TUYEN DUC
NINH THUAN
5th Division
PHUOC LONG
LAM DONG
TAY NINH
PHNOM PENH
Mekong
CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT
25th Division
BINH TUY
BINH THUAN
Phuoc Bien Special Zone
9th Division
KIEN PHONG
KIEN TUONG
DINH TUONG
III CORPS
KIEN GIANG
Rung Sat Special Zone (VNN)
BIEN HOA
GIA DINH
7th Division
VINH BINH
GULF OF SIAM
21st Division
IV CORPS
XUYEN
Con Son (Poulo Condore)
CON SON
SOUTH VIETNAM
MILITARY BOUNDARIES
As of 8 March 1965
Corps boundary
Special zone boundary
Division boundary
Hop Tac area
46993
0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers

I. THE SITUATION WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM

A. POLITICAL SITUATION

1. A mutiny, staged on 8 April by a group of fleet commanders against navy chief Rear Admiral Chung Tan Cang, resulted in the latter's suspension by Armed Forces commander General Minh. The incident may well have further repercussions within the military establishment and within the currently delicate political alignment.

2. The complaints against Cang concerned primarily his involvement in kickbacks from coastal shipping contracts under his control. Opportunism among his subordinates, taking advantage of his apparent loyalty to ousted General Khanh, was also a factor. A three-man military board of inquiry is now looking into the charges of corruption against Cang, as well as into charges of irregularities by General Pham Van Dong, who was simultaneously suspended from the position of Saigon area commander at the behest of Premier Quat. Meanwhile, Marine Brigade commander General Khang has been named acting naval commander and Dong has been replaced temporarily by his somewhat controversial deputy, Colonel Lam Son.

3. The mutiny and subsequent investigations have created further uneasiness in two areas. The danger of setting a precedent for future action by junior officers--many of whom have been reported restless over the political opportunism of their superiors--has not been lost on the generals, some of whom otherwise favored Cang's ouster. In addition, some circles view the episode as one step in a broader power struggle, particularly on the part of Air Vice Marshal Ky and I Corps commander General Thi. Ky has publicly referred to the presence of "bad elements" in the Armed Forces Council.

4. Premier Quat, long concerned over the problem of military infighting, has indicated that he now hopes to take measures to exert greater

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control over the armed forces. He envisages a reorganization of the command structure to eliminate the positions of commander in chief and chief of staff. This would be primarily a device to "dispose" of Generals "Little" Minh and Huynh Van Cao, whom he considers uninspiring. They would be replaced with a single chief of the Joint General Staff, for whom Quat has no definite candidate. At the same time, Quat hopes to increase the responsibilities of Vice Premier and Armed Forces Minister General Thieu, whom he regards as a capable officer. Eventually, Quat hopes to dissolve the Armed Forces Council, now a potential rival authority.

5. Quat's proposals, in conjunction with the suspension of Admiral Cang and General Dong--a Catholic and Catholic sympathizer respectively--would have the effect of removing Catholic influence from the top military echelons, except for the presence of General Thieu. Although he has publicly stressed that the suspensions have no religious connotations, Quat is clearly running some risk of a Catholic reaction. His ultimate goal of extending his control over the military could lead to conflict with the generals as a group.

6. Catholic fear of a Buddhist hand in recent events is reflected by a reported appeal to Quat by the Catholic hierarchy in Saigon to prevent a general purge of Catholic military officers. General Dong, whom Quat suspects of stirring up Catholic circles, has privately described the charges against himself as trumped up, implying that they represent a Buddhist - Viet Cong conspiracy to seize control. The possibility of a Catholic-instigated coup attempt cannot be fully disregarded in view of the contacts maintained by militant Catholic refugee circles with ringleaders of the abortive 19 February coup, who are still at large in the Saigon area.

7. Although the possibility exists that Buddhist influence was exerted, either indirectly upon Quat or through sympathetic officers, in the

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suspension of Cang and Dong, the Buddhist hierarchy continues to refrain from overt political involvement. Buddhist efforts to develop a more openly anti-Communist posture remained evident during the week. Criticism of Viet Cong oppressive tactics was voiced by monks, laymen, and students alike at a 10 April reception by the Saigon University Buddhist Student Association. A speech by Thich Tam Chau, head of the Buddhist Institute, exhorted Buddhist worshipers to tighten their ranks against the Communist threat. Chau's speech, however, also contained some references to the continued presence of "Diemist remnants" and warned that, if these elements sought revenge against Buddhism, they would be combated along with the Communists. A lay Buddhist member of the National Legislative Council also recently implied that the Catholics were opposing land reform, and stressing instead less urgent political reforms. The source, however, did express support for the government's decision to hold elections on 30 May for municipal and provincial elections. Quat's cabinet has also recently taken some economic decisions calculated to increase support from organized labor.

8. South Vietnamese officials, and the Saigon press in general, have welcomed President Johnson's Baltimore speech as a reaffirmation of a firm US commitment to the country's defense. The US Embassy observes that the speech has provided a further lift to morale. Although there were some expressions of uneasiness in the Catholic press, and in statements attributed to Foreign Minister Tran Van Do, over the offer to entertain "unconditional discussions," Premier Quat's public statements have softened the effect. He stressed the US pledge of support and noted that the US merely attached no conditions to discussions which could lead to peace, as opposed to a peace settlement. Quat further hailed the US proposal of cooperative aid to Southeast Asia as a means of "stemming the Red tide." In contrast, some other Saigon comments have indicated concern over any inclusion of North Vietnam in the project.

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9. A military tribunal on 9 April sentenced to death Nguyen Van Hai, the terrorist captured in the recent bombing of the US Embassy. A death sentence was also meted to another terrorist, captured earlier with explosives, and a possible accomplice of Hai received five years at hard labor. Despite normal procedure, in which the death sentence is carried out within 48 hours, no date was set for Hai's execution. Premier Quat had indicated his full sympathy with the need to delay the execution in view of the Viet Cong threat to retaliate against a US civilian official in their hands. Clemency can be authorized by Chief of State Suu, or Hai may possibly be held temporarily for further questioning, as was done with a terrorist similarly sentenced in Da Nang. Meanwhile, evidence has accumulated that another US civilian, a USOM provincial representative captured by the Viet Cong last August, was shot and killed by the Viet Cong in January when he was discovered trying to escape.

Economic Situation

10. Initial work on the dredging of Da Nang's harbor channel was completed last week. A channel 35 meters wide was opened; dredging will continue until the channel, which was severely silted during last fall's floods, is 90 meters wide. The GVN also signed contracts for two transportation surveys. One calls for a comprehensive technical and economic study of transport facilities, including rail, road, and port requirements. The second contract provides for study of port facilities and shipping for the major coastal ports, including Saigon, and some inland ports.

There has been no improvement in the urban rice situation: rice deliveries to Saigon remain unseasonally low, and the price rose again. The implementation and effectiveness of planned military sweeps to provide security for rice shipments remains unknown.

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B. MILITARY SITUATION

1. Although there was a moderate rise in Viet Cong activities last week, Communist military successes were limited. Two of the three reported large-scale Viet Cong attacks were turned into significant Communist defeats. Despite some indications that the Viet Cong are suffering from effective US-GVN assaults, they remain capable of intensifying the war when and where they choose.

Communist-initiated activity increased in I and IV Corps but remained at the low level of the previous week in II and III Corps. Two company-size attacks were reported from I Corps: On 7 April a Viet Cong company simultaneously attacked two New Rural Life hamlets in Quang Tin Province and on 8 April, in Quang Ngai Province, a Viet Cong company-size attack force suffered greater losses than the Popular Forces platoon it ambushed. A determined Viet Cong battalion-size attack against a South Vietnamese marine battalion bivouacked along Route 1 was turned into a significant Communist defeat. The marines combined a strong defense with an aggressive counterattack to kill 205 Viet Cong while losing only four killed and 22 wounded. Almost all of the Viet Cong were killed by well-disciplined small arms fire in this purely infantry engagement. Enemy activity in the delta picked up noticeably but consisted mostly of small-scale activities. In Kien Giang, a Viet Cong force overran and completely leveled an outpost manned by 55 paramilitary forces. Only four in the garrison escaped and the others, along with their weapons, are missing. Despite the overall increase in Communist-initiated activity last week, the pattern remained unchanged.

There are some indications that the Viet Cong are feeling the effects of the long war. The number of Viet Cong military personnel returning to government control under the Chieu Hoi Program, while still modest, has reached its highest level since COMUSMACV started recording this statistic in January 1964. Recent ARVN operations have uncovered large caches of food, particularly in and around Viet Cong War Zone D, a factor which could disrupt the Communist timetable for future offensive operations. For the fourth time in a month, the Viet

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Cong have failed to react militarily to the substantial losses of foodstuffs. The recent discoveries of large caches of weapons and the partial compromise of the sea infiltration system along the northern coastal provinces probably represents some additional logistical loss to the Viet Cong.

There is also some evidence that the Viet Cong now being encountered are being given minimum training before their employment in main force front line units. Viet Cong recently captured in Binh Dinh after their encounter with the South Vietnamese marines indicated that they had received only 15 days basic military training. Five of the 10 captives were newly infiltrated and on initial interrogation displayed little basic military knowledge. Viet Cong prisoners taken after the government victory in Chuong Thien Province last week stated that their units had not been active in the southern reaches of the delta because they had withdrawn to the U-Minh Forest for training. The prisoners said that Viet Cong morale in these units is low and that some were experiencing difficulty recruiting to offset a high desertion rate. Two-thirds of the Viet Cong 303d battalion, located in Chuong Thien Province, were said to be new recruits, many of them young boys of 16-17 forcibly drafted from hamlets. Additionally, the expanded application of combat air power within South Vietnam is increasing the number of Viet Cong killed in all operations, according to COMUSMACV.

There have been numerous low-level reports of the withdrawal or disarming of Viet Cong units; few of these reports, however, were obtained by penetration agents and they are essentially hearsay statements of enemy intentions. COMUSMACV points out that the number and geographical spread of these reports appears to indicate a centrally-directed Communist campaign to create the impression of a Viet Cong withdrawal. They could also reflect a general regrouping in preparation for renewed attacks. Recent contacts with enemy units and the locale of current Viet Cong activity indicate that

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Communist forces remain in place ready to intensify the war when and where they choose. In particular, COMUSMACV reports that the enemy has been building up a strong force in War Zone D, possibly in preparation for a major operation along the periphery of the Hop Tac Zone.

In sum, despite recent government successes and despite evidence that the Viet Cong are feeling the effects of stepped-up US-GVN assaults and of attrition generally, the Communist force in South Vietnam currently remains capable of significantly intensifying the war beyond present proportions.

2. Government military forces maintained the high tempo of effective offensive operations during the past week resulting in a number of significant victories over the Viet Cong. Another favorable indicator bearing on military operations was the report that the estimated personnel gains for March exceeded 10,000, two-thirds of whom were volunteers.

In Chuong Thien Province, a large operation launched on 4 April under the control of the 21st Division in the delta, forced a major engagement with two Viet Cong main force battalions in the approaches to the U-Minh Forest. While the government forces were moving into the objective area, a Viet Cong battalion ambushed a river assault force. After three days of intense fighting, involving river, air, and ground elements, ARVN successfully broke off the engagement when their advance units were in danger of over-extending their supply lines and the troops were nearing the limit of their physical endurance. Eventually a government victory was achieved. The final results heavily favored the government forces: 278 Viet Cong were killed (body count), 7 captured in battle and 12 other suspects taken later who turned out to be Viet Cong, and considerable material losses. Friendly casualties amounted to 22 killed (including 6 US), 85 wounded plus three aircraft lost.

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A sector-controlled operation in Binh Dinh Province on 4 April, resulted in the virtual destruction of a Viet Cong company. Rapid response and flexibility in changing the scheme of maneuver after contact was made enabled the government force to envelope the Viet Cong flank. Extremely effective air strikes completed the victory. Final results show 42 Viet Cong were killed, compared to government losses of 10 killed and 15 wounded.

The significant government military achievements over the past several weeks could act as a tonic for ARVN and enable it to continue the aggressive offensive against enemy main force units in order to exploit, as much as possible, recent Viet Cong reverses.

3. Communist casualties and weapon losses reflect the intensified government offensive last week, and for the first time both enemy casualties and weapon losses greatly surpass those of the government. Viet Cong personnel losses dropped to 777 (643 KIA) from 875 (795 KIA) from the previous week. Government casualties declined to 666 (155 KIA from 685 (189 KIA) last week. The Viet Cong lost 238 weapons compared to the 198 lost last week, while the government lost only 115 weapons this week compared to the 241 lost one week ago.

C. RURAL RECONSTRUCTION

1. There was little significant progress in the nationwide rural reconstruction effort during the past week. The main problem in Central Vietnam continues to be the disposition of refugees. The high priority Hop Tac program reported only slight gains.

In the I Corps zone, emphasis continued to be centered on the refugee problem. The three provinces of the 2nd Division tactical zone (Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai)--where most of the

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refugees are now concentrated--have formulated plans for their disposition. Six refugee centers have been established in Quang Ngai and appear to be operating effectively.

3. In Binh Dinh Province, Route 1 has been opened to the Quang Ngai border following repair of more than 50 miles of the road north of Qui Nhon. Although commercial traffic has not yet started to use this portion of the road, refugees have started to move back into a town about 50 miles north of Qui Nhon.

4. Progress in the rural reconstruction effort in the Hop Tac area is slow. There was a net gain of three hamlets added to the list of hamlets meeting the six-point criteria. The total of "completed" hamlets in the Hop Tac zone is now 359--six less than reported by MACV two weeks ago.

Recruiting for the Popular Forces showed some improvement during the past week. Four hundred personnel were recruited for the Popular Forces, mainly in Gia Dinh and Bien Hoa provinces.

Rural reconstruction budgets have been prepared by the joint GVN-US rural reconstruction budget team for all of the Hop Tac provinces except Gia Dinh and Bien Hoa.

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II. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS

A. Reactions to President Johnson's April 7 Speech on Vietnam.

World reaction to President Johnson's speech was generally very favorable. United Nations Secretary General U Thant wrote the President welcoming the speech as "positive, forward-looking, and generous." Thant met with Ambassador Adlai Stevenson and Eugene Black, former President of the World Bank, to discuss President Johnson's proposals for Southeast Asia economic development. British Prime Minister Wilson issued a statement praising the speech. Canadian Prime Minister Martin stated in the Canadian House of Commons that Canada was prepared to participate fully in the Southeast Asia economic development program and that he hoped other industrial countries including USSR and eventually Communist China would participate. The French press expressed general approval of the speech saying it was what de Gaulle had long recommended; adding however that US should not exclude negotiations with the Viet Cong "Liberation Front."

Non-Communist Asian comment was favorable for the most part, with the exception of that originating in Djakarta. The semi-official Indonesian Herald criticized the speech as "calculated to deceive." Japanese told Ambassador Reischauer he strongly welcomed the President's clear exposition of US objectives in Vietnam and expressed the willingness of Japan to participate in the Southeast Asian economic development plan.

told our Ambassador Porter that he felt speech was very constructive and leaves the United States in a strong position. Algeria may aspire to play a mediating role in the Vietnam situation through its contacts with Communist China; there is little evidence, however, that the Chinese have any interest in Algerian mediation.

B. Cambodia.

The Cambodian official news service reported on 12 April that a Cambodian was killed by GVN forces on

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Cambodian territory. No further details are available, though the incident is presumed to have occurred on the same day. This is the first reported Cambodian fatality on the border since Prince Sihanouk's most recent threat on 24 March to break relations with the United States if a single Cambodian life were lost in a border incident. Sihanouk has made similar threats in the past without following through.

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III. Developments in the Bloc

A. Communist Reaction to President Johnson's Johns Hopkins speech.

Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow have all commented negatively on President Johnson's 7 April speech. In essence, they have denounced the offer for unconditional talks as an attempt by the US to justify its "aggression in Vietnam."

1. Hanoi on 11 April published a commentary in Nhan Dan, attacking President Johnson personally and labeling the speech a "deception" full of "all the tricks of the most wicked sorcerers." The Hanoi commentary characterized the call for unconditional talks as "hypocrisy," designed to secure the US goal "that is recognition of US aggression." The article attacked the US offer of aid to Southeast Asia as an attempt to "buy the peoples" of the area and asserted that the "Southeast Asians decidedly will never take ten dollars each for selling out their country to the US imperialists." Anti-American remarks by Sihanouk and Sukarno were quoted as proof that Southeast Asians will not be swayed by offers of aid. Despite US attempts to divide "our nation," the article concluded, and despite the fact that the US "feverishly" seeks to split "our international solidarity bloc," the Indochinese peoples "will always unite with us in a rocklike bloc."

DRV language was even stronger in a 14 April Nhan Dan commentary in which the speech was characterized as a spiteful hoax and the President described as "lecturing on peace while brandishing his gun." On the subject of a conference, the commentary said "without the participation of the Front, it is impossible to settle the South Vietnamese question."

2. The first Liberation Front comment on the President's speech came from its representative in Prague who characterized the President's proposals as "untrue and deceptive." This was followed by an 11 April Liberation radiobroadcast which accused the President of pretending to be "eager for peace," at

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the same time that he sends "aircraft to attack the DRV and Hainan Island." The broadcast demanded US troop withdrawal and threatened that if the US continues the war it will be disastrously defeated. However, the commentary added, "there is still time for...(President Johnson)...to think it over."

3. Peiping's most authoritative reaction to the speech, contained in an article by "observer" in People's Daily on 11 April, sought to emphasize the unswerving unity of purpose among the various Vietnamese Communist elements as well as its own determination to continue to support the Vietnamese Communist cause. The "observer" dismissed the call for unconditional talks as a "big swindle" and a "hoax" requiring the unconditional surrender of the South Vietnamese people to the "US imperialists."

The article focused attention on President Johnson's remarks about the "deepening shadow of Communist China" looming over the South Vietnam war, and alleged that the President's repeated mentioning of Communist China was meant to "carry out war threats" and "make the Chinese people stop supporting the revolutionary struggles" of the Vietnamese and other peoples. This idea was rejected as "sheer day-dreaming." "Observer" went on to declare that the "Chinese people are definitely not the kind...who tremble before the war blackmail and provocations of imperialism."

4. Soviet propaganda reaction to the President's address was highlighted by a 10 April Pravda article which attempted to dismiss the speech as a mere propaganda exercise reflecting no real change in US policy. Pravda claimed that the President's reference to unconditional negotiations had no substantive meaning, because in the US reply to the 17 nonaligned nations' appeal, the US had made it clear that an "indispensable condition" for stopping US military action in Southeast Asia "could be only the discontinuance of the national liberation struggle of the Vietnamese people."

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B. Communist Reaction to Third Party offers of Mediation.

In contrast to President Johnson's response to the 17 nonaligned nations' conference proposal, Communist China, North Vietnam, and the Liberation Front have rejected the appeal out of hand. China was reportedly very cool to the nations who delivered the proposal and on 4 April. North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong dismissed the appeal as "inoperative" in a conversation with the French representative in Hanoi. The Front representative in Prague said the proposal was unacceptable because it did not denounce "US aggression" or demand an immediate cessation of US attacks against North Vietnam. To date, Moscow's treatment has been confined to a 1 April TASS item merely noting that Soviet Premier Kosygin had received the appeal.

Peiping has also refused U Thant's good offices. In a 12 April editorial, Peiping declared that the UN should be barred from any role in reaching a settlement of the problem. Referring to press reports that U Thant desired to visit China and the DRV, the editorial asserted that U Thant was "knocking at the wrong door." Peiping and Hanoi also refused to allow Patrick Gordon-Walker to visit their countries.

C. Communist Attitudes on the Vietnamese Situation

1. North Vietnam.

Hanoi has addressed itself to the subject of a conference on Vietnam several times this week at the highest official levels. The effect of all these statements is to indicate that North Vietnam has not changed its terms for an overall settlement of the war. DRV party and state Chief Ho Chi Minh reiterated the standard regime formulation for settling the Vietnamese situation, and for the first time put the formula in the context of preconditions for a conference. Ho's remarks were contained in an interview with a Japanese Communist journalist published by Hanoi on 9 April. The timing of the publication of the interviews suggests that it was intended as an oblique reply to President Johnson's 7 April call for unconditional negotiations, although the President's speech was not mentioned..

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Ho stated that the US must "first of all" withdraw from South Vietnam. It must also stop its "provocative attacks" against the DRV, and let the "South Vietnamese people decide their own affairs." The carrying out of these basic points, according to Ho, will "bring about favorable conditions for a conference along the pattern of the 1954 Geneva conference."

These same conditions have been restated as the official DRV Government position in the course of the National Assembly session which met from 8 to 10 April. The National Assembly is a legislative body comparable to the Chinese National Peoples' Congress and is a vehicle for disseminating regime decisions to the mass of the population. Ho Chi Minh, Premier Pham Van Dong, and Standing Committee Chairman Truong Chinh all addressed the assembly. Hanoi propaganda on the session indicates continuing regime concern with sustaining morale and with making sure that party policy is followed at all echelons in the government apparatus as the US military pressure on the DRV continues. Deputies at the session were tasked with convincing the people of the government's determination to further mobilize everyone to defend the DRV, step up domestic production, and "actively support" the insurgency in South Vietnam.

In this context Ho Chi Minh spoke at length on the determination of the Vietnamese to refuse to bow to US attempts by "force" to bring "our people to terms." Ho also repeated in essence the demands for "settling" the Vietnam war set forth in his interview broadcast on 9 April. He admitted that the assembly was meeting in "a very tense atmosphere," but claimed that it was also convened in "high spirits and with the utmost confidence." Vietnamese terms for a settlement were repeated by Premier Pham Van Dong and incorporated into the National Assembly's final resolution.

2. Communist China

Chinese views on negotiations were indicated this week in the course of Chinese Premier Chou En-lai's visit to Algiers from 30 March to 1 April. Chou reportedly told the Algerians that the Chinese will not intervene in the Vietnam conflict and will refuse to take part in

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negotiations on Vietnam. Chou predicted that a coalition government would soon be formed in Saigon which would ask the US to leave Vietnam and would negotiate with the Viet Cong.

Although Chou's reported comments were probably intended to convey the impression of a "reasonable" China, the remarks are consistent with the established Chinese public position that the "Vietnamese people" are the only ones able to settle the Vietnam problem.

3. USSR

The Soviet Union's attitude toward negotiations continues to reflect the conflicting pressures of Moscow's support for Hanoi's position and the USSR's regard for the future direction of Soviet-US relations. During a talk with Ambassador Kohler on 8 April, Soviet Deputy Premier Polyansky vigorously countered the ambassador's remark that the USSR had rejected negotiations out of hand. Polyansky said Soviet policy was "the peaceful negotiation of all international disputes, including Vietnam." The Soviets have not retreated from their position that even preliminary discussions to arrange negotiations are impossible as long as US raids on North Vietnam continue.

D. Military Developments in North Vietnam

1. The US-GVN air strikes on 3 and 4 April against the Thanh Hoa and Dong Phong Thuong road and railroad bridges evoked the first intervention by enemy aircraft. The bridges are only about 80 miles south of Hanoi, and the Phuc Yen - based MIGs reacted on both days. On the 4th, two MIGs came with little warning, jumped two US F105s from behind while carrying their full bomb load, and downed both of them. Since then no North Vietnamese MIGs have reacted to the subsequent strikes. However, they can be expected to react in areas within cheer range when US aircraft are striking targets they consider critical.

2. On 5 April aerial photography revealed a surface-to-air missile site under construction about 15 miles southeast of Hanoi. No missiles or other weapons equipment have been noted at the site, but the construction is about three-quarters finished. The last clear

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photography of this area, on 21 February, showed only an antiaircraft battery site there.

The equipment for the missile site is probably coming from the Soviet Union. The Chinese Communists probably would not supply it. Whereas, a week ago the Soviets were circulating reports that the Chinese Communists were obstructing Soviet attempts to ship military equipment overland to North Vietnam, in the past week the Soviets have floated new reports that Moscow and Peiping have reached agreement on such shipments, and that the equipment is flowing to Hanoi. To date no new Soviet equipment has been detected arriving in North Vietnam. Soviet ships continue to arrive in North Vietnam, but we have had no grounds to believe that any of them have brought specific military cargo. There is one 12,000-ton ship with a light load of just over 3,000 tons now under way, just past Suez, which shows all the signs of being an arms carrier. This ship could be heading for India, Indonesia, or North Vietnam.

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INTELLIGENCE STUDY

THE SINO-VIETNAMESE EFFORT TO LIMIT AMERICAN ACTIONS IN THE VIETNAM WAR (POLO XX)

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: DEC 1999

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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THE SINO-VIETNAMESE EFFORT TO LIMIT AMERICAN ACTIONS IN THE VIETNAM WAR

This is a working paper of the DD/I Research Staff. It deals with one aspect of Peiping's relations with Hanoi in the context of the war in Vietnam and is a follow-up to an earlier Staff memorandum (RSS No. 0006/65, 2 April 1965) on differences between Chinese and Vietnamese views on strategy for the prosecution of the war.

The writer of this paper, [redacted] has found useful material in the published weekly analysis of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. The DDI/RS would welcome comment addressed to the writer [redacted]

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THE SINO-VIETNAMESE EFFORT TO LIMIT AMERICAN ACTIONS IN THE VIETNAM WAR

Contents

Page

Summary.....i

Introduction.....1

1. To Deter the United States from Increasing Military Aid.....2

2. To Deter the United States from Air Strikes Against the North.....3

3. To Deter the United States from Air Strikes Against China.....22

THE SINO-VIETNAMESE EFFORT TO LIMIT AMERICAN ACTIONS IN THE VIETNAM WAR

Summary

When the Viet Cong was re-activated in 1958-59, neither Peiping nor Hanoi seemed to estimate that the American commitment to Saigon would develop to the point at which territory in the North would be subjected to air strikes. In their discussion of the war in 1960-62, they emphasized that the American effort in the South was "special warfare," i.e., of a very limited character. As American military support of South Vietnam increased, the Chinese became increasingly concerned, and by 1964 they underscored a Sino-Vietnamese community of interest in trying to deter Washington from making air strikes against the North. However, they were at pains to ensure that Washington would not calculate that PLA forces were poised to enter Vietnam or Laos (and, therefore, would not feel impelled to strike by air at the China mainland). The U.S. air strikes on North Vietnam in August 1964 almost certainly took the Chinese and Vietnamese leaders by surprise. By February-March 1965, their failure to prevent strikes against the North forced them to recognize that Mao was wrong in thinking that small wars could be fought with only slight risks to the base areas and to the security of other bloc countries.

Once the concept of sanctuary for the North had been invalidated, the Chinese were apparently stimulated to add a new dimension to their encouragement of Hanoi. That is, in addition to encouraging the North Vietnamese to move the fighting in the South from primarily guerrilla warfare (with occasional big battles of annihilation) to primarily conventional warfare (with many big battles of annihilation), the Chinese apparently began urging the North Vietnamese to infiltrate PAVN forces into the South on a larger scale. Hanoi, evidently reluctant to comply to the extent advocated by Peiping in early 1965, may now be somewhat more willing to do so, in the sense of being willing to infiltrate a few more PAVN units. However, the Chinese seem to be sustaining their pressure for large-scale infiltration or even direct attacks across

the 17th parallel. The Chinese almost certainly would increase their pressure on Hanoi if American air strikes were to hit targets north of the 20th parallel and were to include more economic installations.

Considerably increased awareness of the threat to the China mainland apparently has impelled the Chinese leaders to state publicly the conditions under which they would use the PLA to intervene. There seem to be two conditions for definite intervention. PLA ground forces will enter the fighting if (a) the United States moves large forces of its own ground troops across the 17th parallel and (b) the North Vietnamese prove unable to handle the matter and request Chinese assistance. Were the United States to strike by air at bases in China but not move its troops on the ground into the North, PLA ground forces might be committed to Vietnam. This last part of the Chinese position contains a large element of ambiguity, particularly on the matter of what constitutes an American "attack" against the mainland. The Chinese have declared "If we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack," but they have been equivocal on the matter of whether air strikes against the mainland would spur them to counterattack with the PLA on the ground, or whether air strikes against the mainland would meet merely with a counter air strike (or air defense action).

The Chinese certainly prefer to prevent such American air strikes against their bases. Their options, however, are limited because of their (Mao's) pugnacity and refusal to concede that the small war will not work in Vietnam. They seem to believe that it will still work--that is, that, accepting a larger risk to the North Vietnamese base area and to China than originally foreseen, Communist forces can still pursue the war effectively in South Vietnam, probably without provoking the U.S. into (a) moving its ground forces into North Vietnam on a large scale, or (b) making air attacks on China. Therefore, the Chinese will not desist from encouraging Hanoi and the Viet Cong from continuing the war. They seem to be willing to risk, if necessary, even the destruction of their bases in South China to sustain the war.

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Introduction

As early as 1958, at the time of the Taiwan Strait crisis, the Chinese leaders were apparently aware that the Soviet nuclear umbrella was credible only for the defense of the USSR, not for a Chinese or North Vietnamese military effort. By 1960, intensification of the Sino-Soviet dispute made this awareness even clearer. Nevertheless, the Chinese and North Vietnamese leaders probably viewed the removal of the Soviet nuclear umbrella --in an earlier period a credible restraint on American military action in the Far East--as a development which would not, and should not, prevent the guerrilla war in the South from moving ahead. They seemed to agree that some other deterrent to American action against North Vietnam could be found, and their view centered on PAVN and PLA forces as constituting an adequate (or credible) deterrent.

The Chinese leaders have hinted at the conditions in which they would feel impelled to commit PLA forces to fight in Vietnam. This paper examines the record of Chinese hints and direct statements on this matter in the context of Peiping's and Hanoi's effort to deter the United States from (a) increasing advisory and material military aid to Saigon, (b) striking by air at the North, and (c) striking even at China.

Ambiguity in a statement of deterrence sustains political maneuverability, but reduces credibility. A deterrent statement can be both ambiguous and strong only when military dispositions indicate a real threat. That is, the degree of seriousness of the threat cannot be measured by the content of verbal warnings alone.

Nevertheless, verbal warnings can provide indicators of intentions even without hard information on military dispositions. In our view, a deterrent statement acquires strength from the degree of precision used in (a) committing a country to take direct military actions and (b) closing off avenues of retreat after the specific public commitment is made. Adjectives do not make a deterrent statement strong or weak, nor do analogies with earlier clashes.

In the following analysis, all of the underlining of words and passages has been supplied.

1. To Deter the United States from Increasing Military Aid

In 1960 and 1961, the Chinese leaders avoided making any public statements indicating direct PLA support for the future defense of the North, but hinted, imprecisely, at Peiping's concern in the matter. Typical of the locutions they used were those contained in Chou En-lai's remarks to the North Vietnamese delegation in Peiping: the Chinese government and people "cannot be indifferent" to the grave situation created by American actions in the South, and the Chinese and Vietnamese governments have always been "in close cooperation and supported each other" in building socialism and opposing the United States (statements made on 12 June 1961). Later, in alluding publicly to American "plans to send troops" to the South, Peiping did not go beyond committing "the heroic people of South Vietnam" to react to this new challenge (broadcast of 12 October 1961). Privately, the Chinese made threats which hinted at PLA action but were vague. They were reported to have told the Indian government on 2 November 1961 that Peiping reserved the right to take "direct action" at any time in the interest of its own security. At the same time (i.e., on 2 November), the Chinese press attache in Geneva told a Western journalist that it would be "a terrible thing" if American troops were sent to the South because it is much easier to commit troops in such a situation "than to withdraw them later."

Even when the Chinese leaders implied the possible use of the PLA in a joint military effort with Hanoi, it was to be a joint action to defend "separate" (ko-tzu) countries. That is, it was vague on the matter of PLA use in Vietnam: the Chinese people and "the PLA...will make joint efforts with you to defend the security of our separate countries" (Marshal Lin Piao's message to Hanoi on 21 December 1961). And when this unprecedented (and not repeated) statement of joint defense and other efforts proved to be inadequate to prevent the establishment of the American military command in the South (in February 1962), the Chinese avoided references to any PLA involvement in defense of the North. They were not explicit on their course of action when they warned that the American military command posed "a serious threat to the security of the DRV and China" and that Washington intended to move first against the North and "from there against China" (People's Daily editorial of 25 February).*

2. To Deter the United States from Air Strikes Against the North

Peiping and Hanoi probably estimated in 1962 and 1963 that the establishment of the American military command would not lead to American air attacks on the

*In this editorial, the Chinese repeated what they had said in their government statement of 24 February for the first time--e.g., American action in the South "seriously affects the security of China." The North Vietnamese had established the line earlier and for the first time in their government statement of 18 February that American action was "a direct threat to the security of the DRV." The Chinese government statement ducked the matter of PLA involvement and made a careful distinction between the "direct" threat to the DRV and the "indirect" threat to China.

North.* They seemed to believe that the United States would restrict its military assistance to support below the 17th parallel and were probably confirmed in this view by Washington's references to the limited nature of its action and the need to fight guerrilla wars with (a) "special warfare" rather than with the more extensive (b) "local" warfare or even (c) nuclear warfare.**

However, by early 1964, the Chinese and North Vietnamese leaders displayed real concern about the prospects of American air strikes. In February, NCNA carried American press references to discussions in Washington of air attacks which might be directed against the North, and Hanoi stepped up its deterrent statements. Defense Minister Giap called for the improvement of "combat cohesion of the armed forces of socialist countries" (Soviet Red Star article of 23 February 1964), and the North Vietnamese army paper warned the United States--which "is planning" to increase "provocations" against the North--that the

*A suggestion of Hanoi's thinking on this point was reported by a recent defector from North Vietnam. In late 1963, the Vietnamese Workers Party central committee issued a confidential foreign policy directive which, among other things, stated that the United States was incapable of attacking the North; during a discussion of the directive, cadres were told that the Americans were deterred by the strength of international Communist forces.

**These terms are not precise but seem consistently in Chinese usage to indicate an ascending order. They refer, in order, to a small operation like the U.S. effort in South Vietnam, a larger one such as the Korean war, and a world war. The Russians have a comparable usage. The People's Daily editorial of 25 February 1962 mentioned all three types in connection with American strategic military thought and stressed Washington's use of (a) in Vietnam. Other Chinese and North Vietnamese articles discussed (a) as the prevailing type of American-supported warfare in the South. (Only on 10 May 1965 did a Chinese leader--Lo Jui-ching--state explicitly that the U.S. was moving in the direction of the more extensive "local" war.)

PAVN is stronger than ever and "together with the strength of the peoples and armed forces of the friendly countries in the socialist camp--which support us closely--our strength is second to none" (Quan Doi Nhan Dan article of 3 March). (The 3 March article strongly suggested that only "friendly" China, rather than the USSR, was willing to support the DRV "closely.") Hanoi's concern was also reflected in private contacts; for the first time, diplomatic channels were used to warn Washington. A North Vietnamese official told [redacted] in mid-February 1964 that if the United States were to introduce more forces and equipment into the South, the Communist side could easily match such increases. He went on to say that Hanoi was prepared to deal with the possibility that Washington might carry the war to the North (apparently a reference to air strikes). Also in mid-February, the North Vietnamese increased military and civilian defense preparations against anticipated American air attacks.

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At the same time, the Chinese were careful to avoid identifying Peiping in any direct military sense with Hanoi's defense effort. For example, when Hanoi discussed a hypothetical "invasion" of the North by American ground forces and then referred to the consequence--viz., that the United States "would have to cope not only with North Vietnam, but also with China" (Hoc Tap article of January 1964)--the Chinese omitted this key passage in their reprint. Reflecting Chinese uncertainty of the extent of prospective American action, Peiping's statement of deterrence in early March was so cautious as to be tantamount to a mere repetition of Hanoi's mild warning that "any infringement on the DRV" would be the "responsibility" of the United States (People's Daily editorial of 4 March). While the Chinese were short on specific commitments regarding PLA action, they were long on encouragement. A Chinese "peace" statement of early March declared that "American clamors to extend the war to the North can only frighten those who have lost their nerve," i.e., the Russian leaders.

Hanoi's concern about prospective American air strikes on the North continued through the spring of 1964. On 9

May, General Giap, in an interview with the Communist newsman W. Burchett, the content of which was intended for Western leaders, reflected some anxiety on the part of the leadership when he warned that "any act of aggression against the DRV by the United States...would be suicide." Under Chinese and North Vietnamese criticism at a press conference in Hanoi, Soviet Ambassador Tovmasyan revealed on 15 May that: "A cadre of the DRV's Ministry of Foreign Affairs told me that the Vietnamese people do not see the danger of a direct attack by the United States." (Tovmasyan's apparent point was that if the real North Vietnamese estimate minimized the prospect of an air strike, why should Vietnamese newsmen demand to know if there would be a strong reaction on the part of the socialist camp (i.e., the USSR) were the North to be attacked?) By mid-May, when the United States significantly increased its air-strike capability in the South, the North Vietnamese prepared to absorb bombing attacks. At the time, Hanoi's first major statement indicated awareness that "the Skyraiders introduced into the South are likely to be used in provocations against North Vietnam" and suggested the limited nature of the Communists' retaliatory capability by threatening the Americans only with the punishment "of history" (Nhan Dan editorial of 21 May). Widespread construction of infantry-type defense ditches in the central part of Hanoi was noted by a visitor to the city in early May, suggesting that the Vietnamese were preparing to absorb air strikes even against their capital. Hanoi's second major statement at the time (issued by the DRV Foreign Ministry on 4 June) indicated that countermoves would include primarily a step-up of Viet Cong operations.

The Chinese did not in any way associate themselves publicly with the defense of the North. They spoke only of "friendship" of the PLA and the PAVN and referred vaguely to PLA "support for the Vietnamese people's struggle for reunification" (Lt. General Liu Chih-chien in his speech of 8 June). They apparently were not clear about Washington's intentions. Air strikes in Laos (against Khang Khay) increased their anxiety, which was partly reflected by Chou En-lai's reference to the "dangerous situation in Indochina" and his urgent appeal

for the "speedy calling" of a Geneva conference on Laos (speech of 11 June). The meeting of American officials in Honolulu in June and the air strikes in Laos may well have led the Chinese leaders to conclude that Washington, by "entering upon a new phase of direct and open" support of anti-Communist forces in Laos (People's Daily editorial of 15 June), was hinting at an intention to strike next at North Vietnam if Pathet Lao and Viet Cong operations did not cease. They kept their deterrent statements imprecise as they met in mid-June in a "work conference of the CCP Central Committee": if Washington wants its "own way, it will find itself woefully unwise in its choice" (Ta Kung Pao editorial of 15 June) and "we want to solemnly warn American imperialism to stop playing with fire at once or it will burn itself" (Ta Kung Pao editorial of 18 June).

The Chinese leaders' effort to deter the United States at the time included (a) a revision of Chou En-lai's appeal for a conference, which was elaborated by Chen Yi to be a conference to seek "first of all" a settlement on Laos and (b) warnings that the appeal was not "a sign of weakness" and that China "absolutely will not sit idly by" while the Geneva accords are torn up and "the flames of war are spread to its side" (speech of 24 June). Chen was careful to sustain Peiping's ambiguity on what it would do to protect North Vietnam from prospective air strikes and what it would do if American marines were sent to Laos. Privately, the Chinese were bolder. By late June they seem to have convinced the Laotian ambassador in Peiping that they would act "as we had in Korea" if the United States were to put a division of marines into Laos. They also indicated to him that they preferred to "solve" the Laotian issue by convening a 14-nation Geneva-type conference, at which they would raise the entire Indochina question.

While attempting by this maneuver to impede further American commitments to Vientiane and Saigon, they apparently decided--probably during their "work conference" in June--to further encourage Hanoi and the Viet Cong. They declared that Peiping's support for the Communist effort in Laos and Vietnam "will remain unshakable"

(Kuang-ming Daily article of 20 June). That they continued to view any Soviet statement of deterrence as not essential (and, in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute, as not desirable) was suggested by an article in the Hong Kong Communist newspaper, Wen Wei Pao, on 23 June. Referring to an article in Pravda on 21 June, which had warned that the USSR would not necessarily support China in the event of an enlarged war, the newspaper declared that this warning would only stimulate the Chinese to support the struggle in Laos and Vietnam in "a more resolute way." Khrushchev may have attempted, during the "work conference" discussions among the Chinese leaders, to deter Peiping from further encouraging Hanoi, implicitly warning the Chinese that they would have no Soviet military or political support in the event of any escalation of the war. This was a costly tactical blunder, as it provided the Chinese with a means to "prove" to the North Vietnamese leaders that Khrushchev was a traitor on the matter of support for the revolutionary struggle of a fraternal country.*

Regarding any expectation by Hanoi of support from Peiping in terms of commitment of PLA troops to the North, such a commitment was not anticipated and was not considered necessary. North Vietnamese statements reflected this situation of non-commitment. For example, Hanoi's first major statement at the time of probable Peiping-Hanoi consultations in late June warned vaguely that if the Americans "directly encroach on the security of the DRV," they will "encounter a proper rebuff," but it did not state who would administer the rebuff or how it would be carried out (DRV note to the Geneva Co-chairmen of 25 June). The definitive North Vietnamese statement of

*Khrushchev's non-support of Hanoi had made it relatively easy for the Chinese to disparage Moscow by stressing, for example, that Peiping always maintained that "it is an unshirkable proletarian internationalist duty to safeguard the peace and security of the entire socialist camp, to protect all its members from imperialist aggression." (People's Daily editorial of 9 July)

purposes. The word, "any," was repeated when the People's Daily editorial of 9 July reprinted Chen's remarks,* but later in July the Chinese leaders apparently perceived that the word was dangerously inclusive, committing them to some form of action whether an American attack was launched on the ground or in the air. Thus they dropped the word, "any," by the end of July

By late July, the Chinese were acting somewhat bolder than they had in early June--that is, bolder than during the days immediately following the Honolulu conference of American officials. For the first time, they issued a government statement which hinted at the use of the PLA:

> Despite the fact that the United States has introduced tens of thousands of its military personnel into southern Vietnam and Laos, China has not sent a single soldier to Indochina. However, there is a limit to everything. (Government Statement of 19 July)**

*The editorial of 9 July made the strongest statement of deterrence up to that time: "Should American imperialism attack the DRV, thereby posing a threat to China's peace and security, the Chinese people naturally cannot be expected to look on with folded arms." Nevertheless, it did not say what the Chinese would do when they unfolded their arms.

**The deterrent aspect of the Chinese government statement of 19 July was suggested by the People's Daily editorial of the 20th, which warned Washington to note the new threat and that "we mean what we say." They also pointed to the new threat as "showing that China has made up its mind, formulated its counter measures, as well as looked into every possible future development." (Hong Kong Wen Wei Pao commentator article of 20 July) This reference to contingency planning probably refers to the mid-June "work conference" of the Chinese leadership and further suggests that the decision to sustain and increase support of Hanoi and the Viet Cong was affirmed at the conference.

At the same time, they took care to indicate to Washington that only an attack on North Vietnam (apparently a ground attack was meant)--and not action in South Vietnam--would impel Peiping to commit the PLA in Vietnam:

> We do not want to wage a war in southeast Asia. This is absolutely clear to the State Department in Washington. This position of ours is very accurately known in the State Department. They know that we do not want to wage war. We would feel threatened only if, perhaps, the United States would send their "special warfare" toward the North, if they attack North Vietnam. That is, if the other side were to attack. This would directly endanger the stability of our border and of the neighboring Chinese provinces. In such a case, we would intervene....
>
> Yet, being encircled by aggressive people on the other side, we have to maintain this army. It would intervene if the war in Indochina should be carried to the North....If they want a small war, then a small war it will be. If they want a big war, then it will be a big war. It all depends on the Americans. (Chen Yi interview in late July with Austrian newsman)

This was the first time that a Chinese leader had publicly discussed the specific conditions which would impel the PLA to "intervene." Peiping probably believed, at that time, that the United States would not strike at the North either on the ground or in the air. An indication of such a belief, as of late July, appeared in the broadcast of a Peiping radio commentator on 27 July: he told listeners in Japan that "China considers" American threats to invade the DRV as merely intended to scare China, inasmuch as the United States "would not be able" to invade. The Soviet leaders also may have believed in mid-July that American attacks on the North were improbable; at the

time, Soviet officials reportedly downplayed the risks of escalation on the grounds that President Johnson would not let the fighting expand into a local war.

When, in early August, American planes hit North Vietnamese targets following the incident in the Gulf of Tonkin, the Chinese seem to have been taken by surprise. After a 24-hour delay, the Chinese issued their government statement in which they threatened to help but avoided saying that the PLA now had the right to intervene. The statement fell back upon the distinction made by Premier Pham Van Dong on 27 June:

> In the surprise attack on the DRV...United States imperialism went over the 'brink of war' and made the first step in extending the war in Indochina....Since the United States has taken this action, the DRV has gained the right of action to fight against aggression, and all the countries upholding the Geneva agreements have gained the right of action to assist the DRV in its fight against aggression...no socialist country can sit idly by without lending a helping hand....
>
> Aggression by the United States against the DRV means aggression against China. The Chinese people will absolutely not sit idly by without lending a helping hand. The American government must stop immediately its armed provocations against the DRV and its armed encroachments on the latter's sacred territory, airspace, and territorial waters. (CPR Government Statement of 6 August)

Thus Pham Van Dong's distinction between those who would "fight" and those who would merely "assist" was clearly and deliberately stressed in the statement and the Chinese made no threat to intervene, demanding only that the United States stop bombing (after, in fact, it had stopped). They tried to conceal their decision not to retaliate by

shifting this burden to others. For example, they insisted that "The question now is not one of the United States bringing up a 'complaint' against the DRV, but one of the people throughout the world bringing the American imperialist pirates to trial" (People's Daily editorial of 8 August), and asked (in a People's Daily editorial of 9 August) "Will the people of various countries look on with folded arms while American imperialism plays with fire? Absolutely not." In a conversation on 13 August with a non-Communist Asian diplomat, a Chinese Foreign Ministry official contrasted China's reaction with Moscow's as one of "totally opposing" American air strikes, but he did not say how Peiping intended to oppose the strikes, merely pointing to the "strong opposition of all the peace-loving peoples of the world." At the same time that the Chinese warned, "Don't think that you can get away with your surprise attack on the DRV" (People's Daily editorial of 9 August), they specified only that the Vietnamese would reply: "if the American aggressors dare to expand the war... the Vietnamese people, who are noted for their glorious combat traditions, will most assuredly be able to annihilate the United States bandits on their soil" (Liao Cheng-chih in a speech of 9 August).*

*Privately, the Chinese were anxious to convey to Washington an impression of restraint, almost certainly to deter the United States from considering strikes against the mainland. Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien in mid-August told a Pakistani official that Peiping intended to "recoup the losses by acting on the diplomatic front." Although warning that Chinese threats to intervene should be taken seriously in Washington, he underscored China's "patient and moderate" response to the 5 August strikes. Publicly, Chen Yi later committed only the Vietnamese, not the Chinese, to give a "resolute rebuff" to the United States in the event of more air strikes (statement of 7 September).

Following the second incident in the Gulf of Tonkin on 18 September, the Chinese again employed a variety of statements which were intended as deterrents, but which avoided indicating any course of retaliatory action in the event of sustained air strikes. Speaking in the language of an interested observer rather than an active participant, PLA Army Chief-of-Staff Lo Jui-ching, stated:

> The Chinese people know how to deal with war maniacs. We are closely watching every action of American imperialism to see to what degree it intends to worsen the situation. (Speech of 19 September)

After the crisis of September subsided, the Chinese deterrent statements remained vague, particularly on the matter of a new possible development which the Chinese seemed to see as probable--viz., gradual and phased escalation.

> One should realize that if aggression is enlarged regardless under what label--limited or not very limited--this still constitutes an act of war and a brazen attack on the DRV....All big aggressive wars in the world were begun with a limited label....Once an aggressive neck has been stuck out...it must be chopped off. (People's Daily editorial of 29 November)

This line was careful to sustain Peiping's ambiguity on whether the PAVN would be assisted by the PLA in actual combat in the event of any degree of escalation. This ambiguity was not really clarified in the unusual assertion of Liu Ning-yi (speech at solidarity conference in Hanoi given on 27 November) that the Chinese people will always "fight" with the Vietnamese people. This formulation did not make clear whether "fight" was to mean joint military operations (combat) or merely joint political struggle.

Hanoi was clearly aware of this carefully cultivated ambiguity in the Chinese position. Regarding Chinese

behavior following the August 1964 American air strikes, a North Vietnamese official told a Westerner in early November that "When the Americans attacked the DRV, the Soviets did nothing and the Chinese only talked."* In a published interview in December, Ho Chi Minh suggested that North Vietnam would have to fight alone in the event of escalation. He was careful to say that if the war were expanded to the North, "the CPR will support us and the socialist countries will support us" (reported by Vietnam News Agency on 23 December). At the same time, the Chinese continued to make their usual distinction between supporting North Vietnam and fighting with it. Peiping declared that if South Korean troops were sent to South Vietnam, this would provide all Geneva accords countries the full right "to support" the South Vietnamese (People's Daily editorial of 14 January 1965). Mao Tse-tung himself spoke even more cautiously of the conditions which would compel the Chinese to engage in military operations in Vietnam. He told Edgar Snow on 9 January that "Only if the United States attacked China would the Chinese fight....The Vietnamese can cope with their own situation."

Hanoi put limits on its own reaction. The North Vietnamese reaction to the air strikes of 7 and 8 February 1965 was marked by an apparent anxiety to dispel the notion in the North and elsewhere that Hanoi was obliged to hit back with the full force of the PAVN across the 17th parallel. The DRV government statement of 8 February

*In the fall of 1964, the North Vietnamese began to speak less optimistically about a victory in the South within a few years, and to foresee a longer period. In September, a North Vietnamese trade official told a Japanese businessman that although it may take "generations," we are confident we'll win the war "so long as we have rice and salt." In mid-December, Ho personally told the Cambodian Foreign Minister that "10 to 15 years" would be required for the advent of Communist power in the South.

declared that the enemy had been "appropriately punished," and it made no mention of the need to retaliate in reprisal for damage inflicted by the strikes on the North. The 7 February appeal of the Liberation Front presidium for forces in the South to "strike strongly, really strongly, and really lastingly, in order to protect the North and to liberate the South" suggested that Hanoi's policy was to react by retaliating on a large scale with its military assets in the South rather than preparing for a major PAVN offensive. Hanoi depicted the air strikes as part of an established pattern rather than making a new pattern. By implication, therefore, no major new counteraction directly from the North was required. "Well-deserved" retaliation from the North took the form of bringing down American strike aircraft (Nhan Dan editorial of 13 February). Hanoi declared only that the "South Vietnamese people have the right to strike back." (PAVN regional military commander to NCNA on 11 February)

Peiping, however, seems to have been anxious to go beyond the question of the right of the Viet Cong to that of the DRV itself--i.e., to that of the use of the PAVN.

> ...the DRV has secured the right to take the initiative in dealing counterblows to the South Vietnamese puppets. The United States government should be reminded that it is the United States which has invaded South Vietnam in violation of the Geneva agreements and which has now further taken the lead in breaking up the line of demarcation between southern and northern Vietnam. Do you seriously think that you alone are allowed to do so while others are not? (CPR government statement of 13 February)

This new language suggests that in February 1965 the Chinese leaders were urging Hanoi to increase drastically the number of regular PAVN units in the South, apparently by a large-scale attack across the 17th parallel. Hanoi's propaganda media carried the text of this Chinese government statement, but the Vietnam News Agency summary omitted the theme of initiating counterblows, and the

DRV government statement of 14 February did not mention any DRV right to take such action. By contrast, the People's Daily and Ta Kung Pao editorials of 14 February repeated the theme, as did the People's Daily editorial published on the 19th. The Chinese position was probably intended also to keep the burden of retaliation on the North Vietnamese--that is, on Hanoi's side of the Sino-Vietnamese border; at the same time, the Chinese tried to avoid the appearance of an inactive partner and stated--to the United States--that "We are waiting for you in battle array" (People's Daily editorial of 9 February). This statement did not quite focus on the situation at the time, as the United States was striking North Vietnam, not China, and was doing so in the air, not on the ground.

The Chinese leaders tried to dispel the impression in various countries that Peiping feared the consequences of a direct military confrontation with United States forces. They and their followers tried to justify their inability to deter air strikes against the North and their unwillingness to act militarily. One line taken was that Peiping refused to be lured into fighting at a disadvantage. An editorial in the Cambodian paper, La Depeche (a daily which strongly supports Chinese positions), replying on 9 February to "those who say that the Chinese are contented with giving only verbal support," argued that Peiping "must not commit itself," but must prepare for a confrontation "under the best of all possible conditions." The Chinese leaders themselves revived the formulation of 6 August 1964 that Geneva signatories had gained the right to "assist" the DRV and again resorted to meticulous ambiguity: "as to how this right will be exercised, it is our own affair" (CPR government statement of 9 February). They avoided the question of what the PLA would be ordered to do in response to the early February strikes: "If American imperialism is bent on spreading the war flames and imposing war on us, then we shall have no alternative but to go along with it to the very end. In that event, the whole of southeast Asia, the whole of Asia, would be aflame with the revolutionary fire in which you will be so burnt to death that not even your ashes would be traceable" (People's Daily editorial

of 10 February). This statement was vague precisely at points where precision was easy to employ. That is, it referred to "imposing war on us" and then failed to make clear whether "us" referred to China only or to China and North Vietnam together. At the same time, it dodged the real issue: a commitment to act militarily to counter air strikes against the North. Further, to state that "an invasion of the DRV is an invasion of the CPR" and then to make the entire matter conditional--e.g., "If you insist on imposing war on us, heavy rebuffs are in store for you" (People's Daily editorial of 9 February)--was to make no commitment to use the PLA in defense of the North against air strikes. Peiping seemed to be saying something else: that an American ground attack against the North, if large enough to threaten the PAVN with defeat (as the North Koreans had been threatened in autumn 1950), would lead the PLA to intervene. (It was not necessarily saying that the PLA would intervene in Vietnam if the U.S. were to make air strikes on China.) But a U.S. ground attack on the North was hardly a real possibility; it was a hypothetical situation regarding which Chinese statements could be made to sound bold. "You will become utterly helpless when people resisting aggression, instead of being afraid of you, dare to fight, defy difficulties, and advance wave on wave. You have been taught a lesson on this score in the Korean War. Do you want to have the lesson repeated in Indochina?" (CPR government statement of 13 February)

In short, the Chinese commitment--or hedged promise--was most nearly explicit on the development least likely to occur--a major American ground attack against the North (or China). Regarding the real military situation in February, the Chinese in effect conceded that the air strike strategy against the North could not be halted by their prolonged verbal deterrent effort. They also implicitly conceded that the strikes were a significant American initiative which deprived the North Vietnamese of sanctuary. Reflecting a considerable degree of sensitivity to their inability and unwillingness to try to stop the air strikes, the Chinese declared: "How far will you go? That's your own lookout. But you are grossly mistaken to think that the war can be made to

develop as you wish" (People's Daily editorial of 19 February). Explicitly disparaging American air strike capability based on carrier strength in the Gulf of Tonkin and implicitly underscoring PAVN ground strength, the Chinese pointed to the "airdromes on the sea" and asked "What can they do since the outcome of the war has to be decided on terra firma?" (People's Daily editorial of 19 February). That is, the Chinese were compelled to fall back to the position that the PAVN would not permit the "outcome" of the war to be defeat on the ground for Hanoi; but this did not alter the fact that the North was being subjected to bombing. Privately, the Chinese were bolder. Two statements made on 15 February--one in Paris and one in Rangoon--carried a behind-the-scenes threat from Peiping that China would "intervene" or send "volunteers" if the bombings continued.

The Chinese leaders' reaction to the air strikes of 2 March seemed intended partly to encourage again the North Vietnamese to send more PAVN units to the South and partly to deter further attacks. Regarding encouragement of Hanoi, Peiping stressed explicitly the line that the United States had again "stepped over the boundary" of the 17th parallel and spoke of retaliation in terms of a strike back, apparently from the North (People's Daily editorial of 3 March). The North Vietnamese, however, stressed the theme that the DRV anti-aircraft artillery had given the Americans an "appropriate answer" and that the Viet Cong, too, had "answered" and would answer them with more military victories in the South (Nhan Dan editorial of 5 March). Although their 3 and 5 March editorials mentioned "punishing" the Americans, they did not do so in the context of widening the conflict. Yet this is precisely the context in which the Chinese discussed striking back, downplaying Hanoi's theme of punishment by anti-aircraft artillery in the North:

> Having flagrantly resorted to the war move of bombing the DRV again and again, the Johnson administration said in its statement that the United States 'wishes to avoid widening the conflict.' What does

> this mean? It means in fact that the United States is free to bomb any place at will while others should never strike back; otherwise, they would be 'widening the conflict.' What nonsense! What gangsters' logic! 'It is discourteous not to give after receiving,' a Chinese saying goes. Since American imperialism has forced the war upon others, it cannot expect to escape the punishment it deserves. (People's Daily editorial of 3 March)

This line of argument, which gratuitously provided the North Vietnamese leaders with a basis for PAVN retaliation, seemed to be intended to urge Hanoi to act on a larger scale as well as to accelerate the overall Viet Cong effort. That the Chinese were urging a course of large-scale PAVN entry into the fighting was further suggested by the line of argument carried earlier in a Red Flag article dealing with the war in Vietnam:

> The American imperialists have extended the war to the DRV. The DRV, therefore, is fully allowed to use every possible means to deal telling blows to them and their lackeys. (Red Flag "Commentator" article of 27 February)

This article was not intended merely as justification of the war to neutral and other non-Communist leaders. It was broadcast in Vietnamese, and only in Vietnamese, to Vietnam six times on 2 March, strongly suggesting the Chinese leaders' intention to impel Hanoi--"the DRV is fully allowed"--to make a significantly greater military commitment and to accelerate the effort in the South.

At the same time, the Chinese offered support for such an accelerated effort. Politburo member Peng Chen declared that the Chinese people "have made every preparation and resolutely support the Vietnamese people in launching counterattacks for self-defense in various ways against the American aggressors" (speech of 5 March).

3. To Deter the United States from Air Strikes Against China

Following the early February air strikes, the Chinese leaders apparently became more aware of a real danger of strikes against their own bases than they had been since August 1964. Cutting directly across the bold talk of preparation to take "real action" was the not so bold move to disarm a pre-emptive American air strike on bases in south China by privately indicating (to Washington through a third party) that PLA ground forces were not massed on the southern border. Immediately following the air strikes of 7-11 February on the North, Peiping's Foreign Ministry arranged a visit to the Sino-Vietnamese border area by the China-based correspondent of AFP; he was told by a Chinese official in Kunming that the visit was intended to demonstrate that Peiping was not preparing for direct intervention. Apparently as intended, the correspondent reported to American officials that he saw no military activity in the area. Although insisting publicly on 12 March that American threats ("no sanctuary" and "hot pursuit") to bomb China could not frighten Peiping, the Chinese leaders in effect admitted their inability to prevent the bombings of North Vietnam from extending throughout the DRV and eventually to south China. They implicitly conceded that the United States had unlimited capability to bomb, but downplayed the military significance of bombing:

> Anyhow, you have only so much armed strength at your disposal, and for all your clamoring, the means you can resort to are /only/ that many.

The Chinese also insisted that the North Vietnamese should by no means maneuver for negotiations as a means of gaining a suspension of air attacks. Particularly in the wake of Kosygin's visit to Hanoi, the Chinese declared--in the context of possible "peace talks"--that "We shall never succumb to the American imperialists' blackmail. No socialist country should" (People's Daily editorial of 1 March); that the United States is trying "to gain at the negotiating table what it is unable to gain on the battlefield" (Red Flag article of 27 February, broadcast in Vietnamese to Vietnam on 2 March); and that "Vietnam will not agree, nor will all countries which truly uphold the Geneva agreements" (CPR government statement of 2 March). By contrast, Hanoi was more equivocal on the matter of negotiations in early March, did not directly attack the idea, and deleted the phrase, "Vietnam will not agree," from the Vietnam News Agency account of Peiping's statement.

Regarding Peiping's deterrent effort in early March, the boldest Chinese statements were made privately or quasi-privately. And even these statements contained elements of ambiguity. For example, an "important" Chinese official told a Japanese correspondent in Peiping on 2 March that

> I do not think the United States will be able to carry out bombings on a larger scale, but if it should take a chance, China would strike the United States with real action. (Tokyo Nihon Keizai, 3 March)

Ambiguity was apparent when, after refusing to answer the correspondent's question, "By 'bombings on a larger scale,' do you mean the bombing of Hanoi?", the Chinese official retreated into the following locutions: "Preparations are complete. Troops can be mobilized at any time." These locutions begged the question of when and under what conditions Peiping would use the PLA to assist North Vietnam.

> You may act in your way and we will act in our way. (CPR government statement of 12 March)*

The Chinese leaders were also impelled to downplay the military significance of the landing of American marines at Da Nang. By arguing in their statement of 12 March that the marines' presence would "educate" the South Vietnamese by "negative example" and that "no village, town, forest or road in the whole of southern Vietnam is safe," the Chinese introduced another line of justification for limiting their response to support, falling short of use of the PLA in Vietnam. The apparent logic was: if American force-increases do not basically change Viet Cong capabilities and prospects, Chinese military intervention is not required. "How can 3,500 men save the aggressors from defeat in war?" (CPR government statement of 12 March) The argument was also intended, of course, to buoy up North Vietnamese and Viet Cong morale.

By warning, in the context of non-intervention, that the United States had "embarked on the path of a Korean-type war" (CPR government statement of 12 March), the Chinese further reduced the deterrent value of the Korean War analogy. And by using the analogy in another context--namely, in deploying South Korean troops to Vietnam, the United States "has gone farther down the path of fighting a Korean-type war" (People's Daily article of 18 March)--while threatening no countermeasures,

*Later, in May, the Chinese explicitly contrasted American air and naval power with Communist capability on the ground, declaring that "American naval and air superiority" is no match for "revolutionary war" on the ground and "That is why we say, the enemy may fight in the way it chooses, but we fight in our way." (People's Daily editorial of 7 May This was an indirect admission that Hanoi and Peiping did not have the capability to prevent the air strikes.

Peiping further weakened it.* Actually, in the apparent Chinese view, the PLA would be used to act on the analogy only if American ground forces moved across the 17th parallel, defeating PAVN units and continuing to advance northward. On this point, Edgar Snow in April reported the "thinking of the Chinese leaders" as follows: "Only after repeated warnings were Chinese volunteers sent into the Korean War. They did not intervene until the transportation and communications networks across the Yalu River began to be bombed." Snow's distortion on the matter of bombed networks across the Yalu--if the distortion came from the Chinese--would weaken the analogy to the point of implying that China in this case would not intervene unless China itself were attacked. While it seems doubtful that the Chinese were trying to encourage this impression (as they were taking a different line in other interviews in the same period), Snow seemed to be saying, at the least, that Peiping would not consider air strikes against North Vietnam a sufficient reason for PLA intervention. (His views were set forth in an article in the Tokyo Sekai, #4, April 1965.)**

Regarding the matter of "volunteers," in the context of air attacks on the North, Chinese pledges to send them had political-psychological value--primarily for Chinese prestige, pressure on neutrals, and popular morale in the North--but had no military meaning. Although

*This weakening process had been accelerated by use of the analogy in Chinese statements published on 13 February and 4 March following the early February and early March air strikes on the North.

**The sufficient reason for PLA intervention was asserted privately in the same month by Chou En-lai: an American ground force attack on the North (talks with Ne Win in Rangoon on 3 and 4 April). Chou also told Sihanouk in mid-April that Peiping would send no troops to North Vietnam as long as South Vietnamese or American troops did not invade above the 17th parallel.

the early and mid-March air strikes spurred Hanoi to publicize offers of the Russians, Chinese, Cubans, and others to send volunteers "to fight beside their Vietnamese comrades" (Nhan Dan editorial of 17 March), the North Vietnamese leaders almost certainly viewed these publicized offers as having no real deterrent value. In mid-March, Chou En-lai in effect admitted this, ruling out PLA intervention by alluding to DRV self-reliance. Replying to a French correspondent's question regarding air bombardment of the North Vietnamese, Chou said: "In the first place, they can defend themselves." Hanoi itself declared self-reliance the real Vietnamese Communist policy on military manpower, and voluntary enlistment of Vietnamese was depicted in the 14 and 17 March Nhan Dan editorials as providing the necessary fighting and reserve force for the PAVN. When, therefore, Hanoi's Council of Ministers' meeting on 4 April stressed self-reliance in fighting, it was merely formalizing the fact that Vietnamese Communists were fighting and would fight alone in the war's then-current phase.

Regarding the matter of large-scale PAVN troop movements into the South--a policy Peiping apparently preferred--Hanoi tried to dispel the impression abroad that it would retaliate against the mid-March strikes by taking such radical military action. The North Vietnamese leaders probably believed at the time that a large-scale--rather than piecemeal--PAVN movement across the 17th parallel would spur the United States into launching massive air strikes against all targets in the North. When Hanoi broadcast the 22 March Liberation Front statement, which appealed for support from the North, it changed the key sentence to a more restrained and contingent warning--i.e., from "we will call" to "we will have to call in case of need" on those southerners sent North in 1954. Similarly, when it had called a few days earlier on PAVN forces to defend the country "in coordination with the liberation forces" in the South (Nhan Dan editorial of 16 March), the context had suggested

that the PAVN would defend the North and the Viet Cong would "defend" the South.* By stressing North-South "coordination," Hanoi in these statements seemed to be sidestepping the major issue--that is, whether to launch a large-scale retaliatory attack southward--and insisting instead that Viet Cong operations in the South (such as the bombing of the American embassy in Saigon) was a coordinated and appropriate response to air strikes against the North.

Peiping's prestige was damaged by the March air strikes. These strikes destroyed the concept of a sanctuary and forced them to recognize that Mao was wrong in thinking that small wars could be fought with only slight risks to the base areas and to the security of other bloc countries. The Chinese were compelled to fall back on the argument that the United States would not win the final victory. They were also compelled to screen their military inaction behind a cloud of words, which included the unprecedented pledge to send men to fight in the South. This pledge was made in response to the Liberation Front's 22 March appeal with an eye to (a) recouping setbacks in Peiping's prestige, (b) competing with Moscow on the matter of willingness to send volunteers, and (c) preventing further increases

*The sentence made the North-South distinction in the following way: "Fighting in coordination with the liberation forces and people in the South, let our armed forces and people in the North always stand ready, uphold the spirit of daring to fight and to win, and deal the American pirates still heavier blows to defend the life and property of our people and the airspace, territorial waters, and territory of our country."

of American (or anti-Communist) ground forces in the South.* However, the pledge was hedged. China is "ready to send our men, whenever the South Vietnamese people want them, to fight together with the South Vietnamese people to annihilate the American aggressors" (People's Daily editorial of 25 March). Chen Yi and Chou En-lai used the same hedge--i.e., whenever wanted--on 28 and 29 March respectively. In the 25 March editorial, Peiping was careful to distinguish between the fact that the Viet Cong had already called for "aid, including arms and all other war materials" (and were in fact receiving such aid) and the fact that they had not yet called for fighting men. That is, the Chinese in effect told Washington that their real position was not to commit PLA forces to fight in Vietnam at that time.**

The Chinese leaders hoped to deter the United States from striking by air at China by making it easy for

*Sensitivity to Peiping's inaction and setbacks in prestige was also reflected in (a) a pro-Communist newspaper's appeal to readers in Hong Kong to send letters to the editor to refute local Chinese Nationalist claims that Chinese, not Americans, are the real "paper tigers" (Wen Wei Pao editorial of 14 April) and (b) Peng Chen's use of a hard adjective--e.g., China is "willing to take emergency action" to force the Americans out of Vietnam (speech of 18 April). But Peng was ambiguous on the precise nature of that "emergency action." His remark, made at a time when the delegation led by Le Duan was in Moscow, was primarily intended to regain some ground lost to Moscow as the Soviet pressed their post-Khrushchev effort to increase influence with the North Vietnamese leaders.

**Regarding the matter of negotiations, the 25 March editorial suggested that the Chinese also intended their position to serve as a means of applying more pressure on Hanoi to adopt a stand--against negotiations--similar in degree of harshness to that of the Front and Peiping.

Washington to read the hedge in their position on the matter of sending volunteers. That they were anxious to make this clear to Washington is suggested by (a) Chen Yi's 15 March statement--reported by a Western diplomat in Peiping--that China did not intend to intervene militarily in Vietnam so long as Hanoi did not request China to do so and (b) the story given to a Japanese correspondent in Peiping on 25 March--that is, on the same day that Peiping published its bold-appearing but substantively-weak editorial on volunteers. The correspondent reported that "informed circles" (apparently several Chinese officials) in Peiping believed the time not yet ripe for sending PLA forces to North Vietnam or to the South, that Viet Cong forces would first be strengthened by regrouped southerners, that after Hanoi and Haiphong had been bombed and the North had suffered considerable damage, PAVN forces might cross the demarcation line and strike at American bases in the South, and that only if, at some future time, there were fear that American ground forces would sweep the whole of Vietnam (including the North), China would intervene with PLA units. These signals to Washington from Peiping that the PLA would not be used in Vietnam except in a remote contingency were published at a time when the Chinese seemed intent primarily on deterring further American strikes against North Vietnam. They thus contradicted the ostensible intent. It is probable, therefore, that Peiping was more concerned at the time with deterring the United States from striking at bases in China--and was implicitly arguing to this end that since the PLA is not building up, a pre-emptive American air strike is unnecessary.

This increased concern about possible strikes against Chinese bases was expressed in various ways. For example, a Peiping government statement of 12 March declared that American threats to bomb China would not frighten Peiping; the Chinese ambassador in Paris on 27 March told an Asian diplomat that "some American leaders have even threatened to bomb China, we are quite prepared for this;" a People's Daily editorial of 29 March stated that after attacking South and North Vietnam, Washington's "next step will be aggression against China;" Chen Yi told Nepalese officials on 31 March that an attack on China might come at any time,

and that China was preparing its defenses; and in late March, Chou En-lai reportedly told Ben Bella that "We are convinced that the United States will bomb China and we have already taken all measures to face this aggression." The 9 April attack of Chinese Communist MIG aircraft on American Navy aircraft southwest of Hainan probably was intended as a warning to Washington and further reflected Peiping's real concern that the mainland, or at least Hainan, might be hit by American (or Chinese Nationalist) air and naval strikes.

The shift to increased concern occurred roughly at the time when, in March, the Chinese leaders were made clearly aware that their effort to deter strikes against the North had failed. They believed that these strikes would be sustained and even expanded. Central Committee member, Liao Cheng-chih, for example, was quoted on the air strikes by the Japanese correspondent in Peiping:

> In order to accomplish a revolution, they must bear even their own country's being ruined. (Tokyo Shimbun of 26 March, based on a telephone conversation between the paper's main office and its correspondent in Peiping on 25 March)

On 31 March, the Chinese again hinted at their view that the deterrence effort had failed and they could not prevent further American air attacks on the North. They declared that the Viet Cong would punish the United States "no matter how many bombs it may dump on North Vietnam" (People's Daily "Commentator" article of 31 March published following the bombing of the American embassy in Saigon). At a time when North Vietnamese targets were subjected to air attacks and when the Chinese leaders in effect were telling the North Vietnamese leaders that these strikes must be absorbed, the Chinese cast about for a plausible line to justify their encouragement of Hanoi to face even national destruction. Partly to justify the sacrifical course they were urging upon the Vietnamese and partly in response to Secretary Rusk's 3 May remark on the possibility of suspending bombing, the Chinese leaders discussed more openly than before the

prospect of American strikes against the mainland. Publicly, they pressed forward along the line that Peiping would support the war in Vietnam even if China, too, were to be bombed. The Chinese in this way hoped to add weight to their argument that Hanoi should not accept negotiations in return for a suspension of bombing.

Further, the Chinese leaders hoped to indicate to Washington the futility of any future course which envisaged various degrees of bombing the mainland of China. Marshal Ho Lung declared that Peiping would support the war in the South "no matter how great the cost and sacrifice" (speech of 7 May at the East German embassy); Lo Jui-ching wrote that Peiping would help the Vietnamese "to the limit of our capabilities" even if the United States "enlarges the war" (Red Flag article of 10 May); and "Observer" wrote that support would continue "whether you bomb China or not....We have taken into full account every war venture you may possibly launch and made adequate preparations to meet it" (People's Daily article of 12 May). The latter statement about preparations strongly suggested air defense precautions.

As they prepared for the prospect of air strikes against the mainland (adopting the strategy of expecting the worst development),* they also indicated that they

*Lo Jui-ching wrote that "preparations must envisage the use by imperialists of nuclear weapons as well as conventional weapons" and went on to claim that the United States was converting the war into "a local war of the Korean type" (Red Flag article of 10 May). The People's Daily editorial of 14 May also claimed that special war was being expanded into regional war. This emphasis conflicts with the CCP doctrinal position that small wars can be confined and contrasts with that of 1961-62, when Chinese materials stressed the small-scale, "special warfare" nature of the fighting (see footnote on page 4). The change in Peiping's appraisal of the extent of the war reflects their awareness that not only North Vietnam, but also China has been denied the "right" of indefinite sanctuary.

preferred not to initiate a Sino-American clash. Lo Jui-ching laid it down that "Our principle is: We will not attack unless we are attacked. If we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack." (Red Flag article of 10 May, in which Lo suggests that the Vietnamese can handle the fighting alone) On 12 May, a Chinese official responsible for liaison with the Japanese trade office in Tokyo told a Japanese businessman that "If the United States continues to move toward escalation of the war, China will not sit idly by. Even then, China's position would be to return the punch after being hit first."

Regarding the strategy of the war in the South, the Chinese apparently continued to press Hanoi to accelerate the introduction of regular PAVN units into the fighting. The Chinese seem to have responded to the air strikes of early February and March by encouraging Hanoi to move PAVN forces on a large-scale across the 17th parallel. In early June, they again urged Hanoi:

> All the Vietnamese people, including the people of North Vietnam, have acquired the right to exert their utmost to hit back...the 17th parallel provisional military demarcation line ceases to exist and the people in North Vietnam cease to be restricted in giving support to their fellow countrymen in the South. (People's Daily "Observer" article of 1 June)

Unlike its February reaction, Hanoi did not delete this passage from the domestic broadcasts of the "Observer" article which were beamed on 3 June. This suggests that the North Vietnamese leaders may be willing to infiltrate a few more PAVN units to fight in the South. However, as for PLA action, "Observer" treated the matter with caution. "The Chinese people have the right to do all in their power to aid the Vietnamese people in counter-attacking." Further, on 29 May, Chen Yi had been quoted in People's Daily as telling a French correspondent that the Vietnamese "are perfectly capable of driving the American aggressors out of their country by relying on their own forces." This is obviously the Chinese leaders' preferred course in Vietnam.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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1416-35

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM/CAMBODIA

REPORT NO. CS-311/08182-65

SUBJECT VIET CONG HOSPITAL AND ARMS DEPOT LOCATED IN HAU NGHIA PROVINCE, SOUTH VIETNAM, AND SVAY RIENG PROVINCE, CAMBODIA

DATE DISTR. 2 JULY 1965

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES (30)

DATE OF INFO. MID-JUNE 1965

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (18 JUNE 1965) [redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: [redacted]

AS OF MID-JUNE 1965 THE VIET CONG /VC/ WERE MAINTAINING A HOSPITAL, SAID TO BE THE MAIN VC MEDICAL INSTALLATION, IN THE BORDER AREA OF HAU NGHIA PROVINCE, VIETNAM, AND SVAY RIENG PROVINCE, CAMBODIA. THE PRINCIPAL VC ARMS DEPOT FOR SOUTH VIETNAM WAS ALSO REPORTEDLY LOCATED AT THIS HOSPITAL. THE CAMBODIAN PORTION OF THE HOSPITAL WAS LOCATED IN SAMRONG HAMLET, SVAY RIENG; AND THE VIETNAMESE PORTION, WHICH WAS OF LESSER IMPORTANCE THAN THE CAMBODIAN, WAS LOCATED IN BA THU HAMLET, DUC HUE DISTRICT, HAU NGHIA. A NUMBER OF AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE WORKING IN THE HOSPITAL.

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FOLLOWING IS CAS VIENTIANE 8408 RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON AS IN 11109.
REF: JCS 5221, 062143Z

FOLLOWING ARE AMB SULLIVAN'S COMMENTS ON REF, CONCURRED IN BY CAS VETN:

I BELIEVE IT PERTINENT TO CORRECT CERTAIN APPARENT MISUNDERSTANDINGS RE CAS GUERRILLA EXPANSIONS ALREADY APPROVED IN THE DIRECTION OF THE DRV-LAO BORDER IN THE PROVINCES OF SAM NEUA AND LUANG PRABANG. THESE APPROVALS WERE GRANTED BY ME AND CONCURRED IN BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR EXPANSIONS INTO THE DRV AS STATED IN PARA 3A REF. BY THE TERM "EXPANSION" AS USED IN THESE DISCUSSIONS I REFER TO THE ARMING OF ABLE-BODIED TRIBAL ELEMENTS IN THEIR HOME AREAS AND RECLAIMING THESE AREAS FROM PL CONTROL, BRINGING THEM WITHIN U.S. MISSION'S REFUGEE PROGRAM AND SUPPORTING THEM WITH RICE, MEDICAL CARE, EDUCATION, ETC. IT IS WELL BEYOND OUR CAPABILITY AND OF QUESTIONABLE DESIRABILITY AT THIS TIME TO PLAN SUCH EXPANSIONS INTO TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY THE DRV. I HAVE LIMITED BY APPROVALS FOR OPERATIONS INSIDE THE DRV FROM LAOS TO SMALL SCALE INTELLIGENCE PROBES TO DETERMINE POPULAR ATTITUDES AND THE RECRUITMENT OF INDIGENOUS ASSETS TO PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE AND SUPPORT TO TEAMS SENT IN FROM LAOS. I HAVE AUTHORIZED COMMITMENTS TO INDIVIDUALS ONLY AND NOT TO VILLAGE POPULATIONS OR TRIBAL GROUPS AS SUCH.

MY OWN ATTITUDE TOWARD OPERATIONS INTO THE DRV FROM LAOS IS FAMILIAR TO THE DEPARTMENT AND, I BELIEVE, TO CAS HQS. I FEEL THAT ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF OPLAN 34A IS NOW BEING ACCOMPLISHED IN EFFECT BY ROLLING THUNDER AND IT IS NO LONGER NECESSARY TO CONDUCT GROUND OPERATIONS TO ACCOMPLISH 34A OBJECTIVES SUCH AS TO "INTERDICT ROUTE 7" IN NORTH VIETNAM.

WITH RESPECT TO "THE BROADER OBJECTIVE OF A FULL SCALE RESISTANCE EFFORT", I ASSUME THAT THERE WILL BE FURTHER DISCUSSION ON THE POLICY ASPECTS OF THIS CONCEPT AND I WOULD HOPE TO BE CONSULTED AT LEAST WITH RESPECT TO THE LAUNCHING AND SUPPORT OF SUCH OPERATIONS FROM LAOS.

GP-1
BT

Handle as EXDIS per SS

~~TOP SECRET~~

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 29 JUL 1997

[redacted]

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

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File
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39

The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The West Wing
The White House

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Dear Mac:

I transmit herewith our most recent Special National Intelligence Estimate 10-9-65 which estimates foreign reactions, particularly those of the DRV, China, and the USSR, to certain US military courses of action in Vietnam. These courses are set forth in appropriate detail on the first and second pages of the document under the heading "Assumptions."

I invite your special attention to item (c) on page two: "...we might either continue present policy with regard to air strikes or extend these strikes in North Vietnam to include attacks on land (but not sea) communications from South China...."

This effort to interrupt the flow of military supplies from China to North Vietnam and the southern areas of combat recalls similar efforts and their concomitant difficulties in other theatres of operations and in other time frames. It is my feeling that a close study of our efforts to isolate battlefields in World War II (especially the campaign in Italy) and in the Korean War through the interdiction of land communications by air attacks contain many valuable lessons. Matters such as the rationale of initial target selection; the handling capacity of relevant routes and the proportion of this capacity needed for purely military traffic; the recuperability of targets once damaged; the enemy's use of lash-up repairs, detours, and alternate routes; the relationship between the interdiction of a given route or routes and the level of the enemy's combat effectiveness, and so on, may be greatly illuminated by my suggested reference to history.

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We should bear two things in mind: first, whereas these lessons of the past will be useful, I am sure that they will not be strictly applicable to the much more difficult problem of interdicting overland supply in the Indochina area (ordinary levels of combat expenditure are comparatively small, manpower for repair and portage service is almost certainly not in short supply, and route capacities are probably much larger than those necessary for strictly military requirements); second, these lessons will obviously not be applicable to sea-borne traffic which -- if not right now of major importance to the DRV/VC -- would become so as soon as the squeeze on overland movement began to be felt.

Sincerely,

"Red"

W. F. Raborn

SC No. 10078/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
18 August 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Probable Effects in China and Taiwan of a GRC Attack on the Mainland

Without massive US support for the GRC across the board, including direct military participation in the operation itself, Chiang Kai-shek's proposal to land on the South China coast, cut the main lines of communication between China and North Vietnam, and seize Kwangtung Province has very little chance of success.

A Kwangtung Expeditionary Force (KEF) launched from Taiwan and relying on unaided GRC capabilities would be small. Within a radius of approximately 250 miles the Nationalists are believed capable of putting four divisions ashore--about 50,000 troops--and supporting them for perhaps 30 days. At any greater distance from Taiwan GRC capabilities would be sharply reduced. The GRC task force would have to overcome determined opposition by Communist motor torpedo boats and light patrol craft--of the type that sank two Nationalist ships off the coast south of Kinmen on 6 August.

The GRC air force could provide only marginal air cover for assault elements landing on the northern coast of Kwangtung and probably only intermittent support south of Swatow (see map showing GRC air force radius of action). Once on the beach, GRC troops would be face to face with vastly superior Communist ground forces.

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DATE: DEC 2000


OB
TOTAL FOR CHINA
SOUTH CHINA*
GROUND FORCES
3,379,300
634,400
NAVAL STRENGTH
32 SS
8 DDD-DE
46 Large patrol craft
200 MTB PGM
10 SS
4 DE
37 Large patrol craft
135 MTB. PGM
AIR STRENGTH
1700 Jet fighters
275 Jet light bombers
780 Jet fighters
85 Jet light bombers
* South China area includes all of China south of the Yangtze River and east of Kweichow, Yunnan Provinces
KWANGTUNG
BURMA
VIETNAM
NORTH VIETNAM
LAOS
THAILAND
SOUTH CHINA ORDER OF BATTLE
Chinese Communist Army (three infantry divisions)
Border defense division
F-86/F-100 combat radius (450 n m)
Naval base
Air base
Portion of the coast within which the GRC has a capability of putting 4 divisions ashore
68360 9-65 CIA

In the Canton Military Region alone the Chinese Communists have more than 300,000 regular troops--infantry, artillery, and armor--grouped in five armies. In addition the Communists have six border defense divisions in this area. These units, and the bulk of the more heavily armed regular troops, are deployed on or near the coast where they would be immediately available to oppose GRC landings. Communist troops would have air support from fighter and bomber units which, although probably inferior to GRC air force in quality, would have the advantage of fighting from nearby bases and would have numerical superiority. (see map)

Unless one assumes that major Chinese Communist military units would immediately defect and join forces with the GRC invaders--something we consider extremely unlikely--a successful hit-and-run commando raid in strength is the best result that could be hoped for. Even this would be a chancy operation which could easily turn into a debacle involving the destruction or capture of the greater part of the attacking force. The repeated failure of small-scale (about 30-man) butcher and bolt raids by GRC commando teams between late 1962 and mid-1964 points up the risks of attempting coastal landings.

The net effect of these raids, of which there were 33 in 1963 and 25 during the following year, appears to have been to improve Chinese Communist detection capabilities. The teams encountered only the first line of Communist coastal defense, local militia and Public Security units. These forces displayed no inclination to cooperate with the raiding teams, which were killed, taken prisoner, or driven off in a matter of hours. We have no reason to believe that the end result of a larger operation by unsupported GRC troops would be substantially different, although it might take more time.

If the GRC succeeded in putting a sizable force ashore, local defense units would probably resist to the best of their ability in an effort to buy time for the deployment of regular troops. These would

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REPUBLIC OF CHINA ARMED FORCES STRENGTH



GRC Naval Order of Battle

TYPE	TOTAL
DD	4
DE	5
PRINCIPAL COMBATANT TOTAL	9
PF	1
PCE	5
PC	15
PCN	1
PT	6
PATROL CRAFT TOTAL	28
MMC	2
MSF	2
MSC	4
MSB	11
MINE CRAFT TOTAL	19
APD	1
AGC	2
LSD	1
LST	22
LSM	14
LSSL	3
LSIL	1
AMPHIBIOUS TOTAL	44
MINOR AMPHIBIOUS TOTAL	412
AUXILIARIES TOTAL	14
SERVICE CRAFT TOTAL	37

~~SECRET~~

be quickly concentrated and committed to contain and ultimately to destroy the invaders. There is little doubt that Communist troops would be able to achieve this objective. The PLA is an effective combat force, well trained and heavily indoctrinated. It performed creditably in Korea, demonstrated its ability to fight and win during the 1960 campaign against GRC irregular formations--stiffened by Special Forces units sent from Taiwan--operating in Burma near the Chinese frontier, and more recently in the 1962 border war with India.

The private GRC estimate of the chances for success in an operation lacking US support is probably not very different from our own, and it seems clear that Chiang Kai-shek has a more ambitious scenario in mind. At a minimum he probably envisions massive US backing for the operation up to the beach, with the expectation that if things do not go well once his troops are ashore the US will enlarge its commitment by direct participation (at least in the air) in the campaign on the mainland.

With US naval and air support up to the water's edge the prospects for a GRC landing in force would be considerably better, but the outlook for success in the ultimate objective of seizing and holding all or most of Kwangtung Province is dim at best. Even the largest expeditionary force the GRC could muster and put ashore with US assistance would be heavily outnumbered by the reinforcements the Communists could quickly deploy from the strategic reserve to back up their forces already in place in South China.

During 1963 the GRC worked out a detailed plan for an amphibious attack against Kwangtung. The operation involved 538,000 men--army, navy, and air force--the bulk of the entire Nationalist military establishment. Only a skeleton garrison force of regular troops, strengthened by a call-up of reserves, would be left behind to defend Taiwan and the Offshore Islands. The plan was carefully reviewed by a top level Sino-American committee which included Admiral Alan Kirk--then US Ambassador in Taipei--and COMUSTDC Vice Admiral Charles Melson.

Examination of the proposed operation revealed serious deficiencies in many key areas. The GRC did not have enough amphibious lift for the operation or trained crews to man additional landing ships if these were provided by the US. The Nationalist navy lacked sufficient ships for beach preparation and fire support missions. They did not have enough tactical aircraft with the range required for interdiction and close support missions, nor an adequate pool of trained pilots to replace combat losses. All the armed services were found to be short of trained specialists, especially key technicians for logistics units required to support sustained operations. The total GRC deficit in all categories of supply needed for the operation amounted to approximately a million and a half tons.

Admiral Melson commented that if these deficiencies were eliminated the GRC expeditionary force could probably seize a beachhead and take over the port of Swatow but would be unable to break out of their initial lodgement without assistance from US troops. It is questionable how long GRC troop morale would hold up if the expeditionary force remained bottled up inside a Swatow perimeter. The senior officers and NCO's in the GRC armed forces are mainlanders and would probably remain strongly motivated. The majority of the rank and file, however--approximately 85 percent of the riflemen in the line--are Taiwan-born, have no stake in reconquering mainland China, and might lose heart quickly under continuous heavy pressure.

The Communists would react swiftly to cope with an invasion. The PLA, a land army of some 2.3 million men, is the backbone of Peiping's military strength. Nearly one third of this force is already deployed along the China coast from Shanghai to the DRV border--a total of approximately 634,000 men. These troops include 30 regular infantry divisions, nine artillery divisions, one armored division, and 12 border defense divisions. Forces in the area of the GRC landing would be committed at once to blunt the initial thrust and contain the invasion until reinforcements in overwhelming strength could be deployed from the strategic reserve in north and northeast China.


COMMUNIST CHINA
TAIWAN STRAIT BUILDUP 1962
U.S.S.R.
MONGOLIA
Liao-yang, An-shan
Peiping
Shanghai
Foochow
Amoy
APY REGION
INDIA
NEPAL
BHUTAN
SIKKIM
BURMA
LAOS
THAILAND
NORTH VIETNAM
PHILIPPINES
XXXX
XX
48304 8-62 CIA

The Communist troop build-up in the Taiwan Straits area during June 1962 provides some indication of the speed with which additional forces could be brought in. Apparently in response to what Peiping interpreted as a possible threat of US-supported action by the Nationalists, the Communists moved six infantry divisions and one artillery division into Fukien Province in about one week's time, raising the order of battle strength there from 194,000 to 311,000. (see map)

Additional air support for defending Communist forces in Kwangtung could probably be marshalled with equal speed. During the 1962 build-up four fighter regiments were deployed to backup fields in a matter of days. Chinese Communist air strength now within operational range of the Kwangtung coast includes 390 jet fighters and 25 jet light bombers. This force could be augmented in short order. Peiping has a total of 1,700 jet fighters and 275 jet light bombers and there are at least seven unoccupied but usable airfields in South China to which additional air regiments could be deployed. Much of the Chinese Communist air force is obsolete by Western standards, but would nonetheless be effective against invading troops lacking local superiority.

The GRC belief that a large-scale invasion would trigger mass desertions from the ranks of the PLA appears to have little basis. The armed forces have always received preferential treatment and continuous, high pressure political indoctrination. Even during 1960-62, the years of greatest popular unrest on the mainland during and just after the "leap forward" economic disaster there was no evidence of significant disaffection in the PLA. Apart from about 14,000 Chinese prisoners of war captured in Korea--many of whom were one-time Nationalist soldiers--who elected to go to Taiwan rather than return to Communist control in early 1954, there have been only a handful of low level defectors from the armed forces. Moreover, soldiers are seldom tempted to abandon a victorious standard, and unless the Nationalists were able to inflict a series of surprise defeats on Communist forces from the outset of the invasion a mass turnover of major Communist units appears very unlikely.

GRC hopes for a popular uprising which would hamper the Communist defenders and aid the Nationalist cause also appear illusory. All our evidence concerning the state of popular attitudes in coastal areas of southern China indicates that a large-scale invasion would not spark a revolt at the present time.

The degree of popular disaffection that exists in the mainland population is sometimes exaggerated by observers outside China. There was considerable unrest in 1960-62 when several successive crop failures created semi-starvation conditions in many areas. Recent travelers and refugees from southern coastal areas, however, consistently report that the food situation there has improved substantially.

Communist instruments of control--the police and public security forces--probably are basically loyal to the regime. Low-level party officials bear the brunt of public censure for regime failures and have been subjected to a harsh new "purification" campaign during the past year. Their morale has probably dropped but extremely few have defected, suggesting that their situation has not yet destroyed basic loyalty in this key group.

Southerners in general have always resented governments of any kind imposed on them from the north, and probably see little to choose between the Communists and the Nationalists. They have many reasons to dislike the present regime, with its stifling political controls and record of economic failure, but by all the evidence the Chinese Nationalists still remain deeply discredited in their eyes.

The GRC could, therefore, probably expect little or no help from the civilian population. At best the majority of the people would remain neutral while the issue was in doubt, waiting to throw in their lot with the winning side. At worst, the population might be convinced by Communist propaganda that the landing was a foreign invasion by "imperialist" forces and rally patriotically behind the regime.

Communist military reaction would probably not be limited to simply repelling the GRC invasion in Kwangtung. The Offshore Islands would almost certainly come under military pressure. Heavy artillery attacks would probably be the first step, followed by an attempt to seize some or all of the islands if the Communists concluded that a quick victory over reduced garrison forces was possible. Large-scale amphibious attacks on Taiwan itself would probably not be attempted but commando raids might be launched from the mainland against military installations clearly associated with the GRC attack. GRC naval installations in the Penghu (Pescadores) Islands and at Tsoying, and port facilities in Kaohsiung might be targets for such operations. The Communists might also attempt to bomb airbases in southern Taiwan used by the GRC air force to support the invasion forces. In any such attacks, however, the Communists would probably try to avoid actions which would increase the enmity of the Taiwanese population.

One of Peiping's major objectives would probably be to turn the Taiwanese against the Nationalist government and if possible to promote a "patriotic" revolt against the GRC and its "imperialist masters" in the US. Communist propaganda would portray the GRC invasion as a ruthless exploitation of Taiwanese "comrades" to serve the interests of foreigners.

The Taiwanese population holds little love for mainland Chinese of any political coloration and has no sympathy for Communism. For this reason, Peiping's calls for a rising to "reunite" Taiwan with the mainland would probably have little appeal. It seems likely, however, that the combination of military reverses which would discredit the GRC leadership and mounting casualties--largely Taiwanese--would increase dissidence among the population to a point which would gravely threaten the stability of the Nationalist government. Morale of the ruling mainlander elite, sustained in part by the dream of eventual return to the mainland as conquerors, would almost certainly plummet.

Peiping would exploit the invasion attempt domestically to strengthen its position by appeals

to Chinese patriotism, seeking to re-awaken enthusiasm for regime programs across the board as part of a National effort to repel foreign aggression. Victories over the attacking forces would be played up as evidence of Communist power, and new proof that Mao's dictum "all imperialists are paper tigers" is correct. Abroad, Chinese Communist propaganda would seize on an unsuccessful US-supported GRC attack to bolster the idea that Chinese hegemony in East Asia is the "wave of the future." At the same time, Peiping's propaganda would underscore the threat to world peace created by "US aggression" in order to discredit the US and stimulate deterrent pressure on Washington from US allies and neutral nations.

The Chinese Communists could be expected to back up menacing propaganda statements charging that the US was starting an "Asian war" by troop movements and other threatening military demonstrations designed to show that Peiping was capable of enlarging the conflict at any point along an arc extending from Korea to the Indian Border. It is probable, however, that Peiping would hold off on any such escalation and concentrate on destroying the GRC landing force or driving it into the sea.

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15 October 1965

OCI No. 2389/65

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN THE LAOS PANHANDLE

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Office of Current Intelligence

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
29 JUL 1997

GROUP
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

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OCI No. 2389/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
15 October 1965

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Communist Activity in the Laos Panhandle

1. The Communists appear to be establishing a major base area in the mountainous region straddling the border between southeastern Laos and northern South Vietnam.

2. Intelligence reports received over the past several months have indicated that there has been considerable southbound troop movement into the area from farther north in Laos. In addition, photoanalysis has revealed that the Communists are making steady progress in their efforts to link up North Vietnam with this border area using a network of new and improved motorable roads. On the South Vietnamese side of the border, Viet Cong operations during the recent rainy monsoon season appear to have been designed to consolidate their control over these strategic border areas.

Troop Movements Into the Panhandle of Laos

3. Since the beginning of the rainy season last May, there has been no vehicular traffic moving south on the key supply route which leads south from North Vietnam through the Mu Gia Pass to the Muong Phine - Tchepone area of Laos (see map). In spite of the rains, however, there has been a continuing movement of troops to south Laos. [redacted] have reported a steady flow of southbound troops--mostly Pathet Lao, often in company-size groups. The net (southbound less northbound) movement since June appears to be in the neighborhood of 5,000 troops.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
~~SECRET~~

4. The June 1965 order-of-battle figures for the southern provinces of Laos (those south of Route 12) reported 7,200 Pathet Lao and 800 North Vietnamese in the area. The movement south, therefore, of some 5,000 men would represent about a 50-percent build-up, a significant increase over the number of troops assigned to this area in previous years.

Roadbuilding in the Panhandle of Laos

5. Although through vehicular traffic from North Vietnam to the southern provinces has been stopped by ground softening and high water, particularly along portions of Route 23 north of Ban Phone Mouang, road repair and construction has continued throughout the summer.

6. Perhaps the main undertaking has been the construction of a new road (designated Route 911) leading to Tchepone from the Mu Gia Pass area. This route, which will serve as an alternate to Route 23, branches off Route 23 at a point about 20 miles south of Mu Gia Pass. It then snakes through the hills southward toward Tchepone. This road is as yet unfinished, with about 15 miles remaining to be constructed. When completed, Route 911 will reduce by about a third the distance for trucks moving from Mu Gia Pass to Tchepone. By providing an alternative truck route, it will also make the aerial interdiction task considerably more difficult.

7. The selection of Tchepone as the southern terminus of this new road suggests that during the coming dry season there will be an increase in the volume of southbound traffic moving to the eastern border regions rather than west along Route 9 to the Muong Phalane area. Supplies moving to support the Pathet forces east of Muong Phalane would normally move on the shorter--and already established--route leading through Ban Phone Mouang.

8. Farther south, the Communists have continued their roadbuilding activity in the southeastern border regions. Recent photography indicates that Route 92 south of Ban Dong is trafficable in the dry season to a point a few miles south of Ban Bac. Two spurs lead east from Route 92 toward South Vietnam. One, Route 922, is truckable and apparently is in present use to within five miles of the South Vietnamese border, where the southeastern portion of Savannakhet Province abuts South Vietnam's Thua Thien Province. The second spur originates about 30 miles to the south on Route 92. However, this road (designated Route 923) swings south after a few miles and may be designed to connect with Pathet Lao roads located farther south or to serve as a feeder road to Pathet Lao positions in the mountain fastness rather than as a direct supply route to the border. It is still too early to make any sure prediction of its path, however.

9. There have been other signs that the Communists are developing a road net in the region to the east of Ban Phone. Recent photography indicates that an old French road (Route 165) leading east from Ban Phone toward the borders of Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Kontum provinces in South Vietnam is probably open to light vehicular traffic. There has also been some photography indicating vehicular activity in eastern Attopeu Province.

10. Photography has indicated that these roads are serving numerous Pathet Lao defensive installations in southeastern Laos. Over the past six months, photoanalysis has uncovered what appears to be extensive trenchwork, numerous AAA emplacements, and many training, storage, and regroupment areas. Some of these installations are connected to areas of Viet Cong insurgency across the border by trails suitable for cart traffic.

SOUTHEASTERN LAOS

SECRET

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

Consolidation of Control Over the Corridor

11. This increased emphasis on the southern Laos border region probably reflects the high priority that Hanoi places on the continued control of the corridor --in effect an extension of North Vietnamese territory --linking North Vietnam with the Communist strongholds in the South Vietnamese highlands. Recent Viet Cong setbacks in South Vietnam probably have reinforced Hanoi's view on the necessity of retaining this key artery.

12. The Communists probably feel that this control which has been reasonably secure in the past, might be jeopardized by the increased commitment of the US in its campaign against the Viet Cong. They may also suspect that the US is planning cross-border operations into Laos designed to cut off the supply routes leading south from North Vietnam. Chinese propaganda has in recent months charged the US with planning to "seal off" southern Laos below the 17th parallel.

NLJ.139.006.002/4

~~TOP SECRET~~ THE PRESIDENT 3

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20 October 1965

SC No. 11391/65
Copy No.
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY PRESENCE IN NORTH VIETNAM

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: DEC 2000

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence

~~THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

~~TOP SECRET~~

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SC No. 11391/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
20 October 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Chinese Communist Military Presence in North Vietnam*

SUMMARY

1. The Chinese Communists in June 1965 began deploying a limited number of military support units into North Vietnam (DRV). This marked the first time that Chinese troop units had been stationed outside China since 1958, when Peking withdrew the last of its troops from North Korea. Unlike the Chinese troops in Korea however, the units detected in North Vietnam thus far have been restricted to a few logistic support units and probably some local security forces, including antiaircraft artillery.

2. These Chinese forces for the most part have been moved from adjacent areas of south China into the northeast region of the DRV [redacted] E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs [redacted] On the basis of tentative information, however, we estimate that there may be 15,000 to 20,000 Chinese military personnel now in North Vietnam.

3. Recent aerial photography has revealed some activity in the northeast DRV that is probably related to the presence of Chinese support units. The northern sector of the Hanoi-Pinghsiang rail line is being improved and several new truck parks have been set up in the border area, probably to facilitate the increased flow of supplies into North Vietnam. E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs [redacted]

* This memorandum has the concurrence of the Director, DIA.

4. Although there is no firm evidence that any additional Chinese military units have deployed into North Vietnam since August, there are signs that several units, probably railway engineer and/or conventional engineer units, may be preparing to do so in the near future. These units, which began to appear near the Vietnam border in mid-September, are either newly formed or taken from areas of China other than the immediate border area. At least one railway engineer unit has moved to a position where it can deploy rapidly into the northwest DRV, where the Hanoi-Kunming rail line has been subjected to frequent bombing since mid-July.

5. There is no evidence that the deployment of logistic support units to the DRV has been accompanied by a buildup of Chinese combat forces in the Sino-DRV border area. Such a buildup would probably precede any major deployment of Chinese combat units into North Vietnam. There are however, tentative signs [redacted] that contingency plans, [redacted] have been made for the introduction of a force of considerable size into the border area. Thus available intelligence suggests that the Chinese are taking some of the necessary steps to move more units rapidly into Vietnam should the war escalate. On the basis of their practice to date, we expect to receive some early warning [redacted] if the Chinese military involvement in North Vietnam is significantly expanded.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

[redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

[redacted]

Chinese Military Units in Northeastern North Vietnam

9. The first Chinese unit detected in North Vietnam appeared in the northeast coastal area of Tien Yen in mid-June. E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs [redacted] This same organization controls a number of small Chinese military vessels which, in addition to supporting Chinese security forces, may be providing some type of military logistic support for the North Vietnamese. E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs [redacted]

10. [redacted] E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

11. [redacted]

12. Chinese railway engineer units are highly specialized units with a proven capability for rapid construction and repair of rail lines. By 17 August, photography revealed some new construction work on the northern part of the Hanoi-Pinghsiang railroad, [redacted] The new construction appears to involve efforts to improve the capacity and efficiency of this important narrow gauge line, by eliminating sharp curves and steep gradients. These improvements are apparently being accomplished in such a manner as to minimize the disruption of rail traffic between China and the DRV.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

13. [redacted]

[redacted] photography [redacted] showed a high level of truck activity among several apparently newly established vehicle storage areas stretching from Pinghsiang, China, to Langson in North Vietnam. [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

14. [redacted]

15. The Chinese may have decided to deploy AAA along the Hanoi-Pinghsiang rail line when it became clear in mid-July that the US was going to bomb rail lines north of Hanoi. [redacted] US pilots reported after the strike that they had encountered unusually heavy flak; two US aircraft were downed by ground fire.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>2

Chinese Units in Northwestern DRV

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

16. [redacted]

17. [redacted]

18. To sum up, at least five, and possibly one or two more, Chinese military units have now been detected moving into North Vietnam. These units appear to include a possible AAA division, a suspect border/coastal security defense division, elements of a railway engineer division, a motor transport regiment, and another possible security unit of at least regimental size. At normal organizational strengths, this would amount to about 19,000 troops in all. There are probably also some headquarters and service personnel.

New Chinese Construction Units Near DRV Border

19. Although no Chinese military units have been detected moving into North Vietnam since August, there are indications that several new Chinese construction units may be assembling near the DRV border for possible deployment into the country. These units were first noted in the Kwangsi area of the Canton MR in mid-September. [redacted] E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

[redacted]

20. [redacted] E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

[redacted]

21. [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

22. If the units [redacted] prove to be railway engineer divisions, their deployment into North Vietnam could raise the estimated number of Chinese troops in that country as high as 35,000 to 40,000. In the wake of continued US bombing attacks on North Vietnamese lines of communications, it seems likely that additional Chinese engineer units will be sent to assist the Hanoi regime in keeping its road and rail net operative.

Possible Chinese Contingency Plans

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

23. [redacted]

24. [redacted]

25. [redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

26. [redacted] It is at least clear that the Chinese have taken steps to secure the lines of communications from China to the DRV. Thus, should the war in Vietnam escalate into a major confrontation involving the Chinese, they would not have to start from scratch.

ANNEX

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs



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

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

CHINA
INDIA
KUNMING MILITARY REGION
K'un-ming
YUNNAN
Kuei-yang
CANTON MILITARY REGION
Kuei-lin
Liu-chou
KWANGSI
Canton
Nan-ning
Meng-tzu
Ping-hsiang
Kep
NORTH VIETNAM
HANOI
Tien Yen
BURMA
LAOS
HAINAN
SOUTH CHINA SEA
Vinh
VIENTIANE
Demarcation Line
THAILAND
Mekong
SOUTH VIETNAM
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

23 NOV 1965

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S.J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Vietnam Demonstrations

1. We would appreciate any information which indicates that the individuals on the attached list were either involved in the Solidarity with Vietnam demonstrations on 15 and 16 October, or more specifically, in the preparatory work for these demonstrations.

2. The attached is a list of U.S. citizens who attended the World Council of Peace Congress in Helsinki in July 1965. This list was previously distributed under [redacted]

[redacted]

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1 ENCLOSURE

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Approved for Release
Date OCTOBER 1997

ETATS UNIS o [illegible] L.Irma	Publicité hotelière, Vice-présidente de la Ligue Internationale P.P.Liberté	Del.
o [illegible]KER Herbert	Historien, Editeur Institut Américain des Etudes Marxistes	Del.
o [illegible]NOLD Patricia Monroe	Ménagère Centre de Paix de Valley -SANE	Del.
o [illegible]RGE Sidney	Enseignant	Ob.
o [illegible]RCIETT Deborah	Etudiante Les Femmes pour la Paix de l'Université de Californie	Del.
o BICK Joshua I.Abraham	Rabbin, Journaliste du Journal juif "Morning Freiheit"	Del.
o BICK Leon	Commerçant	Ob.
o BICK Barbara	Educatrice, Editrice du "Memo" de "Women Strike for Peace"	Ob.
o BLOICE Carl Ellenger	Ecrivain W.E.B.des Clubs du Bois	Del.
o BOCK Laura Jane	Etudiante Membre du Congrès de l'Egalité Raciale /CORE/ Secrétaire de la Section de la Jeunesse du Parti Démocrate de l'Université d'Oregon	Del.
o BRENNER Adolph	Retraité Institut Américano-Russe	Del.
o BRENNER Martha	Retraité Institut Américano-Russe	Del.
o CLARKE H.John	Rédacteur, enseignant de la part du journal "Freedomways"	Del.
o Le COURT Thomas Samuel	Etudiant Le Forum "Vendredi Soir" Palo Alto	Del.
o DENNIS Peggy	Journaliste	Del.
o DICKERSON Aurrus Earl	Avocat	Del.
o DUCKLES Madeleine	Ménagère, Journaliste "Women	Inv.

	ETATS Unis (suite)		
o X	FRIEDLANDER Daniel	Etudiant, co-président du Comité pour mettre fin à la guerre au Vietnam	Del.
o	GOLDEN Helen	Conférencière en "Public Affairs" "Women Strike for Peace"	Inv.
o	GOLDSTEIN Paula Jean	Etudiante W.E.B.du Club du Bois	Del.
o	GOODLETT B. Carlton	Docteur en médecine Membre de la Présidence du Comité du W.C.P.	Del.
o	GREENE Elena	Enseignante "Concerned Citizens" (Citoyens Préoccupés) USA.	Ob.
o	HALLIMAN Eda	Etudiante Présidente du Club du Bois du Collège d'Etat S.F.	Del.
o	HERSH Mildred	Enseignante "Women Strike for Peace"	Ob.
o	HOWARD Charles	Journaliste, Editeur en chef de "Howard News Syndicate"	Inv.
o	ILLGEN Frances	Secrétaire Association des loisirs de la capitale (Metropolitan Recreation Association)	Ob.
o	KAROSS Sonia	Reporteur, Ecrivain La Section Littéraire Lithuanienne du Club Culturel des Femmes, "Les Femmes pour la Paix" d'Oakland et le journal "Vilnins"	Del.
o	KIMERLING Noach	Comptable	Inv.
o	KIMERLING Ervine		Inv.
o	KLIMOFF Nickolai	Artiste	Del.
o	KOSKI Ernest	Directeur du journal finlandais "Tyomies" Les Clubs Culturels Finlandais	Del.
o	X KOCH Christopher	Journaliste, Directeur de programme de la fondation pacifique KBAI-FM	Ob.
o	KOMOROWSKI Conrad	Rédacteur, Le Comité de Coordination des Nationalités et de l'hebdomadaire polonais en Amérique "Voix Ouvrière"	Del.

ETATS UNIS (suite)		
KORENJAKI Lempi Maria	Ménagère	Ob.
KOSKI Darla	Etudiante	Ob.
KOSKI Impi	Comptable	Ob.
KOSTI M.Olga	Couturière	Ob.
KURZ Max	Technicien "Metropolitan Recreation Association"	Ob.
LANGE Nils	Docker La Fédération Internationale des Dockeurs de San Francisco	Del.
LEVINE Beatrice	Commerçante Le Club Démocratique Jefferson	Del.
LIPSON Leo	Syndicaliste Institut Américano-Russe	Del.
MAUND Dorothy	Assistante sociale "Women Strike for Peace"	Inv.
MAYER Olive has 201	Ingénieur "Les Femmes pour la Paix" et "Les Citoyens Préoccupés de Palo Alto"	Del.
MEACHAM Stewart	Repr."American Friends Service Committee"	Ob.
MEDIC Anna	Ménagère "Les Femmes pour la Paix"	Del.
MEDIC Anne Louise	Secrétaire Institut Américano-Russe	Del.
MEL DE FONTENAY Arcadia	Artiste, "Les Citoyens Préoccupés" de Palo Alto	Del.
MELISH William Howard	Prêtre La Fédération Méthodiste pour l'Action Sociale	Del.
MILLER Michael Alan	Etudiant, W.E.B. du Club du Bois	Del.
MILLER Susan Bonnie	Etudiante W.E.B. du Club du Bois	Del.
MOOS Elizabeth	Ecrivain W.P.	Del.
MORSE Elsa Peters	Ecrivain,Economiste	Inv.
MOYER Sallee	Retraité "Women Strike for Peace"	Del.
MYERSON Deanne	Enseignante W.E.B. du Club du Bois	Del.
MYERSON Michael	Docker Secrétaire international du W.E.B. du Club du Bois	Del.

ETATS UNIS (suite)

MULDAVIN Peter	Etudiant le W.E.B. du Club de Bois	Del.
MULDAVIN Hanna	Etudiante "Camps Femmes pour la Paix"	
NELSON Clarence Théodore	Prêtre l'Eglise Méthodiste	Ob.
NOSS Rose	Ménagère Le Comité International de l'Action pour la paix	Del.
OHMAN Eleanor	Artiste Le Comité International de l'Action pour la Paix	Inv.
PAIL/THORP Harold	Prêtre	Ob.
PARSONS Helen B.	Etudiante	Ob.
PERRY Rose	Membre de "Women Strike for Peace"	Del.
RABINOWITZ Barbara	Rédacteur du journal "Freedom News"	Inv.
RABINOWITZ Alfred	Décorateur	Inv.
RANDALL Byron	Artiste Institut Américano-Russe	Del.
PACKARD-RANDALL Emmy Lou	Artiste Institut Américano-Russe	Del.
ROBERTS Holland	Economiste Institut Américano-Russe Comité de l'action pour la paix internationale	Del.
ROSETTI Lea	Commerçante Institut Américano-Russe	Del.
ROSENBERG S.Rose	Avocat Association d'Amitié Américano-Soviétique, les clubs juifs culturels, l'Association des Femmes pour l'Action législative et la Guilde Nationale des Avocats.	Ob.
ROSENBURG Louis	Retraité Association d'Amitié Américano-Soviétique	Ob.
SCHERMER Jean	Employée "Women Strike for Peace" et l'Action des citoyens de Brooklyn pour la paix immédiate	Del.
Dr SHAPIRO Herbert	Professeur d'histoire	Del
SIEVIN John Michael		Ob.

ETATS UNIS (Suite)

♀ SMITH Jennie	Ménagère	Ob.
♂ SMITH Donald	Relations publiques Président du CORE de Los Angeles	Ob.
pour John Acker ♂ SMITH Jack	Journaliste	Del.
♂ SAGER James Soliz	Comptable, Président du Comité du IX Festival de la Jeunesse, Le Conseil du WEB du Club du Bois, reporter	Ob.
♀ SUNDERLAND June	Ménagère, "Women Strike for Peace", Centre de l'Action pour la Paix	Del.
♀ SUPRIANO Karol	Etudiante, WEB du Club du Bois	Del.
♂ SUPRIANO Harold Eugene	Assistant Social WEB du Club du Bois	Del.
♂ TERMAN Mandel	Educateur, Le Conseil des Relations Americano-Soviétiques de Chicago	Del.
♀ TOMKINS Ann	Assistante sociale C.I.P.A.	Del.
♂ TRACHTENBERG Alexandre	Editeur	Del.
♀ TUOMINEN M.Irma	Enseignante "Women Strike for Peace" de San Francisco	Del.
♀ WANG Madolin	Retraitée "Women Strike for Peace"	Ob.
♂ WARD Richard	Journaliste	Del.
♂ WEINMAN W.Jack	Enseignant	Ob.
♀ WEINMAN Janice	Ménagère	Ob.
♂ WELLINGTON C.S.	M.D. Mouvement du Droit Civil du Noir	Del.
WILLOUGHBY Robert Earl	Pasteur l'Eglise Méthodiste	Ob.
♀ WOODHOUSE Rosina	Ménagère Secrétaire-trésorière de la WILPF (la Ligue Internationale des Femmes pour la Paix et la Liberté)	Inv.
♂ ZEMEL Louis	Commerçant "World Fellowship"	Del.
♂ KRAMER Michael	Etudiant	

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INFO...J3-1 J5-1 SACSA-1 SAMAA-1
SECDEF-7 ASD/ISA-5 DIA-10 CSA-2
CSAF-5 CNO-2 CMC-3 FILE-1(39)

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CONFIDENTIAL — CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY — ROUTINE
CITE 53337
FOR NMCC/HC
SERVICE

Intelligence Information Cable

[redacted]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(

DATE OF INFO. NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 1965

DISTR. 8 DECEMBER 196[redacted]

SUBJECT

VIET CONG CLAIMS THAT AN ARMISTICE WILL BE DECLARED IN 1966, AND PLANS TO SEIZE PHU YEN PROVINCE AS A BARGAINING POINT FOR NEGOTIATIONS

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (6 DECEMBER 1965)

REF IN 10212

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: [redacted]

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1. IN EARLY DECEMBER 1965 THE VIET CONG (VC) KIEN HOA PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE INSTRUCTED ITS DISTRICT COMMITTEES, ON ORDERS FROM THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE LIBERATION ARMED FORCES, THAT THE LAO DONG PARTY HAD ANNOUNCED THAT AN ARMISTICE WOULD BE DECLARED IN 1966. TO PREPARE FOR THE ARMISTICE, HIGH-LEVEL VC CADRES WERE ORDERED TO SELECT LOYAL CADRES WITH AT LEAST A SECONDARY-SCHOOL EDUCATION FOR A TRAINING COURSE, TO BE HELD IN THE CAMBODIA-VIETNAM BORDER AREA, ON OPERATIONS AS "LEGAL" RESIDENTS. THESE CADRES WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE, AFTER THE CEASE-

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA CIA/NMCC OCI ONE OCR ORR OO EXO

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
4/21/98

FIRE, FOR ORGANIZING ANOTHER "PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION." INTELLECTUALS WITH PRO-COMMUNIST SYMPATHIES WERE ALSO TO BE RECRUITED AND WOULD BE ORGANIZED TO BEGIN THE REVOLUTION IN URBAN AREAS.

2. THE VC IN PHU YEN AND BINH DINH PROVINCES WERE PLANNING, AS OF MID-NOVEMBER, TO LAUNCH LARGE-SCALE MILITARY CAMPAIGNS IN THOSE TWO PROVINCES AND INTENDED TO ATTEMPT TO SEIZE ALL OF PHU YEN IN ORDER TO USE CONTROL OF THE PROVINCE AS A BARGAINING POINT IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE US, WHICH THE VC CLAIMED WOULD TAKE PLACE AT GENEVA IN 1966. IN EARLY NOVEMBER THE VC IN NINH THUAN PROVINCE ORDERED CADRES TO BEGIN COLLECTING MONEY, RICE, AND SALT TO BE TRANSPORTED TO VC TROOPS IN PHU YEN.

3. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE USMACV USOM USIS 2ND AIR DIV 9TH FLD STA CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT. 1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1)

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

Memorandum

COMMUNIST ROAD DEVELOPMENT IN LAOS

9 December 1965

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
29 JUL 1997

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WARNING

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No. 3097/65

9 December 1965

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
MEMORANDUM

SUMMARY

The Communists have made a substantial effort over the past year to expand and improve their supply routes in the Laotian panhandle. This effort is clear evidence of Hanoi's determination to backstop the Communist military campaign in South Vietnam. It increases the Communist capability to support an even greater level of fighting there. It also raises the prospect of stepped-up military activity inside Laos, which might look attractive to Hanoi as a means of distracting our attention from South Vietnam.

The program, which has involved upgrading existing roads and trails and building new ones, is now ready to show results. With the recent advent of the dry season, [redacted] a key section of the supply network, is already reporting trucks moving south in numbers comparable to last season. The Communists should be able to do better this season. By building a number of alternates and bypasses they have also reduced the vulnerability of the supply system to interdiction by air action.

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3.4(b)(1)

COMMUNIST ROAD DEVELOPMENT IN LAOS

1. The Laotian panhandle for several years has provided Hanoi with a primary avenue for supporting the war effort in South Vietnam. The sequence of roads, rivers, trails, supply dumps, and base areas runs through parts of Laos which have been in Communist hands for some four years or even longer.

2. Over the last year, and especially in the past several months, the Communists have been hard at work building additional truckable roads which lead ultimately to the South Vietnamese border. The effort quite obviously carries a high priority tag. One measure of this is that Hanoi, despite a crying need at home, has sent mechanical earth-moving equipment to the panhandle road program--a first in this remote part of Laos.

3. The program, pushed intensively right through the summer monsoon, is now ready to show results. The North Vietnamese can now send trucks 100 miles farther south than they could before, all the way to the South Vietnam border southwest of Da Nang. They have also made the system less susceptible to outages in wet weather.

4. Moreover, by building a number of alternates and bypasses, the Communists have reduced the vulnerability of their supply system to air action. Aerial photography shows they have built an elaborate vine-covered trellis over exposed parts of at least one section of new road. Also, convoys now move almost exclusively at night.

5. [redacted] southbound truck convoys began moving about a month ago, a month earlier than last year. In the past ten days an average of some 17 trucks per day have moved past this single observation point. Last year the Communists averaged the same figure over the six-month dry season. Recent evidence that the Communists are using fuel tanker trucks for the first time indicates that they intend to do better this dry season.

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6. We estimate that the Communists could theoretically deliver some 300 tons per day to South Vietnam during the six-month dry season, if they used the road network to its maximum. To do so, however, the Communists will have to move seven times as many trucks on the roads as they did during the last season, a development which would increase their exposure to air interdiction.

7. A force of at least 8,000 Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese is ranged along the road net. Additional troops may have been transferred into this area recently. These forces, like Communist forces elsewhere in Laos, are in position to launch attacks on government positions at any time with little advance warning. At present, the prime task of these forces is to prevent Souvanna's troops from moving eastward and interfering with the movement of North Vietnamese troops and supplies over the road and trail network to South Vietnam, where they are pressing the guerrilla campaign against American and South Vietnamese forces.

SOUTHEASTERN LAOS

Figure 1



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[redacted]

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PHOTO A





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LAOS: ROUTE 911

PHOTO B

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

PHOTO C



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PHOTO D



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ● ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

(HOLICKA)

COUNTRY LAOS

TDCS DB-315/04216-65

DATE OF INFO. APRIL - JUNE 1965

DIST. 28 DECEMBER 1965

SUBJECT

PATHET LAO [redacted] SUBSEQUENT ACCOUNT OF HIS WITNESSING THE INTERROGATION OF A DOWNED AMERICAN PILOT

PLACE & DATE ACQ. [redacted]

REF [redacted] IN [redacted]

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: [redacted]

1. [redacted] PATHET LAO (PL) [redacted] WHO WAS STATIONED IN HOUA PHAN (SAM NEUA) PROVINCE UNTIL JUNE 1965, CLAIMED DAVID L. HROLICKA SPENT THE FIRST NIGHT OF HIS CAPTIVITY AT A PL HEADQUARTERS IN THE VICINITY OF BAN BAN (XH 6000), [redacted] (KM) EAST OF SAM NEUA, AT APPROXIMATELY XH 7000. THE NEXT DAY, BEFORE BEING TAKEN TO CAVES WHERE PRISONERS WERE HELD, HROLICKA WAS INTERROGATED IN FRONT OF A PL SCHOOL IN THE VICINITY OF XH 7000 THAT WAS IN SESSION. [redacted] COMMENT: [redacted] (TDCSDB-315/04216-65) GAVE THE PRELIMINARY [redacted] ON HROLICKA AND CHARLES [redacted]

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC [redacted] CIA OSD OCI [redacted]

[redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 000143
DATE 26 JUN 1978

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SHELTON'S CAPTURE AND INTERNMENT. [redacted] LATER [redacted] IDENTIFIED A PHOTOGRAPH OF HRDLICKA AS ONE OF THE TWO PILOTS UNDER ARREST IN THE NUONG NGA (VH 1559) AREA. [redacted] CS-311/01444-65, PARAGRAPH 4, REPORTED A PL SCHOOL AT PHOU KHE, ONE KM FROM XIENG SU (VH 1953). THE LOCATION OF THIS SCHOOL REPORTED BY [redacted] IS APPROXIMATELY TWO KM NORTH OF XIENG SU. THE TWO SCHOOLS ARE PROBABLY IDENTICAL.)

4. ACCORDING TO [redacted] INVITED HIM TO GO TO THE SCHOOL AND [redacted] WAS PRESENT FOR THIS INTERROGATION OF HRDLICKA. [redacted] COMMENT: [redacted] THE [redacted] INTERROGATED HRDLICKA IN ENGLISH [redacted] MOST OF THE QUESTIONS WERE OF A POLITICAL/PROPAGANDA NATURE AND HRDLICKA ANSWERED ONLY THAT HE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT POLITICS. QUESTIONING LASTED ABOUT AN HOUR.

5. [redacted] SAW SHELTON ON TWO OR THREE OCCASIONS BY LOOKING IN HIS CAVE. [redacted] TDCSDB-315/04026-65 REPORTED THE CAVES WHERE PRISONERS WERE HELD APPROXIMATELY [redacted] METERS NORTHWEST OF BAN NA KAY TAY (VH [redacted]), 10 KM SOUTHEAST OF SAM NEUA. ANOTHER PL [redacted]

[redacted]

ON 25 DECEMBER REPORTED THAT THE ENEMY HAD A COMMAND POST IN A CAVE AT VH 1915556, 5000 METERS NORTH OF BAN NA KAY TEU AND THAT AMERICAN PILOTS WERE HELD IN PEAR OF A CAVE NEAR THIS COMMAND POST. ON AMS 1:50,000 SCALE MAPS THERE IS LESS THAN ONE KM DIFFERENCE IN THE LOCATION OF THE CAVES WHERE PRISONERS WERE HELD, SO IT IS PROBABLY THAT BOTH ARE IDENTICAL. THE COMMAND POST IS PROBABLY IDENTICAL TO PL HEADQUARTERS MENTIONED IN PARA ONE ABOVE.)

4. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE ARMY AIR USAID CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC USMACV-SAIGON 2ND AIR DIVISION-SAIGON [redacted]

END OF MESSAGE

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ANNEX IV

THE GROUND WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM

ANNEX IV

THE GROUND WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM

I. The Build-Up of Forces

The course of the ground war in South Vietnam is marked by the extent to which, in the conventional military sense, it has become increasingly a confrontation between third country forces. This situation reflects the already heavy commitment of indigenous manpower resources to the war effort. The heavy casualties sustained by local Communist forces (VC) are putting an increasing strain on their ability to mobilize additional military manpower. The GVN has committed substantial manpower resources to pacification programs and internal security and police programs. Over half of the GVN military forces are committed to these counter-insurgency programs. The GVN potential for expansion of its military forces, which would be limited under the best of circumstances, is restrained further by the political unrest in the GVN and the high desertion rate in the ARVN.

Since mid-1965, NVA troops in South Vietnam have increased by nearly 37,000. They now total 38,000 of about 38 percent of the total VC/NVA main force. By the end of 1966, an estimated 60,000 NVA troops will account for nearly half of the VC/NVA main force. By mid-1967 an estimated 75,000 NVA troops will account for 55 percent of main force strength. US/Third Nation* forces at the end of 1964 totaled only 25,000 troops or 9 percent of Allied regular troop strength. In mid-1966 there were 300,000 US/Third Nation troops or 49 percent of total strength. Projected deployments indicate that US/Third Nation forces will account for 470,000 troops or 59 percent of the regular Allied Army strength in South Vietnam by mid-1967.

Regular Free World forces now outnumber the total estimated Communist force by 5 to 1, and hold a 6 to 1 margin

*Here and throughout the remainder of the text, South Korean, Australian and New Zealand Forces are referred to as "Third Nation" Forces.

over the VC/NVA main force units. Overwhelming air and artillery support, coupled with considerable troop mobility and naval participation also add significantly to the preponderance of Allied military strength.

There is a sharp distinction between Communist and Allied forces in the number of support troops needed to back up tactical combat troops. Only about one-fifth of the total Allied Army and Marine Corps troops are committed to engaging and destroying the enemy in offensive operations. Thus of a force in June 1966 totaling slightly over 218,000 Army and Marine Corps ground forces only 44,200 represented troops in maneuver battalions. Over 157,000 troops were involved in indirect combat, logistics, construction engineering, security and other support tasks and some 16,400 troops are in artillery battalions. The Communist forces, on the other hand, have to commit only 18,000 troops or a little over 15 percent of their regular forces to combat support, compared to over 80 percent for the Allied forces.

When the relative build up of opposing forces is looked at in this manner the troop strength ratios change dramatically. The troop strength ratio of Allied maneuver battalions becomes nearly 1:1 rather than 6:1. In the II and IV Corps area the ratio is in the favor of the Communists. The projections of estimated Communist main force strength and Allied troop strength in maneuver battalions in mid-1967 indicate a troop strength ratio which gives the over-all strength advantage to the Communists. The advantage is offset, of course, by the air, artillery and naval support of the Allied forces and their highly developed mobility. Nevertheless, the Communist build up, particularly of NVA forces, shows a determination to commit whatever forces are necessary to match the Allied build up and to extend the war as long as possible. Even if the Communists admit that they cannot win a conventional military victory in South Vietnam they may still calculate that a long extended war with increasing US casualties may eventually break down US will and determination to persevere.

II. Casualties

The toll in human lives is, however, presenting an increasingly high cost to the Communist forces. The heavy casualties sustained by VC forces has already stabilized the extent to which they can commit troops and has forced

them to rely more heavily on NVA replacements. Total Communist losses--killed in action, captured, seriously wounded and deserters--ranged from an estimated 80,000 - 90,000 during 1965. During 1966 we estimate that these losses may range from 105,000 - 120,000 and from 65,000 - 75,000 for the first six months of 1967 if the current rates of combat are maintained and projected troop strengths are realized. We estimate that some 25,000 - 30,000 of the losses during 1966 will be North Vietnamese; an additional 25,000 - 30,000 North Vietnamese will be lost during the first half of 1967. The bulk of these losses will result from battle deaths and serious wounds. Local Communists will sustain estimated losses of from 80,000 - 90,000 during 1966 and an additional 40,000 - 45,000 during the first half of 1967. About two-thirds of local Communist losses will result from battle deaths and serious wounds. The remainder will be accounted for by captives and deserters.

In terms of the number killed in action on the battlefield, the Allied forces will continue to maintain an advantage. We estimate that about 48,000 Communists will be killed during 1966 and an additional 30,000 during the first six months of 1967 compared to 16,000 Free World soldiers estimated to be killed during 1966 (6,000 US and Third Nation, 10,000 ARVN) and an additional 9,000 that will probably be killed during the first six months of 1967.

Reports on battle fatalities among Communist forces indicate they have increased from slightly under 2,000 a month during the first six months of 1965 to about 3,900 each month during the second half of the year and 4,000 a month during January-May 1966.

On the basis of very limited data we estimate that the number of Communist troops seriously wounded and hence effectively lost has increased from about 1,600 - 2,500 a month in 1965 to from 2,000 - 3,200 a month in 1966. Our estimates indicate that the numbers of Communist personnel captured during 1965 and 1966 do not vary much, ranging from 6,300 in 1965 to an estimated 7,000 in 1966.

The Allied forces have achieved better than a 3 to 1 kill ratio over the enemy. Our data on VC/NVA forces killed in action show a sharp change in the relative shares accounted for by GVN forces and US/Third Nation forces. In the last

six months of 1965, US/Third Nation forces accounted for 23 percent of total Communists killed in action. In the first five months of 1966, however, US/Third Nation forces accounted for 56 percent of total Communists killed in action.

The rising casualty rates among Communist forces have had no detectable influence on North Vietnam's desire to continue the war in the South. The enemy continues to buildup his forces in the South, and the Communist forces are performing in battle as well today as they were in 1964 and 1965. The manpower drain on North Vietnam, in numbers alone, has not yet reached a burdensome level. Although the VC units have borne most of the casualties to date and are squeezed for manpower, Hanoi seems willing to increase its commitment. The drain on manpower could, however, become more critical as the casualty rates in the South and the competing demands for more manpower in the North increase. An increase in casualty rates in the South substantially higher than those already estimated through mid-1967 would require an Allied commitment of maneuver battalions substantially greater than that indicated in current deployment programs.

APPENDIX A

THE GROUND WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM

I. General Troop Strength

A. U.S. and Third Nation

1. Forces - General

The U.S. military commitment in South Vietnam, along with that of South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, has grown from some 25,000 troops at the end of 1964 to approximately 300,000 troops at the end of June 1966. Projected troop strengths indicate that approximately 470,000 U.S./Third Nation forces will be stationed in South Vietnam by mid-1967. (See Table IV-1)

In both an absolute and relative sense U.S./Third Nation troop strength in South Vietnam has grown more rapidly since 1964, than has the corresponding buildup in the South Vietnamese regular forces (See Table IV-2). U.S./Third Nation forces represented 9 percent of total Allied regular troop strength in 1964, 41 percent in 1965, and 49 percent in mid-1966. They will account for 59 percent of the planned regular Allied forces in South Vietnam by June 1967.

2. Deployment

U.S./Third Nation ground forces in South Vietnam are predominantly deployed in the I, II, and III Corps areas, with South Vietnamese troops, as of August 1966, maintaining complete military responsibility in the Capital Military Region (Saigon) and IV Corps areas. United States Marines are stationed at Da Nang, Chu Lai and Phu Bai in the I Corps area. Field Force I, with headquarters at Nha Trang (II Corps area), contains the 1st Calvary Division, elements of the 25th Infantry and 101 Airborne Division. ROK forces, and the 5th Special Group. Field Force II, with headquarters at Cu Chi (III Corps area), contains the 1st Infantry Division, elements of the 25th Division, 173 Airborne Brigade, and Australian and New Zealand Units (See Figure IV-1).

B. South Vietnam

1. Forces - General

At the end of June 1966, the Republic of South Vietnam had some 700,000 people under arms (See Table IV-3).

Table IV-1

South Vietnam: Actual and Projected Growth
of Total US/Third Nation Forces
December 1964 - June 1967

Thousands

	Dec 1964	Jul 1965	Dec 1965	Jun 1966	Dec 1966	Jun 1967
United States						
Army	15.0	40.0	120.0	160.0	240.0	275.0
Marines	1.0	25.0	40.0	50.0	70.0	70.0
Air Force	7.0	10.0	20.0	40.0	50.0	50.0
Navy and Coast Guard	1.0	5.0	10.0	20.0	25.0	30.0
Subtotal	24.0	80.0	190.0	270.0	385.0	425.0
Third Nation	1.0	5.0	20.0	30.0	45.0	45.0
Total	25.0	85.0	210.0	300.0	430.0	470.0

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Table IV-2

South Vietnam: Comparative Actual and Projected Regular Allied Troop Strength
December 1964 - June 1967

(In thousands)*

	1964**	1965	June 1966	December 1966	June 1967
GVN***	250.0	300.0	310.0	320.0	325
U.S. and Third Nation	25.0	210.0	300	430.0	470
Total	275.0	510.0	610.0	750.0	795
U.S. and Third Nation as Percent of Total	9	41	49	57	59

* Rounded to the nearest 5 thousand.
** End of year figures except for June 1966 and June 1967.
*** Excludes some 383 thousand quasi-military/security personnel.

Table IV-3

Total South Vietnamese Armed Strength
December 1964 - June 1967

(In thousands)*

	1964**	1965	1966	1967
South Vietnamese Forces				
Regular Military	250.0	300.0	310.0	325.0
Regional	95.0	130.0	140.0	140.0
CIDG	20.0	30.0	30.0	30.0
Popular	170.0	135.0	140.0	140.0
Armed Combat Youth	45.0	40.0	25.0	25.0
National Police	30.0	50.0	55.0	55.0
Total	610.0	685.0	700.0	715.0

* Rounded to nearest 5 thousand.
** End of year strength with exception of June 1966 and June 1967.

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Figure IV-1

SOUTH VIETNAM: MAJOR ALLIED DEPLOYMENTS OF REGULAR TROOPS, BY CORPS, MID-1966



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This figure, however, does not accurately reflect the regular South Vietnamese military strength. Only about 45 percent of the total South Vietnamese armed strength is committed to conventional military operations.

The South Vietnamese have responsibility for the bulk of the pacification program and measures to eliminate or neutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure. These programs require the commitment of some 350,000 men in quasi-military, self-defense and national police units. The South Vietnamese regular military force consists of 275,000 army troops, 15,000 air force and 20,000 navy/marine forces.

Since 1964, the regular South Vietnamese military force has increased by some 60,000 men or by about 25 percent. Projected deployments indicate that the regular forces are to be increased by some 10,000-15,000 men, bringing total strength up to 320,000-325,000 men by June 1967.

2. Major Deployments

The mid-1966 South Vietnamese Army Order of Battle is presented in Table IV-4 below:

Table IV-4

Major South Vietnamese Ground Force Deployments by Corps Area, Mid-1966

Combat Units	Assigned Strength
I Corps	31,000
II Corps	26,500
III Corps	43,000
IV Corps	38,500
Capital Military Region	2,000
General Reserve	8,500
Support Units and Miscellaneous	128,000
Total	277,500*

*Includes five GVN Marine Battalions with a total strength of 4,000 men. Approximately 21 percent of the combat strength is allocated to I Corps, 18 percent to II Corps, 29 percent to III Corps, 25 percent to IV Corps and 7 percent to reserves and the Capital Military Region.

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Figure IV-2

SOUTH VIETNAM
ACTUAL AND PROJECTED GROWTH IN US/GVN/THIRD NATION FORCES AND COMMUNIST FORCES, December 1964 - June 1967



*Projections for Allied Forces provided by Department of Defense.

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Figure IV-3

SOUTH VIETNAM
APPROXIMATE COMPOSITION OF ACTUAL AND PROJECTED GROWTH IN REGULAR ALLIED FORCES (US, TN, AND RVNAF)
December 1964 - June 1967



*Projections for Allied Forces provided by Department of Defense.

Figure IV-4

SOUTH VIETNAM
APPROXIMATE AND PROJECTED GROWTH IN COMMUNIST FORCES
December 1964 - June 1967



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war in South Vietnam is rapidly developing into a confrontation between the United States and North Vietnam with South Vietnamese forces on both sides playing relatively reduced roles. In spite of rapidly growing Allied troop strength and resulting heavy enemy losses, North Vietnam continues to send regular troops south in increasing numbers. The Vietnamese Communists apparently recognize the impossibility of a classic military solution, but may hope to attain their objectives by unconventional means and apparently intend to extend the war as long as possible in the hope of wearing down US will to see the war through.

An early and successful conclusion to the military struggle rests, therefore, with the ability of Allied forces to hunt down and destroy the enemy on his own ground. It is in this context that the numerical superiority in the ratios of Allied to Communist strength became less impressive. More meaningful relationships and trends in analyzing the present and future course of the ground war depend on the actual number of Allied troops theoretically capable of engaging and destroying the enemy in offensive operations.

B. Critical Troop Ratios

1. Assumptions

Total Allied troop strength in South Vietnam presently stands at some 610,000 men. Current NVA/VC main force strength is estimated to be about 100,000 troops.* At first glance it would appear that Allied regular forces presently enjoy a 6:1 numerical superiority over the NVA/VC main force. In a practical sense, however, this is not the case. Western troops and their South Korean and Vietnamese Allies require considerable numbers of support troops to maintain offensive combat units in the field. Since the scale of combat in South Vietnam at the present time is largely dependent on the level of Allied initiated offensive operations, it seems logical to exclude Allied support

*Irregular forces, political cadres and combat support forces are excluded from Communist troop strength in this analysis because of their limited role in conventional warfare.

troops in deriving meaningful ratios of actual Communist/Allied battlefield strength. The combat strength of the NVA/VC main force is taken at current estimated full strength--about 100,000 men. Allied combat strength is defined to include the number of troops assigned to maneuver battalions--those troops who initiate offensive ground actions and conceptually come into direct contact with the enemy. The critical troop ratio is defined as NVA/VC main force/Allied maneuver battalion strength.

2. Offensive Combat Strength

a. U. S./Third Nation

For purposes of this analysis only ground troops are considered--nearly 60,000 men in the Air Force and Navy are excluded from the analysis. (See Table IV-7). Approximately 20 percent of the total U. S. Army and Marine Corps strength in South Vietnam is committed to maneuver battalions. (See Figure IV-5). An additional 7 percent is assigned to artillery battalions that primarily provide combat support to the maneuver battalions.* The remaining 73 percent of the Army and Marine Corps personnel perform supply, construction, engineering, security, and related support tasks. The percent of maneuver battalion strength to total Third Nation troop strength is considerably higher because these troops are largely supported by US service units. The deployment by Corps area and service of US/Third Nation maneuver battalions is presented in Table IV-8. As of June 1966, 31 percent of US/Third Nation maneuver battalion strength was located in I Corps, 41 percent in II Corps, and 28 percent in III Corps. Projected deployments for June 1967 indicate that some 78,600 US/Third Nation troops in maneuver battalions will be distributed in the following manner: I Corps 23 percent, II Corps 49 percent, and III Corps 28 Percent.

b. South Vietnam

In the analysis of the critical troop ratios only the South Vietnamese Army is given consideration--some

*Artillery battalions are excluded from the critical ratio due to the manner in which they are employed in combat.

Table IV-7

South Vietnam: Actual and Projected Deployment of US/Third Nation Forces, by Function
July 1965 - June 1967

(In Thousands)

	1965						1966							
	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Dec 1966	Jun 1967
Combat and Direct Combat Support														
Maneuver Battalions														
USMC	9.0	10.0	12.0	12.0	12.0	12.0	13.0	14.0	15.0	16.0	17.0	17.0	18.0	18.0
USA	6.4	10.4	14.4	16.0	17.6	19.2	24.0	24.0	24.0	26.4	26.4	27.2	39.2	46.4
TH	.8	.8	.8	7.1	7.1	7.1	7.1	7.1	7.1	9.2	10.0	10.0	14.2	14.2
Artillery*														
USMC	2.6	2.6	3.4	3.6	3.6	3.6	4.0	4.6	4.8	4.8	5.4	5.6	5.6	5.6
USA	1.7	1.7	3.7	3.7	6.7	6.7	9.7	9.7	10.2	10.7	10.7	11.0	18.5	21.5
Subtotal	20.5	25.5	34.5	42.6	47.0	50.6	57.8	59.4	61.1	67.1	69.5	70.6	95.5	105.7
Construction, Engineering, Security, Support, etc**														
USMC	13.9	21.6	20.8	21.2	22.2	22.6	21.6	20.8	28.9	29.0	29.8	31.2	43.4	46.4
USA	31.6	36.0	58.1	73.0	80.2	88.9	89.0	95.3	103.2	111.6	117.1	138.8	190.3	219.1
USAF	11.6	12.7	13.6	15.2	18.3	20.6	25.3	28.7	32.3	33.0	33.9	38.1	50.0	50.0
USN***	4.6	5.3	6.0	8.5	8.8	8.7	9.8	10.5	12.7	13.8	14.8	17.8	24.0	24.0
Subtotal	61.7	75.6	98.5	117.9	129.5	140.8	145.7	155.3	177.1	187.4	195.6	225.9	307.7	339.5
Total	82.2	101.1	133.0	160.5	176.5	191.4	203.5	214.7	238.2	254.5	265.1	296.5	403.2	445.2

* Excludes antiaircraft and missile units, unknown TH artillery included in combat and direct combat support.
** Includes USAF and USN, although recognized that these forces perform indirect combat support roles.
*** Includes Coast Guard.

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Table IV-8

South Vietnam: Actual and Projected Deployment
of US/Third Nation Maneuver Battalions by Service and Corps Area
February 1965 - June 1967

(In Thousands)

	1965											1966							
	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Dec 1966	Jun 1967
I Corps																			
USMC*	.3	2.0	4.0	7.0	7.0	9.0	10.0	12.0	12.0	12.0	12.0	13.0	14.0	15.0	16.0	17.0	17.0	18.0	18.0
II Corps																			
USA						2.4	6.4	10.4	10.4	11.2	11.2	13.6	13.6	13.6	13.6	13.6	13.6	25.6	25.6
TW									6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	8.4	8.4	8.4	17.6	12.6
III Corps																			
USA				1.6	1.6	4.0	4.0	4.0	5.6	6.4	8.0	10.4	10.4	10.4	12.8	12.8	13.6	13.6	20.8
TW					.8	.8	.8	.8	.8	.8	.8	.8	.8	.8	.8	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6
Total	.3	2.0	4.0	8.6	9.4	16.2	21.2	27.2	35.1	36.7	38.3	44.1	45.1	46.1	51.6	53.4	54.2	71.4	78.6

* Excludes tank battalions.

COMPOSITION OF US MANEUVER BATTALION AND ARTILLERY BATTALION STRENGTH* TO TOTAL US ARMY AND USMC TROOP STRENGTH
July 1965 - June 1967
(Thousands)



35,000 men in the Air Force, Navy and Marines are excluded. Approximately 16 percent of the total South Vietnamese Army strength is committed to maneuver battalions. (See Figure IV-6). As of June 1966, 21 percent of ARVN maneuver battalion strength was located in I Corps, 21 percent in II Corps, 30 percent in III Corps and Capital Military Region, and 28 percent in IV Corps. Projected deployments for June 1967 reflect no change in present troop size of deployment. (See Table IV-9).

c. NVA/VC Main Force

For purposes of this analysis regular enemy combat strength is considered to include all NVA/VC main force troops. Although it is recognized that not all of the troops in this classification are performing combat tasks, there are several justifications for making such an assumption. These regular enemy troops must be hunted down and destroyed or eliminated regardless of their operational functions. It is also recognized that the NVA/VC main force requirements in terms of endogenous support troops are but a small fraction of similar requirements needed by Western troops.

The estimated strength of NVA/VC main force Corps areas as of June 1966 indicates that approximately 17 percent of NVA/VC main force strength is located in I Corps area, 38 percent in II Corps, 27 percent in III Corps, and 18 percent in IV Corps. (See Figure IV-7). North Vietnamese Army troops are predominantly deployed in the two Northern Corps while VC main force units are largely located in the two Southern Corps areas. Currently there are no known North Vietnamese Army units in the IV Corps.

3. Analysis of Critical Troop Ratios

a. Aggregate Field Strength Ratios

It should first be pointed out that in the field, Allied forces as defined, do not have a distinct numerical manpower advantage over the regular enemy forces. In fact, Communist forces in certain Corps areas possess superior numbers. Strong objections could be raised to this observation. The high degree of Allied troop mobility, and essentially unlimited air and ground support

Figure IV-6

APPROXIMATE COMPOSITION OF ARVN MANEUVER BATTALION STRENGTH TO TOTAL ARVN TROOP STRENGTH 1964 - June 1967

(Thousands)



Table IV-9

South Vietnam: Actual and Projected Deployment
of ARVN Maneuver Battalions by Corps Area
February 1965 - June 1967

(In Thousands)

	1965											1966							
	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Dec 1966	Jun 1967
I Corps																			
RVN	9.0	9.4	9.4	9.4	9.4	9.4	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.8	10.1	10.1	10.1	10.1	10.8	10.8	10.8
II Corps																			
RVN	8.6	8.6	8.6	8.6	8.6	8.6	9.4	9.4	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.8	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.1	10.5	10.5	10.5
III Corps																			
RVN	13.5	13.5	13.5	13.1	13.1	13.1	13.5	13.5	13.5	13.5	13.5	13.5	13.5	13.9	13.9	14.2	15.0	15.0	15.0
IV Corps																			
RVN	12.4	12.4	12.4	12.4	12.4	12.4	12.4	12.4	12.4	12.4	12.4	12.4	13.5	13.9	13.9	13.9	14.2	14.2	14.2
CMR	0	0	0	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4	.4
Total	43.5	43.9	43.9	43.9	43.9	43.9	45.5	45.5	45.9	45.9	45.9	45.9	48.0	48.0	48.0	48.7	50.9	50.9	50.9

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Figure IV-7

SOUTH VIETNAM: TROOP DISPOSITION BY CORPS OF ALLIED MANEUVER BATTALIONS AND ESTIMATED VC/NVA MAIN FORCES (MF)

June 1966



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probably help to make the ratio of friendly to enemy field forces less critical than it appears in Table IV-10. The ratio of friendly to enemy field forces has increased slightly in favor of the Communists during the July 1965-June 1966 period. A friendly to enemy field force ratio of 1:.8 was observed in mid-1965 and a ratio of 1:.9 observed in mid-1966. Projections of enemy and Allied field strengths indicate that the Communists may achieve a 1 to 1 ratio with opposing field forces in December 1966 and a 1.1 to 1 ratio by mid-1967.

b. Qualitative Aspects of Increases in Field Force Strength

The contribution of South Vietnam to both the Allied and local Communist field troop strength has stabilized in the past year. In July 1965, GVN troops accounted for 73 percent of Allied field strength. In June 1966 GVN troops made up 48 percent of Allied field strength. In July 1965, South Vietnamese Communists accounted for 98 percent of the enemy field forces. By June 1966, local Communists accounted for 62 percent of the enemy field forces. United States/Third Nation field forces have increased by some 38,000 during the July 1965 - June 1966 period. Regular South Vietnamese Army field forces have increased by about 7,000 in the same period. Regular North Vietnamese Army force increased by some 37,000 troops in the July 1965 - June 1966 period. The endogenous Communist contribution to VC main force increased strength by an estimated 11,000 during the same period.

c. Corps Area Field Strengths

The critical ratio of opposing field forces in South Vietnam by Corps area as of mid-1966 indicates that Allied strength varies considerably from one area to another (See Table IV-11). The Allied field forces enjoy an estimated 1:.68 and 1:.92 manpower superiority in I and III Corps areas respectively. In II and IV Corps areas the Communists enjoy an estimate 1:1.1 and 1:1.3 manpower superiority in the field. Consequently, it is observed that while Allied forces enjoy an aggregate manpower superiority of 1:.96 in mid-1966, such an advantage is not held equally at each Corps level.

Table IV-10

South Vietnam: Ratio of Allied Maneuver Battalion Strength
to Estimated NVA/VC Main Force Troop Strength
July 1965 - June 1967

(In Thousands)

	1965						1966							
	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Dec 1966	Jun 1967
NVA	1.2	1.2	5.2	7.7	10.7	11.1	11.1	13.1	18.3	24.5	30.9	38.0	60.0	75.0
VCMF	47.3	49.3	51.3	53.3	56.2	59.1	59.2	59.2	59.2	57.7	57.2	63.0	65.0	65.0
Total	48.5	50.5	56.5	61.0	66.9	70.2	70.3	72.3	77.5	82.2	88.1	101.0	125.0	140.0
US/TN	16.2	21.2	27.2	35.1	36.7	38.3	44.1	45.1	46.1	51.6	53.4	54.2	71.4	78.6
GVN	43.9	45.5	45.5	45.9	45.9	45.9	45.9	48.0	48.0	48.0	48.7	50.9	50.9	50.9
Total	60.1	66.7	72.7	81.0	82.6	84.2	90.0	93.1	94.1	99.6	102.1	105.1	122.3	129.5
Ratio Friendly to Enemy	1:.81	1:.76	1:.78	1:.75	1:.81	1:.83	1:.78	1:.78	1:.82	1:.82	1:.86	1:.96	1:1.02	1:1.08
Ratio US/TN to NVA	1:.07	1:.06	1:.19	1:.22	1:.29	1:.29	1:.25	1:.25	1:.40	1:.47	1:.58	1:.70	1:.84	1:.95

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Table IV-11

South Vietnam: Ratio of Allied Maneuver Battalion Strength to Estimated NVA/VC Main Force Troop Strength by Corps Area, Mid-1966

	I Corps	II Corps	III Corps	IV Corps
NVA	10,000	23,500	4,500	--
VCMF	8,500	12,500	23,300	18,400
Total	18,800	36,000	27,800	18,400
US/TN	17,000	22,000	15,200	--
GVN	10,800	10,500	15,000	14,200
Total	27,800	32,500	30,200	14,200
Ratio Friendly to Enemy $\frac{\text{NVA/VC}}{\text{(US/TN + GVN)}}$	1:.68	1:1.1	1:.92	1:1.29

C. Projected Critical Troop Ratios

We estimate that by the end of 1966 Communist field strength in South Vietnam will be about 125,000 and 140,000 by mid-1967 (See Table IV-12). North Vietnamese Army units will account for 54 percent of the total. Projected Allied deployments for the end of 1966 and mid-1967 show that approximately 122,300 and 129,500 troops respectively, will be allocated to maneuver battalions. About 58 percent of the projected Allied field strength will be accounted for by US/Third Nation forces. The projected increases in both forces

will come largely from US/Third Nation troops and the North Vietnamese Army.

Table IV-12

South Vietnam: Projected Critical Troop Ratios:
Allied Maneuver Battalion Strength to
Estimated NVA and VC Main Force Strengths

(In thousands

	June 1966	December 1966	June 1967
NVA	38.0	60.0	75.0
VCMF	63.0	65.0	65.0
TOTAL	101.0	125.0	140.0
US/TN	54.2	71.4	78.6
GVN (ARVN)	50.9	50.9	50.9
TOTAL	105.1	122.3	129.5
Ratio Friendly to Enemy (NVA/VC / US/TN + GVN)	1:.96	1:1.02	1:1.08

The ratio of NVA forces to US/Third Nation forces has grown from approximately 1 to .1 in July 1965, to 1: to .7 in mid-1966. Projections indicate that this ratio may increase to 1 to .8 in December 1966 and nearly 1 to 1 by mid-1967. The North Vietnamese apparently plan to match the buildup in US/Third Nation maneuver battalions. (See Figure IV-8). Thus, during the next 12 months Allied forces in South Vietnam will in a relative sense, face a larger enemy force than they have in the past.

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Figure IV-8

COMPARATIVE, ACTUAL, AND PROJECTED ALLIED AND US/THIRD NATION MANEUVER BATTALION STRENGTH TO VC/NVA MAIN FORCE STRENGTH

July 1965 - June 1966 and Projected for December 1966 and June 1967



*Allied estimates from the Department of Defense.

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III. Operations

A. Assumptions and Methodology

The statistics used to evaluate the intensity and course of the ground war in South Vietnam take on added meaning in a war without fronts. Several of the factors employed to assess the war in South Vietnam are subject to considerable margins of error, and as such require discussion. The number of Communist troops reported killed in action is both the most important and least reliable statistical measure used to assess the progress of the military aspects of the struggle. The figure is subject to error because of duplications, omissions, possibly inflated body counts, and the inability to identify non-military casualties. On the other hand, it is well known that Communist forces exert considerable effort to remove both their dead and wounded from the battlefields of South Vietnam. At present there appears to be no rational method for adjusting enemy body count figures. Consequently, the statistics on enemy dead are taken as received, subject to non-quantifiable reservations on their accuracy.

The allocation of the reported enemy dead to the respective inflicting forces also presents a problem. Combined US/Third Nation and GVN operations are conducted in such a manner that an accurate accounting of enemy casualties by an inflicting force is difficult to achieve. A similar problem exists in trying to determine whether artillery, air support or ground forces inflicted the casualties. Statistical problems also exist in allocating casualties to large and small scale operations.

To allocate the number of reported enemy killed in each engagement to the respective inflicting force, the number of Allied soldiers killed in each combined operation were weighted by their aggregate kill ratios. The number of Allied and enemy killed in action were also rounded in an effort to make the data consistent. It was observed that the majority of US/Third Nation inflicted and sustained casualties were results of maneuver battalion sized operations or greater. A similar assumption with far less certainty was made with respect to GVN forces. South Vietnamese casualties, both inflicted and sustained, were allocated to their

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Figure IV-9

APPROXIMATE COMMUNIST KIA, BY INFLICTING FORCE
1965 - May 1966



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Figure IV-10

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RELATIONSHIP OF COMMUNIST AND US/THIRD NATION KIA TO BUILD-UP OF US/THIRD NATION MANEUVER BATTALION STRENGTH

July 1965 - May 1966



US and TN Maneuver Battalion Strength
(Number of men available for offensive combat)

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Figure IV-11

COMPOSITION OF REPORTED VC/NVA KIA BY INFLICTING FORCE

July 1965 - May 1966



Figure IV-12

APPROXIMATE DISTRIBUTION OF REPORTED VC/NVA KIA, BY CORPS AREA

July 1965 - May 1966



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by them during the 11 month period, 26 percent were accounted for by US Marines in I Corps, 51 percent by US Army/Third Nation forces in III Corps. (See Figure IV-12). As a general rule US/Third Nation maneuver battalion kill ratios have been highest in I and II Corps areas and lowest in III Corps.

3. GVN

During the July 1965 - May 1966 period the South Vietnamese Army participation in ground operations decreased. From July-December 1965, GVN forces accounted for 7 percent of the 23,600 enemy troops reported killed in action, or approximately 3,000 enemy killed per month. (See Figure IV-13). High desertion rates, heavy casualties, and political instability have adversely affected the battlefield contributions of South Vietnamese military units.

South Vietnamese forces achieved a 2.7 to 1 kill ratio over Communist forces during the July 1965 - May 1966 period. Approximately 35 percent of these kills were recorded in I and II Corps, 25 percent in III Corps and 40 percent in IV Corps.

C. Communist Performance in Battle

The question of Communist troop morale is discussed in detail in Annex VII. Communist troop performance indicates that the enemy troops are not yet experiencing morale problems that adversely affect their behavior on the battlefield. However, the number of captured Communist weapons, personnel, and desertions have increased considerably since 1964. (See Table IV-13). These losses can be explained by the increasing scale of combat and do not necessarily reflect a decline in Communist battlefield performance.

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Figure IV-13

RELATIONSHIP OF COMMUNIST AND GVN KIA TO BUILD-UP OF GVN MANEUVER BATTALIONS
July 1965 - May 1966



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Table IV-13

South Vietnam: Absolute Indicators of Communist Performance in Battle

	1964	1965	1966*
Communist "Chieu Hoi" Military Desertions**	1,900	9,500	12,000
Captured	4,200	6,300	7,000
Communist Weapons Captured	5,900	11,800	N. A.

*Estimate for entire year.
**GVN amnesty program for Communist deserters.

By relating the selected indicators to the scale of combat (the number of enemy reported KIA and captured) it is possible to illustrate that in a relative sense Communist forces are essentially performing as well as in battle today as they were in 1964 and 1965.

Table IV-14

Relative Indicators of Communist Motivations in Battle Expressed in Terms of the Scale of Combat, 1964-66

	1964	1965	1966*
Captured - as a Percent of KIA	.24/1	.19/1	.14/1
Weapons Loss - as a Percent of KIA and Captured**	.29/1	.30/1	.32/1
"Chieu Hoi" Desertions - as a Percent of KIA	.11/1	.27/1	.26/1

*Ratios calculated on January-June data.
**Also includes weapons captured on junks and other infiltration craft, consequently this ratio overstates the true battlefield weapons loss.

It is observed that Communist battlefield performance has not changed in spite of the growing scale of combat and increased US/Third Nation participation. At present, the magnitude of Communist morale problems in terms of influencing battlefield performance, seems to be a minor hindrance to enemy operations in South Vietnam.

D. An Approximate Allocation of NVA/VC Battle Fatalities January-May 1966

1. Methodology

One of the most difficult intelligence problems faced in South Vietnam is that of allocating enemy casualties to their respective fighting units. The characteristics of guerrilla warfare make it impossible to distinguish between civilians, irregulars, VC main force and PAVN troops killed in action. Lack of uniforms and unit insignias are some of the basic problems encountered. The time alloted to body identification of the battlefield is influenced by the pressures of combat and undoubtedly is far too short to allow for accurate body counts, let alone extensive investigations of enemy unit identification. The importance of allocating enemy casualties to their respective units is crucial in assessing the present and probable course of the war in South Vietnam. The extent to which the Communists must rely on internal recruitment and North Vietnamese regulars can best be determined by arriving at an approximate allocation of enemy casualties.

It was initially assumed that all enemy reported killed in action were members of the Communist military establishment. Such an assumption obviously overstates enemy losses since it includes civilians inadvertently killed in and around the battlefields and counted as enemy dead. The inclusion of considerable numbers of South Vietnamese Communist irregulars and combat support troops helps to relax this assumption to a certain degree. However, the lack of any definitive study on such civilian casualties makes it impossible to adjust enemy casualties with any degree of precision. Consequently the killed in action figures are taken as given.

In order to allocate enemy battlefield fatalities to NVA/VC units, it was assumed that enemy casualties

were sustained in proportion to their respective troop strength in the various Corps areas as of mid-1966. In the case of irregular and combat support troops it was assumed that these forces were half as likely to engage in major combat operations as were the NVA and VC regular forces. Reported enemy battlefield fatalities were allocated on a corps basis during the January-May 1966 period. Enemy losses and respective strength by corps area were then compared. Since there were no known NVA troops stationed in IV Corps during January-May 1966 it was concluded that all of the reported battle fatalities were sustained by local Communists. NVA strength in III Corps during the relevant period accounted for a small portion of the enemy main force strength - 15 percent in III Corps by mid-1966. The preponderance of enemy casualties in III Corps during the relevant period were assumed, therefore, to be sustained by local Communists. The bulk of the NVA strength in South Vietnam is stationed in II and I Corps respectively. Communist losses during the January-May 1966 period in the two upper Corps were allocated to NVA/VC on the basis of regular enemy troop strength as of mid-1966. By employing this methodology it was deduced that at a maximum 25-30 percent of Communist battlefield fatalities were inflicted on NVA troops during January-May 1966. Projected enemy troop strengths indicate that about 40 percent of the enemy battlefield fatalities during the next year will be sustained by NVA forces.*

The use of Communist regular troop strength as of mid-1966 weights the casualties heavily toward NVA forces during the January-May 1966 period. NVA troop strength has rapidly increased in recent months, thus overstating probable NVA losses during the early months of 1966. Such a bias should counter arguments that NVA forces are employed more intensively in combat than are local Communist forces. The use of total South Vietnamese Communist

*It is not possible at this time to refine the allocation of fatalities by considering the actual frequency with which VC NVA units engage in combat.

troop strength may also overstate local enemy casualties since it implicitly assumes that local forces have and will be engaged as often as North Vietnamese troops.

2. Analysis

This distribution provides some insights into probable future trends in the growth and composition of enemy forces in South Vietnam. It is estimated that Communist battlefield fatalities averaged approximately 4,000 a month during January-May 1966. Average monthly North Vietnamese and VC battlefield fatalities were 1,600 and 2,400 respectively. Accepted aaverage monthly Communist infiltration during the same period was 4,200. Combined accepted and reported NVA infiltration averaged 7,000 a month.

It is obvious that during January-May 1966 North Vietnamese troop strength grew at a more rapid rate than did direct sustained battlefield fatalities. Considerable increases in estimated North Vietnamese Army strength in South Vietnam during the same period confirm this trend. The relatively stable size of the VC main force during the period probably indicates that the local Communists have been able to offset battlefield deaths by recruitments from the irregular forces and the populace.

IV. Communist Losses

A. Total Communist Losses

During 1965, it is estimated that some 79,300 to 90,300 Communists (See Table IV-15) were effectively put out of action. Projections indicate that from 105,000-120,000 enemy forces will be effectively lost in 1966 and from 65,000-75,000 will be lost during the first half of 1967. Battle fatalities account for approximately 40 percent of the losses, seriously wounded, estimated on the basis of captured documents, account for 32 percent, and captured and deserters the remaining 28 percent.

Table IV-15

South Vietnam: Estimate of Communist Losses
1965 - June 1967

	1965	1966	Jan-June 1967
KIA	35,000	48,000	30,000
Captured	6,300	7,000	4,300
("Chieu Hoi" Returnees)	9,500	13,000	8,000
SUB TOTAL	50,800	68,000	42,300
Seriously Wounded	19,000-30,000	24,000-39,000	15,000-24,000
Deserters	9,500	13,000	8,000
TOTAL	79,300-90,300	105,000-120,000	65,300-74,300

1. Killed in Action

Average monthly reported Communist battle fatalities increased from less than 2,000 during the first 6 months of 1965 to approximately 3,900 each month in the second half of the year. During January-May 1966, Communist battle fatalities averaged 4,000 per month. Some 35,000 Communist troops were killed in action in 1965. Approximately 20,000 enemy troops were reported killed in action during January-May of this year, and current estimates indicate that approximately 48,000 Communists will probably be killed in action by the end of 1966.

2. Wounded in Action

a. Methodology

Few if any official figures are released that give an indication of the total number of Communist soldiers wounded in action. The primary reason for the lack of such information is that the enemy remove a considerable number of their dead and wounded from the battlefield in an effort to conceal their losses and prevent the capture of additional personnel.

Three basic components went into derivation of an estimate of NVA/VC wounded in action. Consideration was given to historical factors such as: (1) US, ANZAC, and Japanese experience in Burma, Malaya, and the Pacific Islands in World War II; (2) the experience of South Vietnamese, and US/TN forces in Vietnam; and (3) Communist prisoner interrogation reports mentioning casualties and captured enemy documents such as medical reports and unit combat records. The observed ratios of wounded to killed during World War II and in Vietnam are summarized in Table IV-16 below.

Table IV-16

Selected Wounded to Killed Ratios

World War II	Wounded to Killed
Papuan Campaign (Australian)	2.04/1
Papuan Campaign (US)	2.79/1
Philippines (US)	3.52/1
Okinawa (US)	4.31/1
Burma 1949 (Japan)	2.47/1
Burma 1943 (Japan)	3.23/1
Vietnam	
South Vietnam, 1963-65, (GVN)	2.17/1
US/Third Nation, 1965	4.1/1

Prisoner interrogation reports and captured enemy documents provided 15 quantifiable observations on the relationship between Communist troops killed and wounded in action. Enemy casualties ranged from some 700 in large unit actions to 20 casualties or less in small group actions. All of these losses were sustained while fighting against South Vietnamese forces during 1964 and 1965. The observed ratios of wounded to killed in action ranged from 1.07:1 to 2.4:1, with a weighted average ratio of 1.62:1. Since these figures are not biased by enemy removal of dead troops from the battlefield they may better reflect the distribution of enemy killed to wounded than those ratios which employ Allied body counts as a base figure.

An enemy document captured by the 1st Cavalry Division on 17 March 1966, in central Binh Dinh Province, revealed regimental data on Communist troops wounded in action during 9 April 1965 - 1 March 1966. The 2nd VC, 18th NVA, and Quyet Ram regiments which were estimated to be the major enemy elements stationed in Binh Dinh were listed in the document. The security of Binh Dinh is predominantly maintained by US and ROK forces. Consequently, a comparison between Communist troops killed in action (US/ROK body count) and enemy accounts of those wounded in action in Binh Dinh during the relevant period provides some indication of an enemy $\left(\frac{\text{WIA}}{\text{KIA}}\right)$ relationship between US/Third nation forces and the enemy.

US/ROK forces killed 628 Communists in Binh Dinh during the relevant period according to body counts. Enemy documents indicate that 1,135 troops were wounded. Some 85 Communists wounded in action were captured by US/ROK forces. It is assumed that: (1) US/ROK forces did most of the fighting in Binh Dinh Province; and (2) that the above mentioned Communist regiments comprise most of the enemy strength in Binh Dinh. The resulting ratio is $\frac{\text{WIA}}{\text{KIA}} = \frac{1,135 + 85}{628} = 1.94$ for Communist forces engaging US/Third Nation forces in South Vietnam. The US/ROK body count probably understates the number of enemy killed and consequently results in higher wounded to killed ratio than was probably experienced.

A general relationship between the number of troops killed in action and those wounded in action was

observed in the samples examined. Troops with high kill ratios $\frac{\text{(Enemy killed)}}{\text{(Friendly killed)}}$ also experienced high wounded to killed ratios $\frac{\text{(Friendly wounded)}}{\text{(Friendly killed)}}$. Conversely, troops with relatively low kill ratios tended to have low wounded to killed ratios. Troops (such as NVA/VC) with low kill ratios probably sustain a large number killed and a relatively smaller number wounded, while troops (such as US/Third Nation forces) with high kill ratios sustain a smaller number killed and a relatively larger number wounded. This relationship can be rationalized by the fact that better trained and organized troops with superior support fire from artillery and aircraft sustain fewer fatalities in obtaining or defending an objective than do forces that lack such support fire.

Captured enemy documents further indicate that approximately 50 percent of the wounded received serious injuries--broken bones and damage to internal organs that required immediate surgery. About 30 percent of the wounds were classified as light, and most of these cases were immediately returned to the battlefield. The remaining 20 percent suffered slight wounds that required little medical attention and were also immediately returned to the field.

It is difficult to estimate the number of seriously wounded Communist troops who die or cease to be effective fighting men. However, most of the seriously wounded are moved considerable distances by primitive means of transportation to surgical centers where, undoubtedly, the facilities and the quality of the medical personnel are far below Western standards. These factors coupled with the consideration that many Communist troops are already affected by debilitating tropical diseases suggest that the majority of the seriously wounded troops are out of action for considerable lengths of time or indefinitely.

b. Estimate

Some 19,000 to 30,000 Communist troops were seriously wounded in 1965. End of year estimates indicate that from 24,000-39,000 enemy troops will be seriously wounded in 1966.

3. Captured

Some 6,300 Communist military personnel were captured in action during 1965. Given the current scale of operations it is estimated that approximately 7,000 enemy troops will be captured in 1966.

4. "Chieu Hoi" Returnees and Deserters

Some 9,500 Communist soldiers defected under the GVN "Chieu Hoi" program during 1965. Current estimates indicate that about 13,000 enemy military personnel are expected to defect under the "Chieu Hoi" program this year. No information exists on the number of enemy personnel who simply desert and return to their villages. We estimate that unrecorded enemy desertions are at least equal to the number of defectors under the "Chieu Hoi" program. This is admittedly a conservative approach and the actual numbers of deserters could be significantly higher than the estimates used in this annex.

B. Allocations of Present and Future Communist Military Losses in South Vietnam

It is estimated that a maximum of some 25,000 to 30,000 North Vietnamese troops will be effectively put out of action in South Vietnam during 1966. An additional 25,000 to 30,000 will be lost in the first half of 1967 if current rates of combat are maintained and projected troop strengths are realized. The bulk of the North Vietnamese losses will result from troops killed and seriously wounded in action. Relatively few North Vietnamese losses will be accounted for by captures, desertions, or defections.

Local Communists (including main forces, irregulars and combat support troops) will at a maximum sustain some 80,000 to 90,000 effective losses in action during 1966. An additional 40,000 to 45,000 will be lost in the first half of 1967. Approximately two-thirds of the local Communist losses will result from battle deaths and serious wounds. The remainder will be accounted for by captures and desertions. The relative shift in casualties from local to North Vietnamese Communist forces in 1967 reflects the expected increase in the role of PAVN troops in the South Vietnamese war. In terms of comparative battlefield losses the Allied

forces have a distinct advantage over the Communists. It is estimated that some 16,000 Free World soldiers will be killed in action during 1966, (6,000 US/TN, 10,000 GVN), compared to 48,000 Communists. An additional 9,000 Allied soldiers will probably be killed by mid-1967, reflecting the same loss composition, compared to some 30,000 Communists.

In a country with an abundant population, where some 270,000 natural deaths and 20,000 accidents occur each year, the loss of some 40,000-60,000 youths annually for the sake of "National Liberation" does not, in an oriental sense, seem too high. The increased North Vietnamese commitment in South Vietnam is not, however, entirely based on patriotism. VC units have borne the brunt of enemy casualties to date and appear pressed to maintain their current strength in face of growing Allied strength. The squeeze on VC manpower is becoming more apparent, and the necessity of outside help more acute if the war is to be waged at the present level. North Vietnam appears both willing and able to take on this task in the hope that a protracted struggle will give them ultimate victory. It may, however, find this commitment to be increasingly burdensome particularly as it required increasing numbers of the country's limited resources of skilled manpower and leadership cadres.

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Political

Prime Minister Ky reportedly has responded to criticism leveled at him by Gen Thi, commander of 1st Corps, who implied that Ky's national program lacked positive action. Ky accused Thi of undermining the government by allowing students and other groups to demonstrate in central Vietnam.

A serious morale problem, caused by poor leadership, exists in the junior and field grade officer ranks according to Gen Khang, commander of the Capital Military District, and if not corrected could result in more serious trouble. Khang stressed that the war itself had little to do with the lowered morale and that there still exists a considerable reservoir of will and determination to carry on the struggle against the Viet Cong.

Some Viet Cong reportedly expect an armistice and negotiations next year. Vietnamese intelligence and security services say that the Communists' Kien Hoa Provincial Committee has instructed its district committees to prepare for an armistice in 1966 by selecting cadres for a training course in the Cambodian border area on how to operate as "legal" residents. They are to be responsible, after the cease fire, for organizing another "proletarian revolution." Intellectuals are also to be recruited and organized to begin the revolution in urban areas. In Phu Yen and Binh Dinh Provinces, the Viet Cong as of mid-November were said to be planning large-scale military campaigns with the intention of seizing all of Phu Yen to improve their bargaining position in negotiations with the US, which they claimed would take place in Geneva next year.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Tran Van Do believes that it would be difficult to maintain South Vietnamese fighting morale if the Communists should decide to negotiate. The people would at once conclude that the war was over, and the Communists would take advantage of the discussions to solidify their position. His statements are in line with those of other leaders, many of whom are apprehensive about negotiations. The continuation of Viet Cong "subversive insurgency" during

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and after an armistice would be logical. Moreover the period immediately preceding an armistice will probably be a violent one as participants seek to bargain from a position of strength.

The Viet Cong "Christmas cease-fire" offer has stimulated speculation in some quarters that it is a step toward "peace" through an extended truce and negotiations. The Communists have, however, used past holiday lulls to regroup for attacks. This year's Viet Cong-proclaimed truce during TET (31 January to 6 February) was followed by the assault on Pleiku.

Buddhist officials in Da Nang have accused US troops of desecrating the Khue Bac Pagoda, and a protest was reportedly sent to Ambassador Lodge on 8 December following the assembly of about 500 persons to demand reparations. The pagoda was supposedly damaged on 29 October by US troops firing at a sniper. Subsequent incidents -- as alleged by a Unified Buddhist Association (UBA) representative -- involved the destruction of a statue of Buddha and confiscation of food during searches. Some local officials believe the latter offenses could have been committed by hoodlums or Viet Cong. The situation acquires added importance because of the imminence of the UBA Congress; Thich Giac Ngo, the principal bonze of the damaged pagoda, is said to have threatened public suicide. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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VIET CONG ACTIVITY - 25 JANUARY

1. THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS OF SIGNIFICANT VIET CONG ACTIVITY DURING THE PAST 24 HOURS, NOR OF ANY INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF INCIDENTS INITIATED BY THE VIET CONG SINCE THE TET CEASE-FIRE.

2. THIS AFTERNOON, THE US MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND IN SAIGON REPORTED THAT 46 INCIDENTS WERE INITIATED BY THE VIET CONG DURING THE 48 HOUR PERIOD FROM 1800 23 JANUARY TO SHORTLY AFTER 1800 25 JANUARY (SAIGON TIME). ON A QUANTITATIVE BASIS, THIS REPRESENTS NO INCREASE IN ENEMY ACTIVITY SINCE THE HOLIDAY CEASE-FIRE. ALTHOUGH THE REASON FOR THE ABSENCE TO DATE OF AN ANTICIPATED POST-TET VIET CONG UPSURGE IS NOT FULLY DETERMINED, THERE CONTINUE TO BE INDICATIONS OF LARGE TROOP CONCENTRATIONS IN SEVERAL AREAS.

3. THE VIET CONG MORTAR BOMBARDMENT OF US AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE INSTALLATIONS IN DA NANG YESTERDAY WAS MORE EXTENSIVE THAN INITIALLY REPORTED, AND RESULTED IN A TOTAL OF 29 US AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE CASUALTIES. HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO ENEMY ATTEMPT TO PENETRATE THOSE INSTALLATIONS WHICH WERE UNDER FIRE.

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THIS ONE IS SERIOUS - SO FAR IT'S THE ONLY ONE SINCE TET

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

[redacted]

DATE OF INFO. 3 FEBRUARY 1966

DISTR. 5 FEBRUARY 1966

SUBJECT

[redacted] COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE 3 FEBRUARY DIRECTORATE MEETING

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (3 FEBRUARY 1966)

REF IN 49172

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2001

1. THE FOLLOWING TOPICS WERE DESCUSSED AT A MEETING OF THE NATIONAL DIRECTORATE ON 3 FEBRUARY:

A. IN ORDER TO KEEP CORPS COMMANDERS ADEQUATELY INFORMED ON POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY, AND DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS THE DIRECTORATE GAVE CONSIDERATION TO PUBLICATION OF A WEEKLY BULLETIN. PUTTING OUT THIS BULLETIN WOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF A POLITICAL BUREAU YET TO BE FORMED. PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN CAO KY AND DIRECTORATE SECRETARY GENERAL PHAM XUAN CHIEU WILL CONSULT WITH DEPUTY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CHIEF OF STAFF FOR POLITICAL WARFARE. GENERAL HUYNH VAN CAO ABOUT FORMING THE BUREAU.

B. KY DISCUSSED A PROGRAM WHICH HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CARRIED OUT IN THE PROVINCES FOR THE PURPOSE OF WINNING STRONGER SUPPORT FOR THE WAR EFFORT. HE WANTS DEMONSTRATIONS ORGANIZED IN THE PROVINCES IN WHICH THE PEOPLE WOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO GIVE VOICE TO THE EXHORTATION TO "PRESS ON WITH THE WAR." HE WANTS THIS PROGRAM TO BEGIN BY 2Ø FEBRUARY. ([redacted] COMMENT: IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO ORGANIZE SUCH A PROGRAM BY 2Ø FEBRUARY AND IT VERY WELL MAY BACKFIRE SINCE THE GENERALS MAY FIND THAT THE PEOPLE REALLY WANT PEACE AND NOT WAR.) EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

C. DIRECTORATE CHAIRMAN NGUYEN VAN THIEU AND SECRETARY GENERAL CHIEU WERE PLACED IN CHARGE OF INVESTIGATING THE ACTIVITIES OF RETIRED GENERAL TRAN VAN DON AND HIS FOLLOWERS. PRESENT PLANS ARE ONLY TO TALK TO THEM PERSONALLY IN AN EFFORT TO UNDERSTAND BETTER THEIR POINT OF VIEW AND REASONS FOR THEIR DISSATISFACTION. PERTINENT TO THIS, PRIME MINISTER KY OBSERVED IN PASSING THAT THE GENERALS WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO KILL BAO KIM. ([redacted] COMMENT: BAO KIM IS IDENTICAL WITH NGUYEN BAU KIM, NGUYEN BAU KIEM AND NGUYEN BAO KIM, WHO WAS RECENTLY REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN PLANS FOR A COUP TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE 15 JANUARY. SEE FVS-12,522.) ([redacted]). EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

D. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN HUU CO ASSERTED THAT HE THOUGHT THE AMERICANS WERE OPPOSED TO GENERAL VINH LOC REMAINING

AS II CORPS COMMANDER. BOTH KY AND CO REMARKED THAT VINH LOC SHOULD REMAIN AS II CORPS COMMANDER. KY, CO, AND LOC EXPRESSED ANNOYANCE AT AMERICAN ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE DECISIONS IN SOLVING PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE MONTAGNARDS AND THE UNITED FRONT FOR THE STRUGGLE OF THE OPPRESSED RACES (FULRO). DURING THIS DISCUSSION DIRECTORATE SECRETARY GENERAL CHIEU WAS A MODERATING INFLUENCE ON THE OTHERS WHO WERE CRITICIZING THE AMERICANS. E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)> [C]

E. THE LIST OF CANDIDATES FOR THE FORTHCOMING ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR BUILDING DEMOCRACY WAS SUBMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION. ([redacted] COMMENT: IT WILL BE A LONG TIME BEFORE PREPARATIONS FOR FORMING THIS COUNCIL ARE COMPLETE.) E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs [C]

F. I CORPS COMMANDER GENERAL NGUYEN CHANH THI CRITICIZED PRIME MINISTER KY ON THE SUBJECT OF RAISING THE FARES OF AIR VIETNAM. GENERAL THI POINTED OUT THAT THE POOR PEOPLE IN I CORPS AREA WOULD SUFFER THE MOST SINCE BOAT AND BUS TRANSPORTATION IS FOR THE MOST PART UNAVAILABLE TO THEM.

G. THE DIRECTORATE MEMBERS DECIDED TO POSTPONE INDEFINITELY EFFORTS TO CREATE A POLITICAL PARTY SPONSORED BY THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT. TENTATIVE PLANS FOR SUCH A PARTY HAVE BEEN UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR SEVERAL MONTHS.

H. GENERAL THI AND CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN OPENLY ACCUSED DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER CO AND GENERAL BUI HUU NHON, JGS DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS, OF SEEKING WAYS TO OBTAIN MONEY FOR SPECULATIVE PURPOSES AND ALSO

OF MISAPPROPRIATING FUNDS AVAILABLE TO THEM, SUCH AS A SUM OF SEVEN HUNDRED MILLION PIASTERS SET ASIDE FOR MILITARY HOUSING CONSTRUCTION. E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

1. PRIME MINISTER KY SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE DIRECTORATE FOR MONTAGNARD AFFAIRS MADE A SECRETARIAT AND PLACED UNDER GENERAL VINH LOC WITH HEADQUARTERS IN II CORPS AREA. NO ONE RESPONDED TO THIS RECOMMENDATION. ONE OF THE GENERALS LATER COMMENTED THAT HE INTERPRETED THIS AS A STRONG SHOW OF SUPPORT FOR VINH LOC ON THE PART OF KY.

2. THE FOLLOWING ARE CONFIDENTIAL REMARKS THE GENERALS MADE TO FRIENDS DURING RECESSES IN THE MEETING: E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

A. [redacted] CONFIDED THAT HE WAS SYMPATHETIC TO RETIRED GENERAL TRAN VAN DON AND HIS FOLLOWERS.

B. [redacted] MADE A PROPOSAL IN STRICTIST CONFIDENCE TO ONE OF THE GENERALS WHOM HE TRUSTS THAT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA TO ORGANIZE A POLITICAL FORCE WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM ALL THE FAITHS AND GEORAPHICAL AREAS OF VIETNAM. [redacted] COMMENTED THAT HE WAS CERTAIN THEY COULD ORGANIZE A FORCE FOUR TIMES THAT OF RETIRED GENERAL TRAN VAN DON'S ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN SCHOOL INTELLECTUALS (HOI LIEN TRUONG). [redacted] DOES NOT LIKE DON OR GENERAL DUONG VAN DUC WHO IS PRESENTLY UNASSIGNED. [redacted] EXPLAINED THAT HIS GROUP WOULD BE TERMED A "BROTHERS' SCHOOL MOVEMENT." THE GROUP WOULD BE BROADER IN SCOPE THAN DON'S WHICH IS ENTIRELY MADE E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)
(C)

UP OF SOUTHERN CATHOLICS, BUDDHISTS, CAO DAI, AND HOA HAO.

[redacted] COMMENT: [redacted] DID NOT REVEAL FOR OR AGAINST WHOM THE FORCE WOULD BE OR DESCRIBE HOW THE GROUP WOULD BE UTILIZED ON THE POLITICAL SCENE.)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)
(C)

3. ONE OF THE GENERALS OBSERVED THAT NO MATTER HOW POLITE THE MEMBERS OF THE DIRECTORATE ARE WITH EACH OTHER DURING THESE MEETINGS AND NO MATTER HOW ACCEPTABLE THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH EACH OTHER MAY SEEM TO THE PUBLIC EYE, THERE IS NO UNITY AMONG THEM.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV USIS USAID 2ND AIR DIV 9TH FLD STA CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF.

(END OF MESSAGE)

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WEEKLY REPORT

THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2001

2 March 1966

INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE

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GROUP 1
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THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(24 February - 2 March 1966)

C O N T E N T S

		Page
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE		iii
Map, South Vietnam, facing page		1
I.	THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM	1
A.	POLITICAL SITUATION	1

Ky government's efforts to sustain momentum resulting in negative domestic reactions (p. 1); Reactions to cabinet reshuffle follow anticipated lines (p. 1); Buddhist Tam Chau feels Catholic influence has increased (p. 1); Buddhist ceremony in Hué has overtones of political dissatisfaction (p. 2); No indication of serious Buddhist effort to topple government (p. 2); Directorate proceeding with plans for advisory council (p. 3); New economic minister reluctant to initiate dramatic actions (p. 4); Rice stocks and retail prices rise in Saigon (p. 5).

B.	MILITARY SITUATION	6

Communist activities show substantial increase (p. 6); Weekly statistics record 939 incidents (p. 6); Friendly activity emphasizes search-and-destroy operations (p. 6); I Corps is scene of several heavy engagements (p. 6); Allied operations in other corps areas is

Page

surveyed (p. 7); Communist activity level doubles in I Corps area (p. 8); Other areas witness variety of Communist actions (p. 9); Status of transportation routes is given (p. 10).

Map, Transportation Routes, facing page 10

C. RURAL CONSTRUCTION 11

Rural construction becomes "revolutionary development" (p. 11); Cadre training center begins new class (p. 11); Refugee population continues to grow (p. 11); New refugee commissioner shows promise (p. 12); Quang Nam Province chief reviews problems (p. 12).

Map, North Vietnam SAM sites, facing page 13

II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC 13

Four US aircraft lost over North Vietnam (p. 13); Two new SAM sites bring total to 92 (p. 13); Hanoi propaganda reaction to policy discussions in US (p. 13); Peking feels Communists shouldn't settle for less than total control of government in the South (p. 14); Hanoi's position on discussions with British in Moscow (p. 14); [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS 16

GVN Foreign Secretary scheduled for Japanese visit (p. 16); Diem to check on possible Ky visit and loan (p. 16); Foreign Minister Tran Van Do comments on De Gaulle's letter to Ho Chi Minh (p. 16).

ANNEX: South Vietnam Battle Statistics--Personnel Losses (Weekly)
South Vietnam Battle Statistics--Incidents and Attacks (Weekly)

(The Weekly Report on the Situation in South Vietnam is based on contributions from CIA, DIA, and INR; it is edited and published by CIA without final coordination.)

THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

The pace of Communist military activity has increased, both in terms of initiated actions and of resistance in force to allied ground operations. Most of the action in recent days has been focused in the five northernmost provinces of I Corps, where the Communists have suffered heavily from government counteroperations, but the Viet Cong have also been active in the provinces east of Saigon and in the delta.

The Ky government has sought to keep up the momentum of the Honolulu conference and its own cabinet reshuffle by staging further rallies in the provinces, and by moving ahead both with plans to set up the national advisory council and to hold provincial council elections this spring. However, there are new signs of disenchantment on the part of Buddhists, as a result of the cabinet reshuffle, and on the part of intellectual circles over the anticipated slow pace of political and economic reforms.


NORTH VIETNAM
Dong Hoi
DEMARCATION LINE
Quang Tri
QUANG TRI
Hue
THUA THIEN
Da Nang
I CORPS
QUANG NAM
QUANG TIN
Lai
Quang Ngai
QUANG NGAI
KONTUM
Kontum
BINH DINH
Pleiku
An Khe
Qui Nhon
PLEIKU
PHU BON
Cheo Reo
PHU YEN
Tuy Hoa
DARLAC
II CORPS
KHANH HOA
Nha Trang
QUANG DUC
TUYEN DUC
Da Lat
NINH THUAN
Cam Ranh Bay
Phan Rang
PHUOC LONG
LAM DONG
BINH LONG
TAY NINH
Tay Ninh
Phuoc Vinh
BINH DUONG
Bien Hoa
LONG KHANH
Xuan Loc
BINH TUY
BINH THUAN
PHUOC TUY
III CORPS
HAU NGHIA
BIEN HOA
KIEN PHONG
KIEN TUONG
CHAU DOC
AN GIANG
KIEN GIANG
KIEN HOA
VINH LONG
VINH BINH
CHUONG THIEN
BA XUYEN
BAC LIEU
AN XUYEN
IV CORPS
LAOS
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
Savannakhet
Mekong
Seravane
Pakse
Attopeu
Tonle Sap
PHNOM PENH
Mekong
CAPITAL MILITARY REGION
Sihanoukville
GULF OF SIAM
SOUTH CHINA SEA
SOUTH VIETNAM
CURRENT SITUATION
SECRET

I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

A. POLITICAL SITUATION

1. Despite the Ky government's efforts to sustain the momentum generated in the wake of the Honolulu conference, there have been further indications of a hardening attitude in some circles toward the character and performance of the military regime. These signs were particularly evident during the past week in Buddhist circles, which have reacted negatively to Ky's cabinet reorganization, and among certain political and intellectual circles which appear skeptical of the government's willingness and ability to carry out reforms in the political, economic, and social fields.

2. The US Embassy reported that reactions to Ky's cabinet reshuffle were slow to develop, but tended to follow anticipated lines. Although "die-hard" southerners continue to view the government as northern-dominated, the appointment of four additional southerners to new government positions has mollified the bulk of moderate southerners. The appointment of a Catholic lay leader as secretary of youth has pleased most Catholic circles, althouth some Catholics are reported uneasy over the alleged Marxist background of the new economy minister. Businessmen, on the other hand, tend to expect stronger economic leadership from the cabinet revision. Buddhist leaders clearly resent the replacement of a prominent sympathizer, Ngo Trong Anh, as public works secretary and the increase of Catholic representation in the cabinet; however, the only public comment, appearing in a Saigon newspaper which reflects the views of monk Tri Quang, somewhat backhandedly praised the smooth manner in which Ky effected his governmental changes. Other Saigon papers have devoted minimal comment to the reorganization, but one observed that the changes do not affect the country's basic need for leaders with the "courage to carry out policies they have outlined."

3. [redacted] E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

[redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>
(C)

4. A Buddhist ceremony held in Hué on 27 February to honor Buddhist martyrs also contained overtones of political dissatisfaction, including a hint of possible future Buddhist attacks on the government's pacification teams. One of the speakers, considered close to Tri Quang, claimed that three Buddhist youth leaders had recently been killed--one by the Viet Cong, one by government Popular Forces, and the third by a government political action team (PAT). He urged youths to protest if similar incidents occur. Earlier this year, some Buddhists and politicians in northernmost Quang Tri Province had accused the local province chief of misusing the PATs as one argument in forcing his ouster.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

5. Buddhist leaders, however, give no indication that they are presently considering any serious effort to topple the government. The Buddhists continue to be plagued by internal dissensions, stemming partly from rivalry between Tam Chau and Tri Quang, and perhaps increasingly from conflicts between the clergy and lay leaders over the exercise of political influence. Recently, a group of laymen who are in the process of organizing a Buddhist political party appears to have antagonized Tam Chau by failing, in a mid-February meeting, to elect any

of Chau's supporters to the party's interim leadership. This could cost the embryonic party considerable help from the Buddhist Institute's grass roots organization.

6. In addition to the Buddhist leadership, there are indications of restiveness in some intellectual and political circles partially sympathetic to the Buddhists. A prominent Vietnamese writer and composer has claimed that Saigon intellectuals were furious with Premier Ky's sarcastic response to a Saigon professor who voiced public doubts over the government's good faith in promising political and social reforms. According to a fairly reliable journalist, a group of prominent Saigon politicians, including former deputy premier Tran Van Tuyen and possibly current Foreign Minister Tran Van Do, are working on plans for a new government with support from unidentified young Saigon intellectuals. Tuyen is alleged to have told the group recently that he expected peace and the neutralization of South Vietnam in about six months.

7. Under the aegis of Directorate Secretary General Pham Xuan Chieu, the government is continuing to proceed with its plans to establish a "democracy-building" advisory council by approximately mid-March. Chieu, in consulting various groups about the composition of the 80-member council, reportedly has received some acceptable recommendations from the southern Dai Viet political party, Buddhist leader Tam Chau, and retired General Tran Van Don of the former Minh government. One of Chieu's current major headaches is reported to be a demand by Father Hoang Quynh, an acknowledged leader among militant Catholics, that a list of some 60 to 65 persons be accepted in toto, or none of them would participate. Defense Minister General Co is also reported to have proposed three council members personally associated with him in commercial ventures.

8. General Chieu is reliably reported to have made one concession which may appease some of the current criticism of the government's plan to hand-pick the advisory council membership. He has agreed to permit some prominent persons already serving on provincial or municipal councils--currently the only popularly elected groups in the country--to serve on

the advisory council. At the same time, the government has now authorized the holding of new elections for the provincial and municipal councils this spring, rather than postponing the elections and extending the terms of the present councilmen as earlier contemplated. This decision, reached after prodding by US officials, may also help to dispel doubts of the government's good faith in promising a gradual development toward representative institutions. The provincial councils have only advisory powers, and their influence varies by province, depending upon the calibre of their members and of individual province chiefs. On balance, however, the councils appear to have been more useful and more responsible than expected when they were first elected under the Quat government in May 1965.

Economic Situation

9. The new Economic Minister, Au Truong Thanh, has indicated to the US mission that he is reluctant to initiate any dramatic moves that would endanger his position in the government. He was also unwilling to give final decisions on certain economic policy actions discussed in Honolulu even though it was made clear to him the GVN and US had reached agreement on these matters and it was now a matter of implementing them.

10. For political reasons, Thanh is against imposing new taxes at this time. He has proposed that the high prices of rice in the areas north of Saigon be lowered by subsidizing rice sales using counterpart funds; the USAID Director has given general approval to this proposal. Finally, Thanh believes that the port situation is the number one problem. He said that Prime Minister Ky had signed a decree on 26 February giving the port director full authority to control all port operations including the police and customs officials.

11. Thanh's plan is to initiate key limited actions without undertaking any bold measures which might develop hostility among powerful economic interests during the early phase of his tenure of office. Thanh first wants to get public acceptance of his position and he would then move slowly toward large economic measures. The US Mission strongly

questions this approach because of the serious economic situation.

12. The stocks of rice in Saigon rose from 79,000 MT at the end of January to 87,000 MT on 21 February. The increase resulted totally from imports. Rice deliveries from the delta to Saigon have remained low in February, averaging barely over 1000 MT per day. Meanwhile, wholesale and retail prices of rice are rising.

13. Retail prices in Saigon rose in the week ending 21 February primarily by small amounts. The most significant increases were in rice, charcoal, and firewood. According to the USAID Index, the general level of retail prices remained three percent below a month ago.

14. The prices of $10 bills and $10 MPC (scrip) in the Saigon free market were unchanged at 169 and 177 piasters per dollar, respectively. The price of gold rose by one piaster per dollar to 223. In Hong Kong the piaster-dollar cross rate remained at 159.

B. MILITARY SITUATION

1. The over-all level of Communist-initiated activity for the week ending 26 February rose substantially.

2. During the period there were 939 Communist-initiated incidents compared with the preceding week's 757--or about 200 more than the weekly average for the last half of 1965 and 100 more than the 1966 weekly average. There were 26 attacks and 574 incidents of terrorism compared to 16 and 454 respectively for the previous week. Both of the large-scale attacks occurred on 21 and 22 February in Binh Thuan Province. The kill ratio this reporting period favored free world forces 2.2 to 1, down from 4.6 to 1. Viet Cong casualties were 1,122 killed and 92 captured. Totals the week before were 1,357 killed and 122 captured. South Vietnamese casualties for the reporting period were 379 killed, 826 wounded and 183 captured or missing--a total of 1,388 compared to preceding period's 694. Total US casualties rose to 887 from the 454 of the previous week; total other free world casualties also rose--from 30 to 58. The South Vietnamese lost 392 weapons and captured 264 from the Communists; enemy losses included 20 crew-served weapons, while friendly forces lost seven.

GVN/Allied Activities

3. Friendly activity continued at a high level for the third week with emphasis on search-and-destroy operations. Although there were fewer small-unit actions and no increase in battalion-size operations, there were more contacts with the enemy during this period and the level of fighting showed a marked increase.

4. Over 50 percent of ARVN weekly casualties occurred in I Corps area. On 25 and 26 February during the 1st Division (ARVN) multibattalion search-and-destroy operation in Quang Tri Province, five battalions (ARVN) became heavily engaged with an estimated two VC battalions. In the two-day battle friendly losses were 12 killed, 104 (2 US) wounded, and 6 missing. Viet Cong losses were 220 killed, 4

captured, and 25 weapons seized. In Thua Thien Province on 25 February, a Regional Forces company engaged an estimated VC battalion, and was immediately reinforced by available 1st Division (ARVN) forces. Friendly losses were 8 killed, 22 wounded and three weapons. The VC lost 49 killed, 19 captured and 14 weapons. The combined USMC/ARVN Operation DOUBLE EAGLE II/LIEN KET 24, in southern I Corps area continued with daily contacts. Friendly losses thus far are 8 killed (4 USMC, 4 ARVN) and 133 wounded (102 USMC, 31 ARVN). Enemy losses are 70 killed, 23 captured, 44 individual weapons and three crew-served weapons seized. In Quang Ngai Province, another significant operation was conducted by the 2nd Division (ARVN) to support the local pacification program. On 23 February, contact with a VC force of unknown size resulted in friendly losses of 43 killed, 33 wounded, 28 missing and over 100 weapons lost. Viet Cong losses were 10 killed and six weapons seized.

5. In II Corps area, US forces conducted battalion-size search-and-clear operations. ARVN forces initiated pacification activities along the east side of Route 1 north of Bong Son, and ROK forces continued to secure Route 1. Cumulative friendly losses from this month-long operation now are 366 killed (239 US, 4 ROK, 123 RVN), 1,206 wounded (828 US, 20 ROK, 358 ARVN) and 6 US missing. Enemy losses were 1,742 killed, 430 captured, over 2,000 suspects detained, 302 individual weapons and 63 crew-served weapons seized. Operation VAN BUREN, conducted by the 1st Brigade, US 101st Airborne Division and the Korean Marine Brigade in the rice harvest area southwest of Tuy Hoa, terminated on 21 February with over 30,000 tons of rice harvested. Friendly losses from this 32-day operation were 98 killed (54 US, 44 ROK), 309 wounded (194 US, 115 ROK) and 2 ROK missing. Viet Cong losses were 670 killed, 49 captured and 153 weapons seized.

6. During Operation ROLLING STONE this week in III Corps area, the VC lost 122 killed and 11 captured when they attempted to penetrate the perimeter of the 1st Brigade, US 1st Infantry Division with a force estimated to be three battalions. Friendly losses were 11 killed, 74 wounded and three M-48 tanks and five M-113 APC's damaged. Operation MASTIFF continued without major contact and on

25 February the 2nd Brigade, US 1st Infantry Division was relocated to Dau Tieng.

7. The most significant friendly activity in IV Corps area this week was the multibattalion, 21st Division (ARVN) operation in Chuong Thien Province during which armed helicopters accounted for 35 of the 41 VC killed. In addition, 35 VC with five weapons were captured, while friendly losses were one killed.

8. Free world forces conducted 88 battalion - or larger-size operations during the week ending 26 February, 44 of them achieving contact--33 RVN, two ROK, and nine US. There were 21,986 small-unit operations, including 3,313 conducted by US forces. Of the 187 which achieved contact with the enemy, 132 were conducted by US units. Sea, river, and coastal forces searched 4,116 junks and 16,728 people compared to 4,632 junks and 18,325 people respectively for last week. None of the 198 persons detained was confirmed as VC.

9. There were seven B-52 Stratofortress raids during the week ending 27 February. During the period 18-24 February there were 3,256 tactical air strikes and armed reconnaissance sorties flown by the US Air Force, Navy, Marine and Vietnamese aircraft. These strikes, in addition to supporting ground activities, produced the following results: 1,706 structures destroyed, 1,330 damaged; 80 sampans destroyed, 65 damaged; three gun emplacements destroyed; two trucks destroyed, one damaged; eight roads cut or cratered and one bridge approach cratered. In addition, 139 VC were reported probable KBA with four confirmed KBA (killed by aircraft).

Communist Activity

10. In I Corps area, the level of Communist activity doubled from that of the previous week. In Quang Tri Province on 22 February, a Popular Forces platoon and a Regional Forces company operating separately, but in close proximity to each other were attacked simultaneously. The platoon lost 20 killed, 14 wounded, seven missing and 20 individual weapons. The Regional Force company losses have not

yet been confirmed. The attacking force was identified as an element of the 808th VC Main Force Battalion. Also on 22 February, an estimated two VC companies attacked a government security force in Quang Nam Province. A reaction force of two Ranger companies engaged an estimated VC battalion, and the subsequent heavy contact resulted in friendly casualties of 18 killed, 46 wounded, and 10 missing. Enemy losses were 114 killed. On 22 February, a US Marine Corps aircraft flying at 16,000 feet in western Quang Tri Province received fire from a suspected antiaircraft gun.

11. In II Corps area, enemy activity remained at about the same level as the preceding week but there were more armed attacks. On 21 February, an ARVN battalion in convoy was ambushed by an estimated VC battalion in Binh Thuan Province, and on the same day an unknown number of VC attacked and overran an outpost in Quang Duc Province. On 22 February, an estimated VC battalion attacked the district town of Thien Giao in Binh Thuan Province. Friendly losses were 26 killed, including the district chief, while VC losses were 57 killed and one captured. Documents captured in Darlac Province identified the 966th Battalion, 32nd Regiment in an area northeast of Ban Me Thuot; this unit was previously located in western Pleiku Province.

12. In III Corps area there was a slight decline in enemy activity. On 18 February, an unidentified force attacked an outpost in southern Long An Province. At the same time two district towns and six other outposts in the same area came under attack or harassment. Friendly losses were 10 killed and eight wounded; while VC losses were 28 killed.

13. There was a slight increase in the number of Communist-initiated incidents during the week in IV Corps area. The Binh Thuy Airfield was harassed on 20 February by small arms and mortar fire, resulting in 10 wounded, two trucks damaged and a U-10 aircraft damaged. On 23 February, two outposts in the vicinity of Can Tho and Binh Thuy airfields were attacked by an estimated two VC companies. MACV believes these incidents may be the beginning of a VC effort in Phong Dinh Province to isolate Can Tho from the rice area of An Giang and Chau Doc provinces.

CURRENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND COASTAL RAILROAD



Information as of 26 February 1966

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14. National Route 1 is closed in Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Binh Tuy, and Long Khanh provinces. Route 14 is closed in Kontum, Pleiku, Quang Duc, Phuoc Long, and Binh Long provinces. Route 19 is closed west of Duc Co, Pleiku Province. Route 7 is closed in Phu Yen Province. Route 20 is closed in Lam Dong and Long Khanh provinces. Route 21 is closed in Darlac Province. Interprovincial Route 1 is closed in Binh Duong and Phuoc Long provinces.

15. The National Railroad is operating between Saigon and Xuan Loc, Long Khanh Province; between Song La Song, Binh Thuan Province, and Ninh Hoa, Khanh Hoa Province; between Dalat, Tuyen Duc Province, and Phan Rang, Ninh Thuan Province; and between Da Nang and Hué.

C. RURAL CONSTRUCTION

1. To express better the spirit of the government's pacification effort, the US mission in Saigon has settled on the term "revolutionary development" as the translation of the Vietnamese expression for what was formerly called rural construction. Deputy Ambassador Porter has taken charge of all aspects of the US community's support of the program.

2. On 21 February, 4,500 persons entered the Vung Tau National Cadre Training Center in the first class to receive a new program of instruction designed specifically for revolutionary development cadre. Each province is represented by at least one 59-man team, while the four national priority areas (Da Nang - Hoi An, Qui Nhon -Phu Cat - Binh Khe, the area surrounding Saigon, and An Giang Province have larger representation.

3. In an attempt to utilize the country's administrative assets more effectively, Premier Ky issued a decree ordering trainees in the National Institute of Administration (NIA) to participate in the revolutionary development program. A year of full-time work in the program will follow the NIA student's first year of training at the NIA. The student returns to the NIA for the third year, after which he spends six months of supervised probationary work in a government agency. He then graduates as a "field administrator."

4. General Nguyen Duc Thang, minister of revolutionary development, plans a series of trips to all the provinces to visit cadres, confer with members of the provincial councils, and generally to check on the progress of development programs. During the week of 20-26 February he visited the IV Corps area.

5. The refugee population continues to grow. The latest figures showing 833,875 as of 20 February, an increase of 31,934 since 11 February. The following table compares the increase in the various categories of refugees for the two reporting periods:

	Total	In Temporary Shelters	Resettled	Returned to Native Villages
11 Feb	801,941	450,033	279,873	72,035
20 Feb	833,875	444,549	294,902	94,424

6. An encouraging trend is the number of refugees in temporary shelters. Also encouraging is the increse in the number of refugees returning to their native villages. This latter condition, if it persists, will be an indication that the government is extending its influence in the countryside.

7. According to US officials in Saigon, the newly appointed refugee commissioner, Dr. Nguyen Phuc Que, shows promise in his energetic and serious approach to the job. He has already been able to arrange with the ARVN's Saigon general to provide traveling army medical teams to to into the provinces where the refugee population is concentrated. Que also hopes to increase classroom space for the children of refugees and is making plans to get more assistance to the refugees from province-level officials.

8. Nguyen Hau Chi, the newly appointed province chief for Quang Nam, recently reviewed for General Lansdale some of the problems he expects to encounter when he assumes his new position this month. Pre-eminent among them is the noncooperation of VNQDD members who are unwilling to participate in the nine-village project, a pacification effort in the national priority zone south of Da Nang. (See The Situation in South Vietnam, 29 December 1965 and 9 February 1966 for earlier reports on this project.) The support of this group, whose young men are dodging ARVN efforts to draft them, is conditional upon the resolution of security problems in the province, primarily the security of Route 1 from Da Nang to the province capital of Hoi An and to the populous agricultural river valley just to the west.

NORTH VIETNAM: SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SITES



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II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC

1. Four US aircraft were lost over North Vietnam this week bringing total US losses to 201. Of these 140 have been lost to conventional groundfire, 12 or possibly 13 to SAMs, three to MIG fighters, and the rest for reasons not directly attributable to hostile action.

2. Two new SAM sites--numbers 91 and 92--were discovered during analysis of recent photography. Both are situated within the established boundaries of SAM defenses in the areas of Hanoi, Haiphong, and Thanh Hoa, they do not extend SAM coverage, but, they do add depth to the defenses in this vital region.

3. Hanoi propaganda began this week to react to the recent US public discussions of American policy objectives in Vietnam. A broadcast on 26 February quoted extensively from Western press account of the US Senate Foreign Relations hearings to prove that public opposition to US policy in Vietnam was growing rapidly. The broadcast claimed that the hearings contributed to this growth by bringing "the truth" to the American people.

4. An indirect though more substantive comment on the current debate appeared in a statement by North Vietnamese lawyer Do Xuan Sang on the role of the Liberation Front (NFLSV) which was also broadcast on 26 February. While not referring to the discussions on the role of the Front currently under way in the US, Sang maintained that the NFLSV "unquestionably had a juridical status in the eyes of international law" because it controlled "four-fifths of the territory of South Vietnam, three quarters of the people, discharged all its international obligations and exercised the powers of a sovereign state." Sang stopped short of calling for recognition of the Front as a government but closed his remarks by quoting Ho Chi Minh's letter of 24 January to the effect that "if the US really wants peace it must recognize the NFLSV as the sole representative of the South Vietnamese people and enter into negotiations with it."

5. Chinese reaction to the recent discussions of the Front's role appeared in a 27 February broadcast which made it clear that Peking does not think

the Vietnamese Communists should settle for anything less than total control of the government in South Vietnam. According to the broadcast, Senator Robert Kennedy's expression of a willingness to give the Front "a role in a coalition government" was nothing but a "trick." According to Peking, the Front would be only a "minority group" in such a government, rather than the "sole representative of the Vietnamese people," as the Communists demand. The Front, asserted the broadcast, would never play the "walk-in part" of a "showpiece in a puppet regime fostered by the US."

Hanoi's Position on Discussion With British in Moscow

6. Hanoi responded quickly to Western press reports hinting that concessions in the DRV position on settling the war had been made during the 23 February contact with the DRV embassy in Moscow by Prime Minister Wilson's special representative, Lord Chalfont. A spokesman for the DRV Foreign Ministry on 25 February issued a statement summarizing the meeting which asserted that all reports carried by Western news agencies and at variance with the official statement were to be considered "distorted news." The official statement claimed that the chargé of the embassy in his conversation with the British representative had condemned UK support for the US policy, unmasked the "wicked scheme of the so-called unconditional negotiations of the US," and "clearly explained the DRV Government's four-point stand."

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[redacted]

III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS

A. JAPAN

1. Bui Diem, secretary of state for foreign affairs and formerly special assistant to Premier Ky, is scheduled to arrive in Japan on 4 March for a five-day "unofficial" visit. Diem has told the embassy that the main purpose for the visit will be to test the atmosphere for a possible visit of Premier Ky to Japan this spring. Earlier plans called for a visit in March by Ky but the Japanese proposed delaying it to an unspecified date. Diem also hopes to confirm the availability of about nine million dollars in Japanese loans previously allocated but which have been unused because of some question over interest rates.

B. FRANCE

1. South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Tran Van Do gave an interview to Vietnam Press, the semi-official GVN news agency, in which he commented more in sorrow than in anger on President De Gaulle's letter to Ho Chi Minh. Do stated that French policy on Vietnam seems to stem more from France's "offended pride" than from reason and equity. He also pointed out that De Gaulle's assertion that the GVN is not representative does not ring true since if the GVN had not broken relations, France would still have an ambassador in Saigon.

SOUTH VIETNAM ATTLE STATISTICS

WEEKLY REPORT 19 FEBRUARY - 26 FEBRUARY 66

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Total Personnel Losses

(Killed in Action, Captured or Missing in Action, excluding Wounded in Action)



US Combat Casualties in Vietnam

(including North Vietnam)

	Fatalities	Non-fatal Wounds
Cumulative, 1961-1964	255	1524
Cumulative, 1965	1365	6110
Cumulative, 1966 to date	637	3544
TOTAL	2257	11178

(Figures do not include missing or captured.)



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Total Friendly Forces Personnel Losses

(US/GVN/Other Free World)

Killed in action | Missing or Captured in action | Wounded in action

SOUTH VIETNAM BA. .LE STATISTICS

WEEKLY REPORT 19 FEBRUARY - 26 FEBRUARY 66

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Viet Cong Incidents



Viet Cong Attacks



Weapons Losses



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C O N F I D E N T I A L [redacted]
TDCS-314/03243-66 (ADVAN[redacted]
SOUTH VIETNAM
SUBJECT: INSUBORDINATION CHARGES AGAINST I CORPS COMMANDER THI TO BE PRESENTED TO DIRECTORAT 10 MARCH.
DOI 9 MARCH 1966
PADA [redacted]

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SOURCE: [redacted]

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1. PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN CAO KY HAS CALLED A SPECIAL MEETING OF THE DIRECTORATE FOR 1000 HOURS ON 10 MARCH TO BE ATTENDED BY ALL REGULAR MEMBERS. KY WILL ACCUSE I CORPS COMMANDER NGUYEN CHANH THI OF INSUBORDINATION AND ASK FOR A VOTE OF THE DIRECTORATE APPROVING THI'S REMOVAL FROM HIS COMMAND. KY'S CHARGES WILL BE BASED ON UNREST IN THE I CORPS AREA RESULTING FROM THI'S "WAR LORD" BEHAVIOR. KY INTENDS TO TELL THE DIRECTORATE THAT CONTINUED ACTIVITY OF THIS SORT ON THE PART OF THI WILL OBSTRUCT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IN THE AREA. THIS WILL NOT BE CHARGED WITH POLITICAL MOVES AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. A MAJORITY VOTE OFTHE DIRECTORATE'S TEN REGULAR MEMBERS WILL DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT ACTION WILL BE TAKEN AGAISST THI.

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2. GENERAL [redacted] BELEIVES THERE WILL BE NO DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING A MAJORITY VOTE SUPPORTING KY. [redacted] HAS SPOKEN TO DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN HUU CO ABOUT THE CONTEMPLATED ACTION AGAINST THI AND CO IS FULLY PREPARED TO SUPPORT KY. ACCORDING TO [redacted] THE ONLY DIRECTORATE EMMBER WHO MIGHT POSSIBLE SYMPATHIZE WITH THI IS IV CORPS COMMANDER DANG VAN QUANG AND THIS IS UNLIKELY. [redacted] THINKS THI WILL ACCEPT THE DECISION OF THE DIRECTORATE.

3. PRIME MININTER HAS SPOKEN TO NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR PHAM VAN LIEU ABOUT THE CHARGES AGAINST THI, AND LIEU HAS INDICATED HE BELIEVES THE CHARGES JUSTIFIED. LIEU SIAD HE HAD BEEN AWARE THAT THI HAD BEEN ACTING IMPROPERLY AND THAT HE HIMSELF HAS NOT BEEN INVOLVED IN ANY WAY WITH THI'S ACTIONS.

4. TWO POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES FOR THI'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENT HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED: THE POST OF VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR TO BANGKOK, OR ONE OR TWO YEARS IN THE UNITED STATES FOR STUDY OR TRAINING. THI WILL PROBABLY BE GIVEN SOME CHOICE IN THE MATTER.

5. ACCORDING TO GENERAL [redacted] NO SPECIAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS WILL BE TAKEN TO COUNTERACT POSSIBLE MOVES BY THI IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY APPEARANCE OF A LACK OF CONFIDENCE OR AUTHORITY ONTHE PART OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. ON THE CONTRARY, [redacted] SAID, GOVERNMENT LEADERS WOULD"ACT LIKE GENTLEMEN". [redacted] DOES NOT BELIEVE THI WOULD RECEIVE ANY SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT FOR A CHALLENGE TO THE DIRECTORATE'S AUTHORITY. THE ONLY SUPPORT HE MIGHT POSSIBLY RECEIVE WOULD BE THE SIXTH AND EIGHTH AIRBORNE BATTALIONS IN CENTRAL VIETNAM.

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(C)

6. ACCORDING TO A MEMBER OF KY'S PRIVATE STAFF, ON THE EVENING OF 9 MARCH NGO TRAN ANH, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INSPECTION IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, WAS SENT TO HUE ON A SPCIAL MISSION TO MEET WITH BUDDHIST LEADER THICH RI QUANG. ([redacted] COMMENT: ANH'S MISSION MAY BE TO BRIEF TRI QUANG AS TO WHAT TO EXPECT. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT ANH MIGHT BE GOING TO HUE IN RESPONSE TO A WARNING FROM TRI QUANG THAT CENTRAL VIETNAM BUDDHISTS MIGHT QUESTION THI' S REMOVAL. WITHIN THE PAST FEW MONTHS, HOWEVER, THI AND TRI QUANG HAVE APPEARED TO BE MOVING APART. SELECTION OF ANH FOR THE MISSION TO HUE PROBABLY BASED ON THIS LONG-STANDING FRIENDSHIP WITH TRI QUANG.

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7. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE USMACV USAID JUSPAO 2ND AIR DIV CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

15 MAR 1966

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Correspondence [redacted] the Vietnam Day Committee

Transmitted herewith for your retention are copies of correspondence [redacted] and the Vietnam Day Committee in Berkeley, California, [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

Attachments:
Correspondence as stated

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NAT. INT. SEC. INFO.

53 MAR 25 1966

Approved for Release
Date DEC 1997

VIETNAM DAY COMMITTEE
2407 Fulton Street
Berkeley, California
U.S.A.

December 16, 1965

Dear Friends,

On Tuesday, December 14th, news sources in the United Nations speculated that the Johnson Administration will probably declare war (upon which, they do not say) in January after the proposed cessation of bombings in Vietnam which may occur during the Christmas holidays. The next day, the first real bombing of the large power station near Haiphong in North Vietnam was announced. If the United Nations sources can be trusted, this means the North Vietnamese government, with whom the United States claims it will be seeking peace negotiations during the moratorium in the fighting, in the diplomatic position of risking national suicide if the United States' terms for negotiations are not accepted.

First, we urge that peace groups everywhere, as well as all organizations and individuals opposed to the war, publicly demand that the United States demonstrate its desire for peace in Southeast Asia by extending the cessation of bombings indefinitely.

Second, the strong probability that the United States will soon be at war and will most likely actually bomb the population centers of Hanoi and Haiphong makes it imperative that the anti-war movement respond immediately throughout the world. We therefore urge that, as soon as bombings or a declaration of war take place, demonstrations be held within hours or days at national capitals, at American Embassies/Consulates, Information Centers, and Military Establishments in as many countries as possible. Such a response can represent a significant escalation of the movement to stop this war.

Third, it is also possible that, if war is declared by the United States, the protest movement here will be abruptly silenced. We are depending, therefore, upon our foreign contacts to carry on with the work they have begun around the world to clarify the issues of this war and to put pressure on their governments to stop it.

Yours in the struggle,

Suzanne Gilford, Chairman
International Committee
Vietnam Day Committee

we would like to put it in our organ.

We believe that your message would arouse great attention among 210,000 workers of ZENDENTSU. And serve for strengthening the further strong links of peace and relations between Japan and American peoples.

So , please be kind enough to send ZENDENTSU your steering message concerned.

Cordially yours,

Isami Kondo
Chief editor
All Japan Telecommunications
Workers Union (ZENDENTSU)

1965. 10. 20

Dec. 17, 1965

...COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS UNION...

...our sincere apologies for this belated response...

As you may realize much has transpired in the past several months regarding the anti-war movement in the U.S.A.

In Berkeley, on Nov. 20th, nearly twenty thousand people marched to protest the war in Vietnam and to reaffirm their own Constitutional rights to be able to protest.

During the Thanksgiving weekend (Nov. 24-28) there was a national anti-war convention in Washington, D.C., where delegates, alternates participants and observers representing every political tendency involved in the anti-war movement were present. A major struggle developed during the course of the convention between the Stalinists and the Trotskyists. The issue concerned the formation of a broadly based, non-exclusive membership, national anti-war organization. The problem, even after the convention terminated, has not been fully resolved. At the present moment there exists differences based upon political ideologies within the anti-war movement. This problem is significant. However, it has not destroyed the unity of the movement. The VDC has a "united front" character, and most of the major political tendencies in it are working together. At the present moment the VDC is still undergoing fundamental transformation...

...International Committee for the VDC to issue a factual declaration of any sort. Within the next several months we hope the problems facing us will be resolved, and at that time, if your offer is still open, we would very much like to send you a statement of our policy.

We wish that the tendencies in the anti-war movement in your country were as progressive and outspoken as you are. Once again we appreciate your support and express our solidarity with your organization.

Cordially,

Richard [illegible]
for the Section
International Committee
Berkeley Vietnam Day Comm.

TWENTY FOUR YEARS AFTER PEARL HARBOR
and
THE JAPANESE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT

24 years ago military warfare began between the ruling classes of the U.S. and Japan with the bombing of Pearl Harbor; this terminated in 1945 with the capitulation of the Japanese ruling class and the atomic bombing of the Japanese people at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Today the U.S. and the Japanese ruling classes are linked together in an unholy alliance to promote their class interests in Asia, but the Japanese people are demonstrating their desire for peace to the rest of the world.

The bulk of the Japanese people who are active in the anti-war movement represent a broad spectrum of society composed of student organizations, trade unions, intellectual groups, peace committees, political parties, etc. Their struggle for peace involves three specific, yet related, issues: 1) Opposition to U.S. intervention in Vietnam, 2) Opposition to U.S. bases, nuclear weapons and military personnel in Japan, and 3) Opposition to the Japan-Republic of Korea Treaty.

The Japanese people see the war in Vietnam as being the greatest source of danger for a conflagration which could possibly engulf all of Asia, and many readily identify themselves with the unfortunate victims of this war. Aside from mass demonstrations, rallies and petitions many other methods are being utilized by the Japanese to protest the war. One method is direct refusal to participate in its support: "According to UPI on September 11, 1969, three Japanese shipping companies cancelled contracts to carry food and other supplies for the U.S. between Saigon and other important ports in South Vietnam. This occurred right after the Japanese Sailors' Union decision not to work for ships serving U.S. aggressive war in South Vietnam." (Vietnam Courier, Sept. 23, 1965, p. 5.) Another method consists of direct appeal to the American people: "Japanese Ask Americans to Speak Out on Vietnam." Hundreds of Japanese citizens in a full page advertisement in the N.Y. Times of Nov. 16, called on 'Friends in America' to 'Abandon silence and speak out with us for the sake of peace.'" (The Worker, Nov. 28, 1965, p. 7.) This ad was paid for by the Japan "Peace for Vietnam" Committee, which has sent representatives around the world to speak against the war in Vietnam. The extent of the Japanese people's opposition to the war is most mainly shown, perhaps, by the huge [illegible] who ... in anti-war demonstrations; on September 12th, 500,000 persons throughout Japan protested U.S. intervention in Vietnam.

The Japanese people are strongly opposed to U.S. installations, equipment and armed forces on their soil, because they feel that these bases are being used to support the war in Vietnam. "Although the Japanese Government officially backs American policy in Vietnam its support is neither loud nor always clear... Many Japanese people do not appreciate why the United States is fighting in Vietnam and demand the Americans vacate bases in Japan." (Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 30, 1965, p. 10c.) The following is an excerpt from a leaflet, "Letter to Americans Stationing in Japan," issued by the Japan Youth Committee Against War: "We would like to ask you to think about carefully again your government's actions in Vietnam and ask yourself if there were some reason to justify them, and why the U.S. troops have to be enforced in South Vietnam without the content (sic) of the majority people of Vietnam, to kill innocent Vietnamese and to be killed meaninglessly.... We do not want you, also, to use our soil and sea for the purpose of this aggressive action towards Vietnam

threatening world peace and fundamental right for self-determination of oppressed peoples." Numerous outbursts of protests have occurred in Japan directed against U.S. military presence, such as the recent demonstrations at Sasebo Naval Base.

The recent talks involving the ratification of a Japan-South Korea Treaty which would establish NEATO (North East Asia Treaty Organization) have aroused the anti-war forces in Japan. According to Zengakuren (All-Japan Federation of Student Autonomous Associations) this treaty would be mutually advantageous for the Japanese industrialists and the South Korean landowners; it would provide a cheap source of labor and a "stable foreign market to export over-capital and commodity", and "At the same time the Korean ruling class want the import for exploitation, e.g. to import half products from Japan and manufacture by cheap labor for export." ("International Appeal Against the Vietnamese Aggressive War.")

The Japanese government which, by constitution, cannot send troops to Vietnam, is nonetheless helping the U.S. war effort: "This treaty stipulates that Japan provide $500 million from our taxes and $300 million from other resources to South Korea. The subsidy will reinforce the South Korean Government's military outfit and link Japan more closely to the U.S. Government's cold war policy. South Korea has already sent to Vietnam 15,000 soldiers. This policy will be accelerated by the Japan-South Korea Treaty. We will do our best to stop all these doings that bring disaster to the people in Vietnam." (Joint-statement by the Japan Youth Committee Against War, the Tokyo Student Teach-in Committee, and the Japan "Peace for Vietnam" Committee.) The Japan-Vietnam Friendship Association had this to say: "The immediate objective of the present struggle lies in the prevention of ratification of the Japan-ROK treaty and agreements. Doubtlessly, the de facto military alliance pacts were signed between the Sato Cabinet and South Korean Pak regime in compliance with the insistence of the U.S. imperialism seeking frantically its way out of the quagmire of the Vietnamese war. The bilateral pacts are evidently designed to rig up the North East Asia Treaty Organization that will, under the command of U.S. imperialism, link up the reactionary forces of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, their aim of attack focused on the Socialist countries and the national-liberation movement in Asia." ("People's Struggle Continues Against Japan-ROK Treaty Agreements.") The Japanese people consider the ratification of the Japan-ROK treaty as a very serious threat to the peace of all of Asia, and numerous demonstrations, rallies, speeches and other forms of protest have taken place condemning this treaty.

American intervention in Vietnam, American "occupation" of Japan, and American support of the ruling classes of Japan and South Korea are strongly opposed by the broad-based anti-war movement of the Japanese people.

International Committee of the
Vietnam Day Committee
Berkeley, December 7, 1965

FORM 10-63 3000

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Case # NLJ 97-27
Document # 84

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	TDCS	314/03592-66
DATE OF INFO.	MID MARCH 1966	DISTR.	16 MARCH 1966

SUBJECT

BUDDHIST POLITICAL PLANS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH GOVERNMENT LEADERS

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>
(C)

PLACE & DATE ACQ. [redacted]

REF IN 76300

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>5Yrs (C)

1. (SUMMARY: PROFESSOR TRAN QUANG THUAN CLAIMS THAT THE BUDDHIST INSTITUTE (VIEN HOA DAO, VHD) HAS A PLAN FOR INSTALLING A NEW GOVERNMENT AND THAT THIS HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN CAO KY AND DIRECTORATE CHAIRMAN NGUYEN VAN THIEU. ALLEGEDLY THIEU AND KY HAVE AGREED TO IT IN PART. THE PLAN CALLS FOR A NATIONALY ASSEMBLY (NA) WHOSE MEMBERS WOULD BE SELECTED BY THE PROVISIONAL COUNCILS, HOPEFULLY BEFORE 15 APRIL, FOR THE PURPOSE OF WRITING A CONSTITUTION AND ORGANIZING GENERAL ELECTIONS. KY AND THIEU "HALF AGREED" TO ABANDON THE PRESENT

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)
(C)

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

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Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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ADVANCE COPY TRANSMITTED TO: WHITE HOUSE
STATE DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS NIC NSA OCI

ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR BUILDING DEMOCRACY IN FAVOR OF THIS NA. AFTER THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NEW NA HAS BEEN CHOSEN, THE BUDDHISTS THEN INTEND TO PRESS FOR THE REALIZATION OF THE FOUR POINTS OF THE VHD COMMUNIQUE OF 12 MARCH, ESPECIALLY THE PART ASKING FOR THE RETURN OF THE GENERALS TO THEIR MILITARY DUTIES. THUAN CLAIMED THE VHD HAS THE SUPPORT OF FATHERS HOANG QUYHN AND HO VAN VUI IN THIS EFFORT. THE BUDDHISTS WANT TO PROVE THAT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN BOUGHT OFF BY THE KY GOVERNMENT. THEY CONSIDER KY CHILDISH AND IRRESPONSIBLE AND RESENTED THE RECENT REORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT WHICH THEY SAY WAS CARRIED OUT WITHOUT CONSULTING THEM. THUAN SAID HE BELIEVED STUDENTS WERE LIKELY TO STRIKE IN SAIGON IN A DAY OR TWO.)

1. ACCORDING TO PROFESSOR TRAN QUANG THUAN, THE BUDDHIST INSTITUTE (VIEN HOA DAO, VHD) IS SEEKING NEITHER A COUP NOR THE RESIGNATION OF PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN CAO KY FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. IN THE EVENT OF A COUP, EITHER ANOTHER PART OF THE MILITARY WOULD TAKE OVER, OR THE MILITARY WOULD INSTALL ANOTHER GOVERNMENT LIKE THOSE OF TRAN VAN HUONG (NOVEMBER 1964 TO JANUARY 1965) OR PHAN HUY QUAT (FEBRUARY 1965 TO JUNE 1965) WHICH OWED THEIR AUTHORITY TO THE MILITARY.

B. IF PRIME MINISTER KY SHOULD RESIGN, POWER WOULD REMAIN IN THE DIRECTORATE; THAT IS, IN THE MILITARY. HENCE THE BUDDHISTS WANT KY TO REMAIN AS PRIME MINISTER UNTIL

A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (NA) CAN BE CONVOKED, HOPEFULLY BY 15 APRIL. SINCE ORGANIZATION OF A GENERAL ELECTION WOULD TAKE TOO MUCH TIME, THE PROVINCIAL COUNCILS, WOULD CHOOSE THE MEMBERS OF THE NA. THE NA WOULD THEN WRITE A CONSTITUTION AND ORGANIZE GENERAL ELECTIONS.

2. ON 14 MARCH VHD CHAIRMAN THICH TAM CHAU AND THICH THIEN MINH SAW PRIME MINISTER KY AND THEN DIRECTORATE CHAIRMAN NGUYEN VAN THIEU. ACCORDING TO THUAN BOTH KY AND THIEU AGREED IN PRINCIPLE WITH THE FOUR POINTS OF THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE VHD PRESS CONFERENCE ON 12 MARCH. THEIR VIEWS ON SPECIFIC POINTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

A. POINT ONE (REINTEGRATION OF OFFICERS WHO HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE REVOLUTION): THEY "HALF AGREED," SAYING THAT THEY WOULD APPOINT GENERAL TRAN VAN DON AND OTHERS AS MINISTERS OR TO OTHER CIVILIAN POSTS.

B. POINT TWO (RETURN OF GENERALS TO PURELY MILITARY DUTIES): THIS MOST DIFFICULT POINT WAS NOT DISCUSSED.

C. POINT THREE (CONVOCATION OF A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY): KY AND THIEU AGAIN "HALF AGREED." THEY AGREED TO ABANDON THE PRESENT ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR BUILDING DEMOCRACY, BUT THIEU, SPECIALLY, WAS HESITANT ABOUT THE IDEA OF USING THE PROVINCIAL COUNCILS TO FORM THE NA.

D. POINT FOUR (SOCIAL REVOLUTION): KY AND THIEU FILL AGREED, CLAIMING THAT THIS WAS ALSO THEIR POLICY.

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THUAN SAID HE HOPED THE GVN WOULD SOON HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE TO ANNOUNCE ITS INTENTION TO IMPLEMENT THE ABOVE PLAN.

3. ASSUMING GVN ACCEPTANCE OF THE ABOVE PLAN, THE BUDDHISTS WOULD ORGANIZE NO DEMONSTRATIONS OR MEETINGS UNTIL AFTER THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAD CHOSEN ITS PRESIDING OFFICER. ORDERLY DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD THEN BEGIN AGAIN TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE GVN AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO REALIZE THE FOUR-POINT PROGRAM, ESPECIALLY POINT TWO (RETURN OF GENERALS TO MILITARY DUTIES.)

4. THUAN SAID HE WAS VERY PLEASED THAT THE BUDDHISTS HAD CATHOLIC SUPPORT AT THIS TIME. HE SAID THAT ON 15 MARCH AN EMISSARY REPRESENTING FATHER HOANG QUYNH AND FATHER HO VAN VUI, AND ANOTHER REPRESENTING THE CAO DAI APPROACHED HIM AND SUGGESTED THAT THE FOUR RELIGIONS JOIN IN SIGNING A CENSURE MOTION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. THUAN REJECTED THIS PROPOSAL ON THE GROUND THAT IT WOULD THEN APPEAR THAT THE RELIGIOUS LEADER WERE MERELY SEEKING TO REPLACE THE GENERALS.

5. THUAN OFFERED THE FOLLOWING REASONS TO EXPLAIN WHY THE BUDDHISTS HAD DECIDED TO ACT NOW RATHER THAN ADHERE TO PREVIOUS PLANS TO CONCENTRATE ON LONG TERM ORGANIZATION:

A. THE PUBLIC BELIEVED THAT THE VHD SUPPORTED THE KY GOVERNMENT AND THAT TAM CHAU AND THIEN MINH HAD BEEN BOUGHT OFF BY KY. [redacted] COMMENT: THIS BELIEF HAS

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APPARENTLY BEEN QUITE WIDESPREAD, ESPECIALLY OF TAM CHAU.)

B. THE GVN HAD BEEN TRYING, CONSCIOUSLY OR UNCONSCIOUSLY, TO CORRUPT THE BONZES.

C. KY IS CHILDISH, IRRESPONSIBLE, LAZY, AND A "COWBOY," AND THE PEOPLE DO NOT LIKE HIM MUCH. THUAN COMMENTED THAT KY IS HONEST, HOWEVER, AND A GOOD AIR FORCE COMMANDER.)

D. NEITHER THE VHD NOR THE LAY BUDDHISTS CONNNECTED WITH IT WERE CONSULTED ABOUT THE LATEST REORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT.

E. THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT BY GENERALS HAS RESULTED IN A WAR-LORD SYSTEM.

F. PARADOXICALLY, THE BUDDHISTS ARE ACTING IN ORDER TO SAVE THE GOOD GENERALS--SUCH AS KY HIMSELF AND GENERAL LE NGUYEN KHANG, COMMANDER OF THE CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT--FROM DISASTER.

6. THUAN EMPHASIZED THAT HE LIKED KY PERSONALLY AND THAT THE BUDDHISTS DID NOT HATE ANY GENERAL. EVEN EXILED GENERALS TRAN THIEN KHIEM AND DO CAO TRI COULD RETURN, PROVIDED THEY STAYED OUT OF POLITICS. CONVERSELY, THE BUDDHISTS RECOGNIZED THAT THI COULD NOT BE REAPPOINTED TO THE COMMAND OF I CORPS AND THAT IT MIGHT BE WELL FOR HIM TO GO ABROAD "AFTER HIS HONOR HAD BEEN SAVED." SIMILARLY, THEY RECOGNIZED THAT TRAN VAN DON

COULD NOT BECOME COMMANDER IN CHIEF AGAIN, BUT AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE HE SHOULD BE REINTEGRATED INTO THE ARMY.

7. THUAN BELIEVES STUDENT STRIKES ARE LIKELY IN SAIGON WITHIN A DAY OR TWO. HE SAID DEMONSTRATIONS WILL BE HELD ONLY IF ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY, BECAUSE IN SAIGON THEY ARE TOO HARD TO CONTROL. IN ADDITION TO THE DANGER OF VIET CONG INFILTRATION, THERE ARE OPPORTUNIST AND EXTREMIST FACTIONS WHICH TRY TO EXPLOIT THEM.

8. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 2ND AIR DIV CINCPAC ARPAC CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE.

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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DATE OF INFO. 16 MARCH 1966

TDCS-314/03582-66

DISTR. 16 MARCH 1966

SUBJECT

SCHEDULED DIRECTORATE MEETING ON 18 MARCH TO DISCUSS BUDDHIST EXPLOITATION OF CURRENT UNREST

PLACE & DATE ACQ. [redacted]

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REF [redacted] IN 76103

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: [redacted]

REPORT NO. [redacted]

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DATE: FEB 2001

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1. THERE WILL BE A MEETING OF THE DIRECTORATE ON 18 MARCH. THE MAIN TOPIC OF DISCUSSION WILL BE THE BUDDHIST THREAT TO THE GOVERNMENT, PARTICULARLY BUDDHIST EXPLOITATION OF CURRENT UNREST FOR POLITICAL ENDS.

2. BUDDHISTS HAVE BEEN CONTACTING INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE DIRECTORATE IN AN ATTEMPT TO ASSESS THE UNITY OF THE GENERALS. CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT COMMANDER LE NGUYEN KHANG BELIEVES THE DIRECTORATE HAS SUFFICIENT UNITY TO STAND

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UP TO THE BUDDHISTS. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN HUU CO WILL SUPPORT HIS DIRECTORATE COLLEAGUES BECAUSE HE HAS BEEN A PARTICULAR TARGET OF BUDDHIST CRITICISM. KHANG BELIEVES THE BUDDHISTS MUST BE CONTROLLED EVEN IF STRINGENT MEASURES ARE REQUIRED. HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD COMPROMISE WITH THE BUDDHISTS TO THE SLIGHTEST DEGREE.

3. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE USMACV USAID JUSPAO 2ND AIR DIV CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF.

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Case # NLJ 97-27
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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DATE OF INFO. 21 MARCH 1966

TDCS- 314/03895-66

DISTR. 22 MARCH 1966

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SUBJECT

VIEW OF THE [redacted] PROVINCE CHIEF [redacted] THAT AGITATION IN CENTRAL VIETNAM WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THE GOVERNMENT IS REPLACED

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PLACE & DATE ACQ. [redacted]

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REF IN 80263

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

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1. (SUMMARY. ACCORDING TO [redacted] PROVINCE CHIEF, AGITATION IN CENTRAL VIETNAM WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT IS BROUGHT DOWN. HE THINKS THE VIETNAM NATIONALIST PARTY (VNQDD), MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY, AND "RESPONSIBLE" CATHOLICS WILL JOIN THE BUDDHISTS IN THIS AGITATION. [redacted] CLAIMS THAT MILITARY MORALE AND DISCIPLINE HAS DECLINED SINCE THE DISMISSAL OF I CORPS

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COMMANDER GENERAL NGUYEN CHANH THI AND THAT THE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM IS SUFFERING. HE ASSERTED THAT THE SITUATION IS KEEPING CENTRAL VIETNAM PROVINCE CHIEFS SO BUSY THAT THEY WILL BE UNABLE TO ATTEND THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION MEETING IN SAIGON 23 TO 25 MARCH.)

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2. ON 21 MARCH [redacted] PROVINCE CHIEF [redacted] EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE "UNANIMOUS BIAS" AGAINST OUSTED I CORPS COMMANDER GENERAL NGUYEN CHANH THI SHOWN BY UNITED STATES NEWS MEDIA WAS ADVERSELY AFFECTING THE PEOPLE OF CENTRAL VIETNAM (CVN). [redacted] SAID THE PEOPLE OF CVN WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE MILITARY'S HEAVY-HANDED MANNER OF DISMISSING THI OR OF HANDLING OTHER MATTERS.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C) [redacted] REMARKED THAT AGITATION WOULD CONTINUE AGAINST DIRECTORATE CHAIRMAN NGUYEN VAN THIEU AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN HUU CO. ACCORDING TO [redacted] THE PEOPLE WANT TO AVOID SEEMING TO ATTACK THE SPIRIT OF HONOLULU AND THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WITH WHICH PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN CAO KY IS SO CLOSELY IDENTIFIED AND HAVE THEREFORE SINGLED OUT THIEU AND CO FOR ATTACK AND EXCLULDED KY. HE SAID THAT THE PEOPLE KNOW, HOWEVER, THAT AN ATTACK AGAINST THIEU AND CO IS AN ATTACK AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND THAT THE PEOPLES' EFFORTS

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C) WOULD CONTINUE UNTIL THEIR OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, THAT IS, - A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT. [redacted] CLAIMED MEMBERS OF THE VNQDD WOULD JOIN WITH THE BUDDHISTS AS WOULD SOLDIERS AND RESPONSIBLE CATHOLICS.

4. [redacted] REMARKED THAT THE MILITARY SITUATION IN QUANG NGAI AND QUANG TIN PROVINCES HAS DETERIORATED SINCE THI'S DISMISSAL. HE

SAID DISCIPLINE AND MORALE OF SECOND DIVISION SOLDIERS IS AT A LOW EBB, A SITUATION WHICH WAS KEPT IN CHECK WHILE THI WAS COMMANDER OF I CORPS, BECAUSE THI COULD BE DEPENDED ON TO SHOW UP PERIODICALLY AT UNEXPECTED TIMES AND TO IMPOSE DISCIPLINE. [redacted] SAID THAT THE MILITARY ARE NOW PLAYING CARDS, GAMBLING, DRINKING, AND RUNNING AFTER WOMEN. IN ADDITION, HE CHARGED, THEY ARE SELLING MATERIAL AND FUEL TO THE VIET CONG.

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5. [redacted] ASSERTED THAT THE REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES ARE "EVEN MORE DISORGANIZED THAT EVER." HE ALSO SAID THAT THE RURAL CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM IS BEING SET BACK. FURTHERMORE, THE I CORPS PROVINCE CHIEFS ARE TOO OCCUPIED TO BE ABLE TO ATTEND THE THREE-DAY PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION MEETING IN SAIGON 23 TO 25 MARCH. HOWEVER, PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BE SENT.

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6. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE USMACV USAID JUSPAO 2ND AIR DIV CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

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Case # NLJ 97-27
Document # 211d

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM		TDCS 314/04009-66
DATE OF INFO.	14 - 23 MARCH 1966		DISTR. 24 MARCH 1966

SUBJECT

VIET CONG ORDERS TO STUDENT CADRES TO EXPLOIT UNREST IN DANANG AREA BUT TO FOLLOW DIRECTIONS OF VIET CONG FRONT EXCLUSIVELY

PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (23 MARCH 1966)	REF	IN 82430
SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:	[redacted]	FIELD REPORT NO.	[redacted]

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DATE: FEB 2001

1. (SUMMARY: VIET CONG (VC) INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO STUDENT CADRES IN THE DANANG AREA TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CURRENT UNREST BY INFILTRATING DEMONSTRATION GROUPS AND ATTEMPTING TO CONCENTRATE ALL FORCES AGAINST THE AMERICANS AND THEIR ALLIES IN AN EFFORT TO CAUSE DISSENSION AMONG THEM. AN 18 MARCH CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION TO VC STUDENT CADRES, HOWEVER, ADVISED THE STUDENTS TO FOLLOW THE DIRECTIVES OF THE VC FRONT ONLY, POINTING OUT THAT ALL POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF "REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS" WHICH ARE NOT CONTROLLED BY THE FRONT ARE HARMFUL TO THE FRONT. AS PART OF THEIR INSTRUCTIONS

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FOR INFILTRATING DEMONSTRATION GROUPS, THE STUDENTS WERE TOLD TO INSERT CERTAIN ANTI-GOVERNMENT, ANTI-AMERICAN SLOGANS ON THE BANNERS OF THE GROUPS AND TO ARGUE AT GROUP MEETINGS THAT THE OUSTER OF GENERAL NGUYEN CHANH THI WAS AN AMERICAN CONSPIRACY, BUT TO AVOID ANY MENTION OF THE RESTORATION OF THI TO HIS POST AS I CORPS COMMANDER. INSTRUCTIONS WERE ALSO GIVEN TO INCREASE CLANDESTINE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN DANANG AND, SECONDARILY, TO STEP UP ARMED ACTIVITY IN THE CITY.)

2. ON 14 MARCH THE VC DANANG CITY COMMITTEE SENT INSTRUCTIONS TO THE DANANG LIBERATION STUDENTS' ASSOCIATION TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CURRENT UNREST IN THE DANANG AREA OVER THE OUSTER OF I CORPS COMMANDER GENERAL NGUYEN CHANH THI BY INFILTRATING ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION GROUPS AND TURNING THEIR MANIFESTATIONS TOWARD AN ANTI-AMERICAN, ANTI-"LACKEY"THEME. THE PRINCIPAL VC OBJECT, THE STUDENTS WERE TOLD, IS A CONCENTRATION OF FORCES AGAINST AMERICANS AND THEIR ALLIES IN ORDER TO SPREAD DISSENSION AMONG THEM.

3. THE VC DIRECTIVE POINTED OUT THAT THE PRESENT TROUBLE IN DANANG IS SYMBOLIC OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GENERALS THIEU, KY, AND THI AND THAT, SINCE THE VC BELIEVE THE CRISIS WILL CONTINUE FOR A LONG TIME, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO EXPLOIT THE UNREST TO ADVANCE THE "PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT." LIBERATION STUDENTS' ASSOCIATION CADRES WERE INSTRUCTED TO ATTEND MEETINGS OF OTHER GROUPS, ARGUE THAT THI'S DISMISSAL WAS AN AMERICAN CONSPIRACY AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS A SERVANT OF THE AMERICANS, AND ATTEMPT TO INSERT THE FOLLOWING SLOGANS

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"LEGALLY" ON THE BANNERS OF THESE OTHER GROUPS: "DOWN WITH THE DICTATORIAL GOVERNMENT," "DOWN WITH THE IMPERIALIST ALLIES", "REMOVE FOREIGN TROOPS FROM VIETNAMESE SOIL," "VIETNAMESE SHOULD SOLVE THEIR OWN INTERNAL AFFAIRS," AND "THE VIETNAMESE WANT PEACE AND AN END TO THE WAR."

4. THE STUDENTS WERE CAUTIONED TO AVOID ANY MENTION AT THE MEETINGS OF THE RETURN OR RESTORATION OF GENERAL THI AND WERE FURTHER INSTRUCTED TO STEP UP THEIR ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES THROUGH THE CLANDESTINE DISTRIBUTION OF LEAFLETS URGING STRIKES AGAINST THE AMERICANS AND DEMANDING THEIR REMOVAL FROM SOUTH VIETNAM. THE STUDENTS WERE TOLD, IN ADDITION, THAT ALTHOUGH THE PRINCIPAL EMPHASIS IN THE PRESENT STRUGGLE IS TO BE ON POLITICAL ACTIVITIES, THERE MUST ALSO BE INCREASED ARMED ACTIVITY IN DANANG CITY. [redacted] COMMENT: ALTHOUGH HE STATED HE HAD NOTHING DEFINITE ON WHICH TO BASE HIS BELIEF, THE SOURCE SAID HE FEARED THE VC MIGHT SOON ENGAGE IN NIGHTTIME ACTS OF TERRORISM.) E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)> (C)

5. ADDITIONAL SLOGANS WERE DISTRIBUTED TO STUDENTS IN THE DANANG AREA ON 23 MARCH. THESE INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING:

A. "DEAR PEOPLE, IN VIEW OF THE SERIOUS SITUATION, WE REQUEST THAT THE PEOPLE REALIZE THE PLOTS OF THE VNQDD AND THE PEOPLE'S FRONT IN ORDER THAT ALL PLANS OF THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS AND THEIR SERVANTS, WHO ARE SELLING OUT OUR NATION, MAY BE DESTROYED." [redacted] COMMENT: THE PEOPLE'S FRONT PROBABLY REFERS TO THE POPULAR STRUGGLE FORCE FOR REVOLUTION.)

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B. "KNOCK DOWN THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS, THE GROUP OF VIETNAMESE TRAITORS, AND THE THIEU, CO, KY SERVANT GROUP."

C. "KNOCK DOWN THE SERVANT GROUP, THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PUPPET GOVERNMENT, AND THE SERVANTS WHO ARE SELLING OUT OUR NATION--THIEU, KY, CO."

D. "DEAR SOLDIERS, YOU SHOULD NOT SERVE AMERICA AS SERVANTS. LET US FIRE AT THE AMERICAN PIRATES AND THE PEOPLE'S FRONT. /SIGNED/ DANANG LIBERATION STUDENTS' ASSOCIATION."

E. "LONG LIVE THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT, LONG LIVE HO CHI MINH. /SIGNED/ THE MILITARY POPULATION OF THE FIRST TACTICAL ZONE."

6. ON 18 MARCH THE DANANG COMMITTEE OF THE VC FRONT ISSUED THE FOLLOWING CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS TO ITS STUDENT CADRES IN DANANG:

A. "ALL REVOLUTIONARY AND LIBERATION ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING IN DANANG AND SOME OTHER GROUPS SHOULD BE DIRECTED AND CONTROLLED BY THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT /VC FRONT).

B. "POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS /WHICH ARE NOT CONTROLLED BY THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT/, AS WELL AS REVOLUTIONARY CADRES WHO ARE NOT STRICTLY CONTROLLED AND LED BY THE FRONT ARE HARMFUL TO THE FRONT'S PRINCIPLE OF REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION.

C. "ALL FRONT REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS AND LEGAL AND ILLEGAL CADRES MUST BE GOVERNED BY FRONT LEADERSHIP. CADRES OF ALL

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ECHELONS MUST BE EXAMINED AND APPROVED BY THE FRONT COMMITTEE.

D. "DO NOT UNDERTAKE INDEPENDENT ACTION BY FOLLOWING YOUR PERSONAL OPINIONS OR DISOBEYING THE ORDERS OF YOUR SUPERIORS IF THEY DISAPPROVE YOUR PROPOSALS."

E. "YOU HAVE A DUTY TO REPORT WHAT IS HAPPENING AND TO REMAIN UNITED IN PURPOSE. THIS PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY FOR REVIEW OF YOUR PERSONAL RECORD BY THE FRONT COMMITTEE BEFORE ASSIGNMENT TO CERTAIN TASKS."

7. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE USMACV USAID JUSPAO 2ND AIR DIV CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

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Case # NLJ 97-27
Document # 211e

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM		TDCS-314/04257-66
DATE OF INFO.	14 MARCH 1966		DISTR. 29 MARCH 1966

SUBJECT

VIET CONG DIRECTIVE TO EXPLOIT PRESENT UNREST AND DISSENSION IN GOVERNMENT TO INCREASE VIET CONG MILITARY AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY

PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (28 MARCH 1966)	REF	IN 85291
SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:	[redacted]	FIELD REPORT NO.	[redacted]

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DATE: FEB 2001

1. ON 14 MARCH 1966 A VIET CONG (VC) DIRECTIVE WAS ISSUED, PRESUMABLY BY THE VC MY THO PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE (GVN DINH TUONG PROVINCE), ORDERING ALL VC ELEMENTS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CURRENT DISSENSION OVER THE OUSTER OF I CORPS COMMANDER GENERAL NGUYEN CHANH THI BY STEPPING UP BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. THE DIRECTIVE POINTS OUT THAT THE THI FACTION HAS REACTED STRONGLY TO THI'S REMOVAL AND HAS GIVEN ORDERS TO VN MILITARY TO PREPARE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THI'S INTEREST. PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN CAO KY,

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HOWEVER, CONTROLS THE MILITARY AND THERE IS A CONSEQUENT CONTROVERSY WITHIN GVN RANKS, ACCORDING TO THE VC DIRECTIVE.

2. TO EXPLOIT THIS SITUATION, THEREFORE, THE VC HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO "FIND EVERY MEANS OF WEARING DOWN AND ANNIHILATING THE ENEMY." THE MEANS ARE TO INCLUDE A STEP-UP IN SABOTAGE AND ROAD INTERDICTION ACTIVITIES, AN INCREASE IN DEPLOYMENT OF GUERRILLA AND ENGINEER TROOPS FOR ATTACKS ON VEHICLES AND DESTRUCTION OF BRIDGES, CONTINUED DESTRUCTION OF STRATEGIC HAMLETS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES TO BREAK THE GVN'S ADMINISTRATIVE GRIP IN CERTAIN AREAS, AND INFILTRATION OF VC MILITARY PROSELYTING ELEMENTS INTO DISSENTING GVN GROUPS IN ORDER TO WEAKEN THE MORALE OF THESE GROUPS AND CAMPAIGN AMONG THEM FOR DESERTIONS TO THE VC.

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3. [redacted]DISSEM. STATE USMACV USAID JUSPAO 2ND AIR DIV CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

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Case # NLJ 97-27
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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Political Situation in South Vietnam: The Current Crisis, Possible Future Developments, U.S. Options

I. THE BACKGROUND

At the present time, South Vietnam is neither a "state", in our institutional sense of the word nor -- yet -- a "nation", as we understand and define that term in the West. The Vietnamese have a keen and proud sense of shared membership in a homogenous ethnic group with a common cultural heritage stretching back for many centuries, but they have little sense of shared membership in a single body politic. Articulate and politically conscious elements within South Vietnam -- especially in the military establishment and in urban centers -- are rapidly developing a touchy sense of emotional "nationalism", which is grafted on a traditional and highly developed sense of racial pride, coupled with an equally traditional and developed instinctive dislike for foreigners. As yet, however, there is little sense of a national interest whose claims transcend those of personal ambition or ties to family, associates, region or religion.

With U.S. assistance which they welcome, recognize as essential but nonetheless also resent, non-Communist Vietnamese south of the 17th Parallel are trying simultaneously to cope with an externally directed Communist insurgency and to build something that has never existed before: an independent Vietnamese nation. This endeavor is drastically complicated by the stresses and pressures generated by the insurgency. It is also complicated by other factors: South Vietnam's political parties are all fragmented factions of what were initially clandestine revolutionary organizations. Their leaders are incorrigibly inclined to plot the overthrow of governments and reluctant to support any political structure in which they cannot have the paramount roles. There are no traditionally accepted institutions capable of providing forums for political dissent, measuring the

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relative strength of contending groups, or striking peaceful political bargains. The only organized and disciplined entity in South Vietnam presently capable of managing a government is the military establishment. In the absence of effective political institutions or organizations, religious groups provide the focal point for political sentiments. In the absence of genuine nationalism, regional ties color political emotions and are stronger than nascent higher loyalties.

For the past year South Vietnam has been ruled by a military government which has had to direct a war and, simultaneously, cope with all of the problems outlined above. At the apex of this government has been a Directory of ten generals whose most prominent members have been the Chief of State, General Thieu, and the Premier, General Ky. Neither, however, has possessed independent authority. Instead, both have only exercised power delegated by a collegium.

To survive and accomplish anything this government has had to perform a continual balancing act juggling the aspirations, claims and jealousies of southerners, centristes, and northerners, of Buddhists, of Catholics, and all the other groups who have some measure of political power in South Vietnam. It has also had to cope with civilian restiveness at continued military rule and the widespread desire among politically conscious civilian elements for the evolution of a political structure with a clearer legal title to power and a diminished degree of military authority. Furthermore, it has had to cope with the fact that the military commander of each of the four Corps areas (himself a member of the ruling Directory) is inevitably a warlord whose personal writ within his Corps is at least as strong as that of the central government. Over the past year this problem has been particularly and increasingly acute in South Vietnam's five northernmost provinces which constitute the I Corps area and have been governed by the ambitious, tempermental and sometimes unstable General Nguyen Chanh Thi.

II. THE SCENARIO

It is within this context that South Vietnam's current political crisis developed. By 9 March, General Ky had reached a decision shared by most of his Directory colleagues that the central government could no longer tolerate the Corps area satrapies best exemplified by General Thi's I Corps and, consequently, that Thi had to go. Thi

was called to Saigon for a 10 March Directory meeting at which he was relieved of his command and told that he would be sent abroad for a period of temporary exile. General Ky had prepared his ground carefully for this meeting and was able to obtain the unanimous support of his Directory colleagues. His follow-up execution, however, was not well prepared and was not effectively carried out.

At the 10 March meeting Thi was told he could return briefly to I Corps the following day to wind up his affairs and participate in a change-of-command ceremony designed to save his face. That night, however, the Deputy Prime Minister, General Co, another powerful Directory figure, apparently had a unilateral change of mind. On the morning of the 11th, Co went to the Saigon Airport, prevented Thi from leaving, and in effect placed him under house arrest in Saigon. Five days later the Directory changed its mind again. By then the I Corps situation had begun to be troublesome and Thi was allowed to return to I Corps "for a couple of days" in the hope -- and apparently with the understanding -- that he would exert his personal influence to calm things down before leaving the country. He went back to I Corps on 16 March, is still there, and has done more to aggravate than to assuage the situation.

It was recognized that Thi's dismissal would cause some resentment in I Corps but Ky and his Directory colleagues thought they could keep matters under control. Events proved otherwise, however, for various reasons, among the most important of which are the fact that protest reaction to Thi's ouster was organized and is still directed by key GVN officials in I Corps (e.g., Nguyen Van Man, the mayor of Danang), the fact that Thi's designated successor as I Corps commander, General Chuan, has so far shown himself unable or unwilling to exert effective authority, and -- above all -- the fact that the Buddhists have seized on this opportunity to exert political pressure intended to topple the government.

It was anticipated that Thi's dismissal would be resented by the Buddhists and generate some distress in their ranks. This in fact occured, but in short order it became apparent that the Buddhists -- particularly Tri Quang and his followers -- were not so much interested in Thi himself, with whom they had already become more or less disenchanted, as they were in the opportunity for bringing down the

government. Their initial probes for weakness were not effectively countered and they have accordingly developed their protests into a full-fledged pressure campaign concentrated in but by no means restricted to I Corps.

In the three weeks since Thi's ouster a serious situation has developed in which, at the present time, I corps cannot be said to be effectively under Saigon control, in which Buddhist instigated pressures are seriously threatening the stability and perhaps the actual survival of the present GVN, and in which anti-American and neutralist sentiments are being openly voiced.

III. THE PLAYERS

In the complex political game now being conducted in South Vietnam there are a wide variety of players or groups thereof each with divergent objectives, ambitions, and vested interests.

Ky and the Directory: General Ky and his immediate colleagues obviously want to stay in power, prosecute the war, and conduct the work of social development which they are sincerely if not always efficiently setting in motion. By and large the Directory seems to be hanging together (perhaps to avoid hanging separately) and for the time being at least Ky enjoys the unified, though not necessarily loyal, support of his immediate colleagues. Ky and his associates, however, are obviously disturbed and more than a little unsure of themselves. As indicated above, they keep changing their minds on the best course of action to follow. They are understandably anxious to avoid a head-on collision with the Buddhists or an unwise use of force capable of setting in train a course of events like those which led to Diem's downfall in 1963. It appears, however, that they may be allowing the obvious and very real need for prudence to serve as an excuse for counter-productive procrastination and indecision.

General Thi: Thi provided the occasion for this crisis but is no longer its central element. He obviously resents his ouster and is not disposed to exert himself to ease the problems of his former colleagues. So long as he remains in I Corps he will almost certainly serve as an irritant and visible symbol of the Ky government's

inability to enforce execution of its orders. Throughout his career -- even in the 1960 coup attempt -- Thi has always been someone else's cat's paw, the front -- witting or unwitting -- for other peoples' political manipulations. He remains so today.

The Directory's Key Executive Agents: One of the chief contributors to the present crisis is the fact that Ky and his Directory colleagues have been poorly served, if not actually ill-served, by the chosen executive instruments of their decision to dismiss General Thi. General Chuan, as indicated above, is sitting on a fence. He talks loyalty to Saigon but so far has done nothing to assert or re-establish Saigon's authority in I Corps. There are good grounds for thinking that he personally is more anxious to be on the winning side than to discharge his present responsibilities as I Corps commander. The roles of MSS Chief Colonel Loan, and, particularly, of National Police Director, Colonel Pham Van Lieu, have been, if anything, even more ambivalent. Lieu has been the Ky government's principal go-between in its dealings with Thi but where Lieu's loyalties lie is very much an open question.

The I Corps Bureaucracy: Much of the agitation in I Corps has been not only encouraged but in some cases actually organized by key local officials. The Mayor of Danang, Nguyen Van Man, for example, seems to be the person who organized the "civilian and military struggle committee" which has become the spearhead of anti-GVN protests and demonstrations. Man has done nothing to curb the recurrent strikes which have plagued Danang and may well have been behind them. Bui Hoanh, the province chief of Quang Ngai, has been equally unhelpful. In fact, no I Corps provincial or military official has done anything effective to support the Saigon government.

"The Struggle Group": The most active, vocal and disturbing element in I Corps agitation has been the "struggle groups" and "committees" which have sprung up in Danang, Hue and elsewhere. By and large they seem to be composed of present or recent students, faculty members in I Corps schools (including Hue University) and junior civilian and military officials. They are encouraged and probably directed by Tri Quang's wing of the Buddhist movement. They could never have gotten off the ground without the at least tacit blessing of local officials, though it is not entirely clear if the latter

could now curtail these groups' activities. It is the struggle groups who have taken over the Hue and Danang radio stations, led the demonstrations, put out increasingly anti-American propaganda themes, and begun to voice neutralist and anti-war sentiments.

The Buddhists: South Vietnam's Buddhist movement has considerably more to do with politics than with religion. It is not a tightly organized and disciplined body but it does have widespread support, particularly in youth and student circles. It bears some analogies to the civil rights movement in the U.S. in that it channels strong emotions, finds protest more congenial than constructive advocacy, and has a number of would-be leaders none of whom is willing to let another appear more militant than he. The two major factions within the Buddhist movement are those which coalesce around, respectively, Thich Tri Quang and Thich Tam Chau. Tri Quang's faction is the better organized but is strongest in central Vietnam, including I Corps. Tam Chau's supporters are less well organized but are concentrated in the south, including Saigon, and hence give Tam Chau a voice about equal to that of Tri Quang on the national stage. All of the political Buddhists have been unhappy with the continuation of military rule, and are anxious for a return to civilian government. None, however, has ever been willing to articulate exactly what sort of civilian government he would like to see or whom he would like to have in positions of authority therein. Tam Chau appears prepared to give the Ky government at least some measure of support and assistance so long as it is tangibly forthcoming on the matter of progress of civilian rule. Tri Quang seems currently bent on taking a harder line.

No one has ever been able to divine exactly what Tri Quang wants and he himself would almost certainly be unwilling, if not unable, to spell out his goals with any degree of precision. He apparently does not want the responsibilities of office. He does want a veto power over GVN policies and personnel choices and appears determined to topple any government he cannot control. There is little doubt that Tri Quang is the real driving force behind present agitation, that in the aftermath of Thi's ouster he probed for weaknesses and thinks he has found them. He will almost certainly persist in his pressure until the Ky government falls or until he comes to believe that he cannot succeed and hence must ease off to avoid public defeat. A consummate political realist, he has a keen eye for his opponents'

strengths as well as their weaknesses. He would undoubtedly like to see the present government fall but would almost certainly quiet down if he became convinced that it was going to survive.

Other Vietnamese Groups: In addition to the ones enumerated above, other Vietnamese groups and political figures are closely watching current developments and participating in current activity in various degrees. The Catholics by and large welcomed Thi's ouster and are prepared to give the government some measure of support, they would become even more inclined to provide such support if faced with a clear choice between the present regime and a Buddhist dominated successor. Nonetheless, they are restless and many would like to see a return to civilian rule. Similar sentiments are to be found among other political groups, especially those with ties to central Vietnam, such as some factions of the VNQDD. Southerners (i.e., Cochin Chinese) of all political and religious persuasions are irritated at the troubles caused in central Vietnam and hence are in some measure prepared to support the government, but do not care to wind up on what may prove to be the losing side.

The Communists: Present agitation is a windfall for the Viet Cong. None of the contending factions are now under Viet Cong control but there is little doubt that some of them have been penetrated by Communist elements. The slogans put out over Hue and Danang radios and appearing in struggle committee organized demonstrations are incorporating an increasing number of Communist propaganda themes, including ones directed against the Americans and designed to exacerbate Vietnamese/U.S. relations. Several sources have reported that the Viet Cong are encouraging their followers to take a hand in the current agitation and attempt to divert it to Communist ends. Given current tensions, the instinctive dislike for foreigners common to all Vietnamese but particularly strong in those of central origin, and the inevitable irritants produced by the large U.S. presence, the Viet Cong have a fertile field for disruptive propaganda and political action at the present time.

IV. POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

At the present time it is impossible to predict the outcome of South Vietnam's current political crisis. The future course of events is not now inevitable nor is it yet inexorably ordained. What happens next will depend on what various key individuals do, or fail to do, within the next few hours, days and weeks. Broadly speaking, however, events will probably follow one of five general courses: (1) The current crisis will be resolved in the near future by the present government which will emerge with enhanced prestige but with some alterations in formal structure and key personnel. (2) The crisis will drag on for several weeks with the present government in nominal control but with a tarnished image and ever decreasing authority. (3) A new government will come to power different in form and personnel but espousing similar political objectives -- e.g., prosecution of a war and opposition to Communist insurgency. (4) A new government of neutralist persuasion will come to power determined to end the war as soon as possible and invite the U.S. out of Vietnam. (5) South Vietnam will simply descend into a state of anarchy and will split up along corps and regional lines with no effective central control exerted from Saigon.

Survival of the Present Government: It is essential to realize that the "present government of South Vietnam" is the Directory, not General Ky or General Thieu. If the Directory survives, the government will survive. The Directory is and always has been a collegiate body which, collectively, holds supreme political authority. Ky will probably have to resign as premier but he can do so without shaking the fundamental structure of the government, particularly if he simply steps back to resume running the Air Force (which is what he has long said he wants to do anyway) and remains a member of the Directory. If this happens, the best person to succeed him as premier is probably General Chieu, or if he is assigned another post (see below), General Thang.

If the government -- i.e., the Directory -- is to survive without fatally damaged authority it must immediately initiate and effectively follow through a number of actions -- some preventive, some therapeutic, and some designed to seize the political initiative from the Buddhists by meeting their legitimate demands and, simultaneously, capturing the support and imagination of other political groups.

(1) The government must prevent the future spread of unrest outside of I Corps. This can be achieved by an effective use of police authority, particularly in Saigon, embodying a judicious mixture of firmness and restraint. As yet the unrest and demonstrations outside of I Corps are not out of hand and the strength of the organization directing present unrest (particularly Tri Quang's Buddhists) is considerably weaker in Saigon than in I Corps. In this field, therefore, the government still has a little time, though not much.

(2) It must re-establish its authority over I Corps. This cannot be done by military force, particularly since word of the GVN's plans to use such force has already leaked out. Also it will simply have to be recognized that I Corps is always going to be a separate area -- more or less the personal fief of whoever is chosen as Corps Commander. Nevertheless, it is essential that the Saigon government re-establish the appearance of its authority and, above all, regain control of Hue and Danang radio stations and get the students off the streets. The best way to do this is to appoint a new I Corps Commander whom the Buddhists could not oppose at the outset and to whom they would have to give at least a minimal period of grace. In this context, the shrewdest stroke the government could make would be to recall General Duong Van ("Big") Minh from exile and make him Commander of I Corps. This would hoist Tri Quang's Buddhists on their own petard, and give them a government representative to whom they could not initially object. Putting "Big" Minh in I Corps has other advantages too: being outside of Saigon he would be less likely to constitute a political threat on the national level. Also, being a Cochin Chinese, he does not have family roots in the center and hence could not create a personal satrapy in I Corps as easily as some general native to that area. If "Big" Minh is not available or acceptable, other possible choices for I Corps commander designed to achieve the same results are General Chieu, police director Col. Pham Van Lieu, or General Tran Van Don (though of all of these, Don is least likely to be acceptable to the Directory).

(3) The government must show concrete forward motion toward the objective of re-establishing civilian rule. The best way to do this is to announce within the next few days -- and here the time factor is absolutely essential -- the establishment of a body charged with drafting a constitution. To pre-empt Tri Quang and meet his stated demands, the bulk of this body (say 60%) should be selected by the already existing elected provincial councils, though such council representation could be weighted on a population basis. (If it were, this could be presented as "true democracy," something Tri Quang would find it hard to oppose; though such weighting would in fact dilute the influence of his followers.) The balance of the body should be made up of members appointed by the Directory with an eye to insuring that all political groups in South Vietnam, including minority ones, are adequately represented. This body should be charged with drafting a constitution which would establish a legal base for a future government, the structure of that government, and an electoral procedure for setting it up. It should be announced as part of the package that the constitution written by this body would be submitted to "the people" for ratification by popular referendum. Once the constitution itself had been approved by "the people," provision would be made for holding the elections it required and, after their results were in, installing a government in conformity with the constitution's provisions.

The procedures here outlined would constitute a tangible plan, whose implementation would provide visible concrete progress toward a legal government under civilian control. Given Vietnamese politicians' proclivity for haggling over clauses, however, this procedure would take at least a year, probably more, to complete. It should be announced that the present government will continue to hold power as a public trust until a new one can be chosen in conformity with the provisions of the constitution. Hence this procedure would give the present government at least a year's grace to continue its work of prosecuting the war and rebuilding a new Vietnamese society.

(4) The government must in some measure save its face and preserve its image: Ky may have to resign, but if he does this must be presented as a realignment of responsibility within a continuing and unchanged political structure. General Thi must be gotten out of I Corps and, preferably, sent abroad for at least a short period of "medical treatment" to prove that the Directory is capable of making its rulings stick.

No one can guarantee that a plan such as that outlined above will necessarily work. It has a good chance of success, however, if its various provisions are immediately launched and resolutely followed through. If the Directory does not take action along these lines within the very near future, the situation will almost certainly deteriorate along one of the other four lines outlined above.

V. CONSEQUENCES

In assessing the impact of the current political crisis on U.S. interests it is essential to keep in mind a clear distinction between immediate or near-term consequences and the longer-term effects of current events. The present unrest is obviously unsettling, has damaged the prestige and international image of the Saigon government, given a propaganda and political action windfall to the Viet Cong, and provided fresh ammunition for domestic and international critics of U.S. policy. None of this, however, is necessarily permanent, fatal or, in the long run, even harmful if the current crisis results in the emergence of a stronger political structure with a greater command of civilian loyalties and a better legal basis for its rule.

The longer-term consequences of current events will depend on the way in which current troubles are resolved. It is not essential to U.S. interests that Ky remain as premier but is vastly preferable that the Directory remain in power and the essential structure of the Saigon government not be radically changed under pressure of political unrest. However, even if the present government should fall, our position and interests in Vietnam could still be preserved if the present government were replaced by a successor publicly dedicated to the objectives of prosecuting a war and building a free Vietnamese nation independent of Communist control. We would have to recognize that any such successor, at least at the outset, would probably be even less efficient

than the present regime and that its emergence would be a considerable temporary setback for us. Nonetheless, given the background of the present crisis and the present state of political dynamics within South Vietnam, stresses and upheavals such as the one we are now witnessing are something for which we will simply have to be prepared, much as we obviously want to prevent them. The process of nation-building, balance-structuring, and institution-creating in the midst of a war will never be easy and will invariably be complicated by periods of extreme tension within non-Communist ranks.

U.S. interests would be adversely affected if the present crisis drags on much longer (e.g., for more than another week or two at most) even if the Directory and present regime remains nominally in power. The longer present unrest continues the more difficult it will be to effect a satisfactory resolution or create a stable successor to the present political structure. Also the longer it continues, the greater will be the risk of anarchy, dissolution of effective central authority, and the acquisition of power within some segment of the country (e.g., I Corps) by a neutralist-oriented group subject to Communist manipulation and control. These are real dangers to which we must be alert. They are not presently upon us, however, and we will stand a far better chance of preventing their emergence if we retain our sense of perspective and avoid premature panic.

VI. U.S. OPTIONS

A canvass of available U.S. options must also draw the distinction between immediate options and those available to us over the longer term. At the moment we have little choice but to continue the lines of activity in which we are presently engaged; touching base with and keeping tabs on all elements in the current crisis, working behind the scenes with the present government in an effort to strengthen its hand, exerting discreet pressure for forward movement on its part, and providing useful, concrete ideas for its consideration.

Over the longer-term, the U.S. has basically the three options of (1) continued close involvement in South Vietnamese political life, (2) disengaging from internal Vietnamese politics and focusing our whole attention on the military prosecution of the war and, (3) withdrawal from South Vietnam.

Given the U.S. stake and present public posture, withdrawal is not a viable option at the present time. If we were to curtail our commitments now and look for a way out we would only be vindicating the arguments of those within the U.S. and abroad who are vociferously criticizing our present policy.

Assuming that we are to stay in Vietnam at least for the immediate future, disengagement from internal politics would be neither wise nor realistic since the struggle against the Communists could be lost politically by the South Vietnamese while our forces are defeating the Viet Cong on the field of battle. Were this to happen, our investment in lives, material resources and prestige would have been in vain.

For the time being, therefore, our only viable option is that of continued involvement in South Vietnamese political life. In operative terms this involvement entails the following factors:

(1) We must recognize and keep continually in mind the political impact of the U.S. physical presence in South Vietnam and the degree to which it excites the emotional sensibilities even of those who recognize the need for our support, are grateful for our help, and want desperately for us to remain in order that they may continue to exist as free men. Our actions will have to be marked by great delicacy, political finesse, and a continuing effort to make American influence and presence as unobtrusive as circumstances will permit.

(2) We must obtain some additional leverage over the Vietnamese and make them aware that our continued support is contingent upon some modicum of rational behavior on their part. Few Vietnamese are politically sophisticated in the international sense and most are prone -- for a variety of personal and emotional reasons -- to overrate the importance of Vietnam to the U.S. Tri Quang and General Thi, for example, have made it plain that they feel they can play political games in the midst of a war because they can always count on the United States to protect them from Communist control. We have got to disabuse influential Vietnamese figures of the belief that American public opinion

will support our continued effort in Vietnam no matter what the Vietnamese themselves may do. Perhaps the best way to get this message across would be to bring key Vietnamese figures -- including perhaps even Tri Quang himself -- to the United States for orientation or lecture tours and force them to experience at firsthand the full measure of restlessness about Vietnam now prevalent in America. At a minimum if we cannot persuade such leaders as Tri Quang to come and see for themselves, we must arrange for persons whose reports they will credit to come to the United States and bring back a politically sobering message.

(3) The U.S. must avoid becoming too closely identified with any particular South Vietnamese institutional structure or politician and must avoid smothering emerging Vietnamese leaders in too close a public embrace. The timing of news announcements and policy statements, and the other public manifestations of joint endeavor must, wherever possible, be structured to downplay the fact that the Vietnamese are our dependent clients and build their image as independent allies.

(4) Finally, we must do all we can to foster nation-building in Vietnam and the emergence of a stable non-Communist social structure but we must avoid any attempt to force Vietnamese political development into an institutional framework fashioned in our image. Instead, we must encourage the Vietnamese to devise institutional mechanisms responsive to their needs, consonant with their traditions, and capable of reflecting the realities of political power within their social structure.

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[redacted]

GEORGE A. CARVER, JR.
Acting Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

NLJ.118.002.005/1

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Tuesday, April 5, 1966

Text of CIA Intelligence Memorandum

The Situation in South Vietnam as of 10 AM EST

At 5:55 PM Saigon time, when Prime Minister Ky departed Danang, there was still no reported direct confrontation between the three emergency Vietnamese Marine battalions and anti-government agitators in Danang. Before Ky left for Saigon, he announced in a speech that his previous appraisal that Hue and Danang were Communist-held was incorrect. The press reports that while Ky was in Danang he conferred with Buddhist leaders before making his soft-line speech.

In Saigon, however, Buddhist students from the Buddhist Youth Association battled riot police for three hours before being dispersed. One of the demonstrators was wounded slightly by a shot from carbines which were being fired over their heads. A Vietnamese Ranger battalion moved to the Buddhist Headquarters during the demonstration to enforce the 9 PM to 5 AM curfew imposed earlier in the day.

Demonstrations continued in Nha Trang, where the USIS library was reportedly burned and sacked, in Pleiku town, where there were unconfirmed reports of fighting between soldiers loyal and opposed to the government, and in Hue, where students reportedly demonstrated in front of the American Advisory Billet.

The Commanding General of the 3rd U. S. Marine Amphibious Force has ordered the evacuation to secure areas of all U. S. advisors to tactical Vietnamese units in First Corps trouble spots. Eight civilians in Quang Tri city and 75 in Hue are also being air-evacuated to the Marine base at Phu Bai. This is phase one of the contingency evacuation plan and does not include members of the Consulate in Hue [redacted]

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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DATE OF INFO. 8-11 APRIL 1966

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DISTR. 11 APRIL 1966

SUBJECT

1. PLANNED REMOVAL OF POLICE CHIEF LIEU
2. SITUATION IN I CORPS
3. DISSATISFACTION OF SOME OFFICERS WITH LACK OF FORCEFUL ACTION BY THE GOVERNMENT

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (11 APRIL 1966)

REF. IN 94040

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted]

[redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Y (C)

1. [redacted] COLONEL PHAM VAN LIEU, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE, WOULD BE REPLACED BY GENERAL LINH QUANG VIEN ON 12 APRIL. THE DECISION TO REPLACE LIEU WAS MADE BY PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN CAO KY ON 8 APRIL AND FULLY CONCURRED IN BY DIRECTORATE CHAIRMAN NGUYEN VAN THIEU AND JOINT GENERAL STAFF CHIEF CAO VAN VIEN. KY DECIDED TO REMOVE LIEU AFTER THE GOVERNMENT HAD OBTAINED A MESSAGE FROM CENTRAL VIETNAM ADDRESSED TO LIEU UNDER A PSEUDONYM. THE MESSAGE REQUESTED LIEU TO PROVIDE MORE MONEY FOR ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2001

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IN SAIGON. THE MESSAGE APPARENTLY ORIGINATED FROM SOME ONE CLOSE TO GENERAL NGUYEN CHANG THI.

2. [redacted] GENERAL TON THAT DINH, NEWLY-APPOINTED I CORPS COMMANDER, WAS CONFIDENT HE COULD RESTORE ORDER IN CENTRAL VIETNAM WITHOUT RESORT TO FORCE. [redacted] DINH MIGHT BE PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL FOR A TIME, BUT HIS POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF I CORPS WOULD NOT LAST. [redacted]

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3. THE GROUP OF OFFICERS OPPOSED TO THE GOVERNMENT'S PRESENT POLICIES CONTINUES TO BE DISTURBED AT THE LACK OF FORCEFUL MEASURES IN I CORPS. [redacted] COLONEL NGUYEN NGOC LOAN, CHIEF OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION AND THE MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE, IS SPOKESMAN FOR THE GROUP, WHICH NUMBERS MORE THAN 80 OFFICERS. SOME DIVISION COMMANDERS ARE INCLUDED, AS WELL AS OFFICERS FROM THE AIR FORCE, AIRBORNE, ARMOR, MARINES, AND RANGERS. THESE OFFICERS DESIRE A GENERAL HOUSECLEANING IN THE GOVERNMENT, AND PARTICULARLY THE REMOVAL OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN HUU CO, IV CORPS COMMANDER DANG VAN QUANG, FORMER I CORPS COMMANDER NGUYEN VAN CHUAN, AND TWO OTHER GENERAL OFFICERS.

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4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV USARV NAVFORV 7TH AIR FORCE USAID JUSPAO CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF.

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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI 8 - 11 APRIL 1966
SUBJECT REMOVAL OF NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF LIEU, SITUATION IN I CORPS, AND DISSATISFACTION OF SOME OFFICERS WITH LACK OF FORCEFUL ACTION BY GOVERNMENT.
ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (11 APRIL 1966) FIELD NO. [redacted]
SOURCE [redacted]

1. [redacted] COLONEL PHAM VAN LIEU, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE, WOULD BE REPLACED BY GENERAL LINH QUANG VIEN ON 12 APRIL. THE DECISION TO REPLACE LIEU WAS MADE BY PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN CAO KY ON 8 APRIL AND FULLY CONCURRED IN BY DIRECTORATE CHAIRMAN NGUYEN VAN THIEU AND JOINT GENERAL STAFF CHIEF CAO VAN VIEN. KY DECIDED TO REMOVE LIEU AFTER THE GOVERNMENT HAD OBTAINED A MESSAGE FROM CENTRAL VIETNAM ADDRESSED TO LIEU UNDER A PSEUDONYM. THE MESSAGE REQUESTED LIEU TO PROVIDE MORE MONEY FOR ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN SAIGON. THE MESSAGE APPARENTLY ORIGINATED FROM SOME ONE CLOSE TO GENERAL NGUYEN CHANG THI.

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2. [redacted] GENERAL TON THAT DINH, NEWLY-APPOINTED I CORPS COMMANDER, WAS CONFIDENT HE COULD RESTORE ORDER IN CENTRAL VIETNAM WITHOUT RESORT TO FORCE. [redacted] DINH MIGHT BE PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL FOR A TIME, BUT HIS POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF I CORPS WOULD NOT LAST. [redacted]

3. THE GROUP OF OFFICERS OPPOSED TO THE GOVERNMENT'S PRESENT POLICIES CONTINUES TO BE DISTURBED AT THE LACK OF FORCEFUL MEASURES IN I CORPS. [redacted] COLONEL NGUYEN NGOC LOAN, CHIEF OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION AND THE MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE, IS SPOKE- E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>
MAN FOR THE GROUP, WHICH NUMBERS MORE THAN 80 OFFICERS. SOME DIVISION (C)
COMMANDERS ARE INCLUDED, AS WELL AS OFFICERS FROM THE AIR FORCE, AIRBORNE, ARMOR, MARINES, AND RANGERS. THESE OFFICERS DESIRE A GENERAL HOUSECLEANING IN THE GOVERNMENT, AND PARTICULARLY THE REMOVAL OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN HUU CO, IV CORPS COMMANDER DANG VAN QUANG, FORMER I CORPS COMMANDER NGUYEN VAN CHUAN, AND TWO OTHER GENERAL OFFICERS.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV USARV NAVFORV 7TH AIR FORCE E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>2
USAID JUSPAO CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF. (C)

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REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL/[redacted]
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI [redacted] APRIL 1966
SUBJECT THICH TAM CHAU'S SURRENDER OF CONTROL OVER STRUGGLE MOVEMENT AND SUGGESTION THAT PRIME MINISTER KY RESIGN
ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted] FIELD NO. [redacted]
SOURCE [redacted]

1. PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN CAO KY SAID [redacted] THAT BUDDHIST INSTITUTE CHAIRMAN THICH TAM CHAU HAD CONTACTED [redacted] TO SAY THAT HE HAD TURNED OVER CONTROL OF THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT TO THICH THIEN MINH AND HO GIAC. CHAU SAID HE FELT THERE WAS NOTHING FURTHER HE COULD DO TO CONTROL "EXTREMIST ELEMENTS" IN THE INSTITUTE. TAM CHAU SUGGESTED THAT KY RESIGN IN FAVOR OF DIRECTORATE SECRETARY-GENERAL PHAM XUAN CHIEU WHO WOULD HEAD AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT UNTIL ELECTIONS COULD BE HELD. KY REPLIED THAT THE DIRECTORATE DID NOT WANT HIM TO RESIGN AND, IN ANY CASE, CHIEU DID NOT WANT THE JOB.

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2. [redacted]

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3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV USAID JUSPAO USARV NAVFORV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.
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DIST 13 APRIL 1966

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI AUGUST 1964-10 APRIL 1966

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>2
(C)

SUBJECT BUDDHIST INTENTION FOR CONTINUED CONTROLLED AGITATION IN I CORPS AREA AND EXPECTATION THAT FIRST DIVISION REGIMENTS WOULD OBEY COMMANDER

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (1 APRIL 1966) FIELD NO. [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted]

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1. THICH MAT NGUYEN, REPRESENTING HUE BUDDHIST LEADER THICH DONUW AU HUE AND HIMSELF ONE OF THREE LEADING HUE BONZES, ARRIVED IN DANANG ON THE EVENING OF 10 APRIL TO CALM BUDDHIST AGITATION. HOWEVER, MAT NGUYEN WAS NOT TO STOP THE AGITATION; HE IS TO KEEP THE POT BOILING BUT MAKE SURE IT DOES NOT BOIL OVER. FOR EXAMPLE, ALTHOUGH THE GENERAL STRIKE SUPPOSEDLY HAS ENDED IN DANANG, DRIVERS OF VEHICLES REMAIN ON STRIKE; WHEN THEY RETURN TO WORK ANOTHER GROUP WILL STRIKE. ONE OBJECTIVE OF THE BUDDHISTS IS TO INSTALL TWO HUE BUDDHISTS IN A FUTURE

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NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, WHICH WOULD CAUSE A SERIOUS REACTION AMONG CATHOLICS. THESE TWO ARE BUI TUONG HUAN, RECTOR OF HUE UNIVERSITY AND LE TUYEN HUE UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR. [redacted] PRESENT I CORPS COMMANDER GENERAL TON THAT DINH SHOULD BE ABLE TO ARRIVE AT SOME SETTLEMENT WITHIN ABOUT TWO WEEKS.)

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2. THE THREE REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION, LOCATED IN QUANG TRI AND THUA TYOEN PROVINCES, WILL OBEY ORDERS FROM THEIR COMMANDER, GENERAL PHAM XUAN NHUAN, ALTHOUGH ONE IS RELATED TO FORMER I CORPS COMMANDER NGUYEN CHANH THI. THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE TROOPS OF THESE REGIMENTS WOULD NOT FOLLOW ORDERS OF THEIR COMMANDING OFFICERS. LT. COL. NGUYEN AM, FIRST REGIMENT COMMANDER, IS POLITICALLY NEUTRAL; LT. COL. PHAN BA HAA SECOND REGIMENT COMMANDER, IS POLITICALLY NEUTRAL AND A RELATIVE OF THI'S SUCCESSOR, GENERAL VAN CHUAN; AND LT. COL. LE VAN KHUY, THIRD REGIMENT COMMANDER, POLITICAL INCLINATION UNKNOWN, IS RELATED TO GENERAL THI.

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3. [redacted] IT IS A MISTAKE TO ATTRIBUTE THE PRESENT CRISIS IN THE I CORPS AREA TO GENERAL THI, ALTHOUGH I CORPS OFFICERS MAY BELIEVE THAT THI'S DISMISSAL IS RESPONSIBLE OR THAT THEY HAVE BEEN DEFENDING HIS CAUSE. THI, IN FACT, IS LIKE A CARD PLAYER, PLACING HIS BETS NOW ON THIS LEADER, THEN ON ANOTHER; HE PLAYS HIS SUBORDINATES IN THE SAME MANNER. HIS ONLY REAL OBJECTIVE IS TO

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CONTINUE THE GAME. OFFICERS IN I CORPS HAVE BEEN SUPPORTING THI BECAUSE THEY NEITHER UNDERSTAND POLITICS NOR PERCEIVE THE REAL ISSUES.

4. PRESENT COUP PLANNING AGAINST THE NGUYEN CAO KY GOVERNMENT BEGAN EIGHT MONTHS AGO BY BUDDHIST LEADERS IN HUE, WHO HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR A SUITABLE OCCASION OR PRETEXT. CERTAIN RADIO ANNOUNCEMENTS WERE PREPARED SEVERAL MONTHS IN ADVANCE. THE INSTIGATOR IS THICH TRI QUANG, WHO HAS MANAGED TO KEEP HIMSELF IN THE BACKGROUND WHILE WORKING THROUGH FOUR HUE BUDDHISTS: HOANG VAN GIAU, HUE UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR, VINH KHA, HUE UNIVERSITY STUDENT; LE TUYEN; AND BUI TUONG HUAN. (FIELD COMMENT: MILD BUDDHIST POLITICAL AGITATION DID OCCUR IN AUGUST 1965 AND A STUDENT STRUGGLE MOVEMENT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AROSE IN HUE, BUT THESE ACTIVITIES LOST THEIR MOMENTUM IN EARLY SEPTEMBER 1965.)

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV USAID JUSPAO USARV NAVFORV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 11 APRIL 1966

SUBJECT DR. PHAM QUANG DAN'S REFUSAL TO HEED THICH TRI QUANG'S AND STRUGGLE COMMITTEE'S REQUESTS THAT HE NOT ATTEND POLITICAL CONGRESS

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (13 APRIL 1966) FIELD NO. [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted]

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1. DR. PHAM QUANG DAN, ELECTED CHAIRMAN OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL POLITICAL CONGRESS CONVENED ON 12 APRIL 1966, [redacted] HAD BEEN ASKED NOT TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STRUGGLE COM-

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MITTEE IN THE I CORPS AREA AND OF THICH TRI QUANG. THE STRUGGLE COMMITTEE REPRESENTATIVE, WHO HAD BEEN SENT BY HUE STUDENT LEADER VINH KHA, TOLD DAN THAT HE WAS THE ONLY MEMBER OF THE CONGRESS WHO WAS WELL-KNOWN AND ESTEEMED BY THE POPULATION AND THAT, IF HE ATTENDED, THE CONGRESS WOULD BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE CERTAIN OF ITS OBJECTIVES WHICH WOULD BE HARMFUL TO THE STRUGGLE COMMITTEE'S FIGHT AGAINST THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT. TRI QUANG'S REPRESENTATIVE, [redacted] SAID MUCH THE SAME THING.

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2. DAN TOLD EACH REPRESENTATIVE THAT, LIKE THEM, HE IS OPPOSED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF NGUYEN CAO KY, WHICH HE REGARDS AS TOTALLY INCOMPETENT, AND THAT HE "DOES NOT DISAPPROVE" OF THE STRUGGLE BEING CONDUCTED IN I CORPS. HE FEELS, HOWEVER, THAT COMMUNISM IS VIETNAM'S NUMBER ONE ENEMY, THAT IT MUST BE DEFEATED AT ALL COSTS, AND THAT IT IS THEREFORE NECESSARY TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY TOWARD THAT END. HE TOLD THE REPRESENTATIVES THAT IF, WHILE ATTENDING THE CONGRESS, HE CAN ASCERTAIN THAT KY IS CAPABLE OF ARRANGING FOR GENERAL ELECTIONS WITHIN THREE OR, AT THE MOST, SIX MONTHS AND CAN RESTORE ORDER IMMEDIATELY, HE WILL THEN SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, HE FINDS THAT THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT ACCOM-

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PLISH THIS, HE WILL "RAISE HIS VOICE" AGAINST KY.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE USAID JUSPAO USMACV USARV NAVFORV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 21 APRIL 1966

SUBJZRT APPOINMENT OF COLONEL LOAN AS DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE; LOAN'S VIEWS ON PRIME MINISTER KY'S FUTURE ROLE; AND ATTEMPT BY KY TO MEET WITH GENERAL THI.

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON 21 APRIL 1966) FIELD NO. [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

1. COLONEL NGUYEN NGOC LOAN [redacted] ON 21 APRIL [redacted] HAD BEEN NAMED TO REPLACE COLONEL PHAM VAN LIEU AS DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE. LOAN [redacted] WOULD GIVE UP HIS PRESENT POST OF CHIEF OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION BUT WOULD RETAIN THE POST OF CHIEF OF THE MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING. EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25 (C)

2. [redacted] PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN CAO KY HAD PREVIOUSLY ASKED HIM TO ACCEPT THE POLICE POST BUT HE HAD DECLINED. ASIDE FROM HIMSELF AND COLONEL LIEU, LOAN KNEW OF NO ONE ELSE WHO EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25 (C)

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WOULD BE QUALIFIED. LOAN [redacted] HAD SET THREE CONDITIONS FOR HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE POST AND [redacted] KY HAD AGREED. THE CONDITIONS WERE:

A. KY WOULD REMAIN AS PRIME MINISTER AND HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT UNTIL A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT TOOK OVER.

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B. KY WOULD RELINQUISH HIS RANK AS AIR VICE MARSHAL AND COMMANDER OF THE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE AND TURN OVER THE AIR FORCE COMMAND TO HIS PRESENT DEPUTY, COLONEL TRAN VAN MINH.

C. AFTER COMPLETING HIS DUTIES AS PRIME MINISTER, KY WOULD RETURN TO MILITARY SERVICE IN A VERY SENIOR POSITION SUCH AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE, CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF, OR BOTH. KY WOULD THEN TAKE ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF REORGANIZING THE GVN ARMED FORCES, ELIMINATING SENIOR OFFICERS WHO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN POLITICS, AND ASSIGNING QUALIFIED OFFICERS TO KEY POSITIONS.

3. LOAN EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE MILITARY WOULD SUPPORT KY, BOTH IN HIS PRESENT ROLE AND IN THE FUTURE. LOAN ALSO BELIEVES KY WILL RECEIVE CIVILIAN SUPPORT. ACCORDING TO LOAN, KY HAD MADE AND ATTEMPT THROUGH A THIRD PARTY TO ARRANGE A MEETING BETWEEN KY AND GENERAL NGUYEN CHANH THI. PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WOULD BE TO DETERMINE WHAT THI WANTED TO DO IN THE FUTURE. THI HAS SO FAR REFUSED THE INVITATION, EVEN ON THE CONDITION THAT KY WAS PREPARED TO MEET

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HIM ANYWHERE IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR AND DEPUTY AMBASSADOR ONLY) USAID (DIRECTOR ONLY).

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DIST 25 APRIL 1966

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 23 APRIL 1966

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25 (C)

SUBJECT A GENERAL OFFICER'S ASSESSMENT OF GROUPS FORMING IN THE MILITARY WITH THE AIM OF MAKING DEMANDS ON THE GOVERNMENT

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (23APRIL 1966) FIELD NO. [redacted]

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SOURCE [redacted]

1. (SUMMARY: THERE IS A LOOSE ASSOCIATION WITHIN THE MILITARY SERVICE, RATHER THAN AN ACTIVE CONSPIRACY, OF FIELD-GRADE AND JUNIOR OFFICERS ADVOCATING REFORMS. IN GENERAL, THESE OFFICERS WITH TO SEE THE GOVERNMENT REMAIN IN POWER. THEY WANT STRICT MEASURES AGAINST CORRUPTION, A MORE ACTIVE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR AGAINST THE VIET CONG, AND FIRM HANDLING OF OPPOSITION ELEMENTS. THEY ARE NOT IDENTIFIED WITH ANY EXISTING POLITICAL FORCE.)

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2. THE MILITARY OFFICERS WHO HAVE RECENTLY FORMED GROUPS FAVORING MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT REFORMS ARE MORE "FRIENDS TOGETHER" THAN A CONSPIRACY. THEY SHARE THE SAME GENERAL BACKGROUNDS, FACE THE SAME PROBLEMS AND FRUSTRATIONS OF LOW-AND MIDDLE-LEVEL COMMAND, AND HAVE THE SAME PERSONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. THEY ARE DISSATISFIED AND UNHAPPY, EXCITABLE, AND LIKELY TO BE PRECIPITOUS IN THEIR ACTIONS. SINCE MANY OF THESE OFFICERS COMMAND COMPANIES AND BATTALIONS, THEY COULD BRING EFFECTIVE FORCE TO BEAR FOR A COUP D'ETAT IF THEY ACTED IN CONCERT. AT PRESENT THERE ARE NO SIGNS OF EMERGENCE OF LEADERSHIP OR EVIDENCE OF PLANS FOR ACTION IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THEY ARE NOW LACKING IN CENTRAL LEADERSHIP, SOMETHING THEY MUST DEVELOP BEFORE THEY CAN MOVE.

3. VARIOUS TALKS OF A GENERAL NATURE, AND PERHAPS SPECIFIC DISCUSSIONS OF THE PROBLEMS FACING THE COUNTRY, HAVE TAKEN PLACE AMONG THESE OFFICERS. GENERALLY THEY ARE IN AGREEMENT ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. THE GOVERNMENT OF PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN CAO KY SHOULD REMAIN IN POWER.

B. CORRUPTION MUST BE DEALT WITH EXPEDITIOUSLY IN BOTH THE MILITARY AND THE GOVERNMENT. THEY CITE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN HUU CO AS A CORRUPT GENERAL AND ARE ALSO OPPOSED TO GENERALS NGUYEN VAN CHUAN AND PHAN XUAN NHUAN.

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C. ALL NATIONAL DIFFERENCES MUST BE SUBMERGED IN AN ALL-OUT EFFORT TO PROSECUTE THE WAR AGAINST THE VIET CONG. RATHER IDEALISTCALLY AND EMOTIONALLY THEY BELIEVE THAT A TRULY MILITARY AND DIRECT APPROACH TO THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTH VIETNAM IS THE ONLY ANSWER.

D. THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT MAKE COMPROMISES WHICH WEAKEN THE SOLIDARITY OF THE GOVERNMENT. THEY CITE, AS AN EXAMPLE, THE "WEAK" APPROACH TO THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT AND THE FAILURE OF THE GOVERNMENT TO FORCEFULLY SUPPRESS THE OPPOSITION REPRESENTED BY THICH TRI QUANG.

4. THESE OFFICERS ARE NOT OPPOSED TO THE KY GOVERNMENT AS SUCH BUT ONLY SEEK A MORE HONEST, FORCEFUL, AND DIRECT APPROACH TO THE SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS FACING THE COUNTRY. THEY DO NOT SUPPORT OR REPRESENT THE CATHOLICS, BUDDHISTS, OR ANY POLITICAL PARTY, NOR DO THEY HAVE A PLATFORM OF A GROUP IN TERMS OF JOINT PLANNING OR AGREEMENT REGARDING ACTION TO BE TAKEN. THEY DO NOT APPEAR TO BE COALESCING INTO A COHESIVE FORCE. BOTH COLONEL NGUYEN NGOC LOAN, CHIEF OF THE MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE AND DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL POLICE, AND GENERAL LE NGUYEN KHANG, COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE MARINE CORPS AND THE CAPITAL MILITARY REGION, PROBABLY HAVE THE "RESPECT" OF A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF THESE OFFICERS, BUT NEITHER IS A LEADER OR

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[redacted]

REPRESENTATEVE OF THESE OFFICERS. (FIELD COMMENT: [redacted]
DESCRIBED COLONEL LOAN AS A "LEADER" OF ONE OF THE FACTIONS COMPOSED OF OFFICERS SEEKING REFORM, BUT A MORE ACCURATE DESIGNATION PROBABLY WOULD BE "SPOKESMAN".)

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USAID JUSPAO USARV USMACV NAVFORV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

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DIST 28 APRIL 1966

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 27 APRIL 1966

SUBJECT PREDICTION OF CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT BY COLONEL PHAM VAN LIEU.

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (28 APRIL 1966) FIELD NO. [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted]

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DATE: FEB 2001

1. COLONEL PHAM VAN LIEU [redacted] IS DUE TO BE REPLACED SHORTLY - E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C) COLONEL NGUYEN NGOC LOAN AS DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE, [redacted] CERTAIN CHANGES WOULD OCCUR IN THE GOVERNMENT DURING THE PERIOD FROM 30 APRIL TO 2 MAY. (FIELD

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~ [redacted]

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

COMMENT: DEMONSTRATIONS BY LABOR GROUPS, AND POSSIBLY CATHOLICS, ARE EXPECTED ON 1 MAY, AND 2 MAY WILL BE A LEGAL HOLIDAY. LIEU AND OTHERS MAY HOPE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF POSSIBLE DISTURBANCES TO ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE "CHANGES" ON THE GOVERNMENT.) LIEU [redacted] HAD ALREADY ARRANGED FOR SOMEONE TO COME TO HIS RESIDENCE IN THE NATIONAL POLICE COMPOUND AS SOON AS THE CHANGES WERE UNDER WAY IN ORDER TO TAKE CHARGE OF RADIO PROPAGANDA OPERATIONS.

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2. [redacted] GAVE LITTLE INDICATION OF WHAT CHANGES WERE CONTEMPLATED BUT [redacted] THAT CERTAIN GENERALS WOULD BE DISMISSED, AMONG THEM DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN HUU CO, III CORPS COMMANDER GENERAL NGUYEN BAO TRI, AND IV CORPS COMMANDER GENERAL DANG VAN QUANG.

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[redacted] ALSO [redacted] HUI DIEM, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND DINH THINH CHINH, SECRETARY OF INFORMATION AND OPEN ARMS, WOULD BE AMONG CIVILIANS AFFECTED. (FIELD COMMENT: LIEU [redacted] WOULD STAGE A COUP IF HE HAD SUFFICIENT MILITARY SUPPORT, IMPLYING THAT AT THAT TIME HE FELT HE LACKED SUCH SUPPORT.)

3. AS BACKGROUND TO HIS REMARKS ABOUT FORTHCOMING CHANGES, [redacted] GENERAL CO HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH GENERAL QUANG SEVERAL TIMES RECENTLY, AND [redacted] THAT CO WAS SEEKING SUPPORT FOR A COUP FROM QUANG. ON 26 APRIL, POLICE ARRESTED A JEEPLOAD OF MEN UNDER COLONEL LOAN'S CONTROL WHO WERE DISTRIBUTING ANTI-CO LEAFLETS

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(classification) (dissem controls) [redacted]

IN AND AROUND THE SAIGON CENTRAL MARKET. THE LEAFLETS ACCUSED CO AND HIS WIFE OF BEING INVOLVED IN CORRUPTION. [redacted] THE LEAFLET OPERATION WAS ORGANIZED BY LOAN WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN CAO KY. AFTER THE ARREST OF HIS MEN, LOAN CAME TO SEE LIEU AND THE LATTER RELEASED THE MEN FROM DETENTION. LIEU [redacted] WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE ARREST IF HE HAD KNOWN ABOUT IT AT THE TIME.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

4. LATER ON 26 APRIL, GENERAL CO LEARNED OF THE LEAFLET OPERATION AND COMPLAINED TO LOAN. LOAN DENIED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THE AFFAIR. WHEN CO CALLED LATER TO SAY HE HAD PROOF OF LOAN'S INVOLVEMENT, THE LATTER REPLIED, "SO WHAT".

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USAID JUSPAO USMACV USARV NAVFORV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL/[redacted]

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[redacted]

DIST 28 APRIL 1966

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 28 APRIL 1966

SUBJECT RUMORS OF IMMINENT COUP ATTEMPT BY GENERALS CO AND QUANG.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25 (C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)> (C)

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (28 APRIL 66) FIELD NO. [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted]

1. A NUMBER OF UNCONFIRMED RUMORS HAVE CROPPED UP IN THE PAST DAY OR TWO THAT A COUP WOULD BE ATTEMPTED SOON. ONE RUMOR PLACED THE DATE OF THE COUP ON 30 APRIL, WHILE OTHERS INDICATED THAT IT WOULD TAKE PLACE SHORTLY AFTER MAY DAY. THE RUMORS ALL INDICATE THAT THE COUP IS BEING PLANNED BY DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN HUU CO AND IV CORPS COMMANDER DANG VAN QUANG. IT WAS

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E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25
(C)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

ALSO RUMORED THAT MOVEMENTS OF IV CORPS TROOPS TOWARD SAIGON HAD TAKEN PLACE. ANOTHER COMMON FACTOR AMONG THE COUP RUMORS WAS THE REPORT THAT THE RUMORED MOVE HAD STRONG CATHOLIC SUPPORT, AND THAT A NUMBER OF LEADING CATHOLIC FIGURES HAD DEPARTED SAIGON FOR BIEN HOA WHERE THEY WOULD WAIT UNTIL THE COUP HAD TAKEN PLACE.

2. (FIELD COMMENT: [redacted] THAT COLONEL PHAM VAN LIEU EXPECTED CERTAIN CHANGES IN THE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN 30 APRIL AND 2 MAY. THE MOVES ANTICIPATED BY COLONEL LIEU MAY BE INTENDED TO COUNTER THE RUMORED COUP ATTEMPT BY CO AND QUANG. [redacted] MEN OF THE MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE, HEADED BY CONONEL NGUYEN NGOC LOAN, DISTRIBUTED ANTI-CO LEAFLETS IN SAIGON ON 27 APRIL [redacted] THIS INCREASES THE LIKELIHOOD THAT GENERAL CO IS AWARE THAT SOME HIGH OFFICIALS ARE ACTIVELY WORKING AGAINST HIM.)

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)
(C)

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USAID JUSPAO USMACV USARV NAVFORV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

~~REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL/NO~~ [redacted]

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BUDDHIST ACTION IN VIETNAM:

A Special Assessment of the Situation in the Light of Events in March and April 1966

The origins of the Buddhist initiatives of March and April 1966 in South Vietnam can be found in three important and inter-related energy-releasing forces: (1) the Buddhists' sense of history and particularly their yearning for a rebirth of Buddhism's "Golden Age"; (2) the Buddhist reform movement which had its beginnings in the 1920's, and (3) the social revolution which was triggered by the revolt against Diem in 1963. The ideological content of these three forces is, in our opinion, guiding and will continue to guide the development of Buddhist action in the political realm in the months and years to come. This paper, therefore, provides a brief analysis of the three forces and speculates on possible political trends resulting from their interplay among themselves and with other forces in the Vietnam situation.

Rebirth of the "Golden Age"

The "new," militant Vietnamese Buddhism of today is not simply the product of the struggle against Diem. To look upon it as such is to run the risk of seriously underestimating the vitality of Buddhism and the sense of purpose of its leaders.

The so-called "Golden Age" of Vietnamese Buddhism which ended five centuries ago offers some insight into current Buddhist thinking. Monk leaders today frequently speak of restoring Buddhism to its "rightful place in society." The standard of measure most often used is the Golden Age.

The monk intellectual and writer Thich Nhat Hanh has described these earlier periods as follows in his bestseller Engaged Buddhism:

> Everybody knows that under the Ly and Tran Dynasties, Buddhism played a nation-building role in the realm of literature, morals, arts, education, diplomacy and society. Buddhism during those periods brought progress to Vietnamese society, which demonstrated Buddhist strengths and capacities. According to history, under the Ly Dynasty the most learned persons were Buddhists and monks. The study of Buddhism in those days was a comprehensive and constructive one. It did not bring any social position to anybody. Venerable monks were usually invited to the King's Court to deliver sermons, to discuss cultural, economic, social and even political matters. Monks were invited to receive foreign ambassadors. In spite of that fact, they lived frugally in their pagodas, wore their simple brown robes, and went to the King's Court only at the King's invitation. The intellectuals at that time captured the essence of

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> Buddhism (works of art of the time proved that fact). They had a rich, unfettered, surpassing spiritual life and used their knowledge to help society, from architecture to social works.

In his short history of Vietnamese Buddhism, Thich Thien An of Van Hanh University recounts numerous examples of Buddhist influence on the Court and the nation. During the Dinh Dynasty (969-980), Vietnam was pacified and united by King Dinh Bo Lanh, a Buddhist who supported and propagated the faith. This movement to diffuse Buddhist teachings was led by the learned monk Ngo Chan Luu, who was rewarded by the King with the title Khuong Viet Thuyen Su, "The Priest Who Helped Restore the Nation." King Ly Thai To, who founded the Ly Dynasty (1010-1225), is regarded as typifying the virtuous ruler. He was guided in all of his activities by perhaps the most famous monk in Vietnamese history, Van Hanh. During the Tran Dynasty (1225-1400), several kings were either monks before they assumed power or retired to monasteries at the end of their rule. The most revered, Tran Nhan Tom (1278-1293), is reputed to have moved back and forth between the monkhood and the throne, depending on whether the country needed his services to bring it peace. There do not appear to be instances of kings actually ruling as monks, however.

While no monk today has yet admitted to personal political ambition, the historical tradition of monk-kings who assume leadership when the country is in danger and who then return to the temple in times of peace is appealing to some Buddhists. A brilliant, 21-year old monk commented in August 1965:

> Although Vietnamese monks have been political leaders in the past, now it would probably be necessary for monks to take off their robes. In the first place, Catholics would oppose monks' holding political office. Also, the recent history of Catholics in Latin America and Makarios in Cyprus demonstrates the difficulties that arise in the contemporary world when an individual holds both lay and clerical power. If monks in Vietnam defrock to enter politics, it would probably be on a temporary basis until certain goals were achieved. They would eventually return to their orders.

The historical precedent for a Thich Tri Quang, for instance, to return to lay life to "save the Nation" is very much alive.

Buddhist Reform Movement

Following the Tran Dynasty, Buddhism entered a period of decline under increased Chinese intellectual influence and the consequent espousal of Confucianism and Taoism by the rulers; and later under the impact of Catholicism imported and encouraged by the French. By the Twentieth Century, Buddhism seemed sterile and moribund in comparison with the Golden Age and also with the influence of Roman Catholicism.

The independence movement against France seems to have been an important factor in the revival of Buddhism in the sense that feelings of nationalism were generated which increased the Buddhists' pride in their heritage and also their shame that their religion had become corrupt. Influences also came down from

China where Buddhism had already undergone a period of reform and revitalization under the aegis of the great Abbot T'ai-hsu.

Little is yet known of this period, but it appears that a small number of scholars and learned monks began actively to promote a Buddhist revival in the 1920's. The widely respected North Vietnamese monk, Thich To Lien, encouraged the reform idea and seems in many respects to have been the architect of the movement. In 1931, a Buddhist Studies Association for Cochin China was established in Saigon, and similar groups were founded at Hue for Annam in 1932 and at Hanoi for Tonkin in 1934. There are indications that French colonial officials encouraged the study and discussion of religious and cultural subjects in the hope of channeling the interests of intellectuals away from the independence movement. Hanoi's Quan Su Pagoda in particular became a meeting place for scholars and intellectuals to discuss the history and philosophy of Buddhism. Professional men, professors and university students began to visit the pagodas which had for centuries been mainly the preserve of old women.

The goals of the reform movement were to restore Buddhist precepts, to reorganize the Buddhist Church* and to build a generation of learned monks. These were to be achieved through the Buddhist Associations. While the programs of the Associations varied from region to region, they generally aimed at tightening up discipline and improving conditions in the monasteries, repairing and reconstructing old pagodas, expanding educational facilities for monks, and increasing social service activities. An important decision made during this period was to propagate Buddhism in the Vietnamese language rather than through the medium of Chinese characters which only monks and a few scholars were able to read. Various periodicals and books on Buddhism began to appear in the language of the common man.

The Second World War and the disorders immediately following it slowed down the reform movement, but by the late 1940's the Associations were reorganized and active again. In 1951, a national Buddhist congress was called and the three regional Associations were unified in a National Association. As had been the practice in the regional groups, the national Association was divided into lay and clerical sections. The clerical section was apparently regarded as a national Sangha (Order of Monks), the first nation-wide hierarchy in the history of Vietnam, and some steps were taken toward internal reorganization and standardization of ceremonies. Following unification of the Associations, the tempo of reform increased. Of particular importance were the establishment of higher training schools for monks and the dispatch of monks abroad for advanced studies.

The leadership of the 1963 Inter-Sect Committee for the Defense of Buddhism was drawn from these regional Associations and the national body, and it is these same groups plus certain independant sects which joined together after the fall of Diem to form the Unified Buddhist Church (UBC).

*The word "church" is not an exact translation of the Vietnamese word but is the version most frequently employed by the monks themselves.

From the above, it can be seen that several decades of continuity in organization, leadership and purpose underlie Vietnamese Buddhism of 1966. Thich Tam Chau was a disciple of Thich To Lien; Tam Chau was also a Vice President, and the present Supreme Bonze of Vietnam, Thich Tinh Khiet, was President of the national Buddhist Association prior to 1963; Thich Tri Quang, at the age of 28, was spokesman of the delegation from Central Vietnam to the 1951 unification congress. Although these relationships have yet to be explored, there appear to be strong "school" ties among monks who were trained at certain Buddhist Studies Institutes. Many of the programs and activities of today's Unified Buddhist Church have roots in this earlier period: the lay Buddhist school system, various social welfare institutions, youth groups such as the Buddhist Families organization and the Buddhist University Students Association.

Monks now in their forties and fifties have within their lifetimes seen the decay of several centuries reversed and Buddhism restored as a vital force in society. Many personally made important contributions to the rebirth. It seems safe to speculate that this experience has helped develop the fierce pride, the intense dedication, and the relative unity which characterize the monk leadership.

We say "relative unity" because the UBC has been troubled by internal factionalism since its establishment. Leading monks, such as Thich Tri Quang and Thich Tam Chau, do not see eye to eye at all times on all issues and on methods to be employed. Some monks obviously are more activist than others. Regional loyalties also have their influence, as do the differences between the minority Theravadans and the majority Mahayanists. When it comes to the basic issues, however, the leaders appear to be able to put up a common front, as happened during the Huong period and also the recent demonstrations demanding early elections and the formation of a constitutional government. On the other hand, victory for the activist group of the Unified Buddhist Church could rapidly lead to factional splits over the goals and methods of running the country.

A further sign of lack of complete harmony in Buddhism as a whole is the existence of a General Buddhist Association, composed largely of southern Buddhist groups, which was recognized by the Huong government apparently in a move to divide the Buddhists. This association claims to have two million members and to have a policy of keeping monks out of politics and of complete tolerance for and cooperation with other religions. We do not expect to hear much from it in regard to political issues in view of its policy of non-involvement.

Finally, it is worth noting that the reform movement did not have grass root origins. It was consciously initiated and has been spread by educated laymen and monks with the latter taking an increasingly important role in recent years. While sociological studies of Vietnamese Buddhism are completely lacking, one can tentatively conclude that the role of the monk in the community is gradually beginning to change from traditional detachment to greater participation and leadership. One of the intriguing questions in

this connection which deserves further study is why Buddhist leadership has centered so strongly in the monks and manifested itself so little in laymen. The almost complete takeover of the UBC by monks when it was formed a few weeks after the 1963 revolution appeared to reflect their disillusionment about the selflessness and honesty of laymen, but additional study may reveal other factors, possibly including scriptural justification.

Having pursued their three goals quietly and tenaciously for over a generation, it is not surprising that the Buddhists are beginning to see some results. The Unified Buddhist Church (UBC) has been formed and a group of well educated and highly motivated monks has been developed. The structure and leadership is, therefore, shaping up. The remaining almost untouched objective is to "purify" Buddhism and strengthen its observance among the people. The monk leadership needs and seeks a calmer atmosphere than that now prevailing in order to pursue this goal effectively.

Social Revolution

The social revolution which is now a major objective of leading Buddhist monks and the UBC finds its origins in the struggle against Diem which began as a defense of Buddhism. All evidence points to the fact that the Buddhists reacted to circumstances without a preconceived plot or plans. As Buddhists, they felt their religion was threatened, and their grievances, whether real or imagined, were emotion-charged and deep. As Vietnamese, they were repelled by the growing harshness and repression of an authoritarian regime. As reformers, they feared their movement to revitalize and modernize Buddhism would fail if the Diem government continued in office.

As the Buddhists gained strength and experience in 1963, the nature of the struggle changed. Buddhist opposition crystallized popular discontent and mounting opposition to dictatorship, and the original cause to defend Buddhism was gradually transformed into the beginnings of a major social revolution.

There is relatively little disagreement among the Buddhists as to what social revolution is or the need for it to occur. It is a frequent theme in the speeches and writings of the Buddhists in the post-Diem period. It is broader than the government's social revolution. Essentially, social revolution in its Buddhist meaning is equated with the popular demands that grew out of the struggle against Diem; namely, a purge of the worst Diemist elements, elimination of corruption, creation of democratic institutions, return to civilian leadership, and improved conditions for the masses. It also seems evident that the social revolution is in the minds of many monks synonymous with the Buddhist reform movement and the restoration of Buddhism to a position of predominance in Vietnam. One of the justifications used by monks for restoring Buddhism is that it is potentially the most powerful unifying force in a badly fragmented Vietnamese society.

Buddhist-led agitation since the fall of Diem has adversely affected both internal security and the war effort, but in most instances the monks have

been able to find justification for their actions either in terms of the Buddhist social revolution or on the basis of self-preservation in the face of what appeared to them to be a threat against Buddhism. Less than two months after the 1963 revolution, Mr. Tran Quang Thuan, then a student leader, warned:

> The rural population considers the change in regime just a coup d'etat, not a revolution, because it has not affected them in a favorable way. A revolution must bring about changes at the lowest levels of society, not just in the superstructure. The great difference between the cities and the countryside is still obvious.

Opposition to the Khanh, Huong and now the Ky governments has been motivated, at least in part, by growing disillusionment with the ability of the military or a military-controlled regime to rule justly and with the relatively slow progress toward the goals of the Buddhist social revolution.

Underlying the desire for social revolution are deep sensitivity and concern for the masses. Of all of the organized groups in Vietnam, the monks are undoubtedly in closest touch with the villages. The UBC has provincial and district committees which are staffed by monks and laymen with direct village connections. They have assumed the role both of interpreter of the aspirations of the people and of protector of the welfare of the masses. Their concern for the masses is certainly genuine, but it is not always clear whether the monks are reacting to the will of the people or are attempting to direct it. In October 1964, Thich Quang Do (a spokesman for the UBC) said: "[The monks] are simply conscious of the aspirations of the people...We know that dictatorship is contrary to the will of the masses, whether it be that of Diem or that which Khanh may be tempted to establish." Thich Tri Quang commented in August 1965 that "...the Vietnamese government does not offer anything to rely on...there is absolutely nothing in common between the people and their government," and in April 1966 he explained, "The population has been made miserable by the war and so they earnestly want an election."

There is certainly strong and sincere conviction among the Buddhists that the message of Buddhism is relevant to the needs of the modern world. While this has enabled them to accept the thesis growing out of the reform movement that Buddhism has a social role to play and to identify with the idea of social revolution, very few have been concerned with the theological and philosophical justifications for their action. In this connection, the work of Thich Nhat Hanh is of interest. Educated in the best Buddhist schools in Vietnam and at the Princeton Theological Seminary and Columbia University, the 40-year old Nhat Hanh is a deeply religious social revolutionary. He is in the forefront of monks who have sought to expand Buddhism's social role, but at the same time he is aware that this could lead to oversecularization and dilution of the religious force of Buddhism. Most of the dozen or so books he has written in the past ten years have dealt with the problem of retaining the purity of Buddhism while at the same time relating Buddhism to the needs of

the contemporary world. The following passage, written in late 1965 or early 1966 is representative of Nhat Hanh's thinking:

> [Buddhism in Vietnam believes in] the self determination and the will of the people...Self-determination is the determination to do what we can today...There is a big gap between the authorities and the people...We must try to make the people believe that politics is not the only means to democracy and peace...The people must recognize this fact and start doing things for themselves by whatever means they possess...As he does not expect aid or grace from anyone or anywhere, the Vietnamese should start making revolution in his own life, a revolution from the lower to the upper level, and should abandon his passive attitude of wait-and-see...Materials needed for the social revolution are love, responsibility, and sacrifice...We must fight against poverty and illness and its allies, ignorance and anarchy. We will use both the technical knowledge that we have acquired from Western nations and the heritage and knowledge handed down from our ancestors to our peasants... We should not put our hope of peace and happiness in Vietnam in money, dictatorships and hatred because experience has shown us that these only bring unhappiness to the people. The potentiality of Buddhism in Vietnam is immense. If we know how to utilize it, we could use its force for the reconstruction of our country.

Buddhism and Politics

Any consideration of Buddhism in politics is complicated by the monks' consistent denial of political goals in the face of reality of their political involvement. Kenneth Morgan of Colgate University spent a month in Vietnam in the summer of 1965 systematically interviewing the top Buddhist leadership and found no monk or layman who advocated political action except in extreme cases where it would be necessary to protect or defend Buddhism. In March 1965, Thich Tri Quang said:

> We never want to direct nor to take any part in government. If the government is working for the interests of the country, then we will exhort the faithful to support such a government. If, on the other hand, the government is inefficient and weak, and tries to discredit the Buddhist faith, then we have no choice but to tell our people to be on their guard.

He defined politics as:

> ...genuine goodwill which works for the interests of the nation. I visualize it as a revolutionary force (not any one political party) that should help better the people's standards of living and preserve their spiritual values.

This discrepancy between theory and action may be partly a question of semantics. Buddhist writers and spokesmen have tended to use the word social, as in social revolution, in the broad sense of all affairs of human society. In their minds, it seems that the concept of guiding or influencing government policy in a pattern similar to that of the Golden Age is not political. When the word politics is used by the Buddhists, it appears to be meant to convey the narrow concept of partisan political involvement. Probably more to the point, however, the Buddhists are prevented from admitting to political goals by the disagreement within the Unified Buddhist Church as to the nature and degree of Buddhist involvement in political affairs. Also, the Buddhists would obviously be unwilling to spell out any political plans they might have as this would forearm other elements in society which oppose them.

Given the foregoing factors plus the limited knowledge we have of Vietnamese Buddhism and its leaders, it is impossible to predict precisely the future course of the Buddhists in politics. One can, however, point to certain characteristics, trends and signs which seem likely to influence the development of the political side of Vietnamese Buddhism.

Throughout the post-Diem period up to the formation of the Ky government, the Buddhists had a minimum political demand, although it was not usually articulated as such: a government which in no way threatened or opposed Buddhism. This required that they be given what from their point of view was an adequate voice in any government, whatever its form. They believed they were entitled to this right because they represent the majority of the Vietnamese people and because they led the revolution against Diem. While there were certainly other considerations and complications, the Buddhists opposed Khanh and Huong because they felt the gains they had won in the 1963 revolution were in jeopardy. They took to the streets after Khanh moved toward dictatorship at Vung Tau and returned to the streets when Huong's policies in their view threatened to weaken their voice in government and also to split their still fragile internal unity. Both the Khanh and Huong governments were frequently and strongly criticized by the Buddhists for not purging Diemist elements and permitting them to continue their evil, presumably anti-Buddhist, ways particularly on the local level and in the countryside.

To the Buddhists, the Ky government represented the continuation of an unsatisfactory situation. It must be recognized that civilian, representative government was an ideal that arose out of the revolution against Diem. A common theme in Buddhist thinking and writing is the importance of reformed government and constructive government programs in winning over the people and thus minimizing the fratricidal war. That the Ky government did not fit this image was evident from the beginning. Opposition to the Ky government erupted briefly in Central Vietnam in the summer of 1965 and has since bubbled just beneath the surface; also present were the frustrations and social and economic problems growing out of the intensified war effort.

The ouster of General Thi provided a focus for Buddhist discontent. Thi was, in effect, the Buddhists' voice in the National Leadership Committee, the junta ruling Vietnam. As a revolutionary who had participated in a coup

attempt against Diem and who took pains to identify himself with the common man, he was also in tune with Buddhist thinking. However, there was little pretense that Thi was the main issue. While the Buddhists criticized the Ky government for corruption, mismanagement and ineptness and were also uneasy that the Chief of State was a Catholic, the overriding issue was who would run the government. The monks were simply through with military rule.

In looking ahead to elections, the Buddhists have decided advantages in leadership and organization. One of the remarkable phenomena of the emergence of Buddhism as a social and political force in Vietnam is the caliber of its monk leadership. Little is known of the internal functioning of the Sangha, but it is clear that monks with ability and intelligence are identified early, trained, and moved into positions of leadership. While not all monks are in agreement with Thich Tri Quang's politics, he is widely respected in the Sangha as an intellectual. Thich Ho Giac, co-chairman of the struggle committee against the Ky government, distinguished himself as a brilliant monk student ten years ago in Phnom Penh. Generally, the component bodies in the Unified Buddhist Church seem to be staffed more on the basis of pertinent experience, training, and intelligence than on traditional factors of seniority, devoutness, or nepotism. An additional advantage the monks have as opinion makers is their presumed lower class origins and nationalistic fervor. They are identified neither with foreign powers nor with the privileged groups of previous regimes. They seldom speak anything but Vietnamese. In some cases, monks are known to hide upper class origins in order to increase their appeal to the masses.

The network of Buddhist organizations throughout Vietnam is complex and of questionable efficiency, but it undoubtedly will be used as a mechanism to influence the electoral process. Under the Supreme Bonze, Thich Tinh Khiet, the Unified Buddhist Church is guided by two national bodies, the High Council of the Buddhist Hierarchy and the Institute for the Execution of the Dharma. The High Council, composed of sixty senior monks, deals exclusively with religious matters and regulation of the clergy. It has appeared relatively inactive, but it has given its Secretary General, Thich Tri Quang, both stature and a channel of access to and influence over the more than twenty thousand monks and nuns of Vietnam.

The national body dealing with the lay affairs of the Unified Buddhist Church is the Institute for the Execution of the Dharma (IED). Under the overall guidance of its chairman, Thich Tam Chau, the IED is led by a Leadership Committee of monks composed of two Vice Chairmen, a Secretary General, a Treasurer and seven Commissioners heading General Commissions for Monk Affairs, Propagation of the Faith, Education, Social and Cultural Affairs, Youth, Lay Affairs, and Finance. Each General Commission is divided into several sections and it is here that the day-to-day affairs of the UBC are carried on. The IED functions through eight regional representatives each embracing several provinces and committees of representatives on the provincial and district levels. The IED organization can and sometimes does extend downward to the villages and city wards which are considered the basic units of the UBC. The internal structure of the IED is based largely on the pattern of the Buddhist Associations in the 1931-1964 period, and this in some cases has provided continuity in leadership and organization.

Within the general sphere of activities of the Institute for the Execution of the Dharma are several monk-run groups whose relationships to the IED are either unclear or imprecisely defined, such as the Chaplain Corps, the Young Monks and Nuns League, and the School of Youth for Social Service. There are also numerous lay organizations usually grouped by occupation--for example, the Buddhist Cyclo Drivers of Hue, the Buddhist Plantation Workers of Banmethuot--but it is difficult to assess their influence or their responsiveness to UBC control. Several Buddhist sects and organizations exist over which the UBC exercises no formal control. However, the degree of mutual cooperation at any given time seems to involve the nature of the issue, and in the event of an election some of these groups would almost inevitably make common cause with the UBC.

The Buddhists are thus approaching elections with a numerical advantage, relative strength in leadership and organization, and a nationalist image of considerable appeal to the common man. Yet they have expressed no demands other than for elections, and they have put forth no national program or objectives. To many foreign observers this has seemed an abdication of responsibility, but the Buddhist leadership in the past has not concerned itself with sophisticated platforms and it may feel that it needs no other program than that of wanting what the people want as expressed through leaders elected democratically.

While Thich Tri Quang recently denied that the Buddhists aim to dominate in the election, he at the same time admitted that they are preparing themselves. If and as the government and other competitive forces, such as the Catholics, undertake political activity on their own behalf the tempo and tone of Buddhist activity may well increase to meet the assumed threat. The Buddhists are undoubtedly already taking steps to identify "good" candidates and will pass the word through the network of Buddhist organizations that these are the ones to be supported. If they are true to past pronouncements, the typical candidate will be young, nationalistic and untainted by foreign influences or close associations with old regimes. A "good" candidate would also be known for his probity, as a strong streak of puritanism runs through modern Vietnamese Buddhism.

The role of the monks in elections and government will probably be indirect. They not only are aware that they lack experience and expertise in government, but they also recognize that Catholics and other elements in society would strenuously object to the open participation of monks. Thich Tri Quang has admitted as much. It is conceivable that monks would leave the Order in order to take active political roles, but thus far there have been no indications of this happening. It also seems doubtful at this stage that a strong effort will be made to create a Buddhist state or make Buddhism the state religion. To some extent, the Buddhist attitude, normally one of tolerance toward other religions (although undoubtedly individual monks are anti-Catholic), may be governed by the amount of resistance put up by Catholics and others to an essentially Buddhist-run state.

Without fuller knowledge of the programs and leadership of a Buddhist-dominated government, its form and political orientation are difficult to foresee

If the IED can be taken as a model, it would have a strong executive but at the same time make allowance for the regional, ethnic and religious diversity of Vietnam. It is possible that an effort will be made to develop and instil a Vietnamese Buddhist ideology; occasionally monks, particularly the younger ones, refer to the need for a new ideology which synthesizes the best of Eastern and Western political thinking, Vietnamese culture and Buddhism. More realistically, Buddhist concern for the welfare of the people will probably initially result in a political philosophy akin to democratic socialism aimed at preventing exploitation of the masses.

It is equally difficult to be certain of the attitude of a Buddhist government toward the war and the United States. Certainly the ambiguity of Thich Tri Quang and his followers is cause for concern as is Viet Cong infiltration into Buddhist organizations, but it is worth noting that the Buddhist leadership as a group in the past has supported neither neutralism nor a communist victory. Similarly, while the American presence in Vietnam has given rise to unpleasant incidents and misunderstandings, there is no indication of general agreement among the Buddhists that the United States should be invited to leave before the situation has improved. Until further evidence is available to the contrary, the more real problem for the Vietnamese will be Buddhist overconfidence in their ability to deal with the Viet Cong; for the Americans it will be the inevitably stronger pride and nationalism of a Buddhist-dominated government.

April 29, 1966

(U) EYES ONLY 173

MEMORANDUM for : The Director

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SUBJECT: The Saigon Government's Move Against Danang

(C) Information available in Washington on precisely what has happened in the Danang area during the past twenty four hours -- and what is now happening there, in Hue and in Saigon -- is too fragmentary to permit even moderately well informed speculation, let alone interpretations or conclusions that can be offered with any degree of confidence. We know that a total of three government (i.e., pro-Saigon) battalions (two marine and one airborne) were moved into the Danang area and that after some -- but apparently minor -skirmishing they took at least temporary control of I Corps Headquarters and other strategic locations including Danang radio. We do not yet know what prompted this operation, what its overall objectives are, whether it is but the first step in a larger Directory plan, and what the reaction of other interested parties (e.g., the Struggle forces, the Buddhists, the First and Second Divisions, etc.) will be.

(U) In some ways, the Directory operation actually launched on 15 May (Vietnam time) strongly resembles the plan discussed in March when the agitation sparked by Gen. Thi's ouster first began building up and Danang first came under effective control of the Struggle Forces. At that time the Directory indicated it was thinking of having pro-GVN loyalist elements, especially among the Central Vietnam VNQDD, stir up activity which would serve as a pretext for large scale intervention by Saigon forces and a forcible re-establishment of Saigon control. This earlier plan was shelved but may well not have been forgotten, since recent events may have been guided by its modified reincarnation. Catholic and VNQDD groups in Central Vietnam have been active in recent weeks and the temperature in the I Corps area has risen as a result of their activity.

(1)

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Not knowing exactly what the Directory's plans and intentions are, one can only speculate on the causes of their recent actions. Gen. Dinh had succeeded in restoring a surface calm to I Corps, but the area obviously could not be said to have been restored to Saigon's effective political control. Dinh's own motives and ambitions were also suspect in the minds of his ostensible Directory colleagues. The Struggle Force could not honestly or accurately be termed a Communist movement, but left wing, neutralist and pro-VC elements were obviously penetrating the struggle force structure and gaining some measure of influence within it. The output of Danang and Hue radios was increasingly incorporating themes of obvious Viet Cong inspiration. The activities of the Buddhists, particularly Buddhist chaplins, were undermining Army morale and discipline in I Corps and were beginning to be felt in II Corps. The Directory may have felt that under its surface calm the situation (in I Corps) was deteriorating rapidly and the rot had to be surgically arrested in the national interest. Ky, Thieu and other senior Directory leaders such as Co may have found themselves under increasing pressure from activists like Col. Loan and Marine general Khang and the field-grade officers known as the "Baby Turks". The Directory almost certainly recognized that had they surfaced their intentions to the Americans, we would have endeavored to dissuade them from acting, and this is probably among the principal reasons why they kept their hand so carefully concealed from us.

As for Ky's objectives, again we can only speculate in a very tentative and diffident manner. Ky and his colleagues may feel that if they can re-establish control over Danang and bag the major struggle leaders (Mayor Mai, Col. Yeu,), Hue can indeed be safely left to wither on the vine and the remainder of the I Corps struggle movement will either collapse or can be curbed by a combination of Saigon-inspired VNQDD and Catholic activity. Conversely, the Danang operation may be only the first phase of a larger plan in which it is envisioned that Hue will be occupied after Danang is secured and the government's writ then forcibly extended throughout ICorps. The Directory may also feel that an effective show of force in Central Vietnam will serve to sober, and hence curb, its more vocal and active opponents throughout the rest of the Country, including Saigon — e.g., the Buddhists responsive to the dictates of the Buddhist Institute over which Tri Quang now exercises de facto control. Even if these are indeed the Directory's objectives, it is still not clear whether the Directory intends to scuttle the present program of elections and transfer to civilian rule or is only trying to strengthen its hand during the ensuing weeks and months of political maneuver.

Reactions are even harder to estimate at the present time than intentions or objectives. Much will depend on how successful the Government's move against Danang proves to be and how effective the struggle organization proves to be when put to the test. If the GVN can secure Danang surgically, swiftly and with minimal effective opposition, its political hand will be at least temporarily strengthened. Gen. Nhuan and Gen. Lam will then have to reassess the new balance of strength and determine what course their personal best interests dictate. This could be the course of conciliation and reacceptance of Saigon control through some face-saving formula. On the other hand, if the Danang operation itself proves sticky or meets with serious resistance, the danger of fratricidal civil war in I Corps becomes very real indeed. Even if the Danang operation itself is successful, the spectre of such civil strife is still very much present.

About all that can be said with confidence about the Buddhists is that they will be profoundly upset by the Government's move. If they sense weakness, irresolution or a tactical opportunity they will certainly move to protest strongly. However, if they should determine that the forces arrayed against them are demonstrably too strong to trifle with, they may hold their fire and bide their time. Again, much will depend on the play of the hand in Danang, in Hue, and in Saigon over the next few hours and days.

In making its move against Danang, the Ky government has gambled a great deal on one play. If the operation proves unsuccessful or sparks anarchy and civil war in I Corps, the odds are considerably better than even that the Directory itself will not be able to survive. Even if the operation succeeds, Vietnamese politics will be even stickier than they have been during the period where various interested parties assess new developments and the balance of forces they have created. At the moment all we can do is keep the closest possible watch over the situation and endeavor to assign meaning and value to facts as they emerge.

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No. 11
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May 1966

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

FOREIGN SHIPPING TO NORTH VIETNAM IN APRIL 1966

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2001

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WARNING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

FOREWORD

The data in this memorandum are preliminary and subject to modification as additional information becomes available. Significant changes may occur in data on ship arrivals and cargoes from Communist China and, to a lesser extent, in data on cargoes carried by ships of the Free World. All data on cargoes carried are expressed in metric tons. Data on Soviet and Eastern European ship arrivals and cargoes and on Free World ship arrivals are not likely to be changed significantly. As required, changes will be reported in subsequent memoranda.

CONTENTS

	Page
Summary	1
1. Communist Shipping	3
2. Free World Shipping	4
3. Seaborne Cargoes	5

Tables

1. North Vietnam: Foreign-Flag Ship Arrivals, March, April, and Cumulative 1966	9
2. North Vietnam: Tonnage of Foreign-Flag Ship Arrivals, March, April, and Cumulative 1966	10
3. North Vietnam: Identified Imports Carried by Foreign-Flag Ships, April 1966	11
4. North Vietnam: Identified Exports Carried by Foreign-Flag Ships, April 1966	12

Illustrations

Figure 1.	North Vietnam: Foreign Ship Arrivals, Monthly Average 1965 and January-April 1966 (chart) following page	2
Figure 2.	The Polish Ship Beniowski (photograph) following page	4
Figure 3.	Haiphong Harbor, 10 April 1966 (photograph) following page	6

FOREIGN SHIPPING TO NORTH VIETNAM IN APRIL 1966*

Summary

A continued low level of arrivals by Free World ships at North Vietnamese ports** helped to keep the total of calls by foreign ships in April to the lowest number since September 1965. Eleven Soviet ships delivered 83 percent of North Vietnam's seaborne imports, including a record volume of petroleum products. The same number of Chinese Communist ships carried 56 percent of identified seaborne exports, principally coal for Mainland China. US airstrikes against Cam Pha stopped coal shipments from that port, and for the first time inflicted damage on a foreign ship in North Vietnamese waters.

The 31 arrivals of foreign ships in April were distributed by flag as shown in the following tabulation:

	1966		
	March	April	Monthly Average 1965
Total	35	31	44
Communist	29	24	23
USSR	12	11	7
Eastern Europe	4	2	4
Communist China	13	11	12
Cuba	0	0	Negl.
Free World	6	7	21
United Kingdom	5	4	11
Other	1	3	10

* This memorandum was produced by the Office of Research and Reports; the estimates and conclusions represent the best judgment of the Directorate of Intelligence as of 20 May 1966.
** For details on ship arrivals and the type and distribution of cargo, see Tables 1 through 4 and Figure 1.

All seven of the Free World ships that called in April were chartered to either North Vietnam or Communist China. Four were Hong Kong-owned British-flag ships, and the others were sailing under the flags of Cyprus, Greece, and Malta. The arrival of only 13 Free World ships at North Vietnam in March and April combined, compared with an average of more than 21 Free World arrivals per month in 1965, attests to the effective response of most Free World countries to the US démarche against such voyages.

As a result of the initial US airstrike against facilities at Cam Pha on 19 April, coal shipments from that port ceased immediately, but were resumed at a reduced rate early in May. There are indications that the rate of shipments will not return to previous levels before July. A prolonged reduction in these shipments would appreciably reduce North Vietnam's foreign exchange earnings, 25 percent of which are derived from coal exports.

Because of damage to one of its ships that was loading coal at quayside at the time of the 19 April strike against Cam Pha, Poland protested to the US Government, and there were indications that Poland was suspending the loading of Polish ships for North Vietnam. There have been no additional signs, however, that Poland would stop its ships from calling at North Vietnam. Such an action would be of little economic significance to either Poland or North Vietnam because the relatively small volume of cargoes by these ships could easily be taken over by Chinese-flag ships.

North Vietnam's seaborne trade in April was 14 percent below the average monthly level of 1965. Only cement was exported in larger-than-normal volumes, and only imports of POL (all from the USSR) and miscellaneous general cargoes arrived in above-average volumes. No shipments of arms or ammunition were detected.

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Figure 1

North Vietnam: Foreign Ship Arrivals*

Monthly Average 1965 and January-April 1966





*Excluding one Cuban ship in January, 1966

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1. Communist Shipping

Soviet ships provided the principal support for North Vietnam's seaborne trade in April, particularly for the import trade. Eighty-three percent of identified inbound cargoes was delivered by eight Soviet ships -- all to Haiphong. The eight Soviet ships, including three tankers, arrived loaded from Black Sea ports. They carried the entire volume of POL and fertilizers delivered to North Vietnam by foreign ships in April. In addition, they delivered general cargo that included steel and other metals, trucks, cranes, and other equipment. One of the eight Soviet ships arrived with a load of cotton. Three other Soviet ships, operating under charter to North Vietnam, arrived in ballast to pick up North Vietnamese export cargoes. Of the nine Soviet ships that departed from North Vietnam in April, five (including two tankers) were empty and the other four carried coal to Japan.

Chinese ships calling at North Vietnam in April apparently were employed primarily in transporting export cargoes (mainly coal) from North Vietnam. Only two sailed to Haiphong, the principal port of discharge for import cargo, but nine sailed directly to the coal ports. Small amounts of inbound cargo were identified aboard only two of these nine ships. Because deliveries made to the coal ports normally consist only of small volumes of general cargoes for local consumption, it is assumed that most or all of the other seven ships arrived empty to load coal. There is no information about cargoes carried by the two Chinese ships that sailed to Haiphong.

All Chinese ships arrived at North Vietnam from China, and nine of the ten that left in April returned to China. One Chinese ship left Haiphong for northern Europe with a number of intermediate stops planned en route.

The two Eastern European ships that called at North Vietnam in April included a new Japanese-built Bulgarian bulk carrier on its maiden voyage to pick up a cargo of coal for France. The other was the Polish-flag ship Beniowski (see Figure 2), a 10,443-GRT dry cargo ship which became the principal figure in an incident resulting in an official Polish note of protest to the US government.

The Beniowski was one of four foreign ships at Port Cam Pha on 19 April when 24 US aircraft dropped over 41 tons of explosives on port facilities there. The Beniowski, which was loading coal for France

when the strike occurred, allegedly was showered with debris and shaken by concussion from ten or more nearby explosions of bombs and rockets.* No ship's personnel were injured, but the bridge deck was reported to have been damaged by "flying splinters" and cabin interiors were said to have been damaged by concussion. The Polish note did not mention that the Beniowski is one of 16 ships jointly owned by Communist China and Poland and operated under the Polish flag by Chipolbrok, the Chinese-Polish Shipping Company.

There are indications that the incident may have caused the Poles to cancel future sailings to North Vietnam by Polish-flag ships, although no such policy change has yet been publicized. Such a restriction would result only in minor, temporary inconvenience to North Vietnam. The volume of cargo for North Vietnam handled by Polish ships has been relatively small, and could be easily taken over by Chinese-flag ships operating under charter to Chipolbrok.**

2. Free World Shipping

The seven Free World ships that called at North Vietnam in April included four Hong Kong-owned, British-flag ships and one each under the flags of Cyprus, Greece, and Malta. Four were under charter to Vietfracht (North Vietnam's ship-chartering organization) and three to Sinofracht (Communist China's ship-chartering organization). Only in March had fewer Free World ships visited North Vietnam. Only two Free World ships delivered cargo to North Vietnam in April -- one carried gypsum and general cargo from China; the other, a Greek-flag ship, delivered general cargo from North Korea and Japan. Four of the five Free World ships that departed North Vietnamese ports in April carried outbound cargoes -- three loaded coal for Japan, and one took cement to Cambodia.

Fears for the safety of ships and crews sailing to North Vietnam were aroused again by the Beniowski incident. A Cypriot-flag ship approaching the outer entrance to Haiphong at the time of the airstrike was forced by a shaken crew to divert to Hong Kong. Resumption of the voyage to North Vietnam has been postponed until a replacement

* The other three ships (under Soviet, Chinese, and Maltese flags) did not report damage from the attack.

** There is precedent for such an arrangement. Of four Chipolbrok ships sold to Communist China and placed under the Chinese flag in 1965, three were immediately placed under charter to Chipolbrok.

Figure 2

THE POLISH SHIP BENIOWSKI IN THE TONKIN GULF THE DAY AFTER ALLEGEDLY BEING DAMAGED IN THE RAID ON PORT CAM PHA. COAL FOR FRANCE IS VISIBLE IN HOLDS THREE AND FOUR.

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crew can be flown in from Greece. In another instance, a Greek-flag ship has had to depart Sihanoukville for Haiphong without eight crewmen who had refused to make the trip. The crew of another Greek ship signed a note of protest against being "forced" to sail to Haiphong, but did make the trip. More such incidents can be expected, and bonus payments for voyages to North Vietnam may be driven above the 100 percent rate that has become standard for these trips.

The share of North Vietnam's seaborne trade carried by Free World ships has declined steadily in recent months and reached a new low in April, as shown below:

	Percent	
	April 1966	1965 Average
Total seaborne trade	15	63
Imports	16	36
Exports	15	73

3. Seaborne Cargoes

Identified seaborne cargoes carried to and from North Vietnamese ports for foreign merchant ships in April totaled only 172,100 tons, the lowest since October 1965. Identified seaborne exports amounted to only 99,300 tons, compared with an average monthly volume of 142,800 tons in 1965, as the volume of all major exports except cement fell below normal levels. The volume of identified seaborne imports, on the other hand, was 72,800 tons, 26 percent above the monthly average for 1965. Exceptionally large imports of POL and miscellaneous general cargoes more than offset below-normal volumes of all other major categories of seaborne imports. No shipments of arms or ammunition were detected.

Seaborne deliveries of POL to North Vietnam reached a record high volume of 34,300 tons* in April, compared with an average monthly

* The previous high monthly volume of POL deliveries was 32,000 tons in December 1965.

volume of 14,000 tons in 1965 and of 18,000 tons in the first three months of this year. The increase apparently was in response to Hanoi's request to the USSR that POL deliveries in the second quarter of this year average 40,000 tons a month.

There are indications that North Vietnam is finding it difficult to cope with the larger volume of bulk petroleum deliveries to Haiphong. A 10,300-GRT Soviet tanker that arrived there on 4 May required 11 days to discharge compared with an average discharge time of 6 days for tankers calling this year. The most plausible explanation for the delay is that the oil is being delivered more rapidly than it can be redistributed beyond the port area. The interruption of through service on the Haiphong-Hanoi rail line undoubtedly has made this problem more difficult.

Imports of miscellaneous general cargoes in April totaled 29,400 tons, 55 percent more than the average monthly volume in 1965 but only six percent above the average level of the first three months of this year. Of this total, Free World ships carried 11,300 tons from Japan, North Korea, and China. Deliveries from these countries included 3,100 tons of Chinese gypsum for the Haiphong cement plant, semifinished and finished industrial materials, and tractors. The 18,100 tons that arrived on Soviet ships from the USSR included cotton, assorted metals for industrial use, truck-mounted cranes, tank trucks, dump trucks, tires, helicopter engines, and steel rails.* Haiphong harbor remained free of congestion (see the photograph, Figure 3).

The volumes of other major categories of imports -- bulk foodstuffs, fertilizers, timber, and coal -- were all below average monthly levels for 1965. For the second consecutive month, no seaborne imports of coking coal were detected. Beginning in November 1965, some of these coal shipments were transferred from rail to sea, but full-scale use of the overland route apparently was resumed in March.

The major factor limiting April seaborne exports to a volume 30 percent below the 1965 average monthly level was the airstrike against Cam Pha, in which the coal-cleaning plant and repair shops apparently were gutted and coal-transporting facilities were damaged. Loading

* Since August 1965 Soviet ships have delivered 13,700 tons of rails, more than enough to complete the Kep-Thai Nguyen line and to add a third rail to the line from Hanoi to the Kwangsi border of China.

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Figure 3

HAIPHONG HARBOR, 10 APRIL 1966. IN STREAM, THE SOVIET SHIP KAYMAK DEPARTING EMPTY. AT QUAYSIDE, READING TOP TO BOTTOM: THE SOVIET SHIP MUKACHEVO UNLOADING FERTILIZER AND GENERAL CARGO; AN UNIDENTIFIED COASTAL FREIGHTER; THE CHINESE SHIP SONG JIANG LOADING CEMENT FROM LIGHTERS.

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activities, abruptly halted by the raid, were not resumed until early May and are proceeding at a slow rate. The first ship loaded in Cam Pha since the raids departed on 9 May. Several other ships have been waiting for coal cargoes since the first week of May, but the next shipment was not due out until after 15 May. There are indications that coal shipments will not return to normal before July.

Any prolonged reduction in coal shipments from Cam Pha would have a serious effect on North Vietnam's foreign exchange earnings, 25 percent of which are derived from coal exports. Most coal shipments move by sea, and over the past 15 months, 90 percent of North Vietnam's seaborne coal exports have originated from Cam Pha. The shipping capacity of the other major coal port, Hon Gay, is restricted by a shallower draft limitation.

Because of the interruption of shipments from Cam Pha, the total volume of North Vietnam's seaborne exports of coal in April amounted to only 82,900 tons, 35 percent below the average monthly volume of the preceding three months. China was the major customer for North Vietnam's anthracite in April, taking 55,100 tons by sea. The remainder went to Japan (19,500 tons) and France (8,300 tons).

Cement was the only major export commodity shipped in above-average volume in April. Foreign merchant ships loaded 15,100 tons of cement at Haiphong, more than double the average monthly volume of such shipments in 1965 and the largest monthly volume since 1964. The major share (9,000 tons) of the cement shipped in April went to Cambodia. The rest went to China (3,000 tons), Hong Kong (2,000 tons), and Singapore (1,100 tons).

Cement exports declined steadily after the first quarter of 1965, dropped to zero in January 1966, but recovered strongly in February, March, and April. The high correlation* between the decline in volume of cement exports and the intensity and duration of the bombing of North Vietnam strongly suggests the existence of a causal relationship, although none has been established. Exports of miscellaneous general cargoes amounted to only 1,400 tons in April, compared with an average of 10,000 tons a month in 1965. No shipments of apatite or pig iron were detected aboard foreign ships in April.

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* Assuming a lag of one to two months in the changes in volume of cement exports.

No seaborne exports of apatite have been detected since the Hanoi-Lao Cai rail line was cut in July 1965, although the line has been reopened on occasions since then. North Vietnam's failure to implement export shipments in the face of a strong market for its apatite remains a puzzle.

Table 1

North Vietnam: Foreign-Flag Ship Arrivals a/
March, April, and Cumulative
1966

Flag	March		April		Cumulative	
	Number	Percent of Total	Number	Percent of Total	Number	Percent of Total
Total	35	100.0	31	100.0	151	100.0
Communist countries	29	82.9	24	77.4	108	71.5
USSR	12	34.3	11	35.5	42	27.8
Eastern Europe	4	11.4	2	6.5	11	7.3
Bulgaria			1	3.2	2	1.3
Poland	4	11.4	1	3.2	9	6.0
Communist China	13	37.1	11	35.5	54	35.8
Cuba					1	0.7
Free World	6	17.1	7	22.6	43	28.5
Cyprus	1	2.9	1	3.2	3	2.0
Greece			1	3.2	5	3.3
Italy					1	0.7
Malta			1	3.2	1	0.7
United Kingdom	5	14.3	4	12.9	33	21.9

a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

Table 2

North Vietnam: Tonnage of Foreign-Flag Ship Arrivals a/
March, April, and Cumulative 1966

Flag	March		April		Cumulative	
	Number	Thousand Gross Register Tons	Number	Thousand Gross Register Tons	Number	Thousand Gross Register Tons
Total	35	202.4	31	200.8	151	877.6
Communist countries	29	176.4	24	158.1	108	643.0
USSR	12	76.4	11	86.6	42	300.8
Eastern Europe	4	28.8	2	16.7	11	85.1
Communist China	13½	71.1	11	54.8	54	247.4
Cuba					1	9.7
Free World	6	26.1	7	42.7	43	234.6

a. Many Soviet and Eastern European ships calling at North Vietnamese ports pick up or discharge only small parts of their total cargoes in North Vietnam, and many of the Free World ships only pick up export cargoes. For this reason, with the possible exception of Chinese Communist ships, aggregate tonnage of ships calling is not closely correlative to actual volume of cargoes moving into and out of North Vietnam, but these data are of value as indications of relative changes in the volume of shipping. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

Table 3

North Vietnam: Identified Imports Carried by Foreign-Flag Ships a/
April 1966

Thousand Metric Tons

Flag	Commodity						
	Ammonium Sulfate and Other Fertilizers	Petroleum	Grain and Other Foodstuffs	Coal	Timber	Miscellaneous	Total
Total	8.1	34.3	1.0	0	0	29.4	72.8
Communist countries	8.1	34.3	1.0	0	0	18.1	61.5
USSR	8.1	34.3				18.1	60.5
Eastern Europe							
Communist China b/			1.0				1.0
Free World	0	0	0	0	0	11.3	11.3

a. Identified imports include some estimates of bulk cargoes, using methods which have proved to be highly reliable.
b. An additional unknown quantity of imports may have been carried by Chinese Communist ships.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Table 4

North Vietnam: Identified Exports Carried by Foreign-Flag Ships a/
April 1966

Thousand Metric Tons

Flag	Commodity					
	Coal	Apatite	Cement	Pig Iron	Miscellaneous	Total
Total	82.9	0	15.1	0	1.4	99.3
Communist countries	73.4	0	9.3	0	1.4	84.1
USSR	19.5					19.5
Eastern Europe	8.3				0.7	9.0
Communist China b/	45.6		9.3		0.6	55.6
Free World	9.5	0	5.8	0	0	15.3

a. Identified exports include some estimates of bulk cargoes, using methods which have proved to be highly reliable. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
b. An additional unknown quantity of exports may have been carried by Chinese Communist ships.

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT GROUPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
5/4/98

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No. 0811/66

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
4 May 1966

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*

Politically Significant Groups in South Vietnam

Summary

South Vietnam has a multitude of religious, political, and regional factions. Some are large, loosely organized federations; others are just a handful of men backing an influential leader. Only the various religions have anything like a wide popular base, but they are split internally, and their followers are concentrated for the most part in a few geographic areas. Of the religions, the Buddhist faction headed by Thich Tri Quang has by far the largest popular following. Only two of the political parties have national significance and these are also splintered internally.

At best no more than a tenuous guess can be made on the potential voting strength and voting strongholds of most of the politically influential groups. It appears, however, that Buddhist-backed candidates will garner the largest popular support, and that it will take a rather strong alliance between other factions and groups to offset potential Buddhist strength.

*Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence

The Buddhists

1. Firm adherents of Buddhism probably comprise only about 15 to 25 percent of the roughly 15.5 million South Vietnamese. However, up to 60 percent of the population has been estimated to identify itself loosely with the religion. The Unified Buddhist Association (UBA), a national organization headquartered in Saigon, is presently the principal vehicle for Buddhist political influence. The UBA has at least a partially effective provincial and grass-roots structure extending down to individual pagodas. However, the UBA is divided along regional lines into two major factions, which have tended to act as the militant and moderate wings of the association.

2. The Central Vietnamese Buddhist faction is headed by Thich Tri Quang, whose power is centered in the northern city of Hue and extends roughly from the northernmost provinces along the coast to the southern part of the central lowlands. Quang's influence is greatest in urban areas and mirrors the somewhat xenophobic, militant attitudes of the central Vietnamese populace with its traditional antagonism toward the southerners. Quang's chief lieutenant is Thich Thien Minh, the UBA's youth commissioner; his key lay followers include the Hue University Rector Bui Tuong Huan, Professor Le Tuyen, and former cabinet minister Tran Quang Thuan. It has been estimated that the influence of the central Vietnamese faction extends over as many as three million South Vietnamese. However, probably less than one million of these are registered voters. The faction has been trying for some time to form a lay Buddhist political party, the Vietnamese Buddhist Forces (UVF), but the party is not yet formally in being.

3. The more moderate southern wing of the UBA is led by Thich Tam Chau, chairman of the Buddhist Institute. Chau is actually a spokesman for the refugee Buddhist clergy from North Vietnam, but he appears to control the bulk of southern-born Buddhists, estimated to number from one to three million. The southern Buddhists, however, appear to be far less tightly knit than those under the influence of Tri Quang's faction. Chau is less politically effective than Tri Quang, and has at times allied

himself with politicians whose actions have later cast discredit on him. His principal associates in the clergy are Thich Tam Giac, head of the Buddhist chaplain corps, and Thich Ho Giac, deputy chaplain and a fiery orator.

4. A splinter group, the Southern Buddhist Studies Association, is headed by lay leader Mai Tho Truyen, who has been prominent in international Buddhist circles but has split with the UBA. Although seldom involved in domestic Buddhist "campaigns," Truyen has participated in various government-sponsored civilian councils. He may have several thousand close followers, most of them scattered among the southern provinces, as well as considerable appeal among UBA adherents generally.

5. The Theravada Buddhist sect numbers more than 500,000. Members are largely of Khmer (ethnic Cambodian) stock, and live in the provinces bordering the Mekong River, primarily near Cambodia but also in Vinh Binh Province near the coast. They have been politically inert at the national level, but their leaders--including Son Thai Nguyen, brother of Khmer Serei leader Son Ngoc Thanh--often exert considerable influence in the provinces where they are concentrated. Nguyen's faction is considered rather militant in its actions; the other major faction of the Theravada Buddhists, the Nguyen Thuy Association, is an older, and more conservative group.

The Catholics

6. It is estimated that there are between a million and 1.5 million Catholics in South Vietnam. They have long been prominent among the country's educated and administrative circles, and are numerous among the military officer corps. The Catholics are concentrated chiefly in Gia Dinh and Bien Hoa provinces near Saigon where there are several refugee settlements. There are also pockets of Catholic influence in the delta, east of Saigon, and in the northern provinces.

7. Almost a million of the Catholics are refugees from Communist North Vietnam. They are

very active politically and very vocally anti-Communist. Their acknowledged leader is Father Hoang Quynh, described as a militant and a political activist. During the past year, however, Quynh has taken a rather moderate tack in relations with the Buddhists and other sects, and his influence has been challenged by other refugee priests, including Fathers Nguyen Quang Lam, Nguyen Van Luc, and Tran Van Kiem. Quynh often chooses to conduct his political operations through an organization headed by lay Catholic leader Nguyen Gia Hien.

8. The Catholics native to South Vietnam are less well organized and less aggressive than their northern refugee counterparts. Their principal leader is the archbishop of Saigon, Nguyen Van Binh, generally a voice for moderation and a widely respected figure. The most vocal of their political spokesmen, however, is probably Father Ho Van Vui, a more militant figure who broke openly with the Diem regime.

The Cao Dai

9. The Cao Dai are an eclectic religious sect combining elements of Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, and animism. The sect was formally organized in 1926. Under the French, the Cao Dai enjoyed a measure of political autonomy, including their own army. They claim a following of one to two million, although their real adherents probably number closer to a half million. There are scattered Cao Dai villages in the western provinces of the delta, but the principal base of Cao Dai influence, and the seat of the sect's "Holy See," is in Tay Ninh Province, northwest of Saigon. The Cao Dai population in Tay Ninh appears to number a few hundred thousand.

10. The sect suffers from serious internal splits and it is problematical whether it could become a unified electoral bloc, although it certainly might elect some members to an assembly. Former chief of state Phan Khac Suu is a Cao Dai, but representative of the somewhat independent political Cao Dai elements in Saigon.

11. One principal faction of the sect, and probably the most nationally minded, is led by former Cao Dai "general" Le Van Tat and his brother Le Trung Nghia, who are strongly anti-Buddhist. Tat was chief of Tay Ninh Province from Diem's overthrow until late in the Quat regime. Close to them is Tran Quang Vinh, a "spiritual" leader who served as a member of the advisory High National Council under the Quat government. A rival of Tran Quang Vinh is Cao Hoai Sang, who ousted Vinh from the "Holy See." Sang's political ties, however, are not clear. Another of the sect's factions is led by former "general" Nguyen Thanh Phuong, who heads a small Cao Dai political party, the Vietnamese Restoration Party. Phuong ran as a vice-presidential candidate against the Diem ticket in 1961. At least one Cao Dai faction, under a Major Mung, is openly affiliated with the Viet Cong.

The Hoa Hao

12. The Hoa Hao are a spiritualist Buddhist sect, with possibly close to a million followers, although they claim two million. Most of the members are concentrated in the westernmost area of South Vietnam--An Giang and Chau Doc provinces bordering Cambodia, where they are the dominant political and religious influence. The Hoa Hao still retain remnants of their former private army, but they have suffered from internal divisions and are still without significant national influence. They are, however, a source of recruitment for government paramilitary troops in several delta provinces outside their own domain, and thus may be in process of spreading their local influence.

13. Among the most important Hoa Hao leaders at present are Colonel Tran Van Tuoi, until recently chief of An Giang Province, and Colonel Nguyen Van Hue, the chairman of the An Giang provincial council. Hue is a follower of a once-powerful but unsavory Hoa Hao "general," Tran Van Soai.

14. Other key Hoa Hao figures at present are Colonel Ly Ba Pham, the new An Giang Province chief, and Pham Ba Cam, a Saigon politician who probably has little influence at the local level. One of the many factions in the sect is led by Truong Kim Cu, another former "general" and erstwhile troublemaker.

The Dai Viet Party

15. The Dai Viets are one of the two nationally significant political parties in South Vietnam. They are also splintered into several factions, only two of which are of importance.

16. The northern branch of the Dai Viet Party is composed chiefly of refugees from North Vietnam, and has little in the way of formal mass organization to support its nationally prominent politicians. The faction is led by Dang Van Sung, a publisher, and includes former premier Phan Huy Quat. Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Bui Diem, an adviser to Premier Ky, has also been associated with this faction. As national figures, some of these men probably could draw a substantial vote, particularly in Saigon, but they have no local strongholds.

17. The southern faction of the Dai Viet Party has been weakened by events of the past two years, and is partly splintered between southern and central wings. Its nominal leader, Nguyen Ton Hoan, is once again in exile after having been ousted as deputy premier to General Khanh; he calls his party the Dai Viet Nationalist Party. Hoan appears to have had ties among several top military officers including Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu, whose brother, Nguyen Van Kieu, is a prominent Dai Viet Party member. Leadership of the faction by default now is claimed by Ha Thuc Ky, whose actual base of power is in Quang Tri Province in central Vietnam. Ky calls this faction the Revolutionary Dai Viet Party. Its popular strength is unknown. The southern faction has been estimated to have about 50,000 active followers.

The VNQDD (Nationalist) Party

18. Like the Dai Viets, the VNQDD Party has been badly splintered. Its strength and organization are greatest in the various provinces of northern South Vietnam, known to the Vietnamese as "central Vietnam."

19. The southern branch of the VNQDD, based largely in Saigon, does not appear to have extensive grass-roots support. Among its leaders is Nguyen Hoa Hiep, minister of interior under Quat and a somewhat

ineffective administrator who used his government post to build up the faction. Another old-time VNQDD leader, also in Saigon, is Vo Hong Khanh, a businessman and one-time minister in the Bao Dai era. It was recently reported that Khanh will be recognized by local VNQDD factions as the party's national leader in an effort to unify the VNQDD as a counterforce to the Buddhists. Also prominent in the southern branch, although born in North Vietnam, is former deputy premier in the Quat government, Tran Kim Tuyen.

20. The primary base of VNQDD strength is in central Vietnam where the party appears to have some genuine organization and a grassroots structure. The VNQDD could probably command a following of a few hundred thousand throughout central Vietnam. The party has been particularly active in Quang Ngai and Quang Nam provinces, where it has entrenched itself to some extent in the provincial administration. It has nevertheless experienced internal provincial factionalism, chiefly between younger and older elements. The party has strength in Quang Tin, and also has some following in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces, but substantially less than Tri Quang's central Vietnamese Buddhist faction. Some VNQDD leaders in central Vietnam have cooperated with Tri Quang in the past, but are now in the process of allying themselves against him. The secretary general of the central Vietnam branch of the VNQDD is Nguyen Dinh Luong. However, a genuine regional leader for this faction has not yet emerged.

Independent Politicians

21. A large number of independent politicians, most of them living in Saigon and heading their own small political parties, are nationally prominent and might well be elected if they were to be candidates for a constituent or national assembly. Some of these men wield influence in the current political scene, but probably have no real power or popular support outside of the political and government circles in which they lobby. Many are former government officials and ministers; others are leaders of regional factions; some are former army officers.

22. Among these men are Pham Quang Dan, a Gia Dinh council member; Tran Van Van, a southern leader; Hoang Co Thuy and his brother Hoang Co Binh, a Saigon councilor; former premier Tran Van Huong, and such figures as retired Generals Tran Van Don, "Big" Minh, etc. In very few cases is it possible to estimate the extent and locale of support such men might draw from the electorate, unless they were endorsed by organized parties, religious groups, or the military. Among them, however, are probably some of the country's best political and administrative talent, as well as some of its most overrated politicians.

23. Of the numerous groups with which many of the individually prominent politicians are associated, the Southern Old Students' (or Dong Nai) Association is one which could develop considerable strength, at least in the southern part of South Vietnam. The Association, founded in 1965 and headed by retired General Tran Van Don, reportedly has about 1,200 members. More than 700 are in the Saigon area. Although it is ostensibly an apolitical association of alumni and teachers from four well-known lycees in South Vietnam, the Association is actually a cover for political activity by southern intellectuals and politicians, many of whom wish to see a predominant southern voice in the government. Among other members of the Association, which reportedly meets regularly each month, are former chief of state Phan Khac Suu and Tran Van Van, prominent in the now defunct High National Council and its secretary general, Nguyen Van Loc.

Labor

24. Although there are several competing trade unions, the only labor organization in South Vietnam with any substantial following is the Confederation of Vietnamese Labor, or CVT, headed by Tran Quoc Buu. The union claims a membership of about 300,000 from its affiliates, but actual strength may be less. Most of the CVT support is in the Saigon area, but it has some relatively important affiliates in Da Nang and other cities of I Corps and in the delta. The CVT gains some rural following from its plantation workers' affiliate, but most of the plantation areas are now Viet Cong - infested and residents there may not be permitted to vote.

25. Among the rivals of the CVT is the General Confederation of Free Syndicates (CGSL), an unregistered union led by Bui Luong, a somewhat unsavory political figure who has sought to draw strength away from the CVT. The Confederation of Vietnamese Trade Syndicates (CSTV) under Vui Van Thien and a splinter group of the CSTV under Le Van Thot and Le Dinh Cu are also rivals of the CVT. The Thot-Cu group draws its present strength from the textile workers, whose ranks have reportedly been infiltrated by the Viet Cong.

Military

26. With approximately 600,000 men under arms, the military could be a potentially powerful voting bloc, although there has never been any evidence that the military would vote as ordered in a secret ballot. A past practice of allowing army troops to vote in areas where they are currently based or operating gives the army the potential of swinging the outcome in a given electoral district. Most of the rank and file of the military, however, would probably vote their own political and religious persuasions, although they might support popular military candidates. The influence of the Buddhists among the officers and ranks of both the army and police in I Corps has recently been demonstrated; certain troops in the delta are known to be strongly Catholic.

27. Veterans of the armed services also constitute a potential political force, possibly allied with the military. There are presently estimated to be as many as 500,000 veterans in the country, but they are less likely to vote as a bloc than in accordance with their individual political and religious loyalties. The only significant veterans' organization, the Veterans' Legion Associations des Anciens Combattants Vietnamiens reportedly has about 30,000 members; only some 4,000, however, are said to be interested enough in the organization to pay dues. Under the Diem regime the Legion was of little significance, but it gained prestige from the election of General Pham Xuan Chieu, secretary general of the Directorate, as its president in September 1965, and from the creation in February 1966 of a new cabinet post for war veterans.

Youth and Students

28. About 60 percent of South Vietnam's population is estimated to be below the age of 30. As a result of past electoral laws which have lowered the voting age to 18, youths in their teens and early 20s could exert a significant political impact. Rural and urban youths have different attitudes and outlooks, as do working youths and students, with the latter exercising the most vocal impact.

29. High school age youth apparently have long been the major target of various pressure groups, including the Viet Cong. Because they contain a less sophisticated and more malleable age group, the high schools have often provided the hard core for political demonstration. Many of them reportedly contain Communist cells. The Viet Cong regard the high schools as a means of infiltrating confirmed followers into the universities and as a source of military and agent recruitment. The proportion of students over 18 is unknown, but somewhat greater than in US high schools.

30. University students, often from conservative middle-class families, remained largely uninterested in politics until the Buddhist campaign against Diem in 1963 enlisted their energies and organizations. There is now a plethora of political organizations in the country's four universities: Saigon with 16,000 students; Hue with some 3,600; Dalat with about 1,600; and Van Hanh--a new Buddhist university in Saigon--with a few hundred students. Both at Saigon and Van Hanh universities, the students have tended to be restrained in their political actions over the past year. The Saigon Students' Union, claiming 4,000 of Saigon University's student body under Tran Quang Tri as president and To Lai Chanh as executive committee chairman, has been particularly resistant to recent political agitation. In general, religious organizations in the Saigon universities, such as the Catholic Students' Federation and the Buddhist Students' Association, have exhibited less religious and political fervor than other student groups.

31. The students at Hue University, who generally represent a less privileged class and are under strong Buddhist influence, have been more militant. The Hue Students' Union, under Tuan Xuan Kiem, has been periodically in ferment during the past two years and has been involved in recent "struggle movement" activity. There is a militant, leftist faction among the Hue faculty, including the rector, and the student body has also been reported as increasingly receptive to Viet Cong propaganda. The university of Dalat is under Catholic administration, but has a militant pro-Buddhist element.

Overseas Chinese

32. The Chinese community in South Vietnam is estimated at about a million, most of whom live in Cholon, the Chinese city adjacent to Saigon. They are Vietnamese nationals by decree of the Diem regime, but have managed to retain their own schools which teach Chinese and their internal societies which have begun to operate more openly since Diem's downfall. The Chinese are strongly entrenched in South Vietnam's commercial life, but few have taken an interest in politics.

33. The increasingly disturbed economic situation, however, together with increased government efforts to bring Chinese youths into the armed services, may draw the Chinese more openly into the picture as a political pressure group. Although most of them appear to be oriented to Taipei rather than Peking, there is some Viet Cong influence among them. A few Chinese firms, apparently motivated by profits, supply the Viet Cong, and some Chinese laborers, particularly in the textile industry, are reported to be Communist agents.

The Montagnards

34. The ethnic tribes in South Vietnam number about 500,000, and are scattered throughout the central highlands, primarily close to the main towns. If allowed to vote, they would probably support tribal candidates, but as there are more than 35 different tribes, any real cohesion among the montagnards is questionable. One of the most

prominent tribal leaders now active in the government is Paul Nur, newly appointed to the commissariat for montagnard affairs, but it is by no means clear that he speaks for all the montagnards.

Popular Voting Strength

35. At the present time, there is insufficient information to support any assessment of the potential voting strength and voting strongholds of any or all of the politically influential groups and factions in South Vietnam. Elections held under the Diem regime were controlled or influenced by the government in such a manner as to provide no framework for a study of voting attitudes or habits. Although provincial and municipal council elections held under the Quat regime in May 1965 appear to have been generally free of government domination, available data on them provide only a rough gauge of political and religious influence among the electorate. Moreover, the issues and candidates were local, and the 1965 results may not necessarily have a valid bearing on a national election.

36. It is not yet known whether the coming elections will be organized to run provincial candidates locally, either as individuals or as party slates, or to run all the national candidates on the same ballot. Such arrangements will be very important as they will help determine the vote-drawing power of candidates with either local, provincial, or national reputations. The 1965 local elections brought out some 3.5 million voters, or perhaps half the estimated potential as measured by voter turnout claimed by the Diem regime.

37. Attempts to plot the areas of probable strength or control by the various power groups--Buddhists, Catholics, the sects, the Dai Viets, or VNQDD--can be done only roughly. There are data concerning the political and religious affiliations of individual provincial council members, and the size of the vote won by each member, but no information is at hand concerning the total vote or affiliations of losing candidates. Moreover, the 1965 results provide almost no clue to political affiliations at the district level.

38. Finally, the suppression of genuine political activity by the Diem regime, and to some extent by the power of the military since that time, has prevented the development of political parties, contributed to their internal splits, and forced or encouraged them to operate clandestinely. Most of the parties are reluctant to reveal their membership,and their strength claims, when made, tend to be inflated. Moreover, candidates in the past elections ran as independents or with government endorsement, but usually without political party or religious labels. There is no accurate census of the population as a whole, or of popular religious affiliations.

39. On the accompanying map, an effort has been made to pinpoint known strongholds or pockets of political or religious influence. It has been impossible to estimate group strengths by cities on the map, except for Hue where Buddhist domination is evident. No attempt was made to estimate possible party or religious voting strength. Attempts to pinpoint areas of major strength by religious or political affiliation have been necessarily limited to the populated coastal areas in the northern part of the country, and the major towns and cities in the delta. Most of the inland area of central Vietnam is sparsely populated, and relatively little information is available on rural political allegiances in the delta outside of the known strongholds of the sects and the Khmers. (Map)

POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT GROUPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM



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WEEKLY REPORT

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THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

4 May 1966

INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE

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THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(28 April - 4 May 1966)

C O N T E N T S

	Page
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE	iv
Map, South Vietnam, facing page	1
I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM	1
A. POLITICAL SITUATION	1
Political interest centered around forthcoming elections (p. 1); Government to convene group to draft election law (p. 1); No indication of coup plans for the time being (p. 1); Buddhists may clash with Directorate over post-election provisional government (p. 2); Buddhists will not organize formal party for elections (p. 2); Non-Buddhist groups may unite in opposition (p. 2); Economic Situation: GVN and US officials agree on procedures to facilitate future imports (p. 3); Import license applications show sharp rise (p. 3); Rice prices up but over-all Saigon retail index remains steady (p. 3); Exchange rates are given (p. 4).	
B. MILITARY SITUATION	5
Enemy-initiated activity increases (p. 5); Weekly statistics are given (p. 5); Friendly operations in I, II,	

Page

and IV corps areas are recapitulated (p. 5); Large enemy supply cache seized in III Corps (p. 6); Seven B-52 missions are flown (p. 6); Results of tactical sorties are summarized (p. 6); MARKET TIME continues junk surveillance (p. 7); I Corps reports most Communist incidents (p. 7); VC battalion attacks in III Corps (p. 8); Many small-scale attacks occur in IV Corps (p. 8); Status changes are given for transportation routes (p. 8).

Map, Transportation Routes, facing page 8

C. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT 9

National cadre center begins specialized training (p. 9); Pacification effort hindered by country's economic difficulties (p. 9); Revitalization and reform planned for local governments (p. 9); Chieu Hoi returnees show second consecutive significant decrease (p. 10); Recent psywar operations are reviewed (p. 10).

II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC 11

Premier's report to DRV National Assembly included frank discussion of difficulties caused by US bombing (p. 11); Pham Van Dong also claimed the North had successfully challenged US military power (p. 11); Chinese Communists flatly deny Soviet charges of hampering DRV aid shipments (p. 11); Foreign Ministry statement provides first detailed information on quantity of Soviet military goods transiting China (p. 12); Chinese rebuttal attests to effectiveness of Soviet charges (p. 12).

Page

III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS 13

GVN foreign minister comments on Senator Mansfield's Vietnam peace proposals (p. 13); Sihanouk announces Cambodia will sign "peaceful coexistence" agreement with DRV and NFLSV (p. 13); US troops return fire over Cambodian border (p. 13); Initial shipment of West German medical supplies arrives in Saigon (p. 13).

ANNEX: South Vietnam Battle Statistics--
Personnel Losses (Weekly)
South Vietnam Battle Statistics--
Incidents and Attacks (Weekly)

South Vietnam Battle Statistics--
Personnel Losses (Monthly)
South Vietnam Battle Statistics--
VC Incidents (Monthly)
South Vietnam Battle Statistics--
Weapons Losses (Monthly)

Table 1. General Statistical Data

Table 2. Viet Cong Incidents

(The Weekly Report on the Situation in South Vietnam is based on contributions from CIA, DIA, and INR; it is edited and published by CIA without final coordination.)

THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

Political developments during the week continued to center around the forthcoming elections for a constitutional convention. Peripheral demonstrations and minor incidents of violence, however, helped to maintain a troubled atmosphere.

Friendly military operations decreased during the week, but enemy-initiated activity showed a slight rise, with the I Corps continuing to report the greatest number of Communist incidents.


NORTH VIETNAM
DEMARCATION LINE
Dong Ha
Quang Tri
QUANG TRI
Hue
THUA THIEN
I CORPS
QUANG NAM
QUANG TIN
Chu Lai
Quang Ngai
QUANG NGAI
KONTUM
Kontum
BINH DINH
An Khe
Qui Nhon
PLEIKU
PHU BON
PHU YEN
Tuy Hoa
DARLAC
II CORPS
Ban Me Thuot
KHANH HOA
Nha Trang
QUANG DUC
TUYEN DUC
Da Lat
NINH THUAN
Phan Rang
LAM DONG
PHUOC LONG
BINH LONG
TAY NINH
Tay Ninh
Phuoc Vinh
BINH DUONG
LONG KHANH
BINH TUY
BINH TUAN
Xuan Loc
BIEN HOA
PHUOC TUY
Vung Tau
III CORPS
CAPITAL MILITARY REGION
PHNOM PENH
Mekong
Sihanoukville
KIEN PHONG
KIEN TUONG
LONG AN
KIEN HOA
Vinh Long
KIEN GIANG
Can Tho
CHUONG THIEN
BA XUYEN
AN XUYEN
IV CORPS
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
LAOS
Savannakhet
Pakse
Attopeu
Saravane
Stoeng
Tonle Sap
GULF OF SIAM
SOUTH CHINA
SOUTH VIETNAM
CURRENT SITUATION

I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

A. POLITICAL SITUATION

1. Political developments during the week continued to center around the forthcoming elections for a constitutional convention. Peripheral demonstrations and minor incidents of violence, however, helped to maintain a troubled atmosphere.

2. Although a government advisory council recommended a 100-man committee to draft an election law, the government plans to convene only a 34-man group on 5 May to begin the work. Hopefully, the election regulations will be formulated by the end of the month, which will allow the government the 90-day period necessary for the mechanical organization of the elections themselves. However, now that the pressure of Buddhist and antigovernment demonstrations has ceased, there may be an inclination among some government officials to delay the election date. Indicative of this trend was a remark made by Premier Ky to newsmen on 3 May to the effect that the government would try to hold elections by October--a month later than had been indicated in the government decree of 14 April.

3. Despite a flurry of coup rumors last weekend that were evidently touched off by the dismissal of police director Lieu, current reporting indicates that various factions within the military government have no plans to engineer an internal coup for the time being. In regard to re-establishing government authority in central Vietnam, I Corps commander General Dinh has continued to utilize a conciliatory approach and to rely upon Buddhist cooperation to restore at least superficial order. Internal strife among Nationalist Party (VNQDD) elements in I Corps, however, has resulted recently in individual acts of violence in Da Nang. Catholic demonstrations opposing the struggle force are also continuing in the Da Nang area and near Saigon. A final factor that could cause further friction is the attempt by the incoming national police director, Colonel Nguyen Ngoc Loan, to install police officials in I Corps who are more responsive to Saigon. In particular, Loan has apparently

cc rmanded General Dinh's recent appointment of
a regional police director.

. Thus far, the Buddhists have voiced no ob-
j ons to the government's 34-man election law
c ing committee, and have shown little concern
(general election methods. However, they ap-
to be on a direct collision course with the
tary regime regarding the provisional govern-
that will function in the interim between
tions for a constitutional convention and the
al adoption and implementation of the constitu-
itself--a period that could stretch out to
rly a year. The Buddhists, in accordance with
recommendations of the National Political Congress
t met in Saigon last month, maintain that the
cted constitutional convention should name the
visional government, while Premier Ky and other
rrent government officials appear determined to
intain their primacy instead.

5. Conversations during the week between US Embassy officials and various Buddhist leaders indicate that the Buddhists do not plan to organize a formal party for the forthcoming elections, nor do they plan to put forth any actual candidates themselves. Instead, local committees will be established to back the "best candidates," regardless of their party or religious affiliation. Various Buddhists have also suggested that the candidates be elected on a provincial rather than a population basis, and that the constitutional convention should consist of between 100 and 150 representatives. Few details concerning the constitution itself were discussed by the Buddhists, although they probably will favor some sort of parliamentary system. The decision not to establish an overt political party reflects the past Buddhist tendency to maneuver freely behind the scenes with only minimal responsibilities, and will also make it difficult for other groups to organize against them.

6. The non-Buddhist groups that hope to influence the outcome of the upcoming elections show signs of attempting to unite against the Buddhists. The Catholics and the VNQDD were the most vociferous, especially in

I Corps and around Saigon, where they held rallies and demonstrations espousing anti-Communist, pro-American military, and--in some cases--anti - Tri Quang themes. At this time, however, there is little cohesion among the various groups. Some coalitions have been discussed privately between non-Buddhist leaders and with US officials, but the degree of public receptivity has not been determined.

Economic Situation

7. On 29 April a high-level meeting was held in Saigon between Vietnamese and US economic officials. As a result of this meeting, Minister Thanh agreed to release an additional $42 million in foreign exchange for GVN-financed imports in May and June, and announced that a directive had been issued on new procedures for goods imported under the commodity import program. USAID has worked closely with GVN Ministry of Economy Officials in writing a directive to establish a quarterly consolidation of import applications and to force importers to go through Office of Small Business procedures to a greater extent than heretofore. These procedures entail much stricter price checks. As a result of this GVN action, USAID agreed to release a large block of funds ($108 million) so that licensing can be resumed at a normal pace during the second quarter.

8. The rate of license applications for GVN-financed imports rose to 277 daily during 18-23 April, compared with a daily rate of only 100 during 1-8 April and 172 during 9-16 April. Importers were attempting to beat the 30 April deadline for license applications under the $58.4-million GVN foreign-exchange release announced on 7 March for March-April import licensing. Actual licensing of GVN-financed imports, which was negligible during March, amounted to $21.3 million during the first three weeks of April.

9. The index of Saigon retail prices was generally unchanged from last week. Rice prices, however, continued to rise and the price of the average grade reached a new retail high of 920 piasters per 100

kilograms. It appears that Minister Thanh's policy of selling government rice at low prices in Saigon has not been entirely successful. Although the Ministry of Economy is selling at low prices to retailers in Saigon, these retailers report a considerable lag in the delivery of this rice. Moreover, by exerting control over the rice brought to Saigon by convoy, the Ministry of Economy has reduced the flow of rice to the open market where dealers from surrounding provinces purchase large amounts of rice outside of the ministry's sales program. With demand remaining constant, this reduction in the supply of rice has resulted in higher prices on the open market.

10. In the Saigon free market, the price of US $10 bills rose one piaster per dollar to a 1966 high of 173, or close to the 1965 high of 175. The price of $10 MPC (scrip) also rose by one piaster per dollar to 119. On the other hand, both the piaster-dollar cross rate in Hong Kong and the price of gold fell by one piaster per dollar to 152 and 245, respectively.

CURRENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND COASTAL RAILROAD



Information as of 30 April 1966

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B. MILITARY SITUATION

1. Enemy-initiated activity increased during the week ending 30 April.

2. During this period there were 790 Communist-initiated incidents compared to the previous week's 765. There were 33 attacks (three large scale) and 527 acts of terrorism compared to the previously reported 20 and 570, respectively. The kill ratio favored free world forces 1.7 to 1 compared to the week before's recomputed 5.33 to 1. Viet Cong losses for the period were 456 killed and 98 captured. Vietnamese casualties for the period were 227 killed, 613 wounded, and 29 missing or captured--a total of 869 compared to the previous week's 368. US losses for the week were 70 killed and 589 wounded and three captured--a total of 662 compared to last week's 582. Free world forces lost two killed and 11 wounded (all ROK). The South Vietnamese lost 192 weapons (three crew served) while the Viet Cong lost 168 weapons (one crew served).

	KIA	WIA	MIA/ CAPTURED	TOTAL CASUALTIES
US	70	589	3	662
ARVN	227	613	29	869
THIRD COUNTRY	2	11	---	13
VIET CONG/PAVN	456	---	98	554

GVN/Allied Activities

3. Friendly large- and small-unit operations, as well as corresponding enemy contacts, decreased during the week.

4. In I Corps, US Marine elements conducting Operation GEORGIA in Quang Nam Province inflicted losses of 93 killed and 21 captured on the Viet Cong while sustaining losses of seven killed and 74 wounded.

5. Combined Operation FILLMORE (rice-harvest security) being conducted by elements of the US 101st

Airborne Division and the ROK Capital Division in Phu Yen Province of II Corps continues. Friendly forces have lost 16 killed and 105 wounded while inflicting losses of 193 killed and 44 captured on the enemy.

6. In Tay Ninh Province of III Corps, the forces conducting combined US/ARVN Operation BIRMINGHAM/AN DAN 79/66 successfully seized a large enemy supply cache. The units seized 1,364 tons of rice, 185.5 tons of salt, 6,800 uniforms plus several thousand sets of other clothing, and destroyed 27 base camps. Ninety-three Viet Cong have been killed and ten captured. Friendly forces have lost 42 killed and 175 wounded.

7. Elements of the ARVN 21st Division terminated a three-day search-and-destroy operation in Chuong Thien Province, IV Corps. Friendly units lost 29 killed and 138 wounded while reportedly killing 247 Viet Cong.

8. Free world forces conducted 104 battalion-size or larger operations during the week, 49 of them achieving contact--32 GVN, 14 US, one ROK, and two combined. There were 26,065 small-unit operations, including 3,584 conducted by US forces and 478 by free world forces. Of the 154 that achieved contact with the enemy, 98 were conducted by US units and two by free world forces.

9. Seven B-52 Stratofortress missions utilizing 54 aircraft were flown during the week ending 1 May. The target areas were in the South Vietnamese provinces of Tay Ninh, Quang Ngai, and Quang Tin.

10. On 25 April, a total of 15 aircraft (LOW STOOP III and IV) supported ground search-and-destroy Operation BIRMINGHAM in Tay Ninh Province. On 28 April in Quang Tin Province, a total of 18 aircraft (SPUR TIP I, II, and III) struck Viet Cong troops that were considered a threat to the Tien Phuoc Special Forces Camp; no ground follow-up was scheduled. On 29 April, three aircraft (SNAP CAP II) made a harassing attack in Quang Ngai Province against a reported enemy base and supply point near the Tra Bong Special Forces Camp; no ground follow-up was scheduled. On 30 April, three aircraft (FINE SAND

III) made a harassing attack in Quang Nam Province against a reported Viet Cong training camp. No ground follow-up was scheduled; however, ground search-and-destroy Operation GEORGIA is in this area. On 1 May, 15 aircraft (LOCK BOX IV) attacked a suspected ammunition storage area in Tay Ninh Province; no ground follow-up was scheduled.

11. During the period 22-28 April, a total of 2,455 tactical air strikes and armed reconnaissance sorties were flown by US Navy, Air Force, and Marine aircraft. VNAF aircraft flew a portion of the armed reconnaissance sorties. The cumulative results of these strikes as reported by pilots included the destruction of 2,015 structures, 38 bunkers, 47 sampans, 5 trenches, 213 huts, 49 riverboats, 7 AW positions, 5 storage areas, 3 trucks, and 1 radio station. Damage was reported to 1,263 structures, 5 bridges, 4 bunkers, 32 sampans, 223 huts, 9 riverboats, 14 AW positions, and 4 trucks. There were a total of 92 secondary explosions.

12. On 23 April, an A-4 Skyhawk was downed by probable ground fire approximately 80 nautical miles south-southeast of Saigon. The pilot ejected and was rescued.

13. Forces conducting Operation MARKET TIME searched 5,319 junks and 23,736 people. Of these, two junks and 66 people were detained. During the week, a US Coast Guard cutter was briefly fired on by a Cambodian PT boat off the northwestern tip of Phu Quoc Island, IV Corps. No damage or casualties resulted.

Communist Activity

14. I Corps continues to lead all other areas in incidents, especially terrorism and antiaircraft fire. The density of enemy units in the northern provinces probably has caused greater demands on the people for support. To ensure that the required support is rendered, in view of friendly activity in the area, the enemy has probably reverted to an increased terrorism campaign. Other activity in the area consisted of a mortar attack on the Hue airfield in Thua Thien Province on 24 April, railway and highway sabotage, and harassing attacks on friendly security elements and installations.

15. No significant Communist activity occurred in II Corps during the week. The continued low incident rate is probably an attempt by the enemy to avoid any act that might draw together the dissident political forces in this area.

16. In Phuoc Tuy Province of III Corps, an attack on a New Life Hamlet by an estimated Viet Cong battalion on 26 April and the simultaneous mortaring of a nearby post, resulted in friendly casualties of 40 killed and 18 wounded, with 21 weapons and two radios also lost. Enemy losses were one killed and one captured. Other activity consisted of small-scale attacks and harassing fire on friendly installations.

17. The greatest number of small-scale attacks occurred in IV Corps. Activity in the area continues to be limited to guerrilla-type, small-unit operations in comparison to the enemy activity in the northern corps areas. Although the enemy in IV Corps maintains the capability to mass large units whenever such an action would be advantageous, the lack of cover in the area and a continued ability to maintain influence through terrorism and small-unit actions indicates that the Communists will probably continue operating in the present manner, massing only when the advantages of such a move greatly overshadow the disadvantages.

18. Changes in lines of communication status consist of the opening of National Route 1 in Binh Dinh Province (except the portion south of Qui Nhon) and in Khanh Hoa Province. Route 14 is closed in Binh Long Province. An extended portion of the national railroad has been reopened between Ca Na, Ninh Thuan Province, and Ninh Hoa, Khanh Hoa Province.

C. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

1. Training for the specialized members (civil affairs, census/grievance, and new life development) of the revolutionary development cadre groups began on 25 April at the National Cadre Training Center. This class, the first to receive such training under the revised program, will number about 1,500 persons; some 3,200 cadres are programmed for specialist training in the next class.

2. The pacification effort is suffering from the effects of economic difficulties that seem to be hampering general progress throughout the country. Construction prices, due to inflation, are rising in some cases beyond the 1966 budget estimates of the program. To counteract the rising prices, the provinces have been authorized to use the reserve funds of the Revolutionary Development Ministry and to negotiate contracts directly with "able and trustworthy contractors" in cases where no bids at all for construction projects have been received.

3. On the basis of agreements reached at the Honolulu Conference substantial GVN/US planning is under way to revitalize village and hamlet governments. Reforms include the election of six-member village councils--possibly by 29 May, the date set for the election of one third of the provincial councils. Each elected village council would then select a council chairman and also a village chief, who up to now has been appointed by the province chief. The US has agreed to support a wage increase for village and hamlet officials to bring their salaries in line with those received by the cadre groups working in their areas.

4. The corps and district civil administrative apparatus has also been reviewed and will be the object of certain reforms. The corps commanders, who are also the official government delegates for civil administration, will be granted more latitude in controlling administrative personnel and in shifting funds within their regions. Three administrative bureaus, instead of the present five, will deal with military and political affairs, administration

and finance, and economic and social welfare. Proposed changes in the district apparatus include the establishment of an advisory council made up of the chairmen of the various village councils. Moreover, consideration is being given to the possible replacement of the district deputy for security--now a military officer--by a civilian.

Returnees (Chieu Hoi)

5. For the second consecutive week, the total number of defectors from the Viet Cong decreased significantly. Only 285 persons rallied during the week ending 22 April, apparently a result of the continuing political instability in the northern provinces and the lack of military activity. US Mission officials point out, however, that definite improvements in the program have been realized since last fall, and that high-level GVN officials have demonstrated more support since 1 January 1966.

6. Psychological operations before and after major military contacts have contributed heavily to the successful inducement of Vietnamese Communists and sympathizers to rally to the government. Millions of Chieu Hoi leaflets, safe conduct passes, and maps bearing instructions on how to rally have been dropped on known and suspected infiltration routes and in-country Viet Cong positions, often in conjunction with B-52 strikes. In the central highlands, leaflets written in tribal languages are being dropped. Moreover, day and night aerial broadcasts are being undertaken to heighten the enemy's anxieties, these broadcasts serve as a useful, though technically difficult, means of warning villagers of impending air strikes in their area.

II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC

1. The full text of Premier Pham Van Dong's report to last month's National Assembly meeting, which became available this week, indicated that the premier not only delivered a pep talk to the assembled delegates but also engaged in a relatively frank discussion of the difficulties caused by the US bombing raids. Dong admitted that the North Vietnamese had been forced to mobilize large segments of the population to keep transportation routes open and to strengthen both civil defense and antiaircraft defenses. The premier also confessed that the allocation of manpower resources to meet wartime priorities had been a real problem. The premier claimed, however, that this effort had paid off, and that the monthly average of tonnage moved had increased in 1966 over the last few months of 1965.

2. While cautioning against possible further US escalation of the war, Dong also struck an optimistic note by claiming that the Vietnamese had successfully challenged US military power during the past year, especially in the air. This same theme of optimism dominated a flood of DRV propaganda celebrating the alleged shootdown of the 1,000th US aircraft over North Vietnam on 29 April, a claim that is roughly four times the actual number of US losses. A Nhan Dan editorial occasioned by the shoot-down claim asserted that everywhere in the country people had made contributions to the fight, and that the militia and self-defense forces had demonstrated "many new capabilities and were playing an important role." One of the new capabilities mentioned by Nhan Dan was the ability to use ground-to-air missiles, the first public admission by the DRV that there are SAMs in the North Vietnamese arsenal.

Sino-Soviet Relations on Vietnam

3. The Chinese Communists bitterly assailed Soviet policy on Vietnam this week and flatly denied recent Soviet charges that Peking has hampered Soviet military shipments to the DRV. Speaking at a 30 April mass rally in Peking honoring a visiting high-level Albanian delegation, Premier Chou En-lai disparaged Soviet aid to Hanoi as meager in quantity and inferior

in quality. He also berated the present Soviet leadership in the harshest terms for "sham anti-imperialism" and for collaboration with the US.

4. Chou's remarks were followed up on 3 May with a Foreign Ministry statement designed to undercut Soviet claims of "all out" support for Vietnam and of Chinese obstructionism in the transport of military aid shipments to the DRV. The statement provided the first detailed information on the amount of Soviet military assistance transiting China for the DRV. It asserted that Communist China transported 43,000 tons of Soviet military supplies to North Vietnam in 1965, a figure close to intelligence estimates of the actual tonnage moved. In addition, the statement claimed that during the first quarter of 1966 the USSR used only one third of the 1,730 rail cars Communist China had agreed to make available for military deliveries, and that such goods as were sent by the Soviets had been moved on by the Chinese "with priority, at a high speed, and free of charge."

5. Despite Chinese protestations, however, evidence indicates that Peking has placed onerous restrictions on overland deliveries. Although the restrictions are unlikely to have limited the quantity or types of weapons supplied by the USSR to North Vietnam, they have slowed down the pace of deliveries.

6. This outpouring of Chinese invective betrays Peking's discomfiture over the effectiveness of the recent Soviet charges. Moreover, it probably also reflects Peking's sensitivity to the Soviet success in its call for "unity" at the 23rd CPSU congress last March.

III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS

A. PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN VIETNAM

On 26 April, the semi-official Vietnam Press Agency carried the BBC interview of GVN Foreign Minister Tran Van Do. In reply to a question referring to Senator Mansfield's recent proposals on Vietnam, Do stated that "we must all attempt to apply good will in order to help restore peace, but it is also necessary that our enemies, first and foremost, should have will for peace." Do noted that Senator Mansfield's apparent allusion to the Viet Cong as one of the "certain essential elements" in the Vietnamese situation showed "considerable generosity of spirit" toward an organization that "is only a propaganda instrument of Hanoi."

B. CAMBODIA

1. In a public speech on 24 April, Prince Sihanouk stated that the DRV, Cambodia, and the NFLSV have decided with Cambodia to sign "solemn agreements shortly at a summit meeting which would establish a definite basis for a peaceful coexistence between our two countries."

2. A US military spokesman in Saigon announced on 3 May that on 30 April a battalion of the US 1st Infantry Division operating on the eastern bank of the Gai Bac River in Tay Ninh Province received mortar and small-arms fire from the Cambodian side of the border and that the American commander then directed artillery fire on the gun positions. The US Embassy in Saigon recommends that a US protest be lodged with the Cambodian Government.

C. WEST GERMANY

Eight tons of medical supplies from the Federal Republic of Germany arrived in Saigon on 29 April. This is the first shipment of the 1,500 tons of medical supplies (valued at $4,375,000) offered by Germany.

SOUTH V IAM B TTLE STATISTICS

WEEKLY RE 23 APRIL-30APRIL 1966

SECRET

Total Personnel Losses

(Ki Action, Captured or Missing in Action, excluding Wounded in Action)



US Combat Casualties in Vietnam

(including North Vietnam)

	Fatalities	Non-fatal Wounds	Captured	Missing
Cumulative, 1961-1964	255	1524	10	12
Cumulative, 1965	1365	6110	15	136
Cumulative, 1966 to date	1532	9365	8	53
TOTAL	3152	16999	33	201



Total Friendly Forces Personnel Losses

(US/GVN/Other Free World)

Killed in action | Missing or Captured in action | Wounded in action

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SOUTH VIETNAM BA..LE STATISTICS

WEEKLY REPORT 23 APRIL - 30 APRIL 1966

Viet Cong Incidents



Viet Cong Attacks



Weapons Losses



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
APRIL 1966
PERSONNEL LOSSES
3301
1050
SECRET


SOUTH VIETNAM: BATTLE STATISTICS
MONTHLY REPORT
APRIL 1966
VIET CONG INCIDENTS
3235
110
262
2238
77
J F M A M J J A S O N D
1964
1965
1966
Attacks
Terrorism
Sabotage
Propaganda
SECRET
62107

SOUTH VIETNAM - BATTLE STATISTICS

MONTHLY REPORT

APRIL 1966

WEAPONS LOSSES
(South Vietnamese and Viet Cong)



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South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and Weapons Losses: 1962 - 30 April 1966

1. General Statistical Data:

Time Period		Viet Cong Incidents	Killed in Action		Wounded in Action		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
			GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
	1962	1825	299	1294	475	212	116	390	890	1896	-	-
Jan	1963	927	453	1754	908	318	102	379	1463	2451	457	683
	1964	1770	343	1223	913	-	555	240	1811	1463	917	532
	1965	2206	904	2203	1938	-	471	565	3313	2768	1700	711
	1966	3914	747	2648	1557	-	450	588	2754	3236	935	979
	1962	1460	244	1205	300	316	124	353	668	1874	-	-
Feb	1963	788	379	1082	656	303	82	292	1117	1677	253	399
	1964	2078	374	1055	916	-	303	289	1593	1344	708	471
	1965	1982	880	1564	1840	-	1394	309	4114	1873	2454	620
	1966	3100	1015	4727	2095	-	477	508	3587	5235	1076	1219
	1962	1961	523	1456	737	551	140	523	1400	2530	-	-
Mar	1963	1282	410	1443	851	368	66	222	1327	2033	467	367
	1964	2160	439	1456	1249	-	345	531	2033	1987	814	532
	1965	2056	751	2022	1633	-	720	394	3104	2416	1442	698
	1966	3670	938	5685	1961	-	466	604	3365	6289	1393	1632
	1962	1933	387	1596	532	292	151	415	1070	2303	-	-
Apr	1963	1331	506	1660	878	256	96	388	1440	2304	797	468
	1964	2284	594	1671	1584	-	398	245	2576	1916	990	424
	1965	1860	591	1909	1650	-	232	529	2473	2438	757	973
	1966	3235	573	2818	1522	-	121	483	2216	3301	594	829
	1962	1825	390	1756	509	352	94	524	993	2632	-	-
May	1963	1208	435	1895	889	295	94	695	1418	2885	463	564
	1964	2143	458	1135	987	-	202	242	1647	1377	723	281
	1965	2263	1049	1975	2143	-	873	548	4065	2523	1701	831
	1962	1477	325	1666	613	413	77	441	1015	2520	-	-
Jun	1963	1311	389	1863	772	310	90	437	1251	2609	580	394
	1964	2062	494	1005	1145	-	313	230	1952	1235	718	387
	1965	2597	1211	2208	1920	-	1260	189	4391	2397	2387	793
	1962	1564	384	1544	686	424	212	542	1282	2510	-	-
Jul	1963	1368	529	1918	1071	372	306	387	1906	2677	663	37[illegible]
	1964	3045	900	1427	1812	-	510	219	3222	1646	1889	44[illegible]
	1965	2520	1160	2980	1591	-	540	580	3425	3560	1375	88[illegible]

Time Period		Vi Cc Ir de	Killed in Action GVN	Killed in Action VC	Wounded in Action GVN	Wounded in Action VC	Captured or Missing GVN	Captured or Missing VC	Total Casualties GVN	Total Casualties VC	Weapons Losses GVN	Weapons Losses VC
Aug	1962	1	377	2271	626	367	63	669	1066	3307	-	-
	1963	1	411	1685	804	237	352	482	1567	2404	637	428
	1964	2	721	1449	1612	-	478	282	2811	1731	1106	619
	1965	2	808	3624	1945	-	287	606	3040	4230	705	1074
Sep	1962	1	419	2218	646	365	59	446	1124	3029	-	-
	1963	1	672	1982	1155	234	566	347	2393	2563	878	389
	1964	2	819	1187	1759	-	737	230	3315	1417	1465	525
	1965	2	655	3485	1724	-	266	838	2645	4323	778	838
Oct	1962	-	365	1967	619	286	64	373	1048	2626	-	-
	1963	2	428	1520	989	244	398	236	1815	2000	753	330
	1964	7	739	1617	1583	-	693	576	3015	2193	1510	482
	1965	30	961	3874	2416	-	225	660	3602	4534	762	1013
Nov	1962	1	410	1982	834	368	92	561	1336	2911	-	-
	1963	32	664	2333	1554	373	665	252	2883	2958	1595	455
	1964	32	574	1747	1404	-	410	570	2388	2317	1104	515
	1965	38	1034	5516	2056	-	520	592	3610	6108	1126	2164
Dec	1962	1346	294	2203	618	289	78	463	990	2955	-	-
	1963	1921	389	1440	961	191	320	190	1670	1821	724	546
	1964	2504	1002	1813	2053	-	1092	503	4147	2316	2111	666
	1965	4106	1239	4076	2262	-	926	516	4427	4592	1728	1158

Composite Annual Totals

Time Period	VC Incidents	KIA GVN	KIA VC	WIA GVN	WIA VC	Captured or Missing GVN	Captured or Missing VC	Total Casualties GVN	Total Casualties VC	Weapons Losses GVN	Weapons Losses VC
1962	19076	4417	21158	7195	4235	1270	5700	12882	31093	5195	4049*
1963	17852	5665	20575	11488	3501	3137	4307	20290	28383	8267	5397
1964	28526	7457	16785	17017	-	6036	4157	30510	20942	14055	5881
1965	31529	11243	35436	23118	-	7848	6326	42209	41762	16915	11755
**1966	13919	3273	15878	7135	-	1514	2183	11922	18061	3998	4659

*Monthly data unavailable for 1962 Weapons Losses.
**Through 30 April 1966

2. Viet Cong Incidents: 1962 - 30 April 1966

Time Period		Viet Cong Incidents	ATTACKS				Terrorism	Sabotage	Propaganda	Anti-Aircraft
			Small-Scale	Co. Size	BN. Size	Total				
Jan	1962	1825	528	21	0	549	839	180	257	-
	1963	927	242	8	2	252	447	49	179	-
	1964	1770	218	2	3	223	1244	129	174	-
	1965	2206	57	5	1	63	1489	272	170	212
	1966	3914	42	23	5	70	2490	312	299	743
Feb	1962	1460	480	20	0	500	613	137	210	-
	1963	788	181	13	1	195	433	69	91	-
	1964	2078	211	3	3	217	1389	210	271	-
	1965	1982	73	6	3	82	1411	267	91	131
	1966	3100	50	10	9	69	1829	201	172	829
Mar	1962	1961	561	27	0	588	660	290	423	-
	1963	1282	333	11	0	344	653	131	154	-
	1964	2160	198	4	1	203	1632	158	167	-
	1965	2056	80	3	3	86	1476	240	90	164
	1966	3670	32	10	10	52	2332	212	154	920
Apr	1962	1933	470	27	0	497	1024	220	192	-
	1963	1331	371	9	3	383	688	105	155	-
	1964	2284	211	6	3	220	1738	169	157	-
	1965	1860	38	1	4	43	1407	149	96	165
	*1966	3235	61	7	9	77	2238	252	110	513
May	1962	1825	490	28	0	528	892	154	251	-
	1963	1208	344	13	0	357	608	93	150	-
	1964	2143	170	3	2	175	418	217	140	193
	1965	2263	40	7	11	58	1558	365	115	170
Jun	1962	1477	339	23	0	362	736	157	222	-
	1963	1311	398	11	1	410	652	107	142	-
	1964	2062	128	10	2	140	1390	176	162	194
	1965	2597	62	1	6	69	1784	469	103	172

Time Period		Viet Cong Incidents	ATTACKS				Terrorism	Sabotage	Propaganda	Anti-Aircraft
			Small-Scale	Co. Size	BN. Size	Total				
Jul	1962	1564	437	10	1	448	735	158	223	-
	1963	1368	398	8	1	407	698	80	183	-
	1964	3045	166	12	7	185	2132	286	224	218
	1965	2520	42	0	6	48	1706	400	154	212
Aug	1962	1642	368	10	0	378	885	146	233	-
	1963	1349	356	11	1	368	647	113	221	-
	1964	2580	107	3	3	113	1775	315	173	204
	1965	2498	38	9	5	52	1597	349	200	300
Sep	1962	1375	382	9	0	391	624	178	182	-
	1963	1763	483	17	3	503	889	164	207	-
	1964	3091	110	4	4	118	1938	482	178	375
	1965	2473	19	7	5	31	1530	278	185	449
Oct	1962	1357	406	12	1	419	583	189	166	-
	1963	1422	359	6	0	365	802	105	150	-
	1964	2827	75	2	6	83	1790	480	197	277
	1965	3330	24	8	12	44	1969	415	198	704
Nov	1962	1311	411	7	3	421	614	144	132	-
	1963	3182	631	11	3	645	1990	269	278	-
	1964	1982	57	2	1	60	1391	247	109	175
	1965	3638	26	16	10	52	2234	486	255	611
Dec	1962	1346	375	8	1	384	670	107	185	-
	1963	1921	258	3	0	261	1298	111	251	-
	1964	2504	81	9	6	96	1719	318	128	243
	1965	4106	32	18	7	57	2572	442	317-	718
Composite Annual Totals										
	1962	19076	5247	6	212	5465	8875	2060	2676	No Data
	1963	17852	4354	15	121	4490	9805	1396	2161	No Data
	1964	28526	1732	41	60	1833	19556	3178	2080	1879
	1965	31529	531	73	81	685	20730	4132	1974	4008
	*1966	13919	185	50	33	268	8934	977	735	3005

*Through 30 April 1966

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PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

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[redacted]

GROUP 1
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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 93-68
Document # 146

DIST 6 MAY 1966

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 27-28 APRIL 1966

SUBJECT FORMER PRIME MINISTER QUAT'S VIEWS ON CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (1 MAY 1966) FIELD NO. [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

1. (SUMMARY: FORMER PRIME MINISTER DR. PHAN HUY QUAT RECENTLY REMARKED THAT HE IS WILLING TO TAKE NO MORE THAN A PASSIVE ROLE IN PREPARATIONS FOR THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS. QUAT SAID THAT AT A DINNER HOSTED BY PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN CAO KY, KY TOLD A GROUP OF PROMINENT POLITICIANS AND CABINET MEMBERS THAT HE WANTED 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
5/4/98

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

A CERTAIN NUMBER OF MILITARY MEMBERS ELECTED TO THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY. KY OBSERVED THAT THIS MILITARY GROUP WOULD BE ABLE TO MANEUVER GROUPS NOT ALIGNED WITH THE BUDDHISTS, SO THAT THE BUDDHISTS WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE ASSEMBLY. KY ALSO TOLD THE GROUP THAT THE MILITARY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE STABILITY OF THE NATION AND THAT IF ANY GOVERNMENT OR GROUPINGS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT FAVORED COMMUNISM OR NEUTRALISM; THE MILITARY WOULD CRUSH THEM.)

2. DURING A CONVERSATION ON 29 APRIL, FORMER PRIME MINISTER DR. PHAN HUY QUAT REMARKED THAT HE DID NOT INTEND TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PREPARATION OF THE MECHANISM FOR THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS. QUAT OBSERVED THAT HE WAS PERFECTLY WILLING TO TAKE PART IN MEETINGS WHICH WOULD SET FORTH THE GENERAL PLANS FOR THE ELECTIONS BUT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF HELPING TO FORMULATE THE VARIOUS DETAILS. [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)
[redacted] DR. QUAT WAS IN HIGH SPIRITS BUT NOT AS OPTIMISTIC AS HE HAD BEEN ON A PREVIOUS OCCASION CONCERNING THE SUCCESSFUL CARRYING OUT OF ELECTIONS. ALTHOUGH QUAT DID NOT EXPLAIN HIS DECREASING OPTIMISM, QUAT'S SUBSEQUENT REMARKS INDICATED THAT HIS CHANGE IN FEELING IS PROBABLY DUE TO "RECENT IRRESPONSIBLE ACTIONS" ON THE PART OF KY.)

3. QUAT DESCRIBED A DINNER HE HAD ATTENDED WHICH WAS GIVEN 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

BY PRIME MINISTER KY ON 27 APRIL. AMONG THE GUESTS WERE PROMINENT POLITICIANS SUCH AS LAWYER TRAN THANH HIEP, VIETNAM NATIONALIST PARTY (VNQDD) FACTION LEADER NGUYEN TUONG BA, LAWYER VUONG VAN BAC, DR. NGUYEN CAO HACH, REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE SOUTHERN OLD STUDENTS' ASSOCIATION, AND SOME MEMBERS OF THE CABINET. KY TOLD THE GROUP, WHICH TOTALED MORE THAN TWENTY, THAT HE WAS HOLDING THE DINNER TO THANK THOSE PRESENT FOR THEIR SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE DURING THE RECENT POLITICAL CRISIS AND IN MAKING PLANS FOR AN ELECTION-LAW DRAFTING COMMITTEE. BUI DIEM, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INFORMED THE GATHERING THAT THE ARMED FORCES WOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS IN ONE OF TWO WAYS. ACCORDING TO QUAT, DIEM SAID THE ARMED FORCES WOULD ASK FOR A NUMBER OF SEATS IN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY FOR MILITARY MEN SELECTED BY THE LEADERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OR WOULD PUT UP CANDIDATES TO RUN FOR ELECTION TO THE ASSEMBLY.

4. QUAT SAID THAT KY THEN INTERRUPTED BUI DIEM, STATING THAT THE ARMED FORCES WOULD MERELY SELECT AND SPONSOR THEIR OWN CANDIDATES FOR ELECTION, BUT WOULD NOT ASK THAT A SPECIAL NUMBER OF SEATS BE RESERVED FOR THE MILITARY. (FIELD COMMENT: [redacted] QUAT TOLD [redacted] THAT KY CLAIMED THE ARMY WOULD

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[redacted]

PRESENT CANDIDATES WHO WOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY BEING ELECTED SINCE ABOUT 500,000 PERSONS ARE IN THE MILITARY AND, COUNTING THEIR FAMILIES, THIS WOULD TOTAL SEVERAL MILLION PEOPLE. FROM THIS REMARK QUAT CONCLUDED THAT KY WAS STILL INFATUATED WITH THE IDEA OF A MILITARY POLITICAL PARTY ON THE KOREAN MODEL.)

5. QUAT EXPLAINED THAT KY THEN LAPSED INTO "THIS USUAL BOASTING" ABOUT THE ARMED FORCES AND TOLD THE GROUP THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT THE FACT THAT STABILITY WAS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ARMED FORCES, EVEN AFTER THE ELECTIONS. KY CONTINUED THAT THE ARMY WOULD HAVE TO BE ON ITS GUARD AND WOULD CRUSH ANY GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION OR GROUPINGS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT WHICH FAVORED COMMUNISM OR NEUTRALISM. (FIELD COMMENT: QUAT REMARKED DURING THE [redacted] CONVERSATION THAT HE WOULD BE THE FIRST TO SUPPORT THE RESUMPTION OF POWER BY THE MILITARY IF THICH TRI QUANG'S CLIQUE WERE TO GAIN POWER AND TRY TO IMPOSE A NEUTRALIST SOLUTION; BUT, QUAT ADDED, THERE ARE CERTAIN THINGS WHICH SHOULD BE DONE BUT NOT SAID.)

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6. DR. QUAT SAID THAT AT 2230 HOURS KY ANNOUNCED THAT HE WANTED TO APOLOGIZE BUT THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE TO HAVE "A BIT OF FUN." KY DEPARTED WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN HUU CO. QUAT COMMENTED THAT HE THOUGHT THEY EITHER WENT DANCING OR GAMBLING.

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• C-O-N-F-I[redacted]E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV USAID JUSPAO NAVFORV USARV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

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REPORT CLASS CONF[redacted]TIAL [redacted]

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PAGE 1 OF 9 PAGES

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[redacted]

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Case # NLJ 93-68
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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI

SUBJECT VIET CONG INVOLVEMENT IN CURRENT POLITICAL UNREST IN SOUTH VIETNAM: SITUATION APPRAISAL AS OF 9 MAY 1966

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON FIELD NO.

SOURCE [redacted]

1.5(c)
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1. THIS [redacted] APPRAISAL OF THE CURRENT SITUATION [redacted] IS NOT AN OFFICIAL JUDGMENT BY THIS AGENCY OR ANY COMPONENT. IT REPRESENTS THE OBSERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF A STAFF OFFICER BASED ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO HIM AT THE TIME OF ITS PREPARATION. PREPARED FOR INTERNAL USE [redacted] THIS COMMENTARY IS DISSEMINATED IN THE BELIEF THAT IT MAY BE USEFUL TO OTHER AGENCIES IN ASSESSING THE SITUATION FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES.

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2. (SUMMARY. THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT WHICH STARTED IN EARLY MARCH 1966 IN HUE AND DANANG, OSTENSIBLY IN RESPONSE TO THE REMOVAL OF GENERAL NGUYEN CHANH THI AS I CORPS COMMANDER, WAS QUICKLY TURNED INTO A MOVEMENT, DIRECTED FROM THE PAGODAS IN HUE AND CONTROLLED BY THICH TRI QUANG, TO OVERTURN THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM. THE VIET CONG

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(classification) (dissem controls)

(VC) ARE UNQUESTIONABLY INVOLVED IN MANY OF THE STRUGGLE GROUPS FORMED IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS THE DEGREE OF VC CONTROL OVER ORGANIZATIONS PARTICIPATING IN THE STRUGGLE. IN DANANG, BECAUSE OF APPARENT HIGH-LEVEL VC PENETRATIONS, THE VC MAY NOW BE ABLE TO MANIPULATE THE MOVEMENT TO THEIR OWN ENDS, AND QUANG MAY NO LONGER BE ABLE TO CONTROL IT. TWO KNOWN COMMUNISTS WHO HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN THE DANANG STRUGGLE MOVEMENT ALMOST FROM ITS INCEPTION ARE DANANG PEOPLE'S COUNCIL MEMBER HA XUAN KY, IDENTIFIED AS A PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (PRP) MEMBER, WHO IS CHAIRMAN OF THE PEOPLE'S FORCES TO STRUGGLE FOR REVOLUTION, DANANG, (PFSRD) EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE; AND POLITICAL ADVISOR TO THE PFSRD EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE TRAN DUY TAM, WHO WAS FORMERLY A MEDICAL ASSISTANT TO DANANG MAYOR DR. NGUYEN VAN MAN. KY AND TAM ARE IN CONTACT WITH CHE VIET TAN, SECRETARY OF THE PRP COMMITTEE FOR DANANG AND A MEMBER OF THE VC REGION V COMMITTEE. THEY ARE IN A POSITION TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR HOLD ON THE PFSRD BY FILLING IT WITH VC. HIGHER VC ECHELONS REPORTEDLY DIRECTED SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATIONS TO JOIN STRUGGLE ACTIVITIES BECAUSE OF THE IDENTITY OF VC INTERESTS WITH THOSE OF THE PFSRD. THE ASSAILANT WHO SHOT A VIETNAMESE NATIONALIST PARTY (VNQDD) MEMBER ON 2 MAY HAS BEEN TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED AS KNOWN COMMUNIST NGUYEN HUU TRANH. THE VC HAVE REPORTEDLY SENT 50 PROPAGANDA

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CADRES INTO DANANG TO BE INFILTRATED INTO THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT BY VC ALREADY IN PLACE, AND A VC CELL IN A DANANG LABOR ORGANIZATION WAS DIRECTED TO TRY TO WREST CONTROL OF THE DANANG SYNDICATE OF WORKERS UNIONS FROM ITS PRESENT LEADERS AND REPLACE THEM WITH PRP MEMBERS. OUTSIDE THE DANANG AREA, VC PENETRATION OF THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT IN I CORPS REMAINS ESSENTIALLY CONCEALED, BUT DR. LE KHAC QUYEN, A LEADER OF THE HUE STRUGGLE, HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED BY SEVERAL PERSONS AS A COMMUNIST OR PRO-COMMUNIST. DETERMINATION OF VC INVOLVEMENT OUTSIDE I CORPS IS STILL MORE DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE, BUT VC AGITATORS PARTICIPATED IN DEMONSTRATIONS IN SAIGON, KONTUM, BAN ME THUOT, NHA TRANG, AND DALAT, AND IN NHA TRANG A STUDENT ARRESTED FOR STRUGGLE ACTIVITIES ADMITTED WORKING FOR THE VC UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NHA TRANG MUNICIPAL VC COMMITTEE. A CAPTURED VC QUI NHON COMMITTEE DOCUMENT OF 16 MARCH DIRECTED SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATIONS TO TRY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE LEADERSHIP OF DEMONSTRATIONS AND TO SELECT SUITABLE DEMONSTRATION LEADERS FOR DEVELOPMENT AS VC UNDERGROUND CADRES.)

3. VC INVOLVEMENT IN THE POLITICAL UNREST WHICH HAS PLAGUED SOUTH VIETNAM SINCE MARCH 1966 HAS BEEN WIDESPREAD AND VARIED. PROPAGANDA OVER THE VC LIBERATION RADIO HAS URGED PEOPLE TO JOIN IN THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT AND OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT OF PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN CAO KY. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE VC ARE INVOLVED WITH MANY OF THE ASSORTED STRUGGLE GROUPS WHICH HAVE BEEN FORMED IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE COUNTRY,

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BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS WHICH ORGANIZATIONS ARE UNDER VC CONTROL AND TO WHAT DEGREE. ALL OF THESE GROUPS ARE TARGETS FOR VC PENETRATIONS; SOME MAY ACTUALLY BE ORGANIZED AND CONTROLLED BY THE VC IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRP DIRECTIVES.

4. THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT WHICH STARTED IN EARLY MARCH IN HUE AND DANANG, OSTENSIBLY IN RESPONSE TO THE REMOVAL OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL NGUYEN CHANH THI AS I CORPS COMMANDER, WAS QUICKLY TURNED INTO A MOVEMENT TO OVERTURN THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM. THE STRUGGLE EFFORT WAS ORGANIZED AND DIRECTED FROM PAGODAS IN HUE, WITH ULTIMATE CONTROL IN THE HANDS OF THICH TRI QUANG. ALTHOUGH QUANG HAS BEEN ABLE TO DIRECT THE NATIONWIDE MOVEMENT EFFECTIVELY UP TO THIS TIME, THE SITUATION IN DANANG MAY HAVE REACHED A POINT WHERE, BECAUSE OF APPARENT HIGH-LEVEL VC PENETRATIONS, QUANG MAY NO LONGER BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE MOVEMENT, AND THE VC MAY NOW BE ABLE TO MANIPULATE THE DANANG MOVEMENT TO THEIR OWN ENDS. QUANG MAY BE AWARE OF THE COMMUNIST BACKGROUNDS AND CONNECTIONS OF SOME OF THE TOP LEADERSHIP OF THE PFSRD, BUT HE MAY STILL FEEL THAT THEY WILL RESPOND TO THIS DIRECTION. WHILE QUANG MAY HAVE MISCALCULATED HIS OWN STRENGTH, HE MAY ALSO BE SYMPATHETIC WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF VC PENETRATION AGENTS.

5. ON THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE PFSRD ARE AT LEAST TWO KNOWN COMMUNISTS WHO HAVE BEEN ACTIVE ALMOST FROM THE INCEPTION OF THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT. ONE OF THESE IS HA XUAN KY, A LOCAL HIGH

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(classification) (dissem controls)

SCHOOL TEACHER, AN ELECTED MEMBER OF THE DANANG PEOPLE'S COUNCIL, AND CURRENTLY CHAIRMAN OF THE PSFRD EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. KY HAS A PREVIOUS HISTORY OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITY AND HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED BY TWO RELIABLE SOURCES AS A PRP MEMBER. HE HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH CHE VIET TAN, WHO IS IDENTIFIED AS SECRETARY OF THE PRP COMMITTEE FOR DANANG AND A MEMBER OF THE VC REGION V COMMITTEE. ANOTHER IDENTIFIED PENETRATION OF THE PFSRD EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE IS TRAN DUY TAM, MORE COMMONLY CALLED DR. TAM. THIS MAN HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS THE POLITICAL ADVISOR TO THE PFSRD EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND AS SUCH HE WIELDS CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE ON COMMITTEE ACTIONS. TAM HAS ALSO BEEN IN CONTACT WITH CHE VIET TAN, AND HE HAS INTERFERED IN LOCAL POLICE MATTERS BY PERSONALLY ORDERING RELEASE OF AN INDIVIDUAL DETAINED AS A VC CADRE. TAM PREVIOUSLY WORKED AS A MEDICAL ASSISTANT FOR DR. NGUYEN VAN MAN, MAYOR OF DANANG. ACCORDING TO ONE UNVERIFIED REPORT, TAM INTERCEDED WITH GENERAL THI TO HAVE DR. MAN APPOINTED AS MAYOR OF DANANG. THE FULL EXTENT OF THE INFLUENCE OF THESE TWO MEN ON THE COURSE OF THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT IN THE INTEREST OF DIRECT ASSISTANCE TO THE VC IS YET TO BE DETERMINED. IT IS CLEAR THAT THEY ARE IN A POSITION TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR HOLD ON THE ORGANIZATION BY CAREFULLY SEEDING THE MOVEMENT WITH FELLOW COMMUNISTS TO THE EXTENT THAT IT WILL NO LONGER BE RESPONSIBLE TO ANY AUTHORITY BUT THEIRS. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT. [redacted] WHICH REPORTED ON DISSIDENT GROUPS INVOLVED

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IN ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES IN DANANG FROM 11 MARCH TO 10 APRIL, LISTED KY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE "PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE COMMITTEE FOR DANANG," RATHER THAN THE PFSRD, WHICH WAS SHOWN IN THAT REPORT AS "THE POPULAR FORCES TO STRUGGLE FOR REVOLUTION," LED BY BUDDHIST BONZE THICH TRI HUU AS CHAIRMAN OF ITS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. TAM WAS NOT LISTED AS A MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF EITHER ORGANIZATION IN THAT REPORT.)

6. THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN SOME INFILTRATION OF PRP CADRES INTO THE LOWER LEVELS OF THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT. A PARTICULARLY OUTSTANDING INSTANCE IS PENETRATION OF THE SO-CALLED "SECURITY SERVICE" OF THE STRUGGLE ORGANIZATION, WHICH IS COMPOSED LARGELY OF LOCAL HOODLUM ELEMENTS. THE ASSAILANT IN THE 2 MAY SHOOTING OF A VNQDD MEMBER HAS BEEN TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED AS NGUYEN HUU TRANH, A KNOWN COMMUNIST AND AN AGENT OF DR. MAN. IN ADDITION TO HIS CONNECTION WITH THE VC, THANH HAS AN OLDER BROTHER IN THE DANANG GARRISON COMMAND WHO IS KNOWN TO HAVE A FEMALE VC LIAISON CADRE-COURIER LIVING IN HIS HOUSE. A FAIRLY RELIABLE REPORT INDICATES THAT THE VC HAVE SENT INTO DANANG A GROUP OF 50 TRAINED POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA CADRES TO BE INFILTRATED INTO THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT BY VC ALREADY IN PLACE.

7. ATTEMPTS BY VC TO PENETRATE AND MANIPULATE THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT HAVE BEEN CONTINUOUS SINCE ITS INCEPTION, AND IT IS POSSIBLE

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1.5(e)
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THAT THE VC ANTICIPATED THE OCCURRENCE OF LARGE-SCALE CIVIL DISTURBANCES BEFORE THI'S REMOVAL. IN LATE FEBRUARY, A SENIOR PRP OFFICIAL, POSSIBLY CHE VIET TAN, ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO A STUDENT FRONT ORGANIZATION, PROBABLY THE LIBERATION STUDENT AND PUPIL ASSOCIATION, TO ORGANIZE STUDENT AND YOUTH GROUPS IN DANANG, AS WELL AS TAM KY, HOI AN, HUE, AND QUANG TRI BY THE MIDDLE OF MARCH. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO INDICATION OF THE MISSION OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS, IT PROBABLY WAS TO CAUSE AS MUCH TURMOIL AS POSSIBLE IN ANY DISTURBANCE AS WELL AS TO DISSEMINATE VC PROPAGANDA. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THESE WERE TO BE DECOY ORGANIZATIONS WHICH COULD DO CONTROLLED AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA WORK, AND IF THEY WERE ELIMINATED THIS WOULD NOT ENDANGER THE PRINCIPAL COVERT APPARATUS. IN ADDITION, THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL REPORTS OF HIGHER VC ORGANIZATIONS IN THE DANANG AREA PASSING INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBORDINATE ORGANIZATIONS TO JOIN WITH STRUGGLE GROUP ACTIVITIES BECAUSE OF AN IDENTITY OF INTERESTS BETWEEN THE VC AND THE PFSRD. ONE ELEMENT OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO THE VC AS A PENETRATION TARGET IS THE DANANG LABOR MOVEMENT. NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM DANANG COUNCIL CHAIRMAN HA KY NGO DIRECTED THAT A SECRET CELL IN AN UNIDENTIFIED LABOR ORGANIZATION, POSSIBLY THE DANANG SYNDICATE OF DRIVERS AND MECHANICS, WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO BE HIGHLY INFILTRATED BY VC, TO

1.5(e)
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START AGITATING TO WREST CONTROL FROM THE PRESENT LEADERS OF THE DANANG SYNDICATE OF WORKERS UNIONS, WHOSE PLACES WOULD THEN BE FILLED BY PRP MEMBERS.

8. THE EXTENT OF VC PENETRATION IN I CORPS OUTSIDE THE DANANG AREA REMAINS ESSENTIALLY CONCEALED. IN HUE THERE MAY BE SOME PENETRATION AT THE TOP OF THE MOVEMENT IN THE PERSON OF DR. LE KHAC QUYEN, WHO HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED BY SEVERAL PERSONS AS A COMMUNIST, OR AT LEAST VERY PRO-COMMUNIST. THERE ARE PROBABLY VC PENETRATIONS AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE HIGHLY ACTIVE HUE UNIVERSITY STUDENT BODY, BUT THERE IS NO CLEAR LINK TO VC ORGANIZATIONS, AND THE STUDENT LEADERS RETAIN CONTROL OF THEIR FOLLOWERS. STUDENTS FROM THIS UNIVERSITY APPARENTLY PROVIDED CADRES WHO WENT TO OTHER PARTS OF I CORPS, AND PERHAPS BEYOND, TO ORGANIZE A STRUGGLE MOVEMENT AMONG STUDENTS AND OTHER GROUPS.

9. IT IS MORE DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF VC INVOLVEMENT IN THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT AS IT SPREAD FROM I CORPS TO OTHER AREAS OF THE COUNTRY. THE VC ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO THEIR MUNICIPAL COMMITTEES TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION. VC AGITATORS PARTICIPATED IN DEMONSTRATIONS ORGANIZED AND DIRECTED BY BUDDHISTS IN SAIGON, KONTUM, BAN ME THUOT, NHA TRANG, DALAT, AND OTHER CITIES. A CAPTURED DOCUMENT DATED 16 MARCH FROM THE VC COMMITTEE FOR QUI NHON TO SUBORDINATE SECTIONS REVEALS THE TACTICS THAT THE VC WERE USING [redacted]

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C-O-N-F-[redacted]-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

THE DOCUMENT REQUESTED THAT THE SUBORDINATE SECTIONS: "REPORT URGENTLY EVENTS AMONG STUDENTS AND BUDDHISTS FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, AND LISTEN TO THE RADIO FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. PREPARE MATERIALS FOR USE, INCLUDING FLAGS, SLOGANS, LEAFLETS, EXPLOSIVES, AND GRENADES. DURING DEMONSTRATIONS URGE PEOPLE TO PARTICIPATE. ATTEMPT TO PARTICIPATE IN LEADERSHIP OF DEMONSTRATIONS AND WIN A NUMBER OF LEADERS SO THAT VC SLOGANS WILL BE USED. AT NIGHT SPREAD PROPAGANDA AND MOUNT MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST AMERICANS. SELECT DEMONSTRATION LEADERS WITH POSITIVE, ADVANCED, AND ENERGETIC ACTIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT AS UNDERGROUND CADRES." SIMILAR INSTRUCTIONS PROBABLY WERE ISSUED IN ALL PARTS OF THE COUNTRY.

10. POSSIBLY THE MOST CLEAR-CUT EXAMPLE OF VC INVOLVEMENT IN THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT OUTSIDE I CORPS IS THE CASE OF NGUYEN THI PHUNG, WHO WAS ACTIVE IN THE STUDENT STRUGGLE MOVEMENT IN NHA TRANG. MISS PHUNG WAS ARRESTED ON 23 APRIL AND ADMITTED WORKING FOR THE VC UNDER THE DIRECTION OF HUYNH TUONG, SECRETARY OF THE NHA TRANG VC MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE. SHE APPEARED TO BE A RECENT VC RECRUIT, INDICATING THAT THE VC MOVED QUICKLY TO PENETRATE STUDENT GROUPS.

11. FIELD DISSEM. STATE USMACV USAID JUSPAO NAVFORV USARV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

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PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI [redacted]

SUBJECT RETIRED GENERAL TRAN VAN DON'S VIEW THAT THE BUDDHISTS STOPPED ANTIGOVERNMENT AGITATION TOO SOON

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted] FIELD NO. [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted]

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1. [redacted]

1.5(e)
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[redacted] RETIRED GENERAL TRAN VAN DON LAMENTED THE FACT THAT THE BUDDHISTS HAD STOPPED THEIR ANTIGOVERNMENT CAMPAIGN "IN THE MIDDLE". THUAN EXPLAINED TO DON THAT THE BUDDHISTS HAD NOT WANTED TO BECOME TOO INVOLVED IN POLITICS (SIC) OR PERSONALITIES. THUAN CLAIMED THE BUDDHISTS ONLY WANT AN ELECTED NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR THE GOOD OF THE COUNTRY. DON REPLIED THAT IT WAS REGRETTABLE THAT THE BUDDHISTS HAD NOT CONTINUED TO INDICATE LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN CAO KY, FOR IN THAT CASE DON WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MOVE AGAINST

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(classification) (dissem controls)

THE GOVERNMENT.

2. PROFESSOR THUAN TOLD DON THAT HE WAS DISAPPOINTED IN DON BECAUSE DON HAD EARLIER HINTED THAT HE COULD TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT IF THE BUDDHISTS MOVED IN CENTRAL VIETNAM. DON CONTINUED TO STICK WITH HIS ARGUMENT THAT THE BUDDHISTS HAD STOPPED TOO SOON. DON STATED THAT HE WAS NOT IN CONTROL OF THE ARMY AND HE HAD NEITHER THE MONEY NOR THE CAPABILITY OF HANDING OUT PROMOTIONS IN ORDER TO BUY OFF KEY OFFICERS.

3. THUAN MAINTAINED THAT THE BUDDHISTS DO NOT WANT DON TO STAGE A COUP BUT RATHER TO ORGANIZE SOUTHERNERS POLITICALLY AND INSTILL IN THEM SOME POLITICAL REACTIONS SO THAT THEY WILL PLAY A ROLE IN THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL LIFE. THUAN SAID THAT DON HAS TWO POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS; THE "LIEN TRUONG" FOR INTELLECTUALS AND THE "DONG NAI" FOR WORKERS. (FIELD COMMENT: [redacted] REPORTED THAT THESE ORGANIZATIONS HAD BEEN GRANTED OFFICIAL ORGANIZATION PERMITS.) 1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1)

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USAID JUSPAO USMACV USARV NAVFORV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL [redacted] 1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[redacted]

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Case # NLJ 93-68
Document # 138

DIST 13 MAY 1966

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 8 MAY 1966

SUBJECT REMARK BY GENERAL TRAN VAN MINH THAT HE HAS HEARD THE BUDDHISTS WOULD ACCEPT HIM AS PRIME MINISTER AND MINH'S VIEW THAT A NEW GOVERNMENT SHOULD HAVE SOUTHERN LEADERSHIP

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted] FIELD NO. [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1. ACCORDING TO GENERAL TRAN VAN MINH, WHO HAS BEEN UNASSIGNED SINCE JULY 1965, NGUYEN HOANG KINH OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TOLD MINH THAT MINH'S NAME APPEARS ON A LIST COMPILED BY THE BUDDHISTS OF PERSONS WHO WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE FOR THE JOB OF PRIME MINISTER. KINH FURTHER TOLD MINH THAT BUDDHIST INSTITUTE CHAIRMAN THICH TAM CHAU HAD REMARKDED THAT MINH IS A MODERATE CATHOLIC ACCEPTABLE TO THE BUDDHISTS. KINH EXPLAINED THAT THE BUDDHIST LIEADERSHIP HAS ALREADY ENDORSED

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CONFIDENTIAL [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)
(classification) (dissem controls)

RETIRED GENERAL TRAN VAN DON AS A FUTURE PRIME MINISTER AND THAT MINH, THEREFORE, COULD POSSIBLY BE CONSIDERED EITHER A "DARK HORSE" OR COMPROMISE CANDIDATE ACCEPTABLE TO MILITARY-POLITICAL-RELIGIOUS LEADERS.

2. GENERAL MINH STATED THAT HE TENDED TO DISCOUNT THE EVEN REMOTE POSSIBILITY OF HIS HAVING A CHANCE FOR THE POST OF PRIME MINISTER. MINH ADDED THAT HE WAS READY TO SERVE HIS COUNTRY IN ANY USEFUL MANNER. MINH CLAIMED HE WOULD NOT PERMIT HIMSELF TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY ACTION AIMED AT VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT.

3. ON 4 MAY MINH EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT GENERAL DON WAS PERHAPS THE ONE PERSON WHO HAD ALL THE NECESSARY QUALIFICATIONS FOR MAKING HIM AN ACCEPTABLE PRIME MINISTER. MINH OBSERVED THAT KEY MILITARY PERSONALITIES WOULD ACCEPT DON BECAUSE OF HIS MILITARY BACKGROUND, A CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH WOULD INCREASE HIS LASTING POTENTIAL. FURTHERMORE, DON IS A SOUTHERNER. MINH THOUGHT FORMER PRIME MINISTER TRAN VAN HUONG WOULD BE AN IDEAL CHIEF OF STATE FOR DON. MINH CONTINUED THAT HE TRIED ALWAYS TO REMAIN APOLITICAL BUT, IF DON ASKED HIM TO PARTICIPATE IN A NEW GOVERNMENT, HE WOULD ACCEPT. MINH, WHO IS A SOUTHERNER, EMPHASIZED THAT GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP DOWN TO PROVINCE AND LOCAL LEVEL MUST BE IN THE HANDS OF SOUTHERNERS. HE COMMENTED THAT IT IS QUITE

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LOGICAL THAT THE POPULATION IS RESTIVE BECAUSE MOST GOVERNMENT POSTS AT ALL LEVELS ARE HELD BY NORTHERNERS.

4. NO DIRECT CONTACT EXISTS BETWEEN DON AND MINH, ACCORDING TO GENERAL MINH. MINH NOTED THAT TWO OF HIS AIDES REPORTED THAT EVIDENTLY DON HAD MADE CONTACTS IN MILITARY CIRCLES AND CIRCULATED MINH'S NAME AS ONE WHO WOULD BE NONCONTROVERSIAL AND A SUITABLE MILITARY CANDIDATE FOR A KEY GOVERNMENT POST. THE AIDES HAD HEARD THIS FROM A NUMBER OF JUNIOR AND FIELD GRADE OFFICERS.

5. GENERAL MINH SAID THAT ELECTIONS SHOULD BE DEFERRED INDEFINITELY. MINH REMARKED THAT HE FEARED ELECTIONS WOULD SERVE TO CONFUSE THE SITUATION MORE AND THAT THE VIET CONG WOULD SURELY EXPLOIT SUCH TO THEIR ADVANTAGE.

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USAID JUSPAO USMACV USARV NAVFORV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

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Case # NLJ 91-117
Document # 1436

SECRET

NSC HISTORY INTEREST

1436

Friday, May 13, 1966

The following is the text of a CIA report [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Chou en Lai [redacted] in June 1965, [redacted] said, [redacted] We Chinese are not prepared to accept arbitration or mediation from anyone. On the contrary, we are going to accelerate the Vietnamese war to force the United States to accelerate in turn until the number of U.S. troops there reaches 700,000.

Why, Chou asked, are we doing this? In order to force the U.S. to draw troops from her Asian bases (SIC) and from the U.S. itself for Vietnam. This will automatically increase the hostility of the American people to the U.S. Vietnam policy.

Further, the U.S. will commit large scale atrocities against North Vietnam and this will prove to the yellow race that the U.S. is waging a major war to liquidate all colored people, whether yellow or black. This will cause the people of Asia to hate the Americans.

Thus, we have a doubled edged policy: one for bringing pressure to bear on the U.S. against Vietman policy, and one for causing Asians to oppose U.S. policy. This double edged policy will lead us to our ultimate goal which we want to see realized soon: America will not try to interfere in any area of Asia so as not to repeat their experience in Vietnam. This will give us a free hand in Asia which rightfully belongs to us.

When nations of Asia know the U.S. will not come to defend them and have clear in their minds the U.S. failure in Vietnam plus the American atrocities committed there, then we will have a free hand to liberate Asia

SECRET

[redacted] We intend not only to win in Vietnam, but to make out of it the gateway for the liberation of Asia from American imperialism. Asia belongs to China. It belongs to China more than Latin America belongs to the U.S. We are hindering Soviet aid to North Vietnam because we want nations of Asia to know that their affairs are decided by us and that we have no partners.

[redacted]

[redacted] Chou clearly implies a climax when U.S. troop strength in Vietnam reaches 700,000 with a resulting defeat for the U.S. in Asia and the complete loss of its position. Whether this is to be accomplished by a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam dictated by a military defeat or by political pressures within the U.S. and Asia is not clear.

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Intelligence Information Cable IN 141

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

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C-O-N-F-I-[redacted]E-N-T-I-A-L 152344Z CITE [redacted] 1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1)

DIST 15 MAY 1966

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 15 MAY 1966

SUBJECT SITUATION REPORT AS OF 2000 HOURS LOCAL TIME

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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 93-68
Document # 141

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (15 MAY 1966) FIELD NO.

SOURCE THIS IS A SOUTH VIETNAM SITUATION REPORT PREPARED AS OF 2000 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 15 MAY [redacted] 1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1)

[redacted]

1. ON THE EVENING OF 15 MAY 1966 DANANG CITY APPEARED TO BE HELD BY GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) FORCES. THE CURFEW, WHICH IS FROM 2000 HOURS TO 0500, WAS BEING EFFECTIVELY ENFORCED IN DANANG BY MARINES, AND THE CITY WAS QUIET. THE GVN MOVE TO BRING DANANG BACK UNDER ITS AUTHORITY WAS EXECUTED WITH DISPATCH AND, ON THE WHOLE, EFFICIENTLY. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE STRUGGLE FORCES WERE TAKEN BY SURPRISE, AND ON THE EVENING OF 14 MAY THE ADVANTAGE LAY WITH THE GVN, WHEREAS IN THE MORNING IT LAY WITH THE STRUGGLERS. AFTER INITIAL GAINS IN ESTABLISHING THEMSELVES IN KEY TARGETS, GVN MARINES PULLED BACK AND CONSOLIDATED POSITIONS. 1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1)

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(classification) (dissem controls)

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5/4/98

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C O N F [redacted] E N T I A L [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

2. AT 1800 HOURS OPERATIONS BEGAN IN DANANG WHICH SEEMED DESIGNED TO CAPTURE TINH HOI PAGODA, THE NEW STRUGGLE HEADQUARTERS AND REPORTEDLY THE PRESENT LOCATION OF DANANG MAYOR NGUYEN VAN MAN AND DANANG POLICE CHIEF LUU VAN NGO. OTHER ACTIVITIES DURING THE DAY SEEMED DESIGNED TO INTIMIDATE DIEHARD STRUGGLERS AND IMPRESS THOSE WHO HAD BEEN FORCED INTO THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT WITH THE POWER OF THE GVN. TROOPS ROVED THE CITY, FLUSHING OUT STRUGGLE ADHERENTS BUT NEVER PUSHING THEIR FIREPOWER ADVANTAGE TO THE MAXIMUM. PLANES FLEW OVER THE CITY CONTINUOUSLY IN A CONSIDERABLE SHOW OF STRENGTH.

3. PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN CAO KY AND DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE LOAN WERE AT THE DANANG AIR BASE DIRECTING THE MOVES OF GOVERNMENT FORCES AND APPARENTLY ATTEMPTING TO HANDLE THE SITUATION SO THAT IT WILL RESULT IN A MINIMUM OF DEATHS AND OTHER INCIDENTS THAT COULD CAUSE ADVERSE REACTION FROM THE PEOPLE, WHILE STILL FIRMLY REASSERTING THE AUTHORITY OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

4. THE PEOPLE OF DANANG GENERALLY DO NOT SEEM GREATLY DISTURBED BY THE PRESENCE OF THE MARINES. THERE APPEARS TO BE NO OVERT HOSTILITY TOWARD AMERICANS. THE CIVILIAN POPULACE IS GOING ABOUT ITS BUSINESS, EXCEPT THAT YOUNG PEOPLE ARE CLUSTERED AROUND VARIOUS PAGODAS, APPARENTLY AS MUCH OUT OF CURIOSITY AS ANYTHING ELSE. GVN TROOP MORALE APPEARS HIGH.

5. THERE HAS BEEN A REPORT THAT 1000 "SUICIDE YOUTH" ARE IN DANANG ARMED WITH KNIVES AND GRENADES. AT 1900 THE POWER WENT OFF IN THE SECTION OF THE CITY WHERE MOST OF THE ACTIVITY TOOK PLACE DURING THE DAY--THE AREA

1.5(e)
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1.5(e)
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C-O-N-F-I-D-[redacted]-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

OF THE RADIO STATIONS AND THE BUDDHIST SCHOOL. STRUGGLERS WILL PROBABLY TRY TO REGROUP AND, IF NOTHING ELSE, HARASS GVN TROOPS. SHOULD THE STRUGGLERS ACCEPT DEFEAT IN DANANG, THEY WILL PROBABLY CARRY ON IN HUE.

6. ALTHOUGH THE SITUATION IN HUE SEEMS QUIET FOR THE MOMENT, THE PRESENCE OF A MILITARY POWER BASE AMONG UNITS OF THE FIRST DIVISION AND THE LEADERSHIP QUALITIES OF THICH TRI QUANG GIVE THE STRUGGLE FORMIDABLE POTENTIAL FOR CONTINUING.

7. IN HOI AN, COLONEL DAM QUANG YEU IS DEEPLY COMMITTED TO THE STRUGGLE AND CONSTITUTES A THREAT TO CENTRAL AUTHORITY SECOND ONLY TO THOSE IN HUE. AS OF 1800 ON 14 MAY HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO COERCE BUI QUANG SAN, S-2 OF RCC IN QUANG NAM, TO SIGN A STATEMENT TO BE USED IN LOUDSPEAKER BROADCASTS IN HOI AN SAYING SAN IS AGAINST THE GVN. YEU ALSO CONTINUES TO USE THE THEME THAT GENERAL WALT AND AMBASSADOR PORTER ARE FOR THE STRUGGLERS. HOWEVER, YEU HAS HIS HANDS FULL, AND CURRENT REPORTING INDICATES THAT ONE COMPANY OF THE 39TH RANGER BATTALION WHICH HOLDS HOI AN AIRPORT IS PRO-GVN. AT LEAST THREE OF THE TOTAL OF FIFTEEN M113 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS WOULD COOPERATE WITH GOVERNMENT FORCES.

8. AT THE MOMENT, THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE SEEMS TO HAVE REDUCED THE STRUGGLERS' POTENTIAL TO REACT QUICKLY. HOWEVER, MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE BEFORE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CAN FEEL SAFE IN DANANG OR I CORPS,

1.5(e)
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(classification) (dissem controls)

1.5(c)
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C-O-N-F-I-D[redacted]N-T-I-A-L [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

AND THE MANNER IN WHICH IT USES THE TIME OBTAINED BY SURPRISE WILL DETERMINE THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THIS MOVE TO REASSERT GOVERNMENT CONTROL BY FORCE OF ARMS.

9. FIELD DISSEM. STATE USMACV USAID JUSPAO NAVFORV USARV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

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3.4(b)(1)

C O N F I [redacted] E N T I A L [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

PRIORITY

IN 142

PAGE 1 OF 7 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC
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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

DIST 15 MAY 1966

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 15 MAY 1966

SUBJECT SITUATION REPORT FROM 0200 TO 1930 LOCAL TIME

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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 93-68
Document # 142

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (15 MAY 1966) FIELD NO.

SOURCE THIS IS A SOUTH VIETNAM SITUATION REPORT PREPARED FROM 0200 TO 1930 LOCAL TIME ON 15 MAY 1966 BY CAS. [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

1. [redacted] GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM MARINES MOVED INTO DANANG BETWEEN 0200 AND 1400 HOURS ON 15 MAY 1966. DANANG MAYOR NGUYEN VAN MAN REPORTEDLY FLED DANANG. ALL AIR VIETNAM FLIGHTS WERE CANCELLED FOR 15 MAY, PRESUMABLY TO RESTRICT TRAVEL OF UNDESIRABLE ELEMENTS OR POSSIBLY BECAUSE OF GVN AIR TRANSPORT NEEDS. AT 0400 HOURS ON 15 MAY. SAIGON POLICE RAIDED THE BUDDHIST YOUTH CENTER AT 233 HIEN VUONG AND THE LABOR OFFICE AT 197 LE TAY WHICH WAS THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMUNIST-INFLUENCED LABOR YOUTH ASSOCIATION RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ANTI-UNITED STATES DEMONSTRATION ON MAY DAY.

2. AT 0630 SEVEN TANKS UNDER MARINE COMMAND TOOK OVER I CORPS HEADQUARTERS IN DANANG, DISARMING VIETNAMESE ARMY TROOPS THERE. ONE OR TWO PLATOONS OCCUPIED THE STRUGGLE HEADQUARTERS AT PHO DA PAGODA. 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

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1.5(e)
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THE SECOND MARINE BATTALION WAS REPORTED TO BE MOVING TOWARD DANANG FROM QUANG NGAI, AND THE SECOND BATTALION OF THE SEVENTH REGIMENT OF FIRST DIVISION WAS REPORTED TO BE MOVING TOWARD HUE FROM PHU BAI. SOME GRENADES WERE THROWN EARLY IN THE DAY, BUT NO CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED FROM EARLY ACTION. DANANG CITY WAS QUIET, WITH SKY RAIDERS AND OBSERVATION PLANES OVERHEAD. THE RANGERS WERE IN THE NORTH PART OF THE CITY, AND THE MARINES IN THE SOUTHERN PART.

3. THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT MOVED FAST TO SET UP DEFENSES IN MANY PARTS OF DANANG, AND THE STRUGGLE RADIO BROADCAST THE FOLLOWING MESSAGES:

A. "ORDER OF ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY HEADQUARTERS: (1) ARTILLERY STAND BY TO FIRE AT TWO TARGETS--MILITARY AND CIVILIAN AIRPORTS. (2) ANTIAIRCRAFT UNITS STAND BY AND READY TO FIRE. ISSUED FOR COLONEL DAM QUANG YEU, COMMANDING OFFICER, BY MAJOR TRAN HUU TRAI, CHIEF OF STAFF."

B. "A CALL TO THE MARINES: YOU SHOULD JOIN THE RANKS OF REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE IN I CORPS TO FIGHT AGAINST KY AND HIS PUPPETS TO BUILD A TRUE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY."

4. AT 0715 HOURS COLONEL YEU FLEW TO HOI AN FROM DANANG. HE ALERTED THE QNSS MILITARY COMMAND, AND DEPLOYED AN ARMORED PERSONNEL SQUADRON TO GUARD THE CITY AND APPROACHES. SOMETIME DURING THE MORNING

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

C-O-N-F-[redacted]-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

TWO COMPANIES OF THE 39TH RANGER BATTALION, NORMALLY STATIONED AT QNSS HEADQUARTERS IN HOI AN TRIED TO MOVE TOWARD MIEU BONG, SOUTH OF DANANG, BUT WERE BUZZED BY A VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF) FIGHTER PLANE, AFTER WHICH A LIGHT VNAF AIRCRAFT DROPPED A MESSAGE TO THE COLUMN WARNING IT NOT TO PROCEED TO DANANG. YEU ALLEGED THAT PAT ELEMENTS IN QUANG NAM WERE ASSEMBLING AT DIEN BAN WITH THE INTENTION OF MARCHING NORTH TO DANANG. (FIELD COMMENT. PRESUMABLY YEU WAS IMPLYING THE PAT ELEMENTS INTENDED TO GO TO THE ASSISTANCE OF GVN FORCES IN DANANG.)

5. AT 1000 HOURS AN ORDER ORIGINATED BY SECOND DIVISION COMMANDER GENERAL LAM WENT INTO EFFECT RESTRICTING ALL TROOPS UNDER LAM'S COMMAND TO QUARTERS. ON DISTRIBUTION WERE ALL MILITARY UNITS, THE BUDDHIST CHAPLAIN CORPS, AND THE PAT OFFICE. DEPUTY PROVINCE CHIEF LE TICH THIEU AT TAM KY ISSUED THESE ORDERS TO ALL MILITARY IN HIS AREA. PROVINCE CHIEF NGUYEN THANH TOA WAS IN DANANG AT THIS TIME AND WAS SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO TAM KY ON THE MORNING OF 15 MAY. (FIELD COMMENT. THIEU HAS BEEN CONSIDERED TO BE PRO-STRUGGLE BECAUSE OF HIS PAST AFFILIATIONS AND HIS ACTIONS DURING THE RECENT STRUGGLE MOVEMENT.)

6. AT ABOUT 1000 HOURS ON 15 MAY GENERAL LAM RETURNED TO QUANG NGAI FROM DANANG; HE HAD REPORTEDLY FLOWN TO DANANG AT 0800 HOURS. ONE TANK APPEARED AT "THE PAGODA" AT QUANG NGAI AND THEN LEFT. ONE BATTALION OF MARINES LEFT QUANG NGAI FOR DANANG VIA AIR VIETNAM.

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

QUANG NGAI CITY WAS PLACED OFF LIMITS TO THE MILITARY.

7. AT 1030 HOURS THE STRUGGLE RADIO AT DANANG ANNOUNCED THAT THE RADIO WAS UNDER ATTACK AND COMING UNDER CONTROL OF THE GVN FORCES. GENERAL NGUYEN CHANH THI WAS REPORTEDLY IN GENERAL NHUAN'S FIRST DIVISION COMPOUND DIRECTING OPERATIONS. AN ARMY OFFICER WAS REPORTEDLY IN CONTROL OF THE TOWER AT PHU BAI WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO PREVENT THE LANDING OF TROOP CARRIERS. THE FIRST AND SECOND MARINES WERE REPORTEDLY IN DANANG.

8. AT 1120 HOURS ON 15 MAY PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEMS IN HOI AN, WHERE COLONEL YEU IS LOCATED, WERE BROADCASTING THAT GENERAL WALT AND AMBASSADOR PORTER SUPPORTED THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE KY GOVERNMENT AND THAT I CORPS COMMANDER GENERAL DINH WAS ORDERING TROOPS TO FIGHT THE INVADERS.

9. IN HOI AN, BUI QUANG SAN, S-2 OF RCC AND S-2 FOR THE VIETNAMESE NATIONALIST PARTY (VNQDD) WENT TO COLONEL YEU'S OFFICE AT YEU'S REQUEST, AND WAS APPARENTLY CAPTURED BY YEU, ACCORDING TO A HOI AN BUDDHIST WHO IS OPPOSED TO THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT. AT 1130 HOURS COLONEL YEU INSTRUCTED BUDDHIST MONKS TO TELL ALL YOUNG BUDDHIST MEN TO ASSEMBLE AT THE PAGODA, AND THOSE RESPONSIVE TO HIS ORDERS ASSEMBLED THERE. COLONEL YEU RELEASED SAN AFTER INSTRUCTING SAN TO GIVE ORDERS TO PAT ELEMENTS AND APA'S UNDER SAN'S SUPERVISION TO SUPPORT YEU

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

C-O-N-F-I-[redacted]-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

IN THE COMING FIGHT WITH THE GVN FORCES. SAN CLAIMED THAT HE REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO GIVE SUCH ORDERS, AND LATER SAID THAT HE PLANNED TO WAIT UNTIL THE GVN FORCES CAME TO HOI AN AND THEN HE WOULD INSTRUCT HIS PEOPLE TO FIGHT WITH THE GVN AGAINST YEU. ACCORDING TO SAN, YEU APPEARED VERY NERVOUS AND WORRIED ABOUT THE FACT THAT GVN FORCES HAD CAPTURED KEY POINTS IN DANANG.

10. AS OF 1200 HOURS IT APPEARED THAT GVN FORCES WERE RAPIDLY GAINING CONTROL OF DANANG. THE ELEVENTH RANGER BATTALION REPORTEDLY JOINED THE MARINES IN SWEEPING DANANG.

11. IN HUE THERE WERE STRONG INDICATIONS THAT THE FIRST ARMY OF VIETNAM (ARVN) DIVISION WOULD DEFEND THE ELEVENTH TACTICAL ZONE, THE NORTHERNMOST ZONE OF I CORPS. THE FIRST DIVISION WAS BRINGING ITS TANKS TOWARD HUE FROM POSITIONS IN THE NORTH. THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE FIRST DIVISION WAS MEETING WITH "OLD STRUGGLE LEADERS."

12. IN DANANG HEAVY BUT SPORADIC FIRING BROKE OUT AT 1330 HOURS AGAINST THE BUILDINGS SURROUNDING RADIO DANANG AND TRUONG BO DE BUDDHIST SCHOOL; THE FIRING CONTINUED FOR ONE HOUR. THE FIRING PATTERN SEEMED TO BE INITIATED BY THE MARINES, WHO FIRED HEAVILY ON THE OBJECTIVES, AND, ALTHOUGH THE RETURN FIRE WAS SLIGHT, MOVED TO NEW POSITIONS AND REDUCED FIRE PATTERN. THE SITUATION

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(e)
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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]

(classification) (dissem controls)

THEN BECAME ONE OF SEIGE, WITH OCCASIONAL SHOTS BEING EXCHANGED. ELSEWHERE IN DANANG CITY THE MARINES APPEARED TO HAVE REINFORCED THEIR CONTROL OF KEY POINTS, INCLUDING THE STRUGGLE HEADQUARTERS AT PHO DA PAGODA.

13. ALL REMAINED QUIET IN TAM KY AND HUE. HOWEVER, IN HUE WORK HAD CEASED AS A RESULT OF A GENERAL STRIKE AND THERE WAS A STRUGGLE MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 1600 HOURS. THE FIRST DIVISION REPORTEDLY HAD FORCES READY TO MOVE TO THE HUE AIRPORT IF THE GVN ATTEMPTED A MILITARY MOVE AGAINST THE CITY.

14. SOMETIME BEFORE 1800 HOURS, 2,500 PEOPLE IN HUE ATTENDED A BUDDHIST MEETING AT WHICH GVN ACTION IN DANANG WAS CONDEMNED AND A PLEDGE FOR SUPPORT OF THE STRUGGLE WAS MADE. RADIO HUE, WHICH IS CONTROLLED BY STRUGGLE FORCES, STATED IN AN ENGLISH-LANGUAGE BROADCAST THAT ALLIED FORCES WERE STANDING BY THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT. THERE WAS NO ACTIVITY BY THE FIRST DIVISION EXCEPT PASSIVE DEFENSE OF HUE CITY. GENERAL THI WAS RUNNING THE SHOW AND WAS EXTREMELY ACTIVE.

15. A MEETING AT TINH HOA PAGODA CALLED BY COLONEL YEU FOR 1930 HOURS WAS ATTENDED BY 25 TO 30 YOUNG MEN. YEU'S MESSAGE WAS THAT HOI AN WOULD BE ATTACKED BY GVN TROOPS AND THE YOUTHS SHOULD TELL EVERYONE TO BE READY TO SOUND THE ALARM WHEN THE TROOPS ARRIVED. POLICE CHIEF MINH OF QUANG NAM IN HOI AND HIS CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, TO VAN TAM, WERE SPENDING THE NIGHT AT THE STRUGGLE COMMITTEE IN TINH HOI PAGODA.

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

C-O-N-F-I-[redacted]-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

16. FIELD DISSEM. STATE USMACV USAID JUSPAO NAVFORV USARV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

C-O-N-F-[redacted]-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

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LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 93-68
Document # 140

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI 16 MAY 1966
SUBJECT PARTICIPATION OF GENERAL NGUYEN CHANH THI, GENERAL TON THAT DINH, GENERAL PHAM XUAN NHUAN, AND RETIRED GENERAL TRAN VAN DON IN FORMATION OF REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL IN HUE
ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (16 MAY 1966)
SOURCE [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

DIST 16 MAY 1966
FIELD NO. NONE

1. THERE ARE REPORTS THAT A REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL IS NOW BEING FORMED IN HUE. PARTICIPANTS ARE FIRST DIVISION COMMANDER PHAM XUAN NHUAN, FORMER I CORPS COMMANDER GENERAL NGUYEN CHANH THI, FORMER I CORPS COMMANDER GENERAL TON THAT DINH, AND RETIRED GENERAL TRAN VAN DON, WHO ARRIVED IN HUE FROM DALAT ON 16 MAY 966.

2. FIELD DISSEM. STATE USMACV USAID JUSPAO NAVFORV USARV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

210

[redacted]

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5/4/98

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

IN 139

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC
ODI EXO

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[redacted]

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C-O-N-F-[redacted]-E-N-T-I-A-L CITE: [redacted]

15 16 26 Z DIST 17 MAY 1966

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 15-16 MAY 1966

SUBJECT PRESENCE OF DANANG MAYOR NGUYEN VAN MAN AND STRUGGLE MOVEMENT LEADERS IN HIDING AT TINH HOI PAGODA IN DANANG

LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 93-68
Document # 139

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (16 MAY 1966) FIELD NO.

SOURCE [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1. (SUMMARY. THE PRINCIPAL REFUGE OF STRUGGLE MOVEMENT LEADERS IN DANANG IS THE TINH HOI PAGODA, WHERE DANANG MAYOR NGUYEN VAN MAN, STRUGGLE MOVEMENT EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE POLITICAL ADVISOR TRAN DUY TAM, AND I CORPS COMMANDER OF ARMY ENGINEERS MAJOR TRAI WERE IN HIDING ON THE MORNING OF 16 MAY 1966. FOR A TIME THOSE IN HIDING AT THE PAGODA HOPED FOR MILITARY REINFORCEMENTS FROM HUE AND HOI AN, BUT THE REINFORCING COLUMNS WERE BLOCKED ON THE HIGHWAY AND FORCED TO TURN BACK. IT IS NOW BEING RUMORED THAT MAYOR MAN AND TAM MAY TRY TO MAKE THEIR WAY TO THE FRENCH CONSULATE AND SEEK ASYLUM THERE. MONKS AND

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

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5/4/98

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

BUDDHIST YOUTH ASSEMBLED AT THE PAGODA ARE ENGAGING IN A SORT OF SIT-IN DEMONSTRATION WHICH MAY DEVELOP INTO A HUNGER STRIKE.)

2. AFTER GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) MARINES ARRIVED IN DANANG ON 15 MAY 1966 SOME MEMBERS OF THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT TOOK REFUGE IN PHO DA AND TINH HOI PAGODAS, MANY WENT INTO HIDING ELSEWHERE IN DANANG CITY, AND OTHERS TOOK REFUGE IN DANANG EAST, ACROSS THE SONG DA RIVER, FROM WHERE THEY HOPE TO REACH A VIET CONG SAFE AREA IN THE VICINITY OF MARBLE MOUNTAIN.

3. THE PRECISE STATUS OF PHO DA PAGODA IS NOT CLEAR. WHEN THE MARINES SOUGHT TO SEIZE IT ON 15 MAY, MONKS PUT IN AN APPEARANCE AND WENT ABOUT THEIR NORMAL ROUTINE, AND AS A RESULT THE MARINES DID NOT ENTER OR OCCUPY THE PAGODA. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER ANY ADHERENTS OF THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT REMAINED IN THE PAGODA ON 16 MAY.

4. TINH HOI PAGODA IS THE PRINCIPAL REFUGE OF THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT MEMBERS. DANANG MAYOR NGUYEN VAN MAN, STRUGGLE MOVEMENT EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE POLITICAL ADVISOR TRAN DUY TAM, AND COMMANDER OF THE ARMY ENGINEERS MAJOR TRAI WERE AT TINH HOI ON THE MORNING OF 16 MAY, AND HA XUAN KY AND THE ENTIRE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE TAKEN REFUGE THERE. MONKS AND BUDDHIST YOUTH HAVE BEEN SUMMONED TO THE PAGODA, WHERE THEY ARE ENGAGING IN A

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

C-O-N-F-I-[redacted]E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

SORT OF SIT-IN DEMONSTRATION WHICH MAY DEVELOP INTO A HUNGER STRIKE. (SOURCE COMMENT. THE PURPOSE OF THIS ACTION IS NOT CLEAR, BUT THEIR PRESENCE MAY BE DESIGNED TO DETER MARINES FROM ATTACKING OR FORCIBLY ENTERING THE PAGODA.)

5. FOR A TIME THOSE INSIDE TINH HOI PAGODA HOPED TO RECEIVE MILITARY REINFORCEMENTS FROM HUE AND HOI AN, BUT IN EACH CASE THE REINFORCING COLUMNS WERE BLOCKED ON THE HIGHWAY AND FORCED TO TURN BACK. IT IS NOW BEING RUMORED THAT MAYOR MAN AND TAM MAY TRY TO MAKE THEIR WAY TO THE FRENCH CONSULATE AND SEEK ASYLUM THERE. [redacted] IT IS NOT CERTAIN THAT THE MARINES WOULD PREVENT MAN AND TAM FROM GOING TO THE FRENCH CONSULATE, AS THE MARINES' DUTIES ARE PRIMARILY MILITARY ONES AND THERE IS AT PRESENT NO EFFECTIVE POLICE FORCE ON DUTY. A FEW STRUGGLE MOVEMENT LEADERS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED, BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER ORDERS HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO ARREST ALL OF THE PRINCIPAL LEADERS OR WHICH GVN SECURITY SERVICES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING SUCH ARRESTS. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE MARINES HAVE BEEN GIVEN ARREST LISTS OR HAVE ESTABLISHED CHECKPOINTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF SCREENING IDENTITY DOCUMENTS. THUS THERE IS A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT MAN AND TAM MIGHT BE PERMITTED TO ENTER THE FRENCH CONSULATE WITHOUT INTERFERENCE.)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

6. FIELD DISSEM. STATE USAID USMACV JUSPAO NAVFOR V USARV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

16

F

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

19 May 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bill D. Moyers
The White House

Mr. S. Douglass Cater, Jr.
The White House

SUBJECT: [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

[redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

[redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
-9 OCT 1997

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

3. Ramparts was established four years ago at Menlo Park, California, by its present editor-in-chief and publisher, Edward M. Keating, New York-born author, lecturer, lawyer, teacher, and Catholic layman. From an original all-Catholic staff of three or four, Ramparts now has a staff of twenty-two plus a dozen outside editors. The headquarters recently moved to San Francisco's North Beach area. Offices are also maintained in New York, Paris, and Munich. The magazine publishes monthly. Associate and contributing editors to Ramparts include Jessica Mitford Treuhaft, Marcus Raskin, Arthur I. Waskow, and John Beecher. Several of the listed individuals have been active in support of identified Communist-sponsored agitation or propaganda groups and at least two of the individuals have been identified as active Communists. Donald Duncan is a former Special Forces enlisted man who has written earlier attacks against CIA in Ramparts, and who has publicly stated, "We will continue to be in danger as long as CIA is deciding policy and manipulating nations."

4. Information from a recent issue of People's World, West Coast Communist Party publication, indicates that Edward Keating has stated he would seek the nomination from the 11th California Congressional District at San Mateo, and has described himself as "unalterably opposed" to United States policy in Vietnam. This publication also stated that Robert Scheer had announced he will seek nomination from the 7th Congressional District of California. Scheer stated his campaign would concentrate on opposition to the war in Vietnam and that he would identify with "all those marching and demonstrating for an end to the war in Vietnam".

5. Agency records reflect that Robert Scheer is presently an employee of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions (Fund for the Republic). Scheer was former executive committee member of the University of California branch of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and was formerly a member of the Vietnam Day Committee, which has been responsible for numerous demonstrations on the West Coast protesting United States action in Vietnam.

6. [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

Richard Helms
Deputy Director

Attachment - 1
TAB A - [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

NLJ.001.251.001/7

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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• ROUTINE

IN 20768

9-24

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC [redacted] [redacted] SDO ONE OCR [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] CIA/NMCC

EXO, DDI

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~~S E C R E T~~ 20 0306 Z CITE TDCS DB-315/01447-66

DIST 20 MAY 1966

COUNTRY: JAPAN VIETNAM CZECHOSLOVAKIA

DOI: APRIL-MAY 66

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAY 2001

SUBJ: HOKOYAMA'S METINGS WITH SOUTH VITNAMESE LIBERATION FRONT AND NORTH VIETNAMESE REPRESENTATIVES AND CZECH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

ACQ:

SOURCE: [redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Y
E0 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Y
(C)

1. ACCORDING TO A [redacted] DURING HIS PEACE MISSION TO EUROPE AND ASIA JAPANESE PEACE AMBASSADOR YOKOYAMA MASAYUKI MET WITH CHUONG, SOUTH VIETNAM NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT REPRESENTATIVE IN PRAGUE, AND NGUYEN VAN AN, NORTH VIETNAMESE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN ALGIERS.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONTROLLED DISSEM NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

CHUONG INFORMED YOKOYAMA THAT PERHAPS JAPAN COULD MAKE SOME CONTRIBUTION TO BRING ABOUT AN END OF THE VIETNAMESE CONFLICT. HOWEVER CHUONG CRITICIZED JAPAN FOR ITS COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES FOR THE TRANSPORT AND REPAIR OF UNITED STATES WAR EQUIPMENT AND MANUFACTURE OF NAPALM AND WEAPONS TO SUPPORT UNITED STATES FORCES IN VIETNAM.

2. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE CHARGE IN ALGIERS CITED THE FOUR POINTS PUT FORTH BY HANOI AS CONDITIONS FOR SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM SITUATION AND ALSO CRITICIZED JAPAN FOR ITS CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES. NGUYEN VAN AN ALSO STATED THAT NORTH VIETNAM'S DIPLOMACY IS NOT SECRET AND DENIEPTO YOKOYAMA THAT ANY SECRET NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN UNDERTAKEN BY NORTH VIETNAM WITH THE UNITED STATES.

3. WHILE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, YOKOYAMA MET WITH THE CZECH VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WHO INFORMED HIM THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIA HOPES JAPAN WILL ADVISE THE UNITED STATES TO STOP BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM AND STOP ESCALATING THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM. YOKOYAMA ALSO MET WITH CZECH DIRECTOR GENERAL OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS MIHAOVSKY (PHONETIC) WHO SAID ALMOST THE SAME THING BUT ADDED THAT JAPAN MUST CORRECT THE MISUNDERSTANDING

~~SECRET~~ (classification) ~~CONTROLLED DISSEM NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~ (dissem controls)

OF THE UNITED STATES CONCERNING VIETNAM. THE UNITED STATES MUST FIRST ACCEPT THE FOUR CONDITIONS ANNOUNCED BY HANOI, THEN CONCRETE CONDITIONS OF SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM CAN BE DISCUSSED IN A CONFERENCE.

4. [redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

5. [redacted] COMMENT: YOKOYAMA WAS IN PRAGUE ABOUT 20-22 MARCH, IN ALGIERS AND 12 APRIL, AND DEPARTED RANGOON ON 19 APRIL)

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

6. [redacted] DISSEM: CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC STATE [redacted]

[redacted]

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET CONTROLLED DISSEM NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

NLJ.001.251.001/6

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN 20969

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC [redacted] SDO ONE OCR [redacted] CIA/NMCC
DDI EXO

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM~~

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~~S E C R E T~~

201046Z CITE TDCS DB-315/01448-66

DIST 20 MAY 1966

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAY 2001

COUNTRY: JAPAN VIETNAM FRANCE BRITAIN ITALY

DOI: APRIL-MAY 66

SUBJ: STATEMENTS TO JAPANESE PEACE ENVOY YOKOYAMA ON VIETNAM BY WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND THE VATICAN

ACQ:

SOURCE: [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25 (C)

1. ACCORDING TO A [redacted] REPORT [redacted] ON THE YOKOYAMA MASAYUKI PEACE MISSION TO EUROPE AND ASIA, YOKOYAMA MET WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER COUVE DE MURVILLE AND ASIAN BUREAU DIRECTOR MANA'CH DURING HIS VISIT TO PARIS (LATE FEBRUARY AND EARLY MARCH). COUVE DE MURVILLE TOLD YOKOYAMA THAT IT IS NOT USEFUL FOR THE UNITED STATES TO CONTACT THE SOVIET UNION OR OTHER THIRD COUNTRIES IN AN EFFORT TO SETTLE THE VIETNAM CONFLICT. ACCORDING TO MURVILLE, THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONTACT

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

~~SECRET~~ (classification) ~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM~~ (dissem controls)

NORTH VIETNAM AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT DIRECTLY. IF JAPAN DESIRES TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARD PEACE IN VIETNAM, JAPAN MUST ASK THE UNITED STATES TO MAKE CONCESSIONS TOWARD BOTH NORTH VIETNAM AND THE VIET CONG. MURVILLE ALSO STATED THAT FRANCE IS NOT CONSIDERING ANY CONCRETE PLAN FOR SOLUTION OF THE VIETNAM CRISIS BECAUSE A SOLUTION DOES NOT APPEAR IMMINENT.

2. ASIAN BUREAU DIRECTOR MANA'CH STATED THAT BEFORE VIETNAM PEACE NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE UNDERTAKEN, THE FOLLOWING IMPORTANT POINTS MUST BE CONSIDERED AND ACCEPTED BY THE UNITED STATES:

A. PARTICIPATION OF CHINA IN A PEACE CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM;

B. CESSATION OF UNITED STATES BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM;

C. INDEPENDENT PARTICIPATION OF THE VIET CONG IN THE PEACE CONFERENCE SEPARATE FROM NORTH VIETNAMESE PARTICIPATION.

COMMENTING ON CHINA'S ATTITUDE ON VIETNAM, MANA'CH STATED THAT, ALTHOUGH CHINA HAS URGED NORTH VIETNAM AND THE VIET CONG TO CARRY ON THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE, FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM WILL BE BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIET CONG THEMSELVES.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

3. IN LONDON [redacted] YOKOYAMA MET WITH BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY MICHAEL STEWART, WHO STATED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~ ~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM CONTROLLED DISSEM~~

(classification) (dissem controls)

IS NOT STICKING TO THE FORMALITIES OF THE 1954 GENEVA CONFERENCE SINCE IT CONSIDERS THAT OTHER COUNTRIES COULD NOW PARTICIPATE IN A NEW CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM. ALSO BRITAIN CONSIDERS THAT THE NEUTRAL NATIONS CAN PLAY AN INTERMEDIARY ROLE IN BRINGING THE COMMUNISTS TOWARD ACCEPTING PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

4. IN ROME, YOKOYAMA MET WITH ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY DIRECTOR OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS GAJA (PHONETIC) WHO STATED THAT ITALY'S POSITION ON VIETNAM IS CLOSE TO THAT OF BRITAIN. ITALY, BECAUSE OF INTERNAL POLITICAL FACTORS, CANNOT UNDERTAKE ANY INITIATIVE OR ACTIVE ROLE IN BRINGING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM, GAJA SAID. YOKOYAMA ALSO MET WITH POPE PAUL [redacted] WHO STATED HIS BELIEF THAT JAPAN WILL BE THE SOLE NATION WHICH CAN HAVE AN EFFECTIVE ROLE IN BRINGING A VIETNAM SETTLEMENT. ALTHOUGH THE VATICAN'S APPEAL FOR PEACE DID NOT BRING ANY RESULTS, POPE PAUL ADDED THAT HE HAS NOT ABANDONED HIS EFFORTS. EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

5. [redacted] DISSEM: CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC STATE [redacted]

[redacted] EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ ~~CONTROLLED DISSEM NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

ANNEX V

THE RESOURCES AND LOGISTIC CAPABILITIES
OF THE COMMUNISTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

ANNEX V

THE RESOURCES AND LOGISTIC CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNISTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

I. The Viet Cong Economy and Its Manpower

A. The Viet Cong Economy

The Viet Cong have successfully organized and expanded an economic organization to meet the basic task of funding VC revolutionary activity. The basic economic organization, operating through the Finance and Economic Section of the People's Revolutionary (Communist) Party is assisted by the National Liberation Front and Communist military components in acquiring, transporting, and storing within South Vietnam almost all the non-military supplies required by the Viet Cong. During the past five years, the VC economic organization has expanded with the development of VC forces. Starting as a local self-production unit, the economic structure progressed, first, into a voluntary fund drive, then, into an organized taxation and finance mechanism and, finally into an organization activity supporting enlarged base and battlefield requirements.

Taxation appears to be the principal means used by the Viet Cong to acquire financial and material resources within South Vietnam. Agricultural taxation remains the most important source of VC tax receipts and is clearly dependent on continuing Viet Cong access to or some measure of control over the rural population. The Viet Cong currently exercise predominant political influence over 25 to 30 percent of the rice-cultivated area of South Vietnam which produces between 750,000 and 900,000 metric tons of rice per year. Annual consumption of rice by Communist regular forces could be obtained by an average tax of about 3 percent of total production in VC areas alone. The Viet Cong usually tax at a substantially higher level (12 to 15 percent). There is no indication that resentment by the rural population against taxes of this magnitude has reached levels adequate to stop rice collections. Plantation taxes--either in money or in kind--continue to be

collected and are an important source of supply for Viet Cong forces in the northern III Corps. Internal transportation, business establishments, and commercial activities are also widely taxed.

VC-initiated economic activities, seizures, and clandestine operations supplement VC tax receipts. Bond drives, food production, and simple manufacturing units have been initiated by the VC to support military personnel. Significant supplies of war booty continue to be accumulated by the Viet Cong. Clandestine front business operations and discreet purchases by civilians acting for the Viet Cong, provide access to resources from GVN-controlled areas, including imported manufactured goods.

For specific goods in certain areas of South Vietnam, the Viet Cong have utilized traditional smuggling along the South Vietnam - Cambodia border. During recent months, however, Viet Cong use of Cambodia as a source of non-military supplies has increased and been organized in a systematic fashion. Although this logistic support is more costly than domestic acquisition and evidently requires external financial arrangements with banks in Hong Kong, the immunity and proximity of such logistic support to large VC/NVA forces along the Cambodian border apparently has made this source of supplies increasingly valuable. On an annual basis, it is estimated that at least 5,000 and probably as much as 10,000 metric tons of rice are being acquired from Cambodia and a frequently reported figure of 20,000 metric tons appears to be possible. Some of this rice is also acquired to support Communist forces in Laos. In addition, the VC are acquiring in Cambodia substantial quantities of cloth, pharmaceuticals, salt, fish and fish sauce, gasoline, communications equipment, explosive chemicals, and other supplies.

B. <u>The Economic Impact of Increased Military Pressure</u>

The build-up in VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam during the last year has placed a heavy strain on VC logistic operations. Confirmed VC/NVA main force strength has approximately doubled during the last year. Whereas guerrilla personnel, like the civilian population, are expected to be self-sufficient in basic supplies, main force units require extensive logistic

support. Food supplies, especially rice, remain the principal bulk commodities required by these forces. The entire increase in main force strength has been recorded in rice-deficit areas--I and II Corps and northern III Corps. There has been no increase in VC main force strength in the rice-surplus IV Corps where logistic requirements for food supplies are relatively small.

With the concentration of VC/NVA main force strength in I and II Corps and in northern III Corps annual rice requirements clearly exceed the total rice production under VC control in the provinces of Pleiku, Kontun, Phu Bon, the western districts of the coastal provinces of central Vietnam, and the rice-deficit areas of VC military region 7. In all of these areas, there is evidence that the VC are experiencing food supply problems. For example, a recently captured document cited the logistical difficulties experienced by the VC during an early 1966 campaign in rice-deficit Quang Duc Province that did not have sufficient rice for its own provincial force; region forces assigned to the campaign were required to arrange their own rice supply "through the border," presumably the Cambodian border. During the course of the campaign, one-third of VC combat strength was diverted to the transportation of rice.

The increase in allied military action has continued to hamper the logistic system of the Viet Cong. Allied military actions have had an adverse effect on agricultural production in VC controlled areas and on the percentage of the harvest that the VC can acquire and transport to their base areas. The area covered and percentage of crop harvested in these rice-harvesting operations is not reported, and no aggregative estimate of their impact is possible. Even with continued VC access to rice-producing areas, the Viet Cong face a second major difficulty in transporting this commodity. The major portion of this movement has been carried out by civilian laborers, but the danger of involvement in military action has caused serious disaffection among the VC-controlled population as the tempo of military activity has increased. A third major difficulty caused by allied military activity has been the disruption caused by allied destruction of VC supply caches.

C. The Manpower Situation

The South Vietnamese population in VC controlled areas is at least 3.5 million people and could be as much as five million people depending on the extent to which the VC have access to contested areas. Most of the VC controlled population live in the delta region. This controlled population probably contains some 500,000 physically fit young males. An additional 30,000-35,000 youths annually become old enough to fight. In addition to this controlled population the VC also draw on the population of military age in contested areas, on GVN deserters and on recruits from urban areas.

An increasing requirement for manpower during 1965 forced the VC to resort to monetary inducements and to forced conscription and returnee programs to obtain local personnel. With these new methods VC have been able to attain a significantly higher level of local recruitment--over 80,000 in 1965 compared to 30,000-40,000 annually during 1961-64. We estimate that the VC have a capability in 1966 to recruit and train some 7,000 to 10,000 personnel a month.

Recruitment at this scale must be regarded as close to the maximum capabilities of the VC, particularly if these recruits are to receive adequate training. There have been increasing signs of a growing squeeze on VC manpower during 1966. This is reflected in the growing dominance of North Vietnamese troops as the NVA/VC force expands. There are also frequent prisoner reports of manpower shortages and the poor quality and training of new recruits.

In addition to making up for their own losses of an estimated 80,000-90,000 in 1966, we estimate that VC forces will increase by about 5,000 troops in 1966. The VC are also required, however, to provide replacements for a growing number of NVA losses. During 1966 we estimate that the NVA will infiltrate from 55,000-75,000 troops at the same time that they are expanding the NVA troop level by an estimated 49,000 troops. NVA losses during the year, however, will range from 25,000-30,000. Thus the VC could have to make up for 5,000-20,000 NVA

losses, depending on the rate of infiltration and expansion of NVA forces. This indicates a total VC military manpower requirement in 1966 of from 90,000-115,000. This requirement is within the higher end of the range of current estimates of VC recruitment capabilities.

If the casualty rate increases as expected during 1967 to an annual rate of 130,000-150,000 Communist losses will be beyond the estimated recruitment and training capabilities of the VC. More of the manpower burder will then be placed on North Vietnam creating additional pressures on its manpower resources.

II. Communist Logistic Operations in South Vietnam (See Appendix A)

The Communist forces in South Vietnam have created a highly centralized system of Supply Councils to meet the logistics requirements of the VC/NVA forces. This organization operates at each administrative level in South Vietnam working closely with counterpart economic and service organizations of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) and the Rear Services Staffs of the military command. This elaborate system controls from 40,000-50,000 personnel engaged full-time in logistic support activities. Additional thousands of personnel are conscripted on a part-time basis to assist in transporting supplies, the construction of logistics bases, and the maintenance of supply routes. The VC use an elaborate system of land routes, trails, and inland waterways connecting the infiltration routes from Laos and Cambodia with the major COSVN base areas.

The VC storage system is greatly decentralized working from a large number of small depots, storing generally only 5-10 tons of supplies each. This dispersed system provides maximum protection against large scale destruction or capture of supplies but also serves as a major constraint to the initiation of large sustained enemy actions.

The logistics system used by the Communist forces in South Vietnam has been able to satisfy adequately the minimum requirement for movement and storage of supplies.

This capability has been weakened and made more difficult as the scale of combat has increased and Allied ground operations have disrupted normal logistic movements and overrun storage areas. Difficulty in effectively maintaining the internal distribution of supplies has also been compounded by the manner in which VC/NVA forces are dispersed throughout South Vietnam.

In mid-1966 one-third of the enemy combat and combat support troops was located in the II Corps Area, one third in the III Corps, and the remainder about equally between the I and IV Corps. The IV Corps area with only 15 percent of total VC/NVA regular forces, is the area in which the VC have the greatest self-sufficiency in logistic supplies, particularly foodstuffs. The predominant share of VC/NVA forces is concentrated in food-deficit areas. Thus the II and III Corps areas which are the predominant rice-deficit areas account for almost two-thirds of the total daily logistic requirement.

The inability to transport food from rice surplus to deficit areas has become more severe as Allied ground actions intensify. The Communists have been compelled to turn to Cambodian sources in order to provide rice to the forces in the central highlands. Use of this source of supply has increased in the last half year and may now be as much as 15 tons a day. The need to turn to sources outside the country for rice indicates that internal distribution is one of the most pressing problems faced by the Communists and is probably the most vulnerable aspect of their entire logistics operation.

If the disposition of Communist forces in South Vietnam remains unchanged during the build-up projected through mid-1967 and internal distribution of food is impossible, their dependence on external sources for supplies could double. Our present estimates indicate a maximum external requirement of about 55 tons a day. But if internal distribution of food to the food-deficit areas cannot be effectively accomplished, this requirement could be increased to at least 100 tons a day.

This added logistic requirement would not be critical, particularly if it were met from Cambodian sources. It would not even tax the Laotian infiltration route very severely but would aid substantially in reducing the excess of road capacity over logistic requirements.

The present disposition of Communist forces is much more favorable for the internal distribution of supplies infiltrated into South Vietnam. Over 85 percent of the NVA forces and 35 percent of the VC forces are in the I and II Corps areas in close proximity to the Laotian infiltration corridor and the northern infiltration routes from Cambodia. These forces account for almost three-fourths of the supplies which must be infiltrated from external sources.

The data available on the destruction and capture of supplies by Allied forces during the past year are quite incomplete. Food supplies amounting to at least 10,000-12,000 tons and over 21,000 weapons and 180,000 rounds of ammunition are the major amounts known to have been captured or destroyed. We lack almost completely any meaningful data on Communist stock-piles and are therefore unable to assess the impact of these losses. But as minimum losses, the food stocks may be relatively significant, particularly as Allied operations uncover more storage areas and interfere more with the internal distribution of supplies.

The substantial increase in incidents of Communist terrorism and harassment of local population may indicate that the enemy is finding it increasingly difficult to obtain local support in terms of food and/or labor for its war effort.

APPENDIX A

THE COMMUNIST LOGISTICS SYSTEM IN SOUTH VIETNAM

I. Organization

VC/NVA* logistic operations are under the control and supervision of Supply Councils found at every echelon of command from the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) to the village level. (See Figure III-1)** Village Forward Supply Councils are responsible for procurement and for the distribution of supplies to troops in the field. The province level controls the planning and regulatory agencies which furnish logistic data to the military Rear Service Staffs at the various levels of command. Communications and liaison sections, under the Supply Councils, exercise an important role in safeguarding all types of logistic operations. Party cadre associated with the communication and liaison sections serve as guides, security personnel, station attendants, and supervisory personnel.

Supply Councils also supervise the work of two basic transportation organizations--the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) Finance and Economic Section transport elements and the military Rear Service Section transport elements.

Transport and supporting elements under the jurisdiction of military Rear Services Sections are organized

*The organization structure outlined in this section is estimated to apply generally to both VC and NVA forces. Some of the material appearing in this section is based on an analysis of a captured document discussing the VC Sao Vang Division, a division containing both VC and NVA elements.

**Figure III-1 follows page III-5 in Annex III.

into (1) transport elements of the Rear Services Sections which are organic to the various echelons of the VC/NVA regular military forces, (2) separate military transport units (not found below military region level) responsible for the receipt and redistribution of supplies, and (3) ordnance sections and armament sections. The Rear Service Staff organic to the VC/NVA Division is organized into four functional sections: a quartermaster section for procurement, storage, and distribution of food and clothing; an ordnance section for procurement, storage, maintenance and distribution of weapons and ammunition; a medical section for medical support and evacuation; and a finance section for financial support.

A. Personnel

Enemy forces in South Vietnam in mid-1966 amounted to 260,000-280,000 including from 40,000-50,000 personnel engaged in logistic support. The composition of important VC supply elements is shown in the following tabulation:

Combat Support

Separate Military Transport Units	5,800
Region/Province/District Ordnance and Ammunition Sections	3,000
Other Combat Support Troops	8,800
Total	17,600

Other Forces

Finance and Economic Transport Units	2,000
Infiltration Corridor Personnel	3,000
Communications and Liaison Units	2,000
Organic Military Transport Elements	7,400
VC/NVA Crewmen on Water Craft	12,000
Total	26,400
TOTAL	44,000

In addition to these regular employees the VC have conscripted thousands of temporary, civilian workers to assist in logistic activities. Recruiting is carried out among men between the ages of 18 and 50 and women between the ages of 20 and 41, with the annual period of service usually being from 1 to 3 months. This conscripted labor is given both political and security training. It is then organized into platoons and companies, and assigned by village and district forward supply councils to the combat units or to a rear services staff. Front line or Class A laborers are used by combat units to transport ammunition and food supplies; to evacuate battle casualties; to remove captured supplies to collection points, and to construct supply depots and defensive positions, as well as in other miscellaneous tasks. Local inhabitants have been conscripted to carry weapons and ammunition inland from coastal areas and to transport food to the mountainous regions. Special groups are assigned to carry supplies and ammunition from the Cambodian border area to enemy base areas.

II. Storage and Distribution

The VC supply system is designed to satisfy both normal, continuous troop requirements and those requirements imposed by rapidly changing battlefield conditions. The VC have established an area supply system which incorporates a large number of small depots--each generally having a capacity of five-ten tons--dispersed throughout areas in which VC units operate. Although classes of supplies in depots are usually mixed, some depots store food exclusively and others contain only weapons and ammunition. Even in the larger war zones, supplies are dispersed throughout the area. Villages that are located close to combat units may also act as supply points. In certain areas, only one-third of the prescribed stock is allocated to depots, with the remaining two-thirds dispersed among civilians for custody. This system limits the damage that can be caused by the destruction of one large depot or supply cache, but it also acts as a major constraint to the initiation of large, sustained enemy actions when large amounts of supplies need to be concentrated in relatively small areas.

A. Distribution of Food

Regiments are given an initial issue of rice corresponding to a 30 day supply, which is to be replenished when half of the supply is consumed. Rear service staffs are charged with maintaining a stock equivalent to one month's supply for all forces operating in their area of jurisdiction. When a regiment leaves the area the remaining rice must be returned to these staffs. Troops usually have a seven-day supply of rice in their individual packs as a reserve for emergencies; the unit draws rice from supply points located along the line of movement. This method reduces the supply train and the requirement for porters. Each regiment is assigned an area from which food is purchased. A rear supply element of the regiment normally sends out purchasing teams to the area to contact local VC authorities and to arrange for purchase in the prescribed quantities.

III. Transportation Routes

The enemy in South Vietnam makes use of a very large number and variety of lines of communication. These include major South Vietnamese highways, secondary roads, waterways, trails and innumerable footpaths. (See Figure V-1). Many of the land routes, especially in the north, are narrow, unimproved trails, negotiable only by foot, animal, or small two or three-wheeled vehicles, but trucks are sometimes used on segments of the major routes when they are under Communist control, and sometimes on routes nominally under GVN control. Extensive use is made of water craft in the Delta area.

A. Land Routes

The most frequently used land routes for the movement of personnel are probably the two in a north-south orientation connecting the Laotian and Cambodian infiltration corridor with the large established enemy base areas in Tay Ninh Province northwest of Saigon. The first route, which runs just inside South Vietnam along the Cambodian border, consists for the most part of a connecting group of trails although it follows or parallels existing roads in its southern segments. The second


NORTH
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L A O
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VIETNAM
C A M B O D I A
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CHINA SEA
GULF OF
SIAM
SOUTH VIETNAM
COMMUNIST LOGISTIC SUPPORT
JUNE 1966

route runs between the first route and the coast and follows route 14 for many miles. Many lateral routes connect the two major north-south routes and with coastal points. Some of the north-south routes in the eastern section of the country running roughly between route 19 and the Saigon area are used mainly as supply routes.

Enemy forces attempt to use major South Vietnamese highways to the maximum extent possible. When such roads are only partly under their control, personnel and/or supplies move parallel to the uncontrolled sections. A large portion of the network is located near South Vietnamese provincial and military boundaries where surveillance may be least effective. The enemy selects routes in many cases which are just outside the fire envelope of static GVN artillery units.

Besides Route 14, the VC probably make extensive use of Route 20 north from Saigon, Route 21 west from Khanh Hoa to Darlac, Route 22 through Tay Ninh, Provincial Routes 12 and 8 in the Delta region, Provincial Route 7 west from the coastal province of Phu Yen, and Provincial Routes 13, 4, 1, and 8 north of Saigon. Most of the use of trucks occurs on these roads.

B. Waterways

The VC depend on water craft as the basic means of transportation in the Delta region of South Vietnam. The VC main and local force units in IV Corps alone probably possess about 4,000 craft of varying sizes; the approximately 40,000 militia in IV Corps probably use additional thousands of vessels.

Troops usually are transported in small three-man sampans, and supply movements vary from organized convoys of medium-sized craft capable of carrying loads of one ton or more to small individual craft. The average load per water craft is estimated at 1 3/4 tons but the enemy also has much larger types at his disposal.

Several factors permit Communist forces to make extensive use of waterways in the Delta. There is no

registration of civilian boats, so that Communist boats are difficult to identify. Curfew restrictions cannot be imposed or enforced except on some major waterways because of the lack of adequate communications and patrol craft. Moreover, security is maintained by moving primarily at night, by taking advantage of foliage near river banks, by maintaining advance and rear units to warn of nearby flight activity and by sinking boats for later recovery when detection seems imminent.

IV. War Zones

War Zones usually consist of a group of dispersed and relatively primitive supply caches, command posts, arms workshops, training facilities, and troop bivouacs linked by a network of unpaved roads, trails, and paths. They generally are located on major transport routes used by the enemy in areas which are sparsely populated and/or populated by ethnic or religious minorities hostile to the South Vietnamese government. The war zones located near planned Communist areas of combat probably serve as staging areas, while those located well away from friendly forces most likely contain facilities for weapons repair and manufacture, training, and rest. Areas, such as War Zone C, adjacent to the Cambodian border also serve as access to sanctuary and as transit points for movement of supplies and troops. Until late 1962, the enemy operated in these zones with relative impunity, but the areas have been coming under increasingly heavy ground and air attack in recent months.

V. Logistic Resupply Requirement for Communist Forces in South Vietnam

The VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam have a daily total logistic requirement of 150 tons. This logistic requirement is divided into 5 classes: Class I (food), Class II (weapons), Class III (petroleum), Class IV (quartermaster, engineer and medical) and Class V (ammunition). Figure V-2 shows the daily volume of each class of supply and the amounts supplied from internal and external sources.

A. Class I (Food Supplies)

The Communist forces in South Vietnam obtain most of their food supplies within the country. Although

Figure V-2

SOUTH VIETNAM
DAILY VC/NVA LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS AS OF MID-YEAR 1966
BY CLASS AND SOURCE OF SUPPLY*



*Requirements as calculated by CIA and contained in ranges presented in NIE 14.3-66.

these forces control sufficient rice production to satisfy all VC/NVA food requirements, large quantities of rice apparently are being transported from Cambodia to enemy controlled rice-deficit areas in South Vietnam. This is because of the difficulty in sustaining internal distribution of large amounts of bulk commodities.

The principal rice-deficit areas with large troop concentrations include the provinces of Kontum, Pleiku, Darlac, Phu Bon, and Quang Duc, all in the II Corps area, and Phuoc Long, Binh Long and the northern part of Tay Ninh in the III Corps. If the main and local force VC and NVA troops in these areas were made completely dependent on Cambodian sources for food, Cambodia would be providing about 25 percent of the total daily food requirement for all Communist forces in South Vietnam.

Enemy incidents of terrorism and harassment have risen from a monthly average of 1,629 in 1964 to 2,233 during the first four months of 1966. Although these increases are attributable to various factors they may indicate that the enemy is finding it increasingly difficult to obtain local support in terms of food, and/or labor, for the war effort.

B. Class II and Class IV Supplies

1. Weapons

The enemy stock of weapons has been accumulated from several sources. These include weapons which have been captured, locally-produced, buried or left behind in South Vietnam from the Indochina War, and infiltrated from North Vietnam. Local manufacture of military supplies, however, presently emphasizes ammunition, hand grenades, and mines rather than the fabrication of individual weapons.

Significant quantities of Soviet and East European weapons and Chinese Communist copies of these weapons have been infiltrated into South Vietnam from North Vietnam. About 30 percent of the VC main force is estimated to have been at least partially equipped with the new family of Chinese 7.62 mm weapons by January 1966.

With respect to heavy weapons, the crew-served 60/61 mm and 81/82 mm mortars are now found in most main force battalions. The recent introduction of 120 mm mortars also has added to the firepower of Communist forces in the south. Other heavy weapons known to have been used by Communist forces include the 75 mm recoilless rifle, the 70 mm pack howitzer, and possibly the 105 mm howitzer, the latter having been captured from friendly forces or dating from the war with the French.

The flow of weapons from outside South Vietnam has enabled the VC to achieve some progress in weapons standardization within main force units. However, nonstandard weapons are used by a large number of VC local forces and guerrilla forces. Data on weapons captured in 1963, 1964, and 1965 show that the use of Chinese-manufactured arms is increasing as seen in the following tabulation:

(Percentages based on captured items)

	Chinese	U. S.	French	Home made and other
1963	8.4	27.7	49.8	14.1
1964	22.7	29.1	32.6	15.6
1965	27.0	50.0	8.0	15.0
1966 (estimate)	35.0	30.0	15.0	20.0*

*Includes 5 percent from USSR.

Of the nearly 1,000 weapons captured by Allied troops in clashes with the NVA near Plei Me last November, 86 percent were of Chinese Communist manufacture, 11 percent of North Korean manufacture, and 3 percent of Soviet manufacture. These arms represent the most modern weapons used by Chinese and North Korean forces, suggesting that NVA units are well equipped.

2. Clothing

Enemy requirements for clothing and other textile products are not extensive, and most of it is obtained locally by a special VC clothing unit. However, a number of clothing items such as khaki uniforms, underwear, and winter clothing for the mountainous regions have been produced in North Vietnam and are issued to infiltrators. Some clothing is also required in Cambodia.

3. Medical Supplies

Medical supplies are obtained both locally and from various Communist and Free World countries through Cambodia and North Vietnam. Antibiotics, plasma, and quinine are the principal items acquired from external sources. Medical supplies are in fairly tight supply so that their external procurement has a high priority.

4. Transportation Equipment

Trucks, water craft, and other transportation equipment used by enemy forces in South Vietnam usually are acquired in the country, sometimes by confiscation, but also by purchase or borrowing.

5. Signal Supplies

Most VC communications equipment has been supplied by East European Communist countries or Communist China or is of US, Japanese, or French manufacture and has been captured on the battlefield. NVA equipment is infiltrated with military personnel.

6. Engineer and Chemical Supplies

Most VC/NVA chemical and engineer supplies are estimated to be obtained from within the country, although some chemicals are also smuggled in from Cambodia. A large share of the chemicals is used for the production of filler for locally-produced ammunition.

C. Class III (Petroleum)

The total requirement for petroleum products for VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam is small, being needed primarily for confiscated vehicles, motorized junks in the Delta region, generator equipment at command posts, and in some crude arms factories. The VC obtain supplies from taxation of the content of petroleum tank trucks in VC/NVA-controlled areas of South Vietnam, seizure of petroleum supplies, and purchase from local gasoline stations or in Cambodia.

D. Class V (Ammunition)

In the present situation of relative independence from external sources for most supplies, ammunition is the principal determinant of the volume of supplies which must be infiltrated from North Vietnam. The supply of ammunition is particularly important to the major combat elements equipped with the new family of weapons who are completely dependent on outside sources for their ammunition. Due to the extensive use of a variety of weapons, however, the enemy utilizes both internal and external sources for the supply of ammunition. Standard ammunition is generally manufactured in the Communist countries. The remainder of the supply is from captured stock or is manufactured locally in VC engineer workshops. Viet Cong munition factories are not estimated to have a present capability to manufacture 7.62 mm ammunition. There is no evidence that expended shells are reloaded, and captured U.S. 7.62 mm ammunition is not compatible with Communist weapons.

The heavier ammunition employed by the enemy includes 40 mm antitank grenades, 57 mm and 75 mm recoilless rifle rounds, 60 mm, 82 mm, and 120 mm mortar rounds, and 70 mm, 75 mm and 105 mm howitzer ammunition. All heavier ammunition is either captured or obtained from external sources.

VI. Geographic Distribution of Logistic Requirements for VC/NVA Forces in South Vietnam

As of mid-year 1966 the strength of VC/NVA regular forces in South Vietnam stood at 118,000 personnel. The

disposition of these forces by Corps area is shown in Figure V-3 which also shows the major areas of rice cultivation. The predominant share of these forces is located in rice-deficit areas.

In Figure V-4 we show by Corps area the current allocation of total logistic requirements--150 tons a day--and that portion--some 20 tons a day--which must be supplied from external sources. The distribution of Communist forces reflects an unevenness in daily logistic requirements by Corps area and leads to internal distribution problems.

Thus the forces in the I and IV Corps areas require only 19 and 15 percent respectively of total daily requirements. The IV Corps, with the smallest concentration of forces, is also the area in which the Communists have the greatest self-sufficiency in food. The II and III Corps areas, in which most of the Communist forces are concentrated, account for almost two-thirds of the total daily requirement. These areas are also the predominant rice-deficit areas.

The inability to transport food from rice surplus to deficit areas is apparently becoming more severe. The Communists consequently have had to turn to Cambodian sources as a logistic expedient to provide rice to some of the forces in the central highlands. This movement has increased in the last half year and has reached an estimated 15 tons a day. The need to turn to Cambodian sources for rice indicates that internal distribution is one of the most pressing problems faced by the Communists and is probably the most vulnerable aspect of their entire logistics operation. As US/GVN and allied forces have increasing success in capturing or destroying Communist stockpiles and in disrupting Communist control of transport routes this problem would be even more aggravated. It would not, however, be critical, particularly as long as food supplies could be obtained and infiltrated from Cambodia. Even if they had to be provided by North Vietnam through Laos the volumes which we estimate would be required could be accommodated on the Laotian infiltration network.

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Figure V-3



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SOUTH VIETNAM

Figure V-4

DAILY VC/NVA LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS AS OF MID-YEAR 1966, BY CORPS AREA



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The current estimates of the build-up of Communist forces and the highest probable levels of combat through mid-1967 yield an external logistic requirement for Class II and IV and Class V supplies of 55 tons a day. If the disposition of Communist forces remains the same and internal distribution of food is impossible, an additional 45 tons of food could be required daily in the food-deficit areas (See Figure V-5). This added logistic requirement would not tax the infiltration route through Laos very severely, but it would aid substantially in reducing the excess of road capacity over logistic requirements. But as the Communist build-up continues and the level of combat increases the excess of road capacity in Laos over logistic requirements could be diminished substantially.

The present disposition of Communist forces in South Vietnam is much more favorable for resupply from external sources. Over 85 percent of the NVA forces and 35 percent of the VC forces are in the I and II Corps areas in close proximity to both the Laotian infiltration corridor and the infiltration routes from Cambodia. These forces account for almost three-fourths of the supplies which must be infiltrated from external sources.

VII. Effect of Destruction and Capture of Supplies

The destruction and capture of Communist supplies by US and Allied forces during the past year as compiled from available data for selected categories of supplies are shown below. The data for food, ammunition, and POL basically represent losses incurred in the provinces of Binh Duong, Bien Hoa and Tay Ninh in III Corps area, and Quang Duc, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Pleiku in II Corps--areas where US forces engaged in large search and destroy operations. Weapons losses include those inflicted by South Vietnamese troops as well as US and Allied forces.

Food (tons)	10-12,000
Ammunition	
Small arms and 12.7 mm machine gun (rounds)	180,000
POL (gallons)	7,700
Weapons	21,284

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Figure V-5

SOUTH VIETNAM
DAILY LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS OF VC/NVA FORCES AT VARYING LEVELS OF COMBAT

June 1966 and Projected June 1967

(Short Tons)



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The quantity of food known to have been captured or destroyed represents an amount sufficient to feed the current Communist main and local forces in South Vietnam for a period of about three months. This quantity becomes relatively significant when considered as the minimum loss of food to the enemy. Moreover, recent allied operations have not only destroyed enemy food crops and uncovered VC food storage points, but protected rice harvests from enemy acquisition and interdicted the movement of some food to VC distribution points.

Known losses of small arms and heavy machine gun ammunition, however, represent only about three days' supply for the current order of battle of VC/NVA troops at present levels of combat. Although the magnitude of losses sustained in engagements with ARVN forces or as a result of air strikes cannot be determined at the present time, such losses to date have had little discernible effect on the enemy's ability to initiate attacks or on the rate with which he expends his ammunition.

Known losses of POL in South Vietnam represent less than a two week supply for VC/NVA forces. Losses inflicted against POL stocks by ARVN forces and air strikes probably have added to the quantity of such supplies denied the enemy, but due to the small requirement estimated for VC/NVA forces operating in South Vietnam these losses probably have no effect on enemy capabilities.

The known number of weapons captured or destroyed by friendly forces through June 1966 was sufficient to equip some 40 battalions. Losses incurred as a result of air strikes have raised the total weapons loss, but again, if such losses are examined in the context of the number of VC-initiated attacks over recent months, it becomes clear that total weapons losses have not been prohibitive.

The quantities of destroyed and captured Communist supplies undoubtedly have added to the logistic problems faced by VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam but the extent of these adverse effects cannot be estimated since we are almost totally lacking in knowledge of Communist stockpiles in South Vietnam. The data presently available do not include losses inflicted by South Vietnamese forces (with the exception of losses of weapons); supplies lost as a result of B-52 strikes; or supplies destroyed as a result of numerous strikes by U.S. tactical aircraft.

1803

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

9 JUN 1966

C. F.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bromley Smith
White House Staff
The White House

SUBJECT : Foreign Shipping to North Vietnam in April 1966

1. The attached is the latest in our series of monthly reports on foreign shipping to North Vietnam.

2. The report notes that the number of calls by foreign ships in April was the lowest since October 1965, in large measure because of the continuing small number of arrivals by Free World ships -- only seven. Total seaborne trade was 14 percent below the monthly average for 1965. Coal exports from Cam Pha were cut off for a time by a U. S. air strike on 19 April; the same strike allegedly damaged a Polish ship. No maritime shipments of arms or ammunition were detected.

EO 12958 6.1(c)>25Yrs

[redacted]
WILLIAM N. MORELL, JR.
Director
Research and Reports

Attachment:
CIA/RR EM 66-19 (Subject Report)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2001

486

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Moscow, by its protest of 5 August alleging that US aircraft strafed a Soviet merchant ship in Haiphong harbor, displays a growing uncertainty and apprehension concerning US policy. Its protest is carefully worded, however, so that it does not imply that the strafing was deliberate, and the note itself does not appear to signal a change in Moscow's present policy of limiting Soviet risks in the conflict.

On the contrary, recent signs of Soviet attitudes toward the US seem to underscore Moscow's desire to continue to deal with the US on practical questions of interest and importance despite the strains of Vietnam. This attitude was evident in Premier Kosygin's address to the Supreme Soviet on the day following the "strafing" incident.

Kosygin blamed the US for the strain in Soviet-American relations, but said the Soviet government did "not believe that Soviet-American relations cannot be different from what they are now." He stated that although "aggressive moods obviously predominate in Washington at the present stage, we know that there are other, sounder tendencies there, too. The strengthening of these tendencies will be received with due understanding on our part." The Soviet premier pointed out that despite the "exceedingly tense" international situation caused by the war, measures such as a nonproliferation treaty could still be dealt with.

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In recent days, the USSR has demonstrated its desire to make progress on other matters. The US Embassy in Moscow noted the cooperative spirit displayed by the Soviets toward the US in discussions which ended on 30 July concerning the conservation and use of fishery resources. Much the same spirit and a general lack of polemics was evident on the part of the Soviets in the outer space treaty negotiations in Geneva.

On Vietnam, the Soviets have been attempting recently to persuade third parties to urge restraint on the US. Soviet ambassadors have made demarches to Free World countries (e.g., Sweden and Denmark) warning of the gravity of the situation. The intensely emotional position that Brezhnev took on the subject during UN Secretary General U Thant's visit to Moscow also may have been calculated to create pressure on the US from other quarters to ease military pressure on Hanoi. These tactics reveal not only Moscow's concern over US policy in Vietnam, but a continuing frustration over its inability thus far to influence the course of events there.

The Soviet note charges that US aircraft "strafed the moorings of Haiphong port" on 2 August and "in this connection, large caliber bullets" hit the Soviet vessel Medyn, endangering the lives of the crew. Although this ship, a large-hatch dry cargo vessel carrying POL in drums, is known to have been in Haiphong harbor at the time of the US air strike against the Haiphong POL storage site, its exact position cannot be established. Nor can it be established that the vessel actually was hit by US ordnance. Pilots of the strike aircraft reported all bombs were dropped in the target area and that no foreign shipping was involved. Strike aircraft were armed with guns, but did not use them. Flak-suppression aircraft which accompanied the strike aircraft were not armed with guns or other ordnance which would fit the description of "large caliber bullets."

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[redacted]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

CITE [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

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DIST 12 SEPTEMBER 1966

COUNTRY CZECHOSLOVAKIA/NORTH VIETNAM

DOI [redacted]

SUBJECT PLANS FOR CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT DELEGATION TO TRAVEL TO NORTH VIETNAM

[redacted]

ACQ [redacted] FIELD NO.

SOURCE [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

1. PREPARATIONS ARE UNDERWAY FOR A CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT DELEGATION TO TRAVEL TO NORTH VIETNAM LED BY PREMIER JOZEF LENART. [redacted] COMMENT: THE DATE OF THE VISIT WAS NOT SPECIFIED, AND NO FURTHER DETAILS WERE GIVEN. [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

2. FIELD DISSEM: CINCPAC, PACFLT, PACAF, ARPAC.

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COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI JULY 1966

SUBJECT STATEMENTS OF CAPTURED NORTH VIETNAMESE NAVAL OFFICER ON GOOD TREATMENT OF CAPTURED UNITED STATES PILOTS BY NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT

ACQ VIETNAM (SAIGON) 11 SEPTEMBER 1966

SOURCE [redacted]

1. (SUMMARY. A CAPTURED NORTH VIETNAMESE NAVAL OFFICER SAID ON 7 SEPTEMBER 1966 THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IS FOLLOWING THE RULES OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION TO THE LETTER IN ITS TREATMENT OF DOWNED AMERICAN PILOTS AS PRISONERS OF WAR, AND THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY ARE STILL GUIDED IN THIS MATTER BY INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY GENERAL VO NGUYEN GIAP IN THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR AGAINST THE FRENCH. CAPTURED AMERICAN PILOTS ARE GIVEN ADEQUATE FOOD, CLOTHING, AND SHELTER, AND RECEIVE A HIGHER CASH FOOD ALLOWANCE THAN NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY PERSONNEL. THEY ARE GIVEN PROPAGANDA [redacted] (Encl 61) (S-47, Loi 100-VN))

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[redacted]

MATERIAL TO READ. WOUNDED PRISONERS RECEIVE THE SAME TREATMENT AS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, AND THE DEAD ARE BURIED IN MARKED GRAVES. THE NAVAL OFFICER SAID THAT THE PILOTS WHO SURRENDER ARE NOT TO BE HARMED, BUT THOSE WHO RESIST ARE TO BE SHOT.)

2. ON 7 SEPTEMBER 1966 [redacted] WHO WAS CAPTURED [redacted] SAID THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY TOWARD CAPTURED UNITED STATES PILOTS FOLLOWS TO THE LETTER THE RULES OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR. INSTRUCTIONS THAT PRISONERS MUST BE TREATED HUMANELY HAVE EXISTED IN NORTH VIETNAM SINCE THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR AGAINST THE FRENCH. AT THAT TIME GENERAL VO NGUYEN GIAP ISSUED AN ORDER TO HIS MILITARY FORCES OUTLINING THE PROCEDURES FOR THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY ARE STILL OBEYING THIS ORDER. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ISSUED A SIMILAR ORDER TO THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, AND IT IS STILL IN EXISTENCE. [redacted] COMMENT. SOURCE WOULD NOT PROVIDE DETAILS CONCERNING THESE INSTRUCTIONS.)

3. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT PROVIDES ITS UNITED STATES PRISONERS WITH ACCURATE FOOD, CLOTHING AND SHELTER, AND A CASH ALLOWANCE OF SIX DONG FOR FOOD. THIS ALLOWANCE IS MUCH HIGHER THAN THE TWO DONG THE NORTH VIETNAMESE THEMSELVES RECEIVE.

4. WOUNDED PRISONERS RECEIVE THE SAME MEDICAL TREATMENT AS [redacted]

[redacted]

NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY WOUNDED.

5. UNITED STATES PILOTS KILLED IN ACTION OVER NORTH VIETNAM ARE BURIED IN MARKED GRAVES FOR POSSIBLE LATER EXHUMATION AND REMOVAL TO THE UNITED STATES. [redacted] COMMENT. SOURCE SAID HE DID NOT PERSONALLY OBSERVE THAT THIS WAS BEING DONE, BUT THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS BECAUSE THE FRENCH WAR DEAD HAD BEEN HANDLED IN THIS MANNER.)

6. UNITED STATES PILOTS WHO SURRENDER AFTER BEING SHOT DOWN ARE NOT TO BE HARMED. THOSE WHO RESIST ARREST, HOWEVER, ARE TO BE SHOT.

7. UNITED STATES PRISONERS NOW ARE BEING GIVEN PROPAGANDA MATERIAL TO READ. THE PRISONERS CAPTURED AFTER THE FIRST UNITED STATES BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM DID NOT RECEIVE SUCH READING MATERIAL.

8. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE JUSPAO USARV 7TH AIR FORCE USAID 7/13TH MIG USMACV NAVFORV DIST 50/OSI CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

SPECIAL REPORT

THE UN'S PROBLEMS ON EVE OF 21ST GENERAL ASSEMBLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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THE UN'S PROBLEMS ON EVE OF 21ST GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The 21st session of the UN General Assembly, convening on 20 September, could be the most difficult and rancorous in United Nations history.

The foremost of many problems facing the membership is finding a successor to Secretary General Thant. Thant, who says he will not offer himself for another term after his present one expires in November, has become increasingly concerned about the major powers' failure to make greater use of the UN organization and especially of the office of the Secretary General. He has also deplored the atrophy of the UN's peacekeeping function, as evidenced by its inability to bring about a settlement in Vietnam, its minor role in the Dominican crisis last year, and the present ills of its operations on Cyprus and the Middle East. In part because of such operations, the UN is still in the red financially. It will remain so as long as the USSR and France, the principal debtors to the UN, fail to make voluntary contributions to relieve the situation.

Serious though these issues may be, they are likely to be overshadowed in the coming session by still others of a substantive nature. The Afro-Asians, who can now dominate the assembly by virtue of their numerical superiority, are expected to tie up most of the coming session with a bitter campaign against what they consider vestiges of colonialism on a variety of African problems. The question of the future of the disarmament negotiations will also need to be faced, however, as will the recurring problem of Chinese representation.

An African Assembly

Among the African problems, that of South-West Africa will be given priority. African delegates remain determined to loose the Republic of South Africa's hold on the territory, despite their recent failure to accomplish this through the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the UN's principal judicial body. The court refused to rule on the merits of the case, insisting that the plaintiffs--Liberia and Ethiopia--had no legal right to require South Africa to meet its League of Nations mandate obligations in the territory.

The UN Secretariat has suggested that the afternoon sessions

be devoted to the South-West Africa question, with the rest of the general debate held during the morning meetings. The African group is pleased with this plan since it will dramatize the urgency of the problem and will give the foreign ministers who usually participate at the beginning of the general debate an opportunity to speak out. The discussion will cover the report of the Committee of 24 on the subject of South Africa and the secretary general's report on the educational and training programs for South-West Africa, but it will concentrate on the situation arising from the recent ICJ judgment.

The Africans will attempt to pass a resolution stripping South Africa of its League mandate and placing South-West Africa under UN administration. Such action, however, is of questionable legality and might precipitate South Africa's withdrawal from the UN. Another tactic would be a request to the ICJ for an advisory opinion on whether South Africa has breached its mandate. However, at the present time the anti-ICJ sentiment prevailing among the Africans makes it doubtful that they would go to the court again. During the ICJ election the Africans plan to "purge the court" by filling the five vacancies on the bench with judges more sympathetic to their views. In addition, they plan to introduce an amendment to the UN Charter enlarging the court to give Africa and Asia more representation, as was done for the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council last year.

Considerable sentiment exists for an attempt by the assembly to revoke South Africa's League mandate, but a strong condemnatory resolution, which would have no juridical consequences, might be enough to satisfy the Africans. Ernest Gross, the legal counsel for Ethiopia and Liberia in the recent ICJ case, proposed that a UN commission for South-West Africa be set up to supervise the administration of the mandate and work toward ultimate independence for the territory. Such a maneuver would be a delaying tactic and would rule out any action by the assembly to end the mandate.

Other African issues will involve Rhodesia, the Portuguese territories, and South Africa's apartheid (racial segregation) policies. The General Assembly will consider the report of the Special Committee on Colonialism which recommended mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and called on the UK to take all measures including the use of force to abolish Ian Smith's rebel, white-minority regime. The Africans are likely to attempt to pass an assembly resolution requesting that the Security Council take stronger mandatory action under Chapter 7 than the voluntary measures under Chapter 6 that the UN took last year.

Financing and Peacekeeping

The noise and heat generated by the African debates are likely to dissipate what little impulse exists to deal with UN finances and peacekeeping. The members have little stomach for tackling these problems. There are deep divisions among them on political principles as well as interpretation of the UN Charter's articles on peacekeeping functions. The feeble Committee of 33 set up to deal with the question is now on its last legs. After many months of discussion no new suggestions have been presented and the apathy of the Afro-Asians has brought the meetings to a quiet close. The committee's report to the General Assembly will contain little of substantive value.

Only the Irish have shown any interest in searching for a solution. Even though their proposals were shelved by the last assembly and hardly considered by the Committee of 33, the Irish intend to present them to this assembly. Their plan for financing future peacekeeping operations allows any of the permanent members (US, USSR, UK, France, and China) to avoid sharing the cost of a peacekeeping operation by simply not voting in favor of it. The Canadians are thinking about presenting their formula on financing which apportions the cost of an operation among the members according to a special scale.

Over a year ago an appeal was made for voluntary contributions to relieve the growing UN debt. However, the major debtors --the Soviet Union and France-- have as yet given no sign that they will make a contribution.

The UN's financial conditions are contributing to the ills of the present peacekeeping operation in Cyprus. The secretary general has had to pass the "begging bowl" to keep the operation alive. Members with forces on the island continue to threaten to pull out unless they are reimbursed for their expenses. This has led some countries to suggest that the forces be reduced or be replaced by an observer mission--a change which might endanger the shaky peace now maintained on the island.

The UN operation in the Middle East (UNEF) is suffering from the same ills. Here too there is considerable support for a major reduction in troop strength. The majority of members hold that unless there is some demonstrated progress toward easing Arab-Israeli tension they will be unwilling to continue contributions. The general view is that future financial support for UNEF should be through voluntary contributions.

Disarmament

The numerous disarmament items on the agenda for the 21st General Assembly will be time-consuming and difficult to handle. At last year's assembly these same items--nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, nuclear-free zones, and others--were

discussed and then handed over to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) for further study. However, the ENDC's failure to make progress on any of these issues has led many Afro-Asian countries to question the value of continuing it.

East-West differences over a nonproliferation treaty and the diminishing support from the ENDC's nonaligned members for the Western formula have stalled the negotiations. The deadlock has caused the eight nonaligned members to consider presenting their own version of a treaty at the next ENDC session. Their draft would call for a ban on the transfer of nuclear weapons to states not already having them, a cutoff on the production of fissionable material for weapons, a reduction of stockpiles by nuclear states, and the universal application of international safeguards to all nuclear activities. The eight have drafted a memorandum reaffirming their conviction that a nonproliferation treaty should be concluded and should include these restrictions or be accompanied with or followed by other measures which accomplish the same goals.

Of even more interest to the nonaligned countries is the proposal to extend the limited test ban treaty of 1963 to cover all testing. The nonaligned group sees this issue as the one on which the ENDC might make progress. The nonaligned will argue that improvements in technological capabilities to monitor underground explosions has reduced the need for on-site inspections, hitherto one of the stumbling blocks to such a treaty.

Other possible disarmament topics are a Latin American nuclear-free zone and abolition of foreign military bases, another favorite of the Afro-Asians as well as the Soviet bloc.

While there seems to be little progress toward settlement of the various disarmament issues, there is one bright spot in the related subjects of outer space: the treaty draft now approaching completion in the legal subcommittee of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The Soviet Union may, however, seek to extract certain propaganda advantages.

Admittance of Peking

Another go-around on the question of seating Communist China is expected to occur at about mid-session. The vote was a tie last year and a close vote is expected this year.

Secretary General Thant's reasons for not accepting a second term include a reference to the Chinese representation issue. He reiterated his dissatisfaction that the world organization has not yet achieved universality of membership. It is generally known that Thant has supported the admission of China but his listing it as one of the reasons for his resignation will probably cause some members to reconsider their position on the issue.

However, the recent developments inside China which have further tarnished its international image, together with its leaders' statements disclaiming any desire to come into the UN, will possibly affect Peking's chances of winning more votes.

Last year the ruling that admission of Communist China was an "important question" requiring a two-thirds majority for passage was upheld. This year the importance of this procedural ruling is even greater owing to the likelihood of some changes in the voting pattern. Iran and Senegal intend to vote for admission. Canada is wavering and may abstain. However, Chad and the Maldive Islands, which abstained last year, are expected to support Taiwan. The outcome will depend on the Afro-Asians, who control the most votes in the General Assembly, and their attitudes on the Chinese issue may be affected by the outcome of the debate on South-West Africa and Rhodesia.

Other Issues

Although Vietnam will not be on the agenda, it is certain the foreign ministers will discuss it in their opening speeches. There is also a rumor that the Afro-Asian nations will introduce a resolution at the end of the general debate either on their own or at the request of the secretary general. This resolution would merely call for the cessation of hostilities and the beginning of negotiations. However, the Soviets have recently been making it clear to their friends at the UN that they want no resolution of any sort on Vietnam.

Another kind of admission problem--UN membership for small states ("the bits and pieces problem")--may receive further airing at the 21st General Assembly. The admission of the Maldive Islands last year caused concern that numerous small entities might aspire to UN membership upon becoming independent. Such territories, too small to carry out charter obligations, could find their way into the assembly to the detriment of states with major responsibilities. It has been suggested that there should either be a minimum standard on the size of the states becoming members, or some form of associate status. It has also been proposed that the Security Council committee on membership be revived in order to prevent acceptance of small states simply because no one wants to oppose them.

The Korean question will again be on the agenda but will probably not come up until the end of the session, in which case it would be brushed aside. Saudi Arabia will probably introduce a proposal to invite North Korea to attend the assembly discussions. There is a strong feeling among the nonaligned members that this should be done and that direct talks between the parties should be held.

Thant's Departure and Its Effect on the UN

Overshadowing all of the numerous problems the UN faces is Secretary General Thant's decision not to offer himself as a candidate for another five-year term. There is a possibility that after a formal appeal by the Security Council, Thant will decide to accept a shortened term for perhaps two or three years. Many of his colleagues feel that Thant genuinely wants to leave his post, but they also hope he will not leave if the leadership crisis has not been resolved by 3 November, the day his term expires.

If Thant adheres to his decision to leave, the UN will face the difficult problem of finding a qualified successor acceptable to all the major powers. At present there are no strong candidates, and the search is likely to be long and rigorous. Possible candidates that have been mentioned are Prebisch of Argentina, Garcia Robles or Cuevas Cancino of Mexico, Adebo of Nigeria, Slim of Tunisia, D'Arboussier of Senegal, Rolz-Bennett of Guatemala, Enckell of Finland, and Pazhwak of Afghanistan. The Afro-Asians have agreed among themselves that Thant should be pressed to stay on for an extension of his term if no suitable replacement can be found. (SECRET FOREIGN DISSEM)

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SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP TO REPORTS OF VIETNAMESE "ASSASSINATION" SQUADS IN THAILAND

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ON 27 OCTOBER, [redacted]
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION SUPPLEMENTING THAT REPORTED ON 26 OCTOBER ABOUT FIVE AND SIX-MAN VROUPS ARRIVING IN BANGKOK TO ASSASSINATE THE PRESIDENT:
REFERENCE: CIA MESSAGE 46943 OF 26 OCTOBER 1966

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(6)

1. THE FOLLOWING CLARIFICATION WAS OBTAINED ON 27 OCTOBER FROM THE DEBRIEFERS [redacted] ABOUT THE "FIVE-MAN ASSASSINATION TEAM" (PARA 1A OF REF)

[redacted] PRESUMABLY COMMUNIST, GROUP IN NAKORN PHATHON AND WAS TAKEN TO A MEETING ON THE EVENING OF 10 OCTOBER AT A CHICKEN FARM OUTSIDE TOWN WHERE TEN PERSONS WERE PRESENT. THE GROUP LISTENED TO A LOUDSPEAKER OVER WHICH AN UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER, SPEAKING THAI WITH A CHINESE ACCENT, TOLD THEM THAT A FIVE-MAN VIETNAMESE TEAM WOULD BE COMING TO NAKORN PHATHON FROM VIENTIANE TO PLAN THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON. THE GROUP WAS SAID TO HAVE A LONG RANGE RIFLE WITH A TELESCOPIC SIGHT AND SMALL TRANSMITTING RADIOS FOR COMMUNICATIONS AMONG THEMSELVES. THE ATTEMPT WOULD BE MADE ALONG THE ROUTE BETWEEN DON MUANG AIRPORT AND THE CAPITOL HOTEL AREA ON PAHOLYOTHIN ROAD OR ON RAJDAMNERN AVENUE. ESCAPE WOULD BE BY BOAT DOWN THE RIVER. THE SPEAKER CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT EACH MEMBER WOULD RECEIVE A PRIVATE NOTE LISTING HIS ASSIGNMENT DURING THE OPERATION. [redacted] THE SPEECH CAME FROM A TAPE RECORDER RATHER THAN FROM A CONCEALED ORATOR ALTHOUGH THE LATTER WAS NOT IMPOSSIBLE.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

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ASIAN COMMUNIST EMPLOYMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS AS A POLITICAL TACTIC

This report, originally given a limited distribution in a different form, sets forth the fight-talk tactic used by the Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese Communists in the course of important military conflicts, namely, the Chinese civil war, the Korean war, and the Indochina war against the French. It focuses on the factors which have impelled the Asian Communist leaders to begin negotiations and on the various tactics used during negotiations in the effort to extract political concessions from the West. It also discusses the lessons which the North Vietnamese today profess to see in these earlier situations, confirming them in their conviction not to negotiate prior to attaining a public declaration of surrender from Washington on the issue of troop withdrawal.

This report, prepared by the Research Staff, has been informally coordinated within CIA. The responsible analysts, [Arthur A. Cohen and Helen-Louise Hunter,] would welcome comment, addressed to the Chief or Deputy Chief of the staff [(at Ext. 7213 or 4088).]

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ASIAN COMMUNIST EMPLOYMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS AS A POLITICAL TACTIC

Page

Summary
a. General Findings....1
b. The CCP-KMT Civil War (1937 to 1949)....2
c. The Korean War (1950 to 1953)....3
d. Vietnam (1953 to 1954)....3
e. Implications for Vietnam Today....5

Discussion
A. The CCP-KMT Civil War (1937 to 1949)....5
B. The Korean War (1950 to 1953)....13
C. Vietnam (1953 to 1954)....30
D. Implications for Vietnam Today....48

ASIAN COMMUNIST EMPLOYMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS AS A POLITICAL TACTIC

Summary

This paper discusses the Asian (particularly Chinese) Communist practice of negotiating, focusing on the motives which, in the past, have impelled Asian Communists to negotiate and the signs they have given when they were prepared to talk. It includes an analysis of the fight-talk tactic used in the Chinese civil war in the 1930s and 1940s as well as a detailed examination of the Korean experience of 1950-53 and the Vietnamese experience of 1953-54. Finally, there is a short discussion of implications for Vietnam today.

a. General Findings

On the two occasions when the Chinese Communists have initiated negotiations during military conflicts, their forces were either

(a) weak and in danger of annihilation, as in the Chinese civil war, or

(b) badly hurt in the field, as in the Korean war.

As they negotiated, they continued to fight. This fight-and-talk tactic was formulated by Mao Tse-tung in 1940 as a means to preserve his weak forces from being destroyed by Chiang Kai-shek's militarily superior armies. Subsequently, it was used in Korea by the Chinese and North Koreans, at first as a expedient to shield their badly hurt armies in 1951, and then, from 1951 to 1953, as a holding tactic until they could extract terms enabling them to disengage from a costly limited war.

In Indochina, however, the decision to begin negotiations was imposed by the Soviet and Chinese leaders on Ho Chi Minh when they feared American involvement and escalation of the war more than he did in 1953. They urged Ho to close out the war, which he was by no means losing in the field, and persuaded him to make concessions to the French after talks started and to try to seize Vietnam by a process

of low-risk political subversion. Even after Ho had been induced to begin negotiations, his desire to use Mao's original fight-and-talk tactic for a protracted period was subordinated to the larger interests of Soviet policy (to split the Western alliance in Europe) and Chinese policy (to prevent the US from establishing alliances in Asia). The Soviets and Chinese viewed these interests as being best served by a "peace" offensive and hindered by continuation of the Indochina war. Ho made concessions, particularly on the matter of partition, which were later viewed by him and his lieutenants as a mistake not to be repeated.

b. The CCP-KMT Civil War (1937 to 1949)

Constantly maneuvering to preserve the badly depleted ranks of his Red Army from complete destruction by Chiang Kai-shek's militarily superior forces, Mao in September 1937 finally induced Chiang to establish, on paper, a CCP-KMT united front against Japan. But within the context of this paper alliance, Mao expanded his military and political forces in the northwest and even directed quick-decision thrusts to be made against isolated KMT units. As a pattern of limited armed conflict and political struggle emerged in 1940, Mao avoided major military operations which would provoke a major counterattack and developed a tactic of limited-fight, limited talk: "After we have repulsed the attack of the /KMT forces/ and before they launch a new one, we should stop at the proper moment and bring that particular fight to a close. In the period that follows, we should make a truce with them." (Mao's statement of 11 March 1940). In this way, Mao gained a series of small victories without running the risk of a general civil war, while expanding his territorial holdings behind the Japanese lines.

While fighting continued on the local level, CCP-KMT negotiations went forward on the national level intermittently from 1940 to 1946. Represented in Chungking by his brillant negotiator, Chou En-lai, Mao used various lulls in the civil war to increase his regular forces, and in 1944, he permitted the American Army Observer Mission to operate in Yenan because its very presence had a political restraining effect on Chiang. Recognizing the strengthened military and political position of Chiang after the surrender of Japan in August 1945, Mao tried to settle for a half-way station--legalization of the CCP--on the road to an eventual seizure of national power. Chiang refused to facilitate this eventual takeover. On 19 August 1946, shortly after KMT planes bombed Yenan, Mao dropped the talking half of his dual tactic

and began to fight the all-out civil war, which his forces decisively won in mid-1949.

c. The Korean War (1950 to 1953)

Initial Chinese Communist military successes from November through December 1950 increased Mao's confidence that the UN forces could be driven from Korea if military pressure was sustained, and Chou En-lai rejected a cease-fire as "a breathing spell" for the UN. But a series of manpower-killing advances by UN and ROK units in March and early April 1951 followed by the blunting of the Communists' big April and May offensives, which cost them an estimated 221,000 men, left Mao's best armies on the defensive by 1 June 1951. Of the 21 Chinese Communist divisions which had initiated the April and May offensives, 16 had suffered about 50 percent casualties.

These disastrous defeats impelled Mao to begin negotiations, but there were no prior indications that he was prepared to drop his previous political conditions for a cease-fire. When, on 23 June 1951, Soviet UN delegate Malik for the first time called for talks for a cease-fire, he merely avoided raising the preconditions that the US must withdraw from Taiwan and that Peking should be admitted to the UN. Mao seized upon the military breathing-spell to improve the badly impaired combat capabilities of his forces in the field.

Mao's strategy at the armistice negotiations (July 1951 to July 1953) was to wage a "protracted struggle," combining tactics of political attrition with limited military pressure. But this strategy did not break the determination of the US negotiators to defend the principle of voluntary repatriation of war prisoners. The death of Stalin (5 March 1953) permitted the development of a new Soviet attitude toward East-West tensions in general and concluding an armistice in particular. Soviet pressure on Mao and his own recognition that further resistance was purposeless, and even harmful to his economic program, impelled him to retreat and accept voluntary repatriation--a move which opened the way for the armistice agreement of 27 July 1953.

d. Vietnam (1953 to 1954)

The same considerations that led the Soviets and the Chinese to negotiate an end to the Korean war in mid-1953 made them look with favor upon a negotiated settlement of

the Indochina war. At the time, however, the fortunes of the Vietnamese Communists in their eight-year fight with the French were steadily improving and Ho Chi Minh gave no indication that he would be willing to accept less in a negotiated settlement than his forces could seize on the battlefield.

The first indication that the Communists might consider negotiations came from the Soviets, who began in August 1953 to quote with approval demands in the French press for a "Panmunjom" in Indochina. By September, the Chinese had also indicated a willingness to discuss Indochina at the conference table. But Vietnamese Communist propaganda made it clear that these Soviet and Chinese initiatives were being made at a time when Ho was still resisting the concept of negotiations. The attitude of the Viet Minh leaders at this time is illustrative of the generalization that Asian Communists have been unwilling to begin negotiations when they have been in an advantageous position militarily, or have not been badly hurt in the field.

As the French Government was being subjected to increasing pressure from many members of the National Assembly and from the French public for an end to the costly war, Moscow and Peking acted to convince Ho that he could make major gains through negotiations. On 29 November 1953, he finally took the initiative in proposing negotiations, but it was a hedged proposal that, in effect, demanded a complete French surrender.

Premier Laniel was able to resist the strong domestic pressure for immediate bilateral negotiations with the Viet Minh by agreeing to discuss Indochina at the Geneva conference in May 1954. Although Ho clearly preferred bilaterals, (in which he would have been in a much stronger position vis-a-vis the French than he was at Geneva), he was again pressured by the Soviets to agree to international negotiations.

At Geneva, Molotov and Chou En-lai moved adroitly to avoid any impasse that could be used by the US as an excuse for intervention in the fighting. Ho, whose delegate, Pham Van Dong, started with maximum demands after the fall of Dien Bien Phu (7 May 1954), apparently calculated that negotiations could continue for some time without leading to American involvement. His tactics of protracted negotiations, which would afford him more time to solidify his military position, were similar to those of Mao in Korea. But again

and again, the Soviets and Chinese acted to undercut his delegate's maximum demands at Geneva for French political concessions in exchange for a ceasefire.

The Viet Minh certainly had not expected to have to make as many political concessions as they finally agreed to at Geneva. Ho was in a position to negotiate from strength and to do so for a long time, but he found himself caught in a Sino-Soviet political web and was persuaded not to use his growing military capability to force major concessions. It was clear at the time that the North Vietnamese were far from completely satisfied with the Geneva compromises. As time has gone on, they have probably become even more convinced that the political concessions they made there were a mistake. The clear awareness that they were impelled, primarily by Moscow and Peking, to stop at a half-way station on the road to total military victory has made them all the more determined to fight on in the present situation.

e. Implications for Vietnam Today

North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist officials have indicated privately that the compromises made in 1954, providing the Viet Minh with something less than a total takeover of Vietnam, were a mistake. Ho's determination not to stop half-way again, even in the face of increased US airstrikes, is bolstered by Mao's special need to keep him fighting. Mao's special need, which stems largely from an image of himself as "leader" of the international Communist movement, is to prove Soviet and other doubters wrong regarding the ability of revolutionaries to defeat the US in a protracted small war.

Discussion

A. The CCP-KMT Civil War (1937 to 1949)

The badly depleted ranks of Mao's Red Army, which straggled into the sanctuary of northwest China in November 1935 after the punishing attacks of Chiang Kai-shek's forces during the Long March, were incapable of resisting an all-out KMT offensive. Aware of this basic fact, Mao repeatedly appealed to Chiang to end the civil war and establish a CCP-KMT united front to expel Japanese forces from north China. Chiang was unwilling to comply primarily because Mao insisted on preserving his military units for use in the revolution: "It

goes without saying that we shall never allow Chiang to lay a finger on the Red Army." (Mao's statement of 14 March 1936). But Japan's large-scale attack on China in July 1937 provided Mao with a new opportunity to move Chiang into a united front against Japan. Mao took the first formal step; on 22 September 1937 the CCP declared that its armed forces would be under the "direct control" of Chiang. Actually, three days after this paper statement, Mao made it clear that "direct control" was only an anti-Japanese political facade and that units and their weapons would remain under Communist control:

> It is necessary to maintain the CCP's absolutely independent leadership in what originally was the Red Army as well as in all guerrilla units. Communists are not permitted to vacillate on this principle. (CCP resolution of 25 September 1937)

Mao used the mythical anti-Japanese united front to deter the KMT forces from attacking his new sanctuary in the northwest and to expand his military, territorial, and political holdings. Most of the CCP effort was directed toward extending its assets, some was directed toward guarding against a KMT attack, and only a little was directed toward engaging Japanese armed forces. Negotiations for the reorganization of the former "Red Army" units moved very slowly in 1937 and 1938, and clashes continued on the local level between some Nationalist and Communist forces. As friction increased, Mao began to formulate his political-military tactic. On 6 November 1938, he directed that the CCP's main field work should be in the relatively secure rear areas of the Japanese forces, calculating that the political-military vacuum behind the Japanese lines would shield the CCP from superior KMT forces until the foothold in the northwest could be expanded. Mao enlarged his armed forces as quickly and efficiently as possible, but he always stopped just short of provoking an open break with Chiang and the retribution of a major KMT offensive.

Calculated restraint, intended to provide Chiang with no pretext for an offensive, was designed by Mao to be a temporary tactic to gain vitally needed breathing spells prior to

the opening of a revolutionary advance in the future. Mao indicated the "positive" role of reduced military aggressiveness as a tactic in advancing the revolution:

> Our concession, withdrawal, turning to the defensive or suspending action, whether in dealing with allies or enemies, should always be regarded as part of the entire revolutionary policy, as an indispensable link in the general revolutionary line, as a segment in the curvilinear movement. In short they are positive. (Mao's statement of 5 November 1938)

That is, defensive or suspended action was part of Mao's policy to expand his armies and the CCP membership behind Japanese lines with the aim of seizing more territory at the expense of the KMT. But quick-decision thrusts were never abandoned. For example, in the spring of 1939, Communist forces moved quickly into Shantung Province, and in the winter of 1939-1940, they decimated KMT forces in Hopei Province. These clashes were fully concordant with Mao's policy of expanding holdings by armed struggle within the context of the CCP-KMT paper united front.

A pattern of limited armed conflict and political struggle emerged in CCP-KMT relations in the spring of 1940. Mao began to refine his fighting-and-talking tactic. Militarily, he limited the offensive operations of the Communist armies, which were still considerably inferior to KMT armies; politically, he worked vigorously to indoctrinate workers, peasants, and intellectuals. In this fashion, he groped his way, seeking out and exploiting the soft spots in Chiang's military and political armor.

Mao systematized his tactic. On 11 March 1940, he set forth the unique position that there was no incongruity between waging a political-military struggle against Chiang while maintaining a united front with him. The struggle half of this dialectical policy was intended to demonstrate to Chiang that Mao's forces could not be destroyed--that they would fight back against any KMT offensives. The unity half was intended to deter KMT attacks and to "avert the outbreak of large-scale civil war." Mao depicted the partial struggle against Chiang as "the most important means for strengthening KMT-CCP cooperation," his calculation having been, as he pointed out on 4 May 1940 in a directive to Communist field commanders operating in east China, that clashes with the KMT forces were necessary --

> so as to make the KMT afraid to oppress us...and compel them to recognize our legal status, and make them hesitate to engineer a split.

That is, Mao, on occasion, used military action in certain areas rather than direct political concessions to sustain the united front on paper.

He correctly estimated that small CCP military thrusts would not provoke Chiang to move beyond limited counter-attacks because Chiang did not have the military capability in 1940 to open a nation-wide offensive against CCP forces so long as the war against Japan was being waged. Mao's estimate of 4 May 1940 was that

> The present military conflicts are local and not nation-wide. They are merely acts of strategic reconnaissance on the part of our opponents and are as yet not large-scale actions intended to annihilate the Communists.

In this way, he defended the general plan for limited civil war which he had enunciated on 11 March 1940 as a limited-fight, limited-talk tactic. Mao had set forth the important tactic in considerable detail:

> First, we will never /sic/ attack unless attacked; if attacked, we will certainly counterattack.... Second, we do not fight unless we are sure of victory; we must on no account fight without preparation and without certainty of the outcome....Third, the principle of truce. After we have repulsed the attack of the die-hards /i.e., the KMT forces/ and before they launch a new one, we should stop at the proper moment and bring that particular fight to a close. In the period that follows, we should make a truce with them. We must on no account fight on daily and hourly without stopping, nor become dizzy with success. Herein lies the temporary nature of every particular struggle. Only when the die-hards launch a new offensive should we retaliate with a new struggle.

This became the basic tactical principle of Mao. His practice indicated that his forces were directed to fight, close off the particular battle with a defeat of KMT forces, and then seek a truce and be prepared to negotiate in the hope that Chiang would not take a local and limited defeat as the

reason for a large-scale offensive against all Communist armies. This is the tactical principle designed to advance Mao's protracted war waged with initially weak forces, limiting their actions to safe proportions.

In this way, Mao gained a series of local victories without running a great risk of general civil war. At the same time, he seized territory by expanding the base areas behind the Japanese lines and by controlling the actions of his field commanders, whose forces sporadically chopped away at small KMT units. For example, the First Contingent of the Communist New Fourth Army commanded by General Chen Yi decimated KMT forces in northern Kiangsu in July 1940 and, in the second half of 1940, several Communist victories were won in the lower Yangtze valley. Mao had directed that the New Fourth must be expanded to 100,000 men; by the end of 1940, his generals were successful in expanding this army to approximately that number of combat regulars.

While fighting continued on the local level, CCP-KMT negotiations took place on the national level in the second half of 1940 as Mao implemented his fighting-and-talking tactic. Even when vastly superior KMT forces unexpectedly surrounded and destroyed 9,000 men attached to the New Fourth's headquarters as they were withdrawing to the north of the Yangtze River, Mao refused to consider this setback as invalidating his principle of waging a limited war. In June 1943, the intermittent negotiations between the KMT and CCP reached another major impasse in Chungking, just as they had in late 1939 and in January 1941. Chiang asked Mao to give a conclusive reply to his demands to relinquish the independent CCP government and to incorporate CCP forces into Nationalist armies. Chou En-lai, the brillant Communist representative in Chungking, deflected these demands and charged the KMT with increasing their forces along the northwest border base areas. Chou attained some success in his political effort to depict Chiang as the obdurate element in the united front.

The failure of Chiang to launch large-scale attacks against Communist forces in 1943 was attributed by Mao at the time to the political success in arousing domestic and international opinion against Chiang's policies. (Liberation Daily, 5 October 1943). Two additional factors were Japan's east China offensive against KMT forces and US efforts to stop Chiang's attempts to suppress the Communists. That is, Mao

adroitly used political pressures to compensate for military weakness: "The Communists are not capable of much, if any, offensive action." (Report of Colonel Depass, 16 November 1943)

Expediently, from 1943 to 1945, Mao used the lull in the CCP-KMT protracted war to further expand his armed forces, which increased to 475,000 regulars by October 1944. The Wallace mission to China in June 1944 resulted in the dispatch of the American Army Observer Mission to Yenan, which Mao favored because of "its political effect upon the KMT":

> Any contact you Americans may have with us Communists is gold. Of course, we are glad to have the Observer Mission here because it will help to beat Japan. But there is no use in pretending that--up to now at least --the chief importance of your coming is not its political effect on the KMT. (Mao's remarks to John S. Service, interview of 27 August 1944)

That is, Mao exploited the US desire to end the civil war and get on with the war against Japan, adroitly using it as a political shield against the potential offensive-power of Chiang's superior military forces. He was capable then of considerably more tactical flexibility than he has been in recent years.

By insisting on policies which made the KMT appear unreasonable, Mao deflected Chiang's demand that, to become a legal party, the CCP should disband its armed forces. In a carefully worded proposal, which Mao maneuvered Ambassador Hurley to sign with him in Yenan on 10 November 1944, Mao agreed only "to work for" the unification of all military forces while insisting on the formation of a "coalition national government and a united national military council." His intention was to exploit the generally held view that the CCP was justified in refusing to disband its armies before the formation of a coalition government. However, in order to keep the negotiations alive, he directed Chou En-lai in Chungking to join Ambassador Hurley in pressing Chiang to accept the proposal. Chiang insisted on disbanding the Communist armies, and Mao was then able to "expose" Chiang as recalcitrant in rejecting a "reasonable" negotiations compromise--i.e., a coalition. The widespread domestic and international appeal of the Maoist program for a settlement, the rapidly expanding military-political power of the CCP, and US anxiety to bring about

unity put Chiang at a considerable disadvantage in the talks. Mao's success with dilatory tactics--that is, his substituting of talks about "working for" unified armed forces in the place of action taken to disband CCP armies--further isolated Chiang in China and internationally.

All along, Mao had continued to expand his forces, and by 24 April 1945, he claimed that they totalled 910,000 regulars and more than 2,200,000 militia. Mao made a major move shortly before Japan's surrender, ordering CCP troops to link up with Soviet troops driving southward in Manchuria (10 August 1945). As CCP and KMT armies raced for control of various Japanese-vacated areas and as Chiang prepared to strike at Mao's forces, the Communist leader accepted Chiang's invitation to accompany Ambassador Hurley to Chungking, arriving on 28 August 1945. Mao was still anxious to gain a series of breathing spells. Two days before flying to Chungking, Mao drafted an inner-party policy line on negotiations, in which he indicated that the CCP should be prepared to make some concessions--namely, some reduction in the size of those base areas which were indefensible and in the strength of CCP armed forces.

> Without such concessions, we cannot explode the KMT's civil war plot, cannot gain the political initiative, cannot win the sympathy of world public opinion and the middle-of-the-roaders in China and cannot gain in exchange legal status for our party and a state of peace.
>
> But there are limits to such concessions: the principle is that they must not damage the fundamental interests of the people /i.e., CCP control of the base areas and the armed forces/. (Mao's statement of 26 August 1945)

Mao in Chungking recognized the strengthened military and diplomatic position of Chiang after the surrender of Japan and the signing in Moscow of the Sino-Soviet treaty. In private talks, he dropped his demand (to which he later returned) for a coalition government and high command, but insisted on retaining not less than 20 divisions as well as exclusive control of the base areas in north China. He wanted to obtain a settlement, a half-way station of legalization on the road to an eventual seizure of national power, inasmuch as his armies were still smaller and more badly-equipped than Chiang's. "The Communist armies do not possess

sufficient strength to directly oppose the KMT armies in positional warfare; but over a long period of time as an occupying force, the KMT cannot hold out even with US help." (August 1945 report of Colonel Yeaton from Yenan) Chiang accurately summarized Mao's position as equivalent to allowing the CCP to carry on its political revolution without opposition or hindrance while professing to end the KMT-CCP military clashes by negotiating. Actually, while Mao was talking, CCP forces were consolidating their control over newly taken territory in the north, and when Mao returned on 11 October 1945, after refusing to disband his forces, he justified in the context of protracted revolution, his willingness to negotiate.

Mao made it clear to cadres in Yenan on 17 October that reducing CCP forces to 20 divisions would not mean handing over weapons. "The arms of the people, every gun and every bullet, must all be kept, must not be handed over." He then reminded cadres that his strategy was to wage a long revolutionary war:

> Was our party right or wrong in deciding at its 7th Congress /in April 1945/ that we were willing to negotiate with the KMT provided that they changed their policy? It was absolutely right. The Chinese revolution is a long one and victory can only be won step by step.

As both sides raced to seize Japanese arms and fill the territorial vacuum, Mao directed the Northeast Bureau of the CCP to expand its holdings and use the newly-arrived 100,000 Communist troops to hold the rural areas remote from the existing centers of KMT control. Between the truce of January and June 1946, both sides took territory in Manchuria. During the whole period of the Marshall mission in late 1945 and 1946, Mao tried to disgrace Chiang politically by advocating a moderate program of "peace, democracy, and unity" while his armed forces expanded. He relied heavily on their ability to avoid decisive engagements, to prolong the stop-start fighting, and to counter-attack against small KMT units.

In the final series of negotiations of Mao's long revolutionary war, he gave priority to the goal of attaining a ceasefire and an extension of the Manchurian truce. He was also concerned in June 1946 about US aid to Chiang's forces. On the one hand, he relied on General Marshall's

mediation to gain an immediate cease-fire, to ameliorate Chiang's demands, and to state his own settlement terms. Chou En-lai, urbane and persuasive, ably discharged his task by appearing conciliatory, moderate, and reasonable. On the other hand, Mao's press and radio in Yenan criticized US policy with increasing vehemency in an effort to deter Washington from giving further aid to the KMT. By 26 June 1946, Mao demanded that the US stop all military assistance to Chiang and withdraw all US troops from the mainland; his concern with the modern equipment sent to the KMT forces had been deepened. "Let them know that whatever happens, if we are faced with mechanized war, we shall fight on if necessary with our hands and feet." (Mao's statement to Robert Payne in June 1946)

Although his armies were still numerically inferior to Chiang's, Mao issued an inner-party directive on 20 July warning his forces to prepare to smash Chiang's offensive by an all-out "war of self-defense," which required the temporary abandonment of indefensible cities and the opening of mobile warfare. Mao had no alternative but to fight against superior forces and on 19 August 1946, shortly after KMT planes bombed Yenan, Mao was impelled to drop the talking half of his dual tactic and prepare for all-out civil war, which his forces won in the straight forward contest of military strength waged between late 1946 and mid-1949.

In drawing an analogy between the Chinese civil war and the Vietnam war today, CCP propagandists emphasize the protracted nature of both conflicts and the evolution of weak into strong Communist forces. But they deliberately de-emphasize, or avoid any reference to, the talking-half of Mao's tactic and the temporary half-way station he tried to obtain. Unlike the Soviet propagandists, they insist that talking should take place only after the US withdraws its forces from South Vietnam.

B. The Korean War (1950 to 1953)

Military developments in Korea in the spring of 1951 provide a clear-cut example of the Asian Communists having been impelled to switch to the talking phase after they had been hurt in the field. That is, they viewed the large losses

of Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) combat regulars as the sufficient cause for drastically reducing the fighting phase. The military struggle was subordinated to a political "protracted struggle," the intention being to wear down Western negotiators to attain a favorable political settlement.

When, in late November 1950, the CCF entered the war in force, North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) combat casualties were already very high, estimated by the United Nations Command (UNC) at 200,000 in addition to 135,000 prisoners. The NKPA had been virtually destroyed and never fought again above corps strength in the Korean war. The initial CCF successes against UNC forces from November through December 1950 increased the confidence of the Chinese Communist leaders that they could drive UNC forces from Korea if CCF pressure was sustained. On 22 December 1950 and again on 19 January 1951, Chou En-lai rejected a cease-fire, describing it as a means to gain "a breathing spell" for UNC forces, and demanded that prior to any halt in the fighting all foreign troops must be withdrawn from Korea, US armed forces must be withdrawn from Taiwan, and Peking's representatives must be admitted to the United Nations. As UNC forces retreated from the Yalu River, however, they took a heavy toll of CCF combat units. For example, between 27 November and 11 December, the 60,000 men of the eight divisions committed by the 9th Army Group, Third CCF Field Army, were estimated by the Marine Corps to have suffered 37,500 combat casualties, a little over half of them inflicted by ground forces and the rest by air attack. The 9th Army Group was so damaged by firepower that it disappeared from the Korean battlefield for three months. By mid-January 1951, UNC forces had stopped the CCF all along the front.

General Ridgway directed UNC forces to comply with his dictum of "inflicting maximum casualties on the enemy" rather than gaining ground. The dictum was put into practice in the months following the UNC offensive which started in late January 1951. By 9 February, OPERATION PUNCH had annihilated at least 4,200 CCF (body count) and when, on 14 February, CCF infantry for the first time in Korea attacked in mass waves, UNC forces killed thousands of Chinese at Chipyong-ni. CCF mass infantry assaults resulted in further heavy Chinese casualties on the 20th and again on the 21st with the start of OPERATION KILLER. By 1 March, the entire Chinese front south of the Han River had collapsed and UNC

units moved to within 30 miles of the 38th parallel. CCF manpower and equipment losses continued to be "heavy" after the start of OPERATION RIPPER on 7 March, and on 14 March, Seoul was retaken as CCF and small NKPA forces fell back. A series of manpower-killing advances launched by UNC and ROK units in late March and early April moved the allied forces across the 38th parallel. The ranks of the best armies--Lin Piao's 4th Field Army and Chen Yi's 3rd Field Army--which the Chinese leaders used in the first massive assault against the UNC forces had been seriously depleted. "Now the best troops are annihilated; this forced the CCF to send replacements from the 1st and 2nd field armies.... The CCF suffered high casualties and its faith in victory had been reduced." (From interrogation report of Assistant Battalion Commander, 40th Army, 4th CCF Field Army).*

General Van Fleet met the first Communist spring offensive, launched on 22 April 1951, with the manpower-killing tactics of General Ridgway, and directed his corps commanders on 30 April

> Expend steel and fire, not men.... I want so many artillery holes that a man can step from one to the other.

Because they used massed infantry assaults against concentrated US artillery, automatic-weapons, and air firepower, units of six CCF armies suffered a total of 70,000 casualties between 21 and 29 April and were forced to end their first spring offensive. Their second spring offensive was even more destructive to CCF men and materiel.

On 16 May, 21 CCF divisions, flanked by a total of 9 NKPA divisions, opened the second spring offensive along a 105-mile front using human wave tactics against strongly fortified UNC positions. Although gains of 10 to 15 miles were made along most of the front, the Communist offensive was completely spent by 21 May, and UNC forces, which had recoiled only slightly, lashed back in a major counter-offensive, depriving the Communists of the opportunity to place screening forces between their main armies and the

*The prisoner reports that are referred to in this paper are, in almost every case, the reports of prisoners captured and interrogated in March and April 1951--that is, after the collapse of the January 1951 CCF offensive and before the even more costly defeats of the spring of 1951.

UNC units. UNC counterattacks quickly carried into CCF and NKPA former assembly areas, where large quantities of supplies were captured as many dumps were overrun. By 1 June, the CCF and NKPA lost more than 102,000 men, and of the 21 CCF divisions which had initiated the offensive, 16 had suffered about 50 percent casualties. The following table, which is based on US Far East Command estimates, indicates the magnitude of the Communist losses:

Unit	Strength 16 May	Strength 22 May	Strength 1 June	% Losses
East Central Front (Main attack)				
12th CCF Army	30,000	17,000	10,000	67%
27th CCF Army	31,000	25,000	21,000	32%
39th CCF Army	20,000	20,000	19,000	5%
40th CCF Army	17,000(?)	27,000(?)	27,000(?)	0
II NK Corps	18,000	18,000	17,000	5%
V NK Corps	19,000	18,000	16,000	16%
Central Front				
10th CCF Army	24,000	24,000	23,000	4%
15th CCF Army	32,000	23,000	14,000	56%
20th CCF Army	32,000	32,000	31,000	3%
26th CCF Army	21,000	17,000	19,000	9%
60th CCF Army	31,000	27,000	14,000	55%
63rd CCF Army	29,000	22,000	15,000	48%
Western Front				
64th CCF Army	28,000	22,000	20,000	29%
65th CCF Army	29,000	22,000	18,000	38%
I NK Corps	17,000	11,000	12,000	29%
VI NK Corps	28,000	28,000	28,000	0
TOTALS:	406,000	353,000	304,000	25%

The table indicates that as of 1 June 1951, the Communists had sustained a loss of 25 percent of their total 16 May strength in Korea. From 1 to 14 June, they suffered an additional 49,000 casualties (not included in the table above).

Most of the CCF prisoners were taken during the last week of May in frantic efforts to escape, indicating that the political-control fabric of many CCF units had been shattered, primarily because large numbers of political officers and non-coms had been killed.

The combined heavy losses to the first wave field armies--i.e., the CCF 3rd and 4th--and the second wave armies--i.e., the CCF 1st and 2nd--had significantly reduced the quality of the forces which the Chinese leaders could put in the field in June 1951. Many of their best combat officers and political cadres had been killed or captured, partly because of the Maoist practice which required that they take front-line positions to lead their troops. Many political officers were killed in combat "because they spent much of their time with the men in the front line to lead the battle themselves" (from interrogation report of a private in the 125th Division, 4th CCF Field Army), and in some companies all officers including the company commander had been ordered to the front line to raise the men's "fighting spirit" (from interrogation report of the Company Political Officer in the 118th Division, 4th CCF Field Army). "The casualties among the commanders were high...because they took the lead at the front" (from interrogation report of Battalion Commander, 64th Army, 1st CCF Field Army). The massed infantry attacks--used for the first time by the CCF in Korea in mid-February 1951--facilitated the destruction: "We fought only with human wave tactics; great numbers of men have been sacrificed; it was indescribably miserable" (from interrogation report of Private, 42nd Army, 4th CCF Field Army). The Maoist doctrine of "defeating the enemy's firepower with a superiority in manpower...is a military idea which is no good... These views of mine were shared by most lower-level leaders and the men in the CCF, though they could not dare to make them public" (from interrogation of Assistant Battalion Political Officer, 40th Army, 4th CCF Field Army). "'Human wave' tactics are supposed to overwhelm the enemy's firepower with predominance of manpower and thus win the victory. From my first experience in this war, I found that this tactic had no sense and no value.... In actual combat, it was nothing but a mass loss of lives and defeat" (from interrogation report of Squad Leader and CCP member, 40th Army, 4th CCF Field Army). The quality and number of CCF cadres who were lost to the four CCF field armies probably was the sufficient cause for the Chinese Communist leaders, whose forces comprised abut 95 percent of the Communist combat units in Korea, to switch to the talking phase.

In the disastrous offensives of spring 1951, the CCF and NKPA sustained an estimated 221,000 casualties from 21 April to 16 June. By 16 June, the Chinese casualties since the CCF entered the Korean war were approximately 577,000, including roughly 73,000 non-battle casualties--mostly due to various epidemics--and 16,500 prisoners. (No data are reported here on NKPA total casualties since November 1950.)

The war was increasingly costly for the Chinese in other ways. It forced the regime to modify its program of long-range economic development and to place the economy on a war footing. The war also subjected the regime to economic sanctions imposed by the West, increased inflationary pressures, and strained economic relations between urban and rural areas. The Chinese Communists became increasingly dependent on the USSR, partly because the Chinese were unable to replace from their own resources the stocks of material being expended in Korea.

The first step toward ending the commitment in Korea was to begin negotiations for a cease-fire, the calculation apparently having been that political concessions could be gained by combining protracted talks with propaganda accusations, while the fighting was kept limited.

Following a series of statements made by American and United Nations' officials in late May and early June 1951 regarding the UNC's willingness to end the fighting without demanding a surrender of Communist forces, the Chinese Communists and the Soviets apparently decided to gain a breathing-spell. Prior to the 23 June radio speech of Soviet United Nations' delegate Jacob Malik, there apparently were no indications that the Chinese were willing to accept these Western proposals. On the contrary, the indications continued to point to Chinese intransigence. Unexpectedly, in his radio speech, Malik indicated a change in the Communist position when he avoided linking the Communists' proposal for a cease-fire to their earlier demands that the US must withdraw from Taiwan and that Peking must be admitted to the United Nations. "The Soviet peoples believe that as a first step, discussions should be started between the belligerents for a cease-fire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel."

The Chinese, too, were careful not to admit they had dropped preconditions. On 23 June, the Peking People's Daily frontpaged Malik's proposal without acceding to truce

talks. The Chinese did not accede to truce talks publicly until 1 July, and on 2 July they rationalized the change in their basic position without acknowledging explicitly that it had changed. The Chinese later formulated their switch to the talking phase as follows:

> After the five great campaigns /I.e., offensives from November 1950 to May 1951/, the Volunteers switched over in good time to the strategic line of "engaging in protracted warfare while conducting positive defense" and strictly subordinated the military struggle to the political struggle. (NCNA commentary of 28 November 1958)

The Chinese used the military breathing-spell to improve their impaired over-all combat capabilities. By the time the armistice negotiations started on 8 July 1951, the Chinese had improved their artillery and small-arm stores and had replaced their manpower losses while the NKPA divisions were rebuilt. Politically, they had already exploited the theme of seeking peace and of opposing American "warmongering" with considerable success, gaining face internationally and placing themselves in a favorable propaganda position as the initiators of the truce talks. They were unwilling to move the talks along to a mutually acceptable conclusion within any short period. On the contrary, they used Mao's tactic of wearing down UNC negotiators in a "protracted struggle" (Peking's phrase of 3 September 1951) in order to extract major concessions.

UNC ground advances had ended temporarily on 11 June after the ROK I Corps had taken Chorwon and Kumhwa at the base of the Iron Triangle at points about 20 miles north of the 38th parallel. All of South Korea except for a small part of the Western flank had been cleared of Communist forces enabling fortification of the UNC line in depth in an area 10-20 miles north of the parallel. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), acting on a policy position agreed upon at meetings of the National Security Council (NSC) held on 2 and 16 May 1951, informed General Ridgway not to go beyond the general vicinity of the new line. In his memoirs, President Truman depicted the NSC policy objectives for Korea as follows:

> Regarding Korea, we distinguished between the political aim--a unified, independent, democratic Korea--and the military aim of repelling the aggression and terminating the hostilities under an armistice agreement. With the fighting ended, the purpose would be to establish the

> authority of the Republic of Korea south of a northern boundary line suitable for defense and administration and not substantially below the 38th Parallel, to provide for the withdrawal of non-Korean armed forces from all of Korea, and to build up the ROK forces so as to deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression.

Unlike MacArthur's demand for total victory and expulsion of the Communists from the North, this policy envisaged a status quo along the 38th, a North and South Korea for an interim period, and an armistice agreement ensuring the status quo. In order to impell the Communist leaders to consider entering into armistice negotiations, a series of public statements were made in May and June. On 17 May, Senator Edwin Johnson introduced a resolution into the Senate asking the United Nations to urge the belligerents to declare an armistice by 25 June along the 38th parallel, to agree to the exchange of all war prisoners, and to withdraw all foreign troops by the end of the year. Moscow news media were quick to give extensive publicity to the resolution. On 26 May, Lester Pearson, President of the United Nations General Assembly, stated that total surrender of the aggressors might not be necessary, that it would be sufficient to achieve the objective of stopping the aggression. On 1 June, Trygve Lie, Secretary General of the United Nations, stated that the time was right to stop the fighting, inasmuch as the UNC had forced the invaders back beyond the 38th parallel, which could be the approximate line of demarcation. Also on 1 June, Secretary Acheson told senators at the MacArthur Hearings that the Administration's immediate aim was ending the aggression (the complete unification of Korea being the long-term goal); he was more explicit in his statement on 2 June, declaring that if a cease-fire were arranged around the 38th parallel, "that would accomplish the military purposes in Korea." That is, the 1950 policy of complete unification of Korea and expulsion of the Communists was replaced by the more modest and less costly 1951 policy of settling for a non-Communist half in the South.

The ending of major UNC ground advances in June 1951 was a move dictated by higher American political policy. Whether major UNC advances (1) could have been sustained in drives toward the Yalu and (2) would have impelled the Communists to avoid delaying tactics at the subsequent armistice negotiations (which began on 8 July 1951) are conjectural matters. Although badly hurt, the CCF was still a fighting force; on 1 July, an estimated total of 62 CCF (40) and NKPA (22) divisions confronted 17 of the UNC under General

Van Fleet--a disparity in numbers which provided the Communists with a capability to mount a major offensive and, as a consequence, became a constant source of concern for UNC strategists. The UNC would have required an additional input of at least three divisions to consider pressing forward in further large-scale advances into areas were Communist supply lines were increasingly shorter and UNC lines were increasingly longer. It was doubtful that Van Fleet had sufficient forces to annihilate Communist forces by maneuver and encirclement. Beyond the basic military considerations, the majority of nations composing the UNC were reluctant again to advance toward the Yalu. General Van Fleet's strategic view in June 1951 was:

> Continued pursuit of the enemy was neither practical nor expedient. The most profitable employment for the Eighth Army, therefore, was to establish a defense line on the nearest commanding terrain /the KANSAS-WYOMING phase lines/ north of the 38th parallel. and from there to push forward in a limited advance to accomplish the maximum destruction to the enemy consistent with minimum danger to the integrity of the Eighth Army.

This Ridgway-Van Fleet strategy of maintaining military pressure by means of "limited advance" was the predominant feature of the remainder of the Korean war.* By 1 July, the main

*But even the policy of "limited advance" was costly. For example, UNC infantry attacks on Bloody Ridge in late August and early September 1951, which took the ridge, cost UN and ROK forces over 2,700 casualties and, according to UNC estimates, cost the Communists over 15,000 casualties. Higher losses for both sides were reported after UNC forces took Heartbreak Ridge on 13 October following thirty days of bloody fighting. This policy maintained the UNC military initiative, preventing the Communists from opening a major drive; it provided UNC negotiators with the military pressure sufficient to impell Communist negotiators in October to drop their demand for a demarcation line south of the battle line--that is, the demand for a line at the 38th parallel.

Limited UNC advances in October 1951 had inflicted on the CCF and NKPA the highest monthly total of casualties for the negotiations period and had gained important terrain, but UNC casualties in the advances were high--i.e., 40,000.

fortification of phase line KANSAS was complete and by 30 July, the lull in operations due to armistice negotiations permitted Van Fleet to fortify phase line WYOMING farther north, forming it into another main line of defense.

However, the UNC made it clear from the start--in Admiral Joy's statement at the first armistice meeting on 8 July 1951--that the Communists would not be handed a de facto cease-fire and that fighting would continue until (1) they agreed to reasonable armistice terms and (2) a military armistice commission was prepared to function.

The Communist tactic of political attrition succeeded in frustrating UNC negotiators, but it did not gain the Communists major concessions. Small-scale but sustained UNC military pressure on Communist forces in Korea in October 1951 was reflected in the talks. On 26 October, the Communists in effect dropped their demand that the demarcation line be moved down to correspond with the 38th parallel.

On the other hand, they gained a 30-day de facto cease-fire from 27 November to 27 December, enabling them to further strengthen front-line defenses and to augment unit strength. Further, pressure on their negotiators was relaxed because of a UNC concession on the matter of a permanent or temporary line of demarcation. In early November, the Communist negotiators insisted on establishing a map line of demarcation immediately rather than after the armistice was signed, but General Ridgway and the UNC negotiators opposed this demand, recognizing that a permanent line (at the line of contact) would prevent the UNC from using limited advances to pressure the Communists to get on with the task of concluding an armistice. But the JCS in Washington advised establishment of a map line of demarcation with a time limit appended. The time limit permitted invalidation, by the UNC, of the line at the expiration of a 30-day period. General Ridgway still objected that this in effect granted the Communists a de facto cease-fire for one month and that such a cease-fire would impede the UNC strategy of sustaining military pressure--i.e., pushing the line northward--to prevent further stalling at the negotiations. Ridgway was overruled and on 27 November a map line of demarcation was formally agreed on; by 27 December, the expiration of the 30-day limit, there had been no significant change on the battlefield or in the negotiations, suggesting that the Communist calculation on the premanency of the line of demarcation was proving to be correct, providing them with exemption from UNC military pressure and further time to protract the negotiations.

The Chinese desired a political victory together with a military truce, and as the talks centered on the prisoner issue, they adamantly refused to accept a political setback. The major deadlock on the matter of voluntary repatriation of prisoners prolonged the talks from April 1952 to July 1953, inasmuch as the Chinese insisted on the forcible return of all CCF (and NKPA) prisoners in order to avoid a major propaganda defeat if large numbers were to opt for the West. The Communists would not recognize the UNC stand on voluntary repatriation as a valid principle and argued that it was in conflict with the Geneva Convention which required a compulsory, all-for-all exchange. As an alternative, they calculated that if a relatively small number would resist repatriation--that is, about 16,000 of a total of 132,000 CCF and NKPA prisoners--they could tacitly agree to the UNC screening process.

Both the Communists and the UNC were shocked by the results of the screening process after about only half had been questioned. Over 40,000 of about 65,000 prisoners screened indicated that they would resist repatriation to China and North Korea, but the UNC had given the Communist negotiators an estimate of 116,000 willing to return of the total 132,000 prisoners. When, on 19 April, the Communists were informed that only 70,000 would return without the use of force, the CCF Colonel Tsai was speechless, asked for a recess, and on the following day--apparently on instructions from Peking--said that the UNC's earlier estimate of 116,000 was a far cry from 70,000. It was "completely impossible for us to consider" and "you flagrantly repudiated what you said before." Because the Communists had been stung once by the screening procedure, they indicated they would have nothing more to do with it.

Small, division-scale battles continued in the field, but the Communists were still unwilling to change the nature of the war into that of major offensive actions. The tried to deflect politically damaging charges of inhumanity on the prisoner issue by launching a concerted propaganda campaign, accusing the US--starting in late February 1952--of waging "bacteriological warfare" in North Korea and Manchuria. More importantly, Communist-instigated riots in the POW camps were intended to undercut the UNC position on voluntary repatriation by discrediting the entire screening process. In the POW camps, the Communist soldiers shifted their responsibilities from military to political goals. Close coordination was established between the POW camps and the

Panmunjom truce talks. On 20 May 1952, after forcing a contrived confession of "compulsory screening" from General Dodd, who had been held prisoner by the prisoners of the Koje-do camp, chief negotiator Nam Il charged that

> The commandant of your prisoner-of-war camp could not but confess before the whole world your inhuman treatment and murderous violence against our captured personnel, and the criminal and unlawful acts committed by your side in screening and re-arming war prisoners by force. (emphasis supplied)

The Communist negotiators adroitly used the Koje-do incident to discredit the UNC figures and insisted that they obtain 132,000 prisoners in exchange for 12,000 prisoners held by them on the principle of an all-for-all exchange and forcible repatriation. Neither side conceded, and at the recess of talks on 26 July 1952, a year of negotiation had produced an estimated 2,000,000 words of discussion and nearly 800 hours of formal meetings. The prisoner issue was the only remaining agenda item.

On the battlefield, a military stalemate continued. Mao had confronted the US with his limited-risk protracted war. He apparently believed that Washington would continue to avoid pressing for an all-out military victory because of the manpower losses such a victory would require. By July 1952, CCF and NKPA ground forces strength had almost doubled since the start of the talks in July 1951--from 502,000 to 947,000. He also apparently believed that he could deter the US from initiating airstrikes against the China mainland because of Washington's uncertainty regarding Stalin's reaction to such strikes.

While Stalin lived, Communist negotiators at Panmunjom refused to retreat from their demand for forcible repatriation. New Delhi's efforts to smooth the way for a compromise were rejected when Foreign Minister Vishinsky on 24 November 1952 and Chou En-lai on 28 November 1952 attacked the Indian resolution on repatriation as unacceptable. Mao, too, remained adamant into 1953, declaring that "however many years American imperialism prefers to fight, we are ready to fight it..." (speech of 7 February 1953). Stalin had raised East-West tensions to a high level, and Mao was prepared to sustain those tensions.

On the battlefield, small-unit actions continued in localized struggles for hill positions and, although the Communists had taken losses in October 1952 that had cut their estimated total strength from 1,008,900 to 972,000 at the end of the month, their total began to climb slowly again in November as fighting tapered off. Both sides made the same calculation, namely, that a major offensive would lead to a very high casualty rate but not a military breakthrough.

The death of Stalin (5 March 1953) permitted the development of an entirely new attitude among the Soviet leaders toward East-West tensions in general and toward concluding an armistice in particular.* Moscow now appeared to be more anxious to negotiate a quick end to the war than did Peking. Soviet statements in March following Stalin's death were more conciliatory toward the West than those of the Chinese. Chairman of the Council of Ministers Malenkov stated on 15 March that "there is no disputed or unresolved question that cannot be settled peacefully by mutual agreement of the interested countries." For the first time since the end of World War II, Moscow Radio on 21 March admitted that the US and Britain had played a role in winning a "common victory" over the Axis powers. This followed Foreign Minister Molotov's unexpected agreement on 18 March to intercede with the North Korean leaders to obtain the release of 10 British diplomats and missionaries interned in North Korea since the start of the war. A further indication of the change in the Soviet attitude was Malenkov's depiction of the Korean war as a "defensive" operation in his 17 March message to Kim Il-sung on the anniversary of a Soviet-Korean agreement. Significantly, it differed from a similar message to Kim in 1951, when Stalin had described the war as a "struggle for liberation of the

*The death of Stalin provided the Soviet leaders with the opportunity to jettison Stalin's more senseless and unproductive positions and to use methods of flexibility in diplomacy --such as a variety of goodwill gestures and a diminution of doctrinal hostility to Western governments. Stalin was concerned about the international situation leading to a general war, but for reasons of doctrinal obsessions and personal prestige, he refused to moderate the Soviet attitude toward the West and toward neutrals, and refused to make concessions on important international issues dividing the West and the Communist bloc.

fatherland," in which any cease-fire would be conditioned on the withdrawal of US forces from Korea.

Three days after Chou's return from talks with the post-Stalin leadership in Moscow, the Communists unexpectedly agreed to a routine UNC offer for an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners which General Clark had reiterated in his letter of 26 February. In suggesting that the exchange of the sick and wounded might be the first step leading to the "smooth settlement of the entire question of prisoners of war, thereby achieving an armistice in Korea for which people throughout the world are longing," the Communists indicated on 28 March a new and real interest in solving the last crucial problem blocking a cease-fire agreement. This was the first indication that the Chinese might be willing to make a concession on repatriation.

But Mao waged a protracted political struggle as he prepared to make his retreat on forcible repatriation as small as possible. The Chinese used ambiguous and face-saving language in an effort to hold a series of fallback positions, which they surrendered only after it was clear the UNC would insist on the voluntary principle. An ambiguous proposal by Chou En-lai on 30 March--that both sides

> should undertake to repatriate immediately after the cessation of hostilities all those prisoners of war in their custody who insist upon repatriation and hand over the remaining prisoners of war to a neutral state so as to ensure a just solution to the question of their repatriation (emphasis supplied)--

left unclear the matter of final disposition of prisoners who were unwilling to return to China and North Korea. The Chinese propagandists described Chou's proposal as a "procedural concession," which it was, as the point that prisoners who were unwilling to be repatriated should be handed over to a neutral country represented a Chinese retreat. Chou had been deliberately vague in not stating Chinese demands for forcible repatriation, but Chinese propaganda returned to the demands by insisting on the principle of total repatriation by way of a neutral state. That the Chinese had made a concession in fact while insisting on the principle to cover their retreat is indicated by the statement of the senior Soviet member of the UN Secretariat, Kassaniev, who told a member of the Norwegian delegation on 30 March that Chou's declaration on prisoners was "the real thing" and that only "technicalities" remain to be worked out.

The UNC appraised this concession as indicating no change on the substantive matter of voluntary repatriation, and they pressed the Communists to clarify their position on where screening would take place, on its duration, and on whether the voluntary principle would be part of a cease-fire agreement. After manipulating the language of their counter-proposals throughout April, on 7 May the Communists made two more key concessions. They dropped the requirement that no repatriates should be sent physically to a neutral state and reduced the explaining period from six to four months. Finally, on 4 June, the Communists' chief negotiator, Nam Il, using language designed to conceal the Chinese capitulation on forcible repatriation, stated that "according to the application of each individual, those who elect to go to the neutral nations shall be assisted by the Neutral National Repatriation Commission and the Red Cross Society of India." That is, men who refused to return to the Communist countries could reach non-Communist countries through the channel of a neutral-nations commission stationed in Korea, if explanations failed to persuade them to return home. In this way, Mao accepted voluntary repatriation in a disguised form. His propagandists stated that ex-prisoners may go to "neutral states," without making it clear that they were in fact free to go wherever they chose.

Mao was anxious to still extract a degree of political prestige before the cease-fire agreement was signed. Face-saving offensives were launched in June and July by the Communists to achieve several objectives: (a) to move the line farther south, (b) to give ROK forces a bloody-nose in order to convince Rhee that his forces could not "March North," and (c) to convince international opinion that the CCF and NKPA were not weaker than UNC forces and that the Communist motive in seeking an armistice was not that of avoiding military defeat. Although suffering heavy losses between April and July 1953--an estimated total of 134,412--there were over one million CCF and NKPA forces in Korea, well-fed adequately clothed, and effectively supported by massed artillery by the time of the signing of the armistice on 27 July.

Mao's capitulation on the principle of forcible repatriation--a capitulation which provided the West with a major propaganda victory--apparently stemmed from several major considerations.

1. One was pressure from the post-Stalin leadership. The Soviet leaders were clearly anxious to consolidate their

internal position and to relax international tension. They were alert to the harder policy taken toward the China mainland by the new administration of President Eisenhower. Neither the Soviet nor the Chinese leaders could be certain that the new administration would keep the war limited in the event that truce talks remained deadlocked. Chinese apprehension over the possibility of an attack, or at least a series of substantial raids, from Taiwan was reflected in the resumption of recruiting in Shanghai in February and March 1953 and in defense activity along the south China coast. Implicit warnings from U.S. officials that Washington would not accept an indefinite deadlock and Secretary of State Dulles' explicit statement to Nehru on 22 May--viz., if a truce could not be arranged, the U.S. could not be expected to continue to refrain from using atomic weapons--further increased Communist apprehensions. They were also aware that in the spring of 1953, the U.S. had moved atomic missiles to Okinawa. The post-Stalin leadership desired to move a greater distance from the brink of involvement in the Korean war than Stalin had believed necessary; they were unwilling to risk an escalation on the battlefield which might well have provoked extension of U.S. airstrikes to the China mainland.

2. Mao could perceive no further advantage in continuing the limited war. He was aware that the talking phase--i.e., the war of political attrition, intended to reduce the staying power of the UNC on the voluntary repatriation issue--had failed. The blackmail accusations--that is, American "warmongering" and "bacteriological warfare," which were components of the talking phase--had not forced a UNC concession. His plan of attrition, requiring policy critics in non-Communist countries to soften up the leaders of enemy governments (while policy critics in the Communist countries were effectively eliminated), did not provide him with the advantage he calculated would be decisive in inducing a major retreat. Despite his efforts during the talking phase, the UNC prevailed on the issue of repatriation, announcing on 21 July that 69,000 Koreans and 5,000 Chinese would return to Communist control, but 7,800 Koreans and 14,500 Chinese would be non-repatriates. (Earlier, on 18 June, Rhee had released 25,000 Korean prisoners.) Obviously, these figures represented a political embarrassment to his regime which the new Soviet leaders had to convince him to accept.

3. Mao wanted to get on with the job of industralization. Although political and economic conditions in China and North Korea probably were not exerting compelling pressure on the Communists to conclude an armistice in the summer of 1953, the war was probably viewed as injurious to long-term economic development programs. Political controls had been increased in China during the war and the economic strains on the Chinese were probably less severe in the spring of 1953 than they had been in 1950 and 1951. But Mao was anxious to begin China's First Five-Year Plan of economic development, and the North Koreans were aware that they would have to start virtually from scratch to rebuild.

To sum up, Mao moved into the talking phase in Korea because his best field armies had suffered very heavy losses and were retreating under UNC military pressure. He apparently viewed the enormous loss of human lives with revolutionary callousness, but was forced to draw back because the military capability of his armies had been greatly reduced. When confronted with the UNC's demand that no prisoners should be forced to return to Communist control, he engaged in a "protracted struggle" in the hope of forcing a major concession from the Western powers by combining division-level battlefield pressure with political wearing-down tactics. But he decided to end the Chinese commitment when UNC persistence and Soviet pressure convinced him that further intransigence was purposeless and even harmful to the mainland's economic construction.*

*Total casualties for the CCF and NKPA for the entire war--i.e., from June 1950 to July 1953--were estimated to be 1,500,000, including prisoners of war. In the same period, the UNC casualties were 500,000, of which US losses were 142,019--33,629 dead, 103,284 wounded, and 5,178 missing or captured.

During the longest period of deadlocked negotiations on any one issue--that of repatriation of prisoners, which extended from April 1952 to July 1953--CCF and NKPA casualties were estimated to be over 250,000, while those of the UNC were about 125,000.

C. Vietnam (1953 to 1954)

Near the end of the Korean war, Viet Minh prestige was steadily increasing, and its military successes and organizational effectiveness bolstered Ho Chi Minh's confidence that he could attain a decisive military victory. He was determined therefore, to prosecute the revolutionary guerrilla war more actively and felt under no real compulsion to move toward the talking phase of his long-term effort against the French. On the other hand, lack of French military success and increasing domestic political pressure to reduce or close out the commitment in Indochina made a succession of French premiers and cabinets pessimistic about ever attaining a military decision over Ho's forces.

Even after General Navarre assumed command in Indochina on 8 May 1953, the French were unable to revise their losing strategy in the field despite a much touted (but never implemented) plan for mobile warfare drawn on paper. The force of 150,000 Vietnamese regulars, 50,000 Vietnamese auxiliaries, 15,000 Laotians, and 10,000 Cambodians that Navarre commanded proved unable to take over effectively the job of static defense, so Navarre was impelled to fall back on the old losing policy of tying down and dispersing French and French Union regulars to defend a series of key strongpoints. Out of a total of 175,000 regulars and about 55,000 auxiliaries, there were only seven mobile groups and eight parachute battalions--the equivalent of three divisions--that were not assigned to immobile, defensive duties.

In contrast, the Viet Minh was not tied down to static defense and with about 125,000 regulars, 75,000 full-time regional and provincial troops, about 150,000 part-time guerrillas--in short, the operating equivalent of nine regular divisions--moved freely through the countryside and chose the place to attack the enemy forces. For example, strong Viet Minh guerrilla elements together with two Viet Minh divisions sufficed to contain the 114,000 regular French Union forces in the Tonkin Delta. The Viet Minh skill in guerrilla warfare and in infiltrating into areas under French control seriously reduced Navarre's ability to take the offensive.

While the French were cursed with the necessity of defending a number of politically important but militarily unimportant points, Navarre was also under political restraint from Paris. Because of domestic criticism of the war in

Indochina, the French government had directed its commander in the field to incur the fewest possible number of French casualties. The Viet Minh, on the other hand, was receiving strong support, both military and political, from its allies. The armistice in Korea had enabled Mao to increase significantly his aid across the southern China border to Ho's forces, strengthening their unit firepower and overall military capability. All along, Viet Minh regular forces in northern Indochina continued their gradual evolution from lightly armed guerrilla bands to a regularly organized military force with Chinese and Soviet equipment.

For all these reasons, Ho clearly preferred a complete military victory and gave no indication that he would be willing to attain less in a negotiated settlement than his forces could seize on the battlefield.

The post-Stalin Soviet leadership, however, viewed a softer policy toward East-West military conflicts as a necessary element in their long-range effort to dissolve the Western alliance in Europe. They tried to temporize on every major East-West difference in order to increase pressure against the US by its allies for a relaxation of trade controls, for great power negotiations, and for delays in rearmament and in European integration. The Soviet leaders calculated that such pressures and frictions would progressively reduce the West's capability for united action, as witness Malenkov's statement of the Soviet strategy in his speech of 8 August 1953:

> If today, in conditions of tension in international relations, the North Atlantic bloc is rent by internal strife and contradictions, the lessening of this tension may lead to its disintegration.

This strategy formed the basis of the Soviet campaign of negotiations, the pivotal slogan of which had been set forth by Malenkov in his statement that "there is not a single controversial or unsettled question which could not be solved by peaceful means on the basis of mutual agreement of the interested countries." (Speech of 15 March 1953) But Ho apparently was unwilling to end the war for Soviet political interests, and Moscow was impelled to make a distinction between the need to settle the Korean war and the need to continue the Indochina war.

Shortly after Stalin's death (5 March 1953), the Soviet leaders had made a distinction between the Korean war, which should be settled, and the Indochinese fight for "national independence," which should continue. (Pravda article of 11 April 1953) They insisted that the Soviet Union cannot be expected to "retard the liberation movement" of colonial peoples. (Pravda editorial of 25 April 1953) But the Soviet leaders also tried desperately to deny that their position on Indochina cut across their "peace policy" and seized upon and quoted with approval Churchill's remark that the Viet Minh offensive into Laos was not necessarily a Soviet-inspired move "inconsistent with the attitude of the Soviet government," and suggested that the chances for mutual understanding between East and West would be improved if other Western leaders would recognize the real causes of the "liberation movements." (Pravda editorial of 24 May 1953) Ho made it clear to the Soviet leaders, who did not have the influence with him that they had had with Kim Il-sung, that the distinction between the peace movement and the Indochina war must be maintained.

Ho was also aware of the demoralizing effect that French political disputes were having on French troops in Indochina and almost certainly viewed this development as improving Viet Minh chances in the field. The French military initiative in Indochina was constantly being tempered by political considerations in Paris, and on 9 June 1953, a senior French official in Saigon stated privately that the confused state of French politics and the political issues involved in handling the Indochina war were complicating General Navarre's task of restoring morale and confidence in the French officer corps. The Viet Minh continued to insist inflexibly on the hard-line demand that the basic condition for negotiations was the complete withdrawal of French troops. By late July 1953, they had gained effective control over more than half of the Tonkin population and were believed to have the military capability to occupy the entire delta.

The signing of the Korean armistice in late July 1953 provided the Soviet leaders with the opportunity to maneuver actively for a negotiated settlement of the Indochina war. During the first two weeks after the armistice, Moscow's statements directed in large part to the French, established the line that the Korean truce demonstrated the "victory of negotiations over force" and that this has given a "new stimulus" to the struggle for a peaceful solution to the "dirty war" in Indochina. Whereas prior to the truce, Moscow

had attacked suggestions for East-West negotiations concerning Indochina, by mid-August 1953 it was quoting with approval demands in the French press for a "Panmunjom" in Indochina. By contrast, Viet Minh broadcasts in mid-August 1953 warned that the armistice must not affect the continuation of the war against the French, who will not seek an armistice "in a short time," and that "we must wage a protracted struggle... intensify our fighting so as to annihilate more enemy troops; this is the only way to compel the enemy to accept peace in Vietnam."

As the Soviet leaders began to maneuver for a negotiated settlement, they acted to impress the Chinese leaders with the political benefits which would accrue to China in the event of high-level talks. They gave increasing prominence to the big-power status of the Peking regime and declared that "serious current problems" in Asia could not be resolved without Chinese Communist participation. (Soviet note to the Western powers of 4 August 1953)

The Chinese, who had been working for several years to gain wider recognition as the only legitimate government of China, welcomed this Soviet line. Indicating that the Chinese Communist position was closer to the Soviet position, their delegate to the World Peace Council called for "step by step negotiations" on East-West issues. (Speech of 15 June 1953 by Kuo Mo-jo) On 2 September, Peking specifically cited the Indochina issue as one which could be solved "only by applying the principle of negotiated settlement."

By late summer, the Soviets had begun to contact important French officials privately. These Soviet initiatives were made at a time when Ho was still resisting the concept of negotiations: the "French...and American propaganda campaign," which has the "semblance of peace," is advanced in the "vain hope of weakening the will of our people, who ask only to fight...however painful and long." (Ho Chi Minh speech on 2 September 1953) Ho continued to insist on a "protracted struggle," inasmuch as his forces had not been hurt in the field. On the contrary, in the fall of 1953, Viet Minh military capabilities were at a new high point as a result of the marked increase in Chinese aid, the relatively light casualties suffered during the previous campaign season, and the excellent state of its intelligence regarding French troop dispositions and tactical plans.

The attitude of the Viet Minh leaders at the time is further confirmation of the generalization that the Asian Communists have been unwilling to begin the talking-phase of their dual tactics at a time when they are militarily in an advantageous position and have not suffered high casualties in the field.

French operations to counter expanded Viet Minh guerrilla warfare in the southern Tonkin Delta area had met with very limited success in October 1953 and at the cost of heavy casualties. After an area was "cleared" by the French, the Viet Minh reappeared quickly and Navarre's men, like those of Salan, his defensive-minded predecessor, were tied down and dispersed in a static defense of provincial crossroads waiting for the Viet Minh to come at them again in the night. As the French waited for the Viet Minh fall offensive, reliable reports indicated that they had only four battalions in their mobile reserves in Tonkin and that their military position was "grave." The Viet Minh was aware of this French weakness through a Viet Minh source which was believed by American officials to have penetrated the French high command.

As certain French cabinet officials and many members of the National Assembly increased their demands that Premier Laniel and Foreign Minister Bidault move to end the costly war by negotiations, Ho apparently was brought under increasing pressure from Moscow and Peking to agree to enter the talking-phase of the Viet Minh effort in Indochina. Quoting Izvestiya in its Vietnamese-language broadcast of 24 September, Moscow Radio declared that there exists no international misunderstanding which could not be settled peaceably.

[redacted] the French government was convinced that France could not win the war in Indochina any more than the US could win the Korean war. [redacted] Ministry spokesman who indicated to American officials that the only way France saw of ending the war lay through a negotiated settlement with the Viet Minh.]

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[redacted] On 10 October, Chou En-lai accepted the US proposals for a meeting to discuss the time and place for the Korean political conference, and Peking's propaganda continued to point to the need to settle international problems through peaceful means.

Ho was clearly reluctant to switch to the talking-phase, but because of Soviet and Chinese pressure as well as domestic pressure on the French government to agree to bilaterals, he apparently believed that even a hedged offer to talk would improve his international prestige without hindering Viet Minh military initiatives. In their note of 26 November to the Western powers, the Soviet leaders had indicated their desire to prepare the way for a five-power East-West foreign ministers' conference at which Communist China would be present, and they apparently insisted that Ho should at least appear to be less adamantly against talks with the French than he had been. (Politburo member Truong Chinh had declared on 25 September 1951 that peace negotiations would be "illusory" and that the French would have to be expelled as a necessary condition of peace, and Ho personally stated on 2 September 1953 that "We know that only resistance, however painful and long it may be, can give us victory and restore peace to us.")

When, in late October 1953, Ho began to bring his position a step closer to that of Peking and Moscow, he accepted the principle of negotiations but insisted on the practice of continuing military methods to gain a settlement satisfactory to the Viet Minh. He conceded through his spokesmen that "every international problem can be settled by negotiations" (28 October) and that "to stop the Vietnam war through negotiations is completely necessary and also possible" (23 November). But in his reply to questions posed by the Stockholm paper, Expressen, Ho on 29 November in effect demanded a complete French surrender. He asked the French to begin bilateral negotiations by making a peace proposal--which Ho was only prepared to discuss--to stop fighting, to recognize the Viet Minh regime, and, by implication, to withdraw from Vietnam. Ho implied that, in return, he might not continue his war until the Viet Minh gained a complete military

victory.* Actually, he continued to fight, and despite some displays of French aggressiveness, the military initiative was with the Viet Minh, whose forces in late November 1953 included divisions so disposed as to permit attacks against northwest Tonkin, against the northwest corner of the delta, or against Laos.

Ho's hedged proposal of 29 November was a three-pronged exercise of considerable political skill. It (1) advanced the Soviet and Chinese "peace offensive," (2) further isolated the Laniel government from the National Assembly and the French press, and (3) revived and deepend Vietnamese distrust of the French, who were viewed as being at the brink of a "pacifist trap" and who might decide against a greater military effort in the field. At the same time, Ho had his own paramount interest to protect, namely, winning a complete military victory, and in the first Viet Minh comment on his proposal, it was made clear to Moscow and Peking that peace could be attained only through "prolonged" military struggle and that the Viet Minh had no illusion that peace could be easily won. (Viet Minh news agency broadcast of 7 December 1953)

In France, Premier Laniel, supported by Foreign Minister Bidault, rejected immediate negotiations with the Viet Minh in the illusory hope that future negotiations could be attained on more favorable terms after military successes in the field.

Ho's generals continued their highly successful strategy of dispersing French forces in static defense positions while moving into areas of their own choosing. When, in early December 1953, General Navarre made the recently captured Dien Bien Phu a strongpoint to prevent moves into northern Laos, some Viet Minh forces began to move artillery into the surrounding area and, in late December, other Viet Minh forces swept southward into central Laos.

This invasion of Laos by the Viet Minh was treated cautionsly by Moscow and Peking, who muted reports of the new development in their commentaries and stressed the demand for

*Ho stated that "if the French government wishes to have an armistice and settle the question through negotiations, we will be ready to meet the French proposal."

an end to the war. The Soviet leaders, who were searching desperately for "proof" that Ho really intended to negotiate, centered their commentaries on this proposal of 29 November. "The recent statement by President Ho Chi Minh on his preparedness to examine a French proposal on an armistice, should such a proposal be made, constituted striking proof of the peaceful intentions of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam." (Moscow Radio commentary of 10 January 1954) While initiating little independent comment, Peking continued to rebroadcast foreign statements alleging that only US pressure prevented Paris from seeking an end to the Indochina war.

By contrast, the Viet Minh generally avoided the matter of a negotiated settlement and reminded its forces that real peace could be won "only by pushing forward the armed struggle and by dealing deadly blows at the enemy until he is compelled to demand negotiations." (Viet Minh radio broadcast of 24 December 1953) By mid-January 1954, when at least six battalions of Viet Minh were maintaining pressure on French forces in central Laos and more than 18 battalions were blocking all avenues of exit from Dien Bien Phu and bringing in artillery for the siege, the divergence between Ho, on the one hand, and the Soviet and Chinese leaders, on the other, remained clear-cut and reflected his reluctance to enter the talking-phase when his forces were consolidating portions of northwest Tonkin. By insisting that Paris submit a formal proposal for talks to the Viet Minh, Ho had placed the onus for avoiding negotiations on the French government, which continued to equivocate on the issue.

His forces held the initiative throughout Indochina as the result of widespread simultaneous offensive actions by the time the four-power Berlin conference convened on 25 January 1954. The drive into northern Laos of an estimated 12,000 Viet Minh troops, continued encirclement of Dien Bien Phu, the capture of small French posts in southern and central Laos, and extensive harassing operations in the Tonkin Delta forced a further overall dispersal of French regular forces. On 3 February, the American army attache in Saigon reported that staff thinking and procedures at French headquarters were of the "1935-39 vintage" and that Navarre's strategy was identical to that of the defense-minded Salan. Navarre tied up 12 battalions of regular troops at Dien Bien Phu, only to be by-passed by the Viet Minh, who had moved into portions of Laos but had not been engaged even where the

French had a three-to-one advantage. French patrolling from strongpoints was "the exception rather than the rule," reflecting apparent instructions from Paris to Navarre that he must conduct a "minimum-casualty holding action" with a view to eventual big-power negotiations.

As domestic pressure to end the war increased on the French government in the absence of victories in the field, two alternatives to bilateral negotiations with the Viet Minh were considered: (1) an international negotiated settlement or (2) "internationalization" of the war through UN--i.e., American--involvement. Regarding (1), well before the fall of Dien Bien Phu, French government officials and army staff officers regarded an international negotiated peace as the inevitable solution to the war. In February 1953 they prepared for negotiations at Geneva. Regarding (2), almost all French spokesmen vigorously had opposed internationalization of the conflict and, largely for fear of giving a pretext for Chinese intervention, they continued to rebuff firmly any suggestion that American troops would be necessary.

The Communists hit hard at the possibility of American involvement in responding to speculation in the Western press, reflecting their own calculation that the increasing Viet Minh initiatives in the field might impel "direct intervention" by Washington. One of Molotov's chief aims at the Berlin meeting in agreeing to the Geneva conference was to block any possible increase in American military assistance to the French. The Chinese Communists, satisfied with the Berlin agreement as a first step in gaining general acceptance by the international community, warned that increased American involvement in Indochina was making the issue of Geneva more complicated. Ho Chi Minh expressed his concern when, on 3 March, he accused the US of "another step" toward direct intervention in "allowing the American air force to participate" in the Indochina war.

Soviet plans to end the war by a negotiated settlement at Geneva included a move to convince Ho that important international prestige could be derived from entering the talking-phase of his military effort in Indochina. Pravda on 8 March attacked Foreign Minister Bidault's public statement that it was not necessary to invite Ho's representative to Geneva and insisted that "it is impossible to solve the Indochina problem without considering the lawful right of her people." As Soviet propaganda continued to

press for Viet Minh participation at Geneva, Ho was provided a clear insight into his prospective political gains: unprecedented international prestige, intensification of French-Vietnamese frictions, demoralization of French forces in the field, and reduction of the risk of direct American involvement in the war. Nevertheless, he clearly preferred bilaterals with the French (in order to prevent US pressure on Laniel to remain intransigent) and considered attendance at a multilateral conference would reduce his position of strength. He finally agreed, however, to multilaterals.

Moscow and Paris began to set forth their positions before the Geneva conference was convened. [On 4 March, a Soviet embassy official in London told American officials that if the US and France object to an amalgamation of the Vietnam and Viet Minh administrations, "they can agree to a division along the 16th parallel." This first Soviet comment on Geneva suggested that] Moscow was the most active advocate of partition which would deprive the French of the heavily populated, strategic Tonkin Delta and open the way for Viet Minh control of the whole country. Premier Laniel set forth the French position publicly on 5 March by calling for the complete withdrawal of all rebel troops from Laos and Cambodia, establishment of a neutral zone around the Red River delta, and withdrawal of all Viet Minh troops from that area. He was aware that these terms would be unacceptable to Ho, as was later conceded by the Foreign Ministry official who formulated them in order to forestall any Viet Minh offers for bilateral negotiations before Geneva. Rumors in Paris of direct French-Viet Minh contacts were not confirmed, and on 9 March, the Geneva alternative enabled Laniel to resist pressure for immediate bilateral talks with the Viet Minh.

All the while, Viet Minh tactical capabilities were continuing to improve, particularly with respect to anti-aircraft artillery and heavier infantry weapons acquired from China. Each succeeding campaigning season left the French occupying fewer outposts and the Viet Minh spread over larger areas of the intervening countryside.

Before entering the talking-phase of the Indochina effort, Ho apparently decided to demonstrate Viet Minh strength in the field. He made a major military move for political reasons; on 12 March, Viet Minh battalions hit strongpoints at Dien Bien Phu. He was willing to accept high losses--from 4,000 to 5,000 killed and wounded out of a total of 40,000 troops by 15 March. He was also willing to depart

from Viet Minh military tactics by hitting a major strongpoint without the element of surprise. Though the size and timing of the attack were anticipated, however, the Communist assault did incorporate one major factor for which the French were not prepared; the massive and extensive use of artillery. Communist possession and employment of artillery in itself provided a major element of surprise and rendered invalid the French tactical assumption, on which planning for the defense of Dien Bien Phu had been based.

In early April during the siege, Ho indicated to the pro-Communist newsman Wilfred Burchett that the French situation at Dien Bien Phu was hopeless. Ho placed a helmet upside down on a table, and compared the helmet's rim to the hills around Dien Bien Phu, saying: "They shoot up and we shoot in." He apparently calculated that loss of Dien Bien Phu would reduce Vietnamese army morale, already lowered by talk of an imminent truce; seriously discredit the "new" strategy of Navarre; give the Viet Minh a tremendous boost in prestige immediately prior to the Geneva conference, thus increasing the incentive for defection by Vietnamese nationalists; and increase French domestic pressure for direct negotiations with his representatives.

As Laniel and Bidault parried domestic demands for direct French - Viet Minh negotiations, they were also subjected to increasing Soviet pressure before the Geneva conference began.

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Moscow and Peking were anxious to disparage American foot-dragging and used Secretary Dulles' speech on 29 March, in which he suggested that the West should take "united action" to prevent a Communist seizure of Indochina, to spur Paris into bilaterals. They were particularly fearful that the American preference for the French to fight would stiffen Bidault further at Geneva and make French concessions more difficult to extract from him there, flanked by Secretary Dulles. They were also concerned about American statements regarding eventual if not immediate involvement: Pravda on 11 April claimed that the real target of US threats was China, and the Peking People's Daily declared on 21 April

that "faced with armed aggression, the Chinese people will certainly not refrain from doing something about it." On 28 April, Chou En-lai made another noncommittal deterrent statement: the Chinese "most emphatically will not tolerate aggression against us by any country" and the US is looking toward a "new world war."

The series of assaults on Dien Bien Phu throughout April indicated that Ho intended to take the strongpoint even at a very high cost. Despite murderous losses, which in late April and early May were variously estimated at about two divisions (about 18,000 men), Ho's forces continued to attack in intermittent phases. Their estimated strength was about 20,000 infantry plus some 9,000 supporting troops, as compared with less than 10,000 French Union Troops. There were 134,000 French and Vietnamese regulars in the Tonkin Delta, but the greater part of this number was still tied down in static defense, leaving the relatively few mobile units to counter the increased Viet Minh activity.

By the start of the Geneva conference on 27 April 1954, the overall military situation in Indochina and the particularly serious situation at Dien Bien Phu had provided Ho, and his Soviet and Chinese partners, with a position of considerable strength to use to offset American warnings about possible internationalization of the war. Soviet officials privately made various suggestions for a settlement --such as partition, nation-wide elections, and an immediate cease-fire. Calculating that the French would be more amenable to some sort of partition than to a coalition government, Soviet diplomats on the opening day of the conference privately suggested to American officials that the idea of partition would meet China's requirement that its southern border should be buffered by a Communist regime.

The Soviet-Chinese effort to soften up the French on the issue of partition was made in the face of the opposition of Ho, who like Bao Dai, claimed sovereignty over all Vietnam. [redacted]

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At the Geneva conference, the Viet Minh delegate, Pham Van Dong, tried to use military developments in Indochina as a backdrop in demanding major French concessions. Dien Bien Phu fell on 7 May, with Viet Minh losses estimated at about 21,000, of which about one-half were killed, and French Union losses of about 18,000 men. On 10 May, Pham Van Dong set forth maximum conditions in the form of an eight-point resolution, the main points of which were political which were linked with military provisions for a cease-fire: French recognition of the independence of the three Indochinese Communist-sponsored states, withdrawal of "foreign troops," elections in each state, and a total cease-fire involving occupation by each side of unspecified areas, no reinforcements, and a mixed control commission. Partition was not mentioned. By tying the French-desired cease-fire to political concessions, the Viet Minh put themselves in the position of using the military weapon to extract a French political retreat.

When a conference deadlock was threatened by French determination to deal with military matters first (i.e. to effect a cease-fire) and Viet Minh insistence that political and military questions be dealt with together, Chou En-lai and Molotov, playing major negotiating roles, moved adroitly to avoid any impasse that could be used by the US as an excuse for intervention in the fighting. [In his major speech of 14 May, Molotov had explicitly rejected the French terms for an armistice because Bidault's formula did not deal with political questions. However, at the secret session on the 17th, he conceded that military questions could be discussed first. Chou En-lai also retreated; in a private conversation with Eden on 20 May, he stated that the military and political aspects of any Indochina settlement must be dealt with separately, with priority for a cease-fire. These concessions strongly suggested that neither Moscow nor Peking desired protracted talks; they undercut Viet Minh intransigence and policy to prolong the talks.]

Ho calculated that negotiations could continue together with the fighting for some time without leading to American involvement. A Viet Minh commentary of mid-May seemed to be directed at reminding the Chinese and Soviets that there was no pressing need to end the war:

> We still remember the Korean lesson which taught us that one could negotiate and fight at the same time ...for two years.

Ho was clearly determined to protract the talking-phase to gain as much territory of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as the French were willing to concede. As the Viet Minh augmented its forces in the Tonkin Delta with units from the Dien Bien Phu operation, helping to compress French-controlled areas there, Ho's delegate at Geneva apparently was instructed to insist again on political concessions in exchange for a cease-fire. He hardened the Communist position, which Molotov and Chou En-lai had been making increasingly more flexible.

Pham Van Dong on 25 May insisted on French political concessions before agreeing to end the fighting. He linked any cease-fire prospect with arrangements for "Khmer Isserak and Pathet Lao," the Communist-contrived regimes in Cambodia and Laos, and in effect denied that military and political questions could be separated. Dong also took a hard line on the Soviet-Chinese concept of partition, proposing the "readjusting of areas under control of each state...taking into account the actual areas controlled, including population, and strategic interests." Inasmuch as Chinese Communist maps showed the Viet Minh as holding most of Vietnam, about half of Laos, and parts of Cambodia, the Viet Minh proposal was a demand for considerable territory--more than its units held on the ground.

On 29 May, however, an agreement was reached to have representatives of both commands meet at Geneva to study the disposition of forces prior to a cease-fire. Molotov and Chou apparently were the prime movers on the Communist side in making this concession. Moscow and Peking, whose policy was centered on splitting the Americans from the French and preventing a system of alliances from forming in Asia, were apprehensive regarding the demands of French military leaders and some Laniel cabinet members that the US enter the war. Accordingly, Molotov and Chou worked hard to attain some kind of agreement at Geneva and to prevent an abortive conference from leading to internationalization of the war. Militarily, Ho was keeping up the pressure: a captured Viet Minh document of late May 1954 directed Viet Minh commanders in the Tonkin Delta area to continue their harassing and guerrilla activities for an unspecified period "pending commitment of the battle corps."

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[told Ambassador Heath in Geneva that he favored partition as a solution at about the 16th parallel--i.e., at about the line suggested by the Soviets earlier.

The negotiations took a new turn as the Laniel government tried to survive the National Assembly debate on Indochina which began on 9 June. On the preceding day, the Communists indicated that they would use the weakened government position to gain their maximum demands; Molotov returned to a hard line, similar to that of Pham Van Dong as set forth on 10 May. Molotov demanded independence for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, free elections in these states, and withdrawal of all foreign troops. He seemed to believe that the Laniel government would either move toward the maximum Communist position or be replaced by a government pledged to negotiate an immediate end to the war, and on 9 June, a Soviet Pravda writer told an American journalist in Geneva that no progress on Indochina was possible until after the French government crisis was resolved.

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[redacted] On 12 June, the Laniel government fell, losing the vote of confidence in the National Assembly after the debate on the war; on 18 June, Pierre Mendes-France took over as the new Premier, and he promised to close out the fighting by 20 July.]

In the military conversations between the French and the Viet Minh in Geneva, the latter asked for direct control of about three-fourths of Vietnam, half of Laos, and much of Cambodia. In the field, General Ely stated privately on 15 June that the military situation in the Tonkin Delta was precarious and that French and Vietnamese troops were "very, very tired." The Viet Minh maintained a capability for a full-scale attack on the delta.

The ever-present prospect of American involvement again impelled Molotov and Chou to keep the conference alive with small concessions. On 16 June, Molotov tried to break the deadlock over the composition of the international truce supervisory commission, and on the same day, Chou made a settlement proposal which implied withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from Laos and Cambodia. Under pressure, Pham Van Dong also suggested postponement of a political settlement for those two states. Thus by the time the Geneva conference terminated its Korea phase and temporarily adjourned,

the Soviets and Chinese seemed to have moved back in effect to a position envisaging a partition of Vietnam and a neutral Laos and Cambodia. When Pierre Mendes-France took over as the new Premier pledged to seek an end to the war before 20 July, the road was opened to a final settlement.

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[redacted] Regarding Laos and Cambodia, Chou said that all foreign forces, including the Viet Minh, should be withdrawn and that there must be no American bases in either state. When the new French Premier complained that the military staff talks between the French and Viet Minh at Geneva had been stalled for several days because of Viet Minh intransigence, Chou agreed to intervene to speed the talks. During the conference recess, Chou, in discussions with Nehru in late June in New Delhi, apparently set forth a partition plan.

Chou then moved to apply pressure on Ho to drop his demands for retaining troops in Laos and Cambodia and for a partition line as far south as the 14th parallel. He met with Ho at Nanning on the China-Vietnam border in early July, on his return from India and Burma, to discuss with him the terms for a final settlement. A clear sign that Chou had insisted that Ho give some ground in the intransigent Viet Minh position appeared in the remark made by the Chinese deputy foreign minister [redacted] on 8 July: Chou had had a "very good meeting" with Ho, the results of which "would be helpful to the French." When the Viet Minh tried again at the reconvened conference to gain permission to retain their troops in Laos and Cambodia and to settle on the 14th parallel, Mendes-France complained to Chou that this was unacceptable and out of accord with Chou's position. Chou replied that both sides must make concessions, with the Viet Minh making the larger. On 13 July, following Chou's statement to the French Premier, Pham Van Dong changed his position and told Mendes-France that he was prepared to compromise on the 16th parallel. The French still preferred a line between the 17th and 18th parallels, and rejected Viet Minh demands for control of some part of Laos and elections in all three Associated States.]

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The final settlement on 20 July indicated that the Viet Minh had retreated on three points. They accepted the partition of Vietnam (they had insisted on "unity" of Vietnam) and with the line at the 17th parallel (they had wanted the 14th); they agreed to withdraw from areas south of that line in Vietnam and from all of Laos and Cambodia; and they accepted July 1956 as the date for national elections--a two-year delay contrasting with their demand for only a six-month delay.

Pham Van Dong had come to Geneva with the apparent expectation that the Viet Minh's increasingly strong military position in the field would enable him to extract considerable concessions from the French to open the way for Communist forces to further penetrate Laos and Cambodia and consolidate everything above the 14th parallel in Vietnam. But Soviet and Chinese pressures, stemming from larger policy considerations and fear of American intervention, frustrated this hope for maximum French concessions. Although Ho perceived certain advantages in ending the military phase--that is, his forces could take territory by political subversion and, therefore, his effort would be less costly in terms of manpower and safer in terms of non-involvement by the US--he had not expected to have to make so many political concessions. These concessions were later viewed by him and his lieutenants as a major mistake. His forces had not been badly hurt in field, as the Chinese armies had been in Korea in the spring of 1951 when Mao moved to the talking-phase of the Korean war. He probably was concerned about the prospect of US intervention, but Moscow and Peking were clearly more concerned about the consequences to their policy of internationalization of the war. He was in a position to negotiate from strength and to do so for a long time--"two years" as his radio declared in mid-May 1954--but he found himself caught in a Sino-Soviet political web and was persuaded not to use his growing military capability to force major concessions.

[French military and intelligence officials agreed that Viet Minh forces in the delta following the fall of Dien Bien Phu were capable of launching a damaging full-scale offensive, but it never took place. In mid-July, one Communist journalist stated that he assumed Chou had pressed Ho to keep the fighting at a low boil when the Geneva conference was in its last phase. The Chinese indicated their national interest in settling the fighting-phase when, on 23 July, one of their journalists at Geneva declared privately: "We have won the first campaign for the neutralization of all Southeast Asia," the implication being that only]

[Thailand was a probable area for the establishment of an American base. Chou in late July, after the Geneva agreements were concluded, stated on two occasions that Asian states must work out their "own" security arrangements, and Pravda on 22 July emphasized that the area will not be permitted to join any "aggressive groupings."]

[By contrast, the North Vietnamese leaders were far less categorical in praising the Geneva conference agreements.] Pham Van Dong declared at the closing session on 21 July that the problem of Vietnamese unification remained: "We shall achieve this unity, and we shall achieve it just as we have won the war." This contradicted the Pravda statement on 22 July that Vietnamese independence had been "won." On 22 July, Ho renewed his exhortations for a "long and arduous struggle" and declared that the division of Vietnam was only a temporary and transitional arrangement: "Central, South and North Vietnam are all our land, and our country undoubtedly will be unified, the compatriots throughout our country will certainly be liberated." [The Viet Minh ambassador in Peking, Hoang Van Hoan acknowledged to Indian correspondents on 22 July that despite the strong military position of the Viet Minh, it had to compromise on several vital points, notably the timing of elections (put off for two years), the question of French troop withdrawal, and the location of the temporary demarcation line at the 17th parallel, in order to secure peace in Vietnam.] The leaders of the "Resistance Government Khmer and Pathet Lao," repeated Ho's view that the agreements are but a "first step" and called for a long, hard struggle.

Neither Moscow nor Peking revived propaganda support for these resistance phantom-governments. Moscow made little effort to describe the agreement on Vietnam as "temporary" or to stress that portion of the conference declaration disclaiming any intent to permanently partition Vietnam; that is, the Soviet leaders were satisfied with partition. Peking stressed its own new international prestige and the boost to the cause of "collective peace in Asia" provided by the agreements, which were a manifestation of Chou's five principles as declared jointly with Nehru, U Nu, and Ho.

To sum up, the Soviet and Chinese leaders induced Ho to enter the talking-phase of the Indochina war because:

1. It was a major problem which stimulated Western defense efforts and threatened to make a mockery of the

"peace offensive" designed to impede these efforts. Soviet policy in Europe, devised to produce schisms and paralysis in France and to split Britain from the US, required that an end be brought to this war, just as the Korean war had been removed as a defense-stimulating conflict.

2. Peking as well as Moscow feared that any further military advances in Indochina by the Viet Minh might have led to the formation of a strong anti-Communist alliance including some of the previously uncommitted Asian states.

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3. With the example of Korea before them, the Chinese and Soviet leaders could not ignore the possibility that a continued offensive in Indochina would greatly increase the risk of Ameridan intervention and a global war. They preferred a far lower level of risk, namely, political subversion carried out by the Viet Minh. They "paid off" Ho by continuing (in violation of the Geneva agreements) to supply military equipment to make his army a modernized fighting force.

The developments in 1953 and 1954 have influenced the attitude of Ho and his lieutenants toward the current war. The clear awareness that they had been impelled, primarily by Moscow and Peking, to stop at a half-way station on the road to total military victory in Vietnam, apparently has made them very reluctant to stop half way again.

D. Implications for Vietnam Today

It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this historical lesson for Ho. It sustains his hostility toward any suggestion that he again stop at a half-way station on the road to control of all Vietnam. [redacted]

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[redacted] Only through full and unconditional independence can we achieve stability....We are determined to continue to fight until we achieve total victory, that is, military and political, and the Americans leave and accept our four points. (emphasis supplied)

The Chinese leaders, too, apparently believe that they had made a mistake in pressuring Ho to stop at a half-way station in 1954. Chou En-lai told a visiting youth delegation on 1 January 1966 that

> China will continue her absolute support of Vietnam. To tell the truth, I personally signed the Geneva agreement and I regret that my having done so is causing trouble for our comrades in Vietnam. I am not going to be deceived by the American peace campaign this time.

Actually, it was the Soviet-Chinese (not the "American") peace offensive that required an end to the war, and Molotov was Chou's partner in persuading Ho to make concessions to the French.

Ho is now in a stronger position to reject any Soviet suggestions that he should close out the fighting, and Soviet influence on him is as strong or as weak as Moscow's positive support for the war. That is, when Moscow avoided involvement (i.e., when Khrushchev decided to stand clear of providing important political and military aid to Hanoi), Soviet influence was at an all-time low. On the other hand, when Moscow incurred a degree of commitment (i.e., when the post-Khrushchev leadership decided to supply Hanoi with military aid and political support against the US), Soviet influence increased. However, it will never be as great as it had been in 1954.

The Chinese leaders have helped to make this impossible. In contrast to 1954, they are now the opponents, not the partners, of the Soviets. Ho's militancy is bolstered by Mao's support, which itself stems from special personal requirements. That is, Mao is personally far more pretentious than Ho--as witness the current irrationalities of the Mao cult in China--and with increasing neuroticism insists that his unique doctrine of "people's war" should legitimatize his claim to be the successor of Lenin and Stalin as the "leader of the international Communist movement." Unlike Ho, whose sights are centered on his own national war, Mao

has a larger anti-Soviet doctrinal point to make: protracted small wars are effective in all under-developed areas and must be the main strategy against the US.

Mao has a considerable personal stake in proving to active doubters--namely, the Soviets, the East Europeans, the neutrals, and even men in his own party and military establishment--that his principle of protracted small war will work against the superior American military capability anywhere. Vietnam is the main proving ground for this thesis. [Chou En-lai told [redacted] members on 7 January 1966 that if the Vietnamese Communists continue their military operations

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> they will make the Americans admit their defeat and drive them out....The most important thing ...is to prove this by actual deed. Unless we defeat the enemy, we will not be believed. (emphasis supplied)]

Any sign, therefore, from Hanoi that Ho is willing even to consider the matter of negotiating a cease-fire or a cessation of US air strikes against the North before a total withdrawal of American troops occurs is criticized by Peking. For example, using a double-edged statement, intended for neutrals and for the North Vietnamese, Chou En-lai on 2 September 1965 warned that: "As long as the US does not withdraw its troops, it can carry on endless talks with you so that it may hang on there indefinitely." (emphasis supplied) [That this was a clear warning to Hanoi is suggested by the fact that Chou made the statement [redacted] at the North Vietnamese embassy in Peking.]

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Despite the constant concern of the Chinese leaders that Ho might agree to negotiations before US troops are withdrawn from the South, Ho continues to assign a high priority to prolonging his reactivated war. He and his lieutenants have absorbed Mao's own view on protracted civil war. When, in December 1936, Mao said that "to wage a revolutionary war for ten years, as we have done, might be surprising in other countries," he was rejecting modern Western and Soviet military doctrine on quick-decision ("impatient") war. He made his point emphatic in June 1946, noting that the Spanish civil war was "fought for three years, but we have fought for twenty years." Ho declared on 17 July 1966 that

The war may still last 10, 20 years, or longer. Hanoi, Haiphong, and other cities and enterprises may be destroyed, but the Vietnamese people will not be intimidated.

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Ho apparently believes that he can continue the war primarily because, despite losses in the North and South, he is still able to put forces into the South and to supply them for operations. On the other hand, the Maoist doctrine he has absorbed has a strong ingredient of opportunism. That is, there is no fixed principle that determines when and in what situation negotiations or a cease-fire should be accepted. The deciding factor is a very practical consideration--namely, inability to keep fighting. In the event that US air strikes were to continue to increase his problems, his willingness to negotiate a cessation of the strikes would not be blocked by any doctrinal consideration. The Chinese leaders apparently are aware of the ever-present prospect that Ho might view negotiations as a means to gain a breathing-spell from US pressure and are attacking not only the matter of talks before a total American withdrawal but also the matter of talks to attain a suspension of air strikes against the North.

Despite the constant concern of the Chinese, the cessations of bombing in May 1965 and in December-January 1966 failed to budge the North Vietnamese from their adamant opposition to negotiations because the U.S. had not yielded to their basic demand: that Washington make a unilateral public pledge--prior to negotiations--to withdraw from the South and also (a theme introduced in summer 1965) provide some proof that it would do so. An important political consideration in Hanoi's advancement of this line was the need for deception--that is, the need to commit Washington to a declaration of surrender while pretending that the demand for such a declaration was reasonable. Euphemistic language was used to conceal the fact that the demand was simply for surrender. The North Vietnamese did not, therefore, demand a "surrender" expressly, but rather called on

Washington to "recognize" or "accept" the four points (as set forth on 8 April 1965). Following American military inputs in July 1965, Hanoi became even more unreasonable, and even more frequently demanded that the U.S. "carry out" or show by "actual deeds" that it recognized these points and would abide by them. Further, toward the end of the second suspension of bombing, Ho went beyond the demand for proof of U.S. acceptance of the four points to the demand that Washington negotiate with the Liberation Front and stop bombing forever and "unconditionally." In this way, Ho tried to deflect the appeals of Western and neutral leaders for the commencement of negotiations, and to neutralize the effects of the important American political weapon (the cessation of bombing) which had revealed Hanoi as the real recalcitrant opposed to negotiations. In short, Hanoi's position since January 1966 has been more adamantly opposed to negotiations than it had seemed to be previously.

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Effectiveness of the Rolling Thunder Program in North Vietnam

1 January - 30 September 1966

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUL 2000

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GROUP 1

CONTENTS

		Page
Summary		1
I.	The Rolling Thunder Attack in January-September 1966	5
	A. Scale of Operations	5
	B. Ordnance	5
	C. Aircraft Losses	7
	D. Cost Effectiveness of Operations Against North Vietnam in 1966	8
II.	Target Systems Attacked in January-September 1966	11
	A. Fixed Targets	11
	1. General	11
	2. Electric Power Targets	11
	3. Petroleum Storage Targets	15
	4. Lines of Communications	17
	a. North Vietnam	17
	(1) Railroads	17
	(2) Highways	20
	(3) Waterways	20
	b. Laos	21
	B. Targets of Opportunity (Armed Reconnaissance Missions)	22
	C. Laos Air Operations	23
III.	The Effects of the Rolling Thunder Program in 1966	25
	A. Physical Damage	25

		Page
B.	Casualties in 1966	26
1.	North Vietnamese Claims of Casualties	26
2.	Estimated Casualties from Strikes Against Fixed Targets	27
3.	Estimated Casualties from Armed Reconnaissance	28
C.	North Vietnamese Countermeasures	29
1.	Repair and Reconstruction	29
2.	Civil Defense	30
a.	Organization and Manpower	31
b.	Protective Construction	31
c.	Dispersal of Population and Industry	32
d.	Other Civil Defense Measures	32
e.	Alerts	33
D.	North Vietnamese Political Reactions	34
E.	Soviet and Chinese Communist Assistance	35
1.	Military Aid	35
2.	Economic Aid	36
IV.	General Assessment of the Rolling Thunder Program	47
A.	Agriculture	47
B.	Industry	48
C.	Transportation	51
D.	Foreign Trade	57
E.	Manpower Developments in North Vietnam	59
F.	Third Country Attitudes	61
1.	Soviet and Eastern European Attitudes	61
2.	Communist China's Attitude	62

Page

Tables

1. Attack Sorties by US/GVN Forces in Southeast Asia, During 1965 and January-September 1966 6

2. Ordnance Delivered by Air in Southeast Asia, January-August 1966 7

3. Losses by Model of Fixed-Wing Aircraft, During 1965 and January-September 1966 8

4. Comparison of Rolling Thunder Strikes on Major Fixed-Target Systems: 1965 and January-September 1966 12

5. Comparison of Rolling Thunder Strike Sorties on Major Fixed-Target Systems: 1965 and January-September 1966 14

6. North Vietnam: Airstrikes Against JCS Targeted Bridges, 1965 and January-September 1966 18

7. North Vietnam: Estimated Total Length of Time Railroad Lines were Interdicted for Through Rail Service, 1965 and January-September 1966 19

8. Railroad Bridges Destroyed or Damaged, by Line, 1965 Through 30 September 1966 19

9. Reported Losses of Transport Equipment Due to Bombing in North Vietnam, 1965 and January-September 1966 21

10. Soviet and Chinese Military Equipment Delivered to North Vietnam, 1965 38

11. Soviet and Chinese Military Equipment Delivered to North Vietnam, January-June 1966 40

12. Communist Economic Aid Extended to North Vietnam, 1955-64 42

		Page
13.	[redacted]	43
14.	North Vietnam: Estimated Transport Performance, 1964, 1965, and Projected 1966	53
15.	North Vietnam: Rolling Stock Inventory as of the End of 1964 and 1965 and 1 October 1966	55
16.	North Vietnam: Cargo Truck Inventory as of the End of 1964 and 1965 and 1 October 1966	56

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM IN NORTH VIETNAM* 1 JANUARY-30 SEPTEMBER 1966

The Rolling Thunder air offensive against North Vietnam has been accelerated sharply in 1966, compared with operations in 1965. The 59,000 attack sorties flown in the first nine months of 1966 against targets in North Vietnam were about 2.3 times the 1965 effort; the 90,000 tons of ordnance dropped was 2.6 times the ordnance delivered on targets in 1965. The 1966 air operations have also been carried out more efficiently than the 1965 campaign. The average bomb load per attack sortie has increased, and the rate of aircraft losses has been some 58 percent of the 1965 rate.

In spite of these improvements, it is estimated that the cost effectiveness of the air campaign diminished in 1966. The direct operating cost of inflicting a dollar's worth of damage in North Vietnam has increased by about 28 percent -- from an estimated $6.80 in 1965 to about $8.70 in 1966. The major determinants of this decrease in cost effectiveness have been the far greater proportion of attack sorties accounted for by armed reconnaissance strikes (as opposed to initial strikes on fixed targets) and the geographic concentration of the air effort against logistic targets in the southern areas of North Vietnam, principally Military Region IV.

By the end of 1965, a growing scarcity of fruitful fixed targets outside of sanctuary areas, as well as other operational restrictions virtually forced a continually increasing emphasis on armed reconnaissance. This trend was temporarily interrupted by the strikes against major petroleum storage installations, which began late in June 1966. Strike sorties against JCS fixed-target systems dropped from more than 30 percent of

* This memorandum was produced by CIA. Aside from the normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, this memorandum has not been coordinated outside CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Research and Reports and was coordinated with the Office of National Estimates, the Office of Current Intelligence, and the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs; the estimates and conclusions represent the best judgment of the Directorate of Intelligence as of 3 November 1966.

the total sorties flown in 1965 to less than 3 percent in 1966. Armed reconnaissance sorties increased by over 230 percent, from about 17,300 sorties in 1965 to 57,300 in 1966. Almost two-thirds of these -- 37,000 sorties -- were directed at the southernmost areas of North Vietnam, the Panhandle section south of Vinh.

The air campaign over Laos shows similar emphasis on the attempted interdiction of the infiltration network into South Vietnam. Attack sorties flown under the Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger programs increased from 11,000 sorties in 1965 to about 38,000 during the first nine months of 1966. Ninety-five percent of the attack sorties flown in Laos in 1966 were on armed reconnaissance missions.

The major measurable effects on North Vietnam of Rolling Thunder attacks are:

(1) About 20 percent, or 70,000, of the total military forces are engaged directly in defensive programs and countermeasures against the Rolling Thunder program. About 220,000 full-time and 100,000 part-time workers have been diverted to repair, reconstruction, and dispersal programs in North Vietnam and Laos. In 1965 and 1966, from 25,000 to 35,000 persons are tentatively estimated to have been casualties of air attacks in the North.

(2) Physical damage to economic and military targets has also increased. This damage amounted to $65 million in 1965 and an additional $95 million in the first nine months of 1966. Of the latter total, over 70 percent represented damage to economic targets.

Despite the increased weight of air attack, North Vietnam continues to increase its support to the insurgency in South Vietnam. The Rolling Thunder program has not been able to prevent about a threefold increase in the level of personnel infiltration in 1966. The external logistic support needed to maintain the expanded VC/NVA force in South Vietnam has been adequate. In particular, despite the neutralization of the major petroleum storage facilities in the North, petroleum supplies have continued to be imported in needed amounts.

Taking a broader view, during the course of the Rolling Thunder program the North Vietnamese capability to support the war effort has improved.

(1) The capacity of the transportation system, at least as it affects the ability to handle the flow of men and military supplies to South Vietnam, has been increased.

(2) The sizable manpower drain has peaked, unless there is a sharp increase in estimated VC/NVA manpower losses in South Vietnam or a radical change in the nature of the air campaign against North Vietnam. In 1965 and 1966, North Vietnam had to mobilize 80 percent of its physically fit males as they reached draft age. Subject to the assumptions just delineated, this levy could be as low as 50 percent of the 1967 class.

(3) Aid from the USSR and Communist China received in 1965 and 1966 has amounted, in estimated value, to about five times the total damage caused by Rolling Thunder attacks.

The fact that a large share of the imports now flowing into North Vietnam is not military aid but machinery and equipment seems particularly significant. On the one hand, it reflects a willingness of the major Communist powers to provide additional equipment for war-related industrial facilities, probably encouraged by the fact that the modern industrial sector of the North Vietnamese economy has been largely off-limits to air attack. On the other hand, it suggests that adequate reserves of skilled manpower, electric generating capacity, and other essential inputs are available on a significant scale for conversion to a war-supporting role. While this new emphasis accelerates the ability to support military operations in the short run, it does postpone Hanoi's long-run plans for the development of heavy industry.

Nor has Rolling Thunder served visibly to reduce the determination of Hanoi to continue the war. We see no signs that the air attack has shaken the confidence of the regime, and with increased Soviet and Chinese aid to bolster its capabilities, North Vietnam in the short term, at least, will apparently take no positive step toward a negotiated settlement. In any event, it is estimated that Hanoi will continue to be insistent on a cessation of the bombings as a prerequisite for negotiations. Analysis of popular attitudes in North Vietnam indicates a continued firmness in support of the regime's policies. Although the long-term effects of the war may have some wearying effect on the population, there is no evidence

that it has yet reached a point sufficient to deter Hanoi's leaders from their present policies.

Finally, the course of the air campaign in 1966 has had no significant effect on the attitudes of third countries. From the resumption of the bombings in January 1966 to the escalation represented by the bombing of the petroleum storage facilities, third-country attitudes have been, predictably, relatively constant. The unyielding attitude of the North Vietnamese, particularly during the January bombing pause, has had a somewhat sobering impact on some third countries. Indeed, the escalation against POL storage facilities produced a reaction more restrained and less critical than had been anticipated. Among Communist third countries, the USSR and the Eastern European countries would prefer a negotiated settlement because they regard a continuation of the war as potentially dangerous to themselves and in any case as posing an awkward dilemma for them within the Communist world. The Chinese Communists, however, remain adamant in their attitudes toward the war and any steps leading toward a negotiated settlement.

Over and above the measurable effects discussed in the foregoing, the Rolling Thunder program has certain intangible aspects such as enemy morale and determination which are much more difficult to assess. The Rolling Thunder program has been the object of much neutralist criticism and the target of a concerted Communist diplomatic and propaganda campaign. In one sense, this must serve to stiffen Hanoi's back; at the same time, the program has become one way Hanoi probably measures US determination -- though the extent of US commitment on the ground conveys this determination far more persuasively. Moreover, the Rolling Thunder operation carries some threat of further escalation, and in this way may exert a certain worrisome pressure on Hanoi. On the other hand, if Rolling Thunder were to be terminated at this point without concessions, the United States would be deprived of one form of leverage against Hanoi which it now has.

I. The Rolling Thunder Attack in January-September 1966

A. Scale of Operations

During the first nine months of 1966, US/GVN forces flew nearly 59,500 attack sorties against North Vietnam.* Of this total, the United States flew 58,700 sorties and the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) the remaining 800. The combined effort represents an increase of approximately 130 percent over the nearly 26,000 attack sorties flown against North Vietnam in all of 1965. As shown in Table 1, the air attack on North Vietnam in 1966 represents a larger share of the total attack in Southeast Asia than it did in 1965. The number of attack sorties flown in South Vietnam, on the other hand, represents a smaller share of the total number of attack sorties in Southeast Asia in 1966 than it did in 1965.

Attack sorties specifically flown as initial strikes or restrikes on fixed targets from the target list of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have become very rare. In 1965, such sorties accounted for nearly 30 percent of all attack sorties flown against North Vietnam, and armed reconnaissance sorties accounted for approximately 70 percent. In 1966 the share of fixed target attack sorties not involving any armed reconnaissance had shrunk to 0.6 percent, with armed reconnaissance sorties accounting for 99.4 percent. This change was a continuation of a trend already under way in the latter months of 1965, when, in comparison with previous levels, fixed target sorties declined both absolutely and as a share of the total attack on North Vietnam. The decline undoubtedly reflects the diminishing number of new fixed targets available for attack, broadened authorization for armed reconnaissance, and, at least in part, a change in definitions used. Restrikes on JCS fixed targets were also carried out by armed reconnaissance sorties. Including these restrikes on armed reconnaissance, about 1,600 sorties, or somewhat less than 3 percent of the total number of attack sorties on North Vietnam, were directed against JCS targets.

B. Ordnance

During the first nine months of 1966, approximately 90,000 tons of ordnance were delivered on North Vietnam, or about 2.6 times the

* Attack sorties include: strike, flak suppression, armed reconnaissance, and air interdiction.

Table 1

Attack Sorties by US/GVN Forces in Southeast Asia
During 1965 and January-September 1966

Area	Force	1965 Number of Sorties	1965 Percent	January-September 1966 Number of Sorties	January-September 1966 Percent
North Vietnam		25,890	20	59,494	28
	US	25,276		58,696	
	VNAF	614		798	
South Vietnam		96,549	72	121,388	55
	US	73,412		97,299	
	VNAF	23,137		24,089	
Laos	US	10,819	8	38,291	17
All areas of operation		133,258	100	219,173	100
	US	109,507		194,286	
	VNAF	23,751		24,887	

tonnage delivered in 1965. The amounts delivered on North Vietnam during the early months of the year were much smaller than in the later months. The total for the three-month period January-March was only 12,795 tons, whereas 16,342 tons were delivered in July and 17,333 tons in August. The amount delivered in August was equal to approximately 50 percent of the total delivered on North Vietnam in 1965.

The total ordnance tonnage delivered by air in Southeast Asia, however, has remained fairly constant throughout the year. It was a little over 38,000 tons in January and had increased to over 44,000 by August. As indicated in Table 2, during the early months of the year, when the tonnage delivered on North Vietnam was small, the tonnage delivered on Laos was relatively large. In the spring and summer the tonnages delivered on Laos decreased as the tonnages delivered on North Vietnam increased. Deliveries on targets in South Vietnam have remained relatively constant.

Table 2

Ordnance Delivered by Air in Southeast Asia
January-August 1966

Tons

Month	Country			Total
	North Vietnam	Laos	South Vietnam	
January	273	13,918	23,869	38,060
February	4,780	10,878	21,783	37,441
March	7,742	8,983	24,093	40,818
April	9,037	9,287	18,921	37,245
May	7,556	7,126	18,080	32,762
June	10,963	4,519	19,025	34,507
July	16,342	2,358	23,182	41,882
August	17,333	1,435	25,590	44,358
Total	74,026	58,504	174,543	307,073

During the first nine months of 1966 the average ordnance load per attack sortie against North Vietnam was a little more than 1.5 tons per sortie -- a slight increase over the 1.4 tons per sortie averaged in 1965. In July 1966 the average load was 1.9 tons, approximately the same as the average load per bomber sortie flown by US Air Forces against Germany in World War II. In August 1966 the average load per attack sortie flown against North Vietnam was 1.6 tons.

C. Aircraft Losses

A total of 228 planes, including support as well as attack aircraft, were lost during the nine-month period January-September 1966. All were US aircraft. The ratio of total losses to attack sorties was about 0.38 percent in 1966, compared with a ratio of approximately 0.65 percent in 1965. This is equal to an average loss of a little more than 3.8 aircraft per 1,000 attack sorties in 1966, compared with a loss of 6.5 aircraft per 1,000 attack sorties in 1965. Losses, by model, of fixed-wing aircraft in 1965 and 1966 are compared in Table 3. Losses as a percent of total sorties flown by models of aircraft most used either remained the same or declined.

Table 3

Losses by Model of Fixed-Wing Aircraft
During 1965 and January-September 1966

Aircraft Model	Losses in March-December 1965		Losses in January-September 1966	
	Number	As Percent of Sorties Flown	Number	As Percent of Sorties Flown
F-105	54	0.6	96	0.6
A-4	29	0.3	35	0.2
F-4	19	0.3	25	0.1
A-1	26	0.7	17	0.1
F-8	15	0.4	12	0.4
RF-101	6	2.1	11	0.5
A-6	3	0.6	7	0.6
RF-8	6	1.7	6	1.4
F-104	0	0	5	0.3
[illegible]-4	0	0	4	0.2
F-100	5	1.2	1	0.3
[illegible]	0	0	1	0.9
RA-[illegible]	3	2.3	1	0.1
C-130	0	0	1	0.2
RB-66	0	0	1	Insig.
EB-66	0	0	1	Insig.
RC-130	0	0	1	4.0
EF-10	0	0	1	0.1
RC-47	0	0	1	11.1
EA-1	1	0.1	0	0
B-57	1	0.7	1	0.2
[illegible]	3			
Total	168		228	

D. Cost Effectiveness of Operations Against North Vietnam in 1966

The value of the aircraft lost on sorties against North Vietnam in 1966 may be estimated at about $480 million, on the basis of average costs for production models of the types of aircraft lost. A preliminary estimate of the sortie overhead costs for the attack sorties and for the accompanying support sorties is about $200 million. If the ordnance mix in 1966 was about the same as in 1965, the cost of the ordnance delivered by sorties against North Vietnam in 1966 may have been in the

neighborhood of $150 million. On this basis, the direct operating cost (excluding manpower losses) of the aerial attack on North Vietnam during the first nine months of 1966 may be estimated at about $830 million, as follows:

	Million US $
Aircraft losses	480
Sortie overhead costs	200
Ordnance costs	150
Total	830

A preliminary estimate of the damage done to North Vietnam by the aerial attack is about $95 million. Thus the cost of one dollar's worth of damage to the DRV may be estimated at roughly $8.70. This is an increase of about 28 percent above the estimated cost of $6.80 per dollar's worth of damage in 1965. The increase in cost per unit of damage has been caused by loss of planes of more expensive models, by the increased sortie overhead costs resulting from flying a larger number of sorties, and by the fact that many of the most attractive targets were destroyed in 1965.

II. Target Systems Attacked in January-September 1966

A. Fixed Targets

1. General

The Rolling Thunder attacks during January-September 1966 continued trends that were well defined by the last quarter of 1965. The growing scarcity of fruitful fixed targets which were eligible for attack by the criteria of Rolling Thunder forced a continually increasing emphasis on armed reconnaissance missions and a consequent decline in the number of fixed target strikes. Although 125 fixed targets were struck in 1965, most of the 1966 counterpart effort was in restrikes of these targets. Only 25 new fixed targets were struck in the first nine months of 1966 (see Table 4). Attack sorties flown against JCS fixed target systems dropped dramatically in 1966, compared with 1965. In 1965, about 30 percent of total attack sorties were flown specifically as fixed-target sorties. In 1966, including both fixed-target sorties and restrikes of fixed targets on armed reconnaissance sorties, only somewhat less than 3 percent of total attack sorties were directed against JCS fixed targets. (See Table 5.) Nevertheless, the effectiveness of fixed-target strike attacks, measured in terms of damage costs, more than doubled. Damage directly attributable to airstrikes on fixed targets rose from $5,000 per sortie in 1965 to $11,000 per sortie in 1966. The principal cause of this rise undoubtedly is the concentration of the attack effort on high cost target systems such as powerplants, bridges, and POL storage areas. Strikes on these three target systems accounted for over 60 percent of the fixed target program thus far in 1966, whereas they comprised only 24 percent of the effort in 1965. Other factors, such as the reduction in average strike size, may have contributed to the rise in fixed-target strike effectiveness, but it is apparent that target selection is the key element.

Strikes on military installations included in the JCS fixed-target system accounted for only 40 percent of the total fixed-target strike sorties in 1966. The major portion of this program consisted of restrikes on targets already hit in 1965, and, in general, these attacks produced damage of lower economic cost than those directed against industrial targets.

2. Electric Power Targets

Despite the destruction of about one-third of North Vietnam's electric power industry by US airstrikes, the loss is not yet large enough to have an important impact on the economy. The effectiveness of the strikes has been reduced by carrying out strikes against targets of small economic significance.

Table 4

Comparison of Rolling Thunder Strikes
on Major Fixed-Target Systems:
1965 and January-September 1966

JCS Fixed Target System	Number Targeted	Number of Targets Struck: Struck 1965	Restruck Jan-Sept 1966	New Strikes Jan-Sept 1966
Barracks/supply depots/ ammunition depots	106	64	46	11
POL storage	13	4	4	7
Powerplants	20	6	6	1
Manufacturing and explosives plants	1	1	0	0
Airfields	11	4	3	0
Bridges	61	44	42	6
Radar and communications installations	5	2	0	0
Total	217	125	101	25

US airstrikes against North Vietnamese powerplants have resulted in the neutralization of an estimated 59.000 kilowatts (kw), or 32 percent, of a total installed generating capacity of 187,000 kw. The total cost of damage inflicted is estimated to be $11.5 million. During 1965 there was a total of 21 strikes and restrikes against six Vietnamese powerplants. The cost of damage inflicted is estimated to be about $6.3 million, and the total capacity put out of service amounted to 47,000 kw, of which 24,000 kw was put back into service by March 1966. During 1966 there was a total of 12 strikes and [illegible]trikes against five powerplants. The cost of damage in 1966 is estimated to be about $5.2 million, and the amount of capacity neutralized was about 12,000 kw, plus another 24,000 kw of capacity destroyed that probably would have gone into service during 1966. The following tabulation presents details of the air strikes during 1966:

Powerplant	Date of Air Strikes	Estimated Cost of Damage (Million US $)	Capacity Out of Service
Uong Bi (JCS 82)	18 Apr 66	Negl.	24,000 kw. Put back in service July 1966.
	28 Apr 66	Negl.	No known additional damage.
	11 Aug 66	4.4	24,000 kw put back in service was again neutralized; 24,000 kw being installed was also neutralized.
	14 Aug 66	Negl.	
	17 Aug 66	Negl.	
Thai Nguyen (JCS 82.16)	Between 6-8 Jul 66	0.8	12,000 kw out of 24,000 kw put out of service.
Viet Tri (JCS 82.17)	Prior to 19 Jul 66	Negl.	Probably not out of service more than a few days.
Thanh Hoa (JCS 82.1)	22 Sep 66	N.A.	Restoration under way but estimated not to have operated since summer 1965.
	23 Sep 66	N.A.	
	23 Sep 66	N.A.	
Ben Thuy (JCS 82.11)	23 Oct 66	N.A.	Restoration under way but estimated not to have operated since summer 1965.
	26 Oct 66	N.A.	

During 1966, most of the strikes (7 out of 12) took place in the northern part of the country, while the majority of the strikes (17 out of 21) during 1965 occurred in the south. Two single strikes against the Thai Nguyen and Viet Tri powerplants and five restrikes against the Uong Bi powerplant all were in the north. The remaining missions were accounted for by five restrikes against the Ben Thuy and Thanh Hoa powerplants in the south, both of which were initially put out of operation in the summer of 1965.

The 11 August 1966 strike against the Uong Bi powerplant rates as the most effective single strike against a North Vietnamese powerplant, severely damaging and putting out of service 24,000 kw that had been in service and another 24,000 kw that was almost ready for operation. Total cost of damage resulting from this strike alone was about $4.4 million. Loss of the plant denies North Vietnam the use of its largest and most efficient powerplant for at least one year.

Table 5

Comparison of Rolling Thunder Strike Sorties
on Major Fixed-Target Systems:
1965 and January-September 1966

Ordnance in Tons

JCS Fixed-Target System	1965	Jan-Sept 1966	Total
Barracks/supply depots/ ammunition depots			
Sorties	4,291	272	4,563
Ordnance	7,299	337	7,636
POL storage			
Sorties	128	400	528
Ordnance	120	480	600
Powerplants			
Sorties	229	50	279
Ordnance	370	47	417
Manufacturing and explosives plants			
Sorties	28	N.A.	28
Ordnance	90	N.A.	90
Airfields			
Sorties	421	91	512
Ordnance	330	85	415
Bridges			
Sorties	1,713	565	2,278
Ordnance	3,198	856	4,054
Radar and communications installations			
Sorties	15	N.A.	15
Ordnance	20	N.A.	20
Naval bases, railroad yards, and ports			
Sorties	1,875	222	2,097
Ordnance	1,373	327	1,700
Total			
Sorties	8,700	1,600	10,300
Ordnance	12,800	2,132	14,932

Airstrikes against powerplants during 1966 generally appear to be more effective than in 1965. In terms of capacity put out of operation, each strike averaged some 2,240 kw in 1965 compared with only 1,000 kw in 1966. In value terms, the cost of damage averaged about $300,000 for each strike in 1965 and $430,000 in 1966. However, if the strikes for both years are weighed in terms of long-range effectiveness, the above comparisons are misleading. Accounting of the damage to the Uong Bi powerplant makes a significant difference. If all the capacity put out of operation at Uong Bi is counted in 1966, including the amount being installed which was destroyed, then average capacity put out of operation per strike in 1965 amounts to 1,095 kw, as against 5,000 kw per strike in 1966. The comparison in value terms would not change.

3. Petroleum Storage Targets

US airstrikes against JCS-designated petroleum storage target systems have destroyed almost 80 percent of the pre-strike capacity of 129,110 tons. Almost three-fourths of this destruction was achieved during 1966 when 59 air strikes were flown against petroleum storage targets, compared with only 9 strikes in 1965. The following tabulation summarizes the air campaign against petroleum storage targets during 1965:

JCS	Name	Capacity 1965 Beginning	Capacity 1965 End	Number of Strikes
42	Phu Van	840	0	1
50	Vinh	8,000	1,180	5
51.12	Nam Dinh	11,020	0	2
51.16	Phu Qui	7,560	0	1
Total		27,420	1,180	9

Destruction of JCS petroleum storage targets during the first nine months of 1966 was as follows:

JCS	Name	Capacity a/ 28 June	Capacity a/ 25 October	Number of Strikes
42	Phu Van b/	0	0	0
48	Haiphong	40,620	4,330	3
49	Hanoi	30,620	0	1
50	Vinh	1,180	1,180	12
51	Nguyen Khe	7,500	6,680	10
51.1	Ha Gia (Phuc Yen) b/	9,910	9,910	0
51.11	Bac Giang	2,260	1,560	4
51.12	Nam Dinh b/	0	0	0
51.13	Do Son	2,860	1,430	14
51.14	Viet Tri	1,400	40	8
51.16	Phu Qui b/	0	0	0
51.17	Duong Nham	4,130	0	7
51.18	Can Thon (Kep) b/	1,210	1,210	0
Total		101,690	26,340	59

a. Tons of average petroleum.
b. Not struck to date in 1966.

The effects of neutralizing most of the major petroleum storage facilities have been largely offset by the development of an elaborate system of resupply and dispersed storage sites. The North Vietnamese have been able to maintain petroleum imports at almost normal levels by a combination of movement of petroleum overland from China, the lightering of 10,000-ton Soviet tankers, and, more recently, the use of small 4,000-ton Soviet tankers delivering petroleum from the Soviet Far East.

Difficulties in distributing petroleum internally have been noted, but they do not appear to be sufficient to cause other than highly local transportation difficulties or to interfere with the logistic resupply of the Communist forces in South Vietnam.

4. Lines of Communications

a. North Vietnam

The rail lines, highways, and waterways of North Vietnam were hit continually from January through September 1966, with emphasis primarily on the same areas that were struck in 1965. Of the 355 bridges confirmed by aerial photography to have been struck since the start of bombing, about 140 were targets struck for the first time in 1966. All lines of communications (LOC's) were hit with greater intensity during 1966, but the only new LOC's taken under attack were the roads developed as alternates to routes bombed in 1965.

Airstrikes against JCS-targeted bridges, like strikes against all bridges in North Vietnam, have been concentrated in the southern part of the country. The number of strikes against highway bridges on the JCS target list decreased during 1966, whereas strikes against JCS bridges on the rail lines increased as shown in Table 6.

(1) Railroads

In spite of the increase in airstrikes against the rail lines in 1966, there has been no significant increase in the total length of time the rail lines have been interdicted for through rail service during the year as shown in Table 7. Aerial photography confirmed that a total of 82 railroad and combination rail/highway bridges were damaged or destroyed on all rail lines in North Vietnam since the start of the bombing. This figure represents 28 percent of all rail bridges in the country, half of which were destroyed or damaged from January through September 1966. Table 8 shows a comparison of data by individual line. The Hanoi - Dong Dang and Hanoi - Haiphong lines, the two most important lines for the movement of both imports and domestic goods, have been interdicted for a total of only about two months and one month, respectively, during 1966. The average volume of traffic moved on these two lines could easily have been equal to that moved in 1965 because the lines are normally used below maximum capacity, thus traffic backlogged during periods of interdiction could have been moved while the lines were open. Two additional

bridges were struck on the Dong Dang line during 1966 bringing the total on this line to four bridges, all located approximately midway between Hanoi and the China border. No additional bridges were struck on the Haiphong line.

Table 6

North Vietnam: Airstrikes Against JCS Targeted Bridges
1965 and January-September 1966

Type and Location	Number of JCS Targeted Bridges Struck		Number of Strikes [a]	
	1965	Jan-Sep 1966 [b]	1965	Jan-Sep 1966
Railroad and railroad/ highway	16	16	67	96
Hanoi - Dong Dang line	3	3	6	14
Hanoi - Lao Cai line	1	2	7	9
Hanoi - Haiphong line	2	1	5	5
Hanoi - south [c]	10	10	49	68
Highway	31	16	77	37
21° to 23°	12	7	28	12
19° to 21°	3	1	5	1
17° to 19°	16	8	44	24
Total	47	32	144	133

a. Including restrikes against JCS bridges.
b. Including JCS bridges initially struck in 1965.
c. Including the Hanoi-Vinh line and the makeshift line south of Vinh.

Table 7

North Vietnam:
Estimated Total Length of Time Railroad Lines were Interdicted
for Through Rail Service
1965 and January-September 1966

Railroad Line	1965	Jan-Sep 1966
Hanoi - Dong Dang	1 month	2 months
Hanoi - Haiphong	1 week	1 month
Hanoi - Lao Cai	5 months	5 months
Hanoi - Vinh	9 months	8 months
Hanoi - Thai Nguyen	Negl.	Negl.

Table 8

Railroad Bridges Destroyed or Damaged, by Line
1965 Through 30 September 1966

Railroad Line	Total Bridges on Line	Percent Destroyed/Damaged in 1965	Percent Destroyed/Damaged in 1965 and 1966 Through Sep 30
Hanoi - Lao Cai	139	8	12
Hanoi - Dong Dang	53	4	8
Hanoi - Haiphong	10	20	20
Hanoi - Dong Hoi	85	32	69
Hanoi - Thai Nguyen	7	0	14
Total	294		
Average		14	28

The Hanoi - Lao Cai line has been interdicted for through service for almost 60 percent of 1966, compared with about 40 percent of 1965. The Hanoi - Vinh line has been disrupted for through rail service almost continually since it was first struck in April 1965, except during the cessation of bombing in January 1966. Four of the major bridges destroyed on this line during 1965 have bypass bridges in place and shuttling operations under way. At least 32 additional railroad and combination bridges have been struck on this line in 1966.

(2) Highways

The most significant hindrance to highway traffic has resulted from strikes against routes in the southern part of North Vietnam. Strikes against the central and northern parts of the country have resulted in only minor disruptions of truck service. Route 1A, running along the coast to the DMZ, has been subjected to the most bombing, but apparently also continues to be the most heavily used road in the south. Other north-south routes, such as routes 15 and 101, have been used primarily as supplements or as alternates when portions of route 1A were interdicted. Aerial photography has confirmed the destruction or damage of about 100 additional highway bridges, primarily in the south, in 1966, for a total of 273 highway bridges struck since the start of the bombing. In addition, roadbeds have been cratered at chokepoints, and alternate routes have been bombed. The southernmost motorable road crossing into Laos west of Dong Hoi, completed in April, also has been heavily bombed. The significantly higher level of reported destruction and damage of trucks in the south during 1966, shown in Table 9, has added greatly to the problem of moving supplies south. In spite of these heavy losses, there have been no indications of serious shortages of supplies resulting from either the loss of trucks or of lowered road capacities.

(3) Waterways

The most significant change in the movement of supplies to the south thus far in 1966 has been the increased emphasis on the use of inland and coastal waterways. Airstrikes against the waterways followed the same pattern during 1966 as in 1965, with attacks primarily against watercraft, port areas, and other cargo-handling facilities. No significant damage to the water LOC's has resulted from the numerous strikes against the ports and transshipment facilities in southern North Vietnam. Dredging of waterways, an annual project for the North Vietnamese, probably increased during 1966 in the south. Airstrikes against watercraft probably have been more important in hindering water shipments than strikes against facilities. The number

of watercraft reported destroyed and damaged in 1966 increased nearly five-fold over 1965. The number of watercraft used in the southern area apparently has not decreased, however.

Table 9

Reported Losses of Transport Equipment Due to Bombing in North Vietnam a/
1965 and January-September 1966

	1965		Jan-Sep 1966	
	Destroyed	Damaged	Destroyed	Damaged
Vessels	460	750	2,700	4,350
Trucks b/	320	480	1,600	1,500
Railroad freight cars c/	230	590	1,060	870
Locomotives	6	6	10	13

a. These data are basically those from pilot reports but adjusted downward to eliminate some duplication. Data probably include some exaggeration.
b. Additional trucks were destroyed and damaged in Laos, resulting in effective losses of about 1,000 trucks from the inventory.
c. Including small makeshift railroad cars used on the line south of Hanoi. This type of car is not included in the inventory of mainline freight cars.

b. Laos

Air operations against lines of communications have been concentrated in the north-central and Panhandle areas of Communist-held Laos. The roads and river crossings in the Panhandle were hardest hit in 1966, with about 70 percent of the sorties flown in this region. Strikes have been carried out against bridges, fords, ferries, and choke-points. Some 38,000 sorties, primarily armed reconnaissance, were flown against LOC's and fixed targets located in the north central area and the Panhandle during the first nine months of 1966. Air attacks were heaviest during the dry season, when an average of about 1,300 sorties were flown per week. The level of sorties dropped to an average of about 150 per week during the rainy season, which started

in June. Pilots reported the following damage to LOC's in Laos for the period from 1 April through 30 September 1966:

Region	Bridges	Road Cuts	Fords and Ferries
North Central (Barrel Roll)	13	99	2
Panhandle (Steel Tiger/ Tiger Hound)	173	1,071	114

Aerial photography since January 1966 has confirmed that seven bridges in the north-central region and 57 bridges in the Panhandle, most of which are on fordable streams, were heavily damaged or destroyed. It is estimated that about 1,000 trucks have been destroyed on roads in the Panhandle since the start of bombing in southern Laos.

B. Targets of Opportunity (Armed Reconnaissance Missions)

A total of 57,300 armed reconnaissance sorties were flown in the first nine months of 1966, compared with 17,300 sorties in 1965. This increase of about 230 percent reflects not only the scarcity of authorized fixed targets but also the increasing concern with infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam. The latter concern is apparent in the fact that almost two-thirds of the armed reconnaissance sorties were directed against targets in the southernmost areas of North Vietnam, the Panhandle section south of Vinh.

The rise in damage effectiveness for armed reconnaissance sorties -- from $600 per sortie in 1965 to $900 per sortie in 1966 -- is principally attributable to the concentration of attack on transportation facilities south of Vinh and their systematic destruction. There are, however, two other factors that contribute to the rise in damage per sortie, neither of which is a truly sound comparable indicator of mission effectiveness. The first of these is the inclusion of damage inflicted on naval craft -- a figure unavailable and thus excluded from the assessment of strikes made in 1965. The second is represented by the downing of North Vietnamese interceptor aircraft by Rolling Thunder missions. The cost of these aircraft and the number downed is not related to the number of Rolling Thunder sorties flown, and the disproportionate rise in dollar replacement cost to North Vietnam should therefore be taken into account when measuring effectiveness of the Rolling Thunder program.

C. Laos Air Operations

Approximately 38,000 attack sorties were flown under the Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger programs against the north-central and Panhandle areas of Communist-held Laos during the first nine months of 1966. This air effort shows a marked increase over nearly 11,000 attack sorties flown in similar missions during 1965. Of the attack sorties flown over Laos during January-September of this year, 95 percent were on armed reconnaissance missions. About 70 percent of the attack missions struck targets of opportunity within the Steel Tiger area of operations; the other 30 percent performed similar tasks within the Barrel Roll area.

The intensity of the current air war over Laos is varied to meet fluctuations in weather and the level of enemy truck traffic and infiltration. During 1966, monthly attack sorties over Laos ranged from 8,000 in January (dry season) to 800 in August (wet season). Air-strikes were heavily directed against trucks, bridges, fords, ferries, and road choke-points. It is estimated that during 1966, air attacks in Laos have inflicted at least $5 million damage against the Communist forces. The bulk of this damage, primarily accounted for by truck and bridge destruction, was inflicted in the Steel Tiger area of operation.

III. The Effects of the Rolling Thunder Program in 1966

A. Physical Damage

Attack sorties flown by the Rolling Thunder program increased approximately 130 percent during the first nine months of 1966, compared with all of 1965, but the value of physical damage increased by only about 45 percent. A comparison of total measurable damage to economic and military target systems for 1965 and January-September 1966 is as follows:

	Million US $	
	1965	January-September 1966
Economic targets	34.8	67.2
Military targets	30.4	28.0
Total	65.2	95.2

Damage to military targets, which accounted for 47 percent of the total damage in 1965, accounted for less than 30 percent in 1966. By far the greatest share of damage to military targets was inflicted on aircraft and naval craft, which accounted for 90 percent of the total military damage in 1966. No estimates of damage to naval craft are available for 1965; damage to aircraft in that year accounted for only 10 percent of total damage to military targets.

The major changes in damages inflicted on economic target systems in 1966 as compared with 1965 were the sharp increases in the destruction or damage sustained by transport equipment and the indirect losses of exports and agricultural crops which are attributable to the bombings. Losses in transport equipment jumped from US $6 million in 1965 to $24.5 million in 1966. Indirect losses of agricultural crops and export earnings almost tripled -- from $9.2 million in 1965 to $25.4 million in 1966.

The air attack in 1966 shows some general correlation between the increase in attack sorties and the level of physical damage. Thus, the months of July, August, and September accounted for almost one-half -- 47 percent -- of the total damage sustained by

economic targets. During the same period the air attack accounted for almost 58 percent of the sorties flown to date in 1966. Military damage has remained at relatively low levels during 1966 except during the last four months, when increasing losses of aircraft and naval craft have been sustained. The cumulative effects, by economic sector, of the Rolling Thunder program are discussed in Part IV of this memorandum. The overall effect has been to inflict increasing damage to the transportation system and to cause extensive distribution problems, most notably in petroleum distribution. The airstrikes have continued to depress economic growth and to cause the abandonment of some plans for economic development. Nevertheless, essential economic activities continue; most transportation routes remain open. The level of damage has not been sufficient to cause any sector of the economy to collapse. Nor has popular support of the war been significantly diminished. Hanoi's support of its military activities in South Vietnam has been made more costly and burdensome but has not been reduced below the levels required to continue military operations at the levels maintained throughout most of 1966.

B. Casualties in 1966

All estimates of casualties from bombing North Vietnam are subject to an unknown and conceivably large margin of error because of the questionable validity of the assumptions and estimates used in the calculations. Information emanating from Hanoi is of little value in estimating casualties, with propaganda pronouncements continuing to be directed to the large but usually unspecified numbers of casualties inflicted from the bombing of schools and hospitals. The few numerical reports of civilian casualties produced by Hanoi have been notable for the relatively insignificant quantities shown. By all yardsticks of measurement, however, we conclude that casualties from US/GVN bombing attacks are not a major effect of the air war, in the sense that this number is probably relatively small. Our estimate of 16,000 to 21,000 casualties for the first nine months of 1966 is considered to be preliminary.

1. North Vietnamese Claims of Casualties

There have been no official North Vietnamese estimates of total casualties since September 1965, when Egyptian journalists were reportedly told that 40,000 North Vietnamese had already been killed and 35,000 wounded. This claim is unsupported and far too high. A letter in May 1966 from the Hanoi Red Cross to the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva specifically cited

only 239 civilian casualties inflicted since 31 January 1966, although implying many more. Despite the claims concerning school children, the Education Ministry admitted in October 1966 to the death of only 300 students and 30 teachers since the inception of the bombing in August 1964. Hanoi, of course, must balance the propaganda benefits of claiming heavy casualties against the adverse effect on popular morale.

2. Estimated Casualties from Strikes Against Fixed Targets

A recent comprehensive study of civilian casualties in 90 JCS-targeted areas, both urban and rural, carried out by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), based on photography and demographic statistics for the targeted areas, indicated that a minimum of some 500 civilian casualties were inflicted by some 525 strikes. The minimum estimate, equating to about one civilian casualty per strike, presumes adequate warning for the personnel in the targeted areas. If the personnel received no warning, casualties could be as high as ten times the minimum estimate, the DIA study concluded. For the purposes of our current estimate, the method derived from the Nam Dinh case study was used for urban areas. The conclusion of the Nam Dinh analysis was that casualties ranged from 1 per 12,000 of population to 1 per 18,000 of population. For rural areas a minimum ratio of 0.7 casualties per strike (and a maximum of 7.0 casualties per strike) was implied by the DIA study. For the purpose of estimating casualties against fixed targets in rural areas, the mean of 3.8 casualties per strike has been used in our current estimate.

The application of the Nam Dinh example to 1966 strikes against JCS targets in urban areas yields a total estimate of 200 civilian casualties. If it is assumed that the rural population near JCS fixed targets has less access to sophisticated air raid warning systems and that therefore casualties per average strike are more likely to be close to the 3.8 average between the minimum (0.7) and maximum (7.0) suggested by the DIA photographic study, total civilian casualties from the 218 airstrikes against fixed targets in rural areas in the first nine months of 1966 probably amounted to about 800. The combined nine month 1966 total estimate is that civilian casualties from attacks against JCS fixed targets in 1966 to date have not exceeded 1,000.

Military casualties in fixed target areas in the first nine months of 1966 are estimated to have been negligible.

3. Estimated Casualties from Armed Reconnaissance

The earlier analysis [redacted] in our first casualty study indicated that an average of 1.3 civilian casualties occurred per armed reconnaissance mission, each mission including an average of 5 aircraft. Each sortie thus produced an average of about 0.25 casualty. Comparative analysis of weapons effectiveness and civilian population density supplied by DIA for our first casualty study resulted in a ratio of 0.17 casualties per sortie. In January-September 1966 there were a total of some 57,000 armed reconnaissance attack sorties (excluding those against fixed targets), yielding an estimate of some 10,000 to 15,000 total civilian casualties from armed reconnaissance in the first nine months of 1966, compared with some 4,000 in 1965.

One casualty is normally assigned by DIA for each truck or watercraft damaged or destroyed and 0.01 casualty for each railroad car or locomotive damaged or destroyed. Since some 10,000 motor trucks and watercraft have been reported damaged or destroyed during the first nine months of 1966, casualties of 10,000 are indicated. It is estimated, however, that at least half of these vehicles are operated by civilians whose casualties as a consequence of armed reconnaissance have already been estimated above. The total derived from this method has therefore been reduced to 5,000 and is regarded to comprise only military personnel. Estimates for the first nine months of 1966 are as follows:

	Casualties
Civilian	
Attacks against fixed targets	1,000
Armed reconnaissance	10,000 to 15,000
Subtotal	11,000 to 16,000
Military	
Attacks against fixed targets	Negl.
Armed reconnaissance	5,000
Subtotal	5,000
Total (half killed, half wounded)	16,000 to 21,000

C. North Vietnamese Countermeasures

1. Repair and Reconstruction

The intense effort by the North Vietnamese to keep LOC's open and to maintain an acceptable level of output from its limited industrial capacity has improved their ability to counter the effects of US/GVN air strikes in 1966. Indeed, the capacity of the transport network has been increased by their efforts. Rapid repair and expansion of the road network together with the transfer of traffic from railroads to roads and waterways have been the major determinants of North Vietnamese success.

The roads in North Vietnam, primarily south of Hanoi, have been kept open almost continuously since the start of the bombing by the extensive use of bypasses to destroyed highway bridges and the construction of new alternative routes. Although the air attack in 1966 concentrated on neutralizing these new projects, the system of countermeasures inaugurated in 1965 has been successful in diminishing the effect of bombings. We estimate that 400 miles of short bypasses and an additional 300 miles of alternative routes were constructed in 1965, with the larger projects completed by September 1966. To complete this work, a system of workcamps was organized. The North Vietnamese used these work camps to anticipate airstrikes on LOC's by pre-positioning labor and materials for repairs to damaged bridges or cratered roads and railbeds. Speed and simplicity of repair have been the main features of the maintenance program which uses large amounts of highly mobile labor and local building materials to insure the required flexibility. Rather than repair highway bridges, the North Vietnamese have chosen to build multiple stream crossings such as fords, ferries, and culverts at any one point. The proliferation of stream crossings has greatly improved their ability to maintain through traffic.

Aerial photography in 1966 has revealed a new bridging technique based on the use of steel cables and removable bridge decking to further reduce vulnerability to air attack. Thirty-eight of these cable bridges have been seen on major routes in North Vietnam to date. Comparative day and night photography of one cable bridge showed that the bridge decking is in place at night for traffic and removed at dawn, leaving only the steel cables exposed to air attack. The North Vietnamese have also expended greater effort in 1966 in camouflaging existing bridges and building alternate dummy bridges with rope and netting.

Although rail traffic has been maintained almost continuously in 1966 on their main lines from China and Haiphong port to Hanoi, the North Vietnamese have not been able to repair rail bridges rapidly or provide as many multiple stream crossings as they have done on the highways. This has resulted in some lowering of capacity on rail lines relative to other means of transport. Comparisons of rates of repair reveal that the Dong Dang line from China and the line from Haiphong have been kept open more than the other lines. Chinese railway engineering units stationed on the Dong Dang line have apparently been instrumental in keeping this line open for a greater time. Bypass bridges have been built and original rail bridges repaired to operable condition. A new standard-gauge rail line which runs west from Kep to Thai Nguyen is almost complete, while an additional rail has been installed on the meter-gauge line northeast from Kep to the China border. This work provides the North Vietnamese with a standard-gauge line from China and avoids the need to transload goods at Dong Dang on the China border. Bypass railroad bridges have been seen under construction next to bridges in the suburbs of Hanoi and Haiphong which have not been bombed.

An analysis of North Vietnamese repair practices reveals that they have chosen to resort to temporary bridges and bypasses rather than attempt to provide more permanent replacement spans. The estimated cost for permanent replacement of all damaged bridges to date totals $16.2 million, up about $6 million since 1 January 1966. Since other types of bypasses were used more often to replace damaged highway bridges, the North Vietnamese have spent only $2.5 million to date to repair some bridges to operable condition and to provide bypasses to the remainder. This implies an actual North Vietnamese expenditure on repairs and bypasses amounting to only 14 percent of the cost of permanent repairs. In addition we estimate it would cost another $1.1 million to temporarily replace the present inventory of unrepaired bridges. The total labor input required to complete temporary repairs to all bridges to date is estimated to be 153,000 man-days. By comparison, it is estimated that the North Vietnamese have expended 62,000 man-days on bridge repairs to date, or only 40 percent of what all temporary repairs would require.

2. Civil Defense

The North Vietnamese civil defense system has been characterized by increased precautions to minimize casualties and damage during 1966. A new dispersal of the urban population was ordered this year, and shelter systems have been improved and multiplied.

a. Organization and Manpower

Controlled nationally by a Directorate in the Ministry of Defense, Vietnamese civil defense at the province and town level remains a civilian rather than military type of organization. Peoples "air defense work committees" are established in districts, towns, wards, enterprises, and on state farms. These committees are headed by Party or administrative officials, and their subordinate civil defense units are manned by local residents and employees. Steps have been taken to divide medical assets more equitably, undoubtedly because of urban evacuation and the air raids, which occur principally in areas outside Hanoi and Haiphong. In April 1966 the North Vietnamese claimed they had substantially increased the number of medical workers and dispersed medical installations to the countryside. Thus "92 percent of the villages now have medical stations."

Because civilian volunteers (perhaps 150,000) are used almost exclusively to perform civil defense duties and because each household is responsible for providing its own shelter, no severe manpower drain seems to have been imposed by civil defense work.

b. Protective Construction

Reliable observers and published statements agree that old shelters were refurbished and large numbers of new shelters prepared during 1966. Most progress was reported during the June-September period, and this was probably in compliance with a general order. Shelters of various types are quickly available in Hanoi, and many of the foxholes along the streets have been lined with sections of concrete sewer pipe. According to the North Vietnamese press, some 55,000 shelters were built in Haiphong during one ten-day period. In Vinh, it is claimed that every family has its own shelter, and that there are also 150 kilometers of communication trenches, 8,000 other shelter spaces, and special shelters for machines, documents, and state property. The Vinh Linh area claims 1,000 kilometers of trenches and tunnels, or nearly 15 meters per capita. Other provinces report in a similar manner -- thousands of shelters and many kilometers of trenches built.

Protective measures for industrial equipment are said to have been taken in Hanoi plants -- probably in the form of blast walls between machines, similar to those built in Japan during World War II.

c. Dispersal of Population and Industry

Although the precise degree of urban population dispersed and resettled outside cities is not known, about a 50-percent evacuation seems to have been accomplished. Efforts prior to 1966 may have resulted in about a one-third evacuation of Hanoi. There has been a tendency for evacuees to return to the city, and a letdown in civil defense interest in early 1966 may ha had a permissive effect in this regard. A new dispersal order reportedly was issued about 1 July. Recent newspaper accounts have stated that as much as 75 percent of Hanoi's population may now have been evacuated. However, difficulties in persuading people to relocate has been confirmed, and in August a city official told a newsman the city was about 50 percent evacuated but that the effort was continuing.

The population of Haiphong was partially dispersed, largely this year, after near-by bombings. According to French press reports, over half the people have left; schools are closed and "not an idle hand remains."

Some dispersal of industry is still reported. However, sample photography of plants has failed to bear out anything more than slightly decreased activity at bona fide industrial installations in Hanoi and Haiphong. It is probable that some small industry and shops have been moved out of urban areas. For example, a North Vietnamese newspaper stated on 1 September, "Over one hundred handicraft cooperatives in Haiphong have been carrying out the evacuation policy seriously." The North Vietnamese concede that the movement of many industries is not possible because of lack of electricity outside cities.

Dispersal, camouflage, and personnel shelters for construction workers are used to reduce damage at road camps. [redacted] forbade construction operations in one area until "adequate" air raid shelters were prepared at work sites. Special care was ordered taken to disperse materials and storehouses.

d. Other Civil Defense Measures

The North Vietnamese use camouflage, movement by night with reduced lighting, and dispersal to reduce transport vulnerability. Business, marketing, and the movement of people and goods is frequently restricted to evening and early morning hours.

The movement of goods offloaded at Haiphong takes place under the cover of darkness. At times, poor weather, hampering air operations, has been reported as a factor inducing some shops to keep open during daylight hours.

In addition to the general effort to resettle permanently residents not directly engaged in production or antiaircraft defense, a noticeable portion of the population of Hanoi disperses during the day and returns at night. Foreign observers have reported -- as recently as mid-October -- an appreciable increase at night and on weekends in the size of the capital's population. The daily exodus serves not only to reduce the concentration of people in daylight hours but also to provide manpower for industry and agriculture in outlying areas. The influx of people into the city at night has been attributed to a lack of accommodations in the nearby countryside as well as to the opportunity to shop and conduct business in the evening and early morning hours when markets are open.

e. Alerts

Most observers and letters agree that the North Vietnamese population usually takes shelter in a disciplined manner during air alerts, which are signaled by sirens, whistles, or other audible means. This, of course, means a disruption of industrial and transport operation, and some personal hardship in areas frequently approached or overflown by aircraft. While such lost production and hardships are not readily measurable, they seem cumulative in effect and may have particular consequences in some critical areas, such as ports.

For example, we have several reports from Haiphong with observations occurring at some time during each month from April to October 1966. [redacted] all agreed that dock work ceased completely during air alerts when workers took shelter. [redacted] the alerts "greatly disrupted" dock work and [redacted] one ship was damaged while docking during an alert.

It thus appears that a population disciplined in taking shelter may be vulnerable in the production sense to frequent harassing overflights or to approaches of aircraft toward transportation and industrial centers.

D. North Vietnamese Political Reactions

After enduring 18 months of air attack, the North Vietnamese appear as determined as ever to continue the war. There has been no indication that the bombing program has shaken the confidence of the Hanoi leadership in their ultimate victory. Communist leaders who have talked with the North Vietnamese recently have been greatly impressed with their firmness. A Polish government official recently told a US newsman that Ho Chi Minh's first words to any Communist visitor are always, "We are winning."

There is no sign that any faction of the North Vietnamese leadership is out of step with Ho on the advisability of continuing the conflict, even though the airstrikes have caused the postponement of some of Hanoi's long-cherished program of heavy industry development. At the 12th Central Committee Plenum held some time in 1965, according to a captured document, a decision was made to put the program for the development of heavy industry on the shelf for the duration. Since that time the leadership has appeared to be in complete agreement that the war is the number-one order of business.

One effect of the Rolling Thunder program has been to reinforce certain North Vietnamese attitudes which existed prior to the airstrikes. For example, Hanoi has long been anxious to secure the closest possible Sino-Soviet cooperation in support of the Vietnam war. This has been one reason for the neutral position taken by the North Vietnamese in the Sino-Soviet dispute and for Hanoi's opposition to open hostility between the two powers.

The Rolling Thunder program has also resulted in Hanoi's increased emphasis on the necessity of a halt in US air attacks before there can be a negotiated settlement of the war. The current North Vietnamese position is that the United States must not expect or demand any quid pro quo in return for a cessation of the bombings.

The available evidence indicates that the people of North Vietnam still firmly support the policies of the Hanoi government. The regime has managed to maintain the swell of patriotism which was engendered by the first US airstrikes and has capitalized on a spirit of national resistance against the "US aggressors" to spur the people on to greater sacrifices on behalf of the war in South Vietnam.

Evidence on the feelings of the North Vietnamese toward the war in the south prior to February 1965 was scanty. The available information suggested that the northerners were interested in seeing the insurgents win, but that they did not relish the prospect of having to risk their own economic standing, let alone their lives, on behalf of the southern struggle. Since the bombings of North Vietnam began, however, there appears to be more enthusiasm for supporting the war in the south.

[redacted] A slight drop was noted from 55 percent in 1965 to 48 percent in 1966 in [redacted] expressing active support for the government. This decline may reflect some wearying effect caused by the cumulative impact of the bombing. There are at present, however, no discernible political pressures from within North Vietnam sufficient to cause the Hanoi leaders to alter their decision to continue the war effort.

E. Soviet and Chinese Communist Assistance

1. Military Aid

During the first half of 1966, Soviet and Chinese military aid deliveries to Hanoi are believed to have been at an annual rate slightly above the 1965 level of $250 million (see Tables 10 and 11). These data include the Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM) program, the bulk of which (20 of 24 firing battalions) was provided during 1965. Non-SAM-related assistance in 1966 (estimated at $218 million) is about 50 percent higher than the total non-SAM military aid in 1965 ($144 million).

The USSR accounted for 80 to 85 percent of the military assistance provided by the two major Communist countries, USSR and Communist China, during 1965 and the first half of 1966. Thirty-six MIG's (11 of which were MIG 21's) and nearly 1,200 antiaircraft guns were delivered by the USSR in 1965 and 24 MIG's and about 425 guns during the first half of 1966. In addition, as many as 1,500 Soviet military technicians may have been engaged in training North Vietnamese military personnel in the use of SAM's and aircraft.

Chinese Communist military deliveries during 1966 have been at a rate nearly double those in 1965. Aid has consisted primarily of small arms, ammunition, and trucks. The Chinese also delivered eight MIG-15/17 fighters and about $5 million worth of radar equipment in 1965, as well as four small naval craft in the first half of 1966. In addition to the delivery of military equipment, there are between 25,000 and 45,000 Chinese logistic support troops in North Vietnam working on the construction and repair of transportation facilities. An unknown number of Chinese military personnel also are employed in training North Vietnamese to operate and maintain equipment provided by the Chinese.

2. Economic Aid

All developments foreshadow substantially increased aid to Hanoi from other Communist countries in late 1966 and 1967, a trend already confirmed by the volume and composition of North Vietnamese imports in 1966 to date. The frequent signings of aid pacts and the stress in the announcements on the support for the war effort indicate a growing emphasis on materials and services needed to continue the war. [redacted] the recent Warsaw Pact meeting stated that the Pact countries had signed pledges of $1 billion in goods and cash to support Hanoi in the war effort. The Soviet Union would supply $800 million of this aid.

It is estimated that deliveries of economic aid in 1965 were $150 million, two to three times the average annual level in 1955-64. This sharp rise has been continued in 1966, and, as in 1965, the USSR is the major contributor. In the last nine months, deliveries of economic aid totaled about $200 million, and an unusually large number of new Soviet industrial aid contracts with North Vietnam were noticed [redacted] In June 1966, Soviet specialists were reported in North Vietnam to determine equipment needs for constructing new enterprises and rebuilding those destroyed by US air attacks.

After an apparent hiatus of two years, Communist economic assistance to Hanoi was revived in February 1965 when Premier Kosygin visited Hanoi. As the war expanded, numerous new extensions of economic aid were made in mid-1965, but these additions are believed to have been small. Since then, the tempo of aid agreement signings has increased sharply (see Tables 12 [redacted]

In 1966, Moscow reported an agreement in May to provide technical assistance, one in September for $2 million in "free

charge commodities" (possibly consumer goods and medicines), and one in October of additional grants for economic development and increased military aid. China announced additional aid for agriculture in July and a nonrefundable economic and technical agreement in August. In September and October 1966, North Korea and all the Eastern European Communist countries except Yugoslavia signed new aid agreements with North Vietnam. In addition, gifts of money and medicines from workers and other organizations in Communist countries have been announced at a value of $5 million to $10 million.

Table 10

Soviet and Chinese Military Equipment Delivered to North Vietnam
1965

	Total		USSR		Communist China	
	Quantity (Units)	Value (Million US $)	Quantity (Units)	Value (Million US $)	Quantity (Units)	Value (Million US $)
Total		250.0		217.2		32.8
Surface-to-air missile firing battalions	20	106.0	20	106.0	0	0
Aircraft	56	16.1	48	15.1	8	1.0
Il-28 light jet bomber	8	2.8	8	2.8	0	0
MIG-21 jet fighter	11	8.8	11	8.8	0	0
MIG-15/17 jet fighter	33	4.2	25	3.2	8	1.0
Mi-6 helicopter	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mi-1 helicopter	4	0.3	4	0.3	0	0
Other aircraft	0	0	0	0	0	0
Naval craft	0	0	0	0	0	0
Armor	20	0.5	20	0.5	0	0
PT-76 amphibious tank	5	0.3	5	0.3	0	0
BTR-40 armed personnel carrier	10	0.1	10	0.1	0	0
SU-76 assault gun	5	0.1	5	0.1	0	0
Artillery	1,184	30.1	1,184	30.1	0	0
100-mm AAA	64	3.2	64	3.2	0	0
85-mm AAA	250	10.0	250	10.0	0	0
57-mm AAA	350	12.2	350	12.2	0	0
37-mm AAA	500	4.5	500	4.5	0	0
Other artillery	20	0.2	20	0.2	0	0

TOP SECRET TRINE

TOP SECRET TRINE

Table 10

Soviet and Chinese Military Equipment Delivered to North Vietnam
1965
(Continued)

	Total		USSR		Communist China	
	Quantity (Units)	Value (Million US $)	Quantity (Units)	Value (Million US $)	Quantity (Units)	Value (Million US $)
Radar	81	12.7	41	7.8	40	4.9
Trucks and vehicles	2,000	10.0	1,000	5.0	1,000	5.0
Small arms and infantry weapons	0	13.2	0	6.6	0	6.6
Ammunition	0	61.4	0	46.1	0	15.3

TOP SECRET TRINE

TOP SECRET TRINE

Table 11

Soviet and Chinese Military Equipment Delivered to North Vietnam
January-June 1966

	Total		USSR		Communist China	
	Quantity (Units)	Value (Million US $)	Quantity (Units)	Value (Million US $)	Quantity (Units)	Value (Million US $)
Total		130.0		101.4		28.6
Surface-to-air missile battalions	4	21.2	4	21.2	0	0
Aircraft	40	31.3	40	31.3	0	0
Il-28 light jet bomber	0	0	0	0	0	0
MIG-21 jet fighter	14	11.2	14	11.2	0	0
MIG-15/17 jet fighter	10	1.3	10	1.3	0	0
Mi-6 helicopter	6	12.0	6	12.0	0	0
Mi-1 helicopter	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other aircraft	10	6.8	10	6.8	0	0
Naval craft	4	3.6	0	0	4	3.6
Shanghai-class PTF	4	3.6	0	0	4	3.6
Armor	20	0.5	20	0.5	0	0
PT-76 amphibious tank	5	0.3	5	0.3	0	0
BTR-40 armored personnel carrier	10	0.1	10	0.1	0	0
SU-76 assault gun	5	0.1	5	0.1	0	0
Artillery	457	7.8	457	7.8	0	0
100-mm AAA	0	0	0	0	0	0
85-mm AAA	75	3.0	75	3.0	0	0
57-mm AAA	50	1.8	50	1.8	0	0

TOP SECRET TRINE

TOP SECRET TRINE

Table 11

Soviet and Chinese Military Equipment Delivered to North Vietnam
January-June 1966
(Continued)

	Total		USSR		Communist China	
	Quantity (Units)	Value (Million US $)	Quantity (Units)	Value (Million US $)	Quantity (Units)	Value (Million US $)
Artillery (Continued)						
37-mm AAA	300	2.7	300	2.7	0	0
Other artillery	32	0.3	32	0.3	0	0
Radar	0	0	0	0	0	0
Trucks and vehicles	1,000	5.0	500	2.5	500	2.5
Small arms and infantry weapons	0	29.6	0	14.8	0	14.8
Ammunition		31.0		23.3		7.7

TOP SECRET TRINE

Table 12

Communist Economic Aid Extended to North Vietnam a/
1955-64

Million US $

	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963-64	1955-64
Communist China	200	b/	b/	b/	100	b/	157	b/	b/	457
USSR	100	8	12	21	25	200	4	N.A.	b/	369
Eastern Europe	50	8	7	b/	2	Negl.	62	b/	b/	130
Total	350	16	19	21	128	200	223	N.A.	b/	956

a. This is the minimum of economic aid extended by the USSR, Eastern Europe, and Communist China. In addition, insignificant amounts of aid have been extended by Albania, Mongolia, and North Korea. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
b. No extensions are known to exist, although some may have taken place.

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





IV. General Assessment of the Rolling Thunder Program

A. Agriculture

During the past 18 months the production of paddy rice in North Vietnam -- the main agricultural crop in that country -- was about 200,000 tons below the average. While this is only 3 percent below the average for the 18-month period, all of this shortfall occurred during the past six months. Such a shortfall amounts to about $17 million worth of rice on the international market. In addition, the production of subsidiary crops -- manioc, sweet potatoes, corn, and green beans -- was probably below normal during the 1965/66 winter/spring season. There is insufficient information, however, on which to estimate the shortfall of these crops, which are important food substitutes for the preferred rice.

It is difficult to determine the extent to which the bombing attacks contributed to the shortfall of agricultural production. Undoubtedly, poor weather in the last half of 1965 and in the first half of 1966 contributed to the poor performance of agriculture. Although there is little evidence that air attacks directly damaged significant amounts of agricultural crops, the indirect disruptive effects of the bombing on agricultural production were considerable. Agriculture in North Vietnam has usually experienced difficulties -- partly because of the chronically undependable weather and partly as a result of management problems associated with the socialization of agriculture into agricultural cooperatives. The war has brought such additional problems as manpower shortages -- particularly skilled manpower -- disruption of normal farming and fishing schedules, and the interruption of electrically powered irrigation systems and the production and distribution of chemical fertilizers. The North Vietnamese have attempted to lessen the disruptive effects of the bombing attacks by importing increased amounts of chemical fertilizers and substantial numbers of diesel generators to power the irrigation systems. These measures have not been completely successful.

The agricultural shortfall, the disruptive effects of the bombing attacks on the transportation of food to deficit areas, and the increased requirements for the war have contributed to food shortages -- particularly in rural areas. However, food supplies in the larger cities such as Hanoi have been maintained at adequate levels, and there have been no indications of critical shortages anywhere. The continuation of the bombing attacks will continue to exacerbate the tight food situation in North Vietnam. However, the self-sufficient nature of the agricultural economy and the availability of food imports -- particularly from Communist China -- suggest that food supplies are not likely to become critical.

B. Industry

The North Vietnamese industrial sector has not been drastically altered since the start of the Rolling Thunder program in 1965. Some changes have been made in plant production and industrial development because of the war situation, but the regime seems to have been successful in keeping the disruption to a minimum.

The decision to postpone the beginning of the second five-year plan (1966-70) and the substitution of the two-year plan (1966-67) were the result of war pressures on the North Vietnamese economy including the step-up in US bombing. An examination of regime statements since early 1965 on its economic plans suggests that the regime has increased the tempo of some of the programs already begun under the first five-year plan -- dispersal of industry, enlargement and mechanization of agricultural cooperatives, and evacuation of civilians to rural areas. In addition, the decision was taken to postpone heavy industry expansion, with the exception of the machine building and electric powerplants, and to shift emphasis to the increased development of light and local industry. On the surface the decision to postpone heavy industrial expansion appears to have ominous economic overtones for the continued economic development of the country, but the regime has merely postponed part of its heavy industrial expansion; it has not abandoned it.

North Vietnam has published almost no aggregate industrial production data for 1965 and 1966; fragmentary information available indicates that present industrial production is at or above the 1964 level of industrial output. No data on heavy industrial production have been published, but in 1965 the central state-run light industry increased its output by 4.6 percent over 1964, while the output of local industry and handicraft increased by 7.7 percent in 1965. Despite these small increases in industrial output, the regime in August 1966 noted that the "US imperialists have created difficulties for the economy in general and light industry in particular." No information on 1966 output quotas for individual plants or industries is available, but nearly all the reports on individual plants in the popular press are consistent in claiming that the plants are producing at or above their 1965 level despite varying problems.

Evidence of the postponement of heavy industrial development is provided by the recent departure of the Soviet specialists working on the Thac Ba hydroelectric powerplant, which was nearly two years away from completion. No reason was given for their departure. After an examination of the scanty evidence available on industrial

expansion in 1965-66 and future plans for expansion, however, the abandonment of the Thac Ba project appears to be almost unique. In contrast, in June 1966, [redacted] Recent reports more strongly reinforce the thesis that the North Vietnamese have not entirely abandoned their program for heavy industrial expansion. During October, Hanoi sent representatives to Poland and Communist China to examine methods and techniques for installing rolled steel capacity and making other improvements in iron and steel production. These reports imply that the regime still intends to complete the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Plant -- North Vietnam's only iron and steel complex.

US bombing has created some difficulties in the North Vietnamese industrial sector. However, some of the problems such as poor management and administration in individual plants and the shortage of skilled labor existed before the bombing began. The bombing of the electric powerplants does not appear to have seriously affected industrial output. Power shortages have been observed, particularly in Hanoi, but the individual plants have been able to cope with the situation by using mobile generators and by increasing the number of shifts at the plants.

The step-up in the dispersal program, too, caused some difficulties. Many plants attempted to operate simultaneously at both the original location and at the dispersed site. Production was slowed down by this practice, and transportation and distribution costs increased. The smooth evacuation of the plant workers was difficult. Some workers were evacuated to the dispersed site but were still expected to work at the original site; some workers did not wish to be evacuated and morale problems were evident. The organization of the evacuation was poorly handled by the cadres and the trade union leaders responsible for the movement. There is no hard evidence that industrial production has been seriously slowed down by the dispersal program. Nevertheless, most of the dispersed plants are found in the local, light, and handicraft sectors of industry, which are major components of total industrial output; the dispersal program in these sectors has probably depressed total industrial production in the past year.

The first CIA report dealing with the bombing of North Vietnam released in March 1966, listed 15 major industrial plants, [redacted]

[redacted] A review of Hanoi press reports on these plants is helpful in assessing the effect of US bombing on the North Vietnamese industrial plants. The Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Complex is claimed to have lost about 1,000 cadre and workers to the war effort, but still claimed to have exceeded its planned goal. The Haiphong Cement Plant reportedly suffered from a shortage of coal, was harassed by the bombing, and at the end of 1965 was just meeting its planned production quota. The Nam Binh Textile Plant was dispersed but announced that it was installing new machinery in August 1966. The 8 March Textile Plant in Hanoi dispersed part of its operations and found that its transportation costs had increased. The Hanoi Rubber Products Plant lost workers but claimed to have increased its overall output with the production of automobile tires up by 50 percent in the first six months of 1966 as compared with the same period in 1965. The Viet Tri Paper Mill lost production time because of air raids, it was stated, but it improved the quality of its production. The Viet Tri Chemical Combine had a difficult year in 1965. Its machinery and equipment were old, part of it was dispersed, and it lost time because of air raids. Still, the plant claimed achievement of its production quota and began to produce new products.

In combination these claims add up to admitted labor shortages, temporary loss of output due to dispersal, and problems in changing the production mix. They do not, however, reflect serious and prolonged production problems even if one discounts the general claim of meeting planned goals.

In general, the machine building industry has suffered from the same problems as the other industries. One significant observation from reviewing press reports is the conversion of machine building plants to production of agricultural machinery which is aimed at alleviating manpower shortages through increased mechanization of the agricultural cooperatives.

The determination of the regime to continue to train its youth both at home and abroad in technical and academic skills further demonstrates that US bombing has not created severe manpower shortages. There is continuing evidence that North Vietnamese students are being sent to other Communist countries for training. (Around 5,000 students were abroad in 1965 and early 1966, and some reports have suggested that as many as 20,000 may go abroad for study in the next few years.) Further, the regime has just recently opened four colleges with emphasis on technical and engineering skills.

A Rolling Thunder program could have done great damage to the modern industrial sector of the North Vietnamese economy. However, Rolling Thunder target systems chosen did not include the main industrial facilities. The Hanoi regime, possibly now acting on the assumption that industrial installations will not be the main targets of attack, continues to request accelerated deliveries of machinery, goods, and even industrial plants from other Communist countries. Perhaps, if Rolling Thunder had more heavily damaged some of these targets, the North Vietnamese would have a harder time convincing their Communist partners to continue sending industrial aid.

C. Transportation

The transport system of North Vietnam continues to function adequately. There have been and continue to be periodic delays in the movement of goods, which produce temporary local shortages. But transportation is supporting the essential segments of the economy and is providing the required support for the war in the North and in the South.

The rudimentary nature and somewhat primitive character of the system is probably more of an asset than a hindrance in overcoming the effects of the air war on it. The small, light-weight, antiquated railroad system is augmented by reasonably modern but low-capacity motor trucks and a few modern craft on the inland and coastal waterways. But, for the most part, transport is provided by primitive sampans and junks and animal transport, carts, bicycles, and human bearers. Traffic per capita is exceedingly small. Rumania, for example, a country with substantially the same population and 50 percent more area, has 20 times the tonnage per capita that is found in North Vietnam. Thus North Vietnam with a small industrial base and a population with simple wants and needs can exist with a rudimentary primitive type of transportation system, and the task of impairing significantly the movement of traffic over it by the use of air power becomes difficult.

The initial attacks against transportation in the Rolling Thunder program affected the southern part of the country, which is of relatively minor importance to the economy. Concentration of the attacks in this area provided time for the North Vietnamese to obtain advice from the North Koreans and advice and aid from the Chinese. During this period, organizations were also established for the repair of damage and for the marshaling of all forms of transport for the movement of traffic.

These organizations have been remarkably effective in making the necessary repairs, in providing alternate facilities, and in commandeering all forms of transport to keep the essential traffic moving. As a consequence, after 18 months of attack under the Rolling Thunder program, in spite of the heavy cost in terms of manpower and material, the transportation system is better able to continue operating while coping with damage and loss of personnel than it was when the program began.

If the level of attacks achieved during the first nine months of 1966 is maintained for the remainder of the year, total transport performance in 1966 will continue to increase as it has in past years in terms of tons carried, but will decrease slightly in terms of ton-miles, as it did in 1965 (see Table 14). Rail transportation has been more affected by the attacks than other forms of transport. Performance by railroad transport has been reduced both in terms of tons carried and ton-miles, but rail transportation continues to be the principal mode of transport in terms of ton-miles. Increases in tons carried by other modes have more than compensated for the loss in rail tons carried.

The reduction in rail traffic has not affected the volume of imports and exports moved by rail between China and North Vietnam. The volume of such shipments probably will increase again in 1966 as it had in 1965. Halting of through traffic by destruction of bridges on the two lines important for the movement of foreign trade -- the lines from Hanoi to Dong Dang and Haiphong -- has extended over a relatively small percent of the 18 months.

Destruction of bridges and other facilities on the lines from Hanoi to Lao Cai and Vinh has been more continuous and thus more serious for the domestic economy. Especially noteworthy have been the attacks on the Viet Tri bridge on the Lao Cai line and the Phu Ly bridge on the Vinh line. These bridges have remained out of service for fairly long periods of time. Traffic within the modern industrial sector of the economy -- between Hanoi and the industrial cities of Lam Thao, Viet Tri, and Nam Dinh -- has thus been disrupted. Limited through service has now been restored between these cities, however, and shuttle service between the breaks and the line is in use on the remainder of the lines.

The North Vietnamese with the help of Chinese engineers have expanded and improved the railroad system by the addition of some dual tracking, a new line, and alternate rail bridges for some of the bridges on the Hanoi - Dong Dang and Hanoi - Haiphong lines.

Table 14

North Vietnam: Estimated Transport Performance
1964, 1965, and Projected 1966

	1964	1965	1966 a/
Total Performance	20.6	21.7	22.0
Million tons carried	1,200	1,160	1,100
Million ton-miles			
International Trade by Rail			
Imports (thousand tons carried)	180	350	N.A.
Exports (thousand tons carried)	220	170	N.A.

a. Projected for the full year, assuming a continuation of performance at the level of the first nine months.

Dual tracking on the Dong Dang line, which permits both Chinese standard-gauge and North Vietnamese meter-gauge equipment to be used, very likely now extends from the Chinese border south as far as Kep, and some preparations have been made to extend the dual tracking from Kep to Hanoi. A new standard-gauge line from Kep to Thai Nguyen may also have been completed, thus providing a more direct route for shipment of Chinese coal to the iron and steel complex at Thai Nguyen and an alternative route for rail traffic between Kep and Hanoi. Another improvement directly related to the war effort is the extension of a low-cost makeshift rail line south of Vinh toward the Demilitarized Zone. This line is kept in service with inexpensive expedients in spite of intensive bombing.

North Vietnam has suffered a high level of destruction of railroad rolling stock, particularly in 1966, but there is no evidence of a shortage of locomotives or freight cars. It is estimated that the inventory of locomotives remains at about the pre-April 1965 number. The North Vietnamese freight car inventory, however, has been significantly reduced (see Table 1). The Chinese probably have made freight cars available to North Vietnam from the meter-gauge rolling stock of Yunnan Province and formerly used for the Chinese transit traffic through North Vietnam. The loss of this traffic and other traffic such as the transport of apatite after the

Lao Cai line was interdicted in July of 1965 has reduced the requirement for rail transport. Furthermore, Chinese standard-gauge equipment can be used on the new dual-gauge and standard-gauge lines in North Vietnam. Much of the reportedly destroyed rolling stock probably consisted of the makeshift equipment used on the line south of Hanoi, the type that probably could be built in North Vietnam. Thus North Vietnam has sustained a high level of destruction of rolling stock and has continued to operate the railroads at a reasonable level. The North Vietnamese are nevertheless negotiating with the Chinese to buy quite large numbers of rolling stock, presumably to avoid using Chinese equipment within North Vietnam.

North Vietnam is making increasing use of highway and inland and coastal water transport. Traffic moving over these networks is more difficult to disrupt than is traffic on the railroad system. Highway and water transport is also being used to shuttle traffic around breaks in railroad lines. It is estimated that performance by these modes increased in 1965 and 1966, both in terms of tons carried and ton-miles. These increases have been made possible by the considerable expansion and improvement of the road and inland water networks and maintenance of the inventory of transport equipment at the necessary level. New alternate roads have been built and additional waterways dredged. Alternate highway bridges, for the most part pontoon or cable types, as well as ferries and fords have been or are being built. Imports of motor trucks by North Vietnam from Communist countries far exceeded the destruction of these vehicles by air attack in 1965 and have kept pace with such destruction so far in 1966 (see Table 16). In spite of extensive destruction of watercraft, the number observed in use is constantly increasing. The North Vietnamese can build many of the small types observed in use, and Communist countries are providing small modern tugs, dry cargo barges, and tank barges.

The truck route into and through southern Laos is likewise considerably more capable of supporting infiltration now than it was 18 months ago. The fairweather truckable network has been greatly extended and provided with many miles of alternate routes. The portion of the year during which trucks can use the route has been increased by better road alignment and surfacing. After the heavy rains in the fall of 1965, truck traffic began to flow south into Laos a month earlier than it had in 1964. This year, truck traffic into Laos has begun to move in significant volume a month earlier than it did in 1965.

Table 15

North Vietnam: Rolling Stock Inventory
as of the End of 1964 and 1965 and 1 October 1966

	Units
Locomotives (totals rounded)	
As of the end of 1964	120
Imports during 1965	4
Domestic production	3
Losses	-6
As of the end of 1965	120
Imports during January-September 1966	6
Losses	-10 a/
As of 1 October 1966	120
Freight cars b/ (totals rounded)	
As of the end of 1964	1,800
Imports during 1965	60
Losses (230 destroyed times 60 percent)	-140
As of the end of 1965	1,700
Imports during 1966	60
Losses (1,060 destroyed times 60 percent)	-640
As of 1 October 1966	1,100 c/

a. Probably includes some makeshift locomotives used on the rail line south of Hanoi. It has been assumed, therefore, that the mainline locomotive inventory has been maintained at about the end of 1964 level by imports.

b. Reported losses of railroad freight cars have included small makeshift cars used on the rail line south of Hanoi as well as some exaggerations from pilot reports. Thus only 60 percent of those reported destroyed and none of those reported damaged have been deducted from the inventory.

c. These data represent a significant decrease in the inventory during 1966, but this inventory is still sufficient for performance at the level estimated. The actual number of freight cars in North Vietnam must be significantly higher than indicated, however. No evidence exists of a shortage of freight cars in North Vietnam. The number of freight cars imported is a minimum figure. Furthermore, Communist China probably has loaned or given North Vietnam all the freight cars needed. Although no information is available to indicate that Chinese cars from Yunnan Province are operating in North Vietnam, it is logical that this province has made meter-gauge stock available to North Vietnam.

Table 16

North Vietnam: Cargo Truck Inventory a/
as of the End of 1964 and 1965 and 1 October 1966

As of the end of 1964		9,000
Imports during 1965		3,443
Losses	900	-900
Airstrikes	360	
Normal retirement	540	
As of the end of 1965		11,500 b/
Imports during January-September 1966		3,200
Losses	3,200	-3,200
Airstrikes in North Vietnam	1,700	
Airstrikes in Laos	1,000	
Normal retirement	500	
As of 1 October 1966		11,500

a. Includes cargo trucks of one-ton or more capacity. Losses from inventory due to airstrikes were computed using 75 percent of the number reported destroyed and 25 percent of the number reported damaged. Normal retirement was computed at the rate of 6 percent per year.
b. North Vietnam had at least 3,000 additional vehicles, such as jeeps, command cars, ambulances, and service vehicles.

Maintenance and expansion of the transport system has been very costly to North Vietnam interms of manpower diverted and resources expended, in spite of the use of low-cost expedients wherever possible. Through September 1966, repair and restoration cost of damaged or destroyed transport facilities and equipment totaled more than $50 million, or almost one-third of the measurable direct and indirect cost of the Rolling Thunder program to North Vietnam, as follows:

Category	Repair and Restoration Cost (Million US $)
Bridges	19.8
Restoration	16.2
Temporary repair	3.6
Transportation equipment	30.5
Railroad yards and ports	1.0
Total	51.3

The restoration cost at the end of 1965 amounted to only $17.2 million. The increase of $34.1 million during the first nine months of 1966 is accounted for chiefly by damage and destruction to transport equipment amounting to $24.5 million. The cost of restoring and repairing bridges increased by $9.3 million, while railroad yards and ports increased by $300,000.

The sharp increase in the transport equipment category reflects the heavy emphasis on armed reconnaissance missions in the Rolling Thunder program throughout 1966. These equipment losses have been largely offset by imports from Communist countries. Possibly a more serious loss to North Vietnam has been the loss of trained personnel.

The North Vietnamese, with Chinese aid, have gained in experience and efficiency in expanding routes and making the necessary repairs. As a consequence the transport system is now considerably less vulnerable than it was during 1965. The system is performing at a level adequate for military and essential economic needs. It can be expected to operate at this level unless there is a basic change in the pattern and weight of air attack against transportation in North Vietnam.

D. Foreign Trade

North Vietnam's foreign trade, since the initiation of Rolling Thunder, has been marked by two major developments: (1) an increasing volume of imports from Communist countries (Free World imports have been largely maintained); and (2) a general reduction in exports. By the fall of 1966, seaborne imports seemed to have reached a peak set

by the capacity of ports and their connecting rail distribution facilities, while known exports continued to decline.

Recent aid agreements signed by other Communist countries with Hanoi signal the intention to continue a high level of shipments to North Vietnam. Imports were sharply accelerated in both 1965 and 1966. Goods received from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe reached an estimated value of $180 million in 1965,* nearly 65 percent more than in 1964. Comparable value data are not available for 1966, but the volume of seaborne imports from Communist countries in the first nine months averaged about 50 percent more than the same period in 1965. Imports of manufactured goods (largely machinery, equipment, and rolled steel products) comprised a major share of the imports from Communist countries and accounted for the sharpest increases in volume of shipments. Imports of fertilizer and petroleum have also increased significantly.

The value of North Vietnam's exports remained steady within a range of $100 million to $110 million in both 1964 and 1965. Seaborne exports of apatite, which had an average f. o. b. value of nearly $418,000 a month in the first seven months of 1965, virtually ceased following the initiation in July 1965 of recurrent interdictions of the rail line connecting the apatite mines at Lao Cai with Haiphong. The major export losses, however, followed the strikes against coal processing facilities at Cam Pha in April 1966. Seaborne coal exports in the first quarter of 1966 had an average f. o. b. value of $1.8 million a month, but have had an average value of only $0.6 million a month since April and the trend is still downward. There have been additional reductions in seaborne exports of cement, pig iron, and manufactured goods, but the decline in these exports cannot be directly related to the effects of bombing. It is also possible, but not probable, that increased volumes of these commodities have been shipped undetected to Communist China. Continuation of the present degree of retardation of shipments of coal and apatite will cause North Vietnam's export earnings in 1966 to be at least $12 million less than in 1965, approximately half of which is in Free World hard currency, thereby worsening the already large imbalance between imports and exports.

* The estimated distribution of these imports, which include economic aid, is as follows: from China and the Soviet Union, $75 million each; and from the Eastern European countries, $30 million.

E. Manpower Developments in North Vietnam

The Rolling Thunder program, together with other US/GVN military actions in South Vietnam, has placed a significant strain on North Vietnam's manpower resources. The allocation of manpower in response to the air attacks has taxed the ingenuity of North Vietnam's leadership, has forced the country to make meaningful sacrifices in terms of disruption to some normal civilian pursuits, and has inflicted real costs resulting from disruptions of economic activity, most notably in agriculture, transportation, and construction. At the same time, the regime has allocated the bulk of its physically fit youth coming of military age to building up its military forces. In spite of these pressures there are several indications that the quantitative drain on manpower may have peaked during 1966.

The buildup of North Vietnam's armed forces and the replacement of manpower losses in South Vietnam have required the mobilization of at least 170,000 men since 1 January 1965. This figure may be larger if a substantial number of troops are being discharged because of age or illness. At a minimum, total conscription for military service probably has approached 80 percent of the number of physically fit males -- 220,000 -- reaching the draft age of 18 in 1965-66. There is, however, a total pool estimated at about 2.1 million to 2.3 million males in the 15 to 49 age group who are physically fit for military service.

A large measure of the military build-up in North Vietnam is accounted for by forces committed to defensive programs in reaction to the Rolling Thunder program. At least 70,000 North Vietnamese troops, or close to 20 percent of the armed forces, are assigned to units involved almost exclusively in defensive programs and countermeasures against the Rolling Thunder program. This estimate includes those forces assigned to the Air Force, to AAA and SAM units, and to engineering and transportation units. In addition a large number of militia are assigned to air defense activities.

The mobilization of civilian labor has exceeded the manpower needs for the build-up of military forces. By early 1966, North Vietnam had to reallocate large amounts of labor to repair or reconstruction activities and to dispersal and emergency programs directly related to the Rolling Thunder attack. These programs are believed to have required the full-time services of 200,000 workers and the part-time utilization of another 100,000. The obligation of some 150,000

persons to fulfill civil defense responsibilities has created an additional part-time diversion of labor.

The size of this commitment of labor is estimated to have remained stable during 1966. Although the weight of air attack has increased, the labor force has gained a great deal of experience in making quick repairs, using camouflage, and adopting other innovations to neutralize the effects of air attack. The experience gained in this type of construction work has enabled the North Vietnamese to develop faster recuperability from airstrikes. As the expertise and hence the labor productivity of the North Vietnamese improves, and assuming the pattern of air attack does not change, it is estimated that the North Vietnamese will be able to reduce the size of the repair-of-damage labor force and still increase its effectiveness. The commitment of labor could be greater, however, if more of the airstrikes against the logistic target system were concentrated on the rail and combination rail/highway bridges on the major LOC's in the northern part of the country.

Two other manpower drains of some significance are the North Vietnamese assigned to repair and construction activities on the infiltration route through Laos, and casualties resulting from the Rolling Thunder program.

The road repair and construction activities in Laos require the commitment of some 20,000 to 25,000 persons, about three-fourths of whom are North Vietnamese. Since the pattern of this activity has not changed appreciably in the last six months, it is estimated that this commitment has remained stable.

Casualties inflicted in 1966 as a result of the Rolling Thunder program are tentatively estimated at from 16,000 to 21,000. This would be an increase of 40 to 50 percent over the level estimated for 1965. Casualties are probably about three-fourths civilian (principally persons engaged in logistic and transportation activities in direct support of the war effort) and one-fourth military.

The drain on North Vietnam's manpower resulting from military and civilian mobilization and casualties in both North and South Vietnam has amounted to 400,000 to 425,000 persons. This includes an estimated military mobilization of at least 170,000 persons and the full-time assignment of about 220,000 persons to war-associated tasks in North Vietnam and Laos, largely a consequence of Rolling Thunder. This total diversion amounts to about 5 percent of North Vietnam's civilian labor force.

The ability of North Vietnam to meet the numerical commitment of manpower resources is apparent. However, there are many indications that the manpower drain has inflicted strains on the country. Recent indications of possible war-associated strains on manpower are reports that additional women have been trained and are serving in agricultural occupations and in the militia, and that the regime is trying -- apparently with limited success -- to make greater use of unskilled workers from the peasant and urban population. The disappointing fifth-month harvest has probably made it incumbent on the regime to provide more agricultural manpower in order to achieve a successful tenth-month harvest. The regime has also been forced to shelve some plans for industrial expansion.

F. Third Country Attitudes

There has been little significant change in the attitudes of Free World countries toward the US bombing program during the last two years, either because of its continuation or escalation. Free World reaction to the latest escalation of the bombings -- the strikes against the POL storage facilities in the Hanoi-Haiphong area -- produced the normal leftist and Communist cries of "outrage" in Free World states. The overall official reaction, however, was more restrained and less critical than expected.

The so-called non-aligned, or neutral, nations who have attempted from time to time to serve as intermediaries in getting negotiations started have not altered their basic positions during the past year as a result of the continued US airstrikes. The unyielding attitude of the North Vietnamese, however, has had a somewhat sobering impact on certain of these neutral nations. In particular, they have realized that the United States has a valid point in demanding some sign from Hanoi that it will respond positively to a cessation of the bombings. This has not produced a swing toward the United States by these nations, but it has served somewhat to mitigate North Vietnamese efforts to convince the neutrals that the United States is solely to blame for the continuation of the war.

1. Soviet and Eastern European Attitudes

The effectiveness of the US airstrikes in destroying North Vietnamese military hardware and in disrupting the transportation system in North Vietnam has caused Hanoi to place increasing demands on the USSR and the Eastern European countries. In response, these countries have agreed to provide additional economic and military goods.

At the same time, however, there is growing apprehension in the USSR and the Eastern European countries that their own national interests will be threatened by a continuation of the bombing raids. On numerous occasions during the past several weeks, Eastern European diplomats have assured the United States that their increased aid to Hanoi is designed to wean the North Vietnamese away from China and thus improve the chances of getting Hanoi to the negotiating table.

These diplomats clearly believe that there is no chance of getting Hanoi to negotiate until the United States ceases its bombing of North Vietnam. Thus far, however, neither the USSR nor any of the Eastern European countries has indicated that it can assure the United States that Hanoi will make a positive move toward negotiations if US airstrikes cease. The Poles have advised the United States that they do not intend to carry US overtures for negotiations to Hanoi again unless they are given some sign that such activity on their part will be productive.

2. Communist China's Attitude

The Chinese have not altered their position on the war as a result of the Rolling Thunder program. They remain as determined as ever to oppose any move toward peace which does not entail total US capitulation to North Vietnamese demands. Chinese policy remains even tougher than that of the Vietnamese on what it will take to get negotiations started. Peking still insists that the United States must withdraw its troops from South Vietnam before talks can begin.

INFO: JS-1 JS-1 SACSA-3 SAMAA-1 CJCS-7 ONO/LE
SECDEF-7 ASD/ISA DIA-15 CSA-1
CNO-2 CSAF-5 CMC-3 FILE-1 46

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CITE TDCS 66-31705/75-66

DIST 1 NOVEMBER 1966

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI LATE 1965-LATE OCTOBER 1966

SUBJECT SPECULATION ON PRESENCE OF AMERICAN PRISONERS IN HANOI, AND DEFENSE MEASURES, RATIONING, AND PUBLIC MORALE IN HANOI

ACQ [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted]

1. SUMMARY.

[redacted] IF AMERICAN PRISONERS ARE BEING HELD IN HANOI, THEY ARE PROBABLY AT A LARGE ESTABLISHMENT IN A POSSIBLE MILITARY HEADQUARTERS AREA (AREA 65) WHICH IS SURROUNDED BY WALLS WHICH ARE LIGHTED ALL NIGHT AND ARE TOPPED WITH ELECTRIFIED WIRE. JUST AFTER THE 29 JUNE 1966 BOMBINGS OF OIL DEPOTS OUTSIDE HANOI, A CAPTURED AMERICAN PILOT WAS REPORTEDLY SEEN BEING TAKEN ALONG A STREET LEADING FROM THIS AREA AND BACK ALONG THE SAME STREET. AFTER THE BOMBINGS, MIG-17'S MANEUVERED OVER HANOI ALMOST DAILY. 5 4 MIG-21'S AND AN ILYUSHIN-28 WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE MARKINGS WERE ALSO OBSERVED IN SEPTEMBER. SOME SHOPS SHUT AFTER THE BOMBING BUT REOPENED

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[redacted]

IN AUGUST. THERE WAS NO SHORTAGE OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS FOR FOREIGNERS IN HANOI. IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER MEAT, RICE, SUGAR, MATCHES, AND SOAP WERE RATIONED. THE SUPPLY OF RICE AND SUGAR WAS SUFFICIENT FOR PEOPLE TO OBTAIN THEIR QUOTAS, BUT IN MID-SEPTEMBER SOME PEOPLE SAID THEY WERE NOT GETTING THEIR QUOTAS OF MEAT. THE PEOPLE WERE CONVINCED THAT HANOI WOULD BE BOMBED, BUT THEY REMAINED CALM. THERE WAS LITTLE POLICE CONTROL OF THE LOCAL POPULATION, AND SOVIET PERSONNEL WERE FREE TO LEAVE HANOI AS THEY WISHED. THE AI HO AREA ACROSS THE RED RIVER FROM HANOI APPEARED TO BE A MILITARY TRAINING AREA, AND ANOTHER RESTRICTED AREA IN THE O YEN PHU SECTION NORTH OF THE HO TRUC BACH LAKE WAS FREQUENTED BY SOVIET PERSONNEL.)

2. [redacted] IN AN AREA OF HANOI [redacted] THERE WAS A LARGE WALLED-IN ESTABLISHMENT WITH THREE STRANDS OF ELECTRIFIED WIRE WITH NEW LOOKING INSULATORS ON TOP OF THE WALLS. THE WALLS WERE WHITE, FRESHLY PAINTED AND LIGHTED ALL NIGHT. THE ENTRANCE WAS GUARDED BY TWO UNIFORMED VIETNAMESE. THE AREA WAS VERY QUIET. ONCE IN EARLY SEPTEMBER 1965 PEOPLE INSIDE THE WALLS WERE SPEAKING WHAT SEEMED TO BE ENGLISH. [redacted] IF AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE IN HANOI THEY WERE PROBABLY IN THIS LOCATION. [redacted] RIGHT AFTER THE 29 JUNE BOMBINGS OF OIL DEPOTS OUTSIDE HANOI A PILOT CAPTURED IN THE ATTACK WAS TAKEN ALONG THE STREET FROM THE 65 AREA TO THE 131 AREA BY A RAILROAD TRACKS AND THEN TO A LOCATION IN THE AREA OF THE INTERNATIONAL

[redacted]

[redacted]

CONTROL COMMISSION OFFICE IN THE 170 AREA. HE WAS THEN TAKEN BACK ALONG THE SAME STREET. [redacted] COMMENT. TDCSDB-315/02978-66 REPORTED THAT [redacted] BELIEVED THE AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE LOCATED IN THE HANOI CITY JAIL IN A BLOCK BOUNDED BY DAI LO HAI BA TRUNG, HANG BONG, PHO HOA LO, AND PHO HO QUAN SU, IDENTIFIED AS COORDINATE WJ-8512[redacted] [redacted] THAT LOCATION AND THE ONE REPORTED HERE DO NOT APPEAR TO BE IDENTICAL.)

3. AFTER THE 29 JUNE BOMBINGS MIG-17'S FLEW OVER HANOI DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS ALMOST DAILY. THE PLANES WENT THROUGH MANEUVERS THERE, DIVING AND BANKING SEVERAL THOUSAND FEET UP. THEY STAYED UP FOR A SHORT TIME, THEN DISAPPEARED. ONCE IN SEPTEMBER MIG-21'S FLEW OVER HANOI. ON A SUNDAY IN SEPTEMBER AN ILYUSHIN-14 WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE MARKINGS LANDED IN THE [redacted] AREA. [redacted]

4/5. RIGHT AFTER THE BOMBINGS THE SHOPS IN THE HO HOAN KIEM LAKE AREA ([redacted]) WERE SHUTTERED UP AND THE AREA DESERTED IN THE DAYTIME. THE PEOPLE WERE SENT TO WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE DURING THE DAY BUT RETURNED HOME AT NIGHT. AS OF THE END OF AUGUST, HOWEVER, [redacted]

THE SHOPS HAD REOPENED, AT LEAST FOR SEVERAL HOURS A DAY. THE STATE STORE [redacted] NEAR A HOSPITAL WAS OPEN MORNINGS FROM 0600 HOURS TO 0800 HOURS. THERE WERE NO REFUGEE CAMPS IN HANOI NOR EVIDENCE OF SHANTIES OR TEMPORARY REFUGEE HOUSING. NO SCHOOLS WERE OPEN IN HANOI. CHILDREN WHO LIVED IN HANOI ATTENDED SCHOOLS IN THE SURROUNDING COUNTRYSIDE.

5. FACTORIES THROUGHOUT HANOI WORKED A FULL SCHEDULE. THE FACTORY TWO BLOCKS FROM THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR [redacted] WHICH SEEMED TO BE A STATIONERY FACTORY, WORKED AROUND THE CLOCK.

6. THERE WAS NO SHORTAGE OF GASOLINE AND OIL SUPPLIES FOR FOREIGNERS IN HANOI AFTER THE 29 JUNE BOMBINGS. THEY COULD BE PURCHASED FREELY AT ONE OF THREE STATE OUTLETS. OIL TANKS WERE BEING REPAIRED IN THE WAREHOUSE AREA ALONG THE RED RIVER [redacted] WHEN THE WELDING, SURFACING, AND PAINTING WERE COMPLETED, THE TANKS WERE MOVED OUT FROM THIS AREA BY TRUCK.

7. SINCE JUST BEFORE DECEMBER 1965 EACH PERSON HAD BEEN ALLOWED A RATION OF 300 GRAMS OF MEAT A MONTH. SOME VIETNAMESE SAID IN MID-SEPTEMBER 1966 THAT THEY WERE NOT GETTING THEIR QUOTA. RICE WAS RATIONED BUT WAS IN SUFFICIENT SUPPLY. HOWEVER, WHEAT AND RICE BREAD WERE BEING SUBSTITUTED FOR THE RICE RATION IN CERTAIN AREAS OF HANOI. MATCHES WERE RATIONED AS OF LATE OCTOBER 1966. TWO BOXES PER PERSON WERE ISSUED TO LAST UNTIL THE END OF THE YEAR. THE RATIONING OF SOAP ALSO BEGAN IN LATE

[redacted]

[redacted]

OCTOBER, WITH ONE BAR OF SCRUBBING SOAP PER ADULT FOR THREE MONTHS. ONLY CHILDREN UNDER ONE YEAR WERE PERMITTED TOILET SOAP AND THIS WAS RATIONED AT THE SAME RATE. SUGAR WAS RATIONED, BUT PEOPLE WERE ABLE TO GET THEIR QUOTAS.

8. TRUCK CONVOYS, OFTEN OF 12 OR MORE TRUCKS, PARKED ALONG THE RED RIVER [redacted] THE TRUCKS APPEARED TO BE CZECH MANUFACTURE. THE DRIVERS SLEPT IN THE CABS, POSSIBLY AWAITING NIGHTFALL, AS THE SOUND OF TRUCKS MOVING OUT IN THE DIRECTION OF THE LONG BIEN BRIDGE COULD BE HEARD AT NIGHT. THERE WERE MORE TRUCKS IN RECENT WEEKS IN HANOI THAN THERE HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY.

9. THERE WAS VERY LITTLE POLICE CONTROL OF THE POPULATION IN HANOI ITSELF. POLICE AT CHECKPOINTS AT THE BASE OF THE LONG XIEN BRIDGE ON THE HANOI SIDE SEEMED MOST CONCERNED WITH REGULATING TRAFFIC. VIETNAMESE WERE OFTEN NOT CHECKED, AND ONLY THOSE WITH LARGE CARTS WHICH MIGHT IMPEDE TRAFFIC ON THE BRIDGE WERE HELD UP. OTHER CHECKPOINTS WERE AT THE CROSSROADS AT NGA TU SO, AT PHUONG LIET [redacted], AND AT THE CROSSROAD [redacted] BETWEEN THE PARK AND THE CEMETERY. [redacted]

[redacted]

10. JUDGING FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH VIETNAMESE WORKING FOR FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS AND SHOP OWNERS IN THE HO HOAN KIEM LAKE AREA, IT APPEARED THAT THE VIETNAMESE WERE CONVINCED HANOI WOULD BE BOMBED,

[redacted]

[redacted]

BUT THEY TOOK THE PROSPECT OF BOMBING CALMLY, AS THEY DID STORIES OF BOMBING IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. THERE WERE MANY SINGLE-PERSON SEMI-CONCRETE BOMB SHELTERS BEING CONSTRUCTED ON THE STREETS ALL OVER HANOI. THEY WERE ABOUT TWO FEET IN DIAMETER AND FIVE FEET HIGH WITH A CONCRETE LID. WHEN FINISHED THEY WERE BURIED IN THE GROUND.

[redacted] WHEN QUESTIONED, SOME VIETNAMESE APPEARED TO BE UNCLEAR AS TO WHY NORTH VIETNAM WAS FIGHTING. ONE BOURGEOIS VIETNAMESE FUNCTIONARY MADE THE COMMENT IN EARLY 1966 THAT SOLDIERS WHO WENT TO SOUTH VIETNAM NEVER CAME BACK AND WERE NEVER HEARD FROM AGAIN. THERE WERE NO WAR VETERANS OR WOUNDED IN EVIDENCE IN HANOI. [redacted] WORKED FOR THE FRENCH MISSION AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER SAID THAT WHEN HE HAD TAKEN A GROUP OF FRENCH TO HAIPHONG JUST AFTER THE 29 JUNE BOMBINGS HE OBSERVED THAT MANY OF THE BRIDGES HAD BEEN DESTROYED AND PLANKS USED TO CONSTRUCT SINGLE-LANE WOODEN BRIDGES OVER WHICH TRUCKS COULD PASS.

11. THE AI MO AREA ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE RED RIVER FROM HANOI APPEARED TO BE USED AS A MILITARY TRAINING AREA. TROOPS WALKED IN GROUPS IN THIS AREA WITH GUNS AND PACKS ON THEIR BACKS. ANOTHER RESTRICTED AREA WAS IN THE O YEN PHU SECTION JUST NORTH OF THE HO TRUC BACH LAKE. THIS WAS SURROUNDED BY A WALL AND THERE WAS A SIGN

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] "NO ENTRY". SOVIET BLOC PERSONNEL FREQUENTED THE AREA. [redacted] COMMENT. THE AREA COULD HAVE BEEN A LOCAL PRISON.)

12. A NUMBER OF SOVIET BLOC PERSONNEL WERE CONCENTRATED IN [redacted] HANOI NEAR BA DINH SQUARE. THERE WAS NO NOTICEABLE INCREASE OR DECREASE IN SOVIET BLOC PERSONNEL IN RECENT MONTHS. THE SOVIETS HAD NO CHECKPOINT RESTRICTIONS AND WERE FREE TO LEAVE HANOI AS THEY WISHED. BUSLOADS OF SOVIET PERSONNEL OFTEN WENT IN THE DIRECTION OF THE LONG BIEN BRIDGE AND ALONG THE ROAD TOWARD THE AIRPORT DURING THE DAYTIME.

13. [redacted] HAD SEEN HO CHI MINH SOMETIME IN THE LAST THREE WEEKS IN OCTOBER.

14. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE ARMY AIR CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC USMACV-SAIGON 7TH AIR FORCE SAIGON AND [redacted]

[redacted]

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Canadian Foreign Minister Martin to the USSR linking them to Soviet-U.S. collusion and accusing Moscow of trying to induce the Vietnamese to stop fighting in return for a halt to U.S. bombing in the North.

Moscow's continuing assault on CPR rejection of united action to help Vietnam is highlighted by the 27 November PRAVDA editorial article and Brezhnev's 29 November speech at the Hungarian party congress. Other Soviet comment again calls attention to Soviet aid and to support for the four- and five-point stands of the DRV and NFLSV. Comment on Foreign Secretary Brown's visit stresses that Britain and the USSR hold differing positions on Vietnam.

WAR IN THE SOUTH

ARTICLE BY "CUU LONG"

The Cuu Long article,* entitled "New Developments in the Guerrilla War in South Vietnam," discusses the scope and potential of the guerrilla war in unusual detail. It is not clear what prompted the article at this particular time, but the content and Hanoi radio's treatment of it suggest disagreement over the conduct of the war including such basic factors as control and the role of the North Vietnamese.

The article is notable for its stress on the importance of "organizing the revolutionary masses" and for its treatment of the nature of the leadership in this effort. Cuu Long says "leadership over the guerrilla war in various localities is not limited to military matters and cannot be understood as mainly the task of military organs." He declares that given new developments, "we must further discuss the problem of leadership," and he goes on to say in a later passage that "the local NFLSV committees obviously play the leading role."

Cuu Long cites DRV party First Secretary Le Duan as well as the NFLSV Central Committee as his authority on the need to develop the guerrilla war movement on the basis of organizing the revolutionary masses. The Hanoi radio version of the article--only partially available at this writing--deletes a quotation from Le Duan on the subject as well as a subsequent reference to him. Other seemingly sensitive passages deleted by Hanoi include a statement that the tunnels, trenches, and other fortifications in the South are "more extensive" than the communist fortifications of the "Dien Bien Phu battleground." Hanoi also excises

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Cuu Long's unusual details regarding the composition of the guerrilla force: it reports his statement that forces waging guerrilla warfare include all the armed forces from the main-force troops to the regional troops, but it omits his disclosure that they also include "special armed forces, such as the special task force and the ranger force." Hanoi also excises a subsequent reference to "the special task force, the engineer corps, and surveillance units."

Hanoi truncates a lengthy passage in which Cuu Long discusses the organization of the different categories of troops--including "hamlet, village, and intervillage" guerrillas and "specialized and secret" guerrillas. Hanoi omits entirely his statement that the third guerrilla warfare conference, which Liberation Radio reported on 20 October, "determined the procedures for organizing the three types of forces at the basic level." (Hanoi media made a recent reference to the conference in a 19 November VNA report of an article on pacification in the Hanoi weekly TO QUOC. It referred to the conference as having been held at Cu Chi, Gia Dinh Province--a detail which Liberation Radio did not provide.)

While Cuu Long notes in passing that the "regulars" play the decisive role in the war as a whole, his major thesis is that at this stage guerrilla action can successfully counter the allies despite their troop buildup, superior weaponry, and air power. But in a passage reminiscent of his 7 September article, he shows dissatisfaction with the operations against enemy communication lines. Declaring that attacks against communication lines have strategic significance, he says that "if leadership and organization are carried out more realistically, we will deal blows of strategic significance on the heads of the U.S. troops."

Cuu Long concludes his article with the statement that "at present guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam suggests many great problems and is undergoing several developments which cannot be entirely dealt with here."

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THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence

THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(28 November - 4 December 1966)

C O N T E N T S

	Section
POLITICAL SITUATION Constituent assembly developments; Government attitudes toward the assembly; Reaction to new IV Corps commander; Nationalist party squabbles in I Corps.	I
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT Effect of ARVN's 1967 mission on morale; Viet Cong defectors (Chieu Hoi); Viet Cong counter - Chieu Hoi program; National Police target of subversion in Quang Nam; Refugee situation in Tay Ninh.	II
ECONOMIC SITUATION Prices; Currency and gold; Pork situation; Discussions with Ton; Secretary of State for Commerce Thien An on rice policy; Situation at the Saigon port.	III
ANNEX: Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon (table) Weekly/Monthly Saigon Free Market Gold and Currency Prices (graph)	

I. POLITICAL SITUATION

South Vietnam's Constituent Assembly, having approved wording on rights and duties of individual citizens for the draft constitution, is now discussing the form of the future government. Leaders of the present government, meanwhile, are considering proposals by the assembly for changes in the body's founding law, but are not expected to give up their quasi-veto power over the final version of the constitution.

Among other developments, III Corps commander General Khang and several other unnamed senior officers reportedly have misgivings about the recent appointment of General Manh as IV Corps commander. Friction among political party leaders in I Corps could develop into serious trouble for important government programs in the area.

Constituent Assembly Developments

1. On 26 November the Constituent Assembly began a debate on the general principles its drafting committee will follow in writing the constitution. Thus far, the assembly has concluded its debate on rights and duties of individual citizens to be specified in the constitution, and has begun to discuss the form of the future government. The constitution-drafting committee has proposed a straightforward presidential form of executive, but fears within the assembly of a possible return to a Diem-type dictatorship could result in the adoption of a modified system, with a prime minister responsible to the legislature in addition to an elected president.

2. In subsequent meetings, committee representatives recommended a bicameral legislature, an independent judiciary, and an inspectorate in addition to the executive branch of government. The

upper house of the legislature would contain 30 to 35 delegates, and members of the lower house would be elected for every 25,000 to 30,000 registered voters. The judiciary would be headed by a nine-man supreme court. The fourth branch of government, a nine-man inspectorate equal in status to the other branches, would be charged with investigating and monitoring their activities.

3. Previously, the assembly approved 14 rights and four duties of individuals. Duties consisted of obligations to defend the nation and the constitution, to pay taxes, and to fulfill military service. Many of the rights were the usual individual safeguards, such as compulsory and free elementary education; freedom of press, speech, and criticism of the government; right of assembly; and protection from unlawful arrest. Other rights, however, applied more to the specific Vietnamese context. For example, the issue of land réform was introduced as an individual right and produced a heated and disorderly debate. Dr. Phan Quang Dan, a well-known political independent, led the fight for a specific land reform pledge, but received little support; Hoa Hao delegates from the delta were the most vociferous opponents of any land reform provision. Finally, after prodding from assembly chairman Phan Khac Suu, the assembly adopted a provision declaring that the policy of the state would be to make citizens property owners.

4. Another sensitive Vietnamese topic touched upon during the debate on individual rights was civilian-military relations, which were considered as an adjunct to the individual's right to participate in the political process. After a reasonably restrained debate on this subject, the assembly approved the principle that "military personnel on active duty cannot join political parties or participate in the government." The final wording and nuances of this principle, as well as all others, will again be considered by the assembly when the draft constitution itself is presented by the drafting committee; thus the precise application of this principle is not yet clear. However, such a provision could seriously conflict with the government's present administrative system which depends heavily upon military officers all the way down to the district level.

Government Attitudes Toward the Assembly

5. This provision also could have some negative effect on the current thinking of the military leadership regarding proposed modifications of the assembly's founding law, which inter alia would eliminate the government's authority to make changes in the draft constitution reversible only by a two-thirds assembly vote. An assembly committee presented the government with this and other modifications of the founding law on 18 November, and a government reply is expected sometime this week. Although several assembly delegates are optimistic that the government will agree to relinquish its veto power, there is no evidence from government sources that the military leaders are willing to do so. However, compromises on other changes suggested by the assembly are possible.

6. In general, the military rulers are apparently making no concerted effort at present to dictate the constitution. According to a reliable high-level government functionary, the military have no organized plan to influence the activities of the assembly in this regard. Although several members of the inner government circle continue to monitor developments in the assembly, their findings are allegedly reported to Premier Ky and Chief of State Thieu only on an ad hoc basis. The source claimed that government leaders believe the constitution could prove to be too feeble a document to form the basis of any kind of viable government.

Reaction to New IV Corps Commander

7. According to two reliable high-ranking military sources, several senior ARVN officers have misgivings about the assignment of General Nguyen Van Manh as IV Corps commander. They reportedly feel that Manh will not be any improvement over General Quang because Manh and his wife are as guilty of corrupt practices as are Quang and his wife.

8. Rumors of Manh's corruption, however, appear to be only a part of the problem. Manh, a southerner, was apparently Chief of State Thieu's choice for the

IV Corps assignment rather than Premier Ky's. Most of Manh's critics remain unnamed, but III Corps commander General Khang, a close associate of fellow northerner Premier Ky, is one of them. Khang is also a spokesman for the "Baby Turks," a loose association of field-grade officers who, among other things, have been pressing for the removal of southern generals Quang and Co. Most of the unnamed critics of Manh also may fall into the "Baby Turk" grouping, or may otherwise be characterized as supporters of Premier Ky.

9. In this respect, the reports of dissatisfaction over Manh's appointment serve mainly as evidence of the continued factionalism within the military leadership. No action against Manh was intimated in any of the reports, although General Khang reportedly reiterated his desire--and that of Premier Ky--to take action against Deputy Premier General Co at some suitable time.

Nationalist Party Squabbles in I Corps

10. Friction between the Dai Viet and VNQDD parties in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces is a current subject of major interest among knowledgeable Vietnamese in I Corps. In general, Dai Viet supporters predominate in the two northern provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien, while VNQDD members are stronger in the other three I Corps provinces of Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai. At present, the focal point of the friction appears to be in Thua Thien, where six VNQDD-oriented district chiefs have complained to the I Corps commander of alleged discrimination by Dai Viet members among police and Revolutionary Development groups. Other, somewhat unrelated friction among VNQDD factions has also been reported in Quang Ngai and Quang Nam provinces.

11. The interparty squabbling has involved considerable speculation about the political orientation of major government officials in I Corps, especially I Corps commander General Lam. General Lam himself claims that he favors neither party, although there have been numerous allegations that

he is a secret Dai Viet party member. Generally, however, Lam is forced to deal with both parties depending upon their local strength in each province. General Lam has stated that his major concern is to keep party differences within reasonable limits, and to avoid a serious shooting incident which would almost certainly involve US/GVN cadre teams.

12. Thus far, Dai Viet - VNQDD differences have taken the form of extensive maneuvering by party leaders for control of local government functions and various government programs reaching into the countryside. These leaders appear to realize that an outbreak of violence would only be costly for all involved. Nevertheless, an assassination or other violent incident remains a possibility which could touch off a major conflict between the parties, with serious effects on Revolutionary Development and other government programs in the area.

II. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

According to a recent report from the US Embassy, the mission of the ARVN in 1967 to provide a security screen for Revolutionary Development activities may cause some serious morale problems in the officer corps. A total of 2,505 Viet Cong defectors came under government control during November, an all-time high for any month since the inception of the Chieu Hoi program. Meanwhile, the Viet Cong are reported to have initiated a program in Bien Hoa Province to sabotage the Chieu Hoi effort. In Quang Nam Province, the National Police are reported to be the target of a new and intensified program of subversion by the Viet Cong. Nearly 16,000 persons have become refugees in Tay Ninh Province since 31 August, largely as a result of recent allied operations.

Effect of ARVN's 1967 Mission on Morale

1. General Do Cao Tri, who is presently unassigned but maintains many good connections among the military, believes there is apt to be bitterness in the officer corps over the plan for the ARVN to concentrate on providing the security screen for Revolutionary Development (RD) in 1967. According to Tri, morale is already very bad because of excessive favoritism in promotions, a situation which often results in the exclusion of combat officers. Tri also alleged that corruption and reluctance to fight on the part of many general officers are other factors eroding the spirit of the officer corps.

2. Leaving the primary task of combating the Communist main forces to Americans and Koreans will, Tri feels, give many ARVN officers the feeling that they are being relegated to a role which is beneath their dignity. Only proper preparation by the Joint General Staff for the ARVN's new role may, in his opinion, be able to avert further unrest among the officer corps.

3. Although Tri's observations may be colored in part by his own anomalous status, there are some indications that some high ranking members of the government share his reservations about the present and future state of ARVN and the morale of its officers. The feeling is that ARVN officers will have to be re-oriented to make them think differently about themselves, their jobs, and the importance of the pacification mission.

Viet Cong Defectors (Chieu Hoi)

4. The total of returnees to government control in 1966 rose to 17,726 as of 30 November. During the week of 24-30 November, there were 772 returnees according to GVN statistics. This is the second highest weekly total for 1966. The previous weekly high occurred in late February when 922 returnees were tallied. The extremely high return in February was attributed largely to an intensive pre-Tet Chieu Hoi campaign mounted by the GVN. A breakdown of this week's returnees by Corps Tactical Zone follows:

I Corps	48	
II Corps	526	
III Corps	62	
IV Corps	136	
	772	(384 military)

5. During November, there were 2,505 returnees (1,380 military)--an all-time high.

Viet Cong Counter-Chieu Hoi Program

6. According to information received from a rallier, the Viet Cong have established a counter-Chieu Hoi training center in Bien Hoa Province. According to this source, selected individuals are trained at this school to rally to the GVN side and then attempt to obtain jobs at Chieu Hoi centers. Once in place, these agents are supposed to attempt to incite ralliers against the government and

persuade them not to serve in the Vietnamese armed forces. Furthermore they are to work to exploit the complaints of the ralliers.

National Police Target of Subversion in Quang Nam

7. The Viet Cong Quang Da Provincial Planning Committee (responsible for what is approximately the GVN province of Quang Nam and Da Nang City) reportedly has directed its security sections to mount an intensive subversion effort against the National Police in their zones of responsibility. The plan is to be carried out in three phases: (1) investigation of individual members of the force, their families, and ideological and political leanings; (2) intensive subversion effort through every means of contact; (3) discrediting, abduction, or assassination of police who do not agree to cooperate.

8. This new Viet Cong effort, according to the source, is not unusual for its target, but for the fact that Viet Cong security sections have been assigned the mission. This is a measure of the importance which the leadership attaches to the effort. An intensive effort to undermine the police in Quang Nam may be part of a countrywide effort of the Communists to reduce the effectiveness of the National Police force, which is an important asset to the over-all Revolutionary Development program.

Refugee Situation in Tay Ninh

9. Preliminary reports from Tay Ninh Province indicate that as of mid-November, there were 23,059 refugees living in temporary shelters. This represents an increase of nearly 16,000 in the number of refugees in temporary shelter in this province since 31 August when only 7,085 refugees were listed as being in temporary shelters. The increase appears to result in large part from the disruption caused by Operation ATTLEBORO--a massive allied sweep of the province.

10. Tay Ninh Province has had the reputation of being able to absorb most of the refugees which have come from the province. Many refugees, for

instance, re-establish themselves individually rather than in government sponsored projects. This new influx will probably prove more difficult to deal with.

11. Current plans for the resettlement of refugees call for the construction of two model hamlets to resettle 1,000 refugee families. These hamlets were to be constructed during 1967. Considering the magnitude of the current flood of refugees, present plans for resettling refugees will have to undergo serious revision.

III. ECONOMIC SITUATION

Price movements were generally favorable during the week ending 28 November. Retail prices of domestic and imported commodities dropped slightly from levels of the previous week. Free market gold prices fell significantly and currency prices declined also. The prices of protein food led the decline in food prices and, significantly, the prices of pork and rice were at or below the levels reached last week.

The pork situation was discussed by US and GVN officials with a tentative agreement that official price ceilings on pork should be removed. This would depend, however, on establishing an adequate reserve stock of about 2,000 tons of frozen pork. Present facilities can accommodate only about 500 tons. The embassy favors construction of additional cold storage facilities to permit the holding of necessary reserve stocks of pork.

Discussions by embassy officers with GVN economic officials ranged over a number of topics. Although Secretary of State for Industry Ton did not attach much urgency to formulating a new rice policy, Secretary of State for Commerce Thien An shared embassy feelings of the urgency to do so. Thien An recognized, however, that political considerations will exert considerable influence on the rice policy adopted by the GVN.

Although problems have continued since the US took on an advisory and action role at the Saigon port, the embassy feels that a continuation of current efforts in the line of confiscating cargos left in warehouses, improving cargo accountability, and a correct credit policy will have some salutary effects on port operations.

Prices

1. Retail prices in Saigon during the week ending 28 November declined slightly with the over-all USAID retail price index down three percent from the previous week. Food prices declined three percent primarily because prices for protein foods fell or remained steady. The price of pork held steady a second week at the relatively low level of 85 piasters per kilogram, while the prices of beefsteak and fish declined. Rice prices held steady. Non-food items were mixed, with prices for charcoal and soap registering increases and other items holding steady. The USAID non-food index declined one percent below the level of the previous week. (A table of selected weekly retail prices in Saigon is included in the Annex).

2. Prices of imported commodities were generally unchanged: the USAID price index for selected US-financed imports declined only slightly from the level of the preceding week. Prices of condensed milk and flour were again a little lower than the level of the previous week as stocks continued ample. Chemicals remained relatively unchanged as fresh supplies reached the Saigon market. Despite the resumption of construction activity with the onset of the dry season, prices of construction materials, except cement, fell slightly with the arrival of new shipments.

Currency and Gold

3. The free money market remained relatively strong. The price of US dollars and MPC (scrip) was down slightly to 170 and 112 piasters per dollar respectively. The price of gold fell significantly during the week from 239 to 227 piasters per dollar as the recent reduction in the official sale price of gold continued to affect market psychology. (Graphics on monthly and weekly free market gold and currency prices are included in the Annex).

Pork Situation

4. US and GVN officials met on 18 November to discuss the over-all pork situation, particularly

increasing or removing official ceiling prices on live hogs and constructing new storage facilities for frozen pork. Although no substantive decisions were made at this meeting, the discussion was unusually frank and gave a clear picture of GVN thinking on pork.

5. The issue of GVN price ceilings provoked the most lively discussion. US officials contend that these price ceilings, which were originally imposed last December, have served no useful purpose and indeed, have suppressed production and disrupted arrivals of live hogs in Saigon. Moreover, the US feels that current and planned USAID programs, such as disease control, mixed feed plants and importation of improved stock, will not lead to increased production at current official prices. GVN representatives conceded that about one third of Saigon's pork supply currently comes through the black market and that because the official price applies only to live hogs at the slaughterhouse, the market price usually is well above the official level. Nevertheless, GVN officials were reluctant to reach the conclusion that official prices should be abandoned or at least greatly increased. Finally, however, they appeared willing to remove price ceilings provided an adequate reserve stock of about 2,000 tons of frozen pork could be established to regulate the market.

6. The US urged importation of both live hogs, at least through Tet, and frozen pork. In reply to a GVN inquiry about US financing for pork imports, it was pointed out that past pork imports had been financed by the GVN. The question of imports quickly became a question of cold storage facilities since present cold storage capacity is only 500 tons and the continued availability of this capacity is questionable. It was agreed that a cold storage facility of 2,000 ton capacity--roughly one month's consumption in Saigon--would be sufficient to supplement domestic supplies as required. US officials agreed to ascertain the cost and time required for construction of such a facility.

7. The embassy reports that the proper use of frozen pork could stabilize the market without displacing domestic production or lowering the return

to the producer below a fair market level. Moreover, in view of the importance of pork in the consumer price index, a stable pork market would contribute significantly to economic stabilization. For these reasons and because the GVN appears willing to remove price ceilings upon the establishment of an adequate reserve of pork, the embassy feels that there is merit in erecting a large cold storage warehouse.

Discussions with Ton

8. At a meeting with USAID Director MacDonald on 23 November, Acting Secretary of State for Industry Ton said that Premier Ky had announced to the GVN cabinet a 1967 budget ceiling of 75 billion piasters, which would be in line with US thinking on the budget. Ky did not, however, indicate the size of the civilian and military portions. According to Ton, Ky also expressed an intention to scrutinize the various ministerial budgets.

9. Ton again confirmed that the GVN was thinking of granting a ten percent wage increase for all GVN employees in early January or just after Tet. Because of concern about the impact of such a wage increase on prices, however, the GVN is exploring the possibility of disguising this proposed wage increase in the form of increased allowances or across the board step increases.

10. With regard to the recent reorganization of the Ministry of Economy, Ton said that Ky had announced the appointment of Ton as chairman of the Economic and Finance Committee. This economic policy committee had formerly been chaired by the Minister of Economy. It is interesting that, while Governor Hanh was away at the Asian Development Bank meeting in Tokyo, Ky chose to reject Hanh's suggestion that Ky chair the committee with Hanh as vice-chairman.

11. Ton's comments on rice policy indicated that he does not attach much urgency to formulating a new rice policy. He reported that the province chiefs were reluctant to become responsible for establishing rice buying stations because they did

not have adequate warehouses and were afraid of losses. Moreover, Ton felt that there were real dangers in getting ARVN too involved in rice collections. The USAID Director outlined some of the considerations involved in the Mission's proposed rice policy and indicated that a new rice price policy must be enunciated quickly by the GVN if the benefit of a price increase is to accrue to the farmers instead of the merchants. Ton asked that this matter be discussed again in a very restricted circle and not at the next meeting of the joint US-GVN economic committee. The US plans to commence discussions on rice with GVN officials and press them to move forward quickly.

Secretary of State for Commerce Thien An on Rice Policy

12. Secretary of State for Commerce Thien An in discussing rice policy with embassy officers gave the general impression that he would support an increase in the price for rice but that because of possible political repercussions it might not be acceptable to Premier Ky at this time. He confirmed the statement by Acting Secretary of State for Industry Ton that the GVN would not be capable of mounting a buying operation in the provinces. He agreed with the embassy, however, that the rice policy should be announced soon, by 15 December at the latest. This would mean that it would be discussed in a fairly final stage at the next cabinet meeting. This sense of urgency contrasts with that expressed by Ton.

Situation at the Saigon Port

13. The US Embassy feels that in placing the US military in an advisory and action role at the Saigon port last summer, the US adopted the best course of action to increase cargo movements through the port with the least disruption to Vietnamese administration of the port. To date, the following measures have been taken to relieve port congestion: reorganization of the port; approval of a new tariff which sharply increases warehouse charges; establishment of a cargo accountability system; improvement in warehouse management; completion of additional barge landing sites; and Ky's approval for enforcement of the 28 July confiscation decree.

14. In spite of these measures, however, the key port problem--the unwillingness of importers to remove their cargo from port warehouses--has not yet been solved. Although US officials, including Ambassador Lodge, have pressed Ky on confiscating cargo left in warehouses for more than 30 days, progress on confiscation has been disappointing. Hopefully, selective confiscation will take place in the near future. There remains, however, the problem of making available to importers adequate credit in order that they can pick up their goods on arrival. Overdue cargo reports are now being supplied weekly to commercial banks to allow them to bring pressure on consignees to remove their cargo. In addition, the GVN has recently proposed that credit for customs charges be extended to importers in an attempt to get them to move their goods out of the port more rapidly.

15. The embassy feels that the only other alternative--a complete US takeover of the port--would not solve the problem of importers' reluctance to remove their goods. Moreover, the US would be confronted with a host of difficult problems including liability for losses of goods, the handling of certain GVN services such as customs, assumption of title for all port equipment, and maintenance of a complicated bookkeeping and financial system for port operations. More important, however, is the fact that it is unlikely that the GVN would ever accept outright US operation of the port. For these reasons, the embassy feels that the best course of action is a continuation of all current efforts--confiscation, cargo accountability and a correct credit policy--to get importers to remove their goods.

ANNEX

WEEKLY RETAIL PRICES IN SAIGON a/

	3 Jan 1966	7 Nov 1966	14 Nov 1966	21 Nov 1966	28 Nov 1966
Index for All Items b/	160	222	224	227	217
Index for Food Items b/	169	228	230	237 c/	226 c/
Of Which: (In Piasters)					
Rice-Soc Nau (100 Kg.)	800	1,600	1,650	1,600	1,600
Pork Bellies (1 kg.)	70	170	110	85	85
Fish-Ca Tre (1 kg.)	110	130	150	180	140
Nuoc Mam (jar)	50	85	85	85	85
Index for Non-Food Items b/	124	202	202	191 c/	195 c/
Of Which: (In Piasters)					
Charcoal (60 kg.)	440	650	650	620	630
Cigarettes (pack)	10	14	14	14	14
White Calico (meter)	27	36	35	35	34
Laundry Soap (1 kg.)	30	45	45	32	40

a. Data are from USAID sources.
b. For all indexes, 1 January 1965 = 100.
c. Preliminary.

Saigon Free Market Gold and Currency Prices



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them "new criminal acts of aggression." Another domestic service commentator on the 3d, saying the raids will not succeed in frightening the people of the DRV, points out that Vietnam is helped by its socialist friends and that more and more U.S. planes are being destroyed as a result.

Moscow promptly reports the Viet Cong attacks on Tan Son Nhut airfield and on U.S. installations in Saigon, pointing to the resulting "panic" in the American command. And PRAVDA's correspondent, Shchedrov, cites the NFLSV statement that the raids were carried out in "retaliation" for the attacks on Hanoi and the bombing of the DRV "civilian population." A 7 December Moscow domestic service account of a press conference by Dang Quang Minh, the head of the NFLSV's mission in Moscow, to publicize the Front's "black book" on U.S. "chemical warfare" in South Vietnam, also quotes him as referring to the raids near Hanoi as proof of further U.S. escalation and as saying that the raid on Tan Son Nhut airfield was "revenge" for the air strike.

VC Claims Victory in "First Round" of Dry Season Campaign

Hanoi and Front media continue to describe the southern insurgents as responding triumphantly to the NFLSV Central Committee Presidium's 27 October appeal for defeat of the allied dry season offensive. A LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY communique carried by VNA on the 2d ticks off a series of alleged communist victories in the month since the appeal, claims the allies suffered 11,400 casualties in that period, and asserts that "we have won the first round" against the dry season offensive. It pictures an allied debacle in Tay Ninh and heavy allied reverses in the highlands and near the demilitarized zone.

OPERATION ATTLEBORO

Media exert particular efforts to depict Operation Attleboro in Tay Ninh Province as a major victory for the communists. A NHAN DAN editorial on the 30th hails this "glorious and highly significant victory" of the Viet Cong, says the campaign "broke the backbone" of "many elite U.S. units," resulted in some 3,000 enemy casualties, and displayed the "excellent and well coordinated fighting" by the three types of forces. An LPA roundup of the campaign carried by VNA on the 30th and statements by a representative of a regional "Liberation Armed Forces Command" quoted by LPA and carried by VNA on the 3d depict a thorough mauling of allied forces in the operation.

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The most comprehensive discussion of operation Attleboro appears in a lengthy commentary under the pseudonym "Quyet Thang" broadcast by Liberation Radio on 1 and 2 December. The author claims that Attleboro, "the largest military operation thus far," constituted the "biggest, bitterest and saddest" U.S. defeat. He says that the allies had sought to destroy insurgent main forces and "warehouses" and to pacify the Tay Ninh area, but that in fact the VC waged deep and continuous attacks on allied positions. Apparently sensitive over reports of heavy communist casualties, Quyet Thang claims that the allies "failed to destroy a single platoon" of the insurgents and adds, in describing various engagements, that "all of the guerrillas were safe," that "our side was unharmed."

The author stresses the successful coordination "among the different battlefields" and says that the three types of forces fought in "smooth coordination" and displayed "good mutual support." Some defensiveness seems evident, however, in the claim that the Viet Cong won its engagements "in a dignified manner" and waged "continuous" battles on a "minor scale" while setting the stage for "major battles whenever favorable."

The author notes approvingly that regular and guerrilla units cooperate in "deeply penetrating" disputed areas to promote mass uprisings. Citing engagements in the Tay Ninh campaign in which insurgents allegedly "lured the enemy out of his bases" and then attacked, he declares that "this way is, however, insufficient," that communist forces must "penetrate deeply" into allied territory and attack enemy bases, logistic centers, and urban areas. He asserts that "we must attack the enemy not only when he advances or pauses but also when he retreats," and that the insurgents must always "promote the offensive spirit."

Unlike earlier Front comment which flatly ridiculed the assignment of ARVN forces to pacification work, this article observes soberly that this is a development of "strategic importance." But it goes on to say that pacification efforts "have been frustrated."*

U.S. TROOPS IN DELTA

Some concern over the assignment of U.S. forces to delta areas seems evident in a The Truong QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article broadcast to the South on 2 December. It declares that the delta "continues to be

* Comment on ARVN pacification efforts is discussed in the BLOC SURVEY of 25 November, page 14.

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Some dissatisfaction over attitudes of urban intellectuals seems indicated in a 23 November Liberation Radio commentary which claims that "progressive intellectuals in the world approve our just struggle" and "consider siding with us" an "undeniable duty," and that "this truth will surely give our intellectuals food for thought" and will "prompt them to compare it with what they are doing." Urban intellectuals, it adds, "must adopt an appropriate attitude" and "must not turn your heads and feign ignorance" over U.S. "crimes."

Hanoi Edits "Cuu Long" Article on Guerrilla Warfare in South

A seemingly major addition to the literature on the conduct of the war in the South appears with Liberation Radio's 13 November broadcast of an article on guerrilla warfare under the pseudonym "Cuu Long" which was described as having been written for the daily and magazine editions of the DRV army organ QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. The identity of Cuu Long is not known* but he speaks with obvious authority regarding the war in the South. And the article takes on added significance when it is published in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 20 November and broadcast by Hanoi radio to the South on 28, 29 and 30 November with a number of apparently sensitive passages deleted or modified.

Cuu Long's article discusses the scope and potential of guerrilla war in unusual detail. And while he notes in passing that the "regulars" play the decisive role in the war as a whole, his major thesis is that at this stage guerrilla action can successfully counter the allies despite their troop buildup, superior weaponry, and air power. The article comes in the wake of considerable propaganda on military theory. Cuu Long now refers to the Front's guerrilla warfare conference, which Liberation Radio reported on 20 October, saying that it had "determined the procedures for organizing the three types of forces at the basic level." In June, July and August there was a flurry of statements on military matters in the propaganda. Most notably an article in HOC TAP by Nguyen Chi Thanh, broadcast by Hanoi to the South on 24 July, detailed allegedly hypothetical pitfalls which the Viet Cong avoided during the dry season. And at the end of July and early August, Hanoi released speeches at a mid-May "determined-to-win" congress of youth of the armed forces by First Secretary Le Duan, Defense Minister Giap and Gen. Song Hao.

* The last available article attributed to Cuu Long was one carried by Liberation Radio on 7 September which predicted a new U.S. dry season offensive and discussed strengths and weaknesses of the Viet Cong and the allies in somewhat polemical terms.

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Some of Hanoi's deletions of the Cuu Long article raise the possibility of differences on a high level including such basic questions of the role of the VPA in the South and the matter of control of the Viet Cong. The article is notable for its stress on the importance of "organizing the revolutionary masses," and the author cites Le Duan as well as the NFLSV Central Committee as his authority on this matter. Hanoi deletes a quotation from Le Duan on the subject as well as a subsequent reference to him. Hanoi retains Cuu Long's assertion that "leadership over the guerrilla war in various localities is not limited to military matters and cannot be understood as mainly the task of military organs." But Hanoi omits the following passage which says that the matter of leadership must be further discussed.

In the discussion of the role and nature of guerrilla warfare, Hanoi deletes from the middle of a sentence the specification of erroneous concepts as "the idea of depending on concentrated troops and of overestimating the enemy's forces and weapons." And Hanoi omits from a passage on the need for continued attack that statement that: "in this fierce struggle, to pause at the defensive is to invite the danger of being annihilated. Even if we do not attack the enemy, he will attempt to exterminate us."

Hanoi also excises Cuu Long's unusual details regarding the composition of the guerrilla force: it reports his statement that forces waging guerrilla warfare include all the armed forces from the main-force troops to the regional troops, but it omits his disclosure that they also include "special armed forces, such as the special task force and the ranger force." Hanoi also excises a subsequent reference to "the special task force, the engineer corps, and surveillance units." Hanoi also truncates a lengthy passage in which Cuu Long discusses the organization of the different categories of troops--including "hamlet, village, and intervillage" guerrillas and "specialized and secret" guerrillas.

Hanoi Continues to Show Concern Over Internal Problems

LE DUC THO ARTICLE IN NHAN DAN

An article by Le Duc Tho in the 7 November NHAN DAN voices open concern over the shortcomings of some party cadres and stresses that improving the relationship between basic party organizations and the masses is an "urgent demand which must receive the greatest attention." He asserts that commandism and violation of "mass rights" exist in a "serious degree at the basic level." While some of this is a matter of misunderstanding, he says, there are also cases of "bad motives."

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167

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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[redacted]

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C-O-N-F-[redacted]-E-N-T-I-A-L 081522Z [redacted]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

DIST 8 DECEMBER 1966

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 27 NOVEMBER 1966

SUBJECT VIET CONG HOLIDAY CEASE FIRE PLANS IN BINH THUAN PROVINCE

Rostow

ACQ VIETNAM, [redacted] (3 DECEMBER 1966) FIELD NO. [redacted]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

SOURCE [redacted]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1. ON 27 NOVEMBER 1966, THE VIET CONG (VC) HONG PHONG AND DONH HAI DISTRICT COMMITTEES (GVN HAI LONG AND THIEN GIAO DISTRICTS) OF BINH THUAN PROVINCE HELD A MEETING OF DISTRICT AND VILLAGE CADRES TO DISCUSS THE PROPOSED CEASE FIRE PERIODS DURING CHRISTMAS AND NEW YEARS HOLIDAYS.

2. NGUYEN TANH, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE BINH THUAN PROVINCE

C-O-N-[redacted]-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

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1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

COMMITTEE, FIRST REVIEWED THE GENERAL MILITARY AND POLITICAL SITUATION, SAYING THAT BECAUSE OF THE "PEOPLE'S VICTORIES AND THE AMERICANS' FAILURE ON THE BATTLEFIELDS OF VIETNAM" THE AMERICANS LAUNCHED A CAMPAIGN FOR A CEASE FIRE "TO EXAMINE THE FIGHTING SPIRIT OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLES ARMY AND ALSO TO ALLEVIATE THE STRAINED MORALE OF THE AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN SOUTH VIETNAM."

3. NEXT LE HUY, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ADVISOR TO THE BINH THUAN PROVINCE COMMITTEE, ALSO TOLD THE MEETING THAT THE IDEA OF A CEASE FIRE WAS "PROPOSED BY THE AMERICANS." HE ADDED "THEIR OFFER MIGHT BE ACCEPTED BECAUSE WE COULD GAIN GOOD POINTS ON THE BATTLEFIELDS AND IN TERMS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PROPAGANDA." THE REPRESENTATIVES AT THE MEETING THEN AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING PLAN OF ACTION IN CASE A CEASE FIRE IS DECLARED:

A. LOCAL COMMITTEES SHOULD CONDUCT AN URGENT CAMPAIGN TO MOBILIZE AS MANY LABORERS AS POSSIBLE FOR MOVEMENT OF SUPPLIES DURING THE CEASE FIRE PERIOD.

B. THEY SHOULD EXTRACT TWO THIRDS OF THEIR RICE AND SALT STORES TO AID THE VC EASTERN ZONE BATTLEFIELD. [redacted]

COMMENT: THIS IS PROBABLY VC ZONE D.)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

C-O-N-F-I-[redacted]E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

C. LOCAL COMMITTEES SHOULD CONTINUE TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THEIR INSTALLATIONS IN THE EVENT OF A BREACH OF PROMISE BY THE AMERICANS.

D. PRIOR TO THE CEASE FIRE PERIODS, THE VC SHOULD STRIVE TO REOCCUPY STRATEGIC POINTS, SO THAT AFTER THE CEASE FIRE THEY CAN ATTACK THE ENEMY FROM THESE POINTS.

E. DURING THE CEASE FIRE, MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PROSELYTING OPERATIONS SHOULD BE STRESSED AND PROPAGANDA CALLING FOR THE ENEMY SOLDIERS TO THROW DOWN THEIR WEAPONS LAUNCHED. FURTHER, THE REPRESENTATIVES AT THE MEETING WERE TOLD THAT IF THE CEASE FIRE PROPOSAL IS ACCEPTED, THEY WILL BE CALLED TO ANOTHER CONFERENCE AND ADVISED OF ADDITIONAL MEASURES TO BE CARRIED OUT.

4. THE MEETING WAS ALSO TOLD THAT BECAUSE OF DISASTROUS FLOODS IN THE DELTA, PROVISIONS THERE WERE SHORT. SINCE THERE WAS A GOOD HARVEST IN CENTRAL VIETNAM, RELIEF SUPPLIES WOULD BE SENT FROM THERE TO THE DELTA DURING THE CEASE FIRE PERIODS.

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USAID JUSPAO USMACV USARV NAVFORV 7TH AIR FORCE DIST 50/OSI 52TH MIG CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT. REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

1.5(e)
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY TODAY

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY TODAY

C O N T E N T S

		Page
	Summary	1
I.	Introduction	2
II.	General Deployment of Forces	4
	Division Alignments	4
III.	Capability as Effective Fighting Force	8
	Leadership in Combat	9
	Employment of Forces	10
	Effectiveness in Large-Unit Operations	12
IV.	The Manpower Problem	14
	Desertions	14
	Defections to Viet Cong	16
V.	Changeover to Pacification Role	17

ARVN - Order of Battle



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
12 December 1966

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The South Vietnamese Army Today

Summary

Plans are under way to shift the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) away from large-scale offensive operations against Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army main force units and employ it largely as a force to support pacification activities. The problems and characteristics of the ARVN as it exists today will to some extent determine its performance in this mission. This study sets forth some aspects of the ARVN's current status and reviews many of its more important problems on the eve of its reassignment.

NOTE: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Research and Reports, the Office of National Estimates, and the Director's Special Assistant for Vietnam.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Up to the present, neither the sharply increased level of US military assistance nor the large-scale commitment of US combat troops to South Vietnam appears to have resulted in a significant improvement of the over-all operational posture or combat performance of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN).

2. The inclusion of major ARVN elements in the planning and execution of combined operations with American forces has, to some degree, improved the morale and aggressiveness of certain ARVN units, including two of the three divisions based in the western half of III Corps. In much of the rest of the country, however, ARVN combat performance has been generally unsatisfactory or, at best, marginal, with the result that US and third-country deployments have been required to counter major Communist thrusts in most critical areas.

3. During the past year, the ARVN's forces have been most effective in the IV Corps area south of Saigon, largely because Viet Cong main forces in this region have been weakened by sizable cadre and combat troop withdrawals to the III Corps and elsewhere.

4. While there has been a generally favorable trend during 1966 in terms of the number of ARVN units considered combat effective,* the over-all capability of the regular army has, nonetheless, continued to be adversely affected by a number of important factors. Among them has been the general expansion of Communist military resources in the I, II, and III Corps Tactical Zones. The ARVN is unable, in many instances, to engage Communist main force units in the field on equal terms because of understrength units and inferior firepower. Another problem has been the ARVN's training. It is considered poor in quality and

* As of 30 September 1966, 130 of ARVN's 158 maneuver battalions were rated by US advisers as combat effective, 24 marginally combat effective, and four combat ineffective.

often oriented more toward conventional warfare than toward counterinsurgency methods and tactics. The insufficient number of qualified, aggressive and highly motivated officers and NCOs is reflected in frequent tactical blunders in conducting both large and small-unit operations.

5. The desertion rate of all component services of South Vietnam's armed forces, especially that of the ARVN, continued to rise throughout much of 1966. Although the rate has declined somewhat in recent months, it is problematical whether the induction system of the armed forces can continue to keep pace with losses from desertions and combat casualties.

6. On balance, the ARVN is considered generally capabie of maintaining internal security in most major population centers, in a few outlying areas, and along certain lines of communication. It is considered wholly incapable, however, of prolonged effective resistance by itself to the military threat posed by intensified North Vietnamese Army (NVA) infiltration and combat activity. It is also questionable whether the ARVN could cope alone with the Viet Cong, were Allied and North Vietnamese combat units to be withdrawn from South Vietnam.

II. GENERAL DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

1. The 284,633-man ARVN is the predominant force within the South Vietnamese military establishment and comprises about 90 percent of the personnel strength of the regular armed forces.* ARVN forces are deployed by corps zones north to south. For purposes of military command, administration, and logistics, the corps are further subdivided into division tactical areas. Approximately 34,000 ARVN combat troops, including 22,700 in the 1st and 2nd Divisions, operate in the five northernmost provinces of South Vietnam which form the I Corps area. Some 30,000 regular army troops, 19,500 of them subordinate to the 22nd and 23rd Divisions, are based in the central highlands and central coastal provinces of II Corps.

2. The heaviest concentration of ARVN units is in the III Corps area, where nearly 50,000 combat troops, including 34,400 attached to the 5th, 10th, and 25th Divisions, are deployed in an arc screening Saigon and its suburbs on the north, northwest, and northeast. About 38,000 combat personnel, 31,000 of whom are organized under the 7th, 9th, and 21st Divisions, are stationed in the IV Corps southern delta area below Saigon. Finally, the 8,500-man Airborne Division, reinforced by five South Vietnamese Marine battalions, composes the ARVN General Reserve headquartered in the Saigon Capital Special Zone.

Division Alignments

3. The present pattern of ARVN deployment has existed for the past two years, the sole major

*Major ARVN combat units presently include four corps headquarters, ten infantry divisions, one airborne division, one Guard Brigade, one separate infantry regiment, four separate infantry battalions, seven separate artillery battalions, nine armored cavalry squadrons, one Ranger group headquarters, 20 Ranger battalions, and two Special Forces groups.

exception being the creation of the 10th Division in III Corps late in 1965.

4. In 1963 and 1964, two ARVN divisions--the 9th and 25th--were moved from Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh provinces to reinforce the delta because of concern over the deteriorating security situation there. These redeployments, which brought the number of ARVN divisions stationed in the southern III Corps and IV Corps region to four, significantly improved the government's military posture in the delta.

5. Subsequently, the Viet Cong began to skim off cadres and combat elements from their main force units in the delta to permit expansion of their regular force structure in the III Corps area. The withdrawals lowered the combat effectiveness of the Viet Cong main forces in the IV Corps. Communist regulars were largely obliged to disperse and revert to small-unit operations in conjunction with local force battalions. For this reason the ARVN has generally held its own in the delta over the past 18 months, although large Communist forces remain there and the area still serves as a source of manpower and food for enemy units elsewhere.

6. Following the redeployment of the 9th and 25th ARVN Divisions to the delta in 1964, the security situation in Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh provinces went rapidly downhill. During the past year, however, the deployment of US Marines to Chu Lai and of South Korean forces to Qui Nhon has tended to stabilize the military situation in Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh. Offensives by these and other allied units in the area, culminating in the recent highly successful Operation IRVING, have substantially reduced the Communist threat, at least in Binh Dinh Province.

7. The 1st and 7th ARVN Divisions, based in Hue and My Tho, are generally considered the best of the major South Vietnamese units apart from the airborne and ranger outfits. Until six months ago, the 1st Division was more or less holding its own against Communist main forces in Quang Tri and Thua

Thien provinces. The influx of North Vietnamese regulars into the northern part of I Corps, however, was of necessity met by US redeployments. It is questionable, moreover, whether the 1st Division has fully recovered from the heavy involvement of some of its units and officers on the side of antigovernment elements in this spring's political upheaval in I Corps.

8. The ARVN 7th Division has executed a number of successful operations over the past two years which have kept Viet Cong main force units largely off balance in Viet Cong Military Region 8 (the northern Delta area immediately below Saigon). The division has had a number of able commanders and played a key role in supporting the government against coup attempts in 1964-65.

9. The 5th and 25th Divisions, based in the III Corps provinces of Binh Duong and Hau Nghia, were for some time acknowledged as the least effective major ARVN units. However, both divisions have displayed signs of general improvement in the last six months. The greatest single factor in improving tactical efficiency, pacification prowess, troop welfare, and morale of these divisions has been their inclusion in combined operations with US 1st and 25th Infantry Division forces in the area. The division commanders are developing a higher degree of confidence as a result of their direct relationships with American commanders in the planning and execution of joint operations.

10. Since no major US tactical elements are permanently assigned to Long Khanh Province, the 10th ARVN Division (based at the provincial capital of Xuan Loc) has not had a similar stimulus for improvement. This appears to be the major factor in the continued lack of progress in this unit as compared with others in III Corps.

11. In the provinces adjacent to Saigon, and in the Capital Special Zone itself, political as well as strategic considerations play a major role in governing the disposition and effectiveness of ARVN units. The screen of ARVN forces around

Saigon is designed to block any major Communist military effort against the capital as well as a possible movement on the city by coup forces from distant corps areas. Regular army units operating in the capital area thus must be loyal to the government in power. Therefore the zone commander and the commanders of the airborne division, the marine brigade, and the guard brigade which are headquartered in Saigon and make up the ARVN general reserve and the palace guard, are selected as much for their political reliability as for their demonstrated effectiveness in combat.

III. CAPABILITY AS EFFECTIVE FIGHTING FORCE

1. For a number of years, the performance of ARVN combat units in the field vis-a-vis the Viet Cong has been adversely affected by the nature of the training they have received, first from the French during the Indo-China War and then from the US after 1954. In essence, ARVN units have been trained to fight a conventional-type war in a counterinsurgency environment. This, of course, would apply as well to the great majority of US combat troops presently in South Vietnam, who are on the whole outperforming enemy main force units chiefly through the application of conventional warfare techniques. The basic difference, however, lies in the mobility and in the massive logistics-support base available to American combat forces in the field--helicopters, tactical aircraft, heavy artillery, and naval gunfire. US forces, therefore, enjoy an enormous firepower and quick-reaction capability over any Communist unit, a capability which is simply unavailable to most ARVN units on any comparable scale.

2. The large number of automatic weapons available to a main force Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army (NVA) unit gives it an overwhelming superiority in firepower against the average ARVN infantry unit equipped primarily with M-1s and carbines.* The bulk of the Viet Cong main forces in III and IV Corps, as well as NVA units in I and II Corps, are equipped

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* ARVN units have been supplied mainly with US arms and military equipment, most of which is of World War II design and manufacture. In addition to the usual inventory of small arms and automatic weapons, the regular army's heavy weapons include mortars (60-mm., 81-mm., and 4.2-inch), rocket launchers (3.5-inch), recoilless rifles (57-mm.), and howitzers (75-mm. self-propelled and pack, 105-mm., and 155-mm.).

with the modern 7.62-mm. family of small arms, 75-mm. recoilless rifles, 12.7-mm. and 7.92-mm. AAA machine guns, and B-40 rocket launchers. Faced with such superior firepower, ARVN units are generally very wary of closing with the Viet Cong, and rely heavily on artillery and air support in situations where close-in combat is almost mandatory to achieve satisfactory results.

3. Individual ARVN battalions are also often unable to meet Viet Cong/NVA main force units on numerically equal terms. As of September 1966, the average present-for-duty strength for the 158 ARVN maneuver battalions was 458, or 63 percent of the authorized strength of 714. Beyond this, the limited mobility capability of the ARVN, and its continuing requirement to provide security for populated areas, tends to reduce even further the actual number of troops available for offensive operations. For example, many infantry and ranger battalions are frequently unable to put more than 250 to 300 men into a field operation, compared with 400 to 600 men in a Communist main force or provincial battalion. This numerical disadvantage is quite evident to ARVN troops as well as to their commanders, and hence limits their confidence and willingness to take risks.

4. US ground forces, on the other hand, have a more substantial capability. In September, the present-for-duty strength of the 66 US combat maneuver battalions in South Vietnam (48 US Army, 18 USMC) averaged 92 percent. The authorized strength of a US Army infantry battalion in South Vietnam is 837 and that of a US Marine infantry battalion 1,200. American units are thus able to field a much larger combat force in the same number of battalions than their ARVN counterparts. This permits them to engage enemy forces on a unit-for-unit basis on numerically favorable terms.

Leadership in Combat

5. As in any army, ARVN combat effectiveness is directly related to the capability of the unit commander. During the first nine months of 1966, leadership in 22 to 35 percent of ARVN's 158 battalions was rated by US field advisers as unsatisfactory or marginal. Such factors as the rapid

expansion of the force structure necessitated by the acceleration of enemy military activity, the lack of an adequate base of experienced leaders, especially junior officers and NCOs, the preoccupation with political maneuvering at the senior officer level, and the frequent command changes in top echelons, have all contributed significantly to the leadership problem. The ARVN also has a tendency to overstaff its headquarters elements at the sector, regimental, divisional, and corps level with an inordinate number of junior officers and NCOs, many of whom have reportedly paid for the privilege of avoiding combat duty.

6. The importance of good leaderhip is clear. The 9th ARVN Division, for example, has had a good combat record largely because it has consistently had effective and efficient leaders. A number of ARVN regiments have had poor combat records except during the tenure of one specific commander; others, such as the 42nd and 47th Regiments, based in Bac Lieu and Phu Yen provinces, have had a succession of able commanders under whom they performed creditably, only to deteriorate under a bad one.

Employment of Forces

7. During the past few years, the most prevalent type of combat activity engaged in by ARVN units of battalion strength or larger has been the search-and-destroy operation. The great majority of these operations have been conducted independently of other allied forces, and have been controlled by a sector, regimental, or divisional headquarters element. When ARVN units have participated in joint search-and-destroy operations with US and third-country combat forces, their role has often been limited to one of support--such as serving as a blocking force along enemy withdrawal routes. Battalion-size and larger ARVN forces also have engaged in operations designed to protect rice harvests or clear and hold territory for pacification, and in road-clearing and local security.

8. There have been a number of basic weaknesses in the conduct of large-scale ARVN operations. In the first place, many of the multibattalion ground

sweeps have not been adequately coordinated with the general pacification objectives in the local sector and thus have failed to produce lasting results. Secondly, as has already been noted, the relative inferiority in ARVN infantry unit firepower vis-a-vis the Viet Cong has resulted in an overdependence upon preparatory artillery fire or tactical air strikes against known or suspected enemy positions prior to the start of an operation. In many instances, the enemy, forewarned by the preliminary action, has been able to elude government forces.

9. A third and often fatal weakness reflected in many large-scale operations has been the dependence of participating ARVN units on the presumed security provided by vehicular convoy deployment to a battle area. In many operations, ARVN units are completely roadbound; they often refuse to venture into enemy territory except in large truck convoys accompanied by equivalent numbers of armored personnel carriers and other armored vehicles. Such units have often become prime targets for annihilation by enemy ambush units. A classic example was provided in the November 1965 ambush of the ARVN 7th Regiment in the Michelin Plantation area of Binh Duong Province, in which government regulars sustained more than 700 casualties in less than two hours.

10. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, tactical plans for ARVN large-unit operations are normally based on attainment of terrain objectives, and success determined on the basis of executing the prescribed maneuver plan, rather than on the basis of destruction of the enemy force in the area. In addition, these operations are usually planned to terminate at nightfall, thus enabling participating units to return to their cantonment areas either to spend the night with their families or to perform static security duties. This is frequently done at the cost of breaking a potentially fruitful contact with the enemy.

11. Operating in a strength of three companies or less, ARVN forces have also participated in numerous "small-unit actions," usually with reinforcement from Vietnamese paramilitary units. These actions are normally of very short duration, involving

for the most part routine day or night patrol activity or the establishment of ambush sites along known or suspected enemy lines of communication.

12. In small-unit operations, ARVN forces can generally be faulted for their lack of aggressiveness, and for their failure to direct these actions toward the neutralization of Viet Cong capabilities to interfere with pacification. In addition, ARVN small-unit operations often suffer from the absence of clear, coordinated patrol and ambush plans. Very often, participating units will establish tactical patterns easily detected by enemy forces, e.g., utilizing the same ambush site for several consecutive nights or traversing by the same paths and roads while on reconnaissance missions.

Effectiveness in Large-Unit Operations

13. A general idea of the combat effectiveness of the ARVN can be derived from an examination of some of the statistics associated with ARVN operations and by a comparison with similar statistics on US military activities in South Vietnam. The comparison is not intended to play up US combat proficiency vis-a-vis the ARVN. It does, however, provide a general reference point from which to evaluate ARVN operations. As noted in the preceding pages, the ARVN suffers from manpower, leadership, and ground and air support problems which are not experienced in the same degree by US units. It is unlikely, therefore, that the ARVN could ever hope to achieve the level of combat effectiveness of US units.

14. ARVN maneuver battalions spent about 30 percent of their available time during the first nine months of 1966 engaged in large-unit actions, while US units spent about 48 percent of their available time in similar operations. Numerically, nevertheless, the ARVN conducted more large operations than did US forces. ARVN actions, however, were substantially shorter in duration, averaging 5.4 battalion days per operation compared with 22.8 for US forces. Often, the longer operations

in Vietnam yield better results, since the enemy is forced to commit himself to combat through the continued tactical maneuvering of the two sides.

15. About 38 percent of the ARVN's large-unit operations during the first nine months of 1966 resulted in contact with the enemy. This was a substantial decline from 1965, when the rate of contact during similar actions was about 44 percent. US units contact the enemy in about 90 percent of their large-unit operations. The over-all ARVN/enemy kill ratio was 1 to 3.2 on large operations. The US/enemy kill ratio was 1 to 5.4. ARVN forces captured an average of 2.2 enemy soldiers per month per battalion, as compared with 4.2 enemy soldiers per month per US battalion. Finally, ARVN forces took an average of 2.3 enemy weapons per month per battalion and US forces an average of 9.3 per month per battalion. The latter figures do not include weapons taken from overrun enemy supply caches.

IV. THE MANPOWER PROBLEM

1. During 1965, a modest manpower buildup was achieved by the South Vietnamese Army despite increasing desertions and battlefield losses. The number of infantry-type battalions increased from 123 at the end of 1964 to 133 by the fourth quarter of 1965, while personnel strength increased from 220,400 to 267,900.

2. However, while ARVN forces increased numerically from 278,000 at the end of the first quarter of 1966 to 284,633 during the third quarter, the rate of growth has tapered off sharply. The drop may be attributed in part, at least, to the growing inability of the South Vietnamese armed forces induction system to keep pace with losses in the regular army accruing from desertions, combat casualties, and other manpower attrition factors.

Desertions

3. The nearly continuous rise in military desertions, dating from at least 1962, constitutes the most serious manpower problem in all the component forces--regular, regional and popular--of the South Vietnamese armed forces (RVNAF). The monthly average of desertions increased from approximately 9,500 in 1965 to about 11,300 during the first half of 1966. At this rate, projected total desertions for 1966 should exceed 135,000--the highest annual total on record.

4. Moreover, for the first time, the number of desertions in the ARVN or regular army this year comprises more than half of the total desertions reported. The average monthly desertion rate per 1,000 personnel in the ARVN has risen sharply from 8.3 and 14.2 in 1964 and 1965, respectively, to 18.3 for the period 1 January - 30 June 1966. Most of the deserters in all components were conscripts.

5. The ARVN reported a total of 43,617 personnel losses for the first half of 1966, 35,387 of whom were dropped from the rolls as deserters. Desertions among officers and NCOs have risen from 116 and 656, respectively, during 1965, to 117 and 941 for the first six months of 1966. Desertions are heaviest from the Airborne Division.

6. A number of factors have contributed to the continued high level of desertions. One factor is that much of the army rank and file, like the population in general, lacks a positive commitment to the government. Political turmoil, such as the 1966 "struggle movement" in I Corps, has also played a role in accelerating the pace of military desertions.

7. Another cause of desertions has been the increase in Viet Cong combat strength and firepower, which has resulted in increased physical danger for ARVN troops during contacts with enemy main force units. Other factors include the lack of attention on the part of unit commanders to personnel management and troop welfare problems, the absence of an effective disciplinary program, and the lack of prospects for discharge from military service for many individuals.*

8. The dissatisfactions which lead to low morale and heavy desertions within the enlisted and conscripted ranks can often be traced to low pay rates, inadequate dependent housing, concern over the welfare of families, infrequent rotation of units in isolated outposts, and inadequate medical care of the wounded. Among junior officers, there is considerable dissatisfaction because rewards, in the form of assignments, honors, and promotions are more often than not predicated on political considerations rather than merit.

9. A solution to the desertion problem has been of major concern to the South Vietnamese military command, and a number of significant steps have recently

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* Many reserve officers and NCOs, for example, have been on "emergency" active duty since 1950-51 with no real prospects for release. Similarly, few conscripts are released at the end of their two-year active duty obligation.

been undertaken in the hope of reversing the trend.* It is too early to tell whether the problem will be diminished over the long run by these measures. However, total RVNAF desertions for the month of June (9,873) were about 1,500 less than the monthly average for the first half of 1966, while those for July and August were approximately 3,000 less. In fact, the August desertion total (8,108) was the lowest recorded for any month of 1966.

Defections to Viet Cong

10. How many of the South Vietnamese deserters defect to the Viet Cong is unclear. Documents and POW interrogations indicate, however, that there are considerable numbers of ex-RVNAF soldiers in Communist ranks. Some are defectors, others are deserters who have been conscripted by the Viet Cong after their return home. The percentage of former GVN soldiers is probably much higher in Viet Cong irregular units than in main force units. The percentage in the latter, however, seems likely to rise as the Viet Cong's need for manpower outweighs the risks involved in taking in their former enemies. This is borne out by the statements of a Viet Cong lieutenant colonel who defected to the Vietnamese government on 2 August 1966. He claimed that, in a Communist training regiment he had commanded, almost half the trainees had previously served in the RVNAF. The regiment forwarded most of its graduates to regular main force units.

* In June, a comprehensive law providing stiffer penalties for deserters and accomplices, including capital punishment for those crossing over to enemy ranks, was adopted. At the same time, legislation providing a substantial pay raise and other benefits (such as PX and dependent housing privileges) for all military and civil service personnel was put into effect.

Other corrective measures include the adoption by military authorities of modern techniques of deserter investigation and apprehension, and the development of a long-range and comprehensive military leadership improvement program. Finally, a series of major security operations conducted in the Saigon area by the ARVN General Reserve and the National Police have yielded excellent results. Several thousand deserters, draft dodgers, AWOLs, and civilians without proper identification papers have been rounded up.

V. CHANGEOVER TO PACIFICATION ROLE

1. The new mission of ARVN in the Revolutionary Development (RD) program will be, first, to clear areas of whatever organized Communist forces may be present to disrupt the securing of hamlets, and second, to reassert a GVN presence among the people. How successful ARVN will be in this transition is still uncertain. In the IV Corps Zone, for example, where ARVN has not been supported by US ground units, it has done little more than hold its own against the Viet Cong.

2. Some indication of the number of ARVN units which will be committed to the pacification support role is provided in preliminary reports on the changeover. In I Corps, the 1st ARVN Division will commit two maneuver battalions to each of the corps' two provinces; in other words, four of the division's 12 maneuver battalions initially will support RD. In the 7th Division's tactical area, which covers the delta provinces of Go Cong, Kien Hoa, and Dinh Tuong, five of the division's maneuver battalions are initially to be committed to the RD effort.

3. The effect the new mission will have on the morale and efficiency of ARVN officers and men is difficult to judge at present. It may be some time, in fact, before a definite trend can be discerned. Since the ARVN's mission will be to keep Viet Cong units at bay so that RD activities may be carried on, the ARVN may be involved in even more combat than it presently carries out. It is possible that the new mission will result in fewer casualties, but this depends to some extent on how the Viet Cong react.

4. If the Communists decide, for purely psychological reasons, to concentrate their efforts against ARVN units engaged in RD support, casualties could be high and might adversely affect ARVN morale. Also, the Viet Cong may be expected to try to portray the ARVN as playing a secondary role in the war, in the hope of fomenting ill feeling between the ARVN and other allied forces. There is evidence in Viet Cong radio propaganda that such an effort is already under way.

5. The effect of a pacification support role on ARVN desertions is problematical; but in any event, it seems unlikely that the redirection alone will be a critical factor in the desertion rate.

6. The probable reaction of the rural populace to the ARVN's presence in the pacification picture depends in great part on ARVN's performance. The main mission of ARVN will continue to be one of combat rather than one of greater contact with the rural population, but the shift in mission from search-and-destroy to clear-and-hold operations will probably increase contacts with the rural population in the future. Although these conditions will multiply the opportunities for the abuses and pillaging by ARVN which have been so prevalent in the past, there is now an opportunity for a closer sense of identity to develop between the ARVN and the people. The critical factor of troop behavior will depend largely upon the ability and willingness of ARVN troop commanders to maintain close troop discipline. In areas where troops are well led, properly disciplined and behave correctly, they may be expected to be an asset to the RD effort, but the reverse will be the case if units involved do not meet these standards. Because of the importance of harmonious relations between the ARVN and the populace, it is essential that command and troops committed to pacification be aware of the need to present a favorable image to the people with whom they deal. A program is already under way in Saigon to provide the necessary reorientation of those units which will be committed to the support of the RD effort.

7. In the final analysis, the success of the new ARVN mission is likely to depend, to a considerable extent, upon the degree to which it is understood and accepted by individual ARVN field commanders. Political repercussions could be felt, for example, if the present divisional structure is not carefully integrated into the planning of the new mission, or if division and corps commanders feel that their prerogatives are being diminished under the new concept.

8. Top GVN military planners are apparently mindful of these problems in giving their backing to ARVN's supporting role in revolutionary development. Chief of State General Thieu has reportedly indicated that there will be a need to reshape the outlook of many senior officers and that this effort will be undertaken. The chief of the Joint General Staff, General Vien, has also made a point of stressing his own full commitment to the RD support mission by sending a command letter to his subordinates. Moreover, ARVN leaders have made plans for the training in Saigon of teams from all ARVN divisions concerning the new mission. These teams are to return to their parent divisions and initiate similar training programs down to battalion level.

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence

THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(5 December - 11 December 1966)

C O N T E N T S

	Section
POLITICAL SITUATION	I
Constituent Assembly member assassinated; Other Constituent Assembly developments; Directorate rejects assembly proposals; Several ambassadorial changes likely	
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT	II
Refugees flee Viet Cong areas in Kien Giang; Revolutionary Development in An Giang; Land reform; Hamlet security; Viet Cong defectors (Chieu Hoi)	
ECONOMIC SITUATION	III
Prices; Currency and gold; Provincial prices; Joint US-GVN economic meeting; GVN views on rice policy; Credit policy.	
ANNEX: Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon (table)	

I. POLITICAL SITUATION

Official developments on the political scene in South Vietnam last week were overshadowed by the assassination of a prominent member of the Constituent Assembly. The killer has admitted Viet Cong connections, and there is no evidence to suggest that he is anything other than an enemy terrorist. The assembly postponed further substantive sessions because of the incident. Earlier in the week, the ruling Directorate had met and decided to reject an assembly proposal which would have limited the Directorate's power to amend the draft constitution. The decision, however, has not yet been formally conveyed. In other developments, one of Premier Ky's personal assistants told the US Embassy that several Vietnamese ambassadors will be replaced or moved to other posts.

Constituent Assembly Member Assassinated

1. Work in the Constituent Assembly came to a halt last week following the assassination of Tran Van Van, one of the assembly's most prominent critics of the Ky government. Van was en route to an assembly session on the morning of 7 December when two men on a motorcycle fired the fatal pistol shots into his car. One of the killers was captured shortly thereafter by the Vietnamese police; the other man escaped.

2. According to a Vietnamese source, the alleged assassin at first denied being a member of the Viet Cong. Under subsequent police interrogation, however, he admitted belonging to a section of the Viet Cong Regiment for the Liberation of the Capital. He claimed to have been forcibly recruited for the assassination task three months ago, trained at a base camp in Binh Duong Province, and sent into Saigon a week prior to the killing. Although the terrorist denied firing the fatal shots, the police reportedly found that his hands showed traces of gunpowder and that his pistol had fired a bullet retrieved from Van's automobile.

3. If the killing was indeed a plot of the Viet Cong, as seems likely, the choice of Van as the target would seem a good one from their point of view. He was one of the leading southern activists in the assembly and a thorn in the side of the northern-oriented Ky regime during the recent cabinet crisis. The Communists may have calculated that the murder of a major critic of the Ky government would draw suspicion to the regime itself and further sharpen the conflict between northerners and southerners.

4. A day after Van's death, Radio Hanoi and the Viet Cong radio in South Vietnam accused Ky and Thieu of "sending their agents into the streets" to murder him. The broadcasts cited Western press reports speculating that southern antipathies toward the government might be aroused and bring political turmoil. US officials in Saigon, however, have discounted internal political implications in the killing, and there has been no reported adverse reaction from southern assemblymen. The Viet Cong had threatened publicly, prior to the 11 September elections, that they would assassinate candidates for the assembly.

Other Constituent Assembly Developments

5. The assembly will hold its next substantive session early in the week of 12 December. Before adjourning because of Van's murder, it did hear some recommendations on the organization of the future government put forth by the constitution-drafting committee. Those recommendations were similar to the ones presented earlier by other committees advocating four independent government branches: an elected president, a bicameral legislature, a judiciary, and an inspectorate. Although the deputies are generally in agreement, they are still divided about equally on whether to include a prime minister in the system. They also appear to be in favor of providing for elected province chiefs and mayors under the new constitution.

6. Several committee members who were assigned to study selected aspects of a future constitution argued that the present administrative system is not responsive to regional and local needs. They maintained

that too much power has been vested in the hands of the corps commanders to the detriment of the province, village, and city officials. Moreover, they characterize the presently appointed government officials at the province level and lower as generally ineffective either because they are military officers with little administrative experience or because they are underpaid.

7. The committees also recommended instituting a strong system of checks and balances on the government through the following provisions. The legislature should have the right to vote on the national budget, to approve high-level appointments, and to question the executive. The inspectorate and the judiciary should be allowed to check on the abuses of power. The people and the press should have the right to criticize openly the execution of national policy. A legal opposition and a system of political parties should be formalized. The head of state should be limited to one four-year term in office. Neither the executive head of state nor the national assembly should have the constitutional right to dissolve the other.

Directorate Rejects Assembly Proposals

8. The Directorate has decided to reject proposals which would have changed seven articles in the basic charter of the Constituent Assembly. The proposals were submitted to the Directorate on 18 November by a 12-man delegation of assembly leaders. One of the most controversial clauses in the charter, Article 20, empowers the Directorate to amend the draft constitution before it becomes law. According to reliable clandestine sources, the decision to reject the proposals was made at a meeting in early December, attended by the ten military members and eight of the civilians on the 20-member Directorate, but has not yet been officially conveyed to the assembly. Many of the deputies reportedly know that the decision has been made, according to the US Embassy, but several of them have said that the Directorate's inflexible stand is not likely to disrupt the assembly's work.

Several Ambassadorial Changes Likely

9. Prime Minister Ky has officially requested that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs replace Vu Van Thai, the present ambassador to the United States, with Bui Diem, one of Ky's close civilian advisers. The United States has accepted the nomination. Ambassador Thai now is in Saigon, but no date has been set for Diem's departure for Washington.

10. According to another of Ky's assistants, Dinh Trinh Chinh, several other Vietnamese ambassadors will be replaced or shuffled in the near future. Chinh himself is slated for the ambassadorship to Thailand. Other posts affected include Laos, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Tunisia, Malaysia, and the United Nations observer. Chinh states that some of the new ambassadors will be generals who do not presently have significant positions in the military.

11. Recent reports have indicated that the ruling generals have been pressuring the Foreign Affairs Ministry to assign persons whom they favor to ambassadorial posts. Tran Van Do, the ministry head, has registered several complaints to Ky about the alleged military interference.

II. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

Some 2,500 refugees and 64 defectors returned to GVN control in Kien Giang Province after an intensive psychological warfare campaign, backed up with air strikes. Although Revolutionary Development continues to progress favorably in An Giang Province, many problems remain; the principal one is the Hoa Hao political structure which dominates the province and is resistant to change. Land reform efforts may receive new impetus under a new program to allocate funds for a four-pronged approach to improving land tenure conditions for the farmers. Although impressive gains were reported by the GVN in the number of hamlets secured in October, the embassy notes that many of these may represent only paper gains.

Refugees Flee Viet Cong Areas in Kien Giang

1. In December approximately 2,500 refugees have fled a Viet Cong - controlled area in the Hon Chong Mountain area, some 35 miles northwest of the province capital of Rach Gia, Kien Giang Province. The refugees left the Viet Cong base area, according to a MACV report, largely as the result of the combined pressures of air attacks and an intensive, carefully coordinated allied psychological warfare campaign. The refugee group included about 1,200 children.

2. Although the refugees expressed dissatisfaction with Viet Cong control techniques, they are anxious to return to their home areas to begin harvesting their rice. An exodus of this magnitude demonstrates that Viet Cong control of the population may be effectively challenged by a carefully prepared and executed psywar campaign. A follow-up psychological operation is reportedly being planned to exploit this situation more fully.

3. In addition to the refugees, 64 Viet Cong defectors came under government control in Kien Giang. Included in the defector group were one noncommissioned officer, a tax collector, and several cadre.

Revolutionary Development in An Giang

4. An Giang Province, according to a 10 November embassy report, is today clearly the most prosperous province in the delta region, but much work remains to be done to implement fully all aspects of the Revolutionary Development program. The principal reason for this somewhat dark view of the situation in the province is the tight hold maintained by the Hoa Hao power structure on the affairs of the province and apparent Hoa Hao reluctance to a change in the status quo.

5. Hoa Hao power in the province is not monolithic, but rather fractionalized among several elements. While mutually competitive, these factions will unite in the face of any challenge by US advisers, the GVN, the Viet Cong, or any other outside intruders. In An Giang, the three principal factions are: the Central/Hoa Hao Church organization; a local group headed by the province chief, Lt. Col. Ly Ba Pham; and another element led by "Colonel" Nguyen Van Hue, the chairman of the Province Council.

6. One of the chief failings of the RD program in the province, according to this report, has been in efforts to implement the GVN land reform policy. This program, it seems, will be very difficult to initiate here. For example, although extensive aerial photography has been conducted to determine the province's cadastral structure, the province chief, Lt. Colonel Pham, has "refused to discuss" the uses to which this information may be put. Although recent decisions may have largely negated information relating to the land reform program contained in this embassy report (see Land Reform below), even a concentrated GVN effort may founder in the shoals of regionalism and factionalism.

7. Another aspect of RD in which progress is apt to be slow is public health. A new and well-equipped dispensary exists, but is headed by an inadequately

trained former practitioner of oriental medicine whom the people, because of their mistrust, will not patronize. Consequently, a resident medical assistant and two nurses remain idle. The main source of medical care at the present time is US and third-country programs, such as the MEDCAP and MILPHAP teams which have made a large impact on the population. Improvement in public health facilities in An Giang and the entire delta region would be a significant contribution to the well-being of the peasants who in other respects are relatively well off. The GVN would stand to gain an easy and impressive psychological warfare victory by instituting a well-founded medical program for An Giang--a service which the Viet Cong are wholly ill equipped to provide.

8. The seven Revolutionary Development Cadres (RDCs) teams are working rather rapidly and well in An Giang, spending only two or three weeks in each hamlet. This rapid pace is possible because the security situation is generally good in An Giang. Paradoxically, this situation gives rise to another problem--underemployment of the greater part of the normal 59-man RDC teams. Two-thirds of each team's members carry arms and are responsible for providing security for remaining team members fulfilling census-grievance and other duties. These armed elements are now largely idle, although they have been employed in flood relief work.

9. Several criticisms have been voiced about the RDC teams in An Giang, as in other parts of the country. Specifically, they have been called "cowboys" from urban areas not adapted to work in the countryside. Also, they are not recruited from the areas in which they are to work; they are often poorly motivated, trained, and led, and indifferent to local village traditions or to village elders. Furthermore--and this may be the reason for much of the criticism of the RDCs--village and hamlet officials are not paid as well as the RDCs.

10. Although the over-all situation in An Giang is good, there has been no radical departure from the ways of the past. The people do not appear to demonstrate any greater loyalty to or love for the GVN, and the traditional Hoa Hao power structure which commands loyalties remains intact.

Land Reform

11. Priority emphasis is reportedly being given by the GVN and the US to the implementation of all existing GVN land tenure policies in An Giang Province, according to the recent embassy reporting. Other selected areas will also receive increased attention. In order to assist the program in getting under way, some VN$30 million in counterpart funds has been allocated for the following projects:

a. Distribution, with full titles, of former French-held, expropriated, and squatter lands;

b. Investigation, updating, and renewal of tenant-landlord contracts;

c. Establishing: (1) positions of village land officer/registrar and (2) village agricultural committees;

d. Special assistance to An Giang by means of counterpart funding and use of photogrammetry for preparation of title descriptions, land use and capability studies, and an integrated agrarian development plan for a 6,000- to 7,000-hectare tract.

12. During the past year there have been several instances--accompanied by great fanfare--where land titles were presented to these tilling the soil, but these seemed to be mainly for propaganda purposes. The new program appears to be a serious, concerted effort to solve one of the most difficult problems facing any government in Saigon--the effective redistribution of land to peasants who have spent many years cultivating it without anything tangible to show for their efforts. An effective land reform program could go a long way toward undercutting Viet Cong support among the peasants and winning them over to the GVN cause.

Hamlet Security

13. According to statistics received from the GVN there was a net increase of 156 secured hamlets throughout the country during October. Although this figure is an impressive one, the embassy believes it should be accepted only with caution. There are indications that some of these hamlets are secured on paper only, and that the GVN statistics represent an effort by local officials to meet previously established goals. There was a corresponding increase of 1.4 percent in the secured population, raising the total to 56.8 percent of the population--or 8,541,400 persons--living in secured areas.

Viet Cong Defectors (Chieu Hoi)

14. The total of returnees to government control in 1966 rose to 18,190 as of 7 December. During the week of 1-7 December there were 464 returnees, according to GVN statistics. A breakdown of this week's returnees by Corps Tactical Zone follows:

I Corps	63
II Corps	280
III Corps	44
IV Corps	77
	464

III. ECONOMIC SITUATION

The week ending 5 December was highlighted by a sharp rise in Saigon retail prices, partly because of lower deliveries of rice and protein foods to Saigon. As a result of this increase, retail prices are now at their highest level of the year with the exception of the peak that was reached during the September elections. Prices of imported commodities, on the other hand, declined slightly, and free market gold and currency prices showed only small variations. An embassy analysis of provincial prices during July-October shows that these prices are generally well above those in Saigon, but the degree by which the two sets of prices vary has diminished.

US and GVN officials held their sixth joint economic meeting at which Minister of Finance Kien reported that the GVN had decided to permit importers to postpone payment of customs duties in an attempt to ease the importers' need for credit. The US prefers an expansion of the commercial banks' capacity to extend credit to importers--a proposal which Governor Hanh has approved. A US-GVN subcommittee on pork has recommended removal of the official price ceiling on pork, provided cold storage facilities are constructed to hold reserves of pork. Discussions with senior GVN economic officials indicate general agreement with the US-suggested increase in the government price of rice but disagreement with the US proposal for establishing GVN rice buying stations.

Prices

1. Retail prices in Saigon rose sharply during the week ending 5 December, partly because of lower deliveries of rice and protein foods to Saigon.

Both food and non-food items were higher, resulting in a gain of seven percent in the over-all USAID retail price index. This index is now at its highest level of the year with the exception of the peak reached at the time of the September elections. The food index rose eight percent, largely because of soaring rice and pork prices. On 5 December the price of the type of rice used by the working class reached a new 1966 high of 1,700 piasters per 100 kilograms, or 36 percent above the level prevailing just prior to the June devaluation. The price of pork bellies rose to 130 piasters per kilogram--an increase of more than 50 percent above the previous week--reportedly because demand for pork increased while deliveries to Saigon were lower. Beef, fish, and chicken also were higher. The non-food index was three percent above the previous week, largely because of higher prices for charcoal and calico. Heavy pre-Tet purchases of calico caused an 18 percent increase in the price of this commodity. (A table of weekly retail prices in Saigon is included in the Annex).

2. Prices of imported commodities, on the other hand, were slightly lower as measured by the USAID price index for selected US-financed imports. Condensed milk and wheat flour were lower as the market continued to be well supplied, and sugar was unchanged. Fertilizers, chemicals, and rayon yarn edged up slightly. A similar slight upward price movement was recorded by construction materials because of increased demand occasioned by the start of the new construction season.

Currency and Gold

3. Free market prices for dollars and MPC (scrip) moved up slightly during the week ending 5 December. Gold, on the other hand, declined again, reportedly because of an expectation of a further reduction in the official sale price of gold and the continuation of tight cash conditions. Currency price quotations for 5 December have not yet been reported.

Provincial Prices

4. The embassy has just completed a series of price indexes for each of the four regions of South Vietnam based on price reports received for the period 30 June - 31 October 1966 from selected provinces within each region. Although these indexes are relatively crude and in some cases based on incomplete reporting, they show three rather significant trends: (a) with the exception of Region IV, provincial prices generally are well above those in Saigon; (b) after the initial post-devaluation increase in prices, provincial prices have generally not increased significantly and in some cases have declined; and (c) the degree by which provincial prices exceed those of Saigon has diminished during the period studied.

Joint US-GVN Economic Meeting

5. US and GVN officials recently held their sixth joint economic meeting, which was co-chaired by Acting Minister of Industry Ton and USAID Director MacDonald. On the question of credit to importers, Minister of Finance Kien reported that, quite apart from the issue of bank credit, the GVN had decided to give authority to the Director of GVN Customs to permit importers to postpone payment of their customs duties. Importers will put up real estate as collateral. Kien and Ton believe that this liberalization will be sufficient to satisfy the importers' complaint of a lack of customs credit and will assist in speeding up the flow of goods through the port.

6. Kien also proposed that port congestion be relieved by using importers' declarations as the basis for the assessment of duties instead of checking all imported goods. Spot checks would be made to encourage honest declaration. Ton and Kien again expressed the view that the advent of the dry season will induce importers to clear construction materials through the port.

7. The pork subcommittee set up at the fifth US-GVN economic meeting submitted recommendations on

pork policy. This subcommittee, which is composed of US and GVN economic officials, agreed that the present ceiling price on hogs in Saigon does not and cannot effectively control pork prices. Consequently, the group recommended that this ceiling price be eliminated in order to increase deliveries of hogs from the delta and lower pork prices in Saigon. The subcommittee felt, however, that controls should not be removed until means of indirect supply can be set up. For this purpose, the group recommended the construction of a 2,000-ton capacity freezing plant to hold frozen stocks for use in stabilizing prices and providing emergency supplies in case of acute shortages. Among other measures recommended by the pork subcommittee were: importation of live hogs from Thailand to meet Tet requirements, importation of 500 tons of frozen pork, measures to reduce losses from hog cholera, importation of pure-bred swine for breeding, and the establishment of new feed mills. The US promised to determine promptly whether USAID could finance a cold storage plant.

GVN Views on Rice Policy

8. Separate discussions on rice policy with several senior GVN economic officials--including National Bank of Vietnam Governor Hanh, Minister of Commerce Thien An, and Acting Minister of Industry Ton--indicate a general agreement with the US-suggested increase in the government price of rice and the necessity of announcing a new higher rice price promptly. At the same time, however, these GVN officials do not agree with the US proposal for establishing GVN rice buying stations. Moreover, they all expressed the opinion that announcement of a new GVN rice policy will depend largely on Premier Ky's approval in view of possible adverse political reactions from the urban consumer.

9. Governor Hanh feels that there should be a sharp increase in the rice price paid to the farmer in order to increase production and demonstrate GVN concern for the farmers' welfare. Hanh stated that although the GVN would be running

certain political risks in the urban areas, the new rice policy should be a clear break with the present policy of trying to conciliate noisy urban consumers at the expense of the silent peasant. With regard to the US suggestion for GVN rice buying stations, Hanh stated emphatically that the GVN is incapable of conducting buying operations because such a system would be too enticing for those who wish to make personal gains. As an alternative, Hanh suggested the extensive use of information leaflets to inform the farmers of a new government price. He also felt that a liberal credit policy should be established to finance rice purchases at a new government-supported price. According to Hanh, the greatest problem will be ensuring the security of the rice moving from the delta to Saigon.

10. Minister of Commerce Thien An and his staff generally agree with Hanh's views, especially his opinion that the GVN is unable to operate buying stations. Thien An stated that the low pay of and lack of discipline among GVN officials precluded such an operation. In spite of the possible political repercussions of higher rice prices, Ministry of Commerce officials feel that they should make a technically and economically sound proposal to achieve higher prices for producers. In their view, the questions to be considered are: (a) whether and to what level prices should be raised, (b) whether the market in domestic rice should be liberalized or new higher prices should be set, and (c) if the market is liberalized, what would be the best way to avoid excessive price increases and supply shortages. Thien An evidently feels that a free market--without price or other controls--would be the best solution.

11. As a result of these GVN views, the US Mission is examining the possibility of dispensing with the GVN buying station aspect of the US plan. The GVN proposal to increase credit to finance rice purchases also will have to be examined in terms of the impact of this credit on the inflationary gap and over-all price level.

Credit Policy

12. The US Embassy reports that failure to move immediately to expand the capacity of commercial banks to provide credit for imports could well cause a serious financial crisis and result in irreparable damage to the proposed stabilization program for calendar year 1967. Vietnamese commercial banks are almost fully loaned up and cannot obtain funds to finance imports as they arrive. Unless these banks make credit available immediately, importers will be forced to go to the money lenders or simply leave their goods in the port, thus adding to the already critical port congestion. Moreover, until additional credit is available, all current income of the importers will be needed to move goods already in the port. Consequently, importers will be unable to cover advance deposits and taxes on new import licenses with the result that serious shortages of commodities will develop by next spring.

13. It appears that it was possible for the commercial banks to finance the heavy commitments they made in July and August at the encouragement of the National Bank of Vietnam (NBVN) only because of an accounting bottleneck which resulted in the NBVN's being four months behind in its billing of the commercial banks. This mix-up, however, has now been cleared up, and the banks need funds. The NBVN has been hampered in formulating a proper credit policy because of the incorrect assumption that the volume of credit outstanding on the day of devaluation last June had only to be increased to accommodate for the change in the exchange rate plus the anticipated increase in imports. The IMF also used this method to arrive at its estimates of tolerable credit limits. Both the NBVN and the IMF, however, evidently overlooked the fact that as rapid inflation manifested itself in 1965, wholesalers began to take over financing of high profit imports in an effort to corner supply. Since the devaluation, however, black market prospects--except for a few commodities--are dim, and wholesalers no longer have the cash to continue financing importers. As a result, the amount of credit to be made available for imports should make allowance for the volume of imports previously financed outside the banking system.

14. According to embassy calculations, a minimum of roughly 10 billion piasters of additional credit must be made available before mid-January. Such an expansion of credit to the importing sector will not have a significant inflationary impact because credit to importers involves payments to the NBVN rather than creation of demand deposits. Moreover, about 95 percent of all credit currently supplied by the banks in Vietnam is for financing imports--the major anti-inflationary weapon. Although a definition of credit by end-use is somewhat tenuous, the Vietnamese banking and business community seems to concur in this 95 percent estimate. In addition, US officials feel that an expansion of bank credit is a much more productive and direct approach to combating the shortage of funds for imports than other plans such as the GVN deferred customs duties scheme, which will only satisfy part of the importers' need for credit, while temporarily reducing GVN revenues.

15. On 3 December, the US economic counselor met with Governor Hanh of the NBVN, who agreed that steps must be taken to expand credit. Hanh thought, however, that an additional 10 billion piasters of credit was probably too much. Nevertheless, on 5 December Hanh called a meeting of commercial bankers and informed them he was prepared to make more credit available for imports. Specific details on Hanh's announcement are not yet available.

ANNEX

WEEKLY RETAIL PRICES IN SAIGON a/

	3 Jan 1966	14 Nov 1966	21 Nov 1966	28 Nov 1966	5 Dec 1966
Index for All Items b/	160	224	227	217	231
Index for Food Items b/	169	230	236	226 c/	243 c/
Of Which: (In Piasters)					
Rice-Soc Nau (100 kg.)	800	1,650	1,600	1,600	1,700
Pork Bellies (1 kg.)	70	110	85	85	130
Fish-Ca Tre (1 kg.)	110	150	180	140	150
Nuoc Mam (jar)	50	85	85	85	90
Index for Non-Food Items b/	124	202	197	195 c/	200 c/
Of Which: (In Piasters)					
Charcoal (60 kg.)	440	650	620	630	650
Cigarettes (pack)	10	14	14	14	14
White Calico (meter)	27	35	35	34	40
Laundry Soap (1 kg.)	30	45	32	40	40

a. Data are from USAID sources.
b. For all indexes, 1 January 1965 = 100.
c. Preliminary.

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SECRET 181118 Z [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

DIST 18 DECEMBER 1966

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI 13-17 DECEMBER 1966

SUBJECT 1. DAMAGE TO CHINESE AND SOVIET EMBASSIES FROM USAF RAID ON HANOI ON 14 DECEMBER

2. RESULTS OF 13 AND 14 DECEMBER RAIDS AND EFFECT ON HANOI RESIDENTS.

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (17 DECEMBER 1966) FIELD NO. [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

1. (SUMMARY. SHRAPNEL FROM JETTISONED ROCKETS OF A USAF AIRCRAFT HIT BY GROUND FIRE DURING THE 14 DECEMBER RAID ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF HANOI EXTENSIVELY DAMAGED THE ROOF OF THE CHINESE EMBASSY, A ROCKET DEMOLISHED ONE AUTOMOBILE NEAR THE EMBASSY, AND SHRAPNEL STRUCK THE SOVIET EMBASSY. NEITHER THE NORTH VIETNAMESE NOR THE SOVIETS HAD MENTIONED THIS DAMAGE AS OF 16 DECEMBER. ALLEGEDLY 30 PERSONS WERE KILLED DURING THE 14 DECEMBER RAID.

 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

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4/21/98

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

SECRET [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

SOME BUILDINGS NEAR THE RAIL DEPOT AT OOOWUI DURING THE 13 DECEMBER RAID WERE DAMAMGED OR DESTROYED. BOTH THE 13 AND 14 DECEMBER PAIDS FRIGHTENED THE PEOPLE OF HANOI, BUT REPAIR OF THE DAMAGED BUILDINGS BEGAN IMMEDIATELY AFIER THE FIRST RAID. ON 17 DECEMBER TWO LARGE SOVIET SINGLE-ROTOR HELICOPTERS OF A SIZE NOT PREVIOUSLY NOTED WERE AT GIA LAM AIRPORT.)

2. [redacted] THE 14 DECEMBER UNITED STATES AIR FORCE RAID ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF HANOI PRODUCED SOME DANANGE IN HANOI PROPER WHEN ONE AIRCRAFT WAS HIT BY GROUND FIRE AND HAD TO JETTISON ITS ROCKETS. [redacted] THE ROOF OF THE CHINESE EMBASSY RECEIVED EXTENSIVE DAMAGE WHEN A ROCKET STRUCK A GLANCING GLOW TO A TREE IN FRONT OF THE EMBASSY SENDING SHRAPNEL INTO THE ROOF. IN ADDITION, ONE AUTOMOBILE PARKED NEAR THE EMBASSY WAS DEMOLISHED BY A ROCKET.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

3. THE SOVIET EMBASSY ALSO RECEIVED SMALL SHRAPNEL HITS FROM THE SAME AIRCRAFT. AS OF 16 DECEMBER NEITHER THE NORTH VIETNAMESE NOR THE SOVIETS HAD MENTIONED THIS DAMAGE. [redacted]

[redacted] SOME 30 PERSONS WERE KILLED IN THE RAID. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE BELIEVED THIS FIGURE TO BE EXAGGERATED.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

SECRET [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

4. THE 13 DECEMBER RAID ON THE RAIL DEPOT AT 919278 (SHEET 617411, SERIES L701) DESTROYED AT LEAST THREE BUILDINGS IN THE DEPOT COMPLEX AND LIGHTLY DAMAMGED TWO OTHERS. THE GUARD POST AND THE FIRST TWO BUILDINGS AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE COMPLEX APPEARED ONLY SLIGHTLY DAMAMGED. ONE-HALF OF THE FIRST CIVILIAN HOME ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE ROAD AS ONE LEAVES THE DEPOT AND TRAVELS TOWARD HANOI WAS DESTROYED. REPAIR OF THE DAMAGED BUILDINGS BEGAN IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE FIRST RAID.

5. [redacted] THE RAIDS ON 13 AND 14 DECEMBER FRIGHTENED THE POPULATION OF HNAOI WHO HAD COME TO BELIEVE THAT HANOI AND ITS IMMEDIATE ENVIRONS WERE IMMUNE FROM BOMBING.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

6. ON 16 DECEMBER MOST MILITARY POLICE AND MILITIA IN HANOI WERE WEARING STEEL HELMENTS. THE POPULATION SEEMED MORE ANIMATED THAN USUAL AND WORK CREWS WERE MOVING AT A MUCH FASTER PACE. SOME 50 MEDIUM CALIBER ANTIAIRCRAFT WEAPONS MOUNTED ON FOUR-WHEEL VEHICLES WERE SIGHTED ENTERING THE CITY FROM THE DIRECTION OF HAIPHONG. IN ADDITION, ANTIAIRCRAFT CREWS WITH SMALL CALIBER WEAPONS WERE POSTED ON THE ROOFS OF SEVERAL BUILDINGS IN HANOI.

SECRET [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

SECRET [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

7. ON THE MORNING OF 17 DECEMBER TWO LARGE SOVIET HELICOPTERS WERE AT GIA LAM AIRPORT. THE HELICOPTERS WERE SINGLE ROTOR BUT OF A SIZE NOT PREVIOUSLY NOTED AT GIA LAM.

8. [redacted] DISSEM STATE USAID JUSPAO USMACV USARV NAVFORV 7TH AIR FIRCE DIST 50/OSI 525TH MIG CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT REPORT CLASS SECRET [redacted]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

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158

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C-O-N-F-[redacted]D-E-N-T-I-A-L 191503Z [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

DIST 19 DECEMBER 1966

COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM/CHINA/NORTH KOREA

DOI: OCTOBER 1966

SUBJECT: [redacted] COMMENTS ON THE VIETNAM SITUATION AND RELATIONS WITH VARIOUS FOPEIGN COUNTRIES. 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

ACQ: [redacted]

SOURCE: [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

1. SUMMARY. [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

[redacted] DE GAULLE'S EFFORTS IN THE VIETNAM SITUATION WERE AIMED TOWARDS A COALITION GOVEPNMENT AND [redacted] THE NOPTH VIETNAMESE WERE

C-O-N-F-[redacted]D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
4/21/98

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

C-O-N-F-I-[redacted]E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

GOING TO CAPITALIZE ON FRENCH-AMERICAN RIVALRY. [redacted] THE PEKING-MOSCOW DISPUTE DID NOT SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE VIETNAM WAR. CHINA WAS PRESSING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT NOT TO APPEASE THE "REVISIONISTS." [redacted] 1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1) [redacted] NORTH VIETNAM NEEDED MATERIALS AND NOT VOLUNTEERS, THE ACCEPTANCE OF WHOM WOULD BRING MANY PROBLEMS. [redacted] [redacted] ALTHOUGH NORTH KOREA HAD SENT SOME EXPERTS TO VIETNAM, KOREA COULD NOT HELP NORTH VIETNAM VERY MUCH BECAUSE IT HAD DIFFICULT PROBLEMS OF ITS OWN. [redacted] [redacted] INDONESIA COULD NOT EFFECTIVELY APPANGE ANYTHING 1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1) CONCRETE IF IT MEDIATED IN THE VIETNAM QUESTION AND [redacted] IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR DIRECT TALKS TO BE HELD WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAM NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT.

2. [redacted]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

• C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

3. EFFORTS OF DE GAULLE. [redacted] THE MOTIVES FOR FRENCH MOVES IN THE VIETNAM QUESTION WERE NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR BUT [redacted] DE GAULLE LIKE EVERY FRENCHMAN KNEW THE VIETNAMESE MENTALITY VERY WELL THROUGH HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE AND THIS MIGHT BE THE REASON DE GAULLE WAS TRYING TO GIVE THE VIETNAMESE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SETTLE THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. [redacted] DE GAULLE PROBABLY HAD IN MIND A KIND OF COALITION GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD IN THE END SUBMERGE INTO THE UNIFICATION OF VIETNAM. THIS WOULD NOT BE IN FAVOR OF THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM BUT IT WOULD NEUTRALIZE VIETNAM. FURTHERMORE, [redacted] DE GAULLE WAS WAITING FOR THE RIGHT OPPORTUNITY TO INTERFERE IN BRINGING ABOUT A SOLUTION TO THE VIETNAM WAR BECAUSE IF HE ACTED TOO SOON, THE FRENCH FEARED THEY MIGHT LOSE THEIR ASSETS AND INVESTMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND IF HE ACTED TOO LATE HE WOULD LOSE NORTH VIETNAM'S "SYMPATHY." [redacted] THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT DISCOURAGE DE GAULLE'S IDEAS AND EFFORTS BUT WOULD ON THE CONTRARY MAKE AS MUCH USE AS POSSIBLE OF THE DIFFERENCES OF

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

VIEWPOINT AND PIVALRY BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES.

4. THE PEKING-MOSCOW DISPUTE. [redacted] AS TO WHETHEP THE PEKING-MOSCOW DISPUTE INFLUENCED THE VIETNAM WAR. [redacted] THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO POWERS DID NOT SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE VIETNAM WAR. [redacted] THERE WAS SOME RELUCTANCE IN THE SOVIET BLOC TO ASSIST THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WAP EFFORT WHOLEHEARTEDLY. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT SEVEPAL TIMES HAD STATED THAT THE WAR AND ITS EFFECTS WERE NOT A PURELY VIETNAMESE AFFAIR BUT WAS A COMMON CAUSE FOR ALL SOCIALIST STATES. [redacted] THE VIENAM WAR WAS A TEST CASE AS TO WHETHEP WOPLD COMMUNISM WOULD SUCCEED OP NOT. PEOPLE WERE ALWAYS TALKING ABOUT "INTEPNATIONAL DUTY" AND "INTEPNATIONAL STRUGGLE FOR THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT" BUT THESE WOPDS WERE THEOPETICAL AND WERE NOT ALWAYS PUT INTO PRACTICE.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

5. [redacted] COMMUNIST CHINA ALWAYS PPESSED NOPTH VIETNAM NOT TO MAKE ANY APPEASEMENT WITH THE "REVISIONISTS" AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DID NOT LIKE THIS KIND OF PPESSUPE. [redacted] THE NOPTH VIETNAMESE SURELY KNEW WHAT TO DO AND COULD HANDLE MATTERS THEMSELVES AND DID NOT

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

WANT TO BE DICTATED TO BY ANYBODY ELSE. HOWEVER, CHINA ALWAYS COOPERATED FULLY WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE WAR MATERIALS PROBLEM AND ASSISTED AS MUCH AS THEY COULD AFFORD. ALSO, [redacted] THERE WERE NO SUCH BARRIERS TO TRANSPORTATION OF SOVIET AID ACROSS CHINA AS THE SOVIETS CLAIMED IN THEIR PRESS. NO OBSTACLES WERE PUT IN THE WAY BY THE CHINESE IN THE TRANSPORT OF SOVIET WEAPONS. BEFORE, THERE WERE SOME IRREGULARITIES BUT THEY HAD BEEN TAKEN CARE OF AND PRESENTLY TRANSPORTATION OF MATERIALS WERE BEING "SAFEGUARDED BY THE VIETNAMESE THEM-SELVES." HOWEVER, RAIL TRANSPORTATION WAS DIFFICULT AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD THEREFORE ASKED COUNTRIES SENDING AID TO MOVE THE MATERIALS BY SHIP WHENEVER POSSIBLE AND "NOT TO BE FRIGHTENED EVEN BY THE SEVENTH FLEET." [redacted] NORTH VIETNAM WAS RECEIVING ONLY ONE-TENTH OF THE AMOUNT OF AID BEING GIVEN TO THE SOUTH VIETNAM GOVERNMENT BY THE UNITED STATES. NORTH VIETNAM BADLY NEEDED MATERIALS. THERE-FORE, IT HAD ASKED EAST EUROPEAN BLOC COUNTRIES WHY THEY WERE KEEPING THEIR EQUIPMENT ONLY FOR THEMSELVES AND STOCK-PILING IT INSTEAD OF TRYING IT OUT ON A LARGE SCALE IN

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

VIETNAM THE WAY THE AMERICANS DO.

6. WITH REGARD TO BLOC COUNTRIES' VOLUNTEERS, THERE WERE OBSTACLES TO ACCEPTING THEM. THERE WERE THE QUESTIONS OF WHO WOULD COMMAND JOINT/COMBINED OPERATIONS, WHETHER VOLUNTEERS WERE COMPLETELY PREPARED TO DEFEND THE SOCIALIST WORLD ON VIETNAMESE GROUND, AND WHETHER THEY COULD BE TRUSTED TO DEFEND SPECIAL SECTORS ASSIGNED TO THEM. THE MAIN PROBLEM CONCERNED THE CHARACTER AND MENTALITY OF THE VOLUNTEER GROUPS CONSISTING OF DIFFERENT RACES AND IN GENERAL THE EUROPEAN FEELING OF SUPERIORITY OVER ASIANS. [redacted] AT PRESENT NORTH VIETNAM DID NOT NEED VOLUNTEERS BUT ONLY NEEDED MATERIALS. ONLY THE EUROPEAN BLOC COUNTRIES WERE ABLE TO GIVE IT BECAUSE ASIAN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES HAD ONLY SMALL CAPABILITIES WHICH IT WOULD BE UNFAIR TO EXPECT THEM TO SHARE MORE THAN NECESSARY.

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

7. NORTH KOREAN EFFORTS IN THE VIETNAM WAR. [redacted] NORTH KOREA COULD NOT DO MUCH FOR NORTH VIETNAM BECAUSE IT HAD SO MANY DIFFICULTIES AT HOME. HOWEVER, NORTH KOREA ALWAYS CALLED FOR UNITY AMONG THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES ON THE VIETNAM WAR. NORTH KOREA WAS FACING THE EXPANSION PROBLEM AND PENETRATION OF JAPANESE CAPITALISM INTO

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

SOUTH KOPEA. SINCE IT WAS FORMERLY A JAPANESE COLONY, NORTH KOPEA FEAPED A POSSIBLE NEW EMERGENCE OF JAPANESE MILITARISM AND THEPE WAS A GREAT POSSIBILITY OF INVASION FROM SOUTH KOPEA. THUS, THE NOPTH KOPEAN POSITION WAS DIFFICULT: ON THEIP FPONT DOOPSTEP WEPE THE SOUTH KOPEANS SUPPORTED BY THE AMEPICANS AND THE JAPANESE, ON THEIP BACK DOOPSTEP WEPE THE CHINESE AND THE SOVIETS BOTH PPESSURING TO GET NORTH KOREA INTO THEIP OWN SPHERE. THE NOPTH KOPEANS TRYING TO EXECUTE AN INDEPENDENT POLICY MADE THE STATEMENT OF 2 AUGUST 1966 STPESSING THAT THEPE MUST BE FULL INDEPENDENCE AND EQUAL PIGHTS FOP ALL COMMUNIST COUNTPIES, LAPGE OP SMALL. BECAUSE THE KOPEANS WEPE SEPIOUS ABOUT SENDING MANPOWEP, THE NOPTH VIETNAMESE ALLOWED THEM TO SEND EXPEPTS IN ALL FIELDS TO VIETNAM, INCLUDING THE MILITAPY FIELD, TO MAKE A THOPOUGH STUDY OF CONDITIONS IN VIETNAM IN CASE VOLUNTEEPS WEPE SENT LATEP. [redacted] NOPTH KOPEA HAD SUPPLIED A FEW WEAPONS SUCH AS LIGHT MACHINE GUNS AND SEMI-AUTOMATIC PIFLES OF NORTH KOREAN MANUFACTURE AND ALSO POLLING STOCK, TPACTOPS, TEXTILES, AND MEDICINES.

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

8. NOPTH VIETNAM-INDONESIAN PELATIONS. [redacted]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

• C-O-N-F-I-[redacted]E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

[redacted] PPEVIOUS PELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTPIES WHICH WEPE BASED ON TPADITION AND STPENGTHENED BY SUKAPNO AND HO CHI MINH WEPE SPOILED BY THE INDONESIAN COUP D'ETAT BUT THIS WAS ONLY TEMPOPAPY. [redacted] INDONESIA'S ACTING AS MEDIATOP IN THE VIETNAM QUESTION WOULD NEVER ACHIEVE ANYTHING CONCPETE; IT WOULD BE BETTEP FOP THE "IMPERIALISTS" TO APPANGE A DIPECT TALK WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAM NATIONAL FRONT FOR LIBEPATION WITHOUT CONDUCTING ANY TALKS WITH THE NOPTH VIETNAMESE [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[redacted] PEGPETTED THE PPESENT INDONESIAN FOPEIGN POLICY BECAUSE IT HAPMED THE VIETNAM SITUATION WITH INDONESIA COMPPOMISING WITH THE "IMPERIALISTS" AND ALSO THE CESSATION OF THE CONFPONTATION POLICY AGAINST MALAYSIA WAS DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE VIETNAM WAP.

9. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIP CINCPAC PACFLT APPAC PACAF [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

C O N F I D E N T I A L [redacted]

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report

The Situation in South Vietnam

Secret

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence

THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(12 December - 18 December 1966)

C O N T E N T S

	Section
POLITICAL SITUATION	I
Form of future government taking shape; New Constituent Assembly member approved; Official Assembly political blocs changing; Premier Ky still hesitant on revealing presidential ambitions.	
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT	II
Ky reaffirms new role of GVN military forces; Viet Cong concern about revolutionary development; Psychological warfare operations; Revolutionary development progress by corps; The refugee situation in I Corps.	
ECONOMIC SITUATION	III
Prices; Currency and gold; GVN decision on rice policy; Provincial economic developments during October; Discussion with Ky on port congestion; Industrial development in FY 1966.	

ANNEX: Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon (table)
Saigon Cost of Living Index (graph)
South Vietnam Money Supply (graph)
South Vietnam Foreign Exchange Reserves (graph)
Saigon Free Market Gold and Currency Prices (graph)

I. POLITICAL SITUATION

The Constituent Assembly voted in favor of a plan to elect a president and a vice president by universal, secret ballot under the constitution it is preparing. The elected chief executive would, however, appoint a prime minister to render him administrative assistance. The assembly also chose a new member to fill the seat vacated by the assassination of Tran Van Van.

There have been some shifts in the alignment of the official political blocs in the assembly. The second and third largest blocs recently merged to form what is now the largest bloc. Moreover, the Greater People's Bloc, which was previously the largest, is reportedly losing some of its members who claim they want to avoid the "government" stigma that the bloc has allegedly acquired.

Meanwhile, Premier Ky is unwilling to reveal his presidential ambitions even to his closest advisers, according to a reliable Vietnamese source.

Form of Future Government Taking Shape

1. The type of government envisioned under the new constitution is beginning to take shape in the Constituent Assembly. Last week, the deputies approved a modified presidential form of executive branch with a popularly elected president and vice president, and an appointed prime minister. Although the exact wording of the assembly proposals is not clear at this time, it appears that the prime minister and his appointed cabinet can be removed from office by the president acting alone or upon the demand of the national assembly (legislature). The prime minister, however, will merely be an administrative functionary in the proposed system in contrast to the relationship between the chief of state and the prime minister in the present government.

New Constituent Assembly Member Approved

2. In the 14 December session, the deputies approved a motion that the vacant assembly seat of assassinated member Tran Van Van be filled by Dr. Huynh Kim Huu, who had finished behind Van in the 11 September election on the same slate. Dr. Huu is a southern Catholic.

Official Assembly Political Blocs Changing

3. Various sources have indicated that the official assembly blocs, which were formed during the election of permanent assembly officers in late October, are undergoing internal changes involving mergers and shifts in membership. The formation of the Democratic Alliance Bloc was formally announced in the assembly on 13 December. The new bloc is an amalgamation of the heavily northern Catholic, 16-member Democratic Bloc and the 25-member Hoa Hao - Cao Dai - VNQDD Alliance Bloc. With four other members picked up elsewhere in the assembly, it is now the largest bloc in the assembly, although it does not constitute a majority. The US Embassy has reported that the components of the bloc have been considered progovernment, and specifically in favor of Premier Ky.

4. According to one of the members of the new bloc, officers were elected and a policy statement was drafted by bloc members between 3 and 5 December. The reported policy statement deals entirely with constitutional points. This suggests that the merger was brought about by the change in basic issues facing the assembly from the election of assembly officers in October to the drafting of a constitution at present. An earlier report did state, however, that at least some of the impetus for this merger came from Catholic political sources who had been working for the formation of a broad, religious-oriented group.

5. Another delegate has reported that six members of the Greater People's Bloc--heretofore the assembly's largest--have withdrawn from bloc discipline and have joined the ranks of independent assembly delegates. Another 14 members of the bloc

reportedly are considering a similar withdrawal. One of the chief reasons for such action is that many delegates consider the Greater People's Bloc --made up primarily of military, Catholic, and Dai Viet delegates from central and North Vietnam--to be the "government bloc."

6. According to a reliable medium-level official, a new bloc to be known as the Force of the Peasants, Workers, and Military will soon be introduced in the assembly. This group, which reportedly has already obtained the legally required minimum support of 12 assembly delegates, is directly linked to retired General Tran Van Don's southern-based political front group. Both Don and labor leader Tran Quoc Buu are to be listed as advisers to the bloc.

7. The precise status of assembly blocs in terms of their orientation and membership is not clear at present. Various factors, which have been outlined above and which have apparently played a part in the shifts now under way, indicate that these changes may neither be final nor necessarily significant in terms of forming political groupings for next year's national elections.

Premier Ky Still Hesitant on Revealing Presidential Ambitions

8. Premier Ky recently has frequently discussed his political future with three of his closest advisers, but has been unwilling thus far to commit himself to a definite course of action, according to a reliable Vietnamese source with excellent access to those involved in the discussions. Ky reportedly assesses his chances of winning the presidency--should he run--as very strong, but has ended every discussion without committing himself. Ky's advisers believe that Ky wants desperately to run, and that his current indecision is caused by his desire not to lose face, even with them, by committing himself and later being "rebuffed."

9. According to the source, Ky's hesitancy to take any action which might reflect his presidential

ambitions could soon cause him difficulties. For example, Constituent Assembly delegates have unofficially been mulling over a constitutional provision with a minimum age requirement for the president, and thinking seems to be divided between a 35- and a 40-year minimum. Ky, who is 36, reportedly is so sensitive on the age question that he is dreading his scheduled briefing of the Assembly, with the attendant risk of possibly antagonizing any of the delegates while they are considering this question. On the other hand, he does not want to appear as if he is fawning upon the delegates. Despite Ky's unwillingness to influence the Assembly delegates in any way on this question, some of Ky's advisers may attempt to go ahead and take positive action to ensure Ky's eligibility for the presidency on the age basis.

10. Also central to the question of a military candidate for president are the attitudes and actions of Chief of State Thieu, who with Premier Ky forms the basic alliance upon which military unity rests. General Thieu thus far has not committed himself as a presidential candidate, and both Ky and Thieu appear to be waiting for the other to make the first move. Ky and his advisers somewhat naturally feel that he stands a better chance of winning a presidential campaign than would Thieu. They assess Ky as being more popular among the public at large, especially among Buddhists and northerners, and among the relatively younger military officers, while Thieu is favored by a majority of Constituent Assembly delegates in relation to Ky, and is preferred by the senior military officers.

11. Ky and his advisers feel that the Ky-Thieu relationship, and consequently the military unity necessary for political stability, can best be preserved in the future government by Ky running for president and by Thieu becoming a "supreme" military commander. They reportedly admit that the reverse would not be feasible, since Ky would not be an acceptable commander in chief to the senior military officers. In addition, Ky is not willing at this time to accept the post of prime minister under Thieu as it has been outlined in the future government, since he feels that that he would be at the mercy of both Thieu and a national assembly, and subject to removal by either at any time.

II. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

Premier Ky, on 15 December, once again affirmed that the primary mission of the ARVN for 1967 will be to provide a security screen for the revolutionary development. A recent communiqué of the Central Committee of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam indicates that the committee views revolutionary development as a major threat and that a serious campaign probably will be mounted to reduce the program's effectiveness. The South Vietnamese budget for psychological warfare operations will come to $US 36,568,000, and will support the efforts of the Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi, and the Psychological Warfare Directorate of the armed forces. Politics, professional jealousies, and the disinterest of officials charged with supervising the cadre at the local level are at the root of problems still hampering the revolutionary development cadre program throughout the country. Since July of this year nearly 44,700 refugees have returned to GVN control in the I Corps area, often in very large groups.

Ky Reaffirms New Role of GVN Military Forces

1. Premier Ky, on 15 December, stressed the importance of the military's role in recovering the rural areas from Communist control. Speaking at the graduation of the class of officers who will return to their parent military organizations to teach the fundamentals of pacification, Ky maintained that ARVN must demonstrate a spiritual as well as material regard for the people when it commences its primary task of providing the security screen for the revolutionary development program in 1967. He also restated his government's determination to press forward simultaneously with the policy of defeating the Communists and reconstructing the rural areas.

Viet Cong Concern About Revolutionary Development

2. A 5 December communiqué of the Central Committee of the Viet Cong's National Liberation Front, outlining tasks for the coming year, indicates increasing concern among the Communist ranks over the revolutionary development program. Although the communiqué claims the US/GVN pacification effort "has in the main been foiled," one of the political tasks it cites to be accomplished in the coming year is the "smashing" of GVN rural pacification plans. Both the claim of victory and the call for new victories over the revolutionary development effort suggest that the Communists view it as a major threat. The Viet Cong may be expected to make an expanded effort to disrupt the program and to negate any gains that it has registered.

Psychological Warfare Operations

3. Funds budgeted by the GVN for psychological warfare activities during its fiscal year of 1967 (which concides with the calendar year) are reported to amount to $US 36,568,000. This budget, according to a USIS report, will support the combined activities of the Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi (MICH), and the Psychological Warfare Directorate in the armed forces. The new budget, which is only slightly larger than that of 1966, will be divided as follows: for MICH, $US 32,050,000; for the Psychological Warfare Directorate, $US 4,518,000.

4. Personnel currently assigned to the psychological operations and Chieu Hoi activities total 21,773, while the military personnel will total 2,307. The bulk of the civilian personnel, 12,774, will be assigned to the field as Vietnam Information Service (VIS) personnel. The USIS report cautions that there is a significant amount of payroll padding in the case of the MICH.

Revolutionary Development Cadre Program

5. Problems rooted in politics, religion, corruption, insecurity, and professional jealousy continued to restrict progress in the Revolutionary Development (RDC) effort in all corps areas during October.

In all, only 16 provinces and Cam Ranh City reported progress in the program. Sixteen other provinces reported no significant progress in RDC activities, and 11 others reported no progress at all. There is reason to believe, on the basis of individual provincial reports that some provinces reporting no progress may actually have regressed.

6. Both GVN and US advisers are trying to solve the problems that have arisen. The onus for failure seems to rest with those provincial and district officials who are either disinterested or lack an understanding of what the objectives of the RDC program are. The Ministry of Revolutionary Development (MRD) has taken steps to replace some of the inept and disinterested officials, a move which may improve performance in some areas of the country. A summary of progress and problems by corps areas follows.

I Corps Zone

7. Reports from this corps indicate erratic progress mingled with disturbing signs of slippage in the program. In the northernmost province, Quang Tri, weak provincial and district leadership has impeded RD progress in some areas. A mixture of ineffectiveness by the RD committee chief and inexperience of a recently appointed district chief has been cited as the source of difficulty with the RD program in this province. In Quang Nam and Quang Ngai provinces, 19-man technical teams (census grievance, civic action, and New Life Development elements) fresh from the National Training Center at Vung Tau have been successfully melded with the 40-man Peoples Action Teams (PAT) already in place. Initial results with these newly combined teams is reportedly very favorable. Clouding the picture somewhat in Quang Ngai Province, however, are the activities of the Vietnam Nationalist Party (VNQDD). This group is endeavoring to place its members on the RD committees in an effort to enhance their own political positions. In Quang Tin Province, lack of organization plus an adverse military situation have combined to hamper the RD effort there.

II Corps Zone

8. The RD effort in this Corps is suffering from inadequate leadership for the provincial programs.

Also, lack of security in many areas has forced the RDC teams to devote most of their time to protecting themselves, and has given officials charged with supervising the programs an excuse for unproductive cadre operations. In Quang Duc, for example, province officials are reluctant to visit teams in insecure areas and are therefore unable to provide guidance or observe results. In Binh Thuan Province, the falsification of pacification results is an even more alarming tendency. In this province, teams have been moved arbitrarily from hamlet to hamlet, apparently without consideration for whether they have been secured or not. The problem may have been partially solved by the replacement of the Deputy Province Chief for Internal Security.

9. Montagnard cadre teams in Darlac Province are reported to be doing an effective job, and are seeking an expanded role in the RD effort. Although the dissident montagnard autonomy movement FULRO has been active in the area, it has not affected the operation of the montagnard cadres. In Kontum Province, a similar favorable account is given of montagnard cadre activities. In this province, the Vietnamese RDCs are also functioning more effectively under the impact of good leadership and the introduction of better trained cadre groups from the Vung Tau National Training Center.

III Corps Zone

10. A major obstacle to the effective use of RDCs in this Corps zone is the reluctance of province officials to allow cadre groups adequate time to accomplish their tasks. The controversial commander of the ARVN 25th Division, General Phan Trong Chinh, has stepped-up the tempo of hamlet construction to one month, and consolidation phases to one and one-half months. Chinh's order has been issued in an apparent attempt to make the pacification effort in his area look good. Only in Long An Province has the province chief resisted Chinh's order and set a more practical time limit for pacifying a hamlet. In Long Khanh Province, montagnard cadre groups are proving to be the strongest element in the civic action program. Their success is largely the result of the intensive effort of chief of montagnard services in the province.

IV Corps Zone

11. The same general problems--lack of leadership and disinterest--prevalent in the other three corps zones are also present in IV Corps. In three provinces--Chuong Thien, Vinh Binh, and Vinh Long--the lack of adequate security to screen the work of the RDCs in the hamlets has been cited as a major obstacle to RD progress. The population lacks confidence in the ability of the Regional Force and Popular Force to protect hamlets after the RDCs leave the area, and covert Viet Cong penetration of the hamlets is also a source of concern.

The Refugee Situation in I Corps

12. There has been an influx of some 44,700 refugees from Viet Cong-controlled areas of I Corps into government areas since July of this year. Some of this influx has been a mass movement of people: 17,000 persons fled from Quang Tri Province to Thua Thien Province after large US/ARVN forces entered the area just south of the DMZ during Operations HASTINGS and PRAIRIE, and 14,000 persons from the Phu Ky area of south central Quang Nam Province sought GVN refuge during operations by the Marines. All of these evacuations from areas of Viet Cong dominance represent a serious loss to the VC in terms of potential manpower reserves for their armed forces, agricultural workers, or other support roles. Additionally, the Communists suffer a severe propaganda blow when large numbers of persons opt to go over to the GVN side. Details below on two recent evacuations in Quang Tin and Quang Nam provinces show some of the reasons why people leave areas under Communist control and some of the steps that have been taken by the Viet Cong to prevent the exodus.

Quang Nam Province

13. Some 2,200 persons recently resettled in the Nong Son coal mining area in south central Quang Nam relate a familiar story of Viet Cong oppression which forced them to seek shelter in GVN-controlled areas. Originating in the village of Son Phuoc in Duc Duc district, the southernmost of the province, these people took the first opportunity to flee from

Communist control. This arose when a US Marine Corps operation moved into their area early this month. This refugee group estimates that there are another 1,000 persons in the Son Phuoc area who would probably come out if given the opportunity.

14. The Viet Cong made a determined effort to prevent the Son Phuoc refugees from fleeing their village. During the course of their flight, Communist snipers gunned down four of the escapees, killing one. Such a response on the part of the Viet Cong is apparently almost unprecedented, and was done at considerable risk to themselves since allied troops were still operating in the area.

15. Further deterioration of the Communist popular base may be taking place in this particular area of Quang Nam Province. Commanders of US units in the area say that there have been numerous instances of people in remote areas begging US troops either to stay in the area to protect them, or to evacuate them when the troops leave. One reason for the desire of villagers in these northern areas to leave Viet Cong-controlled zones is that the Communists are being increasingly denied rice from the major population centers along the coast; this is causing the Viet Cong to put more pressure on the population under their control. While the flow of rice to the Communists from coastal areas has not been stopped, there is evidence that the government's resources control efforts are becoming more effective. Increased logistical problems, particularly in the matter of food supplies, could possibly lead to serious political problems for the Communists.

Quang Tin Province

16. On 8 December, 16 kilometers east of the province capital of Tam Ky, 42 refugees approached elements of a US Marine unit participating in Operation CORTEZ, and requested evacuation from the area. They carried about 1,000 pounds of rice with them. Among the reasons cited by the group for fleeing their homes were: constant Communist harassment, heavy Communist taxation, impressment of their young men into the Viet Cong ranks, and fear of air strikes.

17. According to a report from clandestine channels, the Viet Cong in the general area of Operation CORTEZ have levied a 20-percent tax on rice, as well as taxes on other agricultural produce, on boats, and on real estate. Recently, payment of all these taxes has been demanded in rice--a good indicator of the urgent need for this commodity. According to the same report, this Viet Cong taxation in kind has had the effect of taking 50 to 100 percent of the rice crop. In another area of Quang Tin Province, the agricultural tax of the Communists is reported to be 50 percent.

III. ECONOMIC SITUATION

Retail prices in Saigon reached a new high during the week ending 12 December as rice and pork prices continued to increase. The currency and gold market, however, remained relatively steady. Prices in the provinces during October were generally unchanged in spite of increased transportation difficulties caused mainly by adverse weather conditions. The GVN decided to raise the government buying price of rice. Other aspects of the new GVN rice policy are not yet clear, but the US Mission tentatively feels that the policy is workable. Ambassador Lodge has urged Premier Ky to take measures to solve the problem at the Saigon port. USAID reports that considerable progress was made in industrial development in South Vietnam during FY 1966.

Prices

1. For the second consecutive week, retail prices in Saigon reached another high, second only to the peak reached at the time of the September 1966 elections. According to the USAID retail price index, prices during the week ending 12 December rose four percent above the previous week. Food prices were up five percent and non-food items rose two percent. As during the previous week, these increases stemmed largely from soaring prices for rice and pork. On 12 December the price of the type of rice used by the working class reached another new 1966 high of 1,750 piasters per 100 kilograms, or 40 percent above the level prevailing just prior to the June devaluation and almost 120 percent above the price at the beginning of the year. The price of pork was 140 piasters per kilogram, or eight percent above the previous week and 65 percent above the price during the latter half of November. Lower deliveries of these commodities to Saigon continue to be the major factor causing the higher prices. Pork prices, which in turn influence the prices of other protein food, are also being affected by an increase in the cost of feed. Prices of non-food items were generally unchanged with the

exception of charcoal and firewood, both of which increased because of lower deliveries to Saigon. (A table of weekly retail prices in Saigon is included in the Annex).

2. Prices of imported commodities were mixed; food items held steady and construction materials, fertilizers and chemicals showed slight increases. No changes were noted in the prices of condensed milk and wheat flour. Sugar declined slightly as the market continued to be well supplied. Iron and steel products, on the other hand, rose as a result of increased demand caused by the start of the new construction season. Fertilizers and chemicals also were higher because importers did not receive any new shipments.

Currency and Gold

3. Although the cost of living continues to rise, the currency and gold market remains reasonably steady. During the week ending 12 December, dollars and MPC (scrip) moved down to the level of two weeks ago. Gold, however, rose because of lower arrivals of gold and increased demand for jewelry for Tet. Currency price quotations for 12 December have not yet been reported. (Graphics on monthly and weekly free market gold and currency prices are included in the Annex).

GVN Decision on Rice Policy

4. On 13 December the GVN finally decided to raise the government buying price of rice. The price to the producer for paddy is to be between 8.5 and 8.9 piasters per kilogram, or roughly double last year's price. This new GVN price is below that recently recommended by US officials--a target price of 10 piasters per kilogram with government buying stations offering a support price of 9.5 piasters per kilogram. It is estimated that the new price for paddy will result in a retail price in Saigon of roughly 16 to 16.5 piasters per kilogram for the cheapest type of rice as compared with the present price of 16.0 piasters. Thus, the GVN is, in effect, setting a retail price which is the same or only slightly above

the existing price. Imported rice will be sold at around 13 to 14 piasters per kilogram, as compared with a recent price of 12.5 to 13.0 piasters.

5. On the controversial issue of provincial buying stations, the GVN has decided to ask the National Agricultural Credit Office (NACO), working together with the province chiefs, to act as a buying agent. The exact role of NACO in the provinces and its relationship to the Ministries of Agriculture and Commerce is unclear.

6. Premier Ky has requested that there be no publicity in the cities for the new rice policy. Moreover, acting on a US recommendation, the GVN will institute a vigorous program in urban areas of rice distribution from trucks. The new price policy will be widely publicized in the rural areas, however, by means of nationally printed information leaflets in order to inform delta farmers of the true price situation and prevent the merchants from again taking advantage of the farmer.

7. Although the GVN price increase is less than that proposed by the US, US officials believe that the new GVN rice policy will work out and intend to give all possible assistance to get the program launched. Several aspects of the program, however, remain unclear. The question of a credit policy for rice, for example, has not been determined. Moreover, although National Bank Governor Hanh and Acting Minister of Industry Ton apparently intend to play significant roles in implementing the program, it remains to be seen who will really be in charge of implementation and what role the province chiefs will play.

Provincial Economic Developments During October

8. Economic developments in the provinces during October were highlighted by greatly increased transportation difficulties which resulted from the rainy season in the northern part of the country and the flooding of the Mekong in the southern area. Viet Cong sabotage also contributed to transportation problems. With the exception of the provinces affected by the floods, however, provincial prices were generally steady. Rice

prices and supplies were satisfactory in Region I, but higher rice prices were noted in both Regions II and IV, as a direct or indirect result of the floods.

9. Although Region I experienced transportation difficulties because of the monsoon rains, prices were generally steady throughout the region, and no shortages of construction materials were noted. There were, however, such seasonal price fluctuations as higher seafood prices because of shortages caused by heavy rains. Plentiful rice supplies, which stemmed from a good local harvest and ample imported stocks, resulted in lower prices for this commodity in almost all provinces of the region. These lower rice prices prevailed even though Viet Cong rice levies were stepped up in some provinces, such as Quang Tri and Quang Tin. A rice protection plan in Quang Tri Province was undertaken too late to prevent a large quantity of rice from falling into Viet Cong hands.

10. Prices in most provinces of Region II were also generally steady, although transportation difficulties were caused by the rains and Viet Cong activity. In Ninh Thuan Province, the Viet Cong destroyed three bridges on Route 11, temporarily blocking traffic to Da Lat. Viet Cong interdiction on the Da Lat - Saigon road in Tuyen Duc Province reduced farmers' income because their crops could not be shipped to Saigon, but resulted in lower prices for vegetables in the province. Rice prices were higher in some areas of Region II even though the rice harvest had been completed. These increases apparently resulted partly from the psychological effect of the flood in the Mekong Delta, partly from lower rice production caused by farm labor shortages. It was reported, for example, that a shortage of field workers in Ninh Thuan Province caused a loss of about ten percent of the recent rice crop. A shortage of farm labor also is adversely affecting vegetable production in Tuyen Duc Province.

11. In Region III prices were relatively stable in eight out of the 11 provinces. Prices rose 15 percent, however, in both Bien Hoa and Tay Ninh provinces. The price rise in the former province apparently stemmed from anticipation of food shortages caused by the Mekong floods, whereas the increased presence of troops and limited movement of goods to and from Saigon explained

the rise in Tay Ninh. Although there was some easing of Viet Cong interdiction of roads in Region III, Viet Cong taxation on commerce increased.

12. Flood recovery operations dominated the economic scene in five provinces of Region IV. Reports from the flooded provinces indicated that rice crop damage, although severe, was less than originally estimated. In Chau Doc and Kien Tuong provinces, however, as much as 80 percent of the rice crop probably was lost. Kien Giang Province, on the other hand, lost only 12 percent of its rice crop. Secondary crops also were hard hit by the floods, with some areas experiencing a complete loss of crops. The floods also damaged roads and slowed transportation of commodities. As a result of these factors plus Viet Cong interdiction, prices rose in some provinces of Region IV. These transportation problems, however, benefited the consumer in some areas where increased supplies of goods normally shipped to Saigon resulted in lower local prices.

Discussion With Ky on Port Congestion

13. On 8 December, Ambassador Lodge called on Premier Ky to discuss the Saigon port problem. The ambassador pointed out that US officials feel the port congestion has stemmed from three major factors: (a) lack of adequate credit for importers to finance removal of their goods from the port, (b) inability to provide importers with the location of their cargo in the port and to clear the goods promptly through customs, and (c) use of the port as a warehouse by importers. National Bank Governor Hanh's recent relaxation of credit has solved the credit problem, and some progress is being made in locating and clearing cargo. The major problem, therefore, is the unwillingness of importers to move their goods out of the warehouses.

14. Ambassador Lodge informed Premier Ky that the latter's decree of 28 July, which called for confiscation of goods left in the port more than 30 days, has not yet been implemented. As a result, the port remains congested, and this congestion is interfering with the program to halt inflation. Moreover, the large quantity of imports scheduled to arrive in December and January will further aggravate the problem. To solve

this problem. Ambassador Lodge presented Ky with a list of goods that have been in the port much longer than 30 days and urged Ky to begin confiscation of these goods. In addition, the ambassador asked Ky to deny further import licenses to those importers who do not withdraw their cargo from port warehouses after 30 days. US officials believe that a suspension of these importers for six to nine months will make clear to the Vietnamese importing community that only those importers who remove their goods from the port promptly will be allowed to import.

15. Although Ky approved of blacklisting importers who do not remove their goods, he felt that wholesale confiscation was not the solution to the problem because the GVN would lose taxes and would not know what to do with most of the confiscated goods. Ky then said that the GVN intended to make examples of several big importers by at least imposing heavy fines on them. Ambassador Lodge explained that the US was not advocating wholesale confiscation, but rather selective confiscation based on the US list of gross offenders. Ky finally said he would take action on these matters promptly. In closing, Lodge pointed out that if the port congestion continues, the US would have to consider halting the shipment of goods to Vietnam.

Industrial Development in FY 1966

16. USAID considers progress in industrial development to be one of its five most significant accomplishments in South Vietnam during FY 1966. Other important accomplishments cited by USAID were: implementation of the economic reforms of last June, improvement in the supply of water and electric power, and progress in overcoming illiteracy. A significant indicator of industrial progress is the amount of USAID approvals for imports of industrial machinery--$16 million during FY 1966, or almost half of the total for the past five years.

17. The textile industry is one of the most important industries in the development effort, with textile machinery accounting for almost half of the $16 million. USAID estimates that when all the approved

textile equipment is in full operation, South Vietnam will be able to satisfy more than four fifths of its requirement for textiles. Progress also is being made in the paper industry. Two major paper firms--Cogido and Cong Ty Giap Vietnam--ordered heavy equipment valued at about $3 million. This equipment is being imported to complete a major expansion program, which will result in a total output of 30,000 metric tons annually. This amount represents an increase of 70 percent above current output of paper and will satisfy about three fourths of South Vietnam's requirements for paper.

18. Another important step toward industrial development during FY 1966 was the installation of Vietnam's first steel rolling mill. During early 1967, this mill will begin producing steel ingots from scrap by the converter process and production of rolled products is expected to reach about 15,000 metric tons annually.

TABLE

Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon a/

	3 Jan. 1966	14 Nov. 1966	21 Nov. 1966	28 Nov. 1966	5 Dec. 1966	12 De 196
Index for All Items b/	160	224	227	217	231	243
Index for Food Items b/	169	230	236	224	243 c/	256 c
Of Which: (In Piasters)						
Rice-Soc Nau (100 kg.)	800	1,650	1,600	1,600	1,700	1,750
Pork Bellies (1 kg.)	70	110	85	85	130	140
Fish-Ca Tre (1 kg.)	110	150	180	140	150	170
Nuoc Nam (jar)	50	85	85	85	90	90
Index for Non-Food Items b/	124	202	197	195	200 c/	206 c
Of Which: (In Piasters)						
Charcoal (60 kg.)	440	650	620	630	650	680
Cigarettes (pack)	10	14	14	14	14	14
White Calico (meter)	27	35	35	34	40	40
Laundry Soap (1 kg.)	30	45	32	40	40	40

a. Data are from USAID sources.
b. For all indexes, 1 January 1965 = 100.
c. Preliminary.

Saigon Cost of Living Index *

(For Working Class Family)



*Official GVN Index

South Vietnam Money Supply



South Vietnam Foreign Exchange Reserves



65139 12-66 CIA

Saigon Free Market Gold and Currency Prices



65140 12-66 CIA

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

PRIORITY
IN 67221

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC
DDI EXO

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[redacted]

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CONFIDENTIAL 281638 Z [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

DIST 28 DECEMBER 1966

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 21 DECEMBER 1966

SUBJECT ALLEGED SUDISTE PLANS TO OVERTHROW THE KY GOVERNMENT AND ASSASSINATE PRIME MINISTER KY

ACQ VIETNAM, [redacted] (26 DECEMBER 1966) [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

1. ON 21 DECEMBER A GROUP OF SUDEISTES, MOST OF WHOM WERE

5 4 3 2 1

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

(classification) (dissem controls)

5 4 3 2 1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
4/21/98

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

EITHER FOLLOWERS OF THICH TRI QUANG OR SYMPATHIZERS OF THE DIEMIST GENERALS, MET AT A PRIVATE HOME IN THE CHU HOA SECTION OF CHOLON TO DISCUSS PLANS FOR CARRYING OUT A COUP AGAINST THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM. THOSE PARTICIPATING IN THE MEETING WERE NOT IDENTIFIED, BUT RETIRED MAJOR GENERAL TRAN VAN DON IS REPORTEDLY ITS LEADER, AND XUAN TUNG, A DISSIDENT MEMPER OF THE VIETNAMESE NATIONALIST PARTY (VNQDD), AND LUONG QUOC XUNG, A FORMER DAI VIET, ARE CONNECTED WITH THE PLOT.

2. THE GROUP DID NOT REACH AGREEMENT ON HOW TO CARRY OUT THE PLOT. SOME FAVORED LAUNCHING A POPULAR DEMONSTRATION WHICH WOULD CULMINATE IN A COUP; OTHERS THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD FIRST BE NECESSARY TO ASSASSINATE PRIME MINISTER KY. THE GROUP IS CONTINUING TO WORK ON THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE.

3. [redacted] COMMENT. THE CAPTAIN'S MOTIVES FOR IMPARTING THIS UNSOLICITED INFORMATION ARE NOT KNOWN. POSSIBLY IT IS A QUESTION OF PLAYING SAFE WITH POTH SIDES.) 1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1)

4. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE USAID JUSPAO USMACV USARV NAVFORV 7TH AIR FORCE DIST 50/OSI 525TH MIG CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL [redacted] 1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1)

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Document # 147

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY • PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

IN 67472

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC [redacted] SDO ONE OCR [redacted] CIA/NMCC

DDI EXO

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[redacted]

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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S-E-C-R-E-T [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

23 19 27 Z DIST 29 DECEMBER 1966

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI 23 DECEMBER 1966

SUBJECT STATEMENTS BY NORTH VIETNAMESE [redacted] THAT CONTINUED AMERICAN BOMBING AND AMERICAN REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE VIET CONG ARE CHIEF OBSTACLES TO NEGOTIATIONS 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

BATOR
BOWDLER
BUDGET
DAVIS
GINSBURGH
HAMILTON
JESSUP
JOHNSON
JORDEN
KENNY S
KRAEER
MOYERS
TAYLOR
WRIGGINS

ACQ [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

1. (SUMMARY. [redacted] NEGOTIATIONS ON THE VIETNAM WAR ARE IMPOSSIBLE WHILE THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM CONTINUES. [redacted] THE NORTH VIETNAMESE CANNOT OFFER CESSATION OF INFILTRATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM IN EXCHANGE FOR CESSATION OF BOMBING AS THAT WOULD STIFLE THEIR ENTIRE EFFORT. [redacted] ANOTHER OBSTACLE TO NEGOTIATIONS IS UNTED STATES FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE VIET CONG (VC) AS DIRECT PARTNERS IN BARGAINING. [redacted] NORTH VIETNAM WOULD BE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE IF "THE INDISPENSABLE CONDITIONS" WERE MET, AND 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

• S-E-C-R-E-T- [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

(Classification) (dissem controls)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
4/21/98

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

• S-E-C-R-E-T [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

THAT WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS IS A CONDITION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE, RATHER THAN A CONDITION FOR OPENING TALKS. THE ATTITUDE OF THE VC ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS, [redacted] IS NOT CLEAR, AS THEY DO NOT ALWAYS AGREE WITH HANOI. [redacted] NORTH VIETNAM EXPECTS EVENTUAL AMERICAN INVASION BUT [redacted] THIS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY DRAW CHINA INTO THE WAR. [redacted]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

[redacted] NOT YET [redacted] ANY DIRECTIVES FROM HANOI ON AMERICAN UNITED NATIONS DELEGATE ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG'S REQUEST TO U THANT TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE AND THIS MIGHT INDICATE A LESSENING OF SKEPTICISM IN HANOI ABOUT UNITED STATES INTENTIONS.)

2. [redacted] CONCERNING NORTH VIETNAM'S REFUSAL TO RESPOND TO UNITED STATES PEACE OVERTURES, [redacted] IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO AGREE TO NEGOTIATE WHILE THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM CONTINUES. [redacted] NORTH VIETNAMESE DO NOT AGREE THAT ANY CESSATION OF AMERICAN BOMBING SHOULD BE MET BY AN EQUIVALENT EFFORT ON THEIR PART. THEY CONSIDER THE BOMBINGS AS BEING WITHOUT ANY GENUINE EQUIVALENT ON THEIR SIDE. IN THEIR VIEW THE SUGGESTION THAT THEY SHOULD CEASE TO INFILTRATE SOUTH VIETNAM IN EXCHANGE FOR A CESSATION OF THE BOMBING WOULD MEAN THAT THEY WOULD BE STIFLING THEIR ENTIRE EFFORT, WHILE THE AMERICANS WOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THEIR LAND WAR INTACT.

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

3. [redacted] THE CHIEF OBSTACLE TO NEGOTIATIONS, IF THE BOMBINGS

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

S-E-C-R-E-T [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

ARE STOPPED, IS UNITED STATES FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE VC AS A DIRECT PARTNER IN THE BARGAINING. [redacted]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DEMAND FOR A WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS AS ONE OF THEIR BASIC FOUR POINTS IS NOT MEANT TO BE A CONDITION FOR THE OPENING OF PEACE TALKS, BUT A CONDITION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE. A STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN INTENT TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES AFTER AN ACCORD ON PEACE TERMS WOULD SUFFICE. THE MODALITIES OF THE WITHDRAWAL CAN BE WORKED OUT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

4. [redacted] THERE ARE THREE DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW ABOUT THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS: (A) PEKING IS TOTALLY OPPOSED TO THEM. IT SUITS THE CHINESE TO HAVE THE WAR CONTINUE, INVOLVING THE UNITED STATES WHILE CHINA IS UNTOUCHED; (B) HANOI WOULD BE READY TO NEGOTIATE IF WHAT IT CONSIDERS TO BE THE INDISPENSABLE CONDITIONS ARE MET; (C) WHAT THE VC WANT IS NOT CLEAR. THEY ARE FIGHTING MEN AND DO NOT ALWAYS SEE EYE-TO-EYE WITH HANOI. [redacted] NORTH VIETNAMESE ABILITY TO CONTROL THE VC [redacted] LIMITED, AND [redacted] THEY MUST BE REPRESENTED IN ANY PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

5. [redacted] AS TO WHETHER THE ESCALATION OF THE WAR MEANS AMERICAN INVASION OF NORTH VIETNAM, [redacted] NORTH VIETNAM BELIEVES AN AMERICAN INVASION MUST BE ANTICIPATED SOONER OR LATER AND IS PREPARING FOR IT. [redacted] THIS INVASION WOULD NOT NECESSARILY DRAW CHINA INTO THE CONFLICT, ALTHOUGH [redacted] "OBVIOUSLY AN

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

S-E-C-R-E-T [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

S-E-[redacted]R-E-T [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

AMERICAN INVASION OF NORTH VIETNAM WOULD INCREASE THE THREAT TO CHINA, AND THE ENTRY OF CHINESE 'VOLUNTEERS' WOULD BE INCREASED. [redacted] HOPE [redacted] CAN PREVENT THIS. [redacted] HOPE IS FOR NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE, EVEN FROM [redacted] FRIENDS." [redacted] FOR SOME SORT OF NEUTRALIZATION OF NORTH VIETNAM, BUT [redacted] DO NOT BELIEVE IN THE 'DOMINO THEORY', THAT CHINA WOULD ATTEMPT TO TAKE OVER ALL OF ASIA IF THE VIETNAM WAR ENDS WITH THE AMERICANS' LEAVING. [redacted] DID NOT BRING UP THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

6. [redacted] AS TO THE TIMING OF REUNIFICATION, [redacted] ALTHOUGH NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM INTENDED TO BE REUNITED, IT WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE IMMEDIATELY--"NOT BEFORE THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF 1968."

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

7. [redacted] HANOI'S REACTION [redacted] TO UNITED NATIONS DELEGATE ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG'S REQUEST TO UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT ON 19 DECEMBER TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE, [redacted] HANOI HAD NOT YET TAKEN ANY OFFICIAL POSITION AND THEREFORE [redacted] NOT [redacted] ANY DIRECTIVES YET. [redacted] THIS MIGHT INDICATE LESS SKEPTICISM IN HANOI ABOUT UNITED STATES INTENTIONS THAN THERE HAD BEEN LAST YEAR WHEN UNITED STATES AMBASSADORS WERE DISPATCHED ON "PEACE MISSIONS" TO VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD. [redacted] THE GOLDBERG OVERTURE CAME AT THE SAME TIME AS THE ARRIVAL OF UNITED STATES REINFORCEMENTS AND THE CONTINUED BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM, WHICH MADE IT DIFFICULT TO TAKE IT SERIOUSLY.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

• S-E-C-R-E-T [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

[redacted] THE REITERATION OF THE AMERICAN "14 POINTS" CONTINUES TO PUT CONDITIONS THAT ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO HANOI.

8. [redacted] AS TO NORTH VIETNAM'S ABILITY TO RESIST A LENGTHY WAR, [redacted] "WE ARE USED TO WAR. WE HAVE HAD A QUARTER CENTURY OF IT NOW, AND WE ARE HARDENED. IT WILL TAKE A MILLION AMERICAN SOLDIERS TO APPROACH ANYTHING LIKE A REAL VICTORY, AND EVEN THOUGH SUCH A FORCE MIGHT BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN A RELATIVELY EFFECTIVE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM, RESISTANCE WOULD GO ON INDEFINITELY." [redacted] THE WAR WAS ESSENTIALLY AN AMERICAN WAR, AS THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE CANNOT BE COUNTED ON FOR EFFECTIVE FIGHTING.

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

9. [redacted] NO PERMANENT VC OFFICE WILL BE OPENED IN PARIS, AS THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN NO INDICATION IT WOULD WELCOME SUCH A REPRESENTATION. [redacted] THERE ARE NO AUTHENTIC VC REPRESENTATIVES NOW IN PARIS.

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

10. [redacted]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

11. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT [redacted]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

S-E-C-R-E-T [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE
IN 66443

153

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC
DDI EXO

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[redacted]

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271318 Z [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

DIST 27 DECEMBER 1966

COUNTRY: VIETNAM / US

DO: 26 DECEMBER 1966

SUBJECT: REACTION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE CONSUL [redacted] TO POSSIBILITY OF NEW PEACE OFFENSIVE

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

ACQ [redacted]

SOURCE: [redacted]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1. [redacted]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

[redacted] IN ORDER FOR THE PEACE OFFENSIVE TO BE SUCCESSFUL THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO UNCONDITIONALLY STOP THE BOMBINGS AND AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF ITS

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
4/21/98

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

S-E-C-R-E-T [redacted]

(classification) (dissem controls)

TROOPS TO BE FOLLOWED BY A TOKEN WITHDRAWAL AS PROOF OF UNITED STATES GOOD FAITH. BECAUSE THE U.S. IS UNWILLING TO DO THIS NOTHING WILL COME FROM THE NEW PEACE OFFENSIVE.

2. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMSMI CINCMEAFSA [redacted] CINCPAC, ARPAC, PACAF, PACFLT).

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

REPORT CLASS SECRET [redacted]

S-E-C-R-E-T

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Case # NLJ 93-183
Document # 154

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE
IN 66445 154

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC [redacted] SDO ONE OCR [redacted] CIA/NMC
AMSD: DDI EXO

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[redacted]

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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271437Z [redacted]

SECRET

DIST 27 DECEMBER 1966 1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1)

COUNTRY: VIETNAM [redacted] U.S.

DOI: 13 - 14 DECEMBER 1966 1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1)

SUBJECT: NORTH VIETNAMESE [redacted] OFFICIAL'S COMMENTS ON 13 - 14 DECEMBER U.S. BOMBINGS [redacted]

[redacted] 1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1)

ACQ: [redacted]

SOURCE: [redacted] 1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1)

1. [redacted] 1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1)

SECRET [redacted] 1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1)

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1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

SECRET [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

[redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[redacted]

A. THE [redacted] OFFICIAL GAVE [redacted] DETAILS OF FOUR VERY POPULATED STREETS INSIDE HANOI WHICH HAD BEEN BOMBED AND STRAFED ON 13 AND 14 DECEMBER 66, BY U. S. PLANES. HE ALSO GAVE [redacted] DETAILS OF MORE POPULATED AREAS ATTACKED IN THE NORTHERN, SOUTHERN AND WESTERN OUTSKIRTS. FOREIGN EMBASSIES WERE ALSO ATTACKED. THERE ARE NO MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN THE PLACES ATTACKED. OVER ONE HUNDRED PEOPLE WERE KILLED OR WOUNDED IN THESE ATTACKS. HE SAID THAT THESE RECKLESS AND OBVIOUS ATTACKS WHICH WERE AGAINST HUMANITY AND AGAINST THE GENERAL AGREEMENT WERE DESIGNED TO FORCE VIETNAM INTO SUBMISSION. THE AMERICANS WERE GRAVELY MISTAKEN. VIETNAM WOULD FIGHT ON WITH EVEN GRIMMER DETERMINATION UNTIL VICTORY.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

B. [redacted] THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (DRVN) WAS APPEALING TO [redacted] OTHER SOCIALIST AND NATIONALIST COUNTRIES FOR SUPPORT, AND TO DENOUNCE AMERICAN ATTACKS ON HANOI AND ITS WAR OF AGGRESSION AGAINST VIETNAM. [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[redacted]

SECRET [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

EVEN THOUGH IT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN SO INTENDED, WITH PLANES OPERATING RIGHT OVER THE CITY AND WITH THE TARGETS ON THE FRINGES AND GROUND INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE CITY ITSELF IT IS UNLIKELY THE CITY WOULD NOT SUFFER CONSIDERABLY FROM BOMBS, OR ROCKETS OR BY UNEXPLODED MISSILES, ANTI-AIRCRAFT SHELLS OR SHRAPNEL.

C. THE AMERICAN FIGHTING AGAINST HANOI HAS CONSIDERABLY INFLAMED PASSIONS AND THE THINKING OF THE VIETNAMESE [redacted] IF THE RAIDS OVER HANOI ARE REPEATED ON THE SAME SCALE AS THE RAIDS ON 13 AND 14 DECEMBER, IT IS CONSIDERED CERTAIN THAT VIETNAM WILL TAKE SOME ACTION TO MEET THIS CHALLENGE. THERE IS SPECULATION AS TO WHETHER THIS WILL MAKE VIETNAM DEVIATE FROM OR MODIFY HER PRESENT POLICY OF DOING THE FIGHTING HERSELF AND NOT ASKING FOR MILITARY VOLUNTEERS. WHILE AMERICANS MIGHT HAVE THEIR OWN METHODS OF ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF THE BOMBS, THE OPINION HELD HERE BY PRACTICALLY ALL OBSERVERS IS THAT IN BOMBING THE HEART OF HANOI, IN CAUSING CIVIL LOSSES AND SOME FRIGHTFULNESS, THE RESULTS HAVE NOT BEEN EFFECTIVE.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

2. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMSMI CINCMEAFSA [redacted] CINCPAC, POLAD).

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

REPORT CLASS SECRET [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

SECRET

284a

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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 93-183
Document # 284a

28 December 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Report on Pacification Measurement Project in Vietnam

1. I departed Washington on 15 November enroute to Saigon, in accordance with State message 83100. This message, sent on behalf of the White House, Department of State, Department of Defense, AID and CIA, advised the U.S. Mission in Saigon of the grid concept developed in Washington for measuring where we stand in Revolutionary Development (RD) and pacification, and designated me as an inter-departmental representative charged with briefing the Mission in Saigon on the details of this concept and assisting the Mission in refining and testing the concept with a view to implementing such a system in Vietnam by January 1967.

2. Briefings were presented at CINCPAC during a stopover in Honolulu on 16 and 17 November, enroute to Saigon. Admiral Sharp was briefed personally and was very receptive to the evaluation concept, recognizing its value as a management tool. Other elements of the CINCPAC staff were also generally receptive. I was joined in Honolulu by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, Jr., from the staff of DCSOPS, Department of the Army, who was designated as JCS/DOD representative to accompany me on my mission.

3. On our arrival in Saigon on 19 November, we met with representatives of the component agencies of the U.S. Mission, briefed them on the evaluation concept, distributed copies of the proposed checklist, and arranged for a meeting the following week to receive their comments and reactions. Ambassador Porter, whom we briefed the following day, reacted very favorably to the concept. He advised us not to be overly flexible in making adjustments to it; expressing his desire that the system ultimately adopted retain the best features of our initial concept.

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4. Colonel Clarke and I retained responsibility for the project from the outset, with assistance from Ambassador Porter's staff which provided us with office space. We fully recognized that some modifications and refinements of the concept would be necessary in order to adjust it to actual conditions and to capitalize on the rather extensive work already done on this area by some Mission components, particularly by MACV's Revolutionary Development Support Directorate, which was engaged in a long-term research project aimed at developing a similar evaluation system.

5. With Ambassador Porter's approval, we embarked on a series of field tests to determine the feasibility of the concept and the validity of the indicators selected in Washington. These tests, including some conducted by three sub-sector advisors, disclosed that our original checklist was somewhat unwieldy and that it contained a number of ambiguities and inconsistencies. (A list of sub-sectors in which tests were conducted is contained in Enclosure 1.) These faults were eliminated through a major overhaul of the checklist and a switch to a multiple-choice format (a revision also suggested by MACV). The refined checklist, which was tested by seven sub-sector advisors, retained the basic features of the original concept but proved to be much less cumbersome.

6. While the testing was in progress, we engaged in a number of meetings and discussions with various elements of the Mission in Saigon and in the field, incorporating suggestions where feasible. By 11 December we had secured full agreement at the working level on the final checklist and on the procedures for implementing the system. Colonel Clarke and I also drafted detailed guidelines for the use of the sub-sector advisors. The need for such guidelines became apparent when the advisors taking part in the early tests expressed a lack of familiarity with certain major aspects of the RD and pacification effort. This was particularly true with regard to the organization and functions of the VC village guerrilla structure and the VC political infrastructure, and to some extent also with the specific developmental goals of the RD program. Accordingly, in our guidelines we defined the scope of the six basic factors, outlined the RD goals with respect to those factors, provided a detailed description of each of the 18 indicators (i.e., VC village guerrilla organization, VC political infrastructure at hamlet and village levels, etc.), and set forth a detailed description of conditions related to each indicator at each of the five grade levels. The guidelines concluded with a listing of sources of information available to the advisor on each factor. Those advisors who were provided with copies

of the guidelines for use in the final tests welcomed them as a valuable educational tool. The guidelines will be made available in handbook form to all U.S. personnel involved in the evaluation system.

7. We briefed the Mission Council on the project on 13 December, describing the results of our coordination and testing activities and the procedures developed for implementing the evaluation system beginning in January. The Mission Council approved the project, and directed its implementation as recommended.

8. The approved system retains the basic features of the concept developed in Washington, with improvements in format and procedures worked out in coordination with components of the Mission. The hamlet will be the basic administrative/political unit evaluated. The approved system retains the grid of six basic factors and five grade levels. The number of indicators on the hamlet checklist was reduced to three for each factor from the original four to seven, and the number of choices required by the evaluator was reduced to 90 from 191 (Enclosure 2). The final checklist will be reduced photographically to a letter-size page. The switch to a multiple-choice format simplified the processing of the data by the ADPS equipment as well as making it less cumbersome for the evaluator. The sub-sector advisor will be provided each month with a hamlet evaluation summary form printed out by the MACV ADPS equipment (Enclosure 3). This form will list all hamlets in the sub-sector, the village to which they belong, the grid coordinates, hamlet population, and hamlet code number. It will also indicate the hamlet's status under the former classification system (secure, undergoing securing, undergoing clearing, uncontested, or VC-controlled), and its classification under the 1967 GVN 11-point, 6-point and 2-point criteria. It will provide spaces in which the advisor will indicate the grade for each of the 18 indicators. It also has spaces for the answers to some 14 "problem area" questions. These questions, which will not affect the hamlet grade, were developed to meet the needs expressed by various agencies in Saigon for subjective data on attitudes of the populace and problems with respect to performance of GVN officials, pay of officials, etc. (Enclosure 4). Responses to these questions will be compiled in the data bank and can be read out to meet the needs of interested agencies.

9. The advisor will enter on the hamlet evaluation summary form the grade compiled from the hamlet worksheets prepared for each individual hamlet to which he has access. The completed data sheet will be forwarded to province level where it will be reviewed by the U.S. province team, including the sector advisor, and the USAID, JUSPAO and CAS province representatives and/or the senior civilian representative. Any differences will be resolved in consultation with the sub-sector advisor submitting the report. The hamlet summary report forms will then be forwarded to Saigon as enclosures to the province team's monthly Special Joint Report, where they will be processed by MACV's ADPS equipment, which will produce a consolidated print-out. Copies of this print-out will be forwarded to Ambassador Porter's staff, and distributed back down through Corps/Region, Division, Province/Sector and Sub-Sector. The ADPS equipment will compute an average grade for each hamlet. Ambassador Porter's Evaluation and Reports Division will compile a summary of these grades in a format similar to that in Enclosure 5, which will be integrated into the Mission's monthly report on RD which is forwarded to Washington. The initial evaluations for the month of January will be contained in the Mission Report for that month which should be available in Washington in late February. No weighting will be applied to the initial grades; some weighting may be injected later if the need arises. Since the basic data will be transmitted by data-link from Saigon to CINCPAC and DOD, it will be possible to ascertain at all levels which areas may be progressing and which may be lagging.

10. The system will provide an essentially American evaluation. However, it must be borne in mind that very few U.S. officials are capable of completing such an evaluation without consulting at some stage with Vietnamese officials, whether they be at the hamlet level or above. In our guidance, we stressed the need for the U.S. advisor to make an actual visit to the hamlet to observe conditions for himself. Recognizing that he must seek information from others, however, we emphasized that he use his own judgment in assessing the reliability of responses to his questions. There was general recognition also of the need to avoid giving the impression of a unilateral U.S. inspection of what is essentially a GVN program. Accordingly, General Thang was advised in a latter from Ambassador Porter that an evaluation system was being developed and experimented with. Ambassador Porter planned to brief General Thang after 22 December on the system, and to offer his Ministry the opportunity to share in the data and even to adopt the same system if it desired.

11. It was also recognized that a shakedown period of several months will be required to eliminate any remaining bugs and to insure consistent application of the criteria throughout the country. This may necessitate some subsequent adjustments in the initial returns as refinements are worked out. Allowance must be made for the fact that, while the processing of the data will be accomplished by machines, the input will reflect the necessarily fallible and inconsistent human judgment of over 200 separate sub-sector advisory teams. The evaluation system will thus have to be carefully monitored to minimize the potential for imbalanced interpretations of criteria by the large number of humans involved.

12. In conclusion, the constructive and cooperative spirit of all elements of the U.S. Mission in Saigon must be acknowledged. Without that spirit, our task would have been very difficult. The valuable assistance rendered by Colonel Clarke is also worthy of note. His enthusiastic, imaginative and hard-working approach to the project assured its success, and his tact and recognized professional standing contributed to the cooperation we received from his military colleagues in Saigon. With his help, we were able to accomplish our task and develop what appears to be a workable system for evaluating progress in RD and pacification.

13. In response to the request contained in State message 102066 (14 December) Colonel Clarke and I visited Bangkok on 15 and 16 December, where we briefed the U.S. Mission on the evaluation system developed for Vietnam. The Mission is studying the materials we provided them and will forward its comments at a later date. Enroute back to Washington, we briefed the CINCPAC staff in Honolulu on 20 December on the results of our work in Saigon.

GEORGE W. ALLEN
Vietnamese Affairs Staff

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

PRIORITY
IN 67487

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC [redacted] DDI SDO ONE OCR [redacted] EXO CIA/NMCC

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GROUP [redacted]

[redacted]

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S-E-C-R-E-T [redacted]

29 [illegible] 12

DIST 29 DECEMBER 1966

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI [redacted] DECEMBER 1966

SUBJECT VIEWS EXPRESSED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE [redacted] THAT ARTICLE BY JAMES RESTON ACCURATELY ASSESSED HANOI POSITION ON NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT SECRET CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

ACQ [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1. [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

BOTH HANOI AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION [redacted] WERE IMPRESSED BY THE ARTICLE BY JAMES RESTON IN THE 26 DECEMBER (SIC) INTERNATIONAL EDITION OF THE NEW YORK TIMES ENTITLED "WASHINGTON:

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4
3
2
1

S-E-C-R-E-T [redacted]

(classification) (dissem controls)

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4/21/98

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

S-E-[redacted]-E-T [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

THE CONFLICT OF POWER," IN THAT IT WAS A GOOD REFLECTION OF THE OFFICIAL MOOD PREVAILING TODAY IN HANOI ON THE QUESTION OF OPENING PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE RELATED QUESTION OF A CESSATION OF THE BOMBINGS IN NORTH VIETNAM. [redacted] PARTICULARLY REFERRED TO RESTON'S STATEMENT THAT HANOI HAS EMPHASIZED THAT THERE CAN BE NO NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL THE BOMBINGS STOP AND SAID THAT THIS WAS AN ACCURATE STATEMENT OF HANOI'S BASIC POSITION IN REGARD TO NEGOTIATIONS.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

2. [redacted] THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF THE BOMBINGS BY THE UNITED STATES WOULD IN A SHORT TIME LEAD TO THE WILLINGNESS OF HANOI TO OPEN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. [redacted] THE CESSATION OF THE BOMBING MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A WAY THAT WILL NOT CAUSE HANOI TO LOSE FACE OR APPEAR TO BE SURRENDERING TO AN ULTIMATUM, AND IF THE BOMBINGS WERE UNCONDITIONALLY STOPPED, THIS WOULD HAVE THE DESIRED EFFECT. [redacted] IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE, BY WAY OF SECRET DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS, FOR THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH VIETNAM TO MAKE A SECRET AGREEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT IF THE BOMBINGS WERE UNCONDITIONALLY STOPPED, HANOI WOULD PROMISE AFTER A SHORT PAUSE TO INITIATE NEGOTIATION TALKS.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

3. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

REPORT CLASS SECRET [redacted]

S-E-[redacted]-E-T [redacted]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY • ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

IN 151

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC [redacted] SDO ONE OCR [redacted] CIA/NMCC

SDI EXO

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[redacted]

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S-E-C-R-E-T [redacted]

29 10 04 Z DIST 29 DECEMBER 1966 1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1)

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM [redacted]

DOI LATE NOVEMBER 1966

SUBJECT [redacted]

ACCOUNT OF CRITICISM OF SOVIETS BY NORTH VIETNAMESE [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

[redacted]

ACQ [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted]

[redacted] 1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1)

1. IN LATE NOVEMBER 1966 [redacted] 1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1) THE USSR IS BLACKMAILING THE AMERICANS BY SAYING THAT IF IT DOES NOT GET WHAT IT WANTS, IT WILL SEND MORE SUPPORT TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. [redacted] REPLIED THAT ONE THING IS CERTAIN: "WE CAN NOT HAVE ANY NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AMERICANS, AND 1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1)

S-E-C-R-E-T [redacted]

(classification) (dissem controls)

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4/21/98

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

S-E-C-R-E-T [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

WE WILL NOT GIVE THE USSR THE CHANCE TO ACT AS A NEGOTIATOR FOR US WITH THE AMERICANS." [redacted] THE SITUATION IN NORTH VIETNAM DIFFERS FROM THAT OF CUBA IN THE PAST IN THAT NORTH VIETNAM IS MORE INDEPENDENT AND THEREFORE DOES NOT NEED TO UNMASK THE REAL MOTIVATION BEHIND THE NEW SOVIET OFFERS OF SUPPORT FOR NORTH VIETNAM. [redacted] COMMENT.. [redacted] MAY HAVE MEANT THAT THE CUBANS, BECAUSE OF THEIR GREATER DEPENDENCE ON THE USSR, HAD TO MAKE A CHOICE BETWEEN THE USSR AND CHINA, WHEREAS NORTH VIETNAM CAN AFFORD TO BE MORE INDEPENDENT, ACCEPTING AID FROM BOTH THE USSR AND CHINA.)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

2. [redacted] A LEADER OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION [redacted] ALSO SAID THAT IF HE WERE TO ACT AS A DOGMATIC ANTI-REVISIONIST, HE WOULD BLAST THE MOTIVATION BEHIND THE SOVIET OFFER OF AID AND THE AID WOULD THEN BE CUT OFF COMPLETELY. HOWEVER, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION LEADER SAID THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE NOT GOING TO UNMASK THE SOVIETS, AND THAT WHAT [redacted] WAS HEARING WAS PURELY INTERNAL CRITICISM.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

3. [redacted] DISSEM. CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC [redacted]

[redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

S-E-C-R-E-T [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Rostow

Gordon

284

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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 93-183
Document # 284

29 DEC 1966

VN - Pacification

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Robert S. McNamara
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT : Mr. Allen's Summary Report

For your information I am forwarding Mr. George W. Allen's summary report on his recent trip to Vietnam to explain the grid concept for measuring the status of pacification and Revolutionary Development activity. This report describes the pilot testing program through which the Washington-developed initial concept was tried out under actual field conditions, the way the concept was discussed and coordinated with the U.S. Mission, the modifications made in the concept as a result of this testing and coordination process, the formal adoption of the modified concept by the Mission Council on 13 December, and the procedures by which it is to be implemented on a nation-wide basis as of 1 January 1967. Mr. Allen also reports on the results of his visit to Bangkok to explain the Vietnam pacification measurement technique to the U.S. Mission in Thailand.

As you are aware, Mr. Allen was accompanied and assisted in this venture by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, Jr., an officer on the staff of DCSOPS, Department of the Army, who served as a Department of

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Defense representative in this exercise. Mr. Allen advises that without Colonel Clarke's enthusiastic and imaginative assistance it would have been impossible to complete this task so successfully and in such a short period of time. I would appreciate it if you could ensure that Colonel Clarke is extended our thanks for and commendation on his fine performance.

/S/ Rufus Taylor

Rufus Taylor
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
Acting Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Under Secretary Katzenbach
Mr. Rostow
Mr. Komer
General Wheeler
General Greene
Mr. Poats

SECRET

ANNEX

THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST SPLIT

ANNEX X

THE EFFECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CLIMATE ON VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PLANS AND CAPABILITIES

I. World Public Opinion

The evidence shows that the Vietnamese Communists believe popular opposition throughout the Western world to US policy in Vietnam can be an important factor in restraining the allied hand against the insurgents. Virtually every significant Vietnamese Communist statement on war strategy has stressed the necessity of mustering the maximum amount of world opposition against allied--principally US--action in the conflict.*

Also significant in the eyes of the Vietnamese Communists are the "liberation movements" and other outbreaks of civil unrest and rebellion which occur elsewhere in the world against Western authorities. Hanoi and the Viet Cong see these, in part, as developments which hopefully will draw a direct American military or economic reaction which will distract and weaken the US war effort in Vietnam.** Such "people's action" is also regarded as encouraging the morale

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*In an important speech setting forth the DRV's terms for settling the war in April 1965, for example, Premier Pham Van Dong devoted nearly a quarter of his address to this theme. "Strong and unrelenting opposition" from the "world's people," Dong said, "has the effect of checking and repelling" the "aggressive and warmongering plots" of the enemy. In the face of this opposition, he claimed, "the rear" of the enemy is "disintegrating" and "contradictions" in his ranks are increasing.

**According to the DRV chief of staff, Van Tien Dung, the US cannot put "all its economic and military potential" into action in Vietnam if it has to "cope with the situation in many other countries and in many fields...to repress other peoples."

of the Communist rank and file in Vietnam by demonstrating that they are not alone in their opposition to Western "imperialism and colonialism." Largely for these reasons, Hanoi has frequently urged greater cooperation and unified action by the Soviet Union and China during the last two years in support of the world "liberation movements." The North Vietnamese apparently consider such action a matter of great significance to Vietnamese Communist interests, since North Vietnamese usually refrain from offering advice to the rest of the bloc.

If the situation in Vietnam develops to the point where the Vietnamese Communists are forced to make a decision on whether to continue to support large-scale insurgency in the South, it is probable that their estimate on the extent of world popular opposition to allied policy in Vietnam and of the strength of the various "liberation movements" would be a significant factor in influencing their decision. It would, however, almost certainly not be a critical factor.

II. Domestic Opposition in the United States

A more important issue in any Vietnamese decision on continuing the war would be the extent and effect of opposition to American policy from within the United States. It is clear that the Vietnamese realize general Western agitation against the allies will never be particularly effective unless accompanied by important opposition in the US.*

The Vietnamese Communists do not view this opposition as simply a manifestation of moral reticence among American intellectuals and leftists over Washington's war policy, but also believe that important opposition may develop as a result of the economic pinch of the war on the American public and business, and that such opposition may be further fanned by the continuing American casualties in Viet nam. It is clear that the Vietnamese believe the US will

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*This has repeatedly been a theme of Vietnamese propaganda in such assertions as "the struggle of the American people plays an important role in the common struggle of the peoples to check the acts of the US Government in Vietnam."

be forced to go on an extensive wartime footing eventually and that this will greatly increase domestic opposition.*

There have been other indications in private that the Vietnamese believe domestic opposition in the US, if developed strongly, would seriously inhibit US war options. Vietnamese Communist cadres have been told by their leaders that the "increase in anger in world opinion over US activities in Vietnam" could be "among the more important factors," in addition to "casualties and economic costs," which would cause the "American government to desist and decide to give up and get out."**

It is hard, however, to assess just how far the Vietnamese Communist inner councils really believe domestic opposition to US war policy has developed to date. In their view of the American situation, the Vietnamese are doubtless influenced to some extent by their overall lack of sophistication on American politics and by their earlier successful experience in bringing significant pressure from French public opinion to bear on French war policy in 1953-1954. In private conversations with visitors to Hanoi, the North Vietnamese have sometimes compared the present war with their own experiences against the French.

Their lack of sophistication and eagerness to seize on evidence of mounting US domestic opposition can perhaps

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*We have the word of North Vietnamese party first secretary, Le Duan, on this. Late last year, he told a visiting Western Communist that he was sure the US would have to mobilize a reserve force of 1,200,000 men in order to support a force of 400,000 men in Vietnam. The US, he said, could not maintain that kind of war effort without being forced eventually by opinion in the US to re-examine and change its policy.

**Western statesmen have been told by Vietnamese Communist spokesmen that they believed the opposition to US policy shown by some congressional leaders and by well-known American journalists indicated a basic "lack of confidence" in the administration's policy. According to the Vietnamese, the "US is suffering from a lack of a clear objective which would unify American public opinion" behind the American policy on Vietnam.

best be seen in their reaction to the American student protests over Vietnam policy which reached at least an initial peak in the fall of 1965. There was an increasing air of optimism over the strength of the student agitation in Vietnamese Communist propaganda at that time, capped by an announcement from Hanoi on 24 October that a "united front of the Vietnamese and American people has de facto taken shape." The propaganda strongly suggested that the Vietnamese were overreading the extent and depth of the protests in the US.* It is possible that the optimistic tone of the propaganda was intended in part to give a boost to the Vietnamese rank and file by demonstrating the sympathy which allegedly exists for their position in the enemy's own camp.

There has been some evidence in Vietnamese Communist materials during 1966 of substantial realism regarding the potential for domestic opposition in the US. This could be seen, for example, in General Vo Nguyen Giap's assessment of the war situation in the DRV party journal in January 1966. Giap placed US domestic opposition last when reviewing American weaknesses in the war. He indicated that the opposition would exercise a restraining effect on American options in Vietnam, but implied that it would not de decisive in determining US staying power in the conflict. Giap placed more emphasis on US limitations in maintaining strong economic and military positions throughout the world while pursuing a large-scale commitment in Vietnam. He did not, however, assess even this latter problem as critical in determining the outcome of the conflict.**

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*Communist misjudgment of American opinion was also evident in Hanoi's threats recently to take punitive action against US flyers, and in its public abuse of the pilots. When Hanoi realized the depth of feeling in the US over the issue, it hastily stopped its propaganda regarding trials. Its willingness to do so is indicative of the importance it assigns to influencing US opinion.

**In private, visiting Western officials in Hanoi have been given much the same line during the past few months. One official was told that the DRV was "not counting" on US opinion to win the war. The same theme has been reflected

(continued on next page)

It would appear that the Vietnamese Communist leadership does not expect any important difficulties for Washington in the near future, at least, as a result of popular opposition to the war or because of economic/military stresses caused by the conflict in the United States. Thus, in any basic decision taken on the war by the Vietnamese Communists over the next few months, the status of domestic American opposition would probably not be regarded as critical. If over the longer pull, however, the US was not forced into extensive wartime mobilization measures and strong domestic opposition was not triggered as Hanoi appears to expect, the situation could possibly become a very important factor in any basic Vietnamese Communist decision on prolonging the fighting.

III. Cambodian Attitudes

Phnom Penh's attitude toward the Vietnam war is of importance to Hanoi's own plans chiefly on two counts: (1) Cambodia's ties to the 1954 Geneva agreements and, (2) its contiguity with Viet Cong operational bases in South Vietnam. By appealing to the nationalistic proclivities of Cambodia's leader, Prince Sihanouk, the Asian Communists have been able to gain a substantial amount of political support for the Vietnamese insurgents during the past several years. This has included Cambodian condemnation of the US role in South Vietnam as well as accusations that the US presence there is, as Hanoi claims, in violation of the Geneve agreements. Both of these themes are regarded by the Vietnamese as important foundation stones in their own political policy on the war.

On the physical side, Cambodia has served as a source and a transit channel for limited amounts of both food and other supplies for the Viet Cong. The Cambodians have also taken a primarily neutral stance in permitting limited use of their territory as a refuge and a secure base for the Vietnamese Communist forces.

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in the remarks of DRV diplomats abroad. In May, a French newsman was told by the DRV representative in Paris that Hanoi was greatly interested in encouraging the efforts of students and intellectuals in the US in their opposition to US policy, but realized that they represented only a minority.

The Communists, nevertheless, do not have an ally or even a constant sideline supporter in the Cambodians. Cambodia's ambivalent foreign policy has frequently been at odds with Hanoi's stand on such issues as Indo-Chinese neutrality and the exact terms for settlement of the Vietnam war. The Communists have thus had to adopt a basically cautious policy in exploiting Cambodia for their war effort. They are probably reluctant to make any really large scale or far reaching plans for the use of Cambodian territory by the Viet Cong, and they cannot automatically count on receiving consistent and favorable political support from Phnom Penh.

On balance, the situation probably tends to exert a restraining influence on Vietnamese Communist policy options in the sense that it forces the Vietnamese to focus primarily on better strategic use of South Vietnamese and Laotian territory in their efforts to cope with the growing allied military pressure on their operational bases.

IV. The Effect of Links With Western Leaders

The Vietnamese Communists also regard the establishment and preservation of adequate links to leaders and key officials of Western countries as an important element in their war strategy. There are a number of reasons for this apart from a natural inclination to enhance Vietnamese Communist prestige at the international level. Such contacts, for one thing, offer the Vietnamese an opening to promote opposition to allied policy on Vietnam among influential individuals in the free world.

This can be seen in Hanoi's treatment of the Indian Government. Although Indian proposals for settling the war have consistently been rejected by the Vietnamese as unacceptably generous to the allies, Hanoi has been very careful to avoid direct attacks on the Indian Leaders in its propaganda. It has assiduously cultivated its diplomatic relations with New Dehli and treated Indian representatives visiting North Vietnam with considerable courtesy and friendship. The Vietnamese doubtless believe the Indian outlook has an important influence on over-all Afro-Asian opinion about the war. Hanoi apparently also regards some Indian leaders as potential channels for floating Vietnamese views about the war to the allies.

During 1966, the Vietnamese seem to have given special attention to the use of Western statesmen as third party channels to the allied leadership. This development has been most evident in Hanoi's treatment of the Canadian representatives who have visited or have been stationed with the ICC in Hanoi. The North Vietnamese have frankly told them that they wish to preserve the channel which the Canadians provide to the US, and have suggested that Canadian visitors be empowered to discuss more than just ICC business while in Hanoi.

From what has been learned of third party contacts with the North Vietnamese, it does not appear that the greater Hanoi interest in talking to prominent Westerners during 1966 represents any softening as yet in Vietnamese resolve to continue the war. It probably does mean, however, that the Communist leaders realize it might become necessary at some point to change their tactics and actively consider a political settlement of the conflict. At such a time, third party contacts could prove especially valuable, in part because they would provide a channel to the allies that did not first filter through the bloc. At such a critical point, the Vietnamese might not see eye to eye on strategy with bloc leaders.

V. The Public Posture of the National Liberation Front (NFLSV)

Since the creation of the NFLSV in 1960, the Vietnamese have made a continuous effort to demonstrate that the Front enjoys broad political support and control throughout South Vietnam and that its "growing strength" is supplemented by mounting recognition of Front claims and position in international circles. The results of this have been disappointing at best for the Communists. Front influence in South Vietnam is limited chiefly to the rural areas under Communist control; even in those areas, the Front is widely regarded as a facade to cover the operations of the hard core Viet Cong (see ANNEX III for a discussion of the numerical strength and influence of the Front in South Vietnam).

On the international side, although there is a substantial body of opinion in the free world which holds that the insurgency in the South is an indigenous, patriotic and legitimate revolutionary movement, the Front's own activities have contributed relatively little to the spread of this belief.

The Front is widely regarded in the West as more or less a voice for the Communist view on Vietnam. Efforts to achieve quasi-diplomatic status for the Front have not been very successful. Even some of the bloc countries where the Front has opened "permanent representations," have made it clear that the NFLSV is accredited only to local national front organizations and not to the bloc government itself.

The best evidence, perhaps, of the weak position of the Front lies in its failure to establish a provisional national government in South Vietnam. While both North Vietnamese and Front officials have hinted on several occasions in the past year that such a move was in process, it will probably not take place in the predictable future. Such an action would pose formidable problems for the Communists and actually further expose the lack of public support for the Front. It would almost certainly alienate politically active groups in the South, such as the Buddhists, who do not entirely support the Saigon government and have political ambitions themselves. The Front would also find it difficult to establish a satisfactory seat of government in South Vietnam.*

Despite the weaknesses of the Front, however, there are compelling reasons for the Vietnamese Communists to continue to operate under its banner. It provides, for example, a formal medium under which all facets of the insurgent political and military activity in South Vietnam can be organized. Although it does not yet pretend to formal government on a national scale, it does establish for the Communists a needed organizational alternative to the Saigon regime. It is also useful as a platform for advertising the broad program of political and economic objectives which the Communists have set forth as their alleged goals in South Vietnam.

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*The leadership of any provisional NFLSV government would have little attraction among politically conscious elements of the population in South Vietnam not allied with the Communists. Movement toward the opening of negotiations on the war, should the Vietnamese Communists decide to do so, might also be complicated by the establishment of a Front government.

PORTS

Extracts from CIA-DIA Appraisals

There was no significant increase in the average time in port for either tankers or dry cargo ships during February or March, despite the record high levels of import.

On-The-Spot Reports

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

In the late March early April 1967 period, port congestion in Haiphong continued with merchant ships waiting two and three weeks before unloading cargo. [redacted]

Quantities of building tools and materials, tractors, and forklifts, both crated and uncrated, were stored in the open in the streets and parks near the wharves. There was an obvious lack of storage space.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)
[redacted]

Heavy bomb attacks on Cam Pha and its port facilities on 15 February destroyed the greater part of the town and many citizens lost their homes. A Soviet ships officer expressed fears that bottom mining of the waterways leading into Cam Pha and Hai Phong ports would render impossible the delivery of aid material by sea to North Vietnam.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)
[redacted]

The efficiency of handling cargo, particularly coal exports, at the Haiphong ports, including Hon Gai and Can Pha, has decreased by about 45% since the bombing began in August 64. As a result of the numerous air alerts, the bombing damage outside the city, and the many difficulties encountered by longshoremen in reaching their places of employment, the workers of the ports now have to spend much more time commuting between their home and places of work, since the evacuation of so many of them from the city.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)
[redacted]

USSR missiles and fuel are coming to North Vietnam by ships.

[redacted]

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DATE: SEP 2008

Extracts from CIA-DIA Appraisals

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: SEP 2000

Damage inflicted on the North Vietnamese economy by air strikes increased significantly and will have unfavorable repercussions throughout much of the industrial sector. The most telling damage resulted from the strikes against electric power plants.

Despite the increased disruption of economic activity, the North Vietnamese gave no indication of abandoning their programs to expand small scale industry and to plan for post-war economic development.

On-The-Spot Reports

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

The bombardment continues to diminish daily, the industrial potential of the country. [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

If industry is subjected to new blows, one certain consequence will be that Hanoi will become more dependent on the Chinese, on whom they are already dependent for their food supply. [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

The main cement plant has been so severely damaged that work has halted. [redacted]

The supply of electricity (in Haiphong) appeared to be just adequate. [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Between Phu Ly and Thanh Hoa, an area in which he spent ten days, the traveler saw electric lights on two occasions only. He saw no piped functioning water supply in any town or village area. The main streets of Thanh Hoa had been almost entirely destroyed. Shops open were selling little more than oil, cloth, and occasionally cigarettes. [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

FOOD

Extracts from CIA-DIA Appraisals

The bombing continues to have a disrupted influence on agriculture and fishing. Reports on the food supply are conflicting. Some reports indicate serious shortages while others suggest that supplies are adequate. In no case, however, have there been reports of severe hunger or starvation or any indication at the present time that the North Vietnamese will not be able to maintain at least the minimum consumption levels.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

On-The-Spot Reports

The next harvest of rice will be mediocre. [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Unless immediate action is taken, insects will destroy the spring rice crop. [redacted]

Irrigation systems must be improved in order to prevent drought and spoilage of rice. [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

There did not seem to be much food in the stores and in the restaurants. Outside Hanoi there was only a little meat. [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

There was an indication of food shortage in Haiphong. As coolies worked with a cargo of soya beans, they were pilfering the beans and eating them raw. [redacted]

Ships carrying food stuffs to North Vietnam received preferential treatment. One merchant ship carrying such a cargoe completed discharge in about four days after arrival. [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

A port guard said that soya beans had become a staple in the diet in North Vietnam, and that while the young working population received sufficient quantities of food the older people were rationed to a subsistence level. [redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: SEP 2008

MANPOWER, MORALE, EVACUATION

Extracts from CIA-DIA Appraisals

There has been no evidence to indicate that Hanoi's determination to pursue the war has declined. Likewise, there is no evidence that the morale of the populace has decreased. However, the increasing hardships being borne by the people have resulted in instances of skepticism of the regime's propaganda line.

There has also been continued emphasis on evacuation from urban areas.

Although the role of women in certain activities is to be expanded, North Vietnam does not appear to be suffering from a general manpower shortage.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

On-The-Spot Reports

The mobilization of the entire population for national defense is producing serious labor difficulties. [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

The Vietnamese authorities have decided to evacuate a great portion of civilian population residing in the eastern section of Hanoi near Paul Doumer Bridge and near the electric power station. [redacted]

Evacuation from Haiphong since American bombing began has reduced the population from 400,000 to 250,000 people. The labor force in Haiphong is predominately women. [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

If it is excluded that Hanoi will not capitulate before American force, fatigue, and anxiety are also no less real. [redacted]

The streets are deserted between 0900 and 1700. [redacted]

Increased U.S. Air Force activity in the Hanoi area is causing a deterioration of morale in the city. [redacted]

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DATE: SEP 2000

Manpower, Morale, Evacuation (continued)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

During the night alerts, citizens could be seen running wildly toward shelters. There is a definite breakdown in order and the air raid wardens had difficulty in controlling the people. For the first time, it could be noted that people were making no attempt to hide their fear or fatigue. [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

The severity of raid (29 Apr near Gia Lam) struck observers who did not hide their pessimism. [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

On clear days air activities were virtually continual from 0630 to 1900 daily. The constant series of alerts seriously inhibited school, repair work, and agriculture; alerts followed all-clears incessantly. [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

In early April, the people of Haiphong seemed much more confident than they appeared in September 1966. There appeared to be no shortages of consumer items at this time (no queues were seen and no complaints were heard from the people). This is in contrast to September 1966 when there were shortages of consumer items -- mostly soap, for which there were always queues. [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

Some villagers in the coastal areas of the North Vietnamese provinces between the 17th and 20th parallels hold the view that if the North Vietnamese government stopped infiltration of troops and supplies into South Vietnam then American bombing of their villages would stop. They state that they are becoming less impressed with their government's claim that attacking aircraft are being shot down, since few have witnessed the downing of any planes. Consequently, they are beginning to doubt seriously the Hanoi regime's boast of inevitable victory. . . . Villagers living in frequently bombed areas are especially terrified of the air strikes and limit their daytime activities to the minimum. [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

It seemed surprising, none the less the fact, that none of the people in Haiphong took the North Vietnamese government's propaganda seriously, particularly the claims of the number of U. S. planes shot down or the claims of the size and number of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong in the south. [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

The villagers expressed resentment at having to repair bomb damage and dig defense trenches without compensation. [redacted]

Manpower, Morale, Evacuation (continued)

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

The morale of the North Vietnamese has been dealt a severe blow by the realization that the war is not only lost economically but also militarily. They now know that Soviet missiles are not capable of stopping air raids. They also fear that the MIG-21 cannot cope with the technical superiority of the American planes. . . . Hanoi cannot possibly continue the war for another two years, and even during that period its efforts would be reduced to sporadic raids of sabotage against installations. [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Overflight of the capital did not cause any damage to Hanoi except that all activities were interrupted nine times. However, this war on nerves begins to affect morale of the Vietnamese who are known for their high morale. Some think that this is precisely one of the U. S. objectives. [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

All schools have been evacuated from Hanoi and Haiphong. Only people required to man the essential services remain in the two cities.... The morale of the North Vietnamese was at the lowest in late January 67. Food has become scarce since the advent of the bombing and the North Vietnamese live miserably. The conclusion reached from talking to the people is that they would like to see the war end as soon as possible. [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

The general level of morale has suffered lately by the continuous U. S. aerial bombardments. The people no longer believe in a victory, but nevertheless continue to support the regime. [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

37a

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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 99-55
Document # 37a

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JAN 2001

6 February 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Comparison of US and Soviet Military Expenditures

1. The table below compares US and Soviet military and space spending in 1966. 1/

	Billion Dollars	
	US (FY 66)	USSR (CY 66)
Strategic Offense	4.6	5.5
Strategic Defense	1.6	5.5
General Purpose	30.3	17.3
RDT&E and Space	14.7	10.3
Command and General Support	22.3	13.1
Total	73.5	51.7

As this table indicates, the Soviets are spending somewhat more than the US for strategic offense, very much more for strategic defense, but only about 70 percent as much in total.

1/ This table includes civilian space (NASA) and nuclear weapons programs (AEC) for both countries. Soviet spending is in terms of US costs. The Soviet breakdown differs from the one presented in the CIA Special Report, [redacted] page 4. In the present instance, Soviet expenditures on nuclear weapons (except RDT&E) are placed under command and general support, for comparability with US data.

EO 12958
6.1(c)>25Yrs
(U)

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

2. The following table shows the percentages of total US and Soviet military and space spending in 1966, by mission.

	US Percent (Dollar Basis) FY 1966	USSR Percent (Ruble Basis) CY 1966 2/
Strategic Offense	6	13
Strategic Defense	2	13
General Purpose	41	30
RDT&E and Space	20	25
Command and General Support	31	19
Total	100	100

3. Following are comments on this comparison:

a. The US percentages are strikingly different from those which prevailed before the US became heavily involved in Vietnam.

b. The US share spent on strategic offense is all intercontinental; in recent years about one-third of the Soviet share has been for systems targeted against Europe and other peripheral areas.

c. The Soviet percentage for strategic defense consistently has been much larger than that of the US.

d. The large US percentage for general purpose forces is unusual. Before Vietnam it was about one-third of the total.

2/ These percentages are based on the ruble costs of Soviet military and space expenditures and not on the dollar costs presented on the first page of this memorandum.

SECRET

2-1778

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[redacted]

COUNTRY Laos

SUBJECT Debriefing of Patnet Lao Rallyers who Escaped from Patnet Lao Prison at Ban Si Koun in Xieng Khouang Province

REPORT NO. CS-311/02623-67

DATE DISTR. 28 February 1967

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES UG 215 695
19 36 20 N
103 17 50 E

DATE OF INFO. 13 December 1966 - 3 January 1967 EXCEPT AS STATED

PLACE & DATE ACQ. (Laos, Vientiane (4 February 1967)) [redacted] BAN SI KOUN NE 4971

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: [redacted]

1. [redacted] stated that at the time of his escape from the prison at Si Koun there were 40 PL guards and 30 prisoners. Some of the prisoners were villagers who had been accused of aiding the Lao Armed Forces or who had refused to cooperate with the PL. [redacted] knew of two prisoners who had been killed for planning an escape. [redacted] escaped while working outside the prison.

2. According to [redacted] there were no Thais or Americans in the prison at Si Koun.

3. After [redacted] escaped, he walked east on Routes 71 and 7 to Ban Ban (UG 4971) where he and two other escapees who were with him raided a PL storage depot to obtain ammunition for the weapon [redacted] had taken from a prison guard. Chased by about a platoon of North Vietnamese Army (NVNA) troops, [redacted] and the other escapees fled along Route 7 to the Nam Tien Bridge (UG 6166), then left the road and headed south. At Ban Ko Liens (UG 6364) the NVNA troops and the escapees engaged in a fire fight. Three NVNA troops and one of the escapees were killed. [redacted] and the third escapee got away but the NVNA troops continued to track them. At [redacted] villagers hid and fed them even after the NVNA troops had offered villager 50,000 kip for their apprehension. Three days after the NVNA troops left [redacted] the villagers provided a guide who took the two to [redacted] (unlocated). The village chief of [redacted] sent them with guides to San Tiau.

[redacted]

STATE #	DIA	ARMY #	NAVY	AIR 7	NSA	AID		
CINCPAC #	ARPAC #	PACAF 2	PACFLT #	[redacted]				

(Note: Field distribution indicated by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

APPROVED FOR RELEASE Date 20 AUG

DIA #78

433

Encl 78 (S-42,601/DB-4A)

4. [redacted] SAID THAT AFTER ESCAPING FROM PRISON HE PLANNED TO RETURN TO HIS NATIVE VILLAGE, [redacted] HE DID NOT KNOW THE WAY, HOWEVER, SO WENT ALONG ROUTE 7 HOPING TO FIND SOMEONE WHO COULD HELP HIM. HE HAD NO INTENTION OF RALLYING TO LAO GOVERNMENT TROOPS BECAUSE HE THOUGHT THAT IF HE DID THEY WOULD SHOOT HIM. HIS PURSUIT BY THE NVNA TROOPS HAD FORCED HIM INTO GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED TERRITORY AND VILLAGERS HAD HELPED HIM ELUDE THE NVNA TROOPS, BUT IT WAS NOT UNTIL THE VILLAGE CHIEF AT [redacted] PERSUADED HIM HE WOULD NOT BE HARMED, THAT HE DECIDED TO GIVE HIMSELF UP TO GOVERNMENT FORCES.

[redacted]

9/a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

IN [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC XXXX XXXX SDO ONE OCR ORR XXXXXXX XXXX CIA/NMCC

FE+O DD/I

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[redacted]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

SECRET

1 23 07Z

CITE [redacted]

DIST 1 MARCH 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI [redacted]

SUBJECT BOMB DAMAGE IN NORTH VIETNAM

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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 99-55
Document # 9/a

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: DEC 2000

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

ACQ [redacted]

FIELD NO.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

SOURCE [redacted]

1. NORTH VIETNAM IS NOT SUFFERING PARTICULARLY AS A RESULT OF THE US BOMBINGS. ECONOMIC AND CIVILIAN LOSSES ARE RATHER ACCIDENTAL AND SMALL. THE BOMBING RAIDS ARE DIRECTED MAINLY AGAINST MILITARY TARGETS AND TRANSPORT. DURING A BOMBING RAID ON THE SUBURBS OF HANOI A TRANSPORT BATTALION WAS HIT. A VILLAGE NEAR HANOI WHICH WAS BURNED DURING A BOMBING RAID WAS A LARGE POL STORAGE CENTER. SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY BATTERIES ARE FREQUENTLY CONCEALED BY SIMPLE BAMBOO HUTS. VARIOUS [redacted] REPRESENTATIVES IN NORTH VIETNAM HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO FIND EVIDENCE THAT CIVILIANS WERE BEING DELIBERATELY BOMBED. TRANSPORTATION COLUMNS ARE OFTEN CAMOUFLAGED IN NORTH VIETNAMESE

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

SETTLEMENTS, AND THEY BECOME THE TARGETS OF BOMBING RAIDS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THERE ARE FIRES IN THE VILLAGES AND CIVILIAN LOSSES. THE PRECISION OF THE BOMBING IS VERY HIGH.

2. FIELD DISSEM: NONE

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

17a

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday, March 8, 1967

LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 99-55
Document # 17a

TEXT OF CIA REPORT [redacted]

SUBJECT: North Vietnamese Civilian Reaction to U. S. Air Strikes

[redacted] E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

[redacted] E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

[redacted] E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

When some villagers in the coastal areas of North Vietnamese provinces between the 17th and 20th parallels were asked specifically, most of the fishermen linked the bombing of North Vietnam to the active pursuit of the war in the South by the Hanoi regime. The crew of a fishing boat from the Quang Xuong district believe that if the North Vietnamese Government stopped infiltrating troops and supplies into South Vietnam, the American bombing of North Vietnam would cease. None of the fishermen demonstrated any spirit for the war and none volunteered the opinion that the reunification of the two Vietnams was a cause worth fighting for. Their principal interest in the war is having the bombing stop.

Local Lao Dong Party Cadre tell the villagers that the bombing is in revenge for the terrible losses the United States and its "puppet"

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South Vietnamese Army are sustaining in the South. The villagers give progressively less credence to this claim as the war drags on, more men are drafted and never heard of again, and rationing becomes more acute. Although village officials report that many of the attacking aircraft are being shot down, the villagers do not believe this because they have witnessed little, if any, effective defense measures, and the air raids continue. One of the few who witnessed the downing of an American aircraft related how the aircraft flying protective cover took a heavy toll of militia and army troops who were attempting to capture airmen from the plane which had been shot down.

The North Vietnamese regime's inability to end the air attacks by counteractions has caused some villagers to seriously doubt the Government's oft-repeated boast of "the inevitability of victory." Many judge the decision to continue fighting in the South as a lack of official concern for the dangers and hardships the bombing is causing the people in the coastal villages.

Although many of those questioned described the bombing as "indiscriminate," when pressed most admitted that principal targets for attacking aircraft appeared to be security posts, bridges, radar installations, and coastal and inland waterways traffic. (Comment: Off-target bombs and flimsy construction of nearby structures seem to cause the majority of civilian casualties.)

The villagers, especially in areas that have been bombed repeatedly, are terrified by the raids. The populace, therefore, holds daytime activity to a minimum, and many of the Government-operated economic and administrative units, including the fishing cooperatives, have been either damaged, abandoned, or evacuated to areas that have not been bombed.

Because of air attacks on fishing boats, Government confiscation of boats for use in coastal and inland waterways cargo shipping, and breakdowns because of the lack of spare parts, fish production has been reduced in many areas to a point where the fishermen cannot turn in enough fish to the cooperatives in exchange for sufficient rice to support their families. The fishermen admitted that in such cases they often resort to hiding a portion of their catch for sale on the black market. The hours they spend fishing are dependent on considerations of safety from air attacks rather than on when the fish are likely to bite. The size of the crews on those boats remaining operative have accordingly increased.

In spite of monetary incentives offered by the Government to professional fishermen to serve as coastal shipping laborers, the fishermen avoid this service whenever possible because of the dangers involved from air strikes.

People in the coastal villages are resentful of the time they are required to spend, with no compensation, in repairing bomb damage and digging coastal defensive trenches and air raid shelters.

The fishermen frequently mentioned that Regular Army units in their villages were withdrawn after the village was bombed and that militia units are now providing internal security and manning anti-aircraft artillery sites. In at least one village the militia disregards orders instructing it to fire at all enemy aircraft because it assumes the ground fire will draw retaliatory attack.

17 March 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: A Proposal for Increasing Viet Cong Defections

1. The rate at which the Viet Cong have surrendered in January and February of 1967 is running 65 percent higher than that the first two months of 1966. Tet, the Vietnamese New Year celebration, falls in this period. In the past, large numbers of both government and enemy personnel have taken advantage of the traditional Tet visits to their families as an opportunity to desert, go AWOL or over-stay their leaves. But this year, the marked upsurge in the number of Viet Cong who have formally rallied to the government through the Chieu Hoi system, reveals two major causal factors. The high defection rate is obviously a direct reflection of the erosion in morale and the worsening conditions which the Viet Cong have experienced in the year that has elapsed since Tét 1966. As Allied and GVN pressure increases and expands, this attitude of personal defeat and loss of will to continue will become more widespread in Communist military and political ranks of the enemy causing the Communists internal problems. But since people are the essence of this war, negative attitudes are insufficient for victory. There must be a demonstrable crossing of the line, a cessation of active support for the enemy and at least an implied political acceptance of the Saigon government.

2. Defection is a personal act, and this raises the second factor underlying the recent step-up in the Chieu Hoi rate. The Tet truce removed the most immediate, and probably most important, barrier to defection. It enabled individual VC to leave their units openly, with the blessings of their commanders and without the fear that is present, at any other time of the year, that such an act could mean death. During the past ten months captured documents and prisoner interrogations have shown that the prevention of desertion has become a major enemy

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pre-occupation. In April 1965 a captured document, essentially a primer on how to spot incipient defections, revealed that the VC was willing, that early, to chance the psychological losses that the admission of the seriousness of the problem might cause, in an effort to stem this rising tide. Security restrictions will become increasingly severe and will dissuade many from straying whose decision, given the overall climate of defeat, might otherwise be to give up the fight. The major impediment to an even greater disintegration of the Viet Cong organization in the months ahead will be the very real, individual fear of immediate VC reprisal. The improvements in the national administration of the Chieu Hoi program, the addition of a host of new defection inducements are actually less important than getting the individual VC to lay down his gun and take the first step away from his unit. Advice on how and when to leave the VC, and a believeable guarantee of safe escort out of the zone of retribution would be the most incisive blow we could strike in the exploitation of the breakdown in morale.

3. With 1,100 ralliers now being processed through the Chieu Hoi machinery weekly, we have that many successful case histories to cull to determine, pragmatically, how security restrictions can be circumvented. And in that number we also have the source of talent for a program that will enable us to aggressively engineer more defections. Experience with the few armed Chieu Hoi teams that were created on the model of the People's Action Teams showed that, when properly re-motivated, they were highly effective, zealous workers in the GVN cause.

4. We propose that under the Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi, teams of five to six ex-VC with political and military experience be formed, trained and posted to populous districts where Allied/GVN military actions are planned or where Revolutionary Development programs are being expanded. Actual utilization of the teams would vary from province to province, but when assigned to combat units as a psywar adjunct they would have access to prisoner interrogations to assess, on the spot, the status of the enemy units' morale and the potential for large-scale defections at squad and platoon level. They

could inventory the internal frictions, personnel and disciplinary problems which could be exacerbated later by tailored propaganda and determine as well the identities of those others most likely to defect to whom personal appeals then could be made.

5. With the entry of RD teams into new hamlets, ex-VC Chieu Hoi teams, preferably ones native to that area, would make initial appeals to the inhabitants to contact their VC relations and encourage them to desert the lost cause. During their stay in a hamlet, these teams could actually provide a confidential counselling service on modes of contact and escape. Citing their own experiences they could offer their assistance to any VC willing to defect--providing him the bridge to the nearest secure reception point. If the control and utilization of such teams were properly coordinated with province and district officials (particularly with an expanded provincial constabulary structure), the teams could provide the contact instrument through which secure defections were arranged.

6. No single program or technique is going to crack the Viet Cong organization, but in the pool of ex-VC who have already defected we have an unutilized resource which, if properly exploited, could produce dramatic results.

NLJ.002.191.002/3

17 March 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Attacking the Vietnamese Communists' Southern Organization

I. THE TARGET

1. The Communist insurgency in South Vietnam is basically a triumph of organization. The Communists do not now have any widespread or deep-rooted emotions working for them as they did in Viet Minh days when they were able to capitalize on a pervasive surge of nationalist sentiment and opposition to continued French rule. Nor do the Communists now have any mass base of genuine popular sympathy. (They were able to develop the beginnings of such a base in the earlier years--1954-1963--but in recent years this base has been eroding rather than growing.) What the Communists do have is an efficient, flexible, tightly disciplined and usually locally-rooted organization, carefully built up over a long period of time (in some areas, over more than two decades). It is this organization which holds the insurgency together and keeps it going. Even if all North Vietnamese troops and North Vietnamese logistic support were withdrawn from South Vietnam, the Communists' southern organization (which started the insurgency and through which the insurgency was exclusively waged through 1964) would remain a potentially fatal cancer within the Vietnamese body politic.

2. The Communists' southern organization is knit together and controlled through an elaborate, hierarchical committee structure which runs the People's Revolutionary Party, the name used by the Lao Dong (Vietnamese Communist) Party south of the 17th Parallel. At the apex of the southern pyramid the Communists have an entity known as the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), which is actually the Central Committee of the PRP. Below COSVN, the Communists divide South Vietnam into six regions.

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Each region, in turn, is divided into Communist provinces (whose boundaries are not always the same as those of the GVN's provinces), each province into districts and each district into villages. At every command echelon the Communists direct all of their activities--political, military, subversive and terrorist--through a PRP committee which is subordinate to the PRP committee controlling the echelon above it and which, in turn, directs the PRP committees controlling the various echelons below it. These directing committees vary in size and organizational complexity (depending in part on the command responsibilities of the echelon in question and in part on the degree of Communist control in the area involved). Every committee has a chairman and a panoply of subcommittees. The number and designation of these subcommittees varies from locale to locale, but at every echelon there are always subcommittees for military affairs, Front (i.e., NLF) affairs, and security.* In the upper reaches of the Communist structure, these subcommittees themselves may be large and complex bodies; in the lower reaches (or in areas where Communist control is weak) they may consist of only one person or a very small group.

3. The heart of the Communists' southern organization is their network of provincial and district committees. It is these committees which hold the organization together and maintain the insurgency's essential base at hamlet and village level--the base which exerts control over the rural population and provides the local manpower and resources (e.g., food) without which the insurgency would collapse.

*The chairman of the Military Affairs Subcommittee controls all Communist military activity within his parent committee's area of geographic jurisdiction. (At the village and district level, the Military Affairs Subcommittee chairman is usually the commander of the village VC platoon or district VC company.) Similarly, the chairman of the Front Affairs Subcommittee at each echelon directs all NLF activity within his parent committee's geographic jurisdiction. The Front has an organizational structure which parallels the PRP structure, and is controlled by it at every echelon.

The success and even the continuation of the Communist insurgency depends directly on the performance, morale and effectiveness of these committee cadre, particularly at district and provincial levels. These committee cadre constitute the target group addressed in this paper.

4. In terms of numbers, the target we are talking about is relatively small. The activities of all the Communists' regional, provincial and district committees throughout South Vietnam are probably directed by something less than 10,000 people. Virtually all of these are ethnic southerners, though most of them were trained in North Vietnam and infiltrated back into the south, usually to their native areas. It is through these southern Party members that the Lao Dong and Hanoi control the southern insurgency. It is these southerners who would remain even if all North Vietnamese troops should leave the country.

5. This target cadre group constitutes the Communists' greatest source of strength, but also their area of greatest vulnerability. Losses among this cadre group--whether by death, capture or, particularly, defection--constitute blows at the vitals of the Communist movement. Thus efficient and effective attacks on this target produce maximum results for GVN and allied effort expended.

II. CURRENT PROGRESS

6. A successful attack on the Communists' southern organization requires (a) precise target intelligence and, (b) effective action based on that intelligence. The intelligence required includes the names and physical descriptions of the regional, provincial and district PRP committee members, the aliases or disguises they employ, where they live, where they work, their movement patterns, their backgrounds (e.g., schools, professions, interests, associates, friends, etc.), the names, descriptions and locations of their families and relatives, and the channels of access through which these target personalities can be reached. The object of all action taken against such target personalities is to detach them from the Viet Cong organization by

inducing and accomplishing their voluntary defection (the optimum method), by capture or--if neither defection nor capture is possible--by physical elimination.

7. During the past year, a variety of collection programs including Provincial Interrogation Centers, GVN Police Special Branch activity, GVN Central Intelligence Organization activity and, particularly, Census Grievance programs operated in conjunction with Revolutionary Development cadre activity have made impressive progress in obtaining intelligence on the individuals who comprise the Viet Cong's district, provincial and regional leadership. Progress in this field is not uniform throughout the country; but in many local areas, notable achievements have been recorded in obtaining intelligence on Viet Cong leaders operating in that area--i.e., the Viet Cong opposite numbers of GVN provincial and district officials. The achievements are real, though they are hard to quantify on a national scale with any meaningful precision, partly because much of the intelligence gleaned remains at province and district levels (where, at least potentially, it does the most good) and is not reported in detail to Saigon, let alone Washington.

8. Both the Police Special Branch and, particularly, the Special Operations Corps of the Central Intelligence Organization are endeavoring to develop penetrations of the Viet Cong organization at district, provincial and regional level, penetrations which will not only serve to provide new intelligence and authenticate intelligence received from other sources, but will also provide mechanisms through which defection operations can be mounted. A number of such penetration operations have already been initiated. Efforts are constantly underway to improve them by continued review and assessment of each case and cross-checking of its production with information or intelligence obtained from other sources. On the books, there are 107 going cases and approximately 250 developmental cases which are currently being vetted. This figure is constantly changing, but provides the base from which new penetrations develop.

9. The GVN has made considerably more progress in collecting intelligence on the Viet Cong provincial and district organizational structure than in taking effective action against identified members of that structure. General pressure has been exerted on that structure by improved police operations, by the US Marine Corps' "County Fairs" in I Corps, and by integrated police-military-intelligence operations such as Operation FAIRFAX in the Saigon area. In terms of pinpoint operations, against precise VC organizational targets, the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) have proven themselves an increasingly effective instrument. These units, generally not more than eight to ten men (all intensively trained) both can and do operate in Viet Cong territory. Utilizing intelligence collected by other sources such as the Census Grievance Program and intelligence collected by their own efforts, PRU teams are extensively used in operations designed to capture or, when capture is impossible, ambush Viet Cong cadre.

III. MAJOR OBSTACLES

10. At the present time, there are three major classes of obstacles which hamper our attack on the Communists' southern organization. First, although there has been a significant increase in relevant intelligence information, much of this information is imperfectly exploited, analyzed, and collated. While American intelligence organizations are generally well-coordinated, considerable work remains to be done in improving the cooperation among the various Vietnamese military police and civilian entities with intelligence collection functions and in making a total intelligence product available to Vietnamese action agencies. These problems are more serious in some areas than others and are generally more pronounced at district rather than province level, but they do significantly hinder present action against the Viet Cong target.

11. Secondly, Viet Cong security practices present a formidable obstacle to our efforts to reach key figures in the Viet Cong organization. The Communists are past masters in the art of clandestine operations, including the use of aliases, clandestine

meetings, frequent movement, and the whole professional paraphernalia of covert activity. The Viet Cong are well aware of the importance of their cadres and the need to protect them against blandishments as well as simple bodily harm. The Viet Cong tend to coddle their important leaders in matters of personal safety and the Communists' inverted pyramid of bodyguards reaches impressive numbers when a provincial or regional officer is being protected.

12. Thirdly, with the exception of some PRU teams, GVN elements lack the ability to reach important members of the Communist organization. The police, as now constituted, are incapable of penetrating VC-held areas. Nor, considering the slow growth of Police Field Forces, is it likely they will have such a capability on the national scale in the near future. Similarly, efforts to recast elements of the Regional Forces and Popular Forces into a national constabulary are beset by a variety of obvious difficulties. Military sweeps do provide a shield for the National Police who, when armed with well-drawn black lists provided by a variety of intelligence sources, can screen the population in swept areas and do some separating of the sheep from the goats. The level of VC cadre apprehended in this manner, however, is rarely much above that of hamlet or village committee. Provincial and district Communist leadership is generally far too well protected to be surprised by the ponderous movements of a conventional military sweep.

13. Police action, expanded Chieu Hoi programs, and even some military sweeps can make inroads into the Viet Cong cadre structure at village level and below at a pace which should accelerate as security grows in the countryside. General government success and military pressure will also contribute to a weakening of Communist cadre morale at this level and make such cadre ever more susceptible to GVN blandishments. The district, provincial and regional Communist leadership, however, will continue to be another matter. These cadre have a higher position to protect and are more steeped in and subject to Party discipline, which can be counted on to keep the majority in place. Furthermore, the higher one goes in the Communist hierarchy the greater will be

the sense of outlawry, the greater the estrangement from or hostility toward the GVN, and the greater the reluctance to expect conciliatory treatment from the GVN or its agents. In addition, even when cadre at the district or provincial level are disaffected with the Viet Cong movement, they may not know how to disengage or turn themselves over to the government.

IV. RECOMMENDED COURSES OF ACTION

14. A continuation of all the various forms of pressure now being exerted on the Communists plus continued GVN progress in the pacification/Revolutionary Development field and in the creation of national political institutions should increasingly hamper Communist effectiveness, lower Communist morale and improve the general climate for work against the Communists' southern organization at all levels. A wide range of GVN rural actions already in train, particularly if integrated with an expanded Chieu Hoi program, will augment the drain on the lower rungs of the Viet Cong hierarchy. Work against the upper (i.e., COSVN) level hierarchy is a difficult, highly specialized task requiring separate consideration. Our attack on the district, provincial and regional levels of the Communist organization can be considerably enhanced by efficient execution of the actions outlined below.

15. First, we must improve the collation, integration and exploitation of intelligence already in hand or available through already existing collection channels, particularly at the district (sub-sector) level. This is really a more immediately urgent task than that of acquiring new collection

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16. This does not mean that we should try mechanically to establish duplicate centers in every district in South Vietnam. Instead, there should be a province by province analysis of local coordination problems and the means best suited to solve them in that province and its districts. Since the optimum means in each area will be determined by the status of local programs in that area and the calibre of the locally-assigned people operating them, what works best in province X or district A will not necessarily be the best solution for province Y or district B. Nor should we devote the same degree of effort in all provinces. Instead, we should concentrate initially in those areas where the operational climate and assets available (including effective GVN officials) provide the best environment in which to work.

17. Secondly, in view of the need for an effective instrument capable of attacking the Viet Cong organization on a province-by-province basis, it is essential that on urgent effort be made to develop an effective, well-trained constabulary force. This constabulary would combine various elements such as Regional Forces, Popular Forces, Police Field Forces, and the PRUs into a body which could take effective action on intelligence produced by the Police Special Branch, CIO, Census Grievance program and all other collection sources.

18. Basically, operations aimed at individual VC leaders are appropriately the responsibility of the police, or of a provincial constabulary structure such as that sketched above. The PRUs have, in effect, filled a void created by the weakness of the GVN's present provincial police structure. The PRUs can continue to function effectively as a specialized arm of a provincial constabularly but they can never become a satisfactory substitute for it.

19. The primary objective of PRU teams is the capture of selected, identified Communist cadre. Heavy emphasis is placed in PRU training on kidnap techniques and methods of escorting prisoners through hostile territory. This training has produced an expertise which permits PRUs to operate in Viet Cong areas, to ambush when capture is impossible and in

the process to collect intelligence. This training, however, has produced another critically important capability, namely the ability to provide a means through which a disaffected Viet Cong can be physically contacted and escorted to safety, a means through which he can defect.

20. Defection, not capture, of VC leaders should really be our prime objective. The killing or the arrest of a Communist official can have the effect of a closing of ranks for his comrades; but should he defect he leaves behind ripples of doubt and suspicion among his superiors, his peers and his subordinates.

21. Defection operations at province and district level require the closest kind of supervision, coordination and expert local direction. From the wealth of intelligence data that we have, primarily that from Census Grievance sources, we can discover the location of the wife, mother or father of a VC leader on whom conventional psychological warfare approaches and showers of Chieu Hoi leaflets might be wasted. We know, or can learn, a great deal about him and his background from his neighbors or boyhood friends. At this point we come to grips with the peculiarities of the Vietnamese psyche. The divisiveness, suspicions, and jealousies that complicate our dealings with our Saigon allies, fortunately, are personality characterisics of the enemy as well. The policy of downgrading provincial cadres to district and district level officials to village level cannot help but ruffle feathers among some of those shifted and offers a fulcrum for exploitation. Penetration reporting regularly reveals internal jealousies, antipathies and general backbiting among the Party officials, on personal rather than ideological grounds. Similarly, the intense sense of family identity is a stout bridge to use to dissuade the VC relative to return--particularly when the fight is so evidently not going well. Clergy or friends can be used as go-betweens to either the family or the target himself. In other instances, police or constabulary teams (including PRUs) could handle the communications into safe haven and stand willing to see the defector safely into GVN hands. Protection from VC reprisals on the way out has been a major concern in almost every defection engineered in this fashion.

22. Within each province, all sources of intelligence should be continually screened and collated to sort out the personality targets of sufficient status and interest to warrant individual attention. Stature alone should not be the sole criterion, some reasonable prospect of access or issue for exploitation must exist: family relationships, hard data on fixed location or on regular routes of movement, intimations of disaffection, internal Party troubles, etc.

23. Once the screening process has identified a valid target, however, the decision must then be made on the optimum instrument for reaching that target and detaching him from the Communist organization. Then, when the decision is made, it must be translated into action. All of this requires the kind of coordinating staff now seldom found at district level, a staff which can be created within the framework of a constabulary structure designed for effective provincial operations with U.S. advice and support.

24. For security's sake, but also to enhance the chances for success, the staff should be kept small, informal and directly responsible to the province chief. Its nature and composition should be tailored to each province's individual needs and assets. Should such staffs be created by a Saigon-imposed national directive, their establishment might well result in a pro forma bureaucratic exercise. They should be created on a province-by-province basis without initial reference to a national program. As the executive agent for civil and military matters for his province, the province chief's total support is mandatory; if it is not forthcoming, the staff will not function. We are certain that General Thang, the Minister of Revolutionary Development, would give his blessing and support to such activity, however, knowing it to be generated province by province in much the same way that the Census Grievance program was built.

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46

On the night of 22-23 April approximately 80 trucks were reported moving south in the area of the Mu Gia Pass. This is the first significant southbound convoy spotted in the pass this month, and is far in excess of the average of five trucks a day moving southward through the pass during the first three weeks of April.

Such activity may be a Communist effort to rush additional supplies through the infiltration corridor before the heavy spring rains make some of the Laotian roads impassable. The rainy season does not normally hit the panhandle until June but there are indications that it may be early this year--standing water and deep mud have been observed along parts of Route 23 and Route 911. (Map)

The Military Situation in South Vietnam: No significant contact with Communist forces has been reported in South Vietnam since the heavy enemy artillery, rocket, and mortar attacks in northern I Corps on 27 and 28 April. [redacted]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

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EXO

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[redacted]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

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141603Z CITE [redacted]

DIST 14 MAY 1967

COUNTRY : NORTH VIETNAM

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

DOI [redacted]

SUBJECT : MEASURES TO CONSERVE ELECTRICITY IN HANOI; REROUTING OF BRIDGE TRAFFIC; DEFENSE MEASURE TO PROTECT DIKES.

ACQ : VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

1. HANOI AUTHORITIES ON 10 MAY INSTITUTED A SERIES OF MEASURES TO CONSERVE ELECTRIC POWER IN THE CITY. ON A DAILY BASIS, AUTHORITIES HAVE ORDERED THAT POWER MUST BE REDUCED IN VARIOUS SECTIONS OF THE CITY FOR ABOUT ONE HOUR. SECTIONS WILL BE ROTATED BUT EACH MUST REDUCE POWER WHEN ITS TIME COMES. PRIVATE DWELLINGS HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO USE ONLY BULBS OF 25 WATTS. GOVERNMENT BUREAUS HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED TO USE ONLY 60 WATT BULBS.

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(security classification) (system controls)

2. AS OF 12 MAY, NO RAIL OR MOTOR TRAFFIC WAS MOVING ACROSS THE PONT DES RAPIDES. HOWEVER, MOTOR TRAFFIC WAS NOW BEING CARRIED ON PONTOON BRIDGES PARALLEL TO THE PONT DES RAPIDES. ON 11 MAY PAUL DOUMER BRIDGE WAS CLOSED TO TRAFFIC, WHICH WAS REROUTED TO A PONTOON BRIDGE DOWN STREAM. TWO NEW PONTOON BRIDGES ARE BEING PREPARED SOUTH OF DOUMER BRIDGE.

3. HANOI AUTHORITIES HAVE ESTABLISHED HEAVY AAA AND MISSILE SITES AT UNSPECIFIED POINTS ALONG THE DIKES NORTH OF THE CITY. THE RED RIVER HAS ALREADY BEGUN TO RISE AND AUTHORITIES FEAR USAF BOMBINGS OF THE DIKES DURING THE HIGH WATER PERIOD.

4. DURING THE 5 MAY ALERT TWO MISSILES WERE FIRED IN A SOUTHWEST DIRECTION FROM THE CITY. THE SOUND MADE BY THESE TWO MISSILES WERE NOT THE SAME AS THE SOUND MADE BY SAMS. FROM THE EVENING OF 5 MAY UNTIL THE EVENING OF 12 MAY ONLY THREE ALERTS TOOK PLACE, ONE IN THE AFTERNOON OF 11 MAY.

5. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE USNACV 7TH AIR FORCE 525TH MIG DIST 50/OSI CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF.

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NIE 58-67
18 May 1967

Cy #2 to Jordan

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 58-67

Short-Term Political Prospects for Laos

Submitted by

Richard Helms

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred in by the

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

As indicated overleaf

18 May 1967

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DATE: JAN 2001

Authenticated:

James S. Lay, Jr.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USIB

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The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA.

Concurring:

Vice Adm. Rufus L. Taylor, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Mr. George C. Denney, for the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, for the Director, National Security Agency

Abstaining:

Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, for the Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission and Mr. William O. Cregar, for the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

WARNING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SHORT-TERM POLITICAL PROSPECTS FOR LAOS

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the prospects for political stability in Laos over the next year or so. In addition, to estimate the reactions of Souvanna Phouma and the effect on his government of expanded Allied ground action in the Laos Panhandle. The reactions of other foreign governments to these courses of action are not considered.

CONCLUSIONS

A. During the past several years, the Kingdom of Laos has achieved a substantial degree of political stability. This rests, in part, on the international support which the Royal Lao Government has enjoyed since the 1962 Geneva settlement, support which Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma earnestly seeks to retain. More important, it rests on an understanding among Souvanna, the military, and—to a lesser degree—the conservatives and neutralists, which aims at preserving Lao independence and the attributes of neutrality and tripartitism. In the short term, at least, we see no serious diminution of military support for the regime, nor does a military-inspired coup attempt seem likely.

B. We believe that Souvanna, if approached officially, would disapprove any proposals put to him involving Allied ground action in the Laos Panhandle. He has stated that he would not authorize the introduction into Laos of US or other Allied ground troops. Nevertheless, he has demonstrated some tolerance for small-scale, limited actions of which he is not officially informed; the key test in his view is the ability to avoid acknowledgement. Activities meeting these criteria might, as in the past, be ignored by Souvanna. He would, however, vigorously oppose any action involving the open or prolonged presence

on Lao soil of any substantial number of Allied troops—e.g., one battalion. If the US proceeded with such visible actions despite Souvanna's opposition, he would probably resign, though there is a small chance that he might tolerate the US action in hopes of somehow limiting it.[1]

[1] Mr. George C. Denney, for the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that Souvanna almost certainly would resign. Souvanna regards the preservation of the Geneva settlement as indispensable to the survival of Laos and would see the visible introduction of allied ground forces as signaling the abandonment of that settlement. He has made these points many times. If, despite his opposition, the actions contemplated in this sentence were undertaken, he would assume, against the background of previous US assurances to him, that the US had broken the relationship of confidence built up since 1962 and had lost interest in preserving the Geneva settlement and in his remaining in office. He would have no hope, therefore, that by remaining in office he could exercise any further influence on our courses of action.

DISCUSSION

I. PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL STABILITY

A. Internal Factors

1. After 14 years of independence, the Kingdom of Laos remains economically and politically underdeveloped. Only a few thousand individuals, most of them French-educated, participate in government and politics; the bulk of the population is illiterate and politically apathetic. Popular identification with the country, the government, and the Crown—though stronger than in the past—is very limited, and regional and family loyalties continue to play a predominant role in domestic politics.

2. The Lao political situation is further complicated by two decades of international contention in the Indochina area. A formula was devised by the 14-nation Geneva Conference of 1962 to bring peace to Laos by making the country a neutral buffer state. A tripartite coalition government was organized in Vientiane by the three major Lao political factions—conservative, neutralist, and Communist—and headed by the neutralist Prince Souvanna Phouma. But this design for national reconciliation and territorial unification soon proved unworkable and the internal struggle resumed. Today the Communists control about 40 percent of the area and 20 percent of the population, generally tribal groups inhabiting the rugged and sparsely-populated uplands bordering China and the two Vietnams. The government controls the populous Mekong River lowlands and commands considerable support among some upland ethnic minority groups, particularly the Meo.

3. Since Geneva, Lao politics have undergone major changes. In early 1963, the Lao Communists withdrew from active participation in the tripartite government, and Communist Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops initiated attacks on neutralist-held positions in northern Laos. Souvanna obtained the support of the conservative leadership of the Royal Lao Armed Forces (FAR) for his neutralist force and the US provided needed military equipment and supplies. Since then, Souvanna has come to believe that, in the last analysis, the security of Laos depends on the US.

4. While privately favoring US policies in the Indochina area, Souvanna nevertheless maintains an international position of neutrality and a commitment to tripartite government. He sees the maintenance of these Geneva principles as indispensable to the legitimacy of the Royal Lao Government (RLG) and its international acceptance. He believes that so long as they are retained, even if only as a facade, Moscow will support the present political equilibrium in Laos; and that Hanoi and Peking—whose main military interests now lie outside the territory controlled by the Vientiane government—will at least make no major efforts to upset the present equilibrium. He also believes that the

maintenance of tripartitism may facilitate the reintegration of the Pathet Lao into the national community at some future date.

5. The departure of the Communists from the tripartite government in 1963 reduced it to a neutralist-conservative coalition, with the latter faction numerically predominant. The net result has been the achievement of a substantial degree of political stability. Neutralist-conservative cooperation has grown, almost obliterating the differences which once existed between these factions. Souvanna now frequently ignores any distinction between the two, and in policy terms there is virtually none. The conservatively-inclined military leaders have also become increasingly acceptable to Souvanna. He knows that their support is essential to the preservation of his government, not only because of the military strength they control but also by virtue of the political power they hold in their regional commands. This increased acceptance of the military is also a result of the departure from Laos in recent years of some of the more disaffected and contentious elements among the military, notably General Phoumi and his adherents.

6. For their part, the key Lao military figures accept and support Souvanna in the interest of maintaining, with US support, a broadly-based national resistance to Communist territorial encroachments. The military leaders are also conscious of the restraints placed on them by continuing international interest, particularly that of the US, in keeping Souvanna in power. Souvanna's position is further strengthened by King Savang Vatthana's desire to maintain legitimacy and by divisions among the military arising from regional and family considerations.

7. The neutralist faction, once Souvanna's main support, has been unable to build a true political party and has lost much of its elan. The neutralist label presently attracts little popular support; neutralist candidates, except those identifying with regional interests, have generally suffered defeat at the polls. Kong Le, the military symbol of neutralism, has recently been removed from his command in the interest of integrating neutralist forces into the FAR, and has left the country. Nevertheless, the neutralist label is retained, primarily for cosmetic reasons—to distinguish those who occupy the cabinet posts originally reserved for that faction and to demonstrate that tripartitism survives.

8. The newly-elected National Assembly is more disciplined and cohesive than its predecessor. In the first serious test of its character and intentions, Souvanna's national budget was passed without opposition. This issue had contributed to a major governmental crisis in the fall of 1966. In contrast to the disorganized and obstructive legislature which it replaced, the new Assembly contains a safe majority of deputies obligated to regional military leaders who in turn have agreed to support Souvanna.

9. The Lao Communist political organization—the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS)—is neither strong nor deeply rooted in Laos; it is almost completely a creature of the North Vietnamese on whose support and direction it has

become increasingly dependent. Although the NLHS abandoned its role in the national government in early 1963, it continues to hold to the tripartite concept as a source of legitimacy at home and overseas, a framework within which to reenter the government should the overall situation in Indochina once again warrant the suspension of hostilities and the adoption of political tactics. Although undoubtedly disturbed by Souvanna's effective cooperation with the conservatives, the Lao Communists and their North Vietnamese mentors also realize that the tripartite arrangement under his leadership places significant international constraints on the Lao military and indirectly on the US.

10. *Prospects.* Political stability in Laos will continue to depend on the maintenance of cooperation and mutual respect between Souvanna, the FAR military commanders, and the King. Despite some misgivings about Souvanna on the part of certain of the military leaders, it is probable that they will continue to support his government and its policies. The present arrangement offers them adequate scope for the exercise of political influence within their regions, and they do not appear to have any major policy differences with Souvanna at this time. There is always the possibility, however, that personal rivalries among the military may spark outbreaks of internecine strife as in 1965 and 1966, but a military-inspired coup attempt against Souvanna's government, as in 1964, seems unlikely. Moreover, no military leader has sufficient stature to gain the acquiescence of his peers for any takeover of the government.

B. External Factors

11. *Hanoi and the War in Vietnam.* To Hanoi, the war in Laos is secondary to its campaign to take over South Vietnam. Hanoi seeks through the agency of the Pathet Lao to control the regions adjacent to its own borders. It supports the Pathet Lao as a military and political force in order to preserve a viable instrument for any future Communist takeover of Laos. Of principal immediate importance to Hanoi, however, is control of the southern panhandle area containing the corridor which it views as an essential route between North and South Vietnam.

12. Since 1964, Hanoi's objectives in the southern panhandle have been served by a condition of relative military stalemate in which it retains control of the uplands bordering South Vietnam while FAR forces occupy the flanking Mekong lowlands. At present, Hanoi shows no intention of extending its occupation westward into FAR territory. Nor is it exerting strong political and military pressures on Souvanna's government elsewhere in Laos. It is probable that Hanoi will maintain this posture toward Souvanna so long as the status quo obtains.

13. For his part, Souvanna would like to see the North Vietnamese eventually driven from all Lao territory, but he does not share the intense US concern with the Communist-controlled panhandle area, a rugged region only sparsely populated by non-Lao tribal peoples. So long as Hanoi evidences no interest in extending its occupation westward into the Mekong lowlands, Souvanna is

reluctant to see the boat rocked by attempts to force the NVA/VC out of the highlands.

14. *Souvanna's International Position.* Underlying all Souvanna's actions are his concern for the preservation of the Geneva tripartite framework of government and his dedication to a foreign policy of neutrality for Laos. He has collaborated closely with the US, which is fighting the common enemy in Vietnam and is the only source of large-scale assistance in terms of military hardware and air support. However, he has stated that he would not authorize the introduction into Laos of US or other Allied troops. He is particularly anxious to avoid disturbing relations with the Soviets on whom he relies to provide an additional check on Hanoi's expansionist tendencies and whose recognition he regards as fundamental to the policy of neutrality. He also weighs presumed Soviet reactions in arriving at decisions on domestic affairs. He is also careful to avoid provoking Peking, but he is less hopeful that the Chinese Communists would attempt to restrain Hanoi.

15. Souvanna has accepted certain US military activities in Laos such as bombings that benefit his troops as well as hamper Hanoi's war effort in South Vietnam, and certain covert activities. However, in both cases, his agreement rests on absolute prohibition of publicity. He has refused to acknowledge the existence of any US military activity in Laos with the exception of armed air photoreconnaissance. He has never been informed by the US of its involvement in small-scale ground reconnaissance activities, although he may be aware of them. He has firmly taken the position, both privately and publicly, that he cannot approve US military ground operations in Laos.

16. Souvanna, although prepared to cooperate with the US in actions that he believes will assist Laos without exposing it to new and excessive political or military dangers, has many reasons for placing close limits on such operations. He is aware, as is the Lao elite in general, of the tremendous drain on Lao resources imposed by the hostilities, even at their present level, and of a casualty rate that, particularly for an underpopulated country, is very high. He believes that the introduction of friendly foreign ground troops would be contested by the North Vietnamese and that the level of hostilities would inevitably rise and that Laos would become another battleground of the Vietnam war.

C. The Succession

17. There is no present expectation that Souvanna will resign, either for political or health reasons, though he is 66 years old and has often in the past used the threat of retirement to obtain acceptance of his policies. He appears to enjoy his position and is conscious of his role in building a Lao nation. He is also aware that he is probably the only Lao leader other than the King with sufficient international stature and acceptance to lend credence to the tripartite formula. He is also concerned about the succession problem and wants more time to select and build up an acceptable successor. At

present, he apparently sees Minister of Finance Sisouk na Champassak in this role.

18. Should Souvanna die, there would be considerable jockeying for power which would be likely to continue even after the installation of a new government. Awareness of the importance of US support would affect decisions, but a number of major domestic factors would also come into play. An essential element would be the preference of King Savang Vatthana, constitutionally the most powerful man in Laos and almost universally respected. Another important factor is the military. The Lao military would probably prefer a conservative civilian since the only military figure who might qualify at this time is General Kouprasith Abhay. He would be strongly opposed by many of his colleagues who fear ascendancy of the Vientiane-based Sananikone clan with whom Kouprasith is closely associated. If the King, taking international interests into account, acted vigorously on behalf of a neutralist, such as Prince Sisoumang Sisaleumsak, his decision would probably be accepted.

19. The choice of a successor would, of course, have important implications for the survival of the Geneva structure. Moscow would be particularly concerned about and expect to influence the selection process and would certainly prefer a neutralist. Hanoi, if satisfied through the choice of a neutralist successor that Souvanna's departure would not lead to significantly increased military pressures on its use of Lao territory, would probably accept the replacement with only *pro forma* complaints. If so, its Pathet Lao clients would follow suit. The appointment of a conservative figure would raise questions regarding adherence to the tripartite formula. The emergence of any Lao figure clearly hostile to the tripartite formula would be completely unacceptable to Hanoi and Moscow: Moscow would denounce the new government as without standing under the Geneva agreements, and openly support the Pathet Lao; and Hanoi might take new military initiatives.

II. REACTIONS TO EXPANDED ALLIED GROUND ACTION IN THE LAOS PANHANDLE

20. We believe that Souvanna, if approached officially, would disapprove any proposals put to him involving Allied ground action in the Laos Panhandle. He is predisposed to do so by his whole approach to the war. His resistance would be reinforced by expectations of a North Vietnamese reaction that would enlarge the war in Laos. He would expect that Hanoi would strike back, not only in areas in which the Communists were being attacked but also in areas now under RLG control, which would be of much greater concern. Moreover, he would be inclined to react not merely to a particular proposal, but to the progression of events that he would envisage as likely to follow the first move. Thus, he would be reluctant to authorize officially seemingly low risk, very small-scale, and deniable actions because he would anticipate that, whatever the original US intention, the new actions and the enemy response would generate a momentum of their own.

21. Because Souvanna understands the stake of Laos in the outcome of the war in Vietnam, and realizes that until it is over Laos will perforce remain a theater of operations, he has demonstrated some tolerance for actions of which he is not officially informed. The level of such tolerance will vary from time to time and has, generally speaking, been on an ascending scale. Although he has privately as well as publicly drawn the line against ground operations, the key test in his view remains the ability to avoid acknowledgement. The essential elements in his tolerance of presently-conducted actions have been that: insofar as his official relations with the US are concerned, these actions have not existed; they have been unacknowledged, small, clandestine, and shallow penetrations conducted by specially trained forces; and they have not become, in any sense, a public or diplomatic issue. Expanded activities of this type, so long as they met the same criteria, might continue to be ignored by Souvanna.

22. Souvanna would vigorously oppose any action involving the open or prolonged presence on Lao soil of any substantial number of Allied troops—e.g., one battalion. He would expect a Communist military reaction and, eventually, a much larger and destructive war throughout Laos. If consulted in advance, he would almost certainly oppose the move strongly. Moreover, most of the other Lao political and military leaders, including the King, would share his misgivings and accept his lead in this matter.

23. If the US proceeded with such visible actions despite Souvanna's opposition, he would probably resign, though there is a small chance that he might tolerate the US action in hopes of somehow limiting it.[2] In the event of his resignation, a Lao leader, conservative or military, could probably be found to form a government that would cooperate with the US, but it is uncertain that the King would legitimize the new government. Externally, moreover, the departure of Souvanna under these circumstances would change the Lao situation dramatically. The Vietnamese Communists would no longer have any political restraints on their military actions in Laos, and the Soviet Union would probably swing to direct political support of the Pathet Lao.

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[2] Mr. George C. Denney, for the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that Souvanna almost certainly would resign. Souvanna regards the preservation of the Geneva settlement as indispensable to the survival of Laos and would see the visible introduction of allied ground forces as signaling the abandonment of that settlement. He has made these points many times. If, despite his opposition, the actions contemplated in this paragraph were undertaken, he would assume, against the background of previous US assurances to him, that the US had broken the relationship of confidence built up since 1962 and had lost interest in preserving the Geneva settlement and in his remaining in office. He would have no hope, therefore, that by remaining in office he could exercise any further influence on our courses of action.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
23 May 1967

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Intelligence Attack On The Viet Cong Infrastructure

I. The Targets

1. The Communist insurgency in South Vietnam is basically a triumph of organization. The Communists' efficient, flexible, tightly disciplined and--most important--locally-rooted organization has been carefully built up over a long period of time. Through an intricate network of provincial and district committees, the organization is held together and is able to maintain the insurgency's essential base at hamlet and village level. From this base, control is exerted over the rural population which provides both the local manpower and resources, without which, the insurgency would collapse. The success of the insurgency, therefore, depends directly on the performance, morale and effectiveness of the cadre who comprise the district and provincial level committees. These cadre are, at one time, the Communists greatest source of strength and their greatest area of vulnerability, for losses among this group by death, capture or defection constitute blows at the vitals of the entire movement. Obviously the Communist hierarchy is no less aware than we of both the value and the vulnerability of their cadre. Through their organizational skill and control of the population the Communists have been highly successful in enshrouding these cadre from our eyes. An attack aimed at this target group, to be effective, requires a reciprocal, painstaking organizational effort on our part. Stated simply, we require a) the collection of precise, timely intelligence on the targets, b) the ability to collate and process rapidly the exhaustive data that we do acquire and, c) the means to take prompt, direct action commensurate with the identified target.

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II. Collection

2. During the past year a variety of collection programs have made impressive strides in obtaining intelligence on the individuals who comprise the Viet Cong's provincial and district leadership. The primary producers of this intelligence are the G-2 of ARVN, the Military Security Service (MSS), the special branch of the Directorate General of National Police (DGNP), the special operations corps of the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), the Provincial Reconnaissance Units operating under the province chiefs, the Census Grievance program, the various interrogation facilities (28 provincial interrogation centers with ten more under construction, the National Interrogation Units), and unilateral intelligence collection mechanisms of the US Armed Forces and CAS.

3. Obviously these collection units overlap, but this is desirable since each contribution creates, in effect, a laminate of the VC organization, province by province. Their progress has been substantial. Our problem now, in fact, is not so much the acquisition of new data as the collation and exploitation of the information being obtained through present collection sources.

III. Collation

4. Considering the number of disparate collectors who contribute to the political order of battle which spreads throughout the 44 provinces and ranges from region to hamlet level, orderly collation of the data is a crucial link in its exploitation. The bulk of useful intelligence on the Viet Cong infrastructure is low-level and requires collation and exploitation at district or province level. Existing facilities for intelligence collation include the Sector Operations and Intelligence Centers (SOIC) which operate at province level and are committees of Vietnamese representatives of intelligence organizations and their American advisers; the Province Intelligence Coordinating Center (PICC), an effort by CIO to improve and systematize province coordination of intelligence; the Combined Intelligence Coordinating Center (CICC) operating under GVN executive order in the Viet Cong MR-4 region in and around Saigon and jointly

staffed by Vietnamese and Americans under Vietnamese command; the collation facilities of the Provincial Interrogation Centers (PIC) supported by CAS and operated by the National Police; and District Intelligence Operations Coordinating Centers (DIOCC) of which the center operating in Dien Ban, Quang Nam Province, is the principal prototype. This DIOCC, although staffed by both Vietnamese and Americans, is under American supervision.

5. On the American side, special mention should be made of the MACV, J-2, Central Registry Detachment which has also taken on the task of developing data on the Viet Cong infrastructure utilizing the machine records facilities of the Combined Intelligence Center. Experience has shown that the Vietnamese producers and users of intelligence are subject to parochialism and inter-agency jealousies which afflict the effective collation and exploitation of intelligence. Under these circumstances, American-energized, supported, and in effect controlled, collation centers have been the most effective of the various facilities devised.

6. Collation mechanisms procedures at province level are fairly well established, although there are variations in effectiveness which are related in part to the competence of Vietnamese officials concerned. Improvements in effectiveness at that level will come with time through experience, more effective training, and constant but tactful advisory efforts from the American components. At district level, however, resources collation activity are limited, except in instances where the deployment of U.S. combat units has provided additional trained intelligence manpower and additional facilities. Vietnamese intelligence operations are province-oriented, in part because of shortages in trained manpower, and in part because exploitation means are more readily available at that level. District-level operations, thus, are based largely on intelligence collated and disseminated from the provincial level, fleshed out with whatever additional detail or more current data may be available within the district. This system has proven generally workable insofar as it has provided basic data on the infrastructure in support of pre-planned operations. It is not, however, geared to providing simultaneous rapid response to requirements from lower echelons for intelligence on a number

of targets of opportunity. The performance of the province level elements in this regard can be expected to improve with time, but greater reliance must be placed on developing adequate collation capabilities at district level to meet the need for timely information. This development must be related, however, to the means available at district level to exploit such an improved capability.

IV. Exploitation

7. Since speedy action is vital to the effective use of intelligence, the DIOCC and the CICC (which is internally organized into district level desks) appear to be the most useful mechanisms for collation purposes. However, the entire capability for exploitation, in its many forms, must be considered lest we hastily attempt to recreate in every district capital the success that has been achieved in special circumstances in the Dinh Ban DOIC in Quang Nam Province. What works best in one place in Vietnam does not necessarily work well in another.

8. Many channels--Census Grievance is one example, unilateral penetrations another--do not lend themselves to reporting at other than province level. The province headquarters will, of necessity, continue its clearing house function even where DIOCC programs exist. In addition, this overview is also made necessary by the fact that the Viet Cong have a province, district, village and hamlet breakdown which, although sometimes similar to that of the GVN, varies significantly in many instances. The Viet Cong military organization is superimposed on this system. These adminstrative boundary differences greatly complicate intelligence collation and exploitation and necessitate close coordination among neighboring districts and provinces. Collection and collation of intelligence on the VC infrastructure has far outstripped our ability to take action. At province level the sector G-2, the MSS, the Census Grievance study center, the PIC et al, have kept comprehensive books on the VC apparatus as they see it in each of the province's several districts. However, in our concentration on the identification of the VC cadre, we tend to forget that the VC military and political order of battle are closely enmeshed.

9. The Communists take great pains to prevent their cadre from being exposed, through physical protection provided by their military arm and through their own intelligence resources, which give early warning of impending danger from the GVN. Only where we have sufficient and readily available strength to cope with the enemy's local military resources can we expect to exploit, as thoroughly as we would like, the extensive intelligence which is at hand.

10. The means available at district level for exploiting intelligence on the infrastructure vary considerably and are frequently inadequate. Most district chiefs have at their disposal no more than one mobile RF company and, perhaps, a platoon or two of PF troops, whose operations are not normally oriented against the infrastructure. Police resources in most districts are negligible. Provincial Reconnaissance Units normally operate under the control of provincial authorities. Generally speaking, only when American forces are available are the means--and impetus--provided for operations directed against the infrastructure by district authorities. In the absence of these resources, district authorities lack the will and the impetus to do much more than attempt to cope with the military operations of the Viet Cong, and even if they possessed accurate and timely intelligence on the infrastructure they would not be inclined to react to it effectively.

V. Conclusions

11. The increased awareness that Revolutionary Development progress was being sharply hindered by lack of security, has tended to make us consider the problem solely in terms of the security of the RD cadre teams, despite the fact that the extirpation of the VC cadre system is the sine qua non for pacification. The two thrusts must be considered in tandem. Our successes where Americans have dominated the collation of intelligence at province or district level, have occurred in areas where, because of American troop locations, we were militarily dominant over the VC. In Operation CEDAR FALLS, for example, MACV J-2 advisers, and CAS officers working within the context of the VC/Military Region 4/combined intelligence team were able to provide the military and the police with the intelligence on which they

were able to take action. However, action in this hard core VC area, was made possible by the aggressive presence of the US II field force. Under their protective screen, district-based planning and exploitation was highly productive. Few districts in Vietnam have less information on VC cadre and guerrillas and military displacements that was available in the CEDAR FALLS operation. But the reaction assets available to the average district chief are woefully inadequate.

12. With the reorientation of ARVN battalions into a role in support of RD cadre programs, we should be able to take advantage of this strength and plan our intelligence operations accordingly. ARVN units or Free World forces thus assigned into a new area should determine in which districts the DIOCC concept will be employed. This presupposes--in the case of ARVN troops--that such forces will not merely be a screen; but, instead, will be employed in actively seeking out province and district main force units and destroying them. As the VC lose their protective elements, their cadre become exposed and, thus, vulnerable. The population, aware that retribution for cooperation with the GVN is not the all-prevasive threat that it was previously, become a greater source of intelligence and more of the arcane VC organization is surfaced.

13. For the very same reason that we cannot expect political progress, in depth, if the RD teams are working in an area where company strength VC reaction is an ever-present possibility, our exploitation of intelligence will continue to be no match for the rate at which it can be produced. Collection and collation techniques are constantly being improved and show every promise of continuing in this direction. Reaction capability is the bottleneck which will be broken only if we are successful in defining a new, broad pacification support posture for ARVN and in seeing that these necessary techniques are diligently practiced. The rate at which the redeployment of ARVN into the RD security role is processing does not augur well for an appreciable step-up in the destruction of the VC infrastructure in the near future.

14. The long-discussed concept of a National Constabulary is predicated on this real need for an aggressive, locally oriented force capable of coming to grips with the VC. Unfortunately, the National Constabulary idea is a long way from realization and cannot be considered as a force in being in this effort to increase the tempo of the attack.

15. In the final analysis, then, the problem becomes one of: (a) improving the effectiveness of existing mechanisms at province and higher levels for providing basic intelligence data to support operations at lower levels; and (b) developing an effective mechanism at district level where the means exist to exploit this basic intelligence as supplemented by locally available and timely information. The impetus for both of these must come from the U.S. side, in the first case through tightening up our own advisory procedures, and in the second case by taking the lead in establishing the mechanism built around the intelligence element of whatever U.S. combat forces are deployed in the district. We can press for similar mechanisms when Vietnamese Army units are employed within a district, but in the absence of a full-time U.S. intelligence ingredient as a catalyst (e.g., a battalion S-2 section) the performance will probably not be satisfactory. We can also seek to decentralize Provincial Reconnaissance Unit operations to some extent as a means of reinforcing the resources available to the district, but past experience has shown that if this were done without close U.S. supervision the effectiveness of such operations would be diluted; such a move would be productive only if the U.S. catalytic element were available at the district level.

16. A basic consideration to this problem--one which also affects other aspects of the pacification effort--is that available resources do not permit us to undertake an attack in all areas simultaneously. If properly concentrated, however, our resources are sufficient for us to focus on selected areas where the job can be done effectively. Success and experience thus gained would permit the reallocation of resources--or their duplication--to extend the attack to other areas. The development of additional DOICs should be limited initially to those areas where sufficient resources are available to

warrant the effort. These areas would presumably be those where the concentration of other resources would make the attainment of our pacification goals feasible, and those areas where the destruction of the infrastructure is a priority task. Close coordination of police, PRU, RF, and PF and RD team activities, and Census Grievance activities should be developed at provincial level to support the DOICs established in selected districts, using existing advisory and liaison channels. Once the DOIC mechanism and requisite procedures linking the DOIC to province have been refined, efforts could be made to extend the concept to other districts where Free World or ARVN resources provide the potential for reaction, again bearing in mind the availability of other resources required to further the pacification goal. In this fashion, the infrastructure can be attacked in a rational, effective manner.

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[redacted] CITE [redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DIST 9 JUNE 1967

DOI LATE MAY 1967

SUBJECT MISCELLANEOUS OBSERVATIONS IN HANOI

9 22 57 Z

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
11 JAN 1993

ACQ [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted]

FIELD NO.

1.3(a)(4)

1. SUMMARY. [redacted] THERE ARE FIVE ACTIVE UNDERGROUND POWER STATIONS SERVICING HANOI WHICH ARE LOCATED IN THE CITY AND IN THE SUBURBS. THE MAJORITY OF CHILDREN AND OLD PEOPLE HAVE BEEN RELOCATED OUTSIDE THE CITY. ALSO, MAJOR INDUSTRIES HAVE BEEN MOVED OUTSIDE THE CITY, WHILE SMALL CONSUMER GOODS INDUSTRIES HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO THE CENTER OF THE CITY. AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED REGARDING THE TRANSSHIPMENT OF SOVIET GOODS FROM THE USSR THROUGH CHINA TO NORTH VIETNAM WHEREBY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ASSUMES CONTROL AT THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER.

2. [redacted] THERE ARE FIVE ACTIVE UNDERGROUND POWER STATIONS SERVICING HANOI, THREE OF WHICH ARE LOCATED WITHIN THE CITY LIMITS AND THE OTHER TWO ON THE OUTSKIRTS. [redacted] ONE OF THE POWER STATIONS IS LOCATED NEXT TO THE INDIAN CONSULATE GENERAL ON LE THAN KIET. IT IS DESCRIBED AS A

[redacted] (classification) [redacted] (steam controls)

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• [redacted] [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

RELATIVELY SMALL SOLID CONCRETE BUILDING WITH MANY ELECTRIC CABLES EMANATING FROM IT AND WITH THE WORKS LOCATED UNDERGROUND. THERE IS A LARGE POWER PLANT UNDERNEATH THE MAIN POWER STATION WHICH APPARENTLY HAS NOT BEEN SEVERELY DAMAGED. THERE HAS BEEN NO RATIONING OF ELECTRICITY. AUTHORITIES HAVE URGED ALL RESIDENTS INCLUDING THE FOREIGN COMMUNITY TO CUT DOWN ON THE USE OF AIR CONDITIONERS AND OTHER ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES. HOWEVER, NO EFFORT HAS BEEN EXERTED TO ENFORCE THIS EDICT AND THE PLEAS HAVE BEEN DISREGARDED BY RESIDENTS. APART FROM THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF THE 19 AND 20 MAY BOMBINGS, THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY SHORTAGE OF WATER IN HANOI.

3. DURING THE AIR RAIDS, THE WELL TRAINED POPULACE RESPOND TO THE AIR RAID ALARMS BY GOING TO THE AIR RAID SHELTERS QUICKLY IN A DISCIPLINED FASHION. A FEW REMAIN OUTSIDE BUT STILL IN THE VICINITY OF THE SHELTERS IN CASE OF AN ACTUAL RAID.

4. THE MAJORITY OF CHILDREN AND OLD PEOPLE HAVE BEEN RELOCATED IN AREAS WITHIN AN EIGHT TO SIXTY KILOMETER RADIUS AROUND HANOI. ONLY THOSE WHO ARE ENGAGED IN SOME ESSENTIAL INDUSTRY OR ACTIVITY REMAIN IN TOWN. ALL SCHOOLS HAVE BEEN CLOSED AND ARE NOW OPERATING IN SMALL GROUPS DISPERSED OUTSIDE OF HANOI. THE PEOPLE ARE NOT SENT TO ANY SPECIFIC RELOCATION SPOTS, BUT RATHER SEEK REFUGE WHEREVER THEY CAN. NO ONE LIVING OUTSIDE OF HANOI IS PERMITTED TO REFUSE SHELTER TO THEM. MANY WHO ARE SENT OUT OF HANOI RETURN, BUT THEY ARE SENT BACK ON BUSES. THERE ARE MANY SOVIET BUSES IN EVIDENCE BOTH IN HANOI AND IN THE ENVIRONS. THE HOURS OF OPERATION ARE FROM 0400 TO 0600 HOURS IN THE MORNING AND AFTER 1900 HOURS IN THE EVENING. MANY SMALL CONSUMER GOODS INDUSTRIES HAVE BEEN PURPOSELY TRANSFERRED TO THE CENTER OF HANOI IN ORDER TO AVOID THE BOMBING. MAJOR INDUSTRIES

• [redacted] [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

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• [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

HAVE BEEN RELOCATED OUTSIDE OF HANOI BUT ACTUAL LOCATIONS ARE UNKNOWN. THE DEFENSE MINISTRY IS STILL LOCATED IN HANOI.

5. [redacted] THE SOVIETS WANTED TO CONTROL THE TRANSSHIPMENT OF SOVIET GOODS FROM THE USSR THROUGH CHINA TO NORTH VIETNAM. HOWEVER, THE CHINESE OBJECTED AND STATED THAT THEY WOULD ASSUME CONTROL AT THE USSR BORDER. AT THIS POINT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS INTERVENED AND SAID THAT IF THE USSR AND CHINA WERE GOING TO DISAGREE OVER THIS, THEN NORTH VIETNAM WOULD NOT CONTINUE THE WAR. THE AGREEMENT ATTAINED IS A COMPROMISE WHEREBY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ASSUMES CONTROL AT THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER. [redacted] IN JANUARY THE SOVIETS PLANNED TO IMPORT FINNED MORTARS POSSIBLY 140MM WITH FIVE MILE RANGE WHICH ARE THE SAME TYPE WHICH WERE USED TO SHELL DANANG AIR BASE TWO MONTHS LATER.) 1.3(a)(4)

6. [redacted] AN UNIDENTIFIED AMERICAN PILOT, SHOT DOWN IN A 24 MAY RAID, WAS DISPLAYED AT A PRESS CONFERENCE 25 MAY AT 0500 HOURS. WHEN HE SHOWED SOME RELUCTANCE TO BOW TO THE PRESS THREE TIMES, HE WAS CUFFED ON THE HEAD BY A NORTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIER UNTIL HE DID. ([redacted] COMMENT. THIS TREATMENT RESEMBLED SOMEWHAT THE EXHIBITION OF LIEUTENANT COMMANDER RICHARD STRATTON [redacted]

7. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE USMACV [redacted] CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT SEVENTH AIR FORCE.

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Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

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[redacted] E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C) E0 12958 3.4(b) [redacted]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

SECRET 21 1948Z CITE [redacted]

DIST 21 JUNE 1967

COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM/[redacted] (1) E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>2 (C).

DOI: AS OF 18 JUNE 1967

SUBJECT: RAIDS OF THE SECOND WEEK OF JUNE CAUSE FURTHER DAMAGE TO HANOI FACILITIES; FOREIGN LEGATIONS PREPARE EVACUATION PLANS.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yr (C)

ACQ:

SOURCE: [redacted]

1. [redacted] E0 12958 3.4(b)(1 (C)

MAJOR AMERICAN RAIDS FROM THAI BASES [redacted] AGAIN HIT ADDITIONAL WATER AND ELECTRICAL FACILITIES IN THE CITY OF HANOI. AS A RESULT, AS OF 18 JUNE THE WATER SUPPLY SITUATION IN HANOI HAD "DETERIORATED" GREATLY. WATER WAS IRREGULAR IN SUPPLY AND WAS OFTEN NOT OF PROPER PURITY. [redacted]

SECRET [redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: OCT 2000

SECRET [redacted]

(classification) (dissem controls)

[redacted] AN AUXILLARY WATER SUPPLY UNIT HAD BEEN HIT AS WELL AS A MAIN PUMPING STATION AND [redacted] REPAIRS WERE NOT PERFECTLY EFFECTED. [redacted] COMMENT: IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THIS RESULTED FROM THE 9-10 JUNE RAIDS OR A SUBSEQUENT RAID THE NEXT WEEK). E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>2 (C)

2. ELECTRICITY WAS A CONDITION ALMOST AS BAD, WITH RATIONING STILL IN EFFECT AND POWER BREAKDOWNS OCCURRING. AN ELECTRICAL PLANT ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF HANOI WAS REPORTEDLY BADLY DAMAGED SOMETIME DURING THE WEEK OF 12 JUNE.

3. THE HANOI GOVERNMENT HAS INDICATED THROUGH ITS FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY OFFICIALS THAT EMBASSIES AND LEGATIONS IN HANOI WERE WELCOME TO EVACUATE TO A SAFER SPOT SIXTY KILOMETERS TO THE NORTHWEST OF HANOI. [redacted] FOR PERMISSION FROM DJAKARTA TO DO SO BUT WAS TOLD IN RESPONSE [redacted] E0 12958 3. (C)

OF MINISTRIES OF GOVERNMENT HAD EITHER REMOVED FROM HANOI OR WERE RESETTLED IN UNDERGROUND BUNKERS [redacted] MANY OF THE IMPORTANT PERSONAGES IN IMPORTANT MINISTRIES, EXCEPT THOSE IN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY, HAVE NOT BEEN SEEN IN HANOI IN RECENT DAYS.

SECRET [redacted]

4. THE MORALE OF THE POPULACE, WHILE SUFFERING FROM THE CONSTANT BOMBINGS, REMAINS HIGH AND THE DETERMINATION OF THE YOUNG PEOPLE ESPECIALLY, TO CONTINUE FIGHTING SPEAKS WELL OF THE FANATICAL DISCIPLINE COMMUNIST INDOCTRINATION HAS ACHIEVED. THEY ARE COMPLETELY CONVINCED THAT TIME IS ON THEIR SIDE. E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

5. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT AND PACFLT. [redacted]

[redacted]

REPORT CLASS SECRET [redacted]

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PAGE 1 OF 15 PAGES

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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CONFIDENTIAL 27 20 05 Z CITE [redacted]

DIST 27 JUNE 1967

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs. (C)

DOI 31 OCTOBER 1966 - 31 MAY 1967

SUBJECT DAMAGING EFFECT ON THE MILITARY REGION 4 INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE ARRESTS OF FORTY DISTRICT AND REGION LEVEL VIET CONG CADRES

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (JUNE 1967) FIELD NO. [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted]

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BATOR
BOWDLER
BUDGET
DAVIS
GINSBURG
HAMILTON
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JOHNSON
JORDEN
KEENY
KOMER
MOYERS
TAYLOR
WRIGGINS

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FILE:

1. / SUMMARY - FORTY DISTRICT AND REGION LEVEL CADRES WERE ARRESTED IN VIET CONG/VC/ MILITARY REGION /MR/ 4 BETWEEN 31 OCTOBER 1966 AND 31 MAY 1967. FOUR OF THESE WERE MEMBERS OF THE MR 4 PARTY COMMITTEE, TWO WERE MEMBERS OF THE DI AN DISTRICT PARTY COMMITTEE, AND ONE WAS A MEMBER OF THE THU DUC DISTRICT PARTY COMMITTEE. FUNCTIONALLY, THE MR 4 ECONOMIC-FINANCE SECTION HAS LOST ITS CHIEF AND FOUR OTHER CADRES, AND THE WORKERS' PROSELYTING SECTION HAS LOST

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ITS CHIEF, DEPUTY CHIEF, AND FOUR OTHER CADRES. IN SAIGON, THE MARKET PARTY COMMITTEE HAS LOST THREE CADRES. IN ADDITION, FRONT ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS THE LIBERATION WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION AND THE VIETNAM HIGH SCHOOL TEACHER'S ORGANIZATION HAVE SUFFERED LOSSES, WITH THE LATTER PROBABLY CRIPPLED. THE ELIMINATION OF THESE CADRES FROM THE MR 4 INFRASTRUCTURE HAS PUT A SEVERE CRIMP IN VC POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OPERATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN THE FIELD OF CIVILIAN PROSELYTING. FEW OF THESE PEOPLE WILL BE REPLACED BECAUSE OF THE SERIOUS SHORTAGE OF CADRES. OPERATIONS IN THE SAIGON-CHOLON URBAN AREA HAVE BEEN HARD HIT AND, ALTHOUGH RURAL VC ORGANIZATIONS ARE STILL RELATIVELY INTACT AND THE VC STILL HAVE THE CAPABILITY FOR SABOTAGE, ASSASSINATION AND SMALL-SCALE ATTACKS, IT IS PROBABLE THAT MANY VC MR 4 PLANS FOR 1967 HAVE HAD TO BE POSTPONED OR CANCELLED./

THOSE LOST TO THE INFRASTRUCTURE

2. FORTY DISTRICT AND REGION LEVEL VIET CONG/VC// CADRE FROM VC MILITARY REGION /MR/ 4/ WERE ARRESTED FROM 31 OCTOBER 1966 THROUGH 31 MAY 1967 BY THE GOVERNMENT OF

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VIETNAM /GVN/. /FIELD COMMENT - VC MR 4 COMPRISES SAIGON-CHOLON AND THE DISTRICTS OF BINH TAN, CU CHI, DI AN, GO MON, NGA BE AND THU DUC./ SINCE MANY OF THOSE CADRES ARRESTED HELD SEVERAL, INTERRELATED POSITIONS,THEIR LOSS TO THE MR 4 INFRASTRUCTURE IS EVEN MORE SERIOUS. /FIELD COMMENT - MANY HAD POSITIONS IN BOTH THE PARTY AND FRONT. SEVEN WERE OFFICIALS OF THE FRONT ONLY./ FOUR OF THOSE ARRESTED, LE THI RIENG, TRAN QUANG TINH, LE VAN TU, AND HUYNH MINH TUAN, HAVE BEEN TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED AS MEMBERS OF THE MR 4 PARTY COMMITTEE IN ADDITION TO OTHER POSITIONS. TWO MEMBERS OF THE DI AN DISTRICT COMMITTEE, NGUYEN NGU DANG AND NGUYEN VAN TRANH[redacted], AND ONE MEMBER OF THE THU DUC DISTRICT COMMITTEE, TRAN VAN TAM, WERE INCLUDED IN THE ARRESTS. THE ECONOMIC-FINANCE SECTION OF THE MR 4 COMMITTEE HAS LOST LE QUANG KIEN, TRAN DINH LONG, NGUYEN VAN MUOI, WHO HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS A LEADER IN THE SECTION, NGUYEN THANH TOT, AND LE CANG TANH[redacted], THE CHIEF OF THE SECTION. THE INTELLECTUALS' PROSETYTING UNITS OF THE MR 4 COMMITTEE HAS LOST NGUYEN THI CHON[redacted], LE NGOC LAN, TRAN KHIEM NINH, AND TRAN VAN TAM.

3. THE MR 4 WORKERS' PROSELYTING SECTION HAS LOST ITS

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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CHIEF, LAM VAN KUONG, NGUYEN VAN NAM, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE STRATEGIC ENTERPRISES SUBSECTION - NGUYEN THI PHUNG, WHO WAS IN CHARGE OF THE LIBERATION LABOR ASSOCIATION IN THE KHANH HOI AREA OF SAIGON - LE VAN TU, THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE SECTION - HUYNH MINH TUAN, A CADRE IN THE STRATEGIC ENTERPRISES SUBSECTION - AND TRAN VAN HOA. IN SAIGON, THE MR 4 MARKET PARTY COMMITTEE HAS LOST THREE CADRE - TU OM, NGUYEN VAN THANH AND NGUYEN THI TUYET.

4. A TOTAL OF THIRTEEN KEY MEMBERS OF SEVERAL VC FRONT ORGANIZATIONS WERE ALSO ARRESTED. THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY LOST ONE MEMBER, THE LIBERATION LABOR ASSOCIATION LOST TWO MEMBERS, THE LIBERATION WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION LOST THREE MEMBERS, AND THE VIETNAM HIGH SCHOOL TEACHERS' UNION LOST SEVEN MEMBERS, INCLUDING ITS SECRETARY-GENERAL, NGUYEN VAN BUOI, AND THREE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

5. ONE OF THE MORE IMPORTANT OF THE ARRESTED CADRES IS LE THI RIENG, WHO HAS BEEN A PARTY MEMBER SINCE 1948 AND A MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM /NFLSV/ SINCE 1961. SHE HAS BEEN A LEADER IN THE FIELD OF WOMEN'S PROSELYTING SINCE

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VIET MINH DAYS. ANOTHER ARRESTED CADRE IS NGUYEN THI CHON, ALSO A LEADER IN WOMEN'S PROSELYTING AND THE WIFE OF TRAN BACH DANG, WHO IS BELIEVED TO STILL BE IN CHARGE OF PROPAGANDA AND TRAINING FOR THE CENTRAL OFFICE OF SOUTH VIETNAM /COSVN/. A THIRD DETAINEE, NGUYEN HUU QUE, AN INTELLECTUALS' PROSELYTING CADRE, REPORTEDLY WORKED FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN HANOI PRIOR TO 1955 - AND TRAN QUANG TINH, WHO WAS ARRESTED ON 29 MARCH 1967, REPORTEDLY WAS ALSO AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER IN HANOI.

CONCLUSION

7. THE ELIMINATION OF THESE FORTY DISTRICT- AND - REGION-LEVEL CADRES FROM THE MR 4 STRUCTURE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PUT A SEVERE CRIMP INTO THE VC'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OPERATIONS IN THE SAIGON AREA, PARTICULARLY IN THE FIELD OF CIVILIAN PROSELYTING. THIS IS DUE NOT ONLY TO THE LOSS OF THESE CADRES, SOME OF THEM WITH LONG EXPERIENCE IN PARTY OPERATIONS, BUT ALSO TO THE PRESENT SHORTAGE OF VC REPLACEMENT CADRES IN MR 4 AREA. LE THI RIENG HAS STATED AFTER HER ARREST THAT SHE DOUBTS SHE WILL BE REPLACED BECAUSE OF THIS SHORTAGE AND THAT HER DUTIES WOULD HAVE TO

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BE ASSUMED BY THE REMAINING MEMBERS OF HER SECTION AND HER IMMMEDIATE SUPERIORS. THIS SITUATION IS ALSO TRUE OF OTHER PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN MR 4.

8. OPERATIONS WITHIN THE SAIGON-CHOLON URBAN COMPLEX HAVE BEEN HIT PARTICULARLY HARD, AND IT WILL BE SOMETIME BEFORE THE VC WILL BE ABLE TO RECOVER. HOWEVER, THE RURAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE STILL BASICALLY INTACT, AND, WHATEVER THEIR SHORTCOMINGS AND WEAKNESSES, STILL PROVIDE AN ORGANIZATIONAL BASE FROM WHICH TO EXPAND IN THE FUTURE.

9. IN ADDITION, THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION WITHIN MR 4 STILL MAINTAINS THE ABILITY TO CONDUCT SABOTAGE, ASSASSINATIONS, AND SMALL SCALE ATTACKS, WHICH CAN KEEP THE URBAN AREA UNSETTLED. THUS IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO SAY THAT THE VC THREAT TO MR 4, OR EVEN TO SAIGON, HAS BEEN ELIMINATED. THE THREAT HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN SERIOUSLY DETERRED BY THE LOSS OF THESE CADRES, AND IT IS LIKELY THE VC HAVE HAD TO POSTPONE OR CANCEL MANY OF THEIR 1967 PLANS.

NAMES, POSITION, DATES OF ARREST

10. THE FORTY VC CADRES ARRESTED, THEIR DATES OF ARREST, AND THEIR POSITIONS AND TITLES ARE AS FOLLOWS -

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NAME/S/	DATE OF ARREST	POSITION /S/
AN, MAI DANG	MAY 1967	CHIEF OF CULTURAL AFFAIRS, VIETNAM HIGH SCHOOL TEACHERS' UNION.
BA, NGUYEN VAN AKA TRAN VAN NHUAN AKA BA NHO - AKA BA NGOC - AKA BICH	23 FEB 1967	CADRE IN CHARGE OF WORKERS' PROSELYTING, DI AN DISTRICT.
BAY, NGUYEN VAN AKA NGUYEN VAN BUT - PARTY NAME HAI BINH	20 MAR 1967	MEMBER OF CADRE AFFAIRS FOR PRECINCT 4, NHA BE DISTRICT - COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBER.
BUOI, NGUYEN VAN	MAY 1967	SECRETARY- GENERAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF VIETNAM HIGH SCHOOL TEACHERS' UNION.
CANH, NGUYEN VAN AKA TU CANH - AKA NGUYEN HALL	31 OCT 1966	TRAINING PROPAGANDA CADRE, LIBERATION LABOR ASSOCIATION - MR 4 COMMITTEE CADRE

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CHINH, NGUYEN THI AKA CHI BA	7 MAR 1967	IN CHARGE OF BAC AI HAMLET, DI AN DISTRICT COMMITTEE, UNDER NGUYEN NHU DANG - COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBER.
CHON, NGUYEN THI AKA TRAN THI VANG AKA NAM CHONG AKA NAM QUANG AKA NAM ANH	31 MAY 1967	MEMBER OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION ASSOCIATION - MEMBER OF MR 4 BOURGEOIS INTELLECTUALS SECTION WIFE OF TRAN BACH CANG, COSVN SECTION CHIEF AND A MEMBER OF THE MR 4 COMMITTEE - COMMUNIST PARTY
DANG, NGUYEN NHU AKA NGUYEAN AKA BAY NGO AKA TRI NGUT - PARTY NAME NGUYEN VAN BA	2 MAR 1967	MEMBER OF DI AN DISTRICT COMMITTEE IN CHARGE OF BIEN HOA AREA - COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBER
GHI, NGUYEN VAN	8 NOV 1966	LEADING CADRE OF

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E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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AKA TAM SANG		LIBERATION LABOR ASSOCIATION ELEMENT OF KHANH HOI AREA OF SAIGON MR 4 COMMITTEE CADRE.
HAI, CAO VAN AKA TAM, TRAN VAN AKA CA VINH PHOI CODE NAME NAM CHINH PARTY NAME TRAN PHONG	14 JAN 1967	CADRE OF MR 4 INTELLECTUALS' PROSELYTING SECTION DEPUTY SECRETARY, THU DUC DISTRICT COMMITTEE SECRETARY OF CADRE AFFAIR THU DUC DISTRICT COMMITTEE,
HAI, LY THI	21 APR 1967	MEDIC/NURSE OF COSVN CADRE OF DISTRICT LEVEL
HOA TRAN VAN AKA NGUYEN VAN TANG CODE NAME NAM BA PARTY NAME HUNG	16 FEB 1967	CADRE OF MR 4 WORKERS' PROSELYTING SECTION
HUONG, LAM VAN AKA TRAN MINH TRUNG	19 DEC 1966	CHIEF OF WORKERS' PROSELYTING SECTION

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AKA PHAN XUAN NHI		OF MR 4 COMMITTEE
CODE NAME TU BINH		
KIEN, LE QUANG	15 MAR 1967	MEMBER OF DEMOCRATIC
AKA LE QUANG DINH		PARTY CADRE OF MR 4
CODE NAME SAU CAN		ECONOMIC - FINANCE
PARTY NAME DAO		SECTION
KIEU, TRAN VAN	21 DEC 1966	DEPUTY CHIEF, MR 4
AKA CHIN K		WORKERS' PROSELYTING
AKA CINH CA		SECTION - MEMBER OF MR 4
AKA LE VAN TU		COMMITTEE
LAN, LE NGOC	26 MAY 1967	MEMBER OF MR 4
AKA HUA DUC		INTELLECTUALS'
AKA BA TRA		PROSELYTING SECTION
LANG, TRAN DINH	MAR 1967	CADRE OF MR 4
AKA TU LANG		ECONOMIC-FINANCE
AKA BA MOT		SECTION - COMMUNIST
		PARTY MEMBER
LINH, PHAM VAN	MAR 1967	MEMBER OF CADRE AFFAIRS
AKA CHAU VAN BUU		SECTION IN THI NGHE
AKA CHIN BI		OF THU DUC DISTRICT,

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		IN CHARGE OF MILITARY
		CHIEF OF SABOTAGE
		GROUP - COMMUNIST
		PARTY MEMBER
LUONG, LE VAN	11 MAY 1967	CADRE OF MR 4
AKA LE TAN THANH		WORKERS' PROSELYTING
AKA SAU HOAI		SECTION.
PARTY NAME THANH SON		
MUOI, NGUYEN VAN	20 MAY 1967	LEADER OF MR 4
AKA LE VAN CAN		ECONOMIC-FINANCE
AKA ONG MUOI		SECTION
CODE NAME TAN BINH		
NAM, NGUYEN VAN	MAR 1967	ASSISTANT SECRETARY
AKA NGUYEN NAM		FOR STRATEGIC ENTER-
AKA TRUONG VAN DUC		PRISES, MR 4 WORKERS'
CODE NAME SAU PHUONG		PROSELYTING SECTION
		COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBER
NGHIA, HUYNH VAN	17 MAR 1967	MEMBER OF CADRE
AKA DUONG KHANH QUANG		AFFAIRS SECTION - THU DUC
CODE NAME BA CHAU		DISTRICT, IN CHARGE OF

ED 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

PARTY NAME THANG		WORKERS' PROSELYTING IN THI NGHE - COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBER
NGHIA, NGUYEN HUU AKA NGUYEN THAI NGHIEP PARTY NAME THANG TAM	MAY 1967	MEMBER OF CULTURAL AFFAIRS SECTION OF VIETNAM HIGH SCHOOL TEACHERS' UNION.
NINH, TRAN KHIEM AKA LE VAN BA AKA ENGINEER NINH	24 FEB 1967	CADRE IN INTELLECTUALS' PROSELYTING SECTION OF MR 4 COMMITTEE - COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBER.
OM, TU AKA SAU THU	MAY 1967	MEMBER OF MR 4 MARKET PARTY COMMITTEE COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBER
PHUNG, NGUYEN THI AKA UT SUONG	22 DEC 1966	MEMBER OF MR 4 WORKERS' PROSELYTING SECTION IN CHARGE OF LIBERATION LABOR IN KHANH HOI AREA OF SAIGON.
PHUONG, NGUYEN VAN	31 MAY 1967	''PRIVATE SECRETARY''

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

AKA TAM PHUOC AKA TUAN AKA TU		TO TRAN BACH DANG PROBABLY MR 4 COMMITTEE CADRE.
QUE, HONG THI AKA THI NAM	31 MAY 1967	WIFE OF NGUYEN DUC ANH MEMBER OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION ASSOCIATION COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBER
QUE, NGUYEN HUU AKA VINH THE PAINTER	2 FEB 1967	INTELLECTUALS' PROSELYTING CADRE UNDER TRAN VAN TAM, THU DUC DISTRICT COMMITTEE A FORMER MILITARY INTEL- LIGENCE OFFICE IN HANOI PROBATIONARY PARTY MEMBER
RIENG, LE THI AKA NGUYEN THI RIENG AKA HAI RIENG AKA HUYNH THI CHIN	9 MAY 1967	MR 4 COMMITTEE MEMBER CHIEF FOR WOMEN'S PROSELYTING SECTION DEPUTY CHAIRLADY OF WOMEN' LIBERATION ASSOCIATION - MEMBER OF

 EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

		NFLSV CENTRAL COMMITTEE COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBER
SU, HO THI	19 MAY 1967	DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE VIETNAM HIGH SCHOOL TEACHERS' UNION.
SUNG, NGUYEN VAN	19 MAY 1967	MEMBER OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, VIETNAM HIGH SCHOOL TEACHERS' UNION.
SUNG, TRAN DINH	19 MAY 1967	MEMBER OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, VIETNAM HIGH SCHOOL TEACHERS' UNION.
THANH, LE CONG AKA TRAN VAN MUON CODE NAME TU MOI	25 MAR 1967	CHIEF OF MR 4 ECONOMIC-FINANCE SECTION
THANH, NGUYEN VAN AKA VO HUU THANH AKA HO HUU TAI	12 MAY 1967	MEMBER OF MR 4 MARKET PARTY COMMITTEE MEMBER OF DI AN DISTRICT

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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AKA HAI		COMMITTEE.
TINH, TRAN QUANG	29 MAR 1967	VC MAJOR - OF FORMER
AKA NGUYEN VAN TINH		COMMANDER OF INTELLIGENCE
		OFFICE IN HANOI - PROBABLY
		MR 4 COMMITTEE MEMBER
TOT, NGUYEN THANH	MAR 1967	CADRE OF COSVN ECONOMIC-
AKA CAU NAM		FINANCE SECTION
CODE NAME THANH QUANG		
CODE NAME DAN SANH		
TUAN, HUYNH MINH	10 NOV 1966	MEMBER OF MR 4
AKA NGUYEN VAN DINH		COMMITTEE MEMBER OF
AKA BE		STRATEGIC ENTERPRISES
CODE NAME SAU TRUNG		SUBSECTION MR 4
PARTY NAME NUON		WORKERS' PROSELYTING
		SECTION
TUYET, NGUYEN THI	1 MAY 1967	CADRE OF MR 4
AKA NGUYEN THI THANH		MARKET PARTY COMMITTEE

11. FIELD DISSEM - STATE USAID JUSPAO USMACV CORDS USARV NAVFORV 7THAF DIST 50/OSI 525TH MIG CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN FOREIGN DISSEM GROUP 1

No. 0358/67
July 1967
1967
6/30/85

II. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

The Government of Vietnam since the beginning of 1967 has distributed more than 70,000 permanent land titles to farmers. This activity in combination with other GVN-sponsored land reform projects is in part calculated to reap immediate short-term political advantages as well as longer range economic benefits. Revolutionary Development cadre efforts continue to meet with varying degrees of success in several widely scattered parts of the country. The resettlement of some 7,000 persons currently underway in Pleiku Province is now 80 percent complete. The newly settled areas are, however, already showing signs of Communist penetration. In Saigon, a pilot program of free medical service for the needy was scheduled to being last month and it is hoped to expand it into the provinces during July.

Land Reform

1. US officials in Saigon have reported that the Government of Vietnam (GVN) has distributed more than 70,000 permanent land titles since 1 January 1967. These permanent titles replace temporary land-ownership certificates issued during the Diem regime and have been issued by the GVN to farmers cultivating former French lands and lands seized in 1956 under Ordinance 57. Permanent land titles have reportedly been issued in cases where full payments for the land have not yet been made to the government. The title holders are, however, still liable for the payments due.

2. Two recent decrees are concerned with restructuring the land tenure system. One, a decree of 19 May, clarifies the status and policies of the government relating to lands distributed to people

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by the Viet Cong but which since have come under government control. The second forbids either landlords or government officials from using the Vietnamese military to collect back rents on these lands. In most cases the collection of back rents on the redistributed lands has been suspended by the government.

3. Major problems and inequities which continue to plague the rural areas include: the violation of tenant-landlord contracts and terms of tenure relationships; a biased or inadequate village administrative authority to cope with land disputes; excessive landlord influence on village affairs; and the problems caused by the Communist land distribution and taxation systems.

4. The basic legislation for the redistribution of land in Vietnam--Ordinance 57--was written in 1956. This legislation limited riceland holdings to 247 acres per landlord and an additional 37 acres was allotted for burial purposes. Provisions were made in the legislation to provide payments to landlords for land expropriated under these laws. Of the approximately 772,000 acres seized under Ordinance 57, 615,000 acres were redistributed. Much of the remainder of the land is in insecure areas and no actions have been taken concerning this land.

5. Land reform projects currently sponsored by the GVN are directed toward the redistribution of land and rent controls in order to achieve an immediate political return and some long-term economic benefits. By giving the farmer a firm, permanent title, the government hopes to induce him to invest labor and capital in the land in order to raise production above a marginal level and create an agricultural surplus.

6. One of the programs to strengthen land tenure is being tested in the An Giang (Province) Priority Area. In this area, aerial photos are being taken of the entire province and maps of land holdings are being made from them. This method offers speed, accuracy, and security since little work needs

to be done on the ground. A title produced by this process contains a description of the land and a photo of it, and since the titles are easily reproducible, copies may be given the owner as well as filed centrally. This program has suffered from technical problems, however, and 70 percent of the aerial coverage done thus far must be reflown.

7. Although accurate statistics on rural affairs are not available, USAID has made the following estimate of the percentage of farmers by tenure:

Tenure	Southern provinces(%)	Central lowland provinces(%)
Owner-operators only	23	29
Operators with only rented land	47	11
Operators with both owned and rented land	30	60

Revolutionary Development Cadre Highlights

8. In an attempt to eliminate corruption found in his area of operations, the leader of an RD team in Chau Doc Province provided provincial authorities information on the illicit activities of the chief of the village in which his team was operating. The village chief had been using the local Popular Forces, to terrorize the local residents, collect illegal taxes, and unlawfully seize private property.

9. In an effort to stop the RD team's investigation of these activities, the village chief had gone so far as to have two of the villagers who had been cooperating with the team killed. Provincial authorities had been reluctant to take any actions against the offender but--when faced with evidence of the murders and with the threat of the resignation of the RD team leader--finally jailed the village chief on murder charge. The team leader is continuing to investigate the villagers' charges of corruption against colleagues of the village chief

who are still in office. The province chief--although commending the RD team leader for his actions--has warned him of "danger to his personal security."

10. In Binh Dinh Province on 14 June two RD teams--recent graduates of the National Training Center--moved into two hamlets in the southern part of the province where the Communists in 1964 had forced the majority of the local residents to leave. The arrival of the RD teams was soon followed by the return of approximately 1,200 former inhabitants of the area. In addition, an estimated 600 residents from nearby hamlets have temporarily resettled in the two hamlets for security and have indicated that they will return to their native residences when RD teams are available to help them reestablish their hamlets.

11. Elsewhere in this province, an RD team operating in Phu Cat District enlisted the support of the US engineer battalion to blast rock needed to build a dam being constructed under the self-help program. When the US unit first arrived they had to do all the work themselves; soon, however, the villagers and RD cadre had taken over the manual labor while the engineers provided only technical guidance. This joint venture reportedly has generated more cordial relations between villagers, RD personnel, and US troops in the area.

12. In Vinh Binh Province four RD teams have been working in what were Communist-controlled areas of Cang Long District since February 1967. At the end of May the teams began to discern signs that they had finally begun to overcome the people's apathy and distrust. The teams have been able to stimulate the people to commit themselves to working on a variety of programs designed to improve hamlet life and have enrolled large numbers of the children in government schools. In adjacent Tien Can District, RD teams have helped newly resettled families--who in the early part of the year had left areas under enemy control--to build approximately 400 new homes for themselves.

13. In Phuoc Tuy Province, the Provincial Intelligence Officer--using intelligence furnished by an RD team operating in one of the villages--apprehended 17 members of that village's chapter of the "Liberation Women's Association." The suspects have been sent to the Provincial Interrogation Center.

14. In Khanh Hoa Province the RD Control Committee has initiated a series of broadcasts from the Nha Trang radio station stressing the importance of RD work in the province and citing examples of the people's participation in RD efforts. This is one of the first reported instances of a provincial control committee taking advantage of the local radio station to promote its RD effort. Similar promotional work needs to be done by Vietnamese officials throughout the country in order to explain the goals and achievements of the RD program to the local populace.

Refugees

15. The Edap Enang highlander resettlement project in Pleiku Province which has as its goal the resettlement of approximately 7,000 people is now approximately 80 percent complete. When the project is completed, approximately 1,200 families will have been moved from the Pleiku-Cambodia border areas and resettled along Highway 19 east and south of the city of Pleiku. The movement of the people is the responsibility of the US 4th Infantry Division, with Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) and the GVN's Special Commission for Refugees (SCR) providing the personnel and resources to assist the montagnards in resettling. The security of the resettlement area is being maintained by a Vietnamese Ranger battalion, two Regional Force companies, and two Popular Force platoons.

16. As of the middle of June over 5,600 people--residents of 44 of the 51 hamlets scheduled for resettlement--were evacuated from their previous residences with the majority of the people electing to relocate in the new areas. Within the resettlement areas construction has been completed on 439 new homes while 782 are still being built. There are indications, however, of Communist penetration of the resettlement area. On at least four occasions in May large numbers of highlanders were cajoled or pressured into abandoning the resettlement area by Communist cadre. One of the prevalent propaganda themes of the Communists is to circulate among the highlanders rumors that the US forces do not have enough rice to feed them and that all US forces will soon be leaving Pleiku Province.

17. In Phu Yen Province work has begun on approximately 1,163 self-help homes for refugees. The SCR has announced that it will pay a second resettlement allowance to previously resettled refugees who are constructing new homes for themselves and, in addition, the SCR will provide these people with seed and farm land. The progress made so far in 1967 in the Phu Yen refugee program is encouraging; in 1966 provincial activities were catagorized by US advisors as "stagnant."

"New Life Development" Activities

18. The Vietnamese Mutual Assistance Association, a voluntary organization, in cooperation with the Ministry of Social Welfare is making plans to provide free medical check-ups and treatment to the needy. Approximately 300 civilian and military physicians have volunteered to participate, and pharmaceutical companies in Saigon have agreed to contribute drugs valued at over 500,000 piastres. The program was scheduled to begin in Saigon at the end of June and expand into the provinces during July. Needy persons seeking medical assistance under this new program have to contact their provincial social welfare center to obtain examination tickets.

NLJ 017-018, 002/18

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

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STATE/DIR DIA [redacted] SDO ONE OCR ORR [redacted] DDI [redacted] EXO

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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SECRET

CITE [redacted]

DIST 30 JUNE 1967

31 22 55 Z

COUNTRY SOVIET BLOC/VIETNAM

DOI EARLY JUNE 1967

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

SUBJECT SOVIET BLOC OBSERVATIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM

ACQ [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted]

TO DIA: FOR GENERAL CARROLL.

E0 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

TO STATE: NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO THOMAS L. HUGHES

TO NSA : FOR GENERAL CARTER.

1. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AMERICAN AIR ACTION AND THE SEEMINGLY INFINITE CAPACITY OF THE AMERICANS TO ESCALATE TO THE DEGREE NECESSARY TO OVERCOME ANY INCREASED SUPPORT RENDERED THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE THE PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF DISILLUSIONMENT AMONG SOVIET AND BLOC OFFICIALS IN HANOI AND THEIR CONVICTION THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE CANNOT WIN. [redacted]

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2. TO PROTECT AND CONSERVE FUEL SUPPLIES, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AVOID THE USE OF CENTRALIZED DUMPS BUT HAVE SMALL SUPPLIES SCATTERED "EVERYWHERE", ALONG ROADS, ETC., AND FREQUENTLY CONSISTING OF ONLY A FEW JERRYCANS.

3. DURING AN AMERICAN AIR RAID, A BOMB FELL IN HANOI A FEW YARDS FROM THE CHINESE COMMUNIST EMBASSY. SOVIET AND BLOC OFFICIALS IN HANOI BELIEVE THAT THIS WAS A NEAR MISS ON A CHINESE RADIO STATION HOUSED IN THE EMBASSY WHICH HAD BEEN TARGETTED BY THE BOMBER.

4. A POLISH DELEGATION COMPRISING A NUMBER OF SENIOR FIELD GRADE OFFICERS HEADED BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL TADEUSZ TUCHAPSKI, DEPUTY CHIEF, INSPECTORATE OF TRAINING, POLISH ARMED FORCES, IS CURRENTLY IN NORTH VIETNAM TO STUDY THE TACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE WAR. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, NO POLISH MILITARY ADVISORS PERMANENTLY IN NORTH VIETNAM. A FEW POLISH PILOTS HAD BEEN THERE PREVIOUSLY.

5. [redacted] DISSEM: CINCPAC (ADMIRAL SHARP ONLY), STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER), USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND ONLY).

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DATE: OCT 2000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• PRIORITY

IN 02978

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	OCR	SDO	AID
	DD/I	EXO							USIA	ONE	ORR	DCS	CGS

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CITE [redacted]

DIST 3 JULY 1967

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(C)

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 2 JULY 1967

E0 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

SUBJECT AGREEMENT BETWEEN CHIEF OF STATE THIEU AND PRIME MINISTER KY THAT THIEU, AS PRESIDENT, WILL BE A FIGUREHEAD AND KY, AS VICE PRESIDENT, WILL RETAIN PRINCIPAL CONTROL AFTER THE ELECTIONS

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted]

E0 12958
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1. (SUMMARY: IT IS AGREED AMONG PRIME MINISTER KY, CHIEF OF STATE THIEU AND THE ARMED FORCES COUNCIL (AFC) THAT THEIU WILL BE A FIGUREHEAD AS PRESIDENT AND KY WILL BE DE FACTO IN COMMAND. THIEU'S PERSONAL PRESTIGE HAS DECLINED CONSIDERABLY AMONG AFC OFFICERS BECAUSE OF HIS SELF-SEEKING BEHAVIOR DURING THE DELIBERATIONS WHICH PRECEDED THE DECISION TO FORM A JOINT THIEU-KY TICKET. KY'S BIGGEST PROBLEM NOW IS TO EXPLAIN, DISCREETLY, TO HIS BACKERS THAT

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HE WILL ACTUALLY HAVE BROAD AUTHORITY IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT AS THOUGH HE WERE PRESIDENT IN FACT, AND TO PERSUADE HIS CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION TO WORK FOR THE NEW THIEU-KY SLATE.)

2. CHIEF OF STATE THIEU AND PRIME MINISTER KY HAVE REACHED AN AGREEMENT ON WHAT THEIR RESPECTIVE ROLES WILL BE IF ELECTED AS PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT. THIEU WILL FUNCTION IN A LIMITED, FIGUREHEAD CAPACITY ONLY, WITH KY AS DE FACTO COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE ONE WITH EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY OVER THE MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE, REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT, AND INFORMATION, EACH OF WHICH WILL LIKELY BE HEADED BY A MILITARY OFFICER. KY WILL ALSO SELECT ALL THE CABINET MEMBERS. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL BE A CIVILIAN; AND ALTHOUGH HE HAS NOT YET BEEN SELECTED, HE WILL PREFERABLY BE SOMEONE WITH A BACKGROUND IN ECONOMICS AND WILL HANDLE THE OTHER MINISTRIES WITH PERHAPS OCCASIONAL GUIDANCE FROM THE VICE PRESIDENT. THIEU UNDERSTANDS THIS ENTIRE ARRANGEMENT CLEARLY AND IS WILLING TO ACCEPT HIS LARGELY TITULAR ROLE. TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING OR LATER MANEUVERING BY THIEU, THE AGREEMENT WILL BE PUT IN WRITING, KEPT ON AN UNOFFICIAL AND CONFIDENTIAL BASIS, AND WILL BE ACKNOWLEDGED BY BOTH

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THIEU AND KY IN PRESENCE OF THE SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES COUNCIL.

3. THERE HAS BEEN A BROAD AND RATHER STRONG REACTION TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE THIEU-KY SLATE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY IN THE PAST TWO DAYS, AND MANY PEOPLE, INCLUDING THE "BABY-TURKS" MILITARY OFFICERS, HAVE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND AND ACCEPT THIS COMBINATION. QUITE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE HAVE STATED THEY FEEL THAT THIEU MAY BE AN ALBATROSS AS THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AND MAY MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE SLATE TO WIN DESPITE KY'S OWN CONSIDERABLE PERSONAL POPULARITY AND VOTER APPEAL. THERE IS ALSO THE DISTINCT PROBLEM OF THE GENERAL PERVERSITY OF THE VIETNAMESE, WHO IF FORCED TO ACCEPT SOMEONE THEY DO NOT FAVOR FOR PRESIDENT, SUCH AS THIEU, MAY CAST THEIR VOTES ELSEWHERE SIMPLY TO EXPRESS THEIR DISPLEASURE. KY'S PREVIOUSLY-ORGANIZED AND PERSONAL CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION HAS BEEN REQUESTING INSTRUCTIONS FROM KY; AND ITS UNITS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY ARE FINDING IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THIS SWITCH IN PLANS AND HAVE ASKED WHETHER THEY SHOULD CONTINUE PROMOTING KY FOR PRESIDENT DESPITE THE AGREEMENT REACHED

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FOR KY TO RUN AS VICE PRESIDENT. KY PLANS TO LET THE EXCITEMENT AND CONFUSION ABATE FOR A FEW MORE DAYS AND THEN INSTRUCT HIS SUPPORTERS EXPLICITLY TO WORK FOR THE THIEU-KY TICKET.

4. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR KY TO EXPLAIN HIS DECISION TO MOVE DOWN TO THE VICE PRESIDENCY, AND PARTICULARLY TO GET THE WORD TO HIS SUPPORTERS IN A SUBTLE FASHION THAT HE WILL HAVE A BROAD AUTHORITY IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND THAT THIEU'S ROLE WILL BE TITULAR. INFLUENTIAL VIETNAMESE, INCLUDING BUDDHIST LEADER THICH TAM CHAU, HAVE CONTACTED KY IN THE PAST TWO DAYS TO ASCERTAIN THE RATIONALE BEHIND HIS MOVE. ENLIGHTENING PEOPLE SUCH AS THIS AND LINING UP BROAD SUPPORT FOR THE NEW THIEU-KY TICKET WILL TAKE A GOOD DEAL OF PATIENCE AS WELL AS TIME. IF IT IS TO BE DISCREETLY DONE. GENERAL NGUYEN NGOC LOAN HAS EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF TO KY THAT THE LATTER MUST HAVE "LOST HIS MIND" ON THIS MOVE AND HAS SAID HE CANNOT UNDERSTAND HOW KY COULD "LET DOWN" HIS MANY SUPPORTERS WHO REALLY BELIEVE IN HIM AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND IN HIS QUALITIES OF LEADERSHIP. LOAN HAS ACCEPTED THIS TURN

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(classification) (dissem controls)

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OF EVENTS, HOWEVER, MUCH AS HE DID HIS OWN RECENT REMOVAL AS CHIEF OF THE MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE, AND LOAN WILL ABIDE BY A RECENT ORDER FROM KY THAT HE STAY OUT OF POLITICS AND ELECTION CAMPAIGN ARRANGEMENTS.

5. KY'S DECISION TO STEP DOWN TO THE ROLE OF VICE PRESIDENT WAS NOT A "POLITICAL" DECISION, IT WAS ARRIVED AT PRIMARILY TO SAVE A BAD SITUATION FROM GETTING WORSE WITHIN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT WHICH HAS BEEN DIVIDED OVER THE THIEU-KY CONFRONTATION. IT MAY DEVELOP HOWEVER, THAT IT WILL ADD TO KY'S POLITICAL STATURE AND INCREASE THE NUMBER OF HIS SUPPORTERS BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE MILITARY RANKS. THE ARMED FORCES COUNCIL (AFC) MEETINGS OF 29-30 JUNE WHICH RESULTED IN FORMATION OF THE THIEU-KY TICKET HAVE ALSO RESULTED IN A CONSIDERABLE LESSENING OF THIEU'S PERSONAL PRESTIGE AMONG ALMOST ALL THE AFC OFFICERS WHO HAD THIS OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE THIEU CLOSELY AT FIRST HAND DURING THESE MANY CRUCIAL HOURS. THESE OFFICERS GOT A CLEAR IMPRESSION OF HIS LACK OF REAL PATRIOTISM AND HIS TOTAL PREOCCUPATION WITH AND CONCENTRATION ON HIS OWN PERSONAL AMBITIONS, REGARDLESS OF THEIR DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON THE UNITY OF THE ARMED FORCES AND FUTURE OF THE COUNTRY.

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THE CLINCHER WAS THIEU'S APPARENT AGREEMENT TO ABIDE BY WHATEVER DECISION THE AFC REACHED, EVEN IF IT WAS WITHDRAWAL OF HIS OWN CANDIDACY, AND THIS HE RENEGED ON ONLY A FEW HOURS LATER DURING THE DISCUSSIONS. THIS AFFORDED THE AFC OFFICERS A REAL INSIGHT INTO THIEU'S CHARACTER, AND THEY DID NOT LIKE WHAT THEY SAW. CURIOUSLY, DURING THE LATE EVENING SESSION OF 29 JUNE, CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF (JGS) GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN AND THE FOUR CORPS COMMANDERS HAD CONFERRED PRIVATELY AND RESOLVED TO PRESENT THIEU WITH AN ULTIMATUM EITHER TO ACCEPT THE POSITION OF CHIEF OF THE JGS IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT, OR TO RESIGN AS CHIEF OF STATE AND FROM THE ARMED FORCES IMMEDIATELY, AND TO PRESENT HIMSELF ENTIRELY AS A CIVILIAN CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT. WHEN GENERAL VIEN CAME INTO THE ROOM TO PRESENT THIS ULTIMATUM TO THIEU, THE LATTER APPARENTLY SENSED THAT IT WAS COMINT, AND IMMEDIATELY ANNOUNCED HE WOULD ACCEPT AND ABIDE BY WHATEVER DECISION THE AFC WOULD REACH. VIEN AND THE CORPS COMMANDERS WERE THUS CLEVERLY LED TO BELIEVE THAT THEIU WOULD WITHDRAW ENTIRELY FROM THE RACE IN FAVOR OF KY, AND THEREFORE THEY DID NOT CONVEY

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THEIR ULTIMATUM TO THIEU. EARLY THE NEXT MORNING THIEU REVERSED HIMSELF COMPLETELY WITH HIS ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE WOULD ENTER THE RACE FOR PRESIDENT. THIS DUPLICITY, COUPLED WITH KY'S DEMONSTRATED WILLINGNESS TO SACRIFICE HIS OWN PERSONAL POSITION AND DO WHATEVER WAS REQUIRED OF HIM TO PRESERVE THE UNITY OF THE MILITARY, HAS CONSIDERABLY INCREASED KY'S SUPPORT AND INFLUENCE IN THE MILITARY. MANY OF THE SENIOR ARMED FORCES COUNCIL OFFICERS PERSONALLY MADE A POINT OF COMMENDING KY FOR HIS DECISION TO STEP DOWN TO THE ROLE OF VICE PRESIDENT, WHILE THIEU WAS LARGELY IGNORED EVEN THOUGH SELECTED AS THEIR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. GENERAL VINH LOC, II CORPS COMMANDER, FOR EXAMPLE, EXPRESSED HIS ADMIRATION FOR KY AS A MAN, INDICATING HE HAD NEVER BEFORE USED THE WORD "ADMIRE" TO DESCRIBE HIS FEELINGS FOR ANOTHER OFFICER, AND GENERAL MINH, ACTING COMMANDER OF THE AIR FORCE, STATED THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME HE PERSONALLY HAD FELT REAL ESTEEM FOR ONE OF HIS SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS.

6. KY'S PRESENT DILEMNA IS THAT ALL OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO GENERATE BROAD POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE THIEU-KY TICKET, SINCE IT REQUIRES SUCH A MENTAL

SHIFTING OF GEARS ON THE PART OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN WORKING IN HIS BEHALF AS A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AND WHO NOW HAVE TO BE PERSUADED THAT THEIR EFFORTS MUST BE REDIRECTED TO SUPPORT THIEU FOR PRESIDENT INSTEAD. KY'S CIVILIAN SUPPORTERS WILL HAVE TO BE PERSUADED OF THE WISDOM OF HIS MOVE, AND THE YOUNGER "BABY TURK" MILITARY WILL HAVE TO BE MADE TO UNDERSTAND THIS THIEU-KY COMBINATION IS A FACT OF LIFE THEY MUST LIVE WITH. WITHIN THE PAST TWO DAYS THERE HAVE ALREADY BEEN RUMORS OF COUP PLOTTING AMONG THE BABY TURK MILITARY. THERE IS NO SUBSTANCE TO THIS, BUT THIS SORT OF TALK DOES INDICATE HOW MUCH CONSTERNATION THERE IS AMONG SOME OF THE MILITARY OVER THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS. KY WILL WORK HARD AT THE TASK OF ELIMINATING THESE TENSIONS AND PERSUADING HIS SUPPORTERS TO GO ALONG WITH THE NEW ARRANGEMENT ON GROUNDS THAT THERE IS NO LEGAL ALTERNATIVE SINCE THE OFFICIAL FILING DEADLINE IS CLOSED.

7. THE MULTIPLICITY OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES (17) AND SENATE LISTS (66) SHOW QUITE CLEARLY THE DIFFICULTIES A PURELY CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION WOULD FACE IF ELECTED IN

VIETNAM. THE VARIOUS CIVILIAN POLITICAL GROUPS OR WOULD-BE GROUPS ARE POORLY ORGANIZED AND ARE SO SELF-SEEKING THAT THEY CANNOT GET TOGETHER EVEN TO INSURE THEIR OWN SUCCESS AT THE POLLS. THE MANY SENATE LISTS ARE INCOMPREHENSIBLE EVEN TO EDUCATED, INTELLIGENT VIETNAMESE, AND TO THE AVERAGE CITIZEN THEY ARE ALMOST USELESS AS A MEANINGFUL LIST FROM WHICH HE CAN SELECT OUR QUALIFIED CANDIDATES OF HIS CHOICE. CONSEQUENTLY, THE SENATE ITSELF WILL PROBABLY BE A DISORGANIZED AND INEFFECTUAL BODY. FOREIGN MINISTER TRAN VAN DO AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN LUU VIEN RECENTLY STATED TO KY THAT THEY NOW REALIZE THE FALLACY OF EXPECTING PURE UNLIMITED DEMOCRACY TO WORK IN TODAY'S VIETNAM, AND CITED THE MANY CUMBERSOME SENATE LISTS AS CASES IN POINT. ANOTHER INTERESTING PROBLEM IS HOW TO PROVIDE EQUAL FACILITIES SUCH AS AIRCRAFT, RADIO-TELEVISION AND NEWSPAPER COVERAGE FOR ALL OF THE 17 PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES. ALTHOUGH KY WILL ATTEMPT TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, IT WILL BE NEXT TO IMPOSSIBLE TO ARRANGE FROM A PRACTICAL POINT OF VIEW.

8. KY'S PERSONAL CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION WHICH HAS FORMED

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(classification) (dissem controls)

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TO PROMOTE HIS OWN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN WILL LIKELY BE USED TO SUPPORT THE THIEU KY SLATE SINCE THIEU HAS NO ORGANIZATION OF HIS OWN AND WILL PROBABLY NOT MAKE ANY CONCERTED EFFORT TO PUT ONE TOGETHER. ALTHOUGH THIS DECISION HAS NOT YET BEEN REACHED, FULL USE WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO BE MADE OF THE KY CAMPAIGN MECHANISM SINCE THE THIEU-KY COMBINATION WILL REQUIRE AN EVEN MORE EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION THAN IF KY HIMSELF WERE RUNNING FOR PRESIDENT.

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9 [redacted] DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR LOCKE, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND, GENERAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR KOMER, CHIEF OF STAFF, J-2) DIR/JUSPAO [redacted] CINCPAC (ADMIRAL SHARP AND POLAD)

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

[redacted] GROUP 1

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN 04183

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC	NIC USIA	NSA ONE	OCR ORR	SDO DCS	AID CGS
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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

050630Z CITE [redacted]

DIST 5 JULY 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

DOI 18-29 MAY 1967

SUBJ OBSERVATIONS IN HANOI IN LATE MAY 1967

ACQ [redacted]

SOURCE

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

1. (SUMMARY: IN LATE MAY 1967 TANKS WERE USED IN ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY POSITIONS IN THE HANOI AREA. PETROLEUM CANS WERE SEEN FREQUENTLY IN THE FREIGHT TRAINS. ALTHOUGH FOOD RATIONING CONTINUED, PRICES ON SOME ITEMS HAD BEEN REDUCED AND GOODS APPEARED PLENTIFUL.)

2, ABOUT 100 MEDIUM-SIZE TANKS SERVING AS ANTIAIRCRAFT EMPLACEMENTS WERE STATIONED ALONG THE BANK OF A LARGE

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RIVER NEAR THE STEEL RAILROAD SPAN OUTSIDE HANOI. EACH TANK PULLED AN ANTIAIRCRAFT GUN MOUNTED ON A WHEELED PLATFORM. IN ADDITION TO ITS OWN CANNON EACH TANK HAD A DOUBLE BARRELLED ANTIAIRCRAFT GUN PROTRUDING FROM THE TURRET OPENING.

3. MOVEMENT OF FREIGHT CARS IN HANOI INCREASED CONSIDERABLY SINCE LAST YEAR. IN ADDITION TO A LOCOMOTIVE IN FRONT EACH FREIGHT TRAIN HAD ANOTHER LOCOMOTIVE. PETROLEUM CARS WERE SEEN FREQUENTLY.

4. FOOD ITEMS WERE APPARENTLY PLENTIFUL AND PRICES ON GOODS AS A WHOLE SEEMED TO HAVE DECREASED. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PRICE OF RICE, WHICH WAS RATIONED, HAD BEEN REDUCED ABOUT TEN PER CENT. SIMILAR PRICE DECREASES WERE NOTED FOR SUCH ITEMS AS SOY SAUCE, MEDICAL GOODS AND BEAN MASH. DOMESTIC VACCINES FOR CHOLERA AND TYPHUS WERE BEING PRODUCED FOR USE IN THE NORTH AS WELL AS IN THE SOUTH.

5. DURING THE PERIOD 18-29 MAY NO BOMB DAMAGE WAS NOTED IN THE AREA OF HANOI GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS OR TO PRESIDENT HO CHI MIN'S QUARTERS. NOR WAS THERE EVIDENCE OF BOMBING AT AN

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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UNIDENTIFIED AIRFIELD NORTH OF HANOI WHERE THE FOLLOWING AIRCRAFT WERE SEEN: A TWIN ENGINE MILITARY PLANE, ABOUT 20 KHAKI-COLORED MILITARY HELICOPTERS AND FIVE OR SIX CIVILIAN CRAFT.

6. A FAIRLY LARGE SIZE AUTOMOBILE REPAIR PLANT SITUATED SOUTH OF THE FANCHIMU (PHONETIC) HOTEL APPEARED TO HAVE EVACUATED ITS MAJOR FACILITIES AND WAS CONCENTRATING PRIMARILY ON MINOR REPAIRS. TWO OTHER FACTORY BUILDINGS LOCATED SOUTH OF THE HOTEL HAD BEEN EVACUATED AND WERE VACANT.

7. CHINESE WERE SEEN IN VARIOUS PARTS OF HANOI. FIVE OR SIX HAD QUARTERS IN THE FANCHIMU HOTEL. THEY WOULD DEPART IN THE MORNING, RETURN AT NOON AND LEAVE LATE IN THE AFTERNOON FOR SOME UNKNOWN DESTINATION. THEIR MISSION IN HANOI WAS NOT KNOWN.

8. VIETNAMESE WORKERS WERE REPORTEDLY VOLUNTARILY RETURNING 20 PER CENT OF THEIR PAY TO THE GOVERNMENT, AND ALLEGEDLY PRODUCTION HAS GREATLY INCREASED IN RECENT MONTHS.

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

9. [redacted] DISSEM: CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC STATE ARMATT NAVATT AIRATT USFJ NSAPACJ COMNAVJ 5AF 6499SG 500MIG USARJ DET/4FID [redacted] GP-1

C O N F I D E N T I A L [redacted]

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

SECRET [redacted]

7 July 1967

SUBJECT: Further Comments Regarding Question of Damage to Dykes in North Vietnam

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

SOURCE: [redacted]

[redacted] no evidence to confirm the allegation made by the DRV Ministry of Water Conservancy on 4 July that the United States Air Force was intensifying strikes against dykes and irrigation works in twelve provinces. [redacted] personal observation and extensive inquiries, [redacted] have produced as confirmation of serious damage to the dykes or of flooding. [redacted] unable to visit the "dyke protecting Hanoi on the North" [redacted] this refers to the dyke North of the police post. [redacted] this dyke may be damaged and "rumor" confirms this.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: OCT 2000

SECRET

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: OCT 2000

REPORT CLASS SECRET [redacted]

[redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI 7 JULY 1967

SUBJECT OBSERVATIONS ON CONDITIONS IN HANOI AS OF 7 JULY.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

ACQ [redacted]

SOURCE

1. ON THE EVENING OF 7 JULY, MOST OF THE CITY OF HANOI WAS ILLUMINATED. SMALL SECTIONS OF THE WESTERN AND CENTRAL PART OF THE CITY WERE BLACKED OUT. AT GIA LAM AIRPORT, THE USUAL TWO FLOODLIGHTS WERE BEING EMPLOYED IN THE PARKING AREA. GIA LAM DISTRICT ITSELF WAS FULLY LIGHTED. THE PONT DES RAPIDES WAS NORMALLY LIGHTED.

2. ~~IT WAS RELIABLY REPORTED IN HANOI THAT THE CENTRAL THERMAL ELECTRIC PLANT APPEARED TO BE 90 PERCENT REPAIRED.~~ → THE AREAS

UNDERGOING REPAIR WERE WELL CAMOUFLAGED. WATER CONSUMPTION APPEARED NORMAL. HANOI OFFICIALS HAVE, HOWEVER, BECOME CONCERNED WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ABNORMAL PERIOD OF DROUGHT. THE LEVEL OF THE RED RIVER IS FROM TWO TO THREE METERS BELOW ITS USUAL LEVEL AND THERE IS CONCERN ABOUT HAVING SUFFICIENT WATER FOR THE FORTHCOMING RICE SEASON. HANOI OFFICIALS HAVE, IN FACT, ALREADY SERVED NOTICE THAT EMERGENCY MEASURES MIGHT BE NECESSARY TTCTRANSFER WATER FROM ONE RICE AREA TO ANOTHER BY A DIKE SYSTEM. SIGNS WERE OBSERVED IN TMB CITY DIRECTING INHABITANTS TO HELP EACH OTHER. THE CIVILIAN POPULATION WAS SHOWING LESS HOPE AND VITALITY, AND THIS WAS DEFINITELY RELATED TO THE 9 — 10 JUNE RAIDS ON THE CENTER OF HANOI, WHICH WERE A TRAUMATIC EXPERIENCE FOR THE HANOI POPULACE

3. TRANSPORT IN HANOI WAS NORMAL. TRAMWAYS WERE FUNCTIONING AND TRAFFIC WAS MOVING AT ITS NORMAL PACE. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF CONSTRUCTION WORK.

4. ON 7 JULY A HEAVY CONVOY WAS SIGHTED AT 1940 HOURS HANOI TIME, WHICH COINCIDED WITH THE ARRIVAL OF THE ICC PLANE. WHEN THE AIRCRAFT LEFT AT 2010 HOURS THE CONVOY HAD ALREADY MOVED INTO THE CITY OF HANOI.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

5. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR LOCKE, MR. CALHOUN) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND, GENERAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR KOMER, GENERAL KERWIN, GENERAL DAVIDSON) CINCPAC (ADMIRAL S ZRP AND POLAD) PACAF (GENERAL RYAN) PACFLT (ADMIRAL JOHNSON) ARPAC (GENERAL BEACH) 7TH AIR FORCE (GENERAL MOMYER)

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

[redacted] GROUP 1

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~S E C R E T~~

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NNNN

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY • ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable IN

STATE/INR DIA EXO NMCC/NC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SDO ONE ORR

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[redacted]

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CONFIDENTIAL

CITE [redacted]

DIST 7 JULY 1967

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI LATE MARCH 1967

SUBJECT REACTION OF RESIDENTS OF NORTH VIETNAM TO AMERICAN BOMBING

ACQ [redacted]

FIELD NO. EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

SOURCE

1. [redacted]

2. THE OTHER DAY, AT ABOUT ONE O'CLOCK IN THE AFTERNOON, THE AMERICAN BOMBERS ATTACKED THE DOWNTOWN AREA OF HAIPHONG. HOUSES NEAR THE CATHAY THEATER WERE HIT AND SOME PEOPLE WERE KILLED. EVEN SO, THE HEARTLESS AMERICAN DEVILS CANNOT FRIGHTEN THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM FOR THEIR CAUSE IS JUST. ON THE CONTRARY THIS BOMBING SHOWS THAT THE AMERICANS ARE FACED WITH FAILURE AND THEY ARE STRUGGLING FOR THEIR EXISTENCE. WE ARE SURE THAT WE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM WILL WIN

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

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CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

(classification) (dissem. controls)

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DATE: OCT 2000

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]
(classification) (dissem. controls)

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

THE WAR IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE AND WILL LIBERATE SOUTH VIETNAM AND UNIFY OUR ENTIRE COUNTRY.

3. [redacted]

4. [redacted] DISSEM. CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF [redacted]

[redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

5 4 3 2 1

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]
(classification) (dissem. controls)

5 4 3 2 1

NLJ 019-018-002/4

SECRET [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

DOI: 7 July 1967

[redacted] the Stockholm World Conference on Vietnam, by comparison with the NLF representatives, the two DRV representatives were skin and bones. One of those, DO Xuan Oanh, a member of the North Vietnam Peace Committee [redacted] [redacted] said that there was adequate food in Hanoi but that bombing and consequent removal of offices from Hanoi caused loss of sleep. Persons allowed return Hanoi once per week. Diesel generators from Russians which provided each village have greatly eased electricity problems caused by bombings of power stations. Do stated North Viet Peace Council has lost two secretaries in single month due bombing. Added that they have suffered much but that suffering only strengthened their resolve. Latter remark made in presence of Nguyen Minh Vy, who is Do's superior.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted] the Vietnam Conference in Stockholm, the speeches of both the DRV and NLF delegates at the opening session were extremely hard line. They held out no prospects for a soft line. This appeared to shock many of the participants. Isabella Blume was heard to say that if the line is to be so hard, the conference will get nowhere. Evgini Fedorov, Chief of the Soviet delegation looked glum and unhappy during the Vietnamese speeches.

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DATE: OCT 2000

Positions were straight party line, stressing North Vietnam has nothing to reciprocate from American cessation bombing or troop cut back/withdrawal. North Vietnam rep and Fedorov exhibited concern over alledged plan bomb dykes. Fedorov speech, at least by comparison, soft and hopeful.

NLJ. 019.028.002/2

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• PRIORITY

IN 07284

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF, JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA ONE OCR EDD

DD/I EXO

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[redacted]

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S-E-C-R-E-T 081318Z CITE [redacted] EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

DIST 8 JULY 1967

COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM

DOI: MAY AND JUNE 1967

SUBJECT: ATTITUDE OF NORTH VIETNAM AND VIET CONG LEADERS AND PEOPLE TOWARD WAR

DRV-1 Collection

ACQ: [redacted]

SOURCE:

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

1. [redacted] EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

S-E-C-R-E-T [redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: OCT 2000

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

S-E-C-R-E-T
(classification)

[redacted] DONG IS FED-UP WITH THE WAR. HO CHI MINH, HOWEVER, DOES NOT SHARE THIS FEELING; HO HAS HIS HEAD IN THE CLOUDS AND IS OUT OF TOUCH WITH THE REALITY OF THE WAR.

E0 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

2. [redacted] THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WHO DO MOST OF THE FIGHTING IN THE WAR ARE BETWEEN THE AGES OF FIFTEEN AND TWENTY-FIVE. THEY HAVE NEVER KNOWN ANYTHING BUT WAR AND THEY ARE PSYCHOLOGICALLY CONDITIONED TO BELIEVE THAT THE ONLY END THE WAR CAN HAVE IS VICTORY FOR THEIR SIDE.

E0 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

3. IN DISCUSSING AN EXTREMELY HARD-LINE SPEECH CONCERNING THE WAR IN VIETNAM WHICH WAS MADE BY DINH BA THI, CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NLF) MISSION IN BUDAPEST AND HEAD OF THE NLF DELEGATION TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, [redacted] THI HAS BEEN IN BUDAPEST FOR TWO YEARS WITHOUT RETURNING TO HANOI. AS A RESULT OF THIS, THI HAD NOT SHARED THE HARDSHIPS OF THE PEOPLE LIVING IN NORTH VIETNAM AND CONCEIVES THAT THE PEOPLE CAN ENDURE THESE HARDSHIPS INDEFINITELY. [redacted] "IT IS EASY TO TAKE A HARD LINE ON THE WAR

E0 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

S-E-C-R-E-T [redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

S-E-C-R-E-T [redacted]
(declassification) (dissem controls)

WHEN LIVING IN BUDAPEST."

4. [redacted] THE SPEECH THI DELIVERED AT THE CONFERENCE WAS SOFTER THAN THE ONE HE ORIGINALLY SUBMITTED [redacted] THI THEN DECIDED NO NLF DELEGATION WOULD ATTEND THE CONFERENCE. HE SUBSEQUENTLY RELENTED AND AGREED TO ATTEND AS AN OBSERVER ONLY. [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

5. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE REPORT CLASS SECRET [redacted]

S-E-C-R-E-T

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

~~SECRET~~

July 10, 1967

(copy of Intelligence Information Cable [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Country: North Vietnam

Subject: Conditions in Hanoi

Source: [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

1. This is the hot season in Hanoi and there is also a drought which broke on the night of 8-9 July. There was no evidence to confirm the allegation made by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) Ministry of Water Conservancy on 4 July that the United States Air Force was intensifying strikes against dikes and irrigation works. [redacted] confirmation of serious damage to the dikes or of flooding.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Electric power in Hanoi has been cut by districts about three times a week, except for that used by key enterprises, in order that irrigation works could be supplied. An increasing number of generators have relieved the power station. Water functions generally and is working better than it was in May, although emergency wells are widespread. Bus, tram and railway services are crowded but adequate.

2. The morale of the working population is now cheerful and relaxed. Women, babies and old people suffer but are powerless to do anything.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted] this adaptable, disciplined peasant people will not act differently from those in other towns of North Vietnam already ruined.) Food is tight but it is not at sub-nutrition level. Military and other stores arrived through Communist China at least until 2 July, including 13 heavy AA guns with crews. Six guns were being towed by tracked vehicles from the railroad station on the night of 8-9 July.)

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

3. [redacted] the government [redacted] still shaken by the Soviet attitude in the Middle East crisis. [redacted] there was a vague rumor that the government party was seriously split while the Middle East crisis was going on, but the specific personalities or issues involved could not be identified.)

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

4. [redacted]

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DATE: OCT 2000

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

4. Ho Chi Minh, President of the DRV, did not appear for the May Day celebrations, nor did he appear for the 19 May celebration of his own birthday. For the latter, there was a photograph of him in the newspaper dressed in winter clothing.

File
3

Secret

#7-BKS
#25-

Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 94-28
Document # 3

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

Problems Posed for North Vietnam by Death of Politburo Member Nguyen Chi Thanh

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JAN 2001

Secret

26

11 July 1967
No. 1365/67

WARNING

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GROUP 1
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DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
11 July 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Problems Posed for North Vietnam by the Death of Politburo Member Nguyen Chi Thanh

Summary

Nguyen Chi Thanh's death of a heart attack in Hanoi on 6 July poses two immediate and important problems for the remaining ten members of the politburo and could have certain longer range and deep ramifications for the party leadership. The most immediate problems facing the Hanoi leaders are the questions of replacing Thanh both as head of the Communist apparatus in South Vietnam and as a full member of the politburo. Choosing a replacement for Thanh in each of these positions could occasion considerable maneuvering within the politburo between the militants and the slightly more moderate elements of that body. The militants, led by party first secretary Le Duan, will probably try to appoint one of their own men to fill Thanh's shoes. The moderates, led by Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap, may well try to replace him with one of their men or at least to divide Thanh's many responsibilities among several candidates, thus cutting back on militant strength.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence.

SECRET

Nguyen Chi Thanh's Background

1. Nguyen Chi Thanh's combined military background and political experience will make him difficult to replace. He was the only individual besides General Vo Nguyen Giap to hold the rank of senior general in the armed forces, and he was a leading member of the militant wing of the North Vietnamese politburo. He also held a key post on the party secretariat which is responsible for the implementation of party policies. As a member of the Party Military Committee, he also had a voice in running the armed forces. Since early 1965 Thanh had been the number one man at the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), the political and military headquarters for the Communist insurgency in South Vietnam.

2. During his two-and-a-half year tour in South Vietnam, Thanh is believed to have held decision-making authority in both the planning and implementation of the strategy and deployment of Communist forces, subject only to review by the full politburo in Hanoi. Thanh's assignment to COSVN in early 1965 was probably prompted by Communist optimism that one final military push against ARVN forces would bring their revolution to a successful conclusion. The leadership in Hanoi wanted a man on the spot who could pull off this military victory and also speak with the authority of the politburo on subsequent political developments.

3. Thanh was apparently hand picked for this job by party first secretary Le Duan--the principal architect of revolutionary strategy in the South. Thanh had the political rank to assume direction of this operation; he had extensive experience in military affairs as the former head of the political department of the army, he held the highest military rank the country could give, and he was philosophically in tune with Le Duan's choice of militant and aggressive solutions to important problems.

4. Shortly after Thanh's arrival in South Vietman he was faced with the necessity of developing both strategy and tactics to deal with the rapid introduction of US combat forces. Thanh believed that

the Communists could sustain the momentum they had built up against ARVN and that the Communists could continue to launch large-scale attacks against US forces. He argued that the US hoped to force the Communists to abandon mobile warfare tactics and to return to guerrilla warfare.

5. Thanh's views did not go unopposed. Opposition apparently came from both old-time Viet Cong guerrilla leaders and from members of the regular military establishment in the North, presumably led by Defense Minister Giap. These men argued for more emphasis on the guerrillas to tie down and disperse the US forces. Thanh's opponents saw his approach as putting too great a strain on manpower resources in the South. They complained that he robbed guerrilla units of manpower in order to bolster main force strength quickly. Thanh's call for the infiltration of large numbers of regular units from North Vietnam also placed considerable strain on manpower and training resources in the North.

6. Thanh was given the forces he asked for in 1965 and early 1966, but the inability of these forces successfully to maintain the initiative against heavy US fire power and mobility seriously undercut his thesis. By the fall of 1966, Vietnamese Communist commentary on the proper conduct of the war emphasized the importance of guerrilla tactics and urged a more balanced use of main forces and guerrillas in the war with the US--an apparent compromise between Thanh and his opponents. Thanh remained commander of the Communist forces in South Vietnam and as late as 31 May 1967 he published an authoritative commentary on the war in the South.

Replacing Thanh in South Vietnam

7. If the politburo wants to replace Thanh with someone of nearly comparable status, only a few men would appear to be likely candidates. Le Duc Tho, the sixth ranking member of the politburo, is a former deputy commander of Viet Cong forces, serving under Le Duan in the war against France. For the last ten years or more he has been holding the important post of chief of the Party Organization

Department, which controls the party in South Vietnam as well as in the North. He was chosen to head the funeral committee for Nguyen Chi Thanh and is known to be a hardliner and close to Le Duan.

8. Another possible candidate, because of his former experience in the South, is Pham Hung, a Viet Cong leader who came north around 1954. He is the number five man on the politburo. Since his return north, however, Hung has devoted his primary and almost exclusive attention to the fiscal management of the DRV economy and is regarded as a follower of Phan Van Dong rather than of Le Duan. General Van Tien Dung, chief of staff of the North Vietnamese Army, is an alternate member of the politburo and also served in South Vietnam previously. As such he might make a good choice to replace Thanh at COSVN.

An Opening in the Politburo

9. Thanh's death not only poses a problem in relation to the top spot in South Vietnam, it also raises the question of replacing him on the politburo. This is the first time since at least 1960 that an opening has occurred in the governing body of the party. Thanh's career over the past ten years was very closely tied to Le Duan--number two man in the party and leader of the more militant element in the North Vietnamese leadership. Nguyen Chi Thanh's promotion to senior general occurred in the late 1950s shortly after Le Duan moved into the number two position in the party. Thanh was removed as head of the army's political department in 1961--apparently after significant differences with Defense Minister Giap. Giap argued for the development of a professional military but Thanh pushed for the use of the army as a political and economic force to promote social reform, particularly in agriculture. This argument was ultimately resolved in Giap's favor, at least insofar as Thanh was removed as head of the army's political department. Thanh re-emerged two years later into the mainstream of party affairs to provide the cutting edge for one of Le Duan's policies--a shift away from traditional North Vietnamese neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute toward support

of Peking. Although almost all of the politburo eventually and apparently with some reluctance endorsed this move publicly, Nguyen Chi Thanh was the first and most outspoken to use Chinese-style invectives in criticizing the Soviet "revisionists."

10. The kinds of differences which have separated Giap and Nguyen Chi Thanh over the years are believed to reflect fundamental differences within the entire North Vietnamese politburo. Thanh's death could compound those differences. If the leadership intends to replace him immediately, General Giap and those who think like him will most certainly urge a replacement more in tune with their more moderate and pragmatic philosophy. Premier Pham Van Dong is the leading spokesman for the moderates and over the past two years has appeared to have gained considerable power at the expense of Le Duan. Le Duan, on the other hand, holds the powerful post of party first secretary and he will be eager to replace Thanh with another militant on whom he can count for strong support.

11. If Thanh is not immediately replaced, his loss could affect the relatively even balance in the politburo. With Thanh alive, the 11-man politburo was probably divided evenly along militant/moderate lines with five militants, five moderates, and Ho Chi Minh standing above both groups as final arbiter. Although not all issues find the politburo divided clearly along militant/moderate lines, such a division is believed to be characteristic of many of the important decisions that the leadership has made in pursuing its national objectives.

12. The politburo could be expanded by the addition of one or several members. Alternate politburo member Van Tien Dung is the most likely candidate to be elevated to full politburo status. General Dung, however, is regarded as a Giap man, and his status as a professional military man might work against him. The party would not want to weight the politburo too heavily with military members.

13. Several other central committee members present themselves as likely candidates for politburo membership by virtue of their active and prominent roles in party affairs. To Huu is a possibility because of his position on the party secretariat. He would probably satisfy Le Duan's requirements for a hardliner. Xuan Thuy, the director of the party's foreign relations department, although removed as minister of foreign affairs a few years ago for reasons of health, has become extremely active in foreigh affairs again and could be considered politburo material. He has appeared to take a hard line in the past on relations with the Soviet Union, but as foreign minister he was also close to Pham Van Dong, suggesting that he might make a good compromise candidate.

Prospects

14. A possible solution for the replacement of Thanh would be to divide up his several responsibilities among both militants and moderates. This is the kind of solution which might appeal to Ho Chi Minh, who likes to keep a balance between the two wings of the party. Such a solution might also appeal to the moderates who would see it as cutting down militant strength to some extent. There is currently some question, however, as to Ho's health and his ability to deal effectively with major problems. Ho has only made two public appearances since 15 March, once in late April for a local election and again on 7 July for Nguyen Chi Thanh's funeral. Several recent travelers to Hanoi have been told that Ho is ill and cannot receive visitors.

15. Ho's illness may be only temporary. If, however, he should become incapacitated and unable to carry the weight of arbitrating between the competing elements in the party leadership, a struggle for power might well ensue. The two major contenders for power would probably be Pham Van Dong and Le Duan. There have been some indications over the past two years that these two men hold differing views on the proper tactics to be used in regard to the war, although both men appear to share the same goal, eventual control of South Vietnam. Pham Van Dong appears

to have greater confidence than Le Duan in the use of negotiations as a tactic in gaining control over the South whereas Le Duan seems to put more stock in the purely military aspect of the struggle. The man or men chosen to replace Nguyen Chi Thanh may provide some hint as to the relative strengths of the two men and their supporters.

CONFIDENTIAL Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 94-28
Document # 1

NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF VAN TIEN DUNG ON DRV MILITARY STRATEGY

An article by North Vietnamese Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Van Tien Dung, published in the June magazine of the DRV army organ QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, presents an analysis of the air-defense war which is notable for its directness and detail. Dung echoes his past articles in vigorously defending Vietnamese "people's war" tactics. He describes foreign assistance as "very important" and says it has never been so great, but he argues forcefully against uncritical acceptance of foreign military doctrine or dependence on modern weapons alone. The article is generally consistent with positions Dung has taken before on foreign aid, modern weapons, and indigenous military theory; what prompted the exposition of his views at this time and, specifically, what bearing the article may have on developments in DRV relations with the Soviet Union are left unclear.

Dung's article is also notable for its emphasis on the close link between the war in the North and the war in the South. Dung insists that the "war of destruction" against the North will end only after the "war of aggression" in South Vietnam is completely defeated--a thesis only rarely voiced by DRV leaders in the past. Dung's stress on this point now raises questions about his attitude toward DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's suggestion last January that U.S.-DRV talks might follow a halt in the bombing.

Hanoi media gave Dung's article extensive publicity, broadcasting it in installments in the domestic service from 13 to 16 June. NHAN DAN published it on the 15th and 16th, and the VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY transmitted it on 28 and 29 June. Prior articles by Dung publicized in Hanoi media since September 1964 are listed in the appendix to this report.

CALL FOR BASIC RELIANCE ON PEOPLE'S WAR, BACKED BY BLOC AID

In his latest article Dung repeats the standard DRV position that North Vietnam must rely mainly on its own strength in the war, while at the same time "striving to struggle for international assistance." The DRV's response to U.S. air attacks, according to Dung, has been based on the traditional Vietnamese strategy

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DATE: JAN 2001

of people's war. He maintains that the party's "creative application" of people's war in the new circumstances of the "war of destruction" has not only marked an advance in the party's theory of people's war but has also "brought some sharp changes in current military theory applied by many developed countries of the world today--especially the theory concerning the role of an air force, missiles, and various means and methods against modern weapons and means."

Dung asserts that while "reality has shown that we must and can, to a limited extent, equip our people's armed forces with modern weapons and means such as jet aircraft and missiles," at the same time it has also demonstrated that "jet aircraft and missiles are not omnipotent" or suitable to all conditions. Therefore, he says, the party has not just built up its air force and missile units but has developed air-defense artillery of all sizes and has enhanced the effectiveness of infantry arms to cope with U.S. planes. He adds polemically that "this is not an unusual phenomenon, but for some time and even today it has caused great surprise to many military theoreticians who have blindly revered modern weapons and techniques."

Dung claims not only that the DRV has developed an original strategy of air defense, but that the DRV armed forces have created "efficient, clever, and versatile" combat methods and tactics. "Even our air force and missile units," he says, "can creatively develop our original Vietnamese combat methods which are suitable to Vietnamese conditions and are not dogmatic and imitative." Dung does acknowledge that the armed forces have "learned the techniques and experience of the fraternal countries," and he says "we must study and grasp some scientific and technical knowledge to be able to properly use the new weapons and methods." But he argues that "the basic problem deciding the success of air defense lies first of all in the thorough understanding and execution of the party's guideline on the direction of people's war with a view to creating original offensive and defensive methods for our air-defense forces."

A 19 December 1964 NHAN DAN article had contained one of Dung's most extensive defenses of traditional Vietnamese military doctrine against unnamed domestic and foreign opponents who, he argued, put undue emphasis on the DRV's need for modern weapons. In the 1964 article Dung pointed out the need to modernize the DRV armed forces, but his main quarrel was with those who "advocate purely military and technical actions, praise modern techniques and weaponry, and reduce the importance of the political factor, the

morale factor, and the masses." He was particularly critical of those who rejected Vietnamese experience and sought guidance from foreign military doctrines.

In his 1964 article--written prior to the air war and the inception of large-scale bloc military aid--Dung expressed much stronger opposition than he does in his more recent writings to reliance on foreign countries for weapons as well as strategy. Rather than acknowledging, as he does now in effect, that socialist countries will help supply necessary modern arms, in 1964 he advocated reliance on the DRV economy "to solve the problems of weaponry and armaments for our army." He explained that "with the spirit of self-reliance and self-sufficiency, and with the help of socialist countries, we are gradually realizing the socialist industrialization of our country in North Vietnam" and that "our industry will create the conditions under which it can supply and modernize our army."

Dung's December 1964 article seemed pointed at the Soviets, appearing a month after Pham Van Dong's visit to Moscow to meet the new Soviet leaders and two months before Kosygin's visit to Hanoi for talks on Soviet-DRV relations and Soviet assistance. But he also directly reprimanded Vietnamese "comrades" who "follow the fighting techniques of an army which is well equipped with modern weapons" and who are therefore "busy with calculations of how to fire a gun, how to calculate the force of a main army in the confrontation with another main army, and so forth." He condemned them for "failing to see the realistic economic, topographical, material, and technical factors in using weapons and armaments of our own army and forces" and for "wanting to use the fighting standards of a foreign regular army and apply them to our army, and hence neglecting our own precious experiences of the past and the present in South Vietnam." While admonishing that "we should learn from the experiences of our fraternal armies," Dung said the learning should be "selective."

In the more than two years since the start of the U.S. air strikes at the DRV, Dung has--though with less candor and less polemically than in his latest article--discussed the question of the role of modern weapons and laid claim to the use of "unique" Vietnamese air defenses. For example, in a 5-6 August 1965 NHAN DAN article he reasoned as follows in explaining why a relatively weak North Vietnam was able to "defeat" the United States' modern tactics and technical means:

> Our armed forces and people have heightened the absolute revolutionary spirit and have used the collective strength and collective intelligence to discover and apply the highly skillful, creative, and clever tactics that are unique to Vietnam. These tactics rely on the strength of the combative spirit and have fully used and developed to a high degree all kinds of our weapons and means to limit the strong point and exploit the weak point of aircraft, warships, and various kinds of modern techniques, such as the U.S. Air Force's guided missiles.

In an article in the February 1966 HOC TAP Dung also alluded briefly to the dangers of dogmatism in military doctrine, declaring that "it is necessary to base oneself continuously on the principle of using a weak force to defeat a stronger one and to overcome all tendencies to rely on weapons, to use a strong force to strike at a strong force, and to apply fighting techniques mechanically and dogmatically." In the same article Dung compared the party's "military science of people's war" with the United State's "rotten bourgeois military art" and claimed that it was the "science" of people's war which allowed DRV pilots with no previous combat experience to down U.S. planes and helped the militia shoot down U.S. jets with rifles.

ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. WAR AGAINST THE NORTH

Maintaining that successful prosecution of the war depends upon a correct understanding of the enemy's plans and capabilities, Dung proceeds to discuss the U.S. position in some detail. In general terms, he says that since the United States is fighting an "unjust" war against an independent country belonging to the socialist camp, it has become "politically isolated" and has been forced to limit its military actions and to resort to "deceptive political and diplomatic tricks." In fact, he says, the "basic weakness" of the U.S. Air Force is its inability to "freely develop its strength," which is "restricted" by the political isolation of the United States. While Dung does not spell out the view that the United States is inhibited by the power of the bloc, he suggests this in stating that "the present balance of the international forces" is one of the factors forcing the U.S. Air Force to "escalate step by step" and preventing it from "attacking the North massively and swiftly through strategic, large-scale, and surprise bombing."

Dung also cites the DRV's "strong resistance" and alleged limitations on the U.S. military capacity as factors inhibiting the U.S. air war. He repeats the optimistic view, periodically expressed in DRV statements, that the number of U.S. aircraft is "limited, aircraft losses have surpassed productive capacity, ...the number of bombs and shells is insufficient, ...professional pilots have gradually been lost and the shortage of pilots has become serious, and, in particular, the U.S. Navy has to employ the pilots of the U.S. strategic defense forces... ."

Dung had addressed himself to similar questions in his August 1965 NHAN DAN article and concluded, among other things, that

> the U.S. imperialists have the habit of boasting that they are rich in money, weapons, ammunition, and planes. But their Strategic Air Force is limited. The U.S. imperialists' losses in planes and pilots have reflected their heavy defeat in the military field.

LINK BETWEEN THE WARS IN THE NORTH AND IN THE SOUTH

In his latest article, Dung says more explicitly than he has in previous writings that there will be no end to the air strikes against the North until after the United States is completely defeated in the South.* Since the "enemy" has not "resigned himself to being defeated in the South," the argument runs, "he certainly does not yet renounce his plots and acts of destroying the North." Dung's past writings have reflected the view that the war in the South governs the course of U.S. actions against North Vietnam and have conveyed strong opposition to any tendency to divorce the two conflicts. In his article published in NHAN DAN 5-6 August 1965, Dung said that along with fighting in the North, "wholehearted support" should be given to the South and that the defeat of the United States and "liberation of South Vietnam" would bring about the defeat of the U.S. war against the North.

Dung maintains in his latest article that the problem of insuring communications and transportation is the "central task" of all the

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* This position has rarely been spelled out by DRV leaders. It was, however, taken by DRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap in an article for the October 1965 issue of the party journal TUYEN HUAN (PROPAGANDA AND TRAINING), as well as by Hong Chuong, editor of the party theoretical journal HOC TAP, in a September 1965 HOC TAP article.

party and people. And he claims that "in defiance of enemy attacks, we have considerably increased the assistance of the great rear to the great front... ." North Vietnamese spokesmen rarely claim so directly that the DRV is increasing assistance to the South. For example, an article under the pseudonym Truong Son, also published in the June 1967 QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine, attributed to Western news reports the statement that North Vietnam was giving "greater and more effective assistance" to the South. And an 18 April 1967 Lao Dong Central Committee circular for May Day, published in NHAN DAN on 23 April and carried by VNA on the 28th, said somewhat ambiguously that "in North Vietnam the armed forces and people are... increasing their economic and national defense potential to defeat the U.S. war of destruction, and at the same time are making every effort to increase the forces for the South Vietnam revolution."

In his 19 December 1964 NHAN DAN article, Dung had attacked opponents who he apparently believed were too concerned with the safety of the North and who may have counseled against too great involvement in the South. Dung declared then that

> we oppose those who want peace but who refuse to countenance war; those who only consider the situation of North Vietnam without considering South Vietnam, too; those who only see the rear without seeing the front also; and those who only pay attention to building up and training the army without grasping the notion that the army must be ready for combat and must also fight hard. We should criticize and overcome attitudes which reflect pacifism and relaxation in combat determination and readiness and vigilance.

ATTACK ON "PEACE ILLUSIONS," FORECASTS OF MILITARY VICTORY

Dung's stress on the notion that the "war of destruction" will end only when the Americans are defeated in the South seems incompatible with the 28 January suggestion by DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, in his response to a question from Australian journalist Wilfred Burchett, that U.S.-DRV talks might follow an unconditional halt in the U.S. air strikes against the North. Dung says "we must never slacken our vigilance, we must combat all illusions and tendencies toward taking temporary action and adopting a wait-and-see attitude, and we must protect and strengthen our forces...in order to conduct a protracted fight." In a preceding passage, Dung says that "recently the enemy at times has de-escalated, and in the future he may at times de-escalate, and he has also stopped

bombing at various periods." And he goes on to claim that the "enemy," because of his military setbacks, was forced "to conduct psychological warfare and to spread the illusion about peaceful negotiations."

Dung's remarks may simply reflect a difference in emphasis, deriving from his role as a military leader, rather than indicating opposition to Foreign Minister Trinh's suggestion. It could be argued that Trinh's proposal was merely a gesture aimed at world public opinion and that the DRV leadership was in basic agreement in assuming that the United States would not stop bombing the DRV while the war continues on its present course in the South. But the thrust of Dung's remarks seem polemical; and it should be noted that his writings have consistently warned against "illusions" about negotiations and have stressed, more than is usual in DRV statements, that a military victory over the United States is possible. One of Dung's bitterest attacks on the idea of negotiations was in his August 1965 NHAN DAN article:

> U.S. military activities can intimidate only chicken-hearted people. Their "good will for peace" can deceive only those who do not have a revolutionary spirit or have a semirevolutionary spirit, but cannot deceive and intimidate our people who know too well the intimate thoughts of the imperialists and who have gloriously defeated any aggressor. At this time, to let ourselves be trapped by the "peace negotiations" of the Americans is to let them continue to massacre our people, partition our country forever, and prepare for further enlarging the war.

While this statement does not rule out negotiations at some later date, subsequent articles by Dung seem in effect to foreclose the possibility of a negotiated settlement at any time by stressing that the communists can win a military victory in South Vietnam. This view had been expounded by Dung in an article in the 17 March 1966 QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, broadcast in the domestic service on 20 March and belatedly transmitted by VNA on 21 May. Dung contended in that article that the South Vietnamese "army and people" had created "dependable conditions" which would "lead to a military victory...under any circumstances." The article was devoted to an analysis of the balance of forces in Vietnam contrived to prove this point, and it concluded that confidence in Vietnamese ability to defeat the United States both militarily and politically "is firmly based on scientic knowledge and has been confirmed by facts."

Dung expressed similar views in an article in the party journal HOC TAP in April of this year. Asking rhetorically whether the Vietnamese "people" would defeat the United States militarily, Dung stated that "the military victories of the people's war in the South and throughout the country have made it unmistakably clear that in Vietnam the U.S. imperialists have sustained and are sustaining heavy military defeats and will surely face complete defeat." He added that the Vietnamese experience demonstrated a "truth of our era": that a small nation "is fully able to defeat U.S. imperialism militarily... ."

Dung's insistence that air strikes will end only with a U.S. defeat in the South comes against the background of periodic repetitions in Hanoi propaganda of the Trinh formula linking a cessation of bombing with possible U.S.-DRV talks. The formula appeared most recently in VNA's 6 June account of a 29 May Trinh interview with Japanese journalists.* Most notably, the editorial in the April HOC TAP--on the occasion of the second anniversary of the DRV's four points--quoted Trinh's statement and declared that it "clearly repeated the unchanged stand of our government and people and reflected our government's good will for peace." An article by Trinh in the same issue of the journal did not directly spell out the substance of his January remark, but Trinh complained that the United States was calling for reciprocal action before it would agree to stop bombing, despite the fact that "on 28 January we pointed out once again our extremely correct stand and attitude." Trinh's remarks in the HOC TAP article on the efficacy of negotiations under proper circumstances stand in sharp contrast to Dung's stress on a military victory. Trinh wrote:

> When the time and place for peace negotiations are right, the revolutionary vanguard must weigh and skillfully coordinate various aspects of the struggle for peace. As Lenin taught us, it is necessary to have a clearsighted patience and to be extremely objective, to ponder many factors at home and in the world, and, at the same time to take into account also the experience acquired by various revolutionary movements.

Dung's statement in his latest article that "the military, political, and diplomatic offensives of the people's war in both parts of

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* DRV media have not mentioned an interview with a correspondent of the Austrian CP organ VOLKSSTIMME, published in the 2 July issue of that paper, in which Trinh is reported to have recalled the formula.

our country are coordinated more and more smoothly and closely, and have developed vigorously," seems noteworthy in the light of differing treatments of Trinh's January formula in North and South Vietnamese communist media. The South Vietnam Liberation Front did not acknowledge the substance of Trinh's proposal. On 31 January VNA carried a LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY interview with Vice Chairman of the NFLSV Central Committee Presidium Huynh Tan Phat in which Phat purported to support Trinh's statements but in fact completely ignored the exchange on U.S.-DRV talks. The only known appearance in Front propaganda of the formula linking DRV-U.S. talks with the unconditional cessation of the air strikes was in Liberation Radio's broadcast of the text of Ho Chi Minh's February letter to President Johnson. Front comment on Ho's letter did not raise the question of negotiations.

A P P E N D I X

ARTICLES BY GEN. VAN TIEN DUNG PUBLICIZED BY HANOI SINCE SEPTEMBER 1964

Column two indicates those DRV media which are known to have carried the articles; it cannot be taken as an exhaustive listing of all media in which every article appeared. The references to "radio" indicate dissemination by the Hanoi radio in Vietnamese.

TITLE	MEDIA	AVAILABLE TRANSLATION
1967		
"Some Great Experiences of the People's War Defeating the U.S. Imperialists' War of Destruction"	QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine, June radio, 13-16 June; NHAN DAN, 15-16 June; VNA, 28-29 June	FBIS Daily Report, 16, 20, 22 June
"Being Greatly Victorious in the Military Field, the Southern Armed Forces and People Will Surely Defeat the U.S. Imperialists' Aggressive War"	HOC TAP, April radio, 13-14 April; VNA, 18 April; NHAN DAN, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN	FBIS Daily Report, 19 April
1966		
"We Shall Certainly Win" [on the alleged downing of the 1000th U.S. plane]	NHAN DAN, 3 May VNA, 7 May	FBIS Daily Report, 9 May
"Having Been Defeated Politically, the U.S. Imperialists are Being Defeated Militarily in South Vietnam"	QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 17 March radio, 20 March; VNA, 21 May	FBIS Daily Report, 5 April and 23 May

TITLE	MEDIA	AVAILABLE TRANSLATION
1966 (continued)		
"Our Armed Forces and People Have Won, Are Winning, and Will Surely and Completely Win Over the U.S. Aggressors"	HOC TAP, February	FBIS Daily Report, 15 March
1965		
"Apply Principles of Combat leadership and Settle the Relationship Between the Demand For Annihilation of the Enemy and Protection of Our Positions and the Demand for Maintenance and Improvement of Our Forces"	QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 15 December	JPRS 34052, 8 February 1966
"We Are Determined to Defeat the War of Destruction of the U.S. Imperialists"	QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine, August NHAN DAN, 5-6 August	FBIS Daily Report, 17 September
"Thoroughly Understand the People's War Line of the Party in Order to be Determined to Defeat the U.S. Imperialist Aggressors"	HOC TAP, August	JPRS 32202, 30 September
"Let Us Fulfill the Task in 1965 of Consolidating Our Militia and Self-defense Corps and Building a Reserve Force"	QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 23 January	JPRS 29025, 8 March
1964		
"Adhere to the Party's Viewpoint in Buildup and Combat Readiness of the Armed Forces"	NHAN DAN, 19 December	JPRS 28472, 26 January 1965
"Discussion of Experiences in Building the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Our Party"	HOC TAP, September	FBIS Daily Report, 16 October

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

2-1796

[redacted]

COUNTRY South Vietnam

SUBJECT Viet Cong Prison System in Binh Long Province

REPORT NO. CS-311/07913-67

DATE DISTR. 21 July 1967

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES RD

DATE OF INFO. 30 December 1965-17 April 1967

PLACE & DATE ACQ. (Vietnam, Bien Hoa (29 June 1967))

[redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: [redacted]

1. Summary: During the period 30 December 1965-17 April 1967, the Viet Cong (VC) in Binh Long Province had five prison camps known as B5, B4, B3, B2 and B1. The first camp, B5, appeared to be a holding area where a prisoner's disposition was decided. In camps B4 and B3, interrogations were conducted. At B2, the final decision was made as to whether a prisoner was to be executed or released. A prisoner slated for release was then moved to B1, where he underwent daily indoctrination and had to sign a statement that he would keep secret everything he had seen. All five camps were composed of thatched huts and were well guarded. There was no indication that any of the five camps held American prisoners.

2. During the period 30 December 1965 - 17 April 1967, the Viet Cong (VC) in Binh Long Province appeared to have a system of handling prisoners of all categories that involved the use of five successive detention camps designated B5, B4, B3, B2 and B1. Each camp served a specific function and prisoners were moved from one camp to the next one in accordance with what appeared to be a standardized system. The specific functions of the individual camps were the following:

5 4 3 2 1 [redacted]

Figure 1

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STATE # | DIA | ARMY | NAVY | AIR | NSA | AID #

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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Date 20 AUG 1997

DIA #91

#37

[redacted]

CS-311/07913-67

a. The first camp into which a prisoner was introduced was Camp B5, located 15 kilometers southwest of Tay Ninh City (exact location unknown). The initial decision concerning the prisoner's disposition probably was taken here. After an undetermined period of time, the prisoner would be transferred to Camp B4.

b. At Camp B4, the prisoner was interrogated frequently, usually about the same subjects, namely, personal background, American and Vietnamese intelligence services worked for, etc. Prisoners were sometimes tortured and were forced to dig trenches and foxholes around the prison compound. The camp was located at approximately XT 905967 and consisted of six thatched houses, each 5 x 10 meters in size and housing 46 prisoners, guarded by about 70 VC. The prisoners were mainly Montagnards, Cambodians and Vietnamese.

c. At Camp B3, located at approximately XU 887034, prisoners underwent further interrogation. The camp consisted of nine thatched houses and was the strongest of the five in terms of defensive positions. Three trails were used to reach B3: one from Loi Minh Hamlet, one from Tra Thanh Village, and the third from the Song Be River, which forms the natural boundary between Government of Vietnam Phuoc Long and Binh Long Provinces. All other trails leading to B3 were mined and/or trapped with spike pits. Normally, about 90 VC were stationed permanently at the camp, but, on occasion, there were as many as 800. One prisoner succeeded in escaping from B3 but was shortly recaptured and killed by the VC.

d. Camp B2 was located at XU 906107 and was where a prisoner's final fate was decided, that is, whether he was to be released or executed. Before any prisoner was executed, his crimes were announced publicly to the other prisoners. Three Vietnamese prisoners were executed in October 1966, one of them a former candidate for the National Assembly. At B2, all prisoners were kept in their cells at all times; like Camps B4 and B3, B2 held approximately 46 prisoners. The permanent guard force was composed of between 150 and 200 Montagnards.

e. If it was decided to free a prisoner, he was then transferred to Camp B1, located at XU 980111. He remained here for an indeterminate time, during which he was subjected to daily indoctrination and was finally forced to write a declaration stating that he would keep secret after his release everything he had seen. As the final step, the prisoner was led to Tra Thanh Village, where he was set free. At B1, 32 prisoners were confined in 26 thatched houses. An estimated 150 VC were in the camp. On occasion the camp served as a temporary base for regular units moving through the area. Once, about 1,500 VC troops camped there for the night.

[redacted] Comment: It cannot be determined from Source's comments if this procedure was standard for handling all VC prisoners or if Source's experiences were unique. Source was also unable to identify the particular point at which each prisoner is introduced into this VC penal system. At no time during the 17 months he spent in the five camps described did he see any American prisoners.

[redacted]

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SC NO. 08720/67
26 July 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Preliminary Assessment of 19 and 20 July 1967 BLACK SHIELD Photography

Summary

Two BLACK SHIELD missions flown about 24 hours apart on 19 and 20 July obtained cloud-free photography of about 80 percent of North Vietnam, including most of the high priority surface-to-surface missile search areas, much of the North Vietnamese air defense system, and many US strike and interdiction target areas. No evidence of surface-to-surface missile deployment was detected.

Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence with the assistance of the Directorate of Science and Technology.

1. Mission 6709 on 19 July obtained photography of about 75 percent of North Vietnam, including the southern DRV down to the DMZ and the Hanoi-Haiphong area. Weather conditions were excellent with the exception of a few scattered areas. Mission 6710 on 20 July covered the DMZ and the area to the north, the Hanoi-Haiphong area, and parts of the Sino-DRV border. Light to heavy haze and cloud cover hampered intelligence exploitation of the 20 July photography, however, expecially in the Sino-DRV border area. (A [redacted] U-2 mission over South China on 20 July provided some coverage of the border, however.)

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(T)

2. No evidence of surface-to-surface missile deployment was obtained by either BLACK SHIELD mission. The two missions covered most of the high priority MRBM search areas west and north of Hanoi and the tactical and coastal defense missile search areas in the southern and central DRV.

3. North Vietnamese air defenses: The mission of 19 July photographed 166 of the almost 200 usable surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, including four new sites in the Yen Bai area. Of the 137 sites which could be read out, 12 were occupied (including 2 new ones), 124 were unoccupied, and one near Yen Bai has been returned to cultivation. The mission of 20 July covered 80 SAM sites, including two new ones (one occupied) in the Haiphong area. Five sites were occupied, 63 unoccupied, and the occupancy of 12 could not be determined.

4. The level of SAM site occupancy falls slightly below our estimate that the North Vietnamese have between 25 and 35 SAM firing battalions, but we cannot tell how many units may have been shifting locations at the time of the photography. Previous BLACK SHIELD missions have photographed up to 20 firing battalions at one time, [redacted]

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5. The two missions together covered the seven major North Vietnamese airfields, but a firm air order of battle (AOB) cannot be derived because

weather conditions and variations in flight paths prevented simultaneous coverage of all seven. Despite these limitations, it appears that the current estimate of fighter strength is fairly accurate. The photography revealed that the mix of fighter types is somewhat different than we have been estimating, however. For example, 10 MIG-21 and 25 MIG-15/17 fighters were photographed on the 19th. Our estimate as of that day was that a total of 29 fighters remained in the DRV--16 MIG-21s and 13 MIG-15/17s.

6. On the basis of this photography--and taking account of subsequent losses as well as aircraft airborne at the time of the photography--it appears that there are now between 25 and 35 jet fighters stationed in the DRV. Of these, at least 10 are MIG-21s.

7. Bomb damage assessment (BDA): The two missions obtained extensive coverage of targets of the US strike effort in North Vietnam. All 23 of the targets being followed at first priority in CIA's BDA studies were covered, as well as nearly all of those being followed at second priority.

8. Coverage of the Hanoi power plant provided the best photography since the US strike of 10 June. Repair work is under way on both the damaged boilerhouse and the control building. The photography confirmed damage to three boilers which supplied steam for about half the generating capacity. Excellent photography of the Nam Dinh powerplant revealed destruction of the coal processing building in a strike on 26 June. Cumulative heavy damage to this facility will probably prevent even partial operation for at least six months. Coverage of the Ben Thuy powerplant showed no change since May, indicating that air strikes in early July inflicted no significant additional damage.

9. Transportation: As in previous BLACK SHIELD missions, wide coverage of rail and road transport routes and facilities was obtained. Detailed analysis of key targets such as bridges and rail yards is under way to assess the current status and

serviceability of the North Vietnamese rail system. Good coverage of the major rail lines between China and the DRV has provided information for analysis of the level of rail transport activity and the inventory of rolling stock available in the DRV. Although the coverage was extensive, however, the resolution is not good enough to determine the extent of the present program to equip the North Vietnamese meter-gauge railway system with an extra track to accommodate Chinese standard-gauge rolling stock.

10. Haiphong--the major ocean port of entry--was covered, but haze hampered analysis. Pinghsiang, the major Chinese storage area and transportation hub near the northeastern DRV border, was photographed, but scattered clouds prevented a complete count of trucks and rolling stock.

11. Chinese activity in North Vietnam: A figure-8 driver training course was observed for the first time near the area of military camps and storage facilities probably built by Chinese engineers in the Lao Cai area at the northwest Sino/DRV border. The course, which is probably designed to train cargo truck drivers, is similar to other courses in North Vietnam and south China. Interrogation reports have mentioned North Vietnamese truck driver students being sent to south China for training. It is possible that this training is now being carried out in the sanctuary zone of northern North Vietnam.

[redacted]

RAND
SEP 8 1967
WASH. OFFICE

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

COUNTRY : NORTH VIETNAM (NVN)

SUBJECT : Captured US Pilot in HAI PHONG Province, [redacted]

DATE OF REPORT : 27/7/67

DATE OF INFO : November 1966

NO. OF PAGES : 2

DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION : 15 July 1967 (O-N) DA NANG, Vietnam

REF : None

[redacted]

SOURCE: [redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

SUMMARY

Source saw a captured American pilot near HAI PHONG city in November 1966. Source spoke with the three security men guarding the American prisoner and learned that he was being taken to HANOI to be detained with "600" other American prisoners who were being detained in a four-story building. These security guards stated that the American POW's were being well cared for and were receiving the equivalent of "a general's ration." Source could provide no additional data regarding the POW's.

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ATTACHMENTS: 1.3(a)(4)

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[redacted]

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1. Source saw a captured American pilot (not handcuffed) riding in a jeep accompanied by three security guards near HAI PHONG City in November 1966. The pilot had been flying a jet when he was shot down, but Source did not know the type of aircraft.

2. Source described the American pilot as Caucasian ("He had pink skin.") and having light blue eyes. He did not know the name or rank of the prisoner.

3. From the security guards, Source learned that the pilot was being taken to HANOI to join "600" other American prisoners who were being detained in a four-story building. Source did not know the location of the building but stated that the top three floors were for American POW's and the bottom floor for the guards. The security guards also stated that the American POW's were being well cared for and were receiving the equivalent of "a general's ration."

4. Source could provide no additional data regarding the POW's.

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

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

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

NND 941536 --- 8/13

Northeast Thailand

Insurgency in parts of northeast Thailand—the Khorat Plateau—is the most recent development in a long history of political disaffection between the people of the northeast and the central government in Bangkok. Communist exploitation of this disaffection was attempted as early as the late 1920's, when branches of the Vietnamese Communist Party were established in the towns of Nong Khai and Khon Kaen. Since then subversive activity has waxed and waned and has been repressed repeatedly by the central government. Armed insurgency increased markedly in late 1964 and early 1965, after two Chinese Communist-oriented Thai front groups—the "Thailand Independence Movement" (TIM) and the "Thailand Patriotic Front" (TPF)—were formed in Peking. Thai insurgents are being indoctrinated in Communist China and trained in North Vietnam.

Three factors have traditionally fostered the development of dissidence in northeast Thailand: 1) the physical isolation of the region from the remainder of Thailand in contrast to its relatively easy accessibility to Laos, 2) the failure of much of the population to identify with the central government in Bangkok, and 3) the relative poverty of a rural population living in a precarious agricultural environment. The Thai Government is devoting increased attention and resources to the task of counteracting these problems.

Location and Transportation

Northeast Thailand covers some 70,000 square miles and comprises about one-third of the entire national area. About 10 million people, one-third of the total population of the country, live here. The region is strategically located relative to Indochina. Imports to Laos from overseas move through the port of Bangkok and across northeast Thailand to their destination. In the present conflict the area serves as a logistical base and as an "aerial back door" for planes flying to Vietnam. Dry and wet season route capacities and the location of selected airfields are shown on Map 58654.

The region is a plateau physically separated from Bangkok and the rest of the nation by a mountainous escarpment consisting of the north-south trending Thiu Khao (mountain range) Phetchabun and the east-west aligned Thiu Khao Phanom Dongrak. At the right-angle junction of the two ranges, some 75 miles northeast of Bangkok, the elevation is over 4,000 feet; the average elevation throughout the mountains is about 2,000 feet. These mountains are formidable obstacles to surface movement either from the lowlands of central Thailand or from locations in southeast Thailand, such as the port area of Sattahip. Villages on the plateau also are largely isolated from one another. Although the monotonous, almost flat surface offers few physical obstacles to road-building other than streams which must be bridged, many of the estimated 15,000 villages are connected to one another or to distant roads only by oxcart tracks that may become almost impassable in the rainy season.

The Thai Government has taken important steps to breach the isolation of the plateau. In 1958 it completed the Friendship Highway from Sara Buri in the central valley to Nakhon Ratchasima (Khorat) and subsequently it extended the road northward to Nong Khai. The eventual completion and improvement of the road system from the strategically important Sattahip-U Taphao (the new B-52 airfield) complex to Nakhon Ratchasima, as well as the construction of two roads into the northwestern part of the plateau (the roads from Lom Sak in the central lowlands to Chum Phae and Loei, respectively), will also help tie the plateau to the lowlands. Under the Thai 7-year highway development plan, 1965-71, a new first-class highway will replace the road from Udon Thani (Udorn) via Sakon Nakhon to the province (*changwat*) of Nakhon Phanom; a road will also be constructed along the Mekong border area from Nong Khai to the province capital at Nakhon Phanom. Both of these roads are under construction. A new road will connect Nakhon Ratchasima with Ubon Ratchathani (Ubon or Ubol) and the present road between Roi Et and Ubon Ratchathani will be improved to make it an all-weather, first-class highway. Many secondary roads connecting isolated villages in security-sensitive provinces are being planned and constructed under accelerated programs.

Rail and air transport facilities are also being improved. The rail line from Bangkok bifurcates at Nakhon Ratchasima and extends northward to Nong Khai and eastward to Warin Chamrap, the rail station for Ubon Ratchathani. Civil airlines link Bangkok with most major towns on the plateau.

Population

Cultural differences and, frequently, very parochial loyalties, in addition to the physical isolation of the area, seem to be paramount in the failure of the plateau population to identify with the central government. The environment of central Thailand, particularly that around the great urban center of Bangkok, comes as a cultural shock to the many peasants from the northeast seeking temporary work in the city. Bangkokians look down upon the northeasterner as a rustic bumpkin who cannot even speak "proper" Thai; he therefore finds it difficult to identify with them. In contrast, the peasant who seeks temporary work in Laos encounters a culture, society, and language much like those of his home community. Thus in some ways his identification is easier with the Lao than with the central Thai. This cultural affinity has led to some ill-organized separatist movements in the past and to the fear in Bangkok that Communist elements would try to exploit these sentiments to undermine the control of the central government over the Khorat Plateau.

Although the peasant in the northeast tends to relate to the Lao, it seems more realistic to characterize both his cultural identity and loyalty as localism, which is often defined by the village limits. Such attitudes are being discouraged by Thai Government programs such as radio broadcasts which encourage the villager to transcend local orientations and to identify with wider segments of the northeast. As a consequence of these efforts, a sense of regionalism epitomized by the term "isan" is appearing. Isan denotes to the Thai that which is distinctly associated with the northeast, as contrasted to the interests and goals of central Thailand. Isan identity, however, does not necessarily imply rigid distinction between the northeast and central Thailand. The "Thai way" does have certain attractions for the northeast villager, and greater acculturation will probably be achieved through government programs. A growing number of northeasterners are being accepted in Thai

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NND 941536 --- 3714

The traditional lack of national identification in northeast Thailand is complicated by the presence of several minority groups. Major minorities and their estimated numbers include the Cambodians (200,000), Kuis (80,000), Phu Thai (100,000), and Vietnamese (35,000). The degree to which these groups have been assimilated to the predominant culture of northeast Thailand varies, but very few of the people identify with Bangkok. Only the Vietnamese are considered to be security problems or disruptive forces, and the central government has registered most of them.

The Cambodians generally retain their own language and to some extent their culture. The Kuis (more commonly known as the Soai) and the Phu Thai, tribal peoples who share in the common pattern of life in the northeast, are very much aware of their distinctive identity. They tend to marry within their own groups and often feel both envy and hostility toward the central Thai.

Of the more than 70,000 Vietnamese estimated to have resided in Thailand before 1959, some 35,000 were repatriated to North Vietnam between 1959 and 1964 by agreement of the two governments. Approximately 30,000 Vietnamese are still in Thailand, and about 30,700 of the estimated 35,000 on the Khorat Plateau are government registered (see Map 56655). The majority are not overtly militant, but they are subject to North Vietnamese influence and are a thorn in the side of Thai security.

ssenger Ferry on Mekong er between Tha Deua, Laos, d Nong Khai, Thailand. s difficult to distinguish beeen the Thai and Lao as th are of the Tai ethnic oup. The Buddhist monk, left eground, represents the edominant religion common Thailand and Laos.

Geo-Economic Factors

The poverty of the area is essentially a rural phenomenon. The average income of the northeastern peasant is only about 60 percent of that prevailing in rural areas elsewhere in the country, whereas the income of the townsman here compares favorably with that in other towns of Thailand. The distribution of income also is uneven among the rural population. Those comprising the uppermost 2 percent of villagers in the northeast are reported to receive 10 times as much cash income per capita as the 78 percent in the lowest income category. Farmers in the latter group average only $15 annual cash income per capita; the inclusion of in-kind income would considerably raise this figure. A United States Operations Mission (USOM) advisor has observed, however, that the villager in northeast Thailand, although poorer than his counterpart in central Thailand, is better off materially than the vast majority of people in many other parts of Asia. A survey of village attitudes in northeast Thailand conducted in the spring of 1966 produced the surprising response that most villagers rated themselves "reasonably well off" rather than "poor."

More than 90 percent of the economically active population derives its livelihood from agriculture, with over 80 percent of the cultivated land in most northeastern provinces devoted to rice production. As in the rest of Thailand, rice is the most important crop, but the yield is poor. In 1966 rice production averaged only 964 pounds per acre in the northeast compared to 1,523 pounds per acre in the central lowlands. Exacerbating the situation is the high nutritional population density (the number of people per square mile of *cultivated* land)—567 in the northeast compared to 463 in the

NND 941536 — 3715

The poorer yield of rice in the northeast is explained largely in terms of the natural environment. The bordering escarpment intercepts moisture-bearing winds from the southwest and creates a rainshadow that reduces both the amount and reliability of rainfall. As a consequence most of the plateau receives far less than the accepted minimum of 70 inches annually that is required for the successful growth of rice in tropical Southeast Asia. Irrigation is therefore required for optimum rice cultivation in the northeast. Only 26 percent of the cropland of the region is irrigated, however, as against 61 percent of the cropland in the central lowland. Generally permeable sandy soils and the relatively level terrain of northeast Thailand restrict the number of locations suitable for sizable reservoirs and hinder the design of effective irrigation systems.

Most low-lying land suitable for irrigated paddy rice is already under rice cultivation. This land is located chiefly in the central and southern provinces, along the Mae Nam (River) Mun and Lam Nam (River) Chi and their tributaries, and generally on the lower slopes but above the valley bottoms, which in many cases are subject to severe flooding. The gradients of rivers on the Khorat Plateau are comparatively low (the main river, the Mun, falls only 300 feet in 250 miles), and runoff is slow. Floodwater arrives so suddenly, is so deep, and remains so long that some of the land otherwise best suited to cultivation cannot be used even for "floating rice," a variety commonly grown in deeply flooded areas.

Most of the area devoted to irrigated rice cultivation is located on the so-called "Roi Et" soils, which are generally acid, sandy loams, giving medium yields at best. Chemical fertilizer most often is a cultural innovation and has seldom been used by the peasant. Further, without heavy subsidization, the peasant rarely has the cash to buy the necessary fertilizer; to remedy this situation the government is encouraging the formation of cooperatives which will furnish loans to the peasant at a minimal interest rate. Outside the irrigated areas, the peasant cannot always be assured of a profitable relationship between fertilizer cost and increased rice yield even though he may be gradually accepting the concept of chemical fertilization.

Deterioration of the natural fertility of the soil has caused rice cultivation to be extended to marginal lands. The movement of people away from the most densely settled areas in parts of the Mun and Chi river valleys (as to new lands in northern Thailand) affords evidence that nutritional density in these areas is becoming critical. Although the potential paddy lands in thinly settled provinces along the Mekong River might support greater numbers, a significant redistribution of the population on the Khorat Plateau in the near future appears to be generally unfeasible in view of the limitations of irrigation works planned for early completion. Projected tanks (reservoirs) and dams will result in complete irrigation systems for only some 10 percent of the present cultivated area. Not until the huge, multipurpose Pa Mong dam of the Mekong Project becomes a reality in the more distant future will it be possible to irrigate a substantial part—an estimated 2 million acres or about 22 percent of the present cultivated area—of the Khorat Plateau. Selected proposed and completed Mekong Project dams are shown on Map 56654.

Other than rice, the chief crops grown on the Khorat Plateau are cotton, kenaf (a fiber plant), and maize. These "upland crops" are generally cultivated on higher slopes by peasants practicing a shifting type of agriculture. Slopeland is cleared by cutting and burning the forest, and the crop is fertilized by the residual wood ashes. Plots are normally cultivated for a few years; further use is inhibited by a rapid diminution of yield.

The area suitable for growing upland crops is estimated to be at least twice as large as the area of paddy land. While this shifting cultivation may be acceptable in thinly settled areas where a long period of bush fallow restores fertility, in parts of the central and southern provinces of the northeast the growing population density has progressively shortened the period of natural soil regeneration; as a result, the land is becoming gradually exhausted. An estimated 20 percent of the upland now lies abandoned. The introduction of a system of permanent agriculture to replace shifting agriculture would significantly improve economic conditions in the region.

Future exploitation of mineral resources may help to stimulate the economic growth of the northeast. According to a survey conducted recently by a US Geological Survey team, there are an estimated 78 million tons of copper ore (representing some 660,000 tons of saleable metal) and 27 million tons of iron ore in the province of Loei. Although coking coal resources are lacking, power generated at the planned Mekong Project dam on the Nam (River) Ngum in Laos might permit the use of electric furnaces at a smelter which could be built in the vicinity of Loei. The Khorat Plateau also has one of the world's largest deposits of rock salt; well drillers have encountered layers of salt more than 800 feet thick. The UN Mekong Committee Secretariat is examining the feasibility of establishing a chemical complex, most likely in the province of Chaiyaphum, which could use up to 50,000 tons of salt annually.

Dry paddy ricefields. Termite mounds, front middle-ground, contain more fertile soil than the surrounding paddy. The mounds are truncated and planted to vegetables. Resin, used for torches and for waterproofing boats and baskets, is extracted from the large yang trees in the background. Mound "farming" and extractive activities are evidence of the subsistence farming in which most northeast peasants

NND 941536 --- 37/6



Wet paddy ricefields. Trees are left standing in the fields so that the humus derived from the fallen leaves will enrich the soil, which often tends to be infertile.

Counter-Insurgency Measures

The Thai Government with the advice and aid of various US Government agencies has taken a number of steps designed to strengthen its position in the northeast. Since 1962, civic action programs that stress the improvement of health and educational facilities, well drilling, development of agricultural techniques, and limited road building have been carried on under the aegis of the Mobile Development Units (MDU) in the National Security Command. In 1964 the Accelerated Rural Development (ARD) program was established under the civilian control and guidance of the Committee for Coordination and Operational Planning (CCOP) in an attempt to meet the Communist challenge more effectively. It provides a vehicle for accelerated, sustained followup to MDU area operations and represents a new concept of coordinated and concentrated programing of all rural development efforts in critical areas.

In 1966 the Counter Subversion Operation Command (CSOC), established to coordinate the countersubversion efforts of all Thai Government agencies operating throughout the country, developed the "0910 plan" (name derived from the 1966-67 lunar calendar year 2509–2510). The "0910 plan," commonly known as the "dry season plan" (operations were to be carried out during the winter-spring dry season), abandoned the previously used but generally ineffective large-scale sweeps of suspected insurgent areas by Thai security forces. Instead, it placed 12-man squads and police reinforcements in 250 selected villages, located in 10 priority areas within 7 security-sensitive provinces, with the objective of denying insurgents access to the population and resources. This measure has proved successful in forcing Communist bands to move out of their former strongholds, but as a result they have increased their activities in adjacent areas.

Prospects

The insurgency threat in Thailand is mitigated by major forces for stability that did not prevail in Vietnam, namely, a strong and effective central government, a history of independence of foreign control, a long tradition of reverence for the king and monarchy, almost universal acceptance of Buddhism, and exceptional economic prosperity by Asian standards. It is apparent, however, that these stabilizing forces apply chiefly to central Thailand; a less favorable situation prevails in the rural areas of the northeast. The generally apolitical peasant of the northeast neither commits himself positively to the central government nor shares to any great extent in the benefits of the current prosperity. There appears to be no active widespread disaffection with the government at present, but the Communist cadre, numbering about 1,300 armed insurgents, is attempting to create disaffection through propaganda, often presented at compulsory propaganda sessions in the villages, and through terrorism.

The combined developmental and security programs of the central government constitute a monumental task of social and administrative reform, and one that, if it is to succeed, must persuade the villagers that their aspirations can be better met by the government than by the Communists.

Dense deciduous and evergreen forests on upper slopes of Phu Phan Mountains. These wooded mountains are a core area for much of the insurgent activity in this part of the northeast.

NND 941536 --- 3717

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

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[redacted]

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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CONFIDENTIAL

CITE TDCS-314/11461-67

011313 Z

DIST 1 AUGUST 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

DOI OCTOBER 1966 - JUNE 1967

SUBJ 1. SOME EVIDENCE OF WAR WEARINESS IN NORTH VIETNAM

2. REPORTED GOOD HEALTH OF HO CHI MINH IN JUNE 1967

3. GENERALLY QUIET CULTURAL REVOLUTION ACTIVITIES AMONG LOCAL CHINESE

ACQ [redacted] FIELD NO. [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

(1. SUMMARY: ANTI-WAR FEELINGS, ALTHOUGH LOCALIZED, HAVE BECOME A PROBLEM FOR THE NORTH VIETNAM (NVN) GOVERNMENT.

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

THE TRADITIONAL CITY DWELLERS' ANTIPATHY TOWARD RUAL LIFE HAS ALSO BECOME A PROBLEM IN THE EVACUATION OF HANOI. HO CHI MINH REPORTEDLY WAS SEEN BY JAPANESE CAMERAMAN TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH AS OF JUNE 1967. THE LOCAL CHINESE COMMUNISTY IN HANOI CARRIES OUT "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" ACTIVITIES ON A RELATIVELY QUIET BASIS.)

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2. ON 25 JULY 1967, [redacted] STATED THAT NOT ALL NORTH VIETNAMESE SUPPORT CARRYING OUT THE PRESENT WAR UNTIL THE BITTER END. HE STATED THAT EVEN AMONG THE HIGH OFFICIALS IN THE GOVERNMENT, "A CERTAIN GROUP OF STAFF OFFICIALS" HAVE RAISED THE QUESTION IN OFFICIAL CIRCLES WHETHER "NORTH VIETNAM CAN WIN THE WAR AGAINST THE U.S." [redacted] COMMENT. THE OFFICIALS WERE NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED.) AS A FURTHER EXAMPLE, HE SAID THAT IN AN UNIDENTIFIED VILLAGE NEAR THE COAST WHICH HAD UNDERGONE LAND REFORM, HE HAD ENCOUNTERED A CATHOLIC PRIEST WHO

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STATED FLATLY THAT HE WAS AGAINST THE WAR. ALTHOUGH THE PRIEST'S STATEMENT CAME AS AN OBVIOUS SURPRISE TO [redacted] AND

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(C)

CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

HIS OFFICIAL NVN INTERPRETER, THE PRIEST WENT ON TO SAY THAT FURTHER FIGHTING WOULD BRING NOTHING BUT MISERY AND DEATH TO THE PEOPLE. HE ADDED THAT HE DID NOT WANT THE VILLAGE TO BECOME A BLOODY GROUND IN THE EVENT A LANDING IS MADE BY THE U.S. TROOPS. [redacted] EXPLAINED THAT THE LAND REFORM ALLOCATIONS HAD TRIGGERED A RUMOR AMONG THE VILLAGERS THAT THEIR AREA WAS REGARDED BY THE GOVERNMENT AS A POSSIBLE ENEMY INVASION POINT. ACCORDING TO [redacted] THE ANTI-WAR FEELINGS OF THE PRIEST AND THE WAR WEARINESS OUTLOOK HELD BY OTHERS HAD BECOME A PROBLEM THAT THE NVN GOVERNMENT MUST RESOLVE.

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3. [redacted] COMMENTED THAT ALTHOUGH EVACUATIONS FROM HANOI WERE PROGRESSING RELATIVELY SMOOTHLY, THE NVN GOVERNMENT WAS CONFRONTED WITH THE PROBLEM OF CONVINCING RESIDENTS TO LEAVE HANOI FOR THE SAKE OF THEIR OWN SAFETY. SUCH RESIDENTS CHOSE TO IGNORE THE EVACUATION ORDERS SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY FELT THAT THEY, AS CITY DWELLERS, WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SUBSIST IN THE PROVINCES. HE SAID THAT THE NVN GOVERNMENT HAD MADE PATRIOTIC APPEALS TO HANOI RESIDENTS IN AN EFFORT TO PERSUADE

E0 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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THEM TO FOLLOW EVACUATION ORDERS. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT INTEND TO TAKE PUNITIVE ACTION AGAINST RELUCTANT EVACUEES. [redacted] ADDED THAT THE NUMBER OF NORTH VIETNAMESE DEATHES RESULTING FROM U.S. BOMBINGS TOTALLED LESS THAN 10,000 DURING THE PAST ONE YEAR AND A HALF. [redacted] COMMENT: THERE IS NOW WAY OF DETERMINING SUBJECT'S BASIS FOR THIS STATEMENT.)

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4. [redacted] SAID THAT DURING THE LATTER PART OF JUNE 1967, [redacted] SAW PRESIDENT HO CHI MIN "SOMEWHERE IN THE OUTSKIRTS OF HANOI..." [redacted] HAD STATED THAT PRESIDENT HO APPEARED TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH AND THAT HO'S COMPLEXION WAS GOOD.

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5. [redacted] STATED THAT LOCAL CHINESE IN HANOI DID WEAR MAO BADGES AND CONDUCTED CLASSES ON THE TEACHINGS OF MAO. HOWEVER, LOCAL CHINESE WERE QUIET AND ORDERLY IN CARRYING OUT THEIR MAOIST ACTIVITIES. [redacted] SAID THAT THE FRONT ENTRANCE TO THE COMMUNIST CHINESE EMBASSY WAS ADORNED WITH A LARGE PICTURE OF MAO TSE-TUNG. IN THE RURAL AREAS, HE NOTED MANY NORTH VIETNAMESE FARMERS WEARING RED MAO BADGES BUT ADDED

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(classification) (dissem controls)

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(C)

THAT THE FARMERS WERE IGNORANT OF THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BADGES AND WERE MERELY WEARING THEM BECAUSE "THEY WERE BRILLIANTLY COLORED."

6. [redacted] DISSEM: CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC STATE ARMATT NAVATT AIRATT USFJ NSAPAC/J COMNAVJ NISOJ 5AF 6499SG 500MIG USARJ DET4/FTD (ALSO SENT SAIGON). GP-1

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REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

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Thursday, August 24, 1967

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(C)

TEXT OF CIA REPORT [redacted]

The bombing of the Doumer Bridge across the Red River by U.S. pilots on August 11, 1967, was very accurate and the bridge will never be able to carry either heavy rail or truck traffic without major reconstruction. While the dropping of one span about 300 meters from the Gia Lam District was important, the crucial damage was done to the structure itself by the impact of at least three high explosive bombs hitting on the remainder of the bridge leading to Hanoi City. The impact of the explosions loosened or broke large rivets that are vital to the structural design of the bridge and completely dislodged many of the braces where the spans are connected.

After the raid on August 21, heavy smoke and fire were noted northeast of the city of Hanoi in the direction of the Yen Vien Railyard for at least three hours. On the August 22 raid, one bomb either hit or hit near the East German Hospital and killed one Vietnamese doctor. Another bomb fell one block south of the French Delegation and the impact shattered glass in unspecified buildings of the French compound. One U.S. aircraft was destroyed by a missile and the plane was seen falling in the Gia Lam District.

In the late afternoon of August 22, it took members of the International Control Commission, who had priority, between three and four hours to get from Hanoi City to Gia Lam by crossing the Red River by ferry, because of extremely heavy traffic. Only two ferries are operating and they can accommodate six to eight vehicles, depending on the size of the vehicles. The ferries are towed by small boats.

On August 22, most of Hanoi City and all of Gia Lam District were blacked out. On the Hanoi side, there

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were only a few lights in the Hai Ba District and no lights in the area surrounding the train station. A few scattered lights were seen along the Red River bank close to the Doumer Bridge on the Hanoi side. Gia Lam Airport was lighted.

On August 22, neither the Pont des Rapides Bridge across the Canal nor the recently-constructed metal bridge about 100 meters south was operating. One span of the new metal bridge was knocked out and dropped into the river. Immediately north of the Pont des Rapides there is a pontoon bypass which can probably support light trucks.

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Monday, August 28, 1967

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(C)

TEXT OF CIA REPORT [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] has been known in the past to embroider information for his own and his Government's purposes and the additional possibility that North Vietnamese officials are feeding him information for their own purposes, it is difficult to separate fact from speculation or misinformation in the report.

Begin text:

The group of officials in the North Vietnamese regime who have generally tended to take a more open-minded position toward the possibility of negotiations with the American Government to end the Vietnam War recognized in mid-August 1967 that chances for early peace talks were very slim. The North Vietnamese Ambassador to Indonesia, Pham Binh, who has been of this clique, sent word to Suharto's [redacted] for secret talks on the Vietnam problem, [redacted] that his (Binh's) optimism before departing for consultations at Hanoi in July 1967, had proven unjustified; before leaving Djakarta, Binh had told [redacted] he was hopeful that talks might occur in August or September 1967.

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An Indonesian Embassy Official in Hanoi relayed to [redacted] the explanation that Pham Van Dong, chief figure in the so-called moderate clique, firmly believes that the war is going

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so badly for the North Vietnamese that if it is not ended in a matter of months, North Vietnam would need massive Chinese intervention to prevent total collapse within eighteen months. Pham Van Dong and his sympathizers fear entry of Chinese combat troops almost as much as they do American troops; they have been concerned that only North Vietnam is suffering from further prosecution of the war; they believe North Vietnam's negotiating position will deteriorate further as America has stepped up its military pressure; outside help from Russia and China to North Vietnam is sorely limited and North Vietnamese civilian and military manpower is sorely pressed. Therefore, Dong's view was that the sooner negotiations could commence and relieve the military pressures on Hanoi the better for the North Vietnamese. This was a difference of viewpoint from Ho, however, not an open break. Dong has bowed to Ho Chi Minh's insistence that the war effort be continued.

Ho, who is as fully in control of the Hanoi regime as ever, agrees with Dong that the war is going badly and costing North Vietnam heavily at present. He sees the winter months, however, as a chance to improve the military position in the South somewhat, to increase supplies to Viet Cong elements in South Vietnam, and then to make a bid for peace talks from a greater position of strength shortly after the new year. He is confident that the North Vietnamese situation will improve over the next few months to permit this.

One factor influencing Ho is the change in the Soviet attitude. The Russians, who were earlier suspected by Ho Chi Minh of wobbling in their support of a militant Hanoi position, have now strongly urged Ho not to negotiate at least until early next year. They have promised Ho an additional two hundred million U.S. dollars worth of military and economic aid for Calendar Year 1968 if Ho fights on; if he does not, they threatened to cut off the aid. Their position is now almost as militant as that of Peking. The Soviets, however, have stated that they wish to have Ho continue fighting until early 1968 and then they will reassess the situation.

This conforms with Ho's own views, and the Pham Van Dong moderates also recognize that post-election political

instability could occur in South Vietnam and that increased Soviet aid would help the war effort greatly. They are skeptical whether either factor or both would offset increased American military strength and North Vietnamese declining resources. Ho's decision, however, stands, and both he and Pham Van Dong are relieved that there will be less necessity to rely exclusively on Communist China. Ho's Chinese top advisors, of whom five out of seventeen have been killed during recent war action and bombings, advocate indefinite continuation of the war. So does the pro-Chinese element in the North Vietnamese politburo, who would agree to negotiations only as a ruse to gain time for a renewed war effort.

(Source Comment: The Soviet reasons for wanting the war to continue until early 1968 are obscure unless they plan another military diversion in some other part of the world and want many American troops pinned down until then. The best way to increase the influence of the Pham Van Dong "peace-minded" clique and to convince them to strengthen their arguments with Ho in favor of negotiations is for the Americans to increase the pressure on Hanoi and prove that Ho is wrong in expecting military improvement before early next year.)

(CIA Comment: [redacted] has maintained frequent contact in Djakarta with Pham Binh and has been at least indirectly in touch with Pham Van Dong and other North Vietnamese officials over a period of several months. His description of Pham Van Dong as a relatively peace-minded North Vietnamese leader and of existence of a "moderate" clique may be overdrawn but probably not consciously on [redacted] part. He himself is fairly hawkish on Vietnam especially for an Indonesian, and it is more likely that Pham Binh and Pham Van Dong have consciously exaggerated their possible slight differences in view with Ho to impress the Indonesians. [redacted] was adamant, however, in insisting that the information on increased Soviet aid to Hanoi came from North Vietnamese officials themselves, whatever their motives for so advising him.

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(C)

It is extremely doubtful that North Vietnamese officials would discuss with any foreigners the extent of disagreement

within the policy-making group at the top of the regime; it is equally improbable that they would reveal Soviet attitudes and conditions in granting aid or give precise information on the amount of aid. On the other hand, it is possible they have [redacted] determined to continue the war and that the Soviets have agreed to support them with additional aid. Other information on the status of Soviet/North Vietnamese aid negotiations indicate, however, that the aid agreements for the first six months of 1968 is still being negotiated and has not yet been signed. [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

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Case # NLJ 00-204
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36-b

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, August 30, 1967

TEXT OF CIA REPORT [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

B

Ambassador Herve Alphand, Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry, said on August 28, 1967, that it was the conclusion of his government that the Vietnam war cannot be won and that the only solution is an American initiative for a ceasefire and a complete withdrawal over a period of two years. The withdrawal should be accompanied by guarantees for the integrity of both North and South Vietnam, and these guarantees, as well as the ceasefire, should be supervised by a consortium of nations organized for the purpose.

Alphand said his government was in touch with the Hanoi government and also with representatives of the Viet Cong in Algeria and Phnom Penh. The French government, therefore, believes that the proposition Alphand is describing would not be unacceptable to North Vietnam and the Viet Cong. The war cannot be won because Ho Chi Minh is prepared to take any punishment that can be meted out, including even the destruction of Hanoi, and because the North Vietnamese are willing to live in the hills for years rather than capitulate. At the same time, the Hanoi government would want a guarantee of the integrity of North Vietnam because it fears the Chinese. A supervised ceasefire and a withdrawal with guarantees of integrity might eventually result in a combined Vietnam, but probably not for a period of at least fifteen years.

Alphand expressed the opinion that an approach such as he described would bring about results. He considered that previous gestures by the American President had always been accompanied by conditions and that the only proposal that would work would be a simple proposal which would involve ceasefire, timed withdrawal, and supervised guarantees of integrity.

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Case # NLJ 00-204
Document # 36c

36-c

SECRET

Wednesday, August 30, 1967

TEXT OF CIA REPORT [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Begin Text

In a letter dated June 9, 1967, a Chinese resident of Haiphong writing to his relatives in Hong Kong made the following comments about effects of the air raids, the costs of evacuating his dependents from the city and other financial complaints:

a. "At the present time, Haiphong is daily being subjected to United States attack. This wild and savage bombardment by the American imperialists, particularly against Haiphong, has resulted in the large scale evacuation of the factories and population, and in turn has brought extreme poverty to the people.

b. "There are ten persons in my family, most of whom have no independent means of support, except my eldest son who has recently obtained a job at a plastics factory where he earns 50 dongs a month which just meets his own expenses. The second son drives an oxcart which is of some help. My third and fourth sons and fifth daughter are at school; my old mother and my wife live with a sixth daughter and seventh son, both of whom are of school age, but unfortunately, because of my financial situation, I cannot pay for their schooling.

c. "We have not been able to send all of our children to safety in the countryside. Three have gone with their school evacation group but their monthly board and lodging costs 100 dongs. Since I have been unemployed since March (1967), I grow deeper in debt. With no income and no reasonable work, I have volunteered to work in the forest, but while waiting for action on my application, I have been without a cent of income.

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d. "Last month we received your package of medicines by post which helped expenses for a short time, but the money did not go very far towards paying the debts owed to my friends. I again beg you to send more medicine to help me in my present hardship. This time, send two packages, one to my wife and one to my friend. It is important that two different addresses of senders be used. This way I will be able to keep more of the B-12 (vitamins); otherwise, most if not all of it will be purchased by the government. Before sending the packages, first advise me of the name and address of each sender, so that due application to customs can be made." [redacted] Comment. Gift packages, particularly drug shipments, are highly valued for the price the drugs can be sold on the blackmarket. It is the standard practice of the North Vietnamese authorities, however, to appropriate as much as ninety percent or more of such scarce goods, reimbursement for which is made at official prices.)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25
(C)

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36-d

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Wednesday, August 30, 1967

TEXT OF CIA REPORT [redacted] E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

[redacted] E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

[redacted] North Vietnam does not feel a need for peace. He said North Vietnam advocated support of the four principles of the North Vietnamese and the five principles of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam as a means to settle the war. [redacted] E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

[redacted] E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

[redacted] E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

Regarding the effects of bombings of North Vietnam, [redacted] E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

a. There was no restriction on the use of electricity in Hanoi.

b. On 12 August the Long Bien Bridge was bombed and destroyed. [redacted] although the Ham Rong Bridge had been attacked 700 times and was a twisted mess, it was still usable. E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

c. On 13 August two waves of bombers attacked the Hanoi area [redacted] saw an American plane shot down. E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

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E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

d. [redacted] Hung Yen Province, South of Hanoi, [redacted] peasants, almost all of them women or children, were working the land in broad daylight in spite of continuous and intense air activity overhead.

e. There were no signs of a food shortage.

f. All industrial plants had been evacuated from urban areas. The 38 spinning plant outside of Hanoi was running at 20 percent of its original capacity.

[redacted] several missiles mounted on mobile frames being transported at night. Unguarded missiles [redacted] parked on roads. [redacted] almost all the missile launchers in North Vietnam are mobile.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yr
(C)

[redacted] Haiphong Harbor was filled with British, Italian, Greek and Chinese Communist freighters. [redacted] trucks from East Germany, tank trucks from Poland and repair trucks from Rumania being unloaded. [redacted] that if Haiphong Port were attacked, North Vietnam would suffer greatly.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25
(C)

[redacted] the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam representatives in Hanoi, [redacted] took the same line as the North Vietnamese regarding the war. [redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1
(C)

[redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25
(C)

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36e

Wednesday, August 30, 1967

TEXT OF CIA REPORT [redacted]

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(C)

[redacted]

Begin Text

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Nam Ha, [redacted] June 30, 1967. Grandmother is very old and weak now. You would not recognize her because she is so thin. I am still all right. I still work at the company, but I have been evacuated to another place. My brother works at a textile factory and has been evacuated with his factory to Lang Son Province, far away on the China border. He is only an apprentice, so he gets only 27 dong a month. It is only enough for him and he cannot send anything back to support grandmother. I make only 37 dong a month when there is much work, but then there is little work I get only 34 dong. That is my net pay, but when I am ill the company has to pay for my medical care, and when I have children I will get a family allowance. If they are ever sick the government has to take care of them too. We work for the government so we belong to the government and we are under government administration. We have sold all that we have to buy medicine for grandmother because she gets ill very often. Now we have only our salary to depend on, which is very sad. Moreover, the war is spreading all over the country and no one can feel secure in his life. Who knows whether or not I will die in the next minute. The American bombs and bullets make no distinction between persons, they threaten everybody.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Hanoi, June 29, 1967. Our health situation is not very good, even though we are not really ill. My daughter is rather small and thin and she does not have a good appetite. My wife is also getting thinner and sometimes has to use medicine. Due to the difficult war situation, nourishing food is lacking and medicines are rare. Our only solution is to try and bear it.

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Ha Bac, June 15, 1967. At present our family is meeting many material difficulties. Because our salary is just sufficient for ourselves, we really cannot afford to help father and mother. I try very hard to save money to help our parents, but it is still very scarce. As to the war situation, it is very hard. Living conditions are very poor because we have to reserve everything for the front. Our food is now composed of 70 percent rice and 30 percent wheat flour, and you know the nutritional value of wheat flour is very low. Living is very difficult.

Huong Phuong, May 30, 1967. These days mother is not as strong as before. Because we have been evacuated medicine is rather rare, and on the other hand, becuase of the war, food is not sufficient. Since we are engaged in a war, want is the common situation of everybody.

Viet Bac [redacted] - Hanoi), May 20, 1967. An evacuated student. In general our activities and studies are getting more burdensome. Not only do we have to concentrate on our studies, but we also have to work to promote production. Specifically, we have to plant vegetables, raise pigs and poultry, etc. to support ourselves with food in this hard time. In the botany class we plant mushrooms for the whole faculty. According to science, one kilogram of mushrooms is more nourishing than one kilogram of fresh beef. This is why this is a very important task. In addition, we have to "make artificial meat." In a word, we try to make everything ourselves.

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Note to: W. JORDEN

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3021302

D-E-N-T-I-A-L

TDCS-314/13052-67

DIST 30 AUGUST 1967

COUNT SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI JULY 1967

SUBJ SUMMARY OF VIET CONG ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM DURING JULY 1967

VIETNAM, SAIGON FIELD NO. [redacted]

SE [redacted]

BATOR
BOWDLER
BUDGET
DAVIS
GINSBURGH
HAMILTON
JESSUP
JOHNSON
JORDAN
KEENY
TAYLOR

K
L

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

SUMMARY: THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM THE VIET CONG (VC) CONTINUE TO FACE SERIOUS PROBLEMS. EVERYWHERE, EXCEPT SOME PARTS OF IV CORPS, FOOD AND MANPOWER ARE IN SERIOUSLY SHORT SUPPLY. TAX COLLECTION IS AN INCREASING PROBLEM IN ALL AREAS. [illegible]AR SUPPORT CONTINUES TO DECLINE. THIS IS ACCELERATED B[illegible]E VC'S INCREASED USE OF TERROR AND REPRESSION TO FORCE

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(C)

[illegible]N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]

(classification) (dissem controls)

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

SUPPORT. LOSS OF POPULATION FROM VC CONTROL CONTINUES TO REDUCE THE MANPOWER AVAILABLE FOR TROOPS, LABOR SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARY, AND TILLERS OF THE FIELDS. DESPITE SUCH EROSION, HOWEVER, THE VC STRUCTURE REMAINS STRONG AND DANGEROUS, WITH FAIR TO GOOD MORALE IN THE UPPER LEVELS. THEY LAUNCHED VERY FEW SIZEABLE MILITARY ACTIONS IN JULY, HOWEVER, FOCUSING THEIR RESOURCES ON ATTACKS ON SMALL OUTPOSTS AND ON HARASSMENT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, CHIEU HOI (OPEN ARMS) AND REFUGEE CENTERS, AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION. THERE APPEARED TO BE AN ELEMENT OF DESPERATION IN THEIR INCREASING RESORT TO INDISCRIMINATE TERRORISM. THE CHIEF NEW DEVELOPMENT IN JULY WAS THE GREATLY INCREASED ATTENTION DEVOTED TO THE APPROACHING NATIONAL ELECTIONS. THIS CONSISTED ALMOST ENTIRELY OF PLANNING, PROPAGANDIZING, AND SPREADING THREATS OF DEATH TO THOSE WHO SUPPORT THE ELECTIONS. SOME MINOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES WERE NOTED DURING THE MONTH.

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END SUMMARY.

VC PROBLEMS:

1. FOOD SHORTAGES WERE VERY SERIOUS IN JULY IN ALL BUT IV CORPS, AND EVEN THERE THE VIET CONG (VC) WERE HARD PRESSED

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L [redacted]
(dissem controls)

IN SOME AREAS TO COLLECT ENOUGH FOOD. IN I AND II CORPS A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF MILITARY MANPOWER HAS BEEN DIVERTED TO AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND COLLECTION OF FOOD FROM THE PEASANTS; FOR EXAMPLE, ONE BATTALION OF THE 95TH NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) REGIMENT IN PHU YEN PROVINCE HAD 15 PERCENT OF ITS MEN DETAILED TO AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION. THE FOOD SHORTAGE HAS CONTRIBUTED TO POOR MORALE AND TO DESERTIONS AND DEFECTIONS. THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM IS AN ABSOLUTE SHORTAGE OF GRAIN CAUSED BY DECREASED PRODUCTION AND INCREASED DEMAND, BUT THIS HAS BEEN COMPOUNDED BY SERIOUS DISLOCATION OF THE VC SUPPLY SYSTEM. ALLIED SWEEPS HAVE BROKEN UP VC SUPPLY ORGANIZATIONS, AND ALLIED UNITS ARE OCCUPYING KEY LOCATIONS ON SOME OF THE ESTABLISHED COMMO-LIAISON ROUTES. IN NINH THUAN A NUMBER OF CADRES WERE REPLACED BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SECURE SUPPLY ROUTES FROM THE MAIN LOGISTIC SUPPORT AREA TO SECRET OPERATIONAL BASES. MEDICAL SUPPLIES, ESPECIALLY ANTIBIOTICS, ARE SHORT IN ALL AREAS.

2. THE VC ARE SUFFERING FROM A SHORTAGE OF TAX INCOME ALL OVER THE COUNTRY. RAISING TAX LEVELS HAS SERVED TO MAKE COLLECTION ALL THE MORE DIFFICULT, AND LOCAL UNITS

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ARE INCREASINGLY RESORTING TO TERRORISM TO ENFORCE PAYMENT. IN SEVERAL DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE COUNTRY INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN "EXECUTED" FOR NON-PAYMENT OF TAXES.

3. POPULATION CONTROL AND LOSS OF POPULAR SUPPORT ARE GROWING PROBLEMS. ALLIED SUCCESS HAS MADE PEOPLE IN MANY AREAS RELUCTANT TO COOPERATE WITH THE VC. TO ENFORCE COOPERATION, THE VC HAVE FREQUENTLY RESORTED TO TERROR AND INTIMIDATION, WHICH HAVE INCREASED THEIR UNPOPULARITY. THE KHANH HOA PROVINCE COMMITTEE FOUND ITSELF IN AN UNHAPPY DILEMMA: IT DECIDED IT DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT TROOPS TO COUNTER ALLIED OPERATIONS AND MAINTAIN CONTROL OVER THE POPULATION AND FOOD PRODUCTION, BUT IT COULD NOT SUPPORT ANY ADDITIONAL TROOPS BECAUSE OF THE UNAVAILABILITY OF FOOD. IN IV CORPS, VC HAVE COMPLAINED OF LACK OF POPULAR SUPPORT BOTH IN CONTESTED AREAS AND VC AREAS.

4. MORALE IN THE LOWER ECHELONS IS POOR NEARLY EVERYWHERE. HIGHER-LEVEL CADRES AND MAIN-FORCE TROOPS ARE GENERALLY IN BETTER SHAPE AND A FEW INSTANCES OF HIGH MORALE ARE REPORTED. FOOD AND MEDICAL SHORTAGES AND, ESPECIALLY, THE AWESOME POSER OF ALLIED MIL TARY FORCES CONTINUE TO DEPRESS

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[redacted]

MORALE.

5. PERHAPS THE MOST IMMEDIATELY CRITICAL PROBLEM IS THE SHORTAGE OF MANPOWER, WHICH IS TO A LARGE EXTENT AN OUTGROWTH OF THE PROBLEMS ALREADY DISCUSSED. ALTHOUGH DECLINING POPULAR SUPPORT MEANS FEWER VOLUNTEERS, THE PHYSICAL EXODUS OF PEOPLE FROM VC-HELD TERRITORY MEANS AN ABSOLUTE DECREASE IN AVAILABLE MANPOWER FOR ALL PURPOSES--TROOPS, AGRICULTURAL, LABOR, AND MILITARY SUPPORT ACTIVITIES. IN ONE DRAMATIC EXAMPLE, IN (*PORTION GBLD-BEING SVCD) PHONG DISTRICT OF QUANG TRI PROVINCE, 900(*BEING SVCD) FAMILIES REMOVED THEMSELVES TO A RELATIVELY SAFER RURAL DEVELOPMENT AREA.

6. IT HAS RECENTLY BECOME APPARENT THAT WHILE THE PEOPLE ARE LEAVING THE VC, THE VC ARE BEING FORCED TO LEAVE THE PEOPLE. ESPECIALLY IN I AND II CORPS, SUSTAINED ALLIED PRESSURE HAS DRIVEN A LARGE PART OF THE VC FORCES FROM THE POPULOUS COASTAL PLAINS TO THE SAFER BUT SPARSELY INHABITED MOUNTAIN JUNGLES. THIS IN TURN COMPLICATES THEIR RECRUITMENT AND FOOD-SUPPLY PROBLEMS.

7. THE VC ARE TRYING TO MEET THEIR MANPOWER PROBLEMS BY CALLING ON WOMEN AND CHILDREN. YOUTHS DOWN TO 14 YEARS

[redacted]

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(C)

[redacted]

OF AGE ARE BEING TAKEN INTO THE ARMED FORCES. EVEN NORTH VIETNAM (NVN) HAS RESORTED TO LOWERED AGE STANDARDS FOR THE REPLACEMENTS IT SENDS SOUTH. SEVERAL RECENTLY INFILTRATED 16-YEAR-OLDS HAVE BEEN CAPTURED. RECENTLY SEIZED DOCUMENTS REVEAL THAT IN ONE AREA THE VC HAVE ORDERED THAT 50 PERCENT OF THE GUERRILLAS MUST BE WOMEN. IN ANOTHER AREA THE MINIMUM WAS SET AT 33 PERCENT. SOME PROVINCES REPORT FURTHER CUTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE STAFFS TO RELEASE MORE MEN FOR MILITARY SERVICE.

8. THE MANPOWER-REPLACEMENT PROBLEM WAS REPORTED AS BEING SERIOUS EVERYWHERE IN THE THREE NORTHERN CORPS AREAS EXCEPT IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE. IN QUANG TRI THEY CAN GET INFILTRATORS FROM THE NORTH WITH RELATIVE EASE, BUT REPORTS SAY THAT EVEN THERE THE QUALITY OF THE REPLACEMENTS IS DECLINING. IN POPULOUS IV CORPS, FIVE PROVINCES HAVE REPORTED SERIOUS MANPOWER PROBLEMS. KIEN HOA REPORTS NO

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(C)

[redacted]

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SUPPLY FOR LOCAL REPLACEMENTS BUT SAYS THE PROVINCE CAN NO LONGER EXPORT MANPOWER AS IT HAS IN THE PAST. E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

b. HOWEVER, DESPITE THESE CONTINUING AND, IN SOME CASES, GROWING PROBLEMS, THE VC ORGANIZATION IS EFFECTIVE AND THE VC FORCES RETAIN A FORMIDABLE CAPABILITY TO INFLICT DEATH AND DESTRUCTION.

PO ACTIVITIES

10. JULY WAS A RELATIVELY ROUTINE MONTH FOR VC ACTIVITY. THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS, 20 JULY, WAS HERALDED BY THE VC PROPAGANDIST AS A GREAT OCCASION TO BE MARKED BY MAJOR MILITARY AND TERRORIST ACTIVITY, BUT IN THE EVENT IT WAS NOT DIFFERENT FROM ANY OTHER DAY. IN BINH THUAN PROVINCE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE VC PROPAGANDIZED THAT THERE WOULD BE POSTERS AND VC FLAGS EVERYWHERE ON THE 20TH AND THAT THE DAY WOULD BE CELEBRATED WITH "GLORIOUS ACHIEVEMENTS" AGAINST GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) INSTATLATIONS. IN FACT, ONE BULLDOZER WAS DESTROYED AND ONE SMALL, UNSUCCESSFUL ATTACK LAUNCHED, BOTH ON THE 19TH. ON THE 20TH, NOTHING HAPPENED. IN GENERAL, PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED TRENDS CONTINUED THROUGH THE MONTH, THE ONLY MAJOR CHANGE BEING THE INCREASING ATTENTION GIVEN

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

TO ANTI-ELECTION PLANNING AND PROPAGANDA AS THE 3 SEPTEMBER ELECTION DATE DREW NEARER.

11. EVERY PROVINCE [redacted] DOC REPORTED A GREAT DEAL OF ANTI-ELECTION ACTIVITY, MOSTLY IN THE FORM OF PROPAGANDA DISPARAGING THE ELECTIONS AS A "FARCE," STRESSING THE FUTILITY OF VOTING, AND SUGGESTING--SOMETIMES BY EXPLICIT THREATS--THAT SUPPORTING THE ELECTION INVOLVED SERIOUS RISK OF BEING KILLED. BIEN HOA PROVINCE REPORTED THERE WERE SOME INSTANCES OF VC SEIZURE OF FAMILY RECORD BOOKS AND IDENTIFICATION CARDS TO PREVENT VOTING. IN VINH LONG PROVINCE IT WAS NOTED THAT NEARLY ALL VC PLANS AND DIRECTIVES WERE PREFACED BY THE PHASE "FROM NOW UNTIL THE ELECTIONS," INDICATING THE IMPORTANCE ASSIGNED TO THE ELECTIONS BY THE VC LEADERSHIP.

12. MILITARY ACTION BY THE VC/NVA FORCES WAS GENERALLY LIMITED TO SMALL ACTIONS. IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE, HOWEVER, THEY MANAGED TO SCORE TWO "SPECTACULARS" OF THE KIND MOST USEFUL IN BOOSTING THEIR OWN MORALE AND PRESENTING THE WORLD WITH A PICTURE OF ALLIED VULNERABILITY. ON 14 JULY THE VC, UNDER COVER OF A MORTAR ATTACK, SEIZED THE HOI AN JAIL AND RELEASED THE PRISONERS. ABOUT 870 POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

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(C)

CADRE PRISONERS MADE GOOD THEIR ESCAPE, PROVIDING THE VC A MUCH NEEDED SUPPLY OF TRAINED MANPOWER. ON THE SAME NIGHT, AN NVA ARTILLERY UNIT HIT DANANG AIR BASE WITH 48 122MM ROCKETS, KILLING EIGHT, WOUNDING 175, AND CAUSING DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT AND FACILITIES ESTIMATED AS HIGH AS 85 MILLION DOLLARS. IN BINH LONG PROVINCE ON 11 JULY THE ENEMY LAUNCHED AN ILL-CONSIDERED REGIMENTAL-SIZED OFFENSIVE AGAINST A BATTALION OF THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) 5TH DIVISION AND TOOK HEAVY LOSSES. THROUGHOUT THE REST OF THE COUNTRY, THE VC/NVA GUERRILLAS AVOIDED LARGE-UNIT CONTACTS AND LIMITED THEIR INITIATIVES TO HIT-AND-RUN MORTAR AND ROCKET ATTACKS, ASSAULTS ON SMALL OUTPOSTS, AND SMALL ATTACKS ON LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

13. TERRORISM INCREASED IN MOST AREAS, POSSIBLY REFLECTING AN INABILITY TO CONDUCT LARGER OPERATIONS. THESE ATTACKS TENDED TO CONTINUE THE INDISCRIMINATE CHARACTER NOTED THE PREVIOUS MONTH: PEOPLE WERE KILLED SEEMINGLY AT RANDOM BY MINES, BOOBY TRAPS, AND MORTAR FIRE. THERE WERE A FEW GROUP "&EXECUTIONS" OF PEOPLE WHO WERE ACCUSED OF SOME SORT OF ANTI-VC CONNECTIONS. IN NAM HOA DISTRICT OF THUA THIEN

PROVINCE, 14 SELECTED PEOPLE, INCLUDING A 4-YEAR-OLD CHILD, WERE ASSASSINATED. IN ONE SUCH CASE IN GIA DINH PROVINCE, SIX PEOPLE WHO WERE KILLED FOR INVOLVEMENT WITH GVN INFORMER ACTIVITIES WERE LATER FOUND NOT TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED.

14. REPORTS FROM SEVERAL WIDELY SCATTERED PLACES INDICATED THE VC ARE STRIVING TO INCREASE THEIR CAPABILITIES AND ACTIVITY IN THE CITIES, BUT THERE WERE FEW SIGNS OF ACHIEVEMENT IN THIS REGARD DURING JULY. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN NEARLY A YEAR, VC-EMPLANTED GRENADES WERE FOUND IN DANANG CITY, BUT BOTH WERE DISARMED BEFORE EXPLODING. KIEN HOA PROVINCE REPORTED THE ORGANIZATION OF A "RESIGNED-TO-DEATH" CLASS FOR GIVING INDOCTRINATION AND TRAINING FOR SUICIDE ATTACKS ON GVN TARGETS.

15. THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY THE VC CONTINUED TO GIVE HIGH PRIORITY TO COUNTERING GVN PACIFICATION PROGRAMS. AS PREVIOUSLY, THEY LAUNCHED NUMEROUS PHYSICAL ATTACKS ON REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD) TEAMS, OFTEN SELECTING THOSE TEAMS WHOSE PROGRAMS WERE MAKING THE GREATEST PROGRESS. SOME PROVINCES, EXPECIALLY IN IV CORPS, HAVE NOTED INCREASED SOPHISTICATION IN THE ANTI-RED PROPAGANDA. A NUMBER

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(classification) (dissem controls) [redacted]

OF TECHNIQUES, INCLUDING SONG AND POETRY-WRITING CONTESTS, ARE USED IN AN EFFORT TO TURN THE HAMLET-DWELLERS AGAINST THE TEAMS AND TO DEMORALIZE OR SUBVERT THE TEAM MEMBERS.

16. AGENT REPORTS, DEFECTORS, AND DOCUMENTS TELL OF VC DISTRESS OVER THE GROWING EFFORT OF THE CHIEU HOI (OPEN ARMS) PROGRAM. IN ADDITION TO CONDUCTING EXTENSIVE PROPAGANDA, THE VC HAVE MADE MORTAR ATTACKS ON CHIEU HOI AND REFUGEE CAMPS, KILLING AND WOUNDING A NUMBER OF INHABITANTS, AND THEY HAVE ASSASSINATED A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL HOIHXHANH (RALLIERS).

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES.

17. THERE ARE REPORTS FROM ALL FOUR CORPS AREAS OF VC MILITARY UNITS BEING BROKEN UP INTO SMALLER GROUPS AND RECEIVING TRAINING IN SAPPER ACTIVITY AND SMALL-UNIT TACTICS. IN PG CORPS, VC UNITS HAVE BROKEN INTO SMALLER GROUPS IN ORDER TO EVADE FRIENDLY FORCES, AND OBSERVERS SAY THEY SEEM TO BE ASSUMING A SUPPORT ROLE FOR NVA FORCES. THIS WAS DONE

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(classification) (dissem controls) [redacted]

EARLIER IN I CORPS, WHERE IT REPORTEDLY CAUSED VC RESENTMENT AGAINST THE HVA.

18. AN GIANG PROVINCE REPORTS A "DONG KHOI" (MOVE OUT ALL FORCES) CAMPAIGN DESIGNED TO UNITE ALL VC FORCES UNDER A MILITARY COMMAND SECTION AND MAKE ALL CADRES WORK HARDER FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE FALL-WINTER CAMPAIGN. THE DETAILS OF THIS REPORTED POLICY ARE OBSCURE, BUT IT APPEARS TO INVOLVE AN INCREASED RELIANCE ON MILITARY DISCIPLINE IN PLACE OF POLITICAL MOTIVATION. BINH THUAN PROVINCE REPORTS THAT 60 NVN POLITICAL CADRES, WHO CAME DOWN IN MAY, HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO HELP DIRECT ACTIVITIES OF DISTRICT AND VILLAGE COMMITTEES. MANY OF THE BINH THUAN VC ARE LIKELY TO LOOK UPON THEM AS CARPETBAGGERS. THIS PROVINCE HAS ALSO RE-ORGANIZED THREE OF ITS DISTRICTS IN AN EFFORT TO RECOVER FROM THE DISRUPTION CAUSED BY ALLIED MILITARY OPERATIONS.

19. ON 1 JANUARY 1967, THE CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM (COSVN) ISSUED A DIRECTIVE THAT CADRES FROM VARIOUS LEVELS WOULD BE SENT DOWN TO LOWER LEVELS TO STRENGTHEN THEM [redacted] = TDCS-314/05040-67 SUBSEQUENT REPORTING INDICATED COMPLIANCE WITH THE DIRECTIVE IN A NUMBER OF PROVINCES, IN-

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(classification) (dissem controls) [redacted]

CLUDING GONTUM, NINH THUAN, PHONG DINH, AN GIANG KIEN GIANG, AND KIEN HOA. REPORTING RECEIVED DURING JULY INDICATES THAT DARLAC IS THE MOST RECENT PROVINCE TO HAVE IMPLEMENTED THE COSVN DIRECTIVE.

20. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV DIR/JUSPAO (MR. ZORTHIAN ONLY) CINCPAC ARPAK PACAF PACFLT.

REPORT CLASS/[redacted]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• PRIORITY 108a

IN

DIA ARMY NAVY AIR [redacted] SDO ONE OCR [redacted] CIA/NMCC
STATE/DIR NMCC/MC NIC (HENDRICKSON) DD/I EXO

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[redacted]

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SECRET

[redacted]

DIST 1 SEPTEMBER 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI 3 - 8 AUGUST 1967

SUBJECT ROAD CONDITIONS AND BOMBING EFFECTS IN THE VICINITY OF HANOI

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

ACQ

FIELD NO.

SOURCE [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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NAVY DNI, ADMIRAL FLUCKEY;
AIR FORCE AFCIN, GENERAL THOMAS

TO NSA : EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARTER

SUMMARY. DURING THE PERIOD 3-8 AUGUST 1967, MEMBERS OF THE FIFTH RUSSELL TRIBUNAL INVESTIGATION TEAM WERE EXCORTED TO CITIES IN THE VICINITY OF HANOI TO WITNESS THE BOMB DAMAGE. ALL OF THEIR TRAVELING WAS DONE AT NIGHT BY AUTOMOBILE. THE ROADS OVER WHICH THEY TRAVELED WERE IN A BAD STATE OF REPAIR AND IN MANY PLACES COULD NOT BE USED BY A

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(C)

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VEHICLE LARGER THAN A SMALL TRUCK. A VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL SAID THAT ROADS IN THE AREA SURROUNDING NAM DINH CITY WERE SO BAD THAT IT WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR SAM MISSILE TRANSPORTERS TO MOVE FROM PLACE TO PLACE. END OF SUMMARY.

1. IN EARLY AUGUST SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE FIFTH RUSSELL TRIBUNAL INVESTIGATION TEAM WERE TAKEN ON GUIDED TOURS OF BOMBED CITIES IN THE HANOI VICINITY. THE FIRST TRIP TOOK PLACE ON 3 AUGUST WHEN THE TRIBUNAL MEMBERS WERE DRIVEN FROM HANOI TO THE TOWN OF SON TAY NORTH WEST OF HANOI ON ROUTE 11A. THEY WERE ACCOMPAINED ON THIS TRIP BY COLONEL HA VAN LAU WHO HAD BEEN THE SENIOR NORTH VIETNAMESE REPRESENTATIVE AT THE RECENT STOCKHOLM PEACE CONFERENCE. THE TRIP WAS MADE AT NIGHT. ABOUT 10 KILOMETERS FROM HANOI THE GROUP PASSED TEN SAM MISSILE TRANSPORTERS WITH MISSILES WHICH WERE APPARENTLY STOPPED FOR REPAIRS TO THE TRANSPORTERS. IN THE AREA FROM 11-20 KILOMETERS FROM HANOI ON ROUTE 11A THERE WERE NUMEROUS CONVENTIONAL AAA INSTALLATIONS NEAR THE ROAD. ABOUT 22 KILOMETERS FROM HANOI THE ROAD WAS BADLY CRATERED NEAR A DAM WHICH APPEARED TO BE INTACT. THE GROUP WAS TAKEN TO BAT LAI VILLIAGE, QUANG OAI DISTRICT, HA TAY PROVINCE WHICH THEY WERE TOLD HAD BEEN BOMBED WITH CLUSTER BOMB UNITS ON 26 JULY AND 1 AUGUST. NINE PERSONS WERE SAID TO HAVE BEEN KILLED AND 29 WOUNDED. THE VILLAGE WAS QUITE REMOTE AND HAD NO APPARENT

• SECRET (declassification) [redacted]

MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE.

2. ON THE NIGHT OF 5 AUGUST THE GROUP WAS DRIVEN FROM HANOI TO NAM DINH CITY. THEY WERE ACCOMPANIED ON THIS TRIP BY PHAM VAN BAC, WHO IS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE VIETNAMESE WAR CRIMES INVESTIGATION TEAM IN HANOI AND ALSO A JUDGE IN THE CITY OF HANOI. THE ROAD BETWEEN HANOI AND NAM DINH WAS IN A VERY BAD STATE OF REPAIR BECAUSE OF BOMB DAMAGE AND IN SOME PLACES IT WAS NECESSARY TO DRIVE BESIDE THE FORMER ROADBED. THE GROUP SAW MEDIUM SIZED TRUCKS WHICH HAD BECOME STUCK TRYING TO PASS BOMB DAMAGE ON SOME OF THE STEEP CURVES BESIDE THE FORMER ROADBED. THE FOLLOWING MORNING PHAM VAN BAC DISCUSSED ROAD CONDITIONS WITH THE TRIBUNAL GROUP AND SAID THAT THE ROADS IN THE NAM DINH AREA WERE IN VERY BAD SHAPE AND THAT IT WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR THE SAM MISSILE TRANSPORTERS TO GET FROM PLACE TO PLACE.

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3. THE TRIBUNAL GROUP VISITED NAM DINH CITY ON 6 AUGUST. THEY WERE TOLD THAT 35-40 PER CENT OF THE TOWN HAD BEEN DESTROYED BY BOMBING AND THE GROUP AGREED WITH THIS ESTIMATE AFTER OBSERVING THE CITY. [redacted] DESCRIBED THE TOWN AS "EMPTY" AND SAID ALL LARGE HOUSES HAD EITHER BEEN DESTROYED OR DAMAGED. THE REMAINING INHABITANTS LOOKED TIRED AND DEPRESSED.) PHAM VAN BAC SAID THAT THE TOWN HAD A PEACETIME POPULATION OF 93,000 BUT DID NOT

• SECRET (declassification) [redacted]

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SAY WHERE THE FORMER INHABITANTS HAD BEEN RELOCATED. BAC SAID THAT 106 RESIDENTS OF NAM DINH HAD BEEN KILLED BY BOMBS IN 1965 AND 1966 AND THAT 34 HAD BEEN KILLED IN 1967. [redacted] DESPITE VIETNAMESE CLAIMS TO THE CONTRARY, [redacted] THE TRIBUNAL MEMBERS PRIVATELY CONCLUDED THAT CIVILIAN CASUALTIES HAD NOT BEEN HEAVY IN NAM DINH.)

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4. ON THE NIGHT OF 8 AUGUST THE GROUP, STILL ACCOMPANIED BY PHAM VAN BAC, WAS DRIVEN FROM PHU LY CITY TO NINH BINH CITY. THE ROAD BETWEEN THE TWO CITIES CROSSES TAAM SONG DAY RIVER TWICE AND AT BOTH CROSSINGS THE BRIDGES HAD BEEN BOMBED OUT AND PONTOON BRIDGES WERE IN USE. AT THE FIRST CROSSING ABOUT 15 KILOMETERS FROM NINH BINH THE PONTOON BRIDGE WAS TWO LANE AND TRAFFIC WENT THROUGH WITH LITTLE DELAY. HOWEVER, THE PONTOON BRIDGE AT THE CROSSING ABOUT 10 KILOMETERS FROM NINH BINH WAS ONE LANE AND REPRESENTED A CONSIDERABLE BOTTLENECK.

5. THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD 3-8 AUGUST WHEN THE TRIBUNAL MEMBERS WERE TRAVELING BY CAR AT NIGHT THEY FREQUENTLY PASSED LABORERS WORKING ON THE ROADS. THEY WERE TOLD BY PHAM VAN BAC AND COLONEL HA VAN LAU THAT SPECIAL "SHOCK BRIGADES" HAD BEEN CREATED TO HANDLE ROAD DAMAGE. THESE BRIGADES ARE MADE UP OF PERSONS WHO LIVE IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF KEY ROADS AND THEY ARE SUPPOSED TO BE AVAILABLE FOR ROAD REPAIR WORK IMMEDIATELY AFTER A BOMBING ATTACK.

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• S E C R E T [redacted]
(classification)

MANY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SHOCK BRIGADES ARE LABORERS DURING THE D WHO WORK EXTRA HOURS AT NIGHT ON ROAD REPAIR. AN EFFORT IS MADE TO KEEP STORES FOR ROAD REPAIR NEAR THE PLACES THEY MAY BE NEEDED. THE TRIBUNAL MEMBERS FREQUENTLY HEARD EXPLOSIONS AT NIGHT AND THEIR VIETNAMESE ESCORTS CALMED THEIR FEARS BY EXPLAINING THAT THE SHOCK BRIGADES WERE BLASTING ROCK OUT OF NEARBY SMALL HILLS FOR USE ON THE ROADS. PILES OF ROCK FOR ROAD REPAIRS WERE ALONG THE ROA AT REGULAR INTERVALS. ROAD DAMAGE SEEMED TO BE QUICKLY REPAIRED BUT THERE WERE NUMEROUS PLACES WHERE IT WAS OBVIOUS BECAUSE OF THE STEEPNESS OF THE SLOPE OR TIGHTNESS OF THE TURN THAT THE ROAD COULD NOT BE USED BY ANY VEHICLE LARGER THAN A SMALL TRUCK.

5. FIELD DISSEM: NONE.

7. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ADVANCE COPIES SENT ELECTRICALLY TO WHITE HOUSE, STATE, DIA, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, NIC, NSA, OCI.

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DIA ARMY NAVY AIR [redacted] EDO ONE OCR [redacted] CIA/NMCC
STATE/DIR NMCC/MC NIC (HENDRICKSON) DD/I EXO

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2001

DIST 1 SEPTEMBER 1967

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI 5 AUGUST 1967

SUBJECT OFFICIAL NORTH VIETNAMESE BRIEFING FOR FOREIGNERS ON NORTH VIETNAM'S DIKE SYSTEM AND ALLEGED AMERICAN AIR ATTACKS AGAINST THE DIKES

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

ACQ FIELD NO.

SOURCE [redacted]

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NAVY DNI, ADMIRAL FLUCKEY;
AIR FORCE AFCIN, GENERAL THOMAS

TO NSA : EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARTER

SUMMARY. ON 5 AUGUST 1967 PHAM MY, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE VICE MINISTER OF HYDROLOGY, DESCRIBED THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DIKE SYSTEM TO THE MEMBERS OF A VISITING FOREIGN DELEGATION. MY CHARGED THAT AMERICAN AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN SYSTEMATICALLY

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SECRET (classification) [redacted]

BOMBING THE DIKES FOR ALMOST TWO YEARS. HE CLAIMED THE VIETNAMESE HAVE DEVELOPED A SYSTEM FOR RAPIDLY REPAIRING THE DIKES AND ARE BUILDING PARALLEL DIKES IN KEY AREAS IN PREPARATION FOR INCREASED AMERICAN ATTACKS ON EXISTING DIKES.

1. ON 5 AUGUST THE NORTH VIETNAMESE VICE MINISTER OF HYDROLOGY, PHAM MY, BRIEFED A VISITING FOREIGN DELEGATION ON THE NORTH VIETNAM DIKE SYSTEM. MY SUPPORTED HIS BRIEFING WITH CHARTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS AND WAS BOTH CONVINCING AND OBVIOUSLY VERY SERIOUS THROUGHOUT THE MEETING. HE BEGAN HIS TALK WITH A SHORT BRIEFING ON THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DIKE SYSTEM, NOTING THAT PRIOR TO THE MID-1950S IT WAS NOT UNUSUAL FOR RICE GROWING AREAS OF THE RED RIVER DELTA TO BE INUNDATED FOR PERIOD OF UP TO THREE YEARS. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM BEGAN IN THE MID-1950S AND THE PRESENT DIKE SYSTEM DEVELOPED AT THE SAME TIME. THE DELTA AREA AND THE SURROUNDING PLAIN WHERE THE DIKE SYSTEM IS CONCENTRATED NOW CONTAINS NINE MILLION PEOPLE AND THE POPULATION DENSITY VARIES FROM 600 TO 1500 PER SQUARE KILOMETER. EIGHTY PERCENT OF THE RICE GROWING AREA IN NORTH VIETNAM IS NOW ARTIFICIALLY IRRIGATED AND THIS IS POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE DIKE SYSTEM. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE WELL AWARE OF THE VULNERABILITY OF THE DIKES TO AIR ATTACK AND ARE MAKING AN EFFORT TO INSURE THAT THE SYSTEM WILL BE SECURE AGAINST SUCH ATTACK. THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN BOMBING THE DIKES FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS AND THE CURRENT VIETNAMESE EXPERTISE FOR REPAIRING DAMAGED DIKES HAS DEVELOPED AS A RESULT OF THIS BOMBING. THE VIETNAMESE HAVE INSTITUTED A SYSTEM WHEREBY REPAIR MATERIALS AND LABOR BRIGADES ARE AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY IN MANY KEY AREAS. THEY ARE THUS ABLE TO BEGIN REPAIRING THE DIKES ALMOST AS SOON AS THE AIRCRAFT LEAVE THE SCENE. THEY HAVE ALSO STARTED

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SECRET (classification) [redacted]

CONSTRUCTION OF SMALLER DIKES PARALLEL TO KEY DIKES BUT ON HIGHER GROUND SO THAT ANY MAJOR BOMB DAMAGE TO KEY DIKES WILL AFFECT ONLY A SMALL AREA AS THE WATER RELEASED WILL AGAIN BE CONTAINED WHEN IT REACHES THE LEVEL OF THE PARALLEL DIKE.

2. MY CLAIMED THAT THERE WERE 55 AMERICAN AIR ATTACKS SPECIFICALLY AGAINST DIKES IN 1966 AND THAT THERE HAVE BEEN 36 SUCH ATTACKS SO FAR IN 1967. THESE ATTACKS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED PRIMARILY AGAINST THE REGIONS NEAR THE TRA LY RIVER IN THAI BINH PROVINCE AND THE NINH CO RIVER IN NAM HAN PROVINCE. BOMBS OF UP TO 3,000 POUNDS HAVE BEEN USED IN THESE ATTACKS. MY EXHIBITED TO THE GROUP BEFORE AND AFTER PHOTOGRAPHS WHICH HE SAID SHOWED CERTAIN DIKES DAMAGED BY BOMBS AND THE SAME DIKES AFTER THEY HAD BEEN REPAIRED.

3. [redacted] COMMENT. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE BRIEFING WAS PROBABLY A PART OF AN EFFORT TO CONVINCE VISITORS THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS CONDUCTING A PROGRAM TO DESTROY NORTH VIETNAM DIKES. NEVERTHELESS, THE INDIVIDUAL WHO ATTENDED THE BRIEFING WAS CONVINCED THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE GREATLY CONCERNED OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF A CONCERTED AMERICAN AIR ATTACK AGAINST THE DIKE SYSTEM, PARTICULARLY DURING THE COMING HIGH WATER SEASON.

4. NO FIELD DISSEM.

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SECRET

CITE [redacted]

DIST 1 SEPTEMBER 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI 28 JULY - 23 AUGUST 1967

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

SUBJECT AVAILABILITY OF ELECTRIC POWER IN NORTH VIETNAM

ACQ

FIELD NO.

SOURCE [redacted]

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1. THE MEMBERS OF THE FIFTH RUSSELL TRIBUNAL INVESTIGATION TEAM WERE IN NORTH VIETNAM FROM 28 JULY UNTIL 23 AUGUST 1967. THEY [illegible] HANOI FOR MOST OF THIS PERIOD BUT [illegible] TRIPS TO THE COUNTRYSIDE DURING THE PERIOD 3-9 AUGUST. DURING THEIR TIME IN

SECRET [redacted]
(classification)

•SECRET [redacted]

HANOI ELECTRIC POWER WAS CUT OFF ONLY TWICE AND BRIEF STOPPAGES TOOK PLACE ON 21 AUGUST AFTER THE BOMBING. ONE STOPPAGE WAS FOR ONE HOUR AND THE SECOND WAS FOR ONLY ONE HALF HOUR. NORTH VIETNAMESE WITH WHOM TRIBUNAL MEMBERS TALKED ON 21 AUGUST SAID THE STOPPAGES WERE A RESULT OF BOMB DAMAGE TO POWER LINES RATHER THAN HITS ON THE THERMAL POWER PLANT. [redacted] TEAM MEMBERS TALKED WITH CABANES, THE FRENCH PRESS AGENCY REPRESENTATIVE IN HANOI, ON 21 AUGUST AND CABANES SAID THAT HE PASSED THE THERMAL POWER PLANT AFTER THE BOMBING THAT DAY AND THE PLANT DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN HIT.)

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2. THE MEMBERS OF THE TRIBUNAL TEAM WERE REPEATEDLY TOLD BY VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS INCLUDING SUCH PERSONS AS DR. PHAM NGOC THACH, THE DVR MINISTER OF HEALTH, THAT ALL OF THE VIETNAMESE PROVINCES OUTSIDE HANOI ARE HAVING PROBLEMS WITH THEIR ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLIES.

3. FIELD DISSEM: NONE

4. [redacted] COMMENT: ADVANCE COPIES SENT ELECTRICALLY TO EXO, STATE, DIA, NMCC/MC, NSA, NIC.

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SECRET [redacted]

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CITE [redacted]

DIST 1 SEPTEMBER 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

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DOI 11 AUGUST 1967

SUBJECT PHAM VAN DONG INTERVIEW WITH MEMBERS OF THE FIFTH RUSSELL TRIBUNAL INVESTIGATION TEAM IN HANOI, 11 AUGUST 1967

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NAVY DNI, ADMIRAL HOUCKEY;
AIR FORCE AFCIN, GENERAL THOMAS

TO NSA : EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARTER

1. THE MEMBERS OF THE FIFTH RUSSELL TRIBUNAL INVESTIGATION TEAM WHO RECENTLY VISITED HANOI HAD A MEETING WITH PHAM VAN DONG ON 11 AUGUST. THE TRIBUNAL MEMBERS WERE QUITE DISAPPOINTED WITH DONG'S EVASIVENESS IN HANDLING DIRECT QUESTIONS AND HIS FAILURE TO SUPPORT WITH FACTUAL MATERIAL HIS CLAIMS THAT THE WAR WOULD BE THE LONG RUN. DONG SPOKE ONLY OF WINNING THE WAR ALTHOUGH HE PREDICTED THAT

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[illegible] TIMES WERE IN STORE FOR THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. HE CLAIMED THAT [illegible]AMESE PREPARATIONS FOR FURTHER ESCALATION BY THE AMERICANS HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE. [illegible] SUBJECT OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THE WAR WAS NOT MENTIONED.

[illegible] THE INVESTIGATING TEAM LEADER AYBAR SPECIFICALLY ASKED DONG IF THE SINO-SOV[illegible] DISPUTE WAS INFLUENCING THE WAR IN VIETNAM AND ADDED THAT HE HAD RECENTLY ASKED KI[illegible] THE SAME QUESTION. DONG REPLIED THAT THE VIETNAMESE WERE BUSY FIGHTING THEIR OWN [illegible] AND WERE NOT BEING INFLUENCED BY THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH [illegible] AIDING. THEM. [redacted] THIS DEVIOUS HEDGING ON A SERIOUS QUES[illegible] DISAPPOINTED AYBAR.)

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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[illegible]ONG WAS ALSO ASKED WHETHER THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE WILLING TO ACCEPT FOREIGN VO[illegible]. DONG REPLIED THAT FOREIGN VOLUNTEERS WERE NOT NEEDED. HE WAS THEN ASKED WHETHER THIS STATEMENT ALSO APPLIED TO VOLUNTEERS IN THE MEDICAL FIELD. DONG SAID, "YES FOR THE TIME BEING BUT THIS COULD CHANGE."

4. DONG BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE PLANS FOR AIDING SOUTH VIETNAM AFTER VICTORY OVER THE AMERICANS. HE SAID SUCH AID WOULD BE GIVEN IN STAGES AS REQUESTED AND REQUIRED BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE. [redacted] DONG'S APPARENT REFUSAL TO ADMIT THE PRESENT MASSIVE NORTH VIETNAMESE SUPPORT TO THE WAR EFFORT IN SOUTH VIETNAM WAS PARTICULARLY GALLING TO THE TRIBUNAL MEMBERS.)

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5. FIELD DISSEM: NONE

6. [redacted] COMMENT. ADVANCE COPIES SENT ELECTRICALLY TO EXO, STATE, DIA, [illegible]/AC, NSA, NIC.

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PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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DATE: DEC 2000

DIST 1 SEPTEMBER 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI 11 - 23 AUGUST 1967

EO 12958
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(C)

SUBJECT BOMBING OF THE CAU LONG BIEN BRIDGE IN HANOI ON 11 AUGUST AND THE EFFECT OF THE CLOSING OF THE BRIDGE ON TRANSPORTATION IN HANOI

ACQ

FIELD NO.

SOURCE [redacted]

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SECRET [redacted]
(Classification)

1. ON 11 AUGUST THE CAU LONG BIEN BRIDGE CONNECTING HANOI AND THE GIA LAM AREA ACROSS THE RED RIVER WAS BOMBED. THE BRIDGE CROSSES AN ISLAND IN THE RED RIVER AND ABOUT FORTY METERS OF THE BRIDGE SURFACE BETWEEN THE ISLAND AND GIA LAM WAS COMPLETELY DESTROYED WHILE ANOTHER THIRTY METERS OF THE SURFACE WAS SEVERELY TWISTED. THERE ARE 13 SETS OF BRIDGE PIERS BETWEEN THE ISLAND AND THE GIA LAM SIDE OF THE RIVER AND THE PIERS ARE ALTERNATIVELY SINGLE, THEN DOUBLE, THEN SINGLE, ETC. COUNTING FROM THE ISLAND SIDE TOWARDS GIA LAM THE TWO PIERS IN THE FOURTH LINE (C THE SECOND DOUBLE SET OF PIERS) WERE DESTROYED BY THE BOMBING. ONE OF THE TWO PIERS WAS COMPLETELY DESTROYED AND THE OTHER IS VISIBLE ABOVE THE SURFACE OF THE WATER BUT DOES NOT REACH THE BRIDGE. AS OF 22 AUGUST THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT THE VIETNAMESE HAD MADE ANY EFFORT TO REPAIR THE BRIDGE ITSELF ALTHOUGH WORKMEN HAD REPLACED THE POWER AND ELECTRIC LINES CROSSING THE BRIDGE WHICH HAD BEEN DESTROYED WHEN THE BRIDGE WAS BOMBED.

2. SINCE 11 AUGUST TRAFFIC CROSSING THE RED RIVER AT THE BRIDGE HAS BEEN HANDLED BY TWO OLD FERRY BOATS, EACH TOWING A BARGE-LIKE BOAT. THESE FERRIES CARRY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AS WELL AS VEHICLES UP TO AND INCLUDING MEDIUM SIZED TRUCKS. BACKLOGS OF TRUCK TRAFFIC OF AS MANY AS 40 VEHICLES WERE OBSERVED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE RIVER DURING THE PERIOD 11 - 22 AUGUST, BUT THE BACKLOGS NEVER APPEARED TO HAVE REACHED A REALLY SEVERE STAGE AND USUALLY DISAPPEARED DURING THE DAY. THE FERRIES WERE HAVING SOME TROUBLE MANEUVERING BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF TOWING BARGES AGAINST THE RIVER CURRENT; THEY FREQUENTLY WENT UPSTREAM AND LET THE CURRENT OF THE RIVER AID

SECRET [redacted]
(classification)

THEM IN CROSSING. TWO OTHER OLD FERRY BOATS WERE TIED UP ALONG THE RIVER BANK BUT DID NOT APPEAR TO BE IN USE. SMALL CRAFT TRAFFIC ACROSS THE RIVER DID NOT NOTICEABLY INCREASE AFTER THE BRIDGE WAS CUT.

3. SOURCE COMMENT: ULTIMATE SOURCE WAS FRANKLY SURPRISED THAT NO APPARENT EFFORT WAS MADE TO USE SMALL BOATS OR SAMPAN TYPE CRAFT TO TRANSPORT PEOPLE ACROSS THE RIVER. HE WAS ALSO SURPRISED THAT THERE DID NOT APPEAR TO BE ANY MAJOR BLOCKAGE OF TRUCK TRAFFIC. HE VISITED THE HANOI WATERFRONT ALMOST DAILY BETWEEN 11 AND 22 AUGUST AND DID NOT DETECT ANY SIGNS OF EFFORTS TO BUILD ALTERNATE MEANS OF CROSSING THE RIVER, SUCH AS PONTOON BRIDGES. SEVERAL VIETNAMESE NOTED THAT THE RIVER IS QUITE HIGH AT THIS TIME OF YEAR AND THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO BUILD AND MAINTAIN A PONTOON BRIDGE.

4. FIELD DISSEM: NONE

REPORT CLASS SECRET [redacted]

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5. [redacted] COMMENT. ADVANCE COPIES SENT ELECTRICALLY TO EXO, STATE, DIA, NMCC/MC, NSA, NIC.

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~~Confidential~~

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

Prospects for Agriculture in Communist Countries as of August 1967

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

~~Confidential~~

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RR IM 67-57
September 1967

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GROUP 1
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DECLASSIFICATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Prospects for Agriculture in Communist Countries as of August 1967

Summary

Agricultural prospects as of August are relatively good in all the Communist countries except North Vietnam. Crop production for the Communist countries as a group will probably be above average, but less than last year, when record grain harvests were gathered in both the USSR and Eastern Europe (including Albania and Yugoslavia). Contracts to import grain are behind those of the last few years, although the demand for imports may rise if drought continues to affect the fall-harvested crops in China and Eastern Europe.

A record wheat crop has already been harvested in Eastern Europe. The Soviet wheat harvest is likely to be above average, but less than the bumper 1966 crop. The outlook for fall-harvested row crops such as corn, potatoes, sugar beets, and sunflowers is less favorable than a year ago in both the USSR and Eastern Europe. The production and procurement of livestock products, however, probably will exceed the levels of recent years.

Note: This memorandum was produced by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research; the estimates and conclusions represent the best judgment of the Directorate of Intelligence as of 6 September 1967.

The early grain harvest in Communist China is estimated to have been better than in 1966, but it is too early to predict the outcome of the more important fall harvest. The Cultural Revolution thus far appears to have been confined primarily to urban areas, but agriculture may become increasingly involved in the coming months if unrest persists.

In North Vietnam the spring rice harvest -- normally about one-third of the annual rice crop -- is estimated to have been below average, primarily because of reduced acreage. The more important fall rice crop is also off to a poor start because of drought, but the final outcome will depend heavily on the effectiveness of irrigation in the Red River delta, where most of the rice is grown.

USSR

1. A good winter grain crop has been harvested in the USSR. Less is known about the spring wheat crop, the harvest of which is still under way in the important new lands areas of Western Siberia, the Urals, and northern Kazakhstan. One Eastern European source has indicated that Soviet officials expect a total grain crop of about 150 million metric tons* (compared with the 171 million tons claimed in 1966), and a Soviet source has estimated the wheat crop at about 82 million tons (compared with 100 million tons in 1966). The 1967 grain crop is tentatively estimated at 115 million to 120 million tons, including some 60 million to 65 million tons of wheat (the comparable estimates for 1966 are 140 million and 80 million tons, respectively).

2. The Soviet purchase in late July of only 2 million tons of wheat from Canada (leaving 4 million tons yet to be purchased under the three-year agreement ending in mid-1969) probably means that the USSR considers its wheat supply situation to be generally satisfactory. On the basis of the evidence presently

* Soviet statistics on grain production do not make allowances for trash, excess moisture, immature grain, and other factors, which normally amount to an estimated 15 to 20 percent of the total.

available, it is not believed that large additional purchases of wheat this year will be necessary. But, if the weather is inclement during the remainder of the harvest in the new lands -- a rather frequent occurrence -- the quality of the wheat could be reduced, and Soviet officials might feel compelled to import some additional grain, particularly if the alternative were to draw on reserves.

3. The production of row crops, such as corn, sugar beets, sunflowers, and potatoes, has probably been affected by the below-normal precipitation in much of European USSR during July. Although the cotton crop experienced some difficulties earlier this year, production of this irrigated crop is expected to approximate the record 1966 level. A record output of livestock products is expected this year, a result both of good feed supplies and of record numbers in most categories of livestock, but a shortage of processing and storage facilities is causing greater than normal losses of meat and milk.

Eastern Europe

4. Total production of grain in Eastern Europe is expected to be above average but not as high as in 1966 (66 million tons) because of a smaller corn harvest. The 1966/67 growing season for small grains was outstanding in most countries, and production records in wheat were set in all countries except East Germany and Poland. Although small grains planted in both fall and spring ripened almost simultaneously, harvesting losses were held to a minimum because the weather remained dry and additional harvesting machinery was available. One possible exception was East Germany, where intermittent rains, organizational problems, and the high moisture content of the grain may have caused excessive harvesting losses and reduced the milling quality of the grain.

5. The current outlook for fall-harvested crops, such as corn, sunflowers, sugar beets, and potatoes, is not as good as a year ago. Earlier forecasts for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and

Yugoslavia have proved to be too optimistic because of below-normal rainfall. Drought conditions through early September could sharply reduce yields of these row crops, which got off to a late start in most countries and are now at a stage of growth that requires good soil moisture to result in high yields. The northern countries could still realize yields equal to last year, but this seems unlikely in the southern region. The production and procurement of livestock products during the first seven months of 1967 have increased over the same period in 1966 because of good feed supplies and favorable farm prices and will probably continue to exceed 1966 levels during the balance of the year.

6. Eastern Europe's demand for imported grain in FY 1968* is expected to be somewhat less than the 7 million tons purchased in FY 1967. Major importers will continue to be Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland. Their demand for feed grain from the Free World will be stronger than for wheat. Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia will again be able to export grain and could have 3 million tons available, including 1 million tons of wheat. Since 1 July 1967, Rumania and Bulgaria have agreed to export 205,000 tons of wheat to Egypt on credit.

Communist China

7. The winter wheat harvest in Communist China is estimated to have been slightly larger than in 1966. A reduction in sown area, caused by severe drought conditions at the time of fall planting, was more than offset by increased yields resulting from more favorable growing conditions. The early rice harvest was probably also better than in 1966 because of more favorable growing conditions in most of the major producing areas.

8. Drought conditions which began to appear in portions of North and South China in late July and early August may adversely affect fall-harvested crops, although it is still too early to predict the outcome of this important harvest. In North China, soil moisture as of 10 August was considerably below

* Fiscal year 1968 (1 July 1967 through 30 June 1968).

normal in portions of the provinces of Hopeh, Shantung, and Honan, which are major producers of miscellaneous grains such as millet, kaoliang, corn, and pulses. In South China, the coastal regions of Kwangtung Province -- particularly the important late-rice areas of the Canton delta and the Swatow plain -- appeared to be the most seriously affected by drought. In these regions, below-normal soil moisture conditions coincided with late-rice transplanting. The extent to which the late rice is damaged will depend upon the intensity and length of the drought and the effectiveness of irrigation facilities.

9. The Chinese have signed only one contract for the delivery of grain in FY 1968 -- with Australia for 1.5 million tons to be delivered by December 1967. Chinese grain imports in FY 1967 totaled about 5 million tons, 1 million tons less than in FY 1966. The Sino-Canadian grain negotiations planned for Canton in mid-August were canceled by the Chinese and have not yet been rescheduled. Under the three-year agreement covering the period 1 August 1966 - 31 July 1969, the Chinese have already purchased 2.5 million tons of Canadian wheat and can buy a maximum of 5 million tons more over the next two years.

North Vietnam

10. The spring rice harvest in North Vietnam, which normally accounts for about one-third of the annual rice crop, is estimated at about 1.4 million tons, or about 200,000 tons short of the average of recent years. Yields were about average, but acreage was reduced because of an early cold spell this spring, the disruptive effects of bombing attacks, a shortage of rice seedlings, insect and disease infestations, and the substitution of other crops in some of the spring rice fields.

11. In an attempt to increase total food production, the North Vietnamese substituted subsidiary crops and a quick-maturing late spring rice crop for some of the regular spring rice crop.* The resulting increase in the production of these crops was not sufficient to make up for the shortfall in the production of regular spring rice.

12. The important fall rice crop is off to a poor start. Drought conditions -- somewhat unusual at this time of the year -- have interrupted the normal progress of this crop in areas which depend on reservoirs and storage ponds for irrigation water. Much of the rice, however, is grown in the Red River delta, which is irrigated from river systems and probably not as seriously affected by the drought. Moreover, favorable weather from now to harvest could improve the prospects for this crop.

* The subsidiary crops are sweet potatoes, corn, manioc, and green beans. The fast growing late spring rice, normally grown primarily in the mountain areas, was planted in some of the delta provinces this spring. While this crop frequently has high yields, it is very susceptible to insect damage and, as it is harvested later than the regular spring rice crop, is more likely to interfere with the transplanting of the fall rice crop.

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No. 1262

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
2 September 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Vietnam Elections Situation Report No. 1

SUMMARY

The CIA Station in Saigon advises that the VC have apparently learned a lesson from last year's fiasco when they advertised that they would smash the Constitutent Assembly elections and actually did very little. This time they are promising less and doing more. The number of significant incidents of Communist violence is now at least three or four times normal and well above last year's pre-election level. Significant enemy-initiated activity has increased during the week throughout South Vietnam. While none of this recent activity has had the impact of the earlier shelling of Can Tho, the assualt on Quang Ngai, or the attack on Thang Binh District headquarters, recent terrorist actions do show the enemy's capability to hit the people. To date, however, we have seen no evidence that this terrorism is likely to cause a significant reduction in voter turn-out.

* * *

1. Saigon: The Combined Security Committee has a report that VC cadre operating in the Saigon area will shell the city on the night of 2-3 September. An artillery attack will start at 0500 hours on 3 September (1700 hours, 2 September Washington time) against sensitive installations in the Capital, especially polling booths. In support of the attack VC special mission cadres will set off explosions simultaneously at numerous polling places in order to prevent election participation.

2. In the past 72 hours, there have been twelve terrorist incidents in the Saigon area, resulting in 1 VC dead, 2 US dead, 18 VN wounded and 3 US wounded. Eight of these incidents, including four involving US personnel, took place during the night of 1-2 September. All US personnel killed and one of the US wounded were in Cholon area, which US personnel had been warned to avoid.

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DATE: DEC 2000

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3. General: In I Corps, all major population centers except Quang Tri were attacked during the past week. There was a sharp increase in attacks by fire along the coast of II Corps; propaganda, terrorism, and sabotage were evident in III Corps, and indiscriminate mining of roads and shelling of civilians was the rule in IV Corps. In the period 26 through 31 August, there were 324 incidents compared to the weekly average for 1967 of 478 but a better indicator of the intensity is the level of activity as measured by the increase in assaults, attacks by fire, kidnapping, and mining.

4. I Corps: In the past 24 hours I Corps reported the kidnapping of a hamlet chief, 12 subchiefs, and 52 civilians near Hoi An for the third group abduction in the area. Also in the Hoi An area, a resettlement camp was mortared resulting in one killed, one wounded, and the destruction of 50 houses.

5. In II Corps, a polling place was attacked and burned at Song Cau with three wounded. Near Tuy Hoa a base camp was attacked and an artillery position was mortared. The Dien Khanh District headquarters, Khanh Hoa Province was attacked by an unknown number of enemy with hand thrown charges killing two civilians and wounding 30. The Du Long District Hqs. and MACV Team No. 39, Ninh Thuan, received small arms and mortar fire killing one civilian and wounding 9.

6. In III Corps, terrorism and sabotage in the past day included detonation of a bike bomb in Ben Cat, Binh Duong Province, wounding 17 civilians and two ARVN. In Hau Nghia, Binh Long, and Bien Hoa Provinces, highways 1, 13, and 15 were interdicted by mining of bridges and culverts.

7. IV Corps reports a civilian bus detonating a mine in Dinh Tuong with casualties of 10 civilians killed and 15 wounded. Also in Dinh Tuong two bridges were destroyed along highway 4. In Vinh Long, Tra An District town was mortared with 15 civilians wounded.

VIETNAM STATION REPORT NO. 46/67 (26 AUGUST - 3 SEPTEMBER 1967)

A BARE AND BLESSED PLURALITY

THE FINAL FIGURES ARE NOT IN YET ON THE VOTING FOR PRESIDENT, AND NONE OF THE RESULTS HAVE BEEN ANNOUNCED IN THE SENATORIAL RACE. BUT EVEN IF WE DID HAVE ALL OF THE FIGURES, IT IS TOO EARLY TO MAKE A DEFINITIVE JUDGMENT ON THE MEANING OF THE 3 SEPTEMBER ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, BECAUSE AS MUCH IS UNKNOWN AS IS KNOWN. WHAT FOLLOWS, THEN, IS MORE A SIGH OF RELIEF THAT EVERYTHING TURNED OUT SO WELL THAN THE WISE PRONOUNCEMENT OF A DISPASSIONATE JUDGE.

THE OBSTACLES TO THE CONDUCT, PROPER OR IMPROPER, OF ANY ELECTION AT ALL IN THIS WEARY, DISCOMBOBULATED COUNTRY ARE SO ENORMOUS AS TO BE LITTLE UNDERSTOOD. IN A COUNTRY WHERE GROUND TRANSPORTATION BETWEEN MOST MAJOR CITIES AND

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DATE: FEB 2001

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TOWNS REMAINS UNDER CONSTANT THREAT OF HOSTILE INTERDICTION, IT WAS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH THE ELECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN 44 PROVINCES AND SIX AUTONOMOUS CITIES (DANANG, SAIGON, HUE, CAM RANH, DALAT, AND VUNG TAU). ALL TOLD, THIS MEANT THE SETTING UP AND STAFFING OF 8,808 POLLING PLACES.

EACH OF THE 11 PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AND 48 SENATORIAL SLATES WAS THEORETICALLY ENTITLED TO AN OBSERVER AT EACH POLLING PLACE, AND THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WAS COMMITTED TO PAYING FOR THEM; FORTUNATELY, THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF OBSERVERS WAS K EPT WELL BELOW THE THEORETICAL MAXIMUM. EACH POLLING PLACE HAD TO BE PROVIDED WITH AN AMPLE STOCK OF BALLOTS FOR ALL OF THE CANDIDATES AND SLATES -- 460,200,000 BALLOTS IN ALL, IN ORDER THAT EACH VOTER COULD BE HANDED A HEFTY SHEAF OF 59 ON ENTERING. THIS MEANT MOVING ABOUT A THOUSAND TONS OF MATERIAL, OFTEN TO PLACES TOO SMALL TO FIND EXCEPT ON VERY LARGE-SCALE MAPS. AS A MEASURE OF THE PROBLEM, EACH OF THE EIGHT DISTRICTS OF BINH DINH PROVINCE (302,260 REGISTERED VOTERS) HAD TO BE PROVIDED WITH TWO 2 1/2 TON TRUCKS TO DISTRIBUTE THE BALLOTS AND COLLECT THEM AFTER VOTING.

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THE PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN EFFORT WAS NO SMALL AFFAIR EITHER. EACH PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AND SENATORIAL SLATE HAD THE RIGHT TO HAVE PRINTED AND DISTRIBUTED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE A NUMBER OF LEAFLETS AND POSTERS EXTOLLING THE CANDIDATES' VIRTUES AND PUBLICIZING THEIR SYMBOLS (USED AS IDENTIFICATION FOR THOSE MANY VOTERS WHO COULD NOT READ). ALL OF THIS AMOUNTED TO AN ADDITIONAL 144,720,000 PEICES OF PAPER, ENOUGH TO KEEP THE LANDSCAPE CLUTTERED AND THE SEWERS CLOGGED FOR SOME TIME. SURPRISINGLY, MOST OF THE POSTERS, LEAFLETS, AND BALLOTS GOT WHERE THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO, THANKS IN PART TO THE WONDROUS EFFICIENCY OF AMERICAN AIR SUPPORT.

THE VIET CONG AND NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY DID EVERYTHING THEY COULD TO MAKE THE ELECTIONS FAIL. FORTUNATELY, ALL THEY COULD DO WAS NOT VERY MUCH AS OPPOSED TO THE MASSIVE EFFORT OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT (WITH, OF COURSE, AMERICAN POWER IN THE BACKGROUND). BETWEEN 1800 HOURS, 2 SEPTEMBER, AND 0800 HOURS, 4 SEPTEMBER, THE VC KIDNAPPED 278 CIVILIANS, WOUNDED 160, AND KILLED 23 IN SOME 274 ATTACKS OF VARIOUS KINDS (THESE ARE MINISTRY OF SECURITY FIGURES).

[redacted] VINH LONG [redacted]

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"ELECTION DAY BROKE CLEAR AND BRIGHT, AFTER A WET AND STORMY NIGHT. PART OF THE PRECIPITATION CONSISTED OF RIFLE AND MORTAR ROUNDS, GRENADES, AND MINES ..... WHEREAS, DURING LAST YEAR'S CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS, LARGE CROWDS HAD BUILT UP AT THE POLLS ONE HOUR BEFORE THEY OPENED, THIS YEAR FOUND PEOPLE STAYING AWAY IN A WAIT-AND-SEE POSTURE..... THOUGH OFFICIAL SOURCES STATED THAT ALL ROADS WERE OPEN AND THAT TRAFFIC WAS FLOWING AS USUAL, THE BUSES WERE NOT ON THE ROADS UNTIL THE MORNING HAD MATURED. BY 1000 HOURS; HOWEVER, MUCH OF THE WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE HAD EVAPORATED AND THE PEOPLE WERE COMING TO THE POLLS IN MOUNTING NUMBERS....."

IN ANOTHER PROVINCE, LONG KHANH, A VILLAGE WHICH HAD FOUR INHABITANTS WOUNDED WHEN IT CAME UNDER MORTAR FIRE IN MID-MORNING, LATER REPORTED A 97 PERCENT TURNOUT AT THE POLLS.

IF THE VC FAILED TO MAKE MUCH OF AN IMPRESSION ON THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE POPULATION, THEY WERE MORE SUCCESSFUL IN THE CASE OF THE AMERICAN OBSERVERS SENT OVER BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON. GOVERNORS MURPHY OF CALIFORNIA AND GUY OF NORTH DAKOTA VISITED A POLLING PLACE IN TUY HOA CITY WHERE AN EXPLOSION SEVERAL HOURS EARLIER HAD KILLED THREE AND WOUNDED

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APPROXIMATELY 40; THEIR REACTION TO THE NEWS THAT SOME OF THE WOUNDED LATER RETURNED TO VOTE WAS DESCRIBED AS "FAVORABLE."

OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE WERE THE RESULTS IN IV CORPS, THE DELTA, WHERE ABOUT ONE-THIRD OF THE POPULATION OF THE COUNTRY LIVES (INCLUDING 1,694,944 REGISTERED VOTERS OUT OF A COUNTRYWIDE TOTAL OF 5,853,251). HERE, THE MAIN BURDEN OF SECURITY IS CARRIED BY THE VIETNAMESE THEMSELVES, SINCE AMERICAN GROUND TROOPS ARE LIMITED TO ONE INFANTRY BRIGADE.

[redacted] "GENERAL VOTER REACTION APPEARED TO BE THAT OF PARTICIPATING IN SOME FESTIVE OCCASION ..... WE ARE IMPRESSED BY THE MAGNITUDE OF THE GVN EFFORT TO ENSURE ORDERLY ELECTIONS IN THE DELTA, AND CONSIDER THE ELECTIONS A RESOUNDING VOTE OF CONFIDENCE BY THE PEOPLE FOR ..... THE CLOSEST THING TO ORDER AND STABILITY THAT THEY HAVE SEEN IN QUITE SOME TIME."

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AS OF 1800 HOURS, 4 SEPTEMBER, THE 83 PERCENT OF THE VOTERS WHO TURNED OUT SEEM TO HAVE GIVEN THE MILITARY THIEU/KY TICKET A PLURALITY OF ABOUT 35 PERCENT. (UNOFFICIALLY, IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THIS MAY LATER DECLINE TO ABOUT 32 PERCENT.) THE PROBABLE SECOND-RUNNER, WHEN ALL OF THE RESULTS ARE IN,

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WILL BE A DARK HORSE, TRUONG DINH DZU, WHO HAD BEEN EXPECTED TO TRAIL FORTH OR FIFTH. TWO FAMILIAR OLD FACES, BOTH IN THEIR 50'S, TRAN VAN HUONG AND PHAN KHAC SUU, APPEAR TO BE COMING IN THIRD AND FOURTH. SOME QUICK ARITHMETIC INDICATES THAT, IF DZU, HUONG, AND SUU HAD BEEN ABLE TO UNITE, THEY MIGHT HAVE WON. AN EQUALLY SUPERFICIAL PROGNOSIS FOR THE FUTURE IS THAT, WHILE UNABLE TO UNITE IN RUNNING, THEY MAY FIND IT EASIER TO GET TOGETHER IN NEGATING EFFORTS OF THE NEW REGIME TOWARD CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRESS. WE SHALL BE WATCHING CAREFULLY FOR INDICATIONS OF A UNIFIED CIVILIAN OPPOSITION.

WHILE WE NATURALLY TAKE SATISFACTION OF THE ELECTIONS' OUTCOME, IT BY NO MEANS SIGNALS AN END TO VIETNAM'S DIFFICULTIES; RATHER, IT PRESAGES PROBLEMS OF A NEW SORT, IN SOME WAYS AS DIFFICULT OR MORE SO TO DEAL WITH AS THOSE WE HAVE FACED IN THE PAST. THE NEW LEGISLATURE HAS TEETH, AND NOTHING

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IN THE COMPORTMENT OVER THE PAST YEAR OF ITS FUTURE MEMBERS INDICATES THAT THEY WILL BE AFRAID TO BITE. OPERATING AS THEY WILL BE WITHOUT ANY FRAMEWORK OF ORGANIZED POLITICAL PARTIES, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT WHAT SORT OF AN INFLUENCE THE LEGISLATORS WILL EXERT ON THE FUTURE OF THEIR COUNTRY. AT THIS POINT, THERE IS NO REASON FOR PESSIMISM, BUT RAMPANT OPTIMISM WOULD BE EQUALLY UNJUSTIFIED. WHAT IS CERTAIN IS THAT THE FUTURE OF VIETNAM DOES DEPEND ON A WISE AND FORCEFUL EXERCISE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER BY THIEU (WHO HAS NOT PREVIOUSLY SHOWN HIMSELF TO BE FORCEFUL), AND ON THE NEW PRESIDENT'S ABILITY TO WORK IN CLOSE HARMONY WITH HIS VICE PRESIDENT (WHICH HE HAS NOT PREVIOUSLY DONE, EITHER). OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE WILL BE THE ABILITY OF THE TWO EXECUTIVE LEADERS TO ADAPT THEMSELVES TO WORKING WITH THIS NEW PHENOMENON, TO BOTH OF THEM TOTALLY UNFAMILIAR, A TUMULTOUSLY INDEPENDENT-MINDED LEGISLATURE.

DZU: ALL THINGS TO ALL MEN

OF ALL OF THE CIVILIAN CANDIDATES, IT WAS TRUONG DINH DZU WHO SEEMS TO HAVE ANNOYED THIEU AND KY THE MOST DURING THE RECENT CAMPAIGN. AT ONE POINT, KY EXCLAIMED THAT, IF THAT

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"ANIMAL" DZU WERE ELECTED, HE (KY) WOULD BUILD A CAGE FOR HIM. SINCE DZU NOW OFFICIALLY HOLDS 17.4 PERCENT OF THE NATIONAL VOTE, AND MAY END UP WITH ABOUT 22 PERCENT, THE CAGE MAY HAVE TO BE A BIG ONE.

IN THE 50 YEARS SINCE HE WAS BORN IN BINH DINH, DZU HAS MANAGED TO GET AROUND QUITE A BIT, AND HAS NEVER BEEN ACCUSED OF BEING BASHFUL. HE WAS EDUCATED IN FRANCE; VISITED THE UNITED STATES; BECAME A DISTRICT GOVERNOR OF ROTARY INTERNATIONAL; JOINED SOCIETIES FAVORING FRIENDSHIP WITH AMERICANS, JAPANESE, FRENCH, AND CHINESE; AND PARTICIPATED IN BOTH THE BUDDHIST AND CONFUCIANIST ASSOCIATIONS. IN THE PERIOD BEFORE THE ELECTION, HE CLAIMED ~~MACV~~ CIA SUPPORT, [redacted] HE ALSO TOLD [redacted] THAT HE WAS BACKED BY A LARGE AMERICAN FIRM, PACIFIC ARCHITECTS AND ENGINEERS. HIS SON REPORTED THAT DZU HAD BEEN SOLICITING HELP IN THE UNITED STATES, WHERE HE HAD HAD PROMISES FROM "SOME PROFESSORS," AND WAS ALSO GOING TO GET HELP FROM ESSO, WHICH HAD OFFERED HIM THE SERVICES OF A PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICER. DZU HIMSELF STATED THAT HE HAD AN EXCELLENT CHANCE OF BEING ELECTED BECAUSE THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT HAD GIVEN

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HIM 150,000,000 PIASTERS FOR HIS CAMPAIGN. AMONG HIS COMPATRIOTS, HE HAS CLAIMED SUPPORT FROM THICH TJZ QUANG AND THE EXTREMIST BUDHISTS, THE CATHOLICS, THE HOA HAO, THE CAO DAI, AND THE VIETNAMESE LABOR CONFEDERATION.

DZU'S RALLYING CRY IN THE CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN "PEACE" AND THE SYMBOL OF HIS TICKET IS THE "WHITE DOVE". THE FIVE SENATORIAL SLATES WITH WHICH HE IS ASSOCIATED BEAR THE NAMES "PEACE ON EARTH," "PEACE AND PROSPERITY," "PEACE AND CONTENTMENT I, II, AND III." HIS FULL-PAGE CAMPAIGN AD PUBLISHED THE DAY BEFORE THE ELECTION WAS CONINED ENTIRELY TO THE PEACE ISSUE, AND OUTLINED A PEACE PLAN WHICH INCLUDED THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING IN NORTH VIETNAM, A TOTAL CEASE-FIRE SOUTH OF THE 17TH PARALLEL; TALKS WITH "OUR ALLIES," HANOI, AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT; AND THE RECONVENING OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE.

IN AND OF THEMSELVES, DZU'S PROPOSALS ARE NOT OBJECTIONABLE. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE VC HAVE REGARDED DZU'S PLATFORM WITH SUCH FAVOR THAT THEY HAVE GIVEN HIM THEIR SUPPORT. FROM TAY NINH, FOR EXAMPLE, [redacted] REPORTS THAT "THERE HAD BEEN SUBSTANTIAL VC PROPAGANDA IN THE PROVINCE ORDERING THE PEOPLE TO

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VOTE FOR THE DZU-CHIEU TICKET AND IT IS ASSUMED THAT THIS PROPAGANDIZING HAD SOME EFFECT....." WHATEVER THE CAUSE, DZU-CHIEU WON IN TAY NINH BY 39,947 VOTES TO THIEU-KY'S 30,830. A SIMILAR REPORT FROM KIEN GIANG TOLD OF A VC DISTRICT COMMITTE MEETING ON 14 AUGUST AT WHICH A VC OFFICIAL EXHORTED THE PERSONS ATTENDING " TO PROPAGANDIZE EARNESTLY ....." THAT THE VOTERS CAN UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION AND CAST THEIR BALLOTS FOR" DZU.

ALL OF THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT DZU IS A COMMUNIST OR EVEN A NON-COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZER WITH THE VIET CONG. BUT A MAN WHO CAN RUN AS A STRONG NATIONALIST ON A TICKET OF PEACE AND VIOLENT ANTI-MILITARISM, WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY CLAIMING THE SUPPORT OF [redacted] STANDARD OIL, CERTAINLY GIVES EVIDENCE OF A SUPPLE, SUBTLE CHARACTER, ONE HARDLY KNOWS WHAT TO EXPECT OF HIM.

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IN SUM, THE ELECTION WAS A SUCCESS. IT WAS SUCCESSFUL PARTLY BECAUSE IT WAS NOT TOO REPEAT TOO SUCCESSFUL; THE MILITARY TICKET WON (WHICH WAS GOOD), BUT NOT BY A MAJORITY (WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN BAD). TO CONCLUDE, WE MIGHT QUOTE STATEMENTS MADE BY TWO PROMINENT AMERICAN OBSERVERS. GOVERNOR HUGHES OF NEW

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JERSEY: "I'VE SPENT ANOTHER DAY WITHOUT SEEING EVIDENCE THAT WOULD LEAD TO THE PRESUMPTION OF FRAUD OR WRONGDOING. IT WAS A VERY INSPIRING DAY .....I WAS AMAZED AT THE ELECTION ACTIVITY.....I SAW 150 PEOPLE BEING INSTRUCTED IN HOW TO VOTE..... YOU COULDN'T GET EIGHT PEOPLE TOGETHER LIKE THAT IN JERSEY....." AND, FINALLY, WHITNEY YOUNG OF THE URBAN LEAGUE: "I WAS IMPRESSED WITH THE INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM ..... HERE WE WERE IN A CITY (PHAN THIE) THAT HAD JUST HAD ROCKETS THROWN IN, AND THERE WERE PEOPLE PARADING ..... I'VE BEEN MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE FAIRNESS OF THE PRESS THAN THE FAIRNESS OF THE ELECTION."

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

BT

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NLJ 019-022-001/11

~~SECRET~~

782

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

4 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President,
The White House

SUBJECT: General Vanuxem's Comments to Ambassador Lodge

REFERENCES: A. Saigon Embassy Telegram 4867 (NoDis)
B. Saigon Embassy Telegram 4868 (NoDis)

1. General Vanuxem was one of Marshal de Lattre's most dashing and colorful young colonels and made a great military name for himself during the Franco-Viet Minh War, principally as the commander of Group Mobile 3 operating in the Red River delta. A fine military officer, he is not noted for political sophistication. He is bitterly anti de Gaulle and believed to have had ties with the OAS.

2. On the rice issue, China has and continues to supply North Vietnam with rice. In recent years China has been the major source of North Vietnam's rice imports. The full extent of such deliveries in the past and at present is not known--only sketchy material is available on seaborne and rail cargoes from China to North Vietnam. It is possible that transport disruptions and other activities associated with the cultural revolution have upset delivery timetables or reduced deliveries. Chinese exports elsewhere, however, have been affected very little.

3. This year we have noted a striking increase in North Vietnam's import of foodstuffs from Communist countries. During the first half of 1967 about 220,000 tons was delivered, compared to about 30,000 tons in the first half of 1966. If China has reduced its rice shipments, other Communist countries may be making up for such losses by growing deliveries of other grains and foods. Imports, however, are only a

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DATE: DEC 2000

~~SECRET~~

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small part of food supplies in North Vietnam. Food allocations in North Vietnam do not appear to have been cut in recent months. Reports indicate, however, the substitution of other grains for part of the rice ration. We have received no unusual reports of food deficiencies in North Vietnam.

4. Even if Vanuxem could raise a three division force of French Mercenaries, which we doubt, it would be hard to envisage a military unit whose introduction into the Vietnam conflict would have more unfortunate political consequences. Any US employment of French mercenaries would be a propaganda windfall of major proportions for Hanoi and would be an act our South Vietnamese allies would almost certainly consider politically unacceptable.

5. Any significant land invasion of North Vietnam would greatly increase the risk of direct Chinese intervention in the Vietnam conflict with major ground forces.

6. In short, we are very much in accord with Ambassador Bunker's comments as expressed in Reference B.

/s George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

59a

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

5 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

This is the message Secretary Rusk mentioned at lunch today.

E0 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

I had requested permission from Secretary Rusk to disregard an instruction from the Ambassador that we not distribute this message, rather that we all await the Ambassador's own description of a conversation [redacted] into which this material would be incorporated.

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(C)

The message is not in quotation marks, because it is our Station Chief's write-up of the main points [redacted] made to him.

Richard Helms

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

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COPY

SECRET

Thursday, September 7, 1967

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(C)

TEXT OF CIA REPORT [redacted]

A resident [redacted] who returned [redacted] in late August, 1967, from Canton where she had a reunion with her family, including a daughter who arrived in Canton from Haiphong in July, 1967, and a grandson who also fled from Haiphong to China in mid-August, stated that according to these members of her family there was no electricity nor water service in Haiphong. (Source comment: These refugees were not questioned about the specific dates the stoppages occurred nor the emergency measures put into effect.)

According to these two members of her family, the electric dynamo station at Lac Vien and Minh Khai Streets, Haiphong, had been completely destroyed in a recent air attack. (Source comment: The informant did not question her relatives about the specific date of the incident.) The refugees stated further that other recent air attacks against Haiphong had resulted in the destruction or heavy damage of the Haiphong Cement Works, the sardine factory at Cua Can, the battery factory near the railroad bridge, the wool factory at An Duong, and the dockyards at Ha Ly. The refugees reported also that the Haiphong customs godowns had suffered heavy damage as well as the Paul Bert Quarters of a cadre training facility in recent attacks.

The refugees stated (but did not say they had personally witnessed the incident) that during one recent air attack against Haiphong, in early August, the crew of an anti-aircraft position in the city had panicked before American aircraft were actually over the city and had fired their weapons at ground level instead of skyward, killing and wounding a large number of civilians gathered near a square on Saigon Street close to the Chinese Communal House.

According to the refugees, living conditions in North Vietnam were extremely hard. Families were being allowed to purchase only two rice bowls and one towel per family every six months. These essentials were only sold upon submission of the family's registration booklet. In the event of breakage to a rice bowl, the broken pieces had to be shown in evidence before authorization could be obtained to replace them. Each family was further allowed only one half a bar of soap every three months.

SECRET

The refugees stated that vegetables were rare and expensive. Although meat was available, the price had reached a level beyond the means of most, with some people complaining they had not tasted pork in a year; pork was being sold at 13 Dongs a catty. The price of rice at the official rate was set at .30 Dongs per catty; rice on the black market, however, commanded a price of three Dongs per catty. The official rice ration was approximately 15 kilos per person per month, but this was cut by 50 percent with flour from the Soviet Union. No cooking oil or sugar was seen on the market. It appeared that the North Vietnamese Government was acting leniently towards the black market, since the refugees had heard of no profiteer having ever been punished for this activity. Cheap cotton cloth from the Soviet Union had recently been brought in and was not rationed. Despite its poor quality, according to the refugees, the people were happy to have it and it sold well.

Review
Case # NLJ 94-28
Document # 74a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

IN 74a

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC ~~AEC~~ ~~Treas~~ SDO ONE OCR ORR ~~USIA~~ ~~FBIS~~ CIA/NMCC

DDI EXO

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S-E-C-R-E-T [redacted]

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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CITE [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

S E C R E T

SEP 8 23 35 Z

DIST 8 SEPTEMBER 1967

COUNTRY [redacted] SOVIET UNION/VIETNAM/KOREA

DOI JUNE-AUGUST 1967

SUBJECT VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS' STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE WAR. SOVIET BLOC AND NORTH KOREAN AID TO NORTH VIETNAM.

BOWDLER
BUDGET
DAVIS
FRIED
GINSBURGH
HAMILTON
JESSUP
JOHNSON
JORDEN
KEENY
LEONHART
ROCHE
SAUNDERS
TAYLOR

ACQ 28 AUGUST 1967 FIELD NO.

SOURCE [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

SUMMARY: [redacted] NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS [redacted] THOUGHT THE VIET CONG HAD THE INITIATIVE IN THE VIETNAMESE WAR AND THAT THE US WOULD EVENTUALLY BE DEFEATED BY A BREAKDOWN IN MORALE, FATIGUE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WANT A ONE-THIRD INCREASE IN AID FOR 1968 AND PARTICULARLY ASKED FOR ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS. THEY SAID THEY EXPECT HAIPHONG TO BE BLOCKADED AND ARE PREPARING TWO NEW PORTS AGAINST THIS EVENTUALITY. THE CHINESE HAVE 200,000 UNARMED WORKERS IN NORTH VIETNAM AND ARE SUPPLYING LARGE QUANTITIES OF FOODSTUFFS TO NORTH VIETNAM. [redacted] MANY SOVIET PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN WOUNDED

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JAN 2001

•S E C R E T/ [redacted]
(classification)

IN NORTH VIETNAM AND [redacted] THE SOVIET ADVISORY GROUPS THERE NUMBER
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OVER TWO THOUSAND. INFORMATION AVAILABLE [redacted] INDICATES THAT ONE AMERICAN AIRCRAFT IS LOST FOR EVERY 7.2 MISSILE FIRINGS IN NORTH VIETNAM BUT THAT AMERICAN COUNTERMEASURES ARE CONSTANTLY INCREASING THE RATIO. NORTH KOREA IS TO SUPPLY INCREASED AID TO NORTH VIETNAM IN 1967. NORTH KOREA HAS ALSO SENT A TOTAL OF 130 FIGHTER PILOTS TO NORTH VIETNAM, OF WHOM 20 HAVE BEEN KILLED AND 16 WOUNDED. END SUMMARY.

1. [redacted]

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[redacted] IN JUNE 1967, [redacted] NORTH VIETNAMESE PRIME MINISTER, PHAM VAN DONG, DEFENSE MINISTER VO NGUYEN GIAP AND OTHER OFFICIALS. [redacted] TOLD [redacted] THAT A PARTICULAR WEAKNESS IN AMERICAN STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN VIETNAM WAS THE COMMITMENT OF ONLY 38 PERCENT OF THE FORCES TO COMBAT WITH THE REMAINDER IN A SUPPORT ROLE. THE VIETNAMESE BELIEVED THE VIETCONG HAD THE INITIATIVE BECAUSE IT COULD FORCE THE US INTO THE TYPES OF ENGAGEMENT PREFERRED BY THE VIETCONG. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE BELIEVED THE US WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO INCREASE ITS FORCES BEYOND 650,000 MEN.

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(C)

•S E C R E T/ [redacted]
(classification)

2. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS [redacted] THOUGHT THE US COULD ACHIEVE NOTHING BY MILITARY MEANS. THEY EXPECT THE WAR TO BE LONG AND THAT THE AMERICANS WILL IN THE END BE DEFEATED BY A BREAKDOWN IN MORALE, FATIGUE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS.

3. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ASKED FOR CONTINUED AND INCREASED AID FROM THE SOVIET BLOC, WHICH THEY FEEL THEY DESERVE BECAUSE VIETNAM IS FIGHTING IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. A REQUEST WAS MADE MAINLY FOR MORE ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY WEAPONS.

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(C)

[redacted]

4. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE [redacted] EXPECT HAIPHONG TO BE BLOCKADED. THEREFORE, TWO NEW PORTS ARE BEING CONSTRUCTED TO SUPPLANT HAIPHONG AND WORKSHOPS ARE BEING BUILT IN UNDERGROUND CAVES IN CLIFFS NEAR THE SEACOAST. A NEW PORT HAS BEEN BUILT NEAR THE

EO 12958
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(C)

CHINESE-NORTH VIETNAMESE BORDER WHERE MAJOR UNLOADINGS ARE ALREADY TAKING PLACE. FROM THIS PORT, THE OFFLOADED CARGOES ARE TRANSPORTED TO NORTH VIETNAM. [redacted] COMMENT: [redacted] NOT [redacted] CLEAR WHETHER THIS PORT WAS ON THE CHINESE OR THE VIETNAMESE SIDE OF THE BORDER. NOR [redacted] WHETHER THE LAND TRANSPORT OF CARGOES WAS BY RAIL OR ROAD.)

SECRET/[redacted]
(classification)

5. IN ADDITION, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE [redacted] THOUGHT VIETNAM WAS NOT LIKELY TO BE REUNITED UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS. THEY SAID MORALE AMONG THEIR PEOPLE WAS HIGH AND THAT THEY WERE EAGER TO PURSUE THE WAR.

6. ACCORDING TO STATEMENTS [redacted] BY SOVIET OFFICIALS IN HANOI, THERE ARE ABOUT 200,000 CHINESE IN NORTH VIETNAM. THE CHINESE ARE UNARMED AND ARE PRINCIPALLY ENGAGED IN TRANSPORTATION AND ROAD REPAIRS. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS [redacted] LOST CONFIDENCE IN AND BECAME FEARFUL OF COMMUNIST CHINA AFTER THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION BEGAN. NONETHELESS, THE CHINESE ARE SENDING LARGE FOOD SHIPMENTS TO NORTH VIETNAM.

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7. NORTH VIETNAM REQUESTS AID THROUGH VARIOUS CHANNELS, INCLUDING APPROACHES TO INDIVIDUAL MINISTRIES IN FRIENDLY COUNTRIES. THUS, A [redacted] TRANSPORTATION MINISTRY DELEGATION WAS INVITED TO NORTH VIETNAM. [redacted] RAILS AND TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT ARE NOW BEING DELIVERED TO NORTH VIETNAM BY SURFACE TRANSPORTATION. DURING 1967 A NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION HAS VISITED EVERY SOVIET BLOC COUNTRY TO DISCUSS AID FOR 1968. HANOI'S AID REQUESTS ARE GENERALLY ONE-THIRD HIGHER THAN THE AMOUNTS SUPPLIED IN 1967. ACCORDING TO SOVIET SOURCES, THE QUANTITY OF ARMS SUPPLIED

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(C)

NORTH VIETNAM BY THE USSR IN 1967 IS GREATER THAN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE CAN POSSIBLY USE DURING THIS YEAR AND THEY SHOULD NOT TURN TO OTHER COUNTRIES FOR ADDITIONAL AID DURING THIS PERIOD. EQUIPMENT IS GIVEN VERY POOR MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. THE SOVIETS HAVE SENT COMPLICATED DEVICES TO 450 INSTITUTIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM. [redacted] COMMENT: THIS WAS NOT FURTHER CLARIFIED.) THIS EQUIPMENT IS NOT BEING USED BECAUSE THERE IS NO WAY TO GET IT ASSEMBLED. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE SEEKING EQUIPMENT OF MORE IMMEDIATE APPLICATION TO THE WAR, E.G., FIELD WORKSHOPS AND MACHINERY FOR REPAIR AND ASSEMBLY PURPOSES. MOST RECENTLY, ON 20 AUGUST, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION MINISTRY ASKED THE POLISH GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE FREE TRANSPORTATION BY SHIP FROM GDANSK TO HAIPHONG FOR ONE THOUSAND RAILROAD RAILS, WHICH HANOI HAD RECEIVED AS A GIFT FROM EAST GERMANY. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SAID RAIL SHIPMENTS VIA CHINA WERE DIFFICULT NOW.

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8. NORTH VIETNAM'S WISHES WITH RESPECT TO SUPPLIES ARE VERY HIGH. EAST GERMANY PROPOSED TO THE COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC AID (CEMA) THAT AN ORGANIZATION BE ESTABLISHED TO COORDINATE BLOC AID IN ORDER TO TAKE CARE OF HANOI'S NEEDS. [redacted] THIS WAS NECESSARY SINCE THE VIETNAMESE WAR IS A GREAT BURDEN TO THE BLOC COUNTRIES, WHICH NOW MUST ALSO MEET NEW OBLIGATIONS TO THE ARAB STATES.

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(classification)

9. THE MOST IMPORTANT SUPPLIES, E.G., ARMAMENTS AND AMMUNITION, ARE BEING TRANSPORTED TO NORTH VIETNAM BY RAIL VIA CHINA. THE JOURNEY REQUIRES 20 TO 25 DAYS. [redacted] COMMENT: [redacted] PRESUMABLY [redacted] THE ENTIRE JOURNEY AND NOT THE TIME REQUIRED TO PASS THROUGH CHINA.) THE ONLY GOODS DELIVERED VIA HAIPHONG BY SEA ARE FUEL, CEMENT, FOOD, TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT AND OTHER BULK CARGOES. NO STRICTLY MILITARY GOODS ARE TRANSPORTED VIA HAIPHONG.

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10. A [redacted] DELEGATION TO NORTH VIETNAM VISITED UNDERGROUND HOSPITALS AND OBSERVED MANY WOUNDED SOVIETS WHO HAD BEEN ASSIGNED TO MISSILE AND AIR BASES. [redacted] COMMENT: [redacted] IT IS NOT KNOWN PRECISELY WHEN THESE OBSERVATIONS WERE MADE.) THERE ARE TWO SOVIET ADVISORY GROUPS IN HANOI FOR THE AIR FORCE AND FOR THE MISSILE UNITS. SOVIET SPECIALISTS ARE ASSIGNED TO THE AIR AND MISSILE BASES. THEIR NUMBER IS ESTIMATED AT OVER TWO THOUSAND.

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11. INFORMATION AVAILABLE [redacted] INDICATES THAT ONE AMERICAN AIRCRAFT IS SHOT DOWN OVER NORTH VIETNAM FOR EVERY 10-12,000 ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRINGS. WITH RESPECT TO MISSILES, ONE AIRCRAFT IS SHOT DOWN FOR EVERY 7.2 FIRINGS. EFFECTIVE TACTICS AND ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES BY THE AMERICANS ARE CONSTANTLY

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DATE: APR 2001

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

IN

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EXO DDI

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CITE [redacted]

SECRET

DIST 15 SEPTEMBER 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM/FRANCE

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

DOI EARLY SEPTEMBER 1967

SUBJECT NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL'S COMMENTS ON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

ACQ 13 SEPTEMBER 1967

FIELD NO.

SOURCE [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

1. LE DINH NAHN, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMAT IN PARIS WHO HANDLES LIAISON WITH THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY ON PROPAGANDA MATTERS, MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS IN EARLY SEPTEMBER 1967 ON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS [redacted]

A. THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE IN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITY CONTINUES TO BE THE ADVOCATION OF COMPLETE AND UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBARDMENTS OF NORTH VIETNAM BY THE UNITED STATES. THIS OBJECTIVE MUST CONTINUE TO STAND BY ITSELF AND SHOULD NOT BE TIED TO ANY QUID PRO QUO ON THE PART OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT.

B. IF THE BOMBARDMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM BY THE UNITED STATES CEASES, NORTH VIETNAM WOULD BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. HOWEVER, THE NORTH

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(classification) (dissem controls)

VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE NO POSITION ON THE FORM THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD TAKE PRIOR TO THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBARDMENTS.

C. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IS OPPOSED TO ANY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT. THE UNITED STATES MUST NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH NORTH VIETNAM.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

D. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IS OPPOSED TO ANY NEW GENEVA CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM. [redacted] COMMENT. [redacted] THIS NORTH VIETNAMESE POSITION, WHICH IS SHARED BY THE SOVIET UNION, REFLECTS THE NEED FOR EXCLUDING COMMUNIST CHINA FROM ANY ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE VIETNAM WAR. COMMUNIST CHINA, [redacted] IS OPPOSED TO THE PRESENT NORTH VIETNAMESE POSITION ON NEGOTIATIONS.)

2. LE DINH NAHN COMMENTED THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ELECTION RESULTS CAUSED INCREASED DISUNITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THAT HE EXPECTED THAT ALL SORTS OF PROPOSITIONS ON PEACE NEGOTIATION WOULD SOON BE FORTHCOMING AS A RESULT. NONE OF THESE PROPOSITIONS WOULD BE CONSIDERED, HOWEVER, UNLESS THERE WAS FIRST AN UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBARDMENTS OF NORTH VIETNAM.

3. LE DINH NAHN EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION THAT IN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES PUBLIC OPINION WAS INCREASINGLY FAVORABLE TO NORTH VIETNAM'S POSITIONS. IN HIS VIEW, THERE APPEARS TO BE ALMOST COMPLETE UNITY OF OPINION THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CEASE ITS BOMBING OF THE NORTH. NAHN ATTACHED PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THE FAVORABLE TREND HE BELIEVES IS DEVELOPING IN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION.

4. SOURCE COMMENT. [redacted] NAHN IS VERY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT NORTH

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(C)

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

IN

[redacted]

SECRET — NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

VIETNAMESE PROSPECTS FOR SETTLING THE VIETNAMESE WAR ON ITS OWN TERMS, AND HE APPEARS TO EXPECT THAT THE UNITED STATES, IN RESPONSE TO PUBLIC OPINION, WILL SOON STOP ITS BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM.

5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMB, DCM, POL COUNSELLOR ONLY), CINCPAC, ARPAC, PACAF, PACFLT (ALSO SENT SAIGON, PARIS, BANGKOK, HONG KONG).

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(classification) (dissem controls)

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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 94-28
Document # 5

Secret

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#136-Sit. Rm
#137+138 dest 9/22

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

North Vietnamese Defense Minister Giap's Analysis of the War--I

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JAN 2001

Secret

133

20 September 1967
No. 1387/67

WARNING

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GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
20 September 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

North Vietnamese Defense Minister Giap's Analysis of the War--I

1. The first part of a lengthy analysis of the war by North Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap has been received. This part of the article was serialized in the North Vietnamese press from 14 to 16 September and Hanoi radio began broadcasting the first installment on 17 September. Only eight of twelve parts of the first installment are available at the present time.

2. The first installment appears to be similar to the kind of article that Giap writes periodically. Such articles have become a regular feature of North Vietnamese propaganda during past years, one in July 1965, another in January 1966, and the last in January of this year. In general they are designed to provide Vietnamese Communist cadre, military personnel, and the populace the latest official view of the war. Although the articles are designed primarily for propaganda purposes, they provide useful insights into Hanoi's over-all thinking about US military strengths and weaknesses.

3. In the present article Giap attempts to take a bird's-eye view of US military objectives

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence.

and strategy in South Vietnam since 1965 and tries to explain Communist counterstrategy in the most optimistic and confident terms. He begins, as usual, with an analysis of current US difficulties. According to Giap, US strategy in 1965 was designed to "annihilate the regular units of the Liberation Army" in two major operations, one north of Saigon and another in the "high plateau." Both of these operations were roundly defeated by the Communists, according to Giap; he boasts that not a single "small-size unit of the Liberation main force" suffered a significant defeat.

4. In discussing Communist counteroffensives, Giap emphasizes the growing significance of the political struggle in the South as a means of frustrating US ambitions. As an example, he cites the Buddhist-led demonstrations in the northern part of the country in the spring of 1966. Giap gives the impression that the Communists and their Liberation Front deserve all the credit for this three-month period of civil disorder, whereas available information indicates that the Communists muffed opportunities to exploit these disturbances effectively to promote Communist objectives.

5. Giap claims that the Communist military answer to the US was to open up a "new battlefield" in the fall of 1966. This operation, according to his analysis, forced the US to bring reinforcements into the northern provinces from other areas. The defense minister dismisses the bombings of the North as ineffective, noting that they had served only to harden the determination of the North Vietnamese people to assist the South. He also points to the cost to the US in money, pilots, and aircraft.

6. The general tone of the article is one of complete confidence in ultimate victory. Giap argues that the military situation has never been more favorable from the Communist point of view. He calls his forces "invincible" and asserts that foreign aid is "increasingly effective." He also claims that the North Vietnamese people are "resolved to heighten their determination to fight" and to "advance toward final victory."

7. Although there is nothing unusual in this first part of the first installment of Giap's new article, it should be noted that he frequently saves his main points, such as current and future Communist strategy and estimates of future US actions, for final sections.

8. Comments on the remainder of Giap's article will follow as it becomes available.

Secret

Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 94-28
Document # 6

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

North Vietnamese Defense Minister Giap's Analysis of the War--II

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JAN 2001

Secret

5

21 September 1967
No. 1659/67

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
21 September 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

North Vietnam Defense Minister Giap's Analysis of the War--II

North Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap, in the last portion of the first installment of his new analysis of the war, continues his analysis of the US positions in Vietnam. He insists that a quick victory in Vietnam is one of the essential components of US military strategy, saying that the US relies on "superior military force and firepower" to achieve victory in a "short time." The North Vietnamese military leader maintains that the US has set definite limits on its military objectives in South Vietnam, in an effort to keep the war from interfering with "political, economic, and social life in the US" and with US foreign policy in other parts of the world. Because of this, he predicts that the US will not enlarge the war outside its present boundaries. He also recommends that "world revolutionary people" and "imperialist allies" take advantage of this diversion of US interests to assert their own interests and independence.

The DRV Defense Minister also hopes to see a growth of political problems between the South Vietnamese Government and the US. Hopefully, he maintains that the "contradictions between the Vietnamese people and the US imperialists and their lackeys are the main contradictions which will determine the failure of the US imperialist's war of aggression". He relies on examples of increased desertion rates from South Vietnamese military forces, and the growing "Americanization"

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of the fighting effort to illustrate the difficulties the US faces in this area. Giap confidently predicts that this trend will increase rapidly in the future.

Comments on the remainder of Giap's article will follow as text becomes available.

NLJ.019.022.003/2

CONFIDENTIAL

September 21, 1967

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

TEXT OF A CIA REPORT

(2 723 0654-67)

SUBJECT: Current Conditions in North Vietnam

[redacted]

TEXT OF THE REPORT:

"A foreigner (politically neutral) who passed through Vientiane, Laos, said that North Vietnam is in chaos. The morale of the North Vietnam regular troops is deteriorating and members of the militia are surrendering to South Vietnam in increasing numbers. The nation at large is hoping for peace. Nearly all of the military and industrial facilities in Hanoi, Nam Dinh and Haiphong have been destroyed by bombings. There are rumors that the United States and North Vietnam are negotiating for peace through the United Nations Supervisory Commission (sic. presumably International Control Commission)."

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: APR 2001

Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 94-28
Document # 1

Secret

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

North Vietnam Defense Minister Giap's Analysis of the War– –III

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JAN 2001

Secret
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22 September 1967
No. 1389/67

WARNING

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SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
22 September 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

North Vietnam Defense Minister Giap's Analysis of the War--III*

1. The concluding segment of North Vietnamese Defense Minister Giap's latest analysis of the war emphasizes his view on several points debated by the Hanoi leadership over the past two years. Perhaps most important is Giap's reaffirmation that although the Vietnamese Communists cannot hope to match the number of troops the US and its allies put into South Vietnam, they can nonetheless wage the war successfully. Giap argues that the Communists can overcome the numerical superiority of the allies by improving the quality of the Communist forces and by using superior tactics.

2. The defense minister says he expects the US soon to increase its troop strength in South Vietnam by 50,000, and eventually by as many as another 100,000 to 200,000. Even so, according to Giap, the Communists can maintain a "stalemate" situation. To do so, however, Giap indicates that the irregulars must play a greater role and that irregular strength must be raised. The relative importance of the guerrillas versus the regulars has long been a point of dispute within the Hanoi leadership. Giap has argued that the guerrillas, in conjunction with regular forces, could tie down and disperse US forces, thus prolonging the war until the US became tired. His opponents have argued that Communist main force units could successfully defeat the US and its allies in conventional warfare and that the role of the guerrillas should be subordinated to that of the regulars.

*This is an analysis of the concluding portion of Giap's article which was received out of sequence. The remainder will be reviewed during the next several days.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the office of Current Intelligence.

SECRET

3. Giap's statement sets forth his concept of the over-all strategy for the war. The tactics and types of Communist forces employed at any given moment in South Vietnam and in any given battle are dictated by the actual situation. Thus, in the area just south of the Demilitarized Zone, North Vietnamese regulars appear to be carrying the weight of the fighting. Giap appears to be arguing, however, that sufficient guerrillas of high quality could more effectively tie down US forces and thus limit the number of US troops available for search-and-destroy operations against North Vietnamese regulars. Giap dismisses the concept of a "barrier" across the northern portion of South Vietnam in a few sentences, stating that it would be ineffective.

4. Giap also addresses himself to the problem of the defense of North Vietnam, both against air strikes and against invasion, which he mentions as a possibility. He recites the usual exaggerated claims of the number of US aircraft shot down over North Vietnam but admits that some North Vietnamese air defense units have performed poorly. He calls for "disciplinary measures" against those whose "negligence" has caused avoidable damage and losses.

5. To improve the quality of the North Vietnamese forces Giap says the Communists must "develop the superiority of our existing weapons," invent "highly effective tactics," and improve the military organization. He comes down hard on the need for more and better military training. The North Vietnamese Army rapidly expanded in 1965 and 1966 to meet the challenge posed by the introduction of US combat troops into South Vietnam and, as a result, the quality of the army dropped. A number of North Vietnamese soldiers captured in South Vietnam have indicated they received insufficient training before being sent south. Also Hanoi's need to create a large air defense system almost overnight resulted in its putting many poorly trained personnel on the firing line. The defense minister clearly hopes to improve the quality of his troops during the coming year.

6. Giap concludes his analysis on a note of determination. He warns that the US can be expected to launch "fiercer and more bloody" attacks, but asserts that the Communists will be able to overcome their enemies no matter how difficult the task.

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Case # NLJ 94-28
Document # 8

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#6-WWR
#7-Jordan
#8-Lindsey
#9-Pat Rm.

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

North Vietnam Defense Minister Giap's Analysis of the War– –IV

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JAN 2001

Secret

5

26 September 1967
No. 1390/67

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~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
26 September 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

North Vietnam Defense Minister Giap's Analysis of the War--IV*

1. North Vietnamese Defense Minister Giap's latest analysis of the war gives no hint that Hanoi's leaders are growing discouraged or that they intend to make any concessions to bring the conflict to an early end. Instead, he implies that the Hanoi leadership is as determined as ever and remains confident of ultimate victory. Like his past analyses, Giap's latest review of the war provides a detailed explanation of the reasoning behind Hanoi's determination.

US Strategy

2. In essence, Giap argues that the US has been thwarted in its plan quickly to attack and destroy the Communist main forces. He contends that because of its world-wide military commitments, the US can put only a limited number of troops into South Vietnam and that it originally counted on a quick victory at a relatively small price. Giap asserts that the failure of the US to achieve a quick victory has forced it unwillingly into the position of fighting a prolonged conflict. In such a long-term struggle, the advantage remains with the Communist side, which is better able to persist. There are basic US weaknesses, according to Giap, which will eventually bring about US defeat in a protracted war.

*This is the final memorandum in the series on Giap's latest analysis of the war. It summarizes and analyzes the article as a whole.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence.

~~SECRET~~

3. One basic weakness of the US, he asserts, is the intrinsic inability of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) to perform adequately either as a combat or as a pacification force. This has forced the US to send additional troops to Vietnam and to spread its forces thin in an effort to take up the slack caused by the ARVN's failure. Giap confidently predicts that the performance of the ARVN will not significantly improve and, in fact, will further deteriorate, thus forcing the US to divert more of its forces from their primary task of seeking out and destroying the Communist main forces. The problem facing the US is so great, states General Giap, that putting another 50,000 US troops into South Vietnam will be like "throwing salt into the sea." Giap asserts that even another 100,000 to 200,000 US troops will not suffice to alter the "stalemate." Throughout his assessment, Giap uses the term stalemate to describe the relative strategic position at present between allied and Communist forces. In his view, a perpetuation of the stalemate is more advantageous to the Communists than to the allies.

Enemy Tactics

4. Even more important than US weaknesses, in Giap's assessment of the situation, is the role of Communist tactics in defeating the US. General Giap has long been a great believer in heavy reliance on guerrilla and unconventional warfare. Although he praises the regular Communist forces in South Vietnam, he emphasizes the unconventional aspects of their activity such as lightning raids on urban centers, sporadic mortar and rocket strikes against air bases and camps, and harassment of allied lines of communication.

5. Giap's thesis is that if the Communist forces can remain in the field, keeping the allies spread out and unable to concentrate their forces, they can inflict casualties and avoid head-on clashes with the more powerful US units. In time the allies will tire of the war, he argues, and the Communists will be able to gain an acceptable settlement.

6. Giap emphasizes a tactic which he himself used successfully in the French war--the concentration of main force units in a single strategic area rather than dispersing them less effectively throughout the country. Such an area, according to Giap's thesis, is carefully chosen--close to a safehaven from which troops can be quickly withdrawn or reinforced and for which resupply is relatively easy. In the present war, Giap finds the Tri-Thien area, just south of the Demilitarized Zone, such a strategic area. He argues that this concentration of main force troop strength has the value of tying down large numbers of US troops in areas of Communist choice. It forces the US to react by drawing down allied troop strength and fighting capacity in other areas. Giap claims that such a strategy enables the Communists effectively to counter superior enemy strength without attempting to match it man for man. It also relieves US pressure on other areas and enables Communist local guerrilla and regional forces (probably in conjunction with limited numbers of main force units) to operate more effectively in widespread areas of South Vietnam.

7. Such a concentration of Communist main force units appears directly to contradict the arguments of North Vietnamese politburo member General Nguyen Chi Thanh--who was directing the fighting in the South prior to his death in July of this year. In mid-1966, Thanh was calling for a build-up of main force units throughout the country as the only way to challenge the build-up of US forces in South Vietnam. This issue is apparently an important part of the military debate under way among the North Vietnamese military leadership over military tactics and strategy. This is the first time that Giap has identified himself so personally with the opposition to Nguyen Chi Thanh.

8. It would appear that Giap's strategy is now paramount. The bulk of infiltrating NVA units and replacement groups during 1967 have been committed to the I Corps area.

9. Giap departs further from Thanh's proposed course of action by taking the position that the war can be won through the use of main forces which do not "necessarily possess a strength equaling that of the enemy." The build-up of main forces, he adds, "must conform to the practical conditions of each region and battlefield," (i.e., where the US position is strong and difficult to overcome, Giap warns against over-committing Communist assets). In advocating this strategy, Giap seems to be constructing a rationale for the current Communist tactic of building up forces in the highlands and northern part of South Vietnam, while attempting only to maintain Communist strength at current levels in some other areas, notably coastal II Corps and the region northeast of Saigon. The strategy has been forced on the Communists to the extent that heavy losses and interdiction of supply lines inhibit a significant build-up of forces in certain areas.

10. Giap also applauds what he calls the "independent fighting method" of various elements of the Communist armed forces. Such independence of action, he claims, is a "unique" creation of the Communists in Vietnam. It includes mortar and rocket attacks on allied base areas and commando-like raids on enemy strongpoints conducted by "crack special units," small in number but high in quality. Such actions complement the "coordinated warfare which has long been the standard tactic advocated by Communist strategists.

11. Giap's emphasis on the use of the special unit tactic is probably another reflection of the growing difficulties the Communists have encountered in massing and using their forces in the face of allied pressure. Small-unit hit-and-run tactics offer the chance to inflict maximum damage on the allies at small cost to the Communist unit involved. They differ from simple guerrilla harassment in the quality and armament of the special units involved. Giap implies that "independent fighting methods" are especially useful in areas outside the normal operating area of regular Communist main force units.

Outlook

12. General Giap recognizes that the US may further escalate the war and inflict still greater damage both to North Vietnam and to Communist forces in South Vietnam. He also comments that the US may even invade North Vietnam or expand the ground war into Cambodia and Laos. He claims that the US may bomb North Vietnam's populated centers, further strike its lines of communications, blockade the coast, and bomb the dams and dikes. Despite all of these possible developments, Giap expresses confidence in the ability and determination of the "Vietnamese people" to continue to fight to victory.

13. Giap concedes, however, that greater efforts will be needed if the Communists are successfully to counter the expected step-up in US military activity. In the North, Giap calls for better military training, an expanded militia force, improved air defense work, and more strenuous efforts to keep open the lines of communication. In the South, he calls for more coordination between the various elements of the Communist armed forces.

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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 97-155
Document # 41

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE 41

[redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC	NIC USIA	NSA ONE	OCR ORR	SDO DCS	AID CGS
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[redacted]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

S-[redacted]E-T

CITE [redacted]

DIST [redacted] OCTOBER 1967

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

COUNTRY: CZECHOSLOVAKIA/VIETNAM

DOI: [redacted]

SUBJECT: STATEMENTS [redacted] NORTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR ON THE VIETNAM WAR

ACQ:

SOURCE: [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

SUMMARY: THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR IN PRAGUE STATED THAT THE [redacted] JANUARY 1967 STATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER STILL STANDS AS A VALID STATEMENT "FOR TIME BEING" OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE POSITION ON NEGOTIATIONS. HE STATED THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE NOT SURPRISED BY THE ELECTION RESULTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THAT NO POLICY CHANGES ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION BECAUSE OF THESE RESULTS. THE AMBASSADOR DID NOT CONSIDER THE

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
8 SEP 1997

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

S[redacted]-R-E-T [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

HOC TAP ARTICLE PUBLISHED ON HO CHI MINH'S BIRTHDAY AS AN ATTACK ON MAO TSE-TUNG. HE COMMENTED THAT NORTH VIETNAM WOULD PROBABLY SEND DELEGATES TO THE RUSSELL TRIBUNAL MEETING IN COPENHAGEN. END OF SUMMARY.

1. [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

2. [redacted] THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WINNING VICTORY AFTER VICTORY IN THE WAR AND THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ARE UNITED IN THEIR DETERMINATION TO CRUSH THE AMERICANS. AS REGARDS PEACE, THE DECLARATION OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF

S-E[redacted]R-E-T [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

• [redacted]-E-T [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

[redacted] JANUARY 1967 STILL STANDS, FOR THE TIME BEING. THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF HAVING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES WHILE THE BOMBING CONTINUES. IF THE BOMBINGS CEASE UNCONDITIONALLY, AS WELL AS ALL ACTS OF WAR, THERE IS A WAY TO START TALKS. THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF RECIPROCITY FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SIDE IN EXCHANGE FOR CESSATION OF BOMBARDMENTS. ON THIS PRINCIPLE THERE WILL BE NO CONCESSIONS. THE WORDS OF PEACE SPOKEN BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, DEAN RUSK, AND ARTHUR GOLDBERG ARE LIES AND THEY ARE NOT SINCERE.

3. [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[redacted] THE RESULTS OF THE VIETNAMESE ELECTIONS WERE THOSE EXPECTED. NO POLICY CHANGES WILL BE MADE BECAUSE OF THESE ELECTIONS. THE ELECTIONS WERE RIGGED AND THE RESULTS WERE A FRAUD. IF THE ELECTIONS WERE FREE, ALL THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM WOULD HAVE VOTED AGAINST AMERICAN AGGRESSION.

[redacted]-E-T [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

• S[redacted]E-T [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

4. [redacted] IT WAS NOT AT ALL AN ATTACK ON PRESIDENT MAO AND THERE IS NO REASON TO EXPECT ANY CHANGE IN CHINESE-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

5. [redacted] THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE UNABLE TO ANSWER ON BEHALF OF THE CHINESE. HE COULD ONLY SAY THAT ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WERE READY TO HELP THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE.

6. [redacted] THERE WILL PROBABLY BE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IN COPENHAGEN. THE RUSSEL TRIBUNAL MEETINGS ARE HELPFUL IN EXPOSING THE CRIMES OF THE UNITED STATES.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

S[redacted]R-E-T [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[redacted] 1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

S[redacted]E-T [redacted]

(classification) (dissem controls)

7. [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

8. [redacted]

S[redacted]E-T

NLJ.019.024.001/4

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN -68890

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAG

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SDO

E+O DIE

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Group 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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SECRET

OCT 10 20 51 Z

[redacted]

DIST 10 OCTOBER 1967

COUNTRY : VIETNAM

DOI : [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(
(C)

SUBJECT : STATEMENTS BY VO VAN SUNG, POLITICAL COUNSELOR OF THE DRV GENERAL DELEGATION IN PARIS, ON THE VIETNAM WAR

ACQ : [redacted]

SOURCE : [redacted]

EO 12958 3
(C)

SUMMARY : DURING AN INTERVIEW [redacted] VO VAN SUNG, THE POLITICAL COUNSELOR OF THE GENERAL DELEGATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (DRV) IN PARIS

EO 12958 3.4(
(C)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2001

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON THE VIETNAM WAR: THE DRV HAS NO FALSE ILLUSIONS CONCERNING THE EFFICACY OF INTERNAL US OPPOSITION TO THE VIETNAM WAR. THE DRV WILL COMMENCE NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THE US STOPS BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM. ALTHOUGH THE DRV FEARS THAT THE US WILL TRY TO BOMB THE DIKES, THE DRV BELIEVES THAT ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE WILL PREVENT THIS. THE DRV WILL DEFEAT THE US IN ANOTHER "DIEN BIEN PHU". END SUMMARY.

1. [redacted] EO 12958 3.4(b)(1) (C)

[redacted] THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS TO VO VAN SUNG. SUNG'S REPLIES WERE AS SHOWN. QUESTION: WHILE I WAS IN THE UNITED STATES I LOOKED CAREFULLY INTO THE QUESTION OF INTERNAL US OPPOSITION TO THE WAR. I FIND THAT, PERHAPS, YOU ARE BANKING TOO MUCH ON THE EFFICACY OF THIS OPPOSITION. ANSWER: NO, I CAN ASSURE YOU WE HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THIS. WE HAVE READ THE POLLS AND WE ARE HAPPY WITH WHAT WE SEE. HOWEVER, WE RECOGNIZE THAT, DESPITE THE EXTENT AND VOCIFEROUSNESS OF THE OPPOSITION, WE KNOW THAT IT REMAINS INEFFECTIVE AS LONG AS JOHNSON REMAINS UNCONVINCED.

~~S E C R E T NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM~~

(classification) (dissem controls)

2. QUESTION: HAS IT OCCURRED TO YOU THAT YOU ARE DRIVING JOHNSON INTO A CORNER; THAT, AS LONG AS YOU PERSIST IN YOUR REFUSAL TO USE DIPLOMATIC TOOLS TO END THE WAR, HE HAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO CONTINUING TO PURSUE THE WAR. ANSWER: ALL JOHNSON HAS TO DO IS TO STOP THE AGRESSION. WHEN THE BOMBING STOPS, WE WILL REACH OUR HAND OUT TO HIM. WE WILL THEN BEGIN TO TALK IN A QUIET AND RATIONAL WAY. JOHNSON OFFERED NOTHING NEW IN HIS LATEST SPEECH. THE BOMBING MUST STOP BEFORE WE TALK.

3. QUESTION: SALISBURY, IN HIS BOOK, CITES SOME QUESTIONS HE WAS ASKED IN HANOI WHICH INDICATE THAT YOU MAY SERIOUSLY UNDERESTIMATE THE VASTNESS OF UNITED STATES RESOURCES. ANSWER: OH NO. WE ARE NOT FOOLS, WE KNOW THE POWER OF THE UNITED STATES.

4. QUESTION: THEN YOU KNOW THAT YOU ARE FACED WITH ONLY TWO ALTERNATIVES: THE US CAN ESCALATE THE WAR TO YOUR DISADVANTAGE OR, IF THE US DOES NOT CHOOSE TO DO THIS FOR FEAR OF ADVERSE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION, THE BEST YOU CAN HOPE FOR IS AN INTERMINABLE CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION - A STALEMATE. IN OTHER WORDS. YOU SURELY CANNOT

HOPE FOR ANOTHER DIEN BIEN PHU. ANSWER: BUT YES. WE ARE PREPARING FOR A DIEN BIEN PHU AND IT WILL HAPPEN MUCH SOONER THAN YOU THINK. MORE THAN THAT I CANNOT TELL YOU.

5. QUESTION: WHAT ABOUT FURTHER US ESCALATION. IS THERE ANYTHING YOU REALISTICALLY FEAR? ANSWER: THE US COULD BOMB THE DIKES. QUESTION: I DON'T THINK THEY WOULD DO THAT FOR FEAR OF ADVERSE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION IN VIEW OF THE DIRE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH ACTION. ANSWER: BUT THEY HAVE BOMBED SOME DIKES ALREADY. QUESTION: IF THEY HAD REALLY WANTED TO DESTROY THE DIKES, THEY COULD HAVE DONE SO. ANSWER: I DON'T THINK SO. OUR AIR DEFENSES aRE VERY EFFECTIVE.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted] COMMENT: SUNG'S DISCUSSION ON POTENTIAL BOMBING OF DIKES WAS EVASIVE. HE DID NOT WISH TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT IN DETAIL. [redacted] HAD IMPRESSION THAT THE QUESTION OF BOMBING DIKES WAS OF SERIOUS CONCERN TO SUNG.)

6. [redacted] DISSEM: CINCPAC,PACAF,ARPAC,PACFLT([redacted]

REPORT CLASS: SECRET/NO DISSEM ABROAD/ CONTROLLED DISSEM/ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

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(FURTHER B091345 HANOI CORRESPONDENT'S DISPATCH ENGLISH FRENSA
LATINA 091205--SHORT VERSION NHAN DAN)
(FIRST OF TWO TAKES--INTERVIEW WITH MCCAIN)
(TEXT) HANOI, 9 NINE NOVEMBER--NHAN DAN TODAY PUBLISHED ANSWERS
TO QUESTIONS BY ONE OF ITS CORRESPONDENTS MADE BY A U.S. AIR
PIRATE DETAINED IN NORTH VIETNAM.
HE IS LT CDR JOHN SIDNEY MCCAIN OF THE U.S. NAVY, SERIAL NUMBER
SSA7o7 SIXTYSOFOURSEVENEIGHTSEVEN, CAPTURE ON THE TRUC BACH LAKE
IN HANOI 26 TWOSIX OCTOBER 1967 ONENINESIXSEVEN AFTER HE HAD BAILED
OUT FROM HIS PLANE IN FLAMES. IT WAS FROM THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER
U.S. ORISKANY THAT HE TOOK OFF FOR THE LAST TIME. BEFORE BEING
TRANSFERRED TO THIS SHIP IN OCTOBER 1967 ONENINESIXSEVEN, HE WAS
AMONG THE PERSONNEL FLYING FROM ANOTHER AIRCRAFT CARRIER, THE
FORESTAL. BECAUSE THE LATTER SUSTAINED CONSIDERABLE LOSSES DUE TO
A TERRIBLE EXPLOSION WHICH HAPPENED 29 TWONINE JULY 1967 ONENINE
SIXSEVEN, MCCAIN COULD TAKE LEAVE IN HIS NATIVE COUNTRY AS ONE OF

ACT: DIA-15

INFO: CSAF-1 FILE-1 (19) ETO/WC

PAGE 1 OF 3

Approved for Release
Date AUG 1997

John McCain's Statement

8

THE SURVIVORS. HOWEVER, HE COULD SPEND ONLY A FEW DAYS WITH HIS FAMILY, BECAUSE HE SOON RECEIVED AN ORDER TO REPORT URGENTLY TO THE ORISKANY WHERE HE WAS TO BE ASSIGNED. DURING HIS LEAVE, HE RELATED, HIS WIFE AND EVEN HIS FATHER IN HIS LETTERS ADVISED HIM TO BE EXTREMELY CAREFUL BECAUSE A GREAT NUMBER OF COFFINS OF AMERICAN MILITARYMEN KILLED IN VIETNAM HAD ALREADY ARRIVED IN THE UNITED STATES.

TO A QUESTION OF THE CORRESPONDENT, MCCAIN ANSWERED: "MY ASSIGNMENT TO THE ORISKANY, I TOLD MYSELF, WAS DUE TO SERIOUS LOSSES IN PILOTS, WHICH WERE SUSTAINED BY THIS AIRCRAFT CARRIER (DUE TO ITS RAIDS ON THE NORTH VIETNAM TERRITORY--VNA) (BRACKETS AS TRANSMITTED) AND WHICH NECESSITATED REPLACEMENTS. FROM 10 OCTZERO TO 12 OCTTWO PILOTS WERE TRANSFERRED LIKE ME FROM THE FORRESTAL TO THE ORISKANY. BEFORE I WAS SHOT DOWN WE HAD MADE SEVERAL SORTIE. ALTOGETHER I MADE ABOUT 23 TWOTHREE FLIGHTS OVER NORTH VIETNAM."

MCCAIN ADMITTED THAT HE PARTICIPATED FIVE OR SIX TIMES IN THE ATTACKS ON THE HAIPHONG SECTOR.

FEAR STILL CLEARLY SHOWED ON HIS FACE WHEN HE RECALLED HIS DISASTROUS SORTIE ON 26 TWOSIX OCTOBER AGAIN HANOI. "THE BRIEFING WAS HELD IN THE MORNING," HE SAID. "THAT'S RIGHT. I REMEMBER THAT IT WAS IN THE MORNING THAT THEY TOLD ME OF THE SITUATION AND THE PLAN OF THE RAID, WHICH SHOULD TAKE PLACE ABOUT NOON. A RECONNAISSANCE OFFICER EXPLAINED THIS PLAN TO ME. THEY SHOWED ME PHOTOGRAPHS OF MY TARGET AND MARKED OUT THE PATHS TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE ORISKANY AT THIS POINT. THEY POINTED OUT TO ME A NUMBER OF ANTIAIRCRAFT POSITIONS NEAR HANOI AND A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE ROCKET POSITIONS, THE POSITION OF OUR RESCUE SHIPS, THE RADIO FREQUENCY, THE COMPOSITION OF THE FLIGHT, AND SO FORTH. UPON ARRIVAL NEAR THE TARGET, OUR FORMTION, WITH SIX BOMBERS, WOULD MOUNT THE ATTACK ACCORDING TO THE FOLLOWING ORDER: I WOULD BE NUMBER THREE, AND THE CHIEF OF THE FORMATION, NUMBER ONE. EACH PILOT WOULD HAVE TO APPROACH THE TARGET FROM A DIFFERENT DIRECTION THE CHOICE OF WHICH WOULD BE LEFT TO HIM. WHILE MOVING TOWARD THE TARGET, WE STUMBLED OVER A VERY DENSE NETWORK OF FIRE, A VERY POWERFUL RIPOSTE. A FEW ROCKETS WERE SEEN. OUR CHIEF TURNED TO APPROACH THE TARGET AND I FOLLOWED HIM AT A DISTANCE. AT THE TIME WHEN I WAS PREPARING TO DROP MY BOMBS--I DID NOT KNOW WHETHER OR NOTT ICOULD DROP THEM, BECAUSE

THINGS WERE HAPPENING TOO FAST--I HEARD A TERRIBLE EXPLOSION WHICH SHOOK MY PLANE AND SENT IT TOWARD THE GROUN. IT WAS HIT SO VIOLENTLY THAT I WAS THROWN ON MY BACK AND WENT STRAIGHT TOWARD THE GROUND IN THIS POSTURE. I TRIED TO PULL THE DIRECTION-STICK TO REESTABLISH THE BALANCE OF MY PLANE BUT IT NO LONGER RESPONDED TO ME.

I CONTINUED TO DESCEND AT A DIZZY SPEED. THEN, I EJECTED MYSELF. I DO NOTT KNOW AT WHAT ALTITUDE, BUT IT MUST HAVE BEEN VERY LOW. NATURALLY I FELT BUFFETTING BECAUSE MY BAILING OUT WAS MADE AT THE TIME WHEN THE PLANE WAS FALLING TOO FAST. WHEN THE PARACHUTE OPENED, I LOOKED DOWN AND FOUND OUT THAT I WAS GOING TO FALL INTO A LAKE. I WAS REALLY LUCKY TO BE ABLE TO FALL INTO A LAKE. ALL AROUND ME BOMBS WERE EXPLODING WHILE ROCKETS AND ANTIAIRCRAFT SHELLS WERE STREAKING THROUGH THE SKY. I HIT THE LAKE AND WENT TO THE BOTTOM. WHILE TRYING TO RETURN TO THE SURFACE, I WAS SEIZED BY VIETNAMESE AND PUSHED TO THE BANK OF THE LAKE. THEY DISARMED ME AND BROUGHT ME TO PRISON." MORE 091339 [redacted] 11/1933Z
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"My name is Smith, Richard E., major, FR57992. I was born in [name indistinct], Mississippi, 17 January 1935. I was flying an F-105 out of the 333d Tactical Fighter Squadron, (334th) Wing, Ta Khli Air Force Base, Thailand. My job was flight leader for the whole flight. I was shot down by (935-millimeter)."

Capture of McCain, Rice

Hanoi VNA International Service in English 0537 GMT 27 Oct 67 B

[Text] Hanoi--Among the many U.S. pilots captured in Hanoi yesterday was John Sydney McCain, Lieutenant Commander of the U.S. Navy.

His plane, a phantom, was blasted down by a ground-to-air missile before it could strike. It crashed on the compound of a factory. The parachute fell into the Truc Bach lake inside the capital city. From an observation post on the shore of the lake, a shout rang out, get him, get him! The homeguard units and people's defense and security forces nearby echoed the shout, get him, get him right away! From a corner of the lake someone threw into the water two big bamboo tubes. Bui Duc Hai, a second lieutenant of the people's security service, threw himself into the water and pushed the bamboos forward while swimming. He was followed by many other young men.

From the other side of the lake many people who happened to be on the scene also swam toward the fallen air pirate. The latter, with his cumbersome outfit, sank immediately after reaching the water. Four of his captors hauled him up. Two of them locked both his arms while the other two put his head on a bamboo tube. From the pilot's inside pocket a man took out eight pistol bullets and a signal radio.

Finally, Johnson's navy man was pulled out of the water near a children's swimming pool in the Ba Dinh district. The water dripping at each staggering step he made was tinted with navy blue from the survival dye box he carried. McCain's right leg was still bleeding from a wound he received while in the plane. He was bandaged by a nurse from the Ba Dinh District before being taken to his place of detention.

Meanwhile, other U.S. jetplanes were making frenzied stunts over Hanoi to dodge the deadly groundfire.

John Sydney McCain today appears in NHAN DAN in two photos, one of which shows his capture on True Bach lake. The paper carries a photo of another captured U.S. pilot, Charles Donald Rice, lieutenant JG, U.S. Navy, service number 710266.

AFP Correspondent's Report

Paris AFP in English 2016 GMT 26 Oct 67 (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

[Text] Hanoi--Bernard-Joseph Cabanes Dispatch--U.S. aircraft today attacked Hanoi for the second day running, concentrating on the electric power plant. But several rockets landed in other parts of the city as well, destroying houses and inflicting what was believed to be higher casualties than yesterday's raid. Missiles brought down two of the attacking planes over the center of the city. An open parachute was seen floating amid the puffs of exploding antiaircraft shells. An air-to-ground missile struck a house in the Rue Street district, subjected to bombing last August. The house was 50 yards (meters) from the French diplomatic delegation where shrapnel fell into the garden today. No French were injured.

The American planes came in several waves in the 35-minute raid that began at 1145 local time. Work began quickly after the raid, the clearing away of rubble as blood-covered survivors emerged from ruins and nearby one-man holes used as bomb shelters here. Another alert came 20 minutes after the end of the first raid. It was the fourth alert since the beginning of the morning. Each was marked by the sound of bombs exploding and antiaircraft fire in an area 15 to 18 miles (25 to 30 kilometers) around the capital.

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

IMMEDIATE PRIORITY
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FM FBIS OKINAWA

TO HQ NAVAL FORCES 74903

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McCain
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by LT Thiessen
/s/

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to Adm McCain by
Adm Thackery 10/30/67
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HANOI IN ENGLISH TO AMERICAN SERVICEMEN IN SOUTH IETNAM 1300 .5
30 OCT 67 B
(TALK: "FROM THE PACIFIC TO TRUC BACH LAKE")
(TEXT) IN HIS NEWEST STEP OF WAR ESCALATION--SUCCESSIVE AIR STRIKES AT HANOI CITY THESE DAYS--MR JOHNSON HAS WASTED SCORES OF U.S. AIRCRAFT AND PILOIS.
ADDING TO THE EVER LONGER LIST OF AMERICAN PILOTH CAPTURED OVER NORTH IETNAM WAS A SERIES OF NEWCOMERS. JOHN SYDNEY MCCAIN WAS ONE OF THEM. WHO IS HE? A U.S. NAVY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER. LAST THURSDAY. 26 THOSIX OCTOBER. HE TOOK OFF FROM THE CARRIER ORISKANY FOR A RAIDING MISSION AGAINST HANOICITY. UNFORTUNATELY FOR HIM. THE JET PLANE HE PILOTED WAS 1 OF E OUT OF THE 11 TEN KNOCKED OUT OF HANOI'S SKY. HE TRIED IN VAIN TO EVADE THE DEADLY ACCURATE ANTIAIRCRAFT BARRAGE OF FIRE OF THIS CITY. A SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SHOT DOWN HIS JET ON THE SPOT. HE BAILED OUT AND WAS CAPTURED ON THE SURFACE OF TRUC BACH LAKE RIGHT IN THE HEART OF THE DRV CAPITAL.
WHAT (HERE THE--ED.) FEATS OF ARMS WHICH MCCAIN ACHIEVED?
FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS IN HANOI SAW WITH THEIR EYES CIVILIAN DWELLING HOUSES DESTROYED AND HANOI'S WOMEN, OLD FOLKS, AND CHILDREN KILLED BY STEEL-PELLET BOMBS DROPPED FROM MCCAIN'S AIRCRAFT AND

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NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

THOSE OF HIS COLLEAGUES.
LT COM JOHN SYDNEY MCCAIN NEARLY PERISHED IN THE CONFLAGRATION THAT SWEPT THE FLIGHT DECK OF THE U.S. CARRIER FORRESTAL LAST JULY. HE ALSO NARROWLY ESCAPED DEATH IN HAIPHONG THE SUNDAY BEFORE LAST BUT THIS TIME WHAT MUST HAPPEN HAS HAPPNED. THERE IS NO FUTURE IN IT.
MCCAIN WAS MARRIED IN 1965 ONENINESIXFIVE TO (NAME INDISTINCT) AND HAS A TEN 10-MONTH-OLD DAUGHTER. SURELY HE ALSO LOVES HIS WIFE AND CHILD. THEN WHY DID HE FLY HERE DROPPING BOMBS ON THE NECKS OF THE VIETNAMESE WOMEN AND CHILDREN?
THE KILLING HE WAS ORDERED TO DO IN VIETNAM HAS AROUSED INDIGNATION AMONG THE WORLD'S PEOPLES. WHAT GLORY HAD HE BROUGHT BY HIS JOB TO HIS FATHER ADM JOHN S MCCAIN JR. COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE? HIS GRANDFATHER, ADM JOHN S. MCCAIN, COMMANDER OF ALL AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN THE PACIFIC IN WORLD WAR II TWO, PARTICIPATED IN A JUST WAR AGAINST THE JAPANESE FORCES, BUT NOWADAYS LT COM MCCAIN IS PARTICIPATING IN AN UNJUST WAR, THE MOST UNPOPULAR ONE IN U.S. HISTORY AND MANKIND'S HISTORY, TOO. THIS IS JOHNSON'S WAR TO ENSLAVE THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE.
FROM THE PACIFIC TO TRUC BACH LAKE, MCCAIN HAS BROUGHT NO REPUTATION FOR HIS FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES. THE ONE WHO IS SHEARING MCCAIN'S FAMILY HONOR IS ALSO SHEARING THE HONOR OF WASHINGTON'S UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. HE IS LYNDON B. JOHNSON. 301300 [redacted]
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TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

SC No. 10384/67
6 November 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Preliminary Assessment of Black Shield Photography of 28, 29, and 30 October

Summary

Three double-pass Black Shield missions flown over North Vietnam on 28, 29, and 30 October provided cloud-free photographic coverage of about 55 percent of the country, including the Hanoi, Haiphong, Pinghsiang and Dong Dang areas. All of North Vietnam's six major airfields, more than half of the SA-2 sites, over 75 percent of the rail network north of the panhandle, and 42 priority bridges and rail yards for bomb damage assessment were photographed. No evidence of surface-to-surface missile deployment was noted.

Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence.

1. Three double-pass Black Shield missions flown over North Vietnam on 28, 29, and 30 October provided cloud-free photographic coverage of about 55 percent of the country, including the Hanoi, Haiphong, Pinghsiang and Dong Dang areas. Both Mission 6732 (28 October) and Mission 6734 (30 October) flew two passes each over the area of North Vietnam north of the panhandle. One of mission 6732's passes was along the China border area. Mission 6733 (29 October) flew one pass primarily over the panhandle and the other pass along the China border area. No evidence of surface-to-surface missile deployment was noted.

2. Surface-to-Air Missile Sites: Over half of the nearly 260 SA-2 sites in North Vietnam were photographed by the three missions. Two new sites were detected. The 28 October mission alone covered 120 SA-2 sites. Fourteen of these sites were occupied, 70 unoccupied, and 16 could only be identified. The 29 October mission covered 61 SA-2 sites. One of these sites was occupied, 30 unoccupied (including one new site), and 30 could only be identified. The 30 October mission covered 92 SA-2 sites. Thirteen of these sites were occupied (including one new site), 74 unoccupied, and five could only be identified.

3. Airfields: Good coverage of all six of North Vietnam's major airfields was provided by the 28 October mission. With the exception of Haiphong/Cat Bi--which has a cratered runway--all the airfields appeared to be serviceable.

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4. At Phuc Yen Airfield, the bomb craters on the runway had been filled in and the airfield seemed to be capable of supporting at least limited fighter [redacted] other visible bomb damage from the 24 and 25 October air strikes included: bomb craters on the two main parking aprons and the parallel taxiway; interdiction of the taxiway to the northern aircraft revetments by one bomb crater; two MIG-15/17s probably destroyed

and two other aircraft possibly destroyed; and seven damaged aircraft revetments.

5. At Hoa Lac Airfield, all bomb craters on the runway had been repaired, and the runway appeared to be serviceable. At Haiphong/Kien An Airfield, all bomb craters on the runway had been repaired, making it serviceable. Other bomb craters could be seen on the half-loop taxiway, in six parking revetments, and adjacent to the parallel taxiway.

6. Photography from the 29 October mission showed continuing construction at Yen Bai Airfield in the northwestern part of North Vietnam. Concrete appears to have been laid for part of the runway and parallel taxiway. Three parking aprons, 13 aircraft revetments, and a dispersal taxiway were identified. This is the first sign of progress at this airfield since 20 June. Photography taken at that time showed that preparations had been made to surface the runway. After four months, the Chinese engineers still have not completed the runway, although they have apparently made progress on some of the adjacent facilities.

7. Air Order-of-Battle: The 28 October photography of the six major airfields showed very few aircraft. At Phuc Yen Airfield, ten aircraft could be seen: two small swept-wing aircraft, four possible aircraft, two probably destroyed MIG-15/17s, and two possibly destroyed aircraft. [redacted]

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8. At Hanoi/Gia Lam Airfield, one MIG-15/17 was observed. Two derelict MIG-15/17s and two dummy MIG-21s were noted at Hoa Lac Airfield.

9. Naval Order-of-Battle: The 28 October mission photographed the normal complement of naval vessels in the Haiphong area. Identifiable vessels included three SO-1 class submarine chasers, three or

four Swatow-class gunboats, six P-6 class motor torpedo boats, and two P-4 class motor torpedo boats.

10. Bridges: The 28 October mission provided good coverage of the most important bridges. The Paul Doumer Railroad and Highway Bridge over the Red River was shown to be unserviceable. One span had been dropped into the river and the two adjoining spans had been severely damaged.

11. The Canal des Rapides Railroad and Highway Bridge also was shown to be unserviceable. One span at the south end of the main bridge had been knocked out of position. The alternate rail bypass bridge was also unserviceable.

12. In the Haiphong area, the three main bridges--the railroad and highway bridge and two highway bridges--were observed to be still unserviceable. Ten highway bypass bridges there were serviceable.

13. Transshipment Points: Photography of 28 October showed normal levels of activity at the Pinghsiang and Dong Dang railroad transshipment points. About 390 pieces of rolling stock, including flatcars carrying 42 unidentifiable objects, were noted at Pinghsiang. Approximately 120 pieces of rolling stock and 14 locomotives were observed at the nearby Dong Dang transshipment point.

14. The 28 October photography also showed a probable rail-to-road transshipment point under construction near Ho-Kou, China, just across the border from Lao Cai, North Vietnam. The installation is served by two rail spurs off the Kunming-Hanoi rail line. Construction of such an installation may presage an increase in supply shipments via truck to northwestern North Vietnam. Chinese engineers have been developing the road network and logistical facilities in the border area for the past two years.

15. Railroad lines: The 28 October mission covered 100 percent of the Haiphong-Hanoi rail line,

75 percent of the Dong Dang-Hanoi line, 35 percent of the Kep-Thai Nguyen-Hanoi line, 20 percent of the Lao Cai-Hanoi line, and 10 percent of the Hanoi-Dong Hoi line.

16. Hanoi Thermal Power Plant: Photography of 28 October showed damage at and near the plant. A hole in the generator hall roof indicated a penetration and a possible internal detonation. Another hole in the generator hall roof--which had been repaired after the 21 August strike--has been reopened. A possible hit immediately north of the coal conveyer, entered the new boiler-house section. (This possible hit apparently did not detonate.) A crater was visible on the north boundary of the plant. About 35 civilian structures in the area surrounding the plant have been destroyed and 40 damaged. No smoke or steam from the plant was evident.

CMDR
T. WALDNER

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[redacted]

HANOI CORRESPONDENT'S DISPATCH IN ENGLISH TO PRENSA LATINA
HAVANA [redacted]

(TEXT) NHAN DAN ON 9 NOVEMBER CARRIES A STORY ABOUT THE U.S. PILOT MCCAIN WHO WAS CAPTURED ON 26 OCTOBER AFTER HIS PLANE HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN OVER HANOI.

HIS FLIGHT ON A RAID AGAINST HANOI WAS THE FIRST FOR HIM AND HIS 33D RAIDING FLIGHT OVER NORTH VIETNAM. MCCAIN WAS VERY AFRAID OF THE (?INTENSE) ANTIAIRCRAFT NETWORK IN HANOI, WHICH IS NOT ONLY (?INTENSE) BUT VERY ACCURATE. THAT IS WHY IT BECAME IMPORTANT. THREE OUT OF 25 AIRCRAFT OF HIS GROUP WERE DOWNED. THE UNITED STATES IS NOT ABLE TO BEAR IT IF OUT OF EVERY 25 AIRCRAFT THREE ARE DOWNED, HE SAID.

MCCAIN STATED: THERE IS NOT ANY DOUBT FOR ME; THINGS ARE TAKING PLACE IN A FAVORABLE WAY FOR NORTH VIETNAM. IN PARTICULAR, BEFORE WORLD OPINION AT PRESENT, THE UNITED STATES IS (?VIRTUALLY) STANDING ALONE.

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INTERVIEW WITH MCCAIN

HANOI VNA INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN FRENCH 1339 GMT 9 NOV 67 B

(INTERVIEW OF AMERICAN POW LT CDR JOHN SIDNEY MCCAIN PUBLISHED IN 9 NOVEMBER NHAN DAN)

(EXCERPT) HANOI 9 NOVEMBER--(PASSAGE OMITTED ON CIRCUMSTANCES BEHIND MCCAIN'S TRANSFER FROM CARRIER FORRESTAL TO ORISKANY AND HIS CAPTURE ON TRUC BACH LAKE ON 26 OCTOBER 1967)

TO A QUESTION OF THE CORRESPONDENT, MCCAIN ANSWERED: "MY ASSIGNMENT TO THE ORISKANY, I TOLD MYSELF, WAS DUE TO SERIOUS LOSSES IN PILOTS WHICH WERE SUSTAINED BY THIS AIRCRAFT CARRIER (DUE TO ITS RAIDS OVER NORTH VIETNAM TERRITORY--VNA) AND WHICH NECESSITATED REPLACEMENTS. FROM 10 TO 12 PILOTS WERE TRANSFERRED LIKE ME FROM THE FORRESTAL TO THE ORISKANY. BEFORE I WAS SHOT DOWN WE HAD MADE SEVERAL SORTIES. ALTOGETHER I MADE ABOUT 25 FLIGHTS OVER NORTH VIETNAM."

MCCAIN ADMITTED THAT HE PARTICIPATED FIVE OR SIX TIMES IN THE ATTACKS ON THE HAIPHONG SECTOR.

FEAR STILL CLEARLY SHOWED ON HIS FACE WHEN HE RECALLED HIS DISASTROUS SORTIE ON 26 OCTOBER AGAINST HANOI. "THE BRIEFING WAS HELD IN THE MORNING," HE SAID. "THAT'S RIGHT. I REMEMBER THAT IT WAS IN THE MORNING THAT THEY TOLD ME OF THE SITUATION AND THE PLAN OF THE RAID, WHICH SHOULD TAKE PLACE ABOUT NOON. A RECONNAISSANCE OFFICER EXPLAINED THIS PLAN TO ME. THEY SHOWED ME PHOTOGRAPHS OF MY TARGET AND MARKED OUT THE PATHS TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE ORISKANY AT THIS POINT. THEY POINTED OUT TO ME A NUMBER OF ANTIAIRCRAFT POSITIONS NEAR HANOI AND A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE ROCKET POSITIONS, THE POSITION OF OUR RESCUE SHIPS, THE RADIO FREQUENCY, THE COMPOSITION OF THE FLIGHT, AND SO FORTH. UPON ARRIVAL NEAR THE TARGET, OUR FORMATION, WITH SIX BOMBERS, WOULD MOUNT THE ATTACK ACCORDING TO THE FOLLOWING ORDER: I WOULD BE NUMBER THREE, AND THE CHIEF OF THE FORMATION, NUMBER ONE. EACH PILOT WOULD HAVE TO APPROACH THE TARGET FROM A DIFFERENT DIRECTION; THE CHOICE OF WHICH WOULD BE LEFT TO HIM.

"WHILE MOVING TOWARD THE TARGET, WE STUMBLED OVER A VERY DENSE NETWORK OF FIRE, A VERY POWERFUL RIPOSTE. A FEW ROCKETS WERE SEEN. OUR CHIEF TURNED TO APPROACH THE TARGET AND I FOLLOWED HIM AT A DISTANCE. AT THE TIME WHEN I WAS PREPARING TO DROP MY BOMBS--I DID NOT KNOW WHETHER OR NOT I COULD DROP THEM, BECAUSE THINGS WERE HAPPENING TOO FAST--I HEARD A TERRIBLE EXPLOSION WHICH SHOOK MY PLANE AND SENT IT TOWARD THE GROUND. IT WAS HIT SO VIOLENTLY THAT I WAS THROWN ON MY BACK AND WENT STRAIGHT TOWARD THE GROUND IN THIS POSTURE. I TRIED TO PULL THE DIRECTION-STICK

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PARIS AFP IN ENGLISH 1539 GMT 10 NOV 67 E
(TEXT) HANOI, 10 NOVEMBER--BY EDUARD-JOSEPH CABANES--U.S. NAVY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER JOHN SIDNEY MCCAIN, SON OF ADMIRAL JOHN MCCAINN COMMANDER OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE, WAS QUOTED BY THE HANOI PRESS TODAY AS HAVING STATED THAT THE UNITED STATES APPEARS ISOLATED BECAUSE OF THE VIETNAM WAR. LIEUTENANT COMMANDER MCCAIN, WHO WAS CAPTURED AFTER HIS PLANE WAS SHOT DOWN OVER HANOI LAST 26 TWENTY SIX OCTOBER, WAS SAID TO HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE JOURNALISTS ALONG WITH ANOTHER CAPTURED PILOT, AIR FORCE COLONEL JOHN PETER FLYNN, WHOSE PLANE WAS SHOT DOWN OVER THE CAPITAL ON 27 TWENTY SEVEN OCTOBER.

MCCAIN WAS QUOTED AS HAVING SAID "THE MORALE OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE IS VERY HIGH, THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ARE VERY STRONG, PRESENT EVENTS ARE MOVING TO THE ADVANTAGE OF NORTH VIETNAM, AND THE UNITED STATES APPEARS TO BE ISOLATED.

MCCAIN, 31 THIRTY ONE, SAID THAT HE HAD CARRIED OUT 23 TWENTY THREE RAIDS OVER NORTH VIETNAM, INCLUDING 5 FIVE OR SIX OVER HAIPHONG. HE WAS SHOT DOWN ON HIS FIRST RAID OVER HANOI, LAUNCHED FROM THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER [redacted]. HE SAID THAT HE HAD PREVIOUSLY SEEN BASED ON THE CARRIER FORRESTAL AND HAD NARROWLY ESCAPED DEATH DURING THE BIG FIRE WHICH BROKE OUT ABOARD THE VESSEL TWO MONTHS A

ACT: DIA-15

INFO: NIC-1 FILE-1 (17) ETO/WC

PAGE 1 OF 2

Approved for Release
Date [illegible]

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ASO.

THE NEWSPAPERS SAID THAT BOTH MCCAIN AND COLONEL FLYNN SAID THAT THEY HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE DENSITY AND ACCURACY OF THE ANTIAIRCRAFT FIRE OVER HANOI. FLYNN WAS QUOTED AS STAYING: "YOUR GROUND-TO-AIR MISSILES ARE REALLY DANGEROUS. AS FOR YOUR MIGS, WE COULD HARDLY TELL WHERE THEY WERE COMING FROM, AND AFTER FIRING THEY DISAPPEARED."

COLONEL FLYNN, 45 FORTY FIVE, A VETERAN OF THE KORAN WAR WITH 23 TWENTY THREE YEARS OF ACTIVIE SERVICE, SAID THAT HE CAME FROM THE U.S. AIRBASE AT KORAT, THAILAND. HE ALLEGEDLY SAID THAT EACH SQUADRON AT THE BASE LOST THREE PILOTS AND EVEN MORE PLANES EACH MONTH OF FLIGHTS OVER NORTH VIETNAM. GREATEST LOSSES WERE OF THE F105 ROF F-105 FIGHTER BOMBERS. AT PRESENT, THE UNITED STATES LACKS EXPERIENCED PILOTS.

THE PAPERS QUOTED FLYNN AS HAVING SAID THAT THE YOUNG PILOTS AT THE KORAT BASE, DESPITE AN OUTWARD SOK OF BRAVADO, WERE FRIGHTENED AT THE IDEA OF HAVING TO FLY OVER NORTH VIETNAM, AND PARTICULARLY HANOI. MANY YOUNG PILOTS WANT TO LEAVE THE AIR FORCE TO BECOME CIVILIAN PILOTS, HE WAS SAID TO HAVE STATED. AS FOR THE OLD PILOTS LIKE ME, WE WANT TO RETIRE AND RETURN TO OUR FAMILIES. 121539 [redacted] 12/16/72 NYT
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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(TEXT) AN INTERVIEW WITH TWO AMERICAN PILOTS SHOT DOWN RECENTLY OVER NORTH VIETNAM HAS BEEN PUBLISHED IN HANOI. THE TWO MEN ARE [redacted] SON OF THE COMMANDER OF THE AMERICAN NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE ADMIRAL MCCAIN, AND WAGSCGP [redacted] WHO HAS SERVED IN THE AIR FORCE FOR 25 TWENTY-THREE YEARS.

BOTH NOTED THE GREAT DENSITY AND ACCURACY OF THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE OVER HANOI. COLONEL FLYNN ADMITTED THAT AN EVER GREATER PERCENTAGE OF AIRCRAFT ARE NOT RETURNING TO THE BASE IN THAILAND WHERE HE SERVED. HE ADDED THAT MANY PILOTS ARE AFRAID OF TAKING PART IN THE RAIDS ON THE NORTH. ACCORDING TO THE FIGURES PUBLISHED IN HANOI THE UNITED STATES HAS LOST MORE THAN 2,500 TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AIRCRAFT OVER NORTH VIETNAM.
162300Z [redacted] 16/2342Z NOV
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McCain
Flynn

ACT: DIA-15

INFO: J1-2 CSAF-1 FILE-1(19)/ONO/MY

PAGE 1 OF 1

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

T. S.

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(TEXT) AN INTERVIEW WITH TWO AMERICAN PILOTS SHOT DOWN

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FOR ACTION
SIGNED

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE 15 APR 1982

(16)

RECENTLY OVER NORTH VIETNAM HAS BEEN PUBLISHED IN HANOI. THE TWO MEN ARE LT. CMDR JOHN MCCAIN, SON OF THE COMMANDER OF THE AMERICAN NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE ADMIRAL MCCAIN, AND WASSCGP FLYNN WHO HAS SERVED IN THE AIR FORCE FOR 23 TWENTYTHREE YEARS. BOTH NOTED THE GREAT DENSITY AND ACCURACY OF THE ANTIAIRCRAFT FIRE OVER HANOI. COLONEL FLYNN ADMITTED THAT AN EVER GREATER

PERCENTAGE OF AIRCRAFT ARE NOTT RETURNING TO THE BASE IN THAILAND WHERE HE SERVED. HE ADDED THAT MANY PILOTS ARE AFRAID OF TAKING PART IN THE RAIDS ON THE NORTH. ACCORDING TO THE FIGURES PUBLISHED IN HANOI THE UNITED STATES HAS LOST MORE THAN 2,5[illegible] TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AIRCRAFT OVER NORTH VIETNAM.

[redacted] 23Z NOV

BT

McCain
J. P. Flynn

...to questions by one of its ... in North Vietnam. He is Lt Cdr John ..., captured on the Truc Bach Lake in ... from his plane in flames. It was free ... to take off for the last time. Before being ... among the personnel flying from ... to the latter sustained considerable ... July 1967. McCain could take leave in his ... he could spend only a few days with ... to report urgently to the Oriskany ..., he related, his wife and even his ... extremely careful because a great number of ... Vietnam had already arrived in the ...

... declared: "My assignment to the Oriskany, ... pilots, which were sustained by this ... North Vietnam territory) and which ... pilots were transferred like me from the ... shot down we had made several sorties. ... North Vietnam."

McCain added that he was attacked five or six times in the attacks on the Haiphong sector.

He still clearly ... when he recalled his disastrous sortie on 26 October against ... briefing was held in the morning," he said. "That's right. I remember that it was in the morning that they told me of the situation and the plan of ... which was to take place about noon. A reconnaissance officer explained this plan to ... showed us photographs of my target and marked out the paths to be followed ... that way at this point. They pointed out to me a number of ... and a number of possible rocket positions, the position of ... and the frequency, the composition of the flight, and so forth. We ... the target. Our formation, with six bombers, would ... the attack ... the following order: I would be No three, and the chief of the ... flight. Each pilot would have to approach the target from a different ... the choice of which would be left to him. "While moving toward the ... we encountered a very dense network of fire, a very powerful ripeste. A few ... The chief turned to approach the target and I followed him at a ... At the time when I was preparing to drop my bombs--I did not know ... or not I could drop them, because things were happening too fast--I heard a ... explosion which shook my plane and sent it toward the ground. It was hit so violently that I was thrown on my back and went straight toward the ground in this position. I tried to pull the direction-stick to reestablish the ... of my plane but it no longer responded to me.

[illegible]

"I continued to descend at a dizzy speed. Then, I ejected myself. I do not know at what altitude, but it must have been very low. Naturally I felt buffetting because my bailing out was made at the time when the plane was falling too fast. When the parachute opened, I looked down and found out that I was going to fall into a lake. I was really lucky to be able to fall into a lake. All around me bombs were exploding while rockets and antiaircraft shells were streaking through the sky. I hit the lake and went to the bottom. While trying to return to the surface, I was seized by Vietnamese and pushed to the bank of the lake. They disarmed me and brought me to prison."

"What do you think of Hanoi's fire barrage?" asked the NHAN DAN correspondent.

McCain cried out: "Very intense,,very accurate. When a fire barrage is so accurate, one has to reckon with it. You are excellent artillerymen. Naturally, I have never seen such a fire network, because it was the first time that I flew over Hanoi."

"Were all the pilots who had flown over Hanoi afraid of the firepower from the ground?"

"Yes, certainly!" McCain said. "How lucky are those who do not have to come often to the Hanoi sector. Very dangerous!

"Because they could very well be shot down, hit, something that no one wants! When I arrived near my target I saw two rockets streaking by my side, and it was terrible to see. They flew very fast, very strongly."

Suddenly the air pirate was silent as if he were still obsessed by the memory of his disastrous sortie. "For me," he concluded, "there is no longer any doubt. Things are taking place in a favorable opinion; the United States at present seems to be standing alone, so much is its isolation."

Peter Flynn Remarks

Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1400 GMT 9 Nov 67 S

[Commentary by Comrade Trung Sinh "The Old Chap Caught In A Trap"]

[Text] People say this piratic pilot from Ohio is very fond of studying history, but it is not known whether he has studied the history of the United States as a whole or only that of the U.S. Air Force. If he confined himself to a study of the history of those who have used air forces as an aggressive instrument, he surely knew the case of [name indistinct], whose plane was recently brought down by one of our valiant young pilots while on a piratic mission over Hanoi. It is a fact, however, that he himself, a hard-core U.S. pilot, added a new ill-fated passage to the gloomy history of the U.S. Air Force. He is U.S. Air Force Col John Peter Flynn who was born on 17 October 1922 and belonged to the U.S. 355th Fighter Wing stationed at Korat in the U.S. satellite of Thailand.

While on a piratic mission over Hanoi on 27 October 1967, his F-105D aircraft was shot to pieces by the mighty air defense firepower of the army and people of the valiant capital, and he was captured, after parachuting, by young boys and girls in the valiant town of Gia Lam, right on top of one of the craters made by his criminal bombs.

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: APR 2001

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

15 November 1967

INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIONS OF US PEACE GROUPS

Contents

Summary

I. The Peace Movement: Confusion, Coordination, and Communism

II. Nature of the International Contacts

III. Coordinating the International Campaign: A Record of Foreign Contacts

Appendices:

A. US Peace Groups with Significant International Communist Contacts

B. American Organizations Participating in Anti-Vietnam War Activities

Note: This study was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence with the assistance of the Clandestine Services. It is based in part on material supplied by the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the intelligence services of the US Army, Navy, and Air Force, and other offices of CIA's Directorate of Intelligence. The paper has been coordinated only with the Clandestine Services of CIA.

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S U M M A R Y

CIA has reviewed the information immediately available from all sources on the US peace movement and its international connections. The following principal findings emerge from this study:

A. Diversity is the most striking single characteristic of the peace movement at home and abroad. Indeed it is this very diversity which makes it impossible to attach specific political or ideological labels to any significant section of the movement. Diversity means that there is no single focus in the movement. Joint action on an international scale is possible only because coordination is handled by a small group of dedicated men, most of them radically oriented, who have volunteered themselves for active leadership in the key organizations. Thus a handful of activists coordinate the activities and propel the energies of large heterodox masses toward a few broad purposes.

B. The coordinators of the peace movement--personalities such as Dellinger, Hayden, Bevel, and Egleson--are tireless, peripatetic, full time

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crusaders. They have the requisite funds for travel; they simplify the interaction among the peace groups by assuming a multiplicity of offices and establishing interlocking personal contacts between groups. Many have close Communist associations but they do not appear to be under Communist direction. In any case their purposes in so far as the war in Vietnam is concerned, coincide with those of the Communists. Thus, the Communist Party of the USA benefits from anti-US activity by Peace groups but does not appear to be inspiring them or directing them.

C. Contact between Hanoi and the leaders of the US peace movement has developed to a point where it is now almost continuous.

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[redacted] Nevertheless these exchanges of views have played an important part in channeling antiwar activity on both sides of the world.

D. Apart from contacts with the Hanoi officialdom, US peace activists by and large do

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not deal with foreign governments. Their relations are with foreign, private institutions such as the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and other international peace federations. Moscow exploits and may indeed influence the US delegates to these bodies, through its front organizations, but the indications--at least at this stage--of covert or overt connections between these US activists and foreign governments are limited.

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I. THE PEACE MOVEMENT:
CONFUSION, COORDINATION, AND COMMUNISM

1. The American peace "movement" is not one but many movements; and the groups involved are as varied as they are numerous. The most striking single characteristic of the peace front is its diversity.

Many Molds and Many Motives

2. Under the peace umbrella one finds pacifists and fighters, idealists and materialists, internationalists and isolationists, democrats and totalitarians, conservatives and revolutionaries, capitalists and socialists, patriots and subversives, lawyers and anarchists, Stalinists and Trotskyites, Muscovites and Pekingese, racists and universalists, zealots and nonbelievers, puritans and hippies, do-gooders and evildoers, nonviolent and very violent.

3. One thing brings them all together: their opposition to US actions in Vietnam. They do not join up for the same reasons, of course; there are as many motives as there are groups. And they function on different levels: some motives are politically inspired and professional while others are

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purely personal, some are focused on Vietnam exclusively while others are related to the war only incidentally.

4. One explanation for the diversity of motivation and outlook is the fact that the anti-war sentiment has taken root in separate sectors of the society having little else in common. In addition to the professional pacifists, activists come from the student world, from militant elements of the Negro and other minority communities, from the labor movement, and from the intellectual sphere. In some cases--the civil rights and labor movements specifically--the rank and file are largely disinterested in international problems. But their leaders may not be; some are as active as the intellectual and student leaders both at home and abroad. Each projects his own personal attitudes and prejudices, which frequently are not representative of the group he speaks for.

5. The advocates of "Black Power" are a group apart. Their specialized interest when it comes to Vietnam is not peace, but the war as a case study of the "liberation struggle." They make

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an effort to relate the Vietnam problem to their non-white "Third World," focusing particularly on the position of the Negro serving in Vietnam and on resistance to the draft. While joining in certain aspects of the peace campaign, the "Black Power" elements remain aloof from the leftist mainstream.

The Coordinators

6. Out of such diversity comes much confusion and more than a little disagreement. Strains are evident both on the home front and in their international activities. The job of coordinating a program of joint action, first within the US and then internationally, is an enormous one. Given the strains and complications involved, the performance of the coordinators is impressive.

7. Several factors make the task easier than it might seem. These factors also have a direct bearing on the orientation and direction of the movement. Most important is the fact that the responsibility for coordination and tactical direction is delegated to a small staff of key leaders. These people are dedicated activists and seem to know where they are going. Another--and related--

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factor is the interlocking structure of the peace groups. A number of the key activists are involved in more than one organization, and there is considerable interaction among the executives. The problem of lining up many diverse groups and coordinating action is thus simplified to some degree.

8. The main mechanism for coordinating both domestic and foreign protest activity related to Vietnam has been the "mobilization committee." Out of the Student Mobilization Committee of 1966 evolved the Spring Mobilization Committee (SMC), which in turn was succeeded by the present National Mobilization Committee (NMC). The officers appointed to the executive bodies of the NMC are numerous, reflecting the coalition's broad base, but the real responsibility seems to be concentrated in the hands of a few. The names of these key coordinators turn up regularly, wherever the action happens to be.

Ideology of the Left, Old and New

9. As the peace groups have coalesced over the past year and half, ideological lines have become so blurred as to render conventional political

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classifications worthless. The various joint action groups are so conglomerate that it is difficult to stamp them with any one label without qualification. Control is the only valid indicator, and evidence of control by any one element is what is usually lacking. The peace movement, and even most of its constituent parts, is too big and too amorphous to be controlled by any one political faction.

10. In terms of the political spectrum and international connections, the activists generally range from somewhere left of center to the farthest limit of the Left. Many are Marxist-oriented, but the Marxists come in all colors. Take the Communists: the "orthodox" Moscow-oriented Communists, the Peking-influenced "Marxist-Leninists," and the self-oriented Trotskyites are all energetically active in the Vietnam protest activity. It would be surprising if they were not since the objectives of the movement are consistent with the national interests of the USSR and Communist China. The peace movement can be described in ideological terms only if one political element is dominant or exerts a controlling influence. A careful review

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of the evidence available on both domestic and foreign activity does not substantiate either conclusion in the case of any of the groups.

11. This is not to say that the Communist role is not substantial. Both the individual peace groups and the coordinating organizations are well infiltrated with Communists of one stripe or another. Assets of the US Communist Party (CPUSA) are most commonly noted. In the case of certain groups, particularly in the student field, the Trotskyite revolutionaries (directed by the Socialist Workers Party) or the Maoists (Progressive Labor Party) predominate. These Marxist groups harbor deep hostilities toward each other; often in fact they seem more concerned about countering each other than about countering the non-Communists.

12. As a result of their infiltration of the leadership of key peace groups, the Communists manage to exert disproportionate influence over the groups' policies and actions. It remains doubtful, however, that this influence is controlling. Most of the Vietnam protest activity would be there with or without the Communist

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element. The CPUSA, in other words, is exploiting and benefiting from anti-government activity, but it does not appear to be inspiring it or directing it.

13. The non-Communist sector known as the "radical left" is heavily engaged in the campaign. Its organizations are non-exclusive and its branches autonomous, which makes them vulnerable to Communist infiltration. For example, the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), perhaps the most active of the major organizations (see appendix A), opens its doors officially to Communists along with others of "progressive" inclination. Although plainly radical, the convictions espoused by the SDS and its intellectual arm, the Radical Education Project (REP), make it clear, however, that SDS leaders are not interested in "pre-packaged ideology" or excessive Communist guidance. These militants, who identify themselves as the New Left, generally look on Communists--especially those with foreign loyalties--as not only suspect but rather old-hat.

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II. NATURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS

1. Most of the contacts between US and foreign groups on Vietnam are private, that is with persons and organizations not directly connected with foreign governments. The contacts with Hanoi, which are traced in Section III, represent the only evidence we have of extensive dealings with government officials.

In the Public Domain

2. The key activists are on the move much of the time. There is ample opportunity therefore for consultation with counterparts abroad. Regular communication is maintained through wires, letters and publications as well. These informal contacts are further cultivated at the more formal international conferences which the peace organizations sponsor at regular intervals.

3. American students resident abroad also provide an important channel for coordinating US activity with foreign activity. In some capitals US students have formed their own protest organizations, which function as subsidiaries of the NMC.

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Examples are the "Stop It" and "Angry Arts" committees in London and the Paris American Committee to Stop War. Other centers of student activity are Berlin, Stockholm, Tokyo, and Mexico City.

4. Aside from these major centers of activity, a current check of all foreign countries where we have representatives has turned up little or no evidence of contact between US citizens and local Vietnam protest groups. In one or two instances, aside from those mentioned above, we have noted written appeals from the NMC in New York to sympathetic organizations abroad to mobilize protest demonstrations.

Governmental Contacts

5. Indications of overt or covert connections between US activists and foreign governments are limited, [redacted]

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6. If such clandestine Communist connections do exist, they are likely to be indirect. They would be wired through the extensive circuits of

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front organizations and national parties. It can be assumed, for example, that substantial Soviet influence and advice--at a minimum--are passed via the CPUSA to the American student movement through the Communist-controlled Du Bois Clubs of America and to other groups via the Tri-Continental Information Center (TCIC) (see Appendix A). We have seen no evidence that anything more is being passed, except possibly some airline tickets.

7. The secretary general of the CPUSA has been involved in several contacts between American peace groups and Hanoi, as related in Section III. Moscow's underwriting of the Stockholm peace conference last July is also noted there.

8. Peking and Havana have lent some assistance to the anti-US campaign, but on a much smaller scale than Hanoi or Moscow. Both capitals are often on the itineraries of traveling peacemakers and Liberation War-mongers. In addition, Robert Williams, the American defector who lives in Peking, is in intermittent contact with a number of US anti-war organizations and "Black Power" groups.

9. Clandestine contact overseas would be facilitated by the fact, noted in the previous

section, that the responsibility for international coordination rests in the hands of a few dedicated activists. These itinerant coordinators personally have close Communist and ultraradical associations; a few are reported to have called themselves Communists of a kind or to have endorsed Communism in some fashion.*

10. We have no evidence, however, that they act under any direction other than their own. It should be noted that this probably would not be evident if they did, since their voluntary activities serve Soviet and Chinese interests about as well as they could if they were controlled. A number of the US activists clearly are willing to allow themselves to be used by foreign governments, but it is difficult to judge how insidious their motives are.

11. What might prove control or direction would be evidence of relationships involving more than

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* *David Dellinger, the leading US peace activist, stated in May 1963 that he was "a Communist, but not of the Soviet type," according to a reliable FBI source. Although never a member of a political party, Dellinger has been continuously associated with pacifist organizations since the 1930's and later with the Trotskyite Socialist Workers Party and various Communist front groups. He is also noted for his involvement in pro-Castro organizations.*

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cooperation freely given, such as funding, secret directives, communications aids, blackmail, and the like. Our examination of the evidence available to us at this time has produced very little one way or another on this subject.

12. [redacted]

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13. On the basis of what we now know, we see no significant evidence that would prove Communist control or direction of the US peace movement or its leaders.

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III. COORDINATING THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN: A RECORD OF FOREIGN CONTACTS

1. In this section an attempt is made to relate certain foreign contacts of US peace activists, [redacted] with the development over the past year of an internationally orchestrated campaign to rally opposition against US actions in Vietnam. A variety of individuals, organizations, and programs have been involved in these contacts, but only two threads can be traced throughout the pattern. One represents the efforts of individuals active in the Mobilization Committees to organize popular demonstrations, which culminated in the world-wide protest marches of 21 October; the other represents the development of the "war crimes tribunal" staged by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation (BRPF), which will hold its second and more spectacular session next month. Among names frequently mentioned, that of David Dellinger stands out, largely because of his special role as coordinator and international intermediary and because he is

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the only leader prominently involved in both of the activities mentioned above.

2. Close personal coordination between US activists and the North Vietnamese appears to have begun in 1965. The DRV at that time invited Herbert Aptheker, prominent CPUSA theoretician and Director of the American Institute for Marxist Studies, to visit Hanoi. Aptheker in turn suggested that he be accompanied by Staughton Lynd, former Yale Professor and a leader of the US Committee for Non-Violent Action (CNVA), and Thomas Hayden, a militant civil rights worker and a founder of the SDS. The trio visited Hanoi in December 1965. In the course of this trip they spent four days in Moscow and three days in Peking. In late January, after their trip was completed, CPUSA chief Gus Hall reportedly commented that the mission had boosted the party's prestige markedly, adding that this favorable atmosphere should be exploited to build up the CPUSA.

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3. [redacted]

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4. [redacted]

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* *The Vietnam Peace Committee is a North Vietnamese government agency apparently responsible for promoting and coordinating international protest activity.*

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5. [redacted]

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6. [redacted]

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These included four American women invited in December to check on US bombing of residential areas, three clergymen (including Muste) on a "mission of protest" in early January 1967, and the Ashmore-Baggs-Quintanilla mission in January under the auspices of the Center for Studies of Democratic Institutions at Santa Barbara. In the latter part of January, two American Quakers--Russell Johnson and Paul Johnson--visited Hanoi. Arriving with Russell

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Johnson on 20 January were Wilfred Burchett, Australian Communist journalist, and Ralph Schoenman, the American who serves as Director of the Russell Peace Foundation. Shortly thereafter the Quaker action group in the US notified the State Department that the yacht Phoenix would force a "confrontation" by sailing to North Vietnam with a shipment of medical supplies.

7. [redacted]

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8. [redacted]

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9. [redacted]

10. The Russell Foundation meanwhile was busy with preparations for the first session of its "International War Crimes Tribunal" (IWCT), which was held from 2 to 10 May in Stockholm.

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[redacted] The importance Hanoi attaches to this charade as a vehicle for promoting world and American opposition to US policies has been made abundantly clear

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[redacted] Dellinger appears to act as a co-ordinator of US activity relating to the IWCT. During the session in Stockholm, Dellinger participated as a panel member of the "tribunal."

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11. [redacted] Dellinger arrived in the North Vietamese capital on 26 May. With him was Nick Egleson, a leader of SDS. Talks with North Vietnamese officials during this two-week visit resulted in a proposal to hold a conference later in the summer between a number of US activists representing student, Negro, and assorted pacifist groups and representatives of the DRV and the NLFSV. The outcome of this proposal was the Bratislava Conference in September (see below).

12. Moscow had been concentrating for some time on a major international conclave of peace groups scheduled for Stockholm in July (not to be confused with the Stockholm session of the IWCT in May).

13. Although the meeting was held nominally under the auspices of a Swedish organization, it was inspired and dominated by the World Council of

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Peace (WCP), the Soviet bloc's aging and discredited peace front. The Stockholm Conference represented a major propaganda play by Moscow, designed to embarrass the US but at the same time to move the Vietnam problem closer to the conference table. Despite its reputation as an instrument of the Soviet Government, the WCP had managed to corral a large number of legitimate pacifist groups by exploiting widespread sentiment against the Vietnam war. Like all but a few of the mixed American delegation,* the majority of delegates shared the WCP's moderate approach to the problem aimed at a compromise settlement. Moscow failed, however, to allow for the Vietnamese. Hanoi's determined delegation paralyzed the conference by refusing to budge from a take-it-or-leave-it position that no settlement was possible except on the basis of the Four and Five Points. Few delegates were willing to oppose the Vietnamese actively.

* *American views ranged from the radical Peking-oriented position of Rev. James Bevel, representing the Spring Mobilization Committee, to the moderate Quaker position of the American Friends Service Committee. The extreme "Black Power" groups apparently did not participate in the Stockholm Conference (in contrast to their strong presence at the later Bratislava meeting). One of the "star" delegates at Stockholm was SANE's Dr. Spock, but he was noted chiefly during the conference for going sailing.*

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The conference ended almost before it started with the deep divisions in the peace movement laid bare for all to see. Moscow could count nothing for its effort but a temporary refurbishing of the WCP's standing in the international peace community.

14. For the US peace coalition, the Stockholm conference was useful in providing an opportunity to strengthen its contacts with antiwar groups throughout the world. The way was thus prepared for closer coordination of protest activity on an international scale. The meeting also enabled the Americans to continue their dialogue with the North Vietnamese. [redacted]

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15. [redacted] the large US-Vietnamese conference to firm up plans for the October demonstrations. [redacted] was held in Bratislava from 5 to 13 September. [redacted]

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Little information is available on what transpired at Bratislava beyond discussion of the planned demonstrations.

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16. A number of the US participants flew to Hanoi after the conference wound up. These included several representatives of SDS led by Hayden. [redacted] On the 18th he reported the formal establishment of the "South Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with the American People." Hayden appears to have left Hanoi for Prague on 19 October. [redacted]

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17. Also in October the North Vietnamese Women's Union issued their invitation to three members of the WSP (see appendix A) for discussions on "their joint struggle against violence." The day after their return to the US on 20 October, Dagmar Wilson and her WSP vanguard staged a demonstration in Washington against the draft.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(S)

18. [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
E0 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(S)

[redacted]

19. [redacted]

E0 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
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[redacted] The efforts culminated in the demonstrations of 21 October, but did not end there. By 7 November, Thomas Hayden was back in Phnom Penh, and there is every reason to surmise that contacts between the peace organizations and Hanoi are continuing as before.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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APPENDIX A

US "Peace" Groups with

Significant International Communist Contacts

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

1. NATIONAL MOBILIZATION COMMITTEE TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM (NMC)

The NMC, principal sponsor of the October peace demonstration in Washington, was a direct outgrowth of the Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC). SMC was formed to coordinate the demonstration in April 1967 against the Vietnam War and the draft.

The NMC is not an action group. It is a coordinating outfit responsible for disseminating information and literature to other peace groups and to the public at large. It coordinates demonstrations, obtains necessary permits, negotiates with civil authorities for facilities, and provides legal assistance when needed. Except for the few paid professional executives, the NMC can be categorized simply as a collection of local peace groups.

Communist penetration of the organization is apparent at several levels, but the NMC is so diversified in its make-up and organizationally loose, that it is not an easy mark for classic Communist manipulation.

Many members of the NMC leadership, including Chairman David Dellinger and Vice Chairman Jerry Rubin, have known and associated with Communists and Communist-front groups over the years.

Both Dellinger and Rubin are also strong supporters of Castro and his movement.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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2. STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (SDS)

SDS, formed in 1962, is a radical "New Left" student organization with a militant line on domestic and foreign issues. It claims to have some 3,000 members in 150 chapters on college campuses throughout the US. SDS membership is open to all, including Communists.

SDS works closely on college campuses with the Communist-controlled W.E.B. Du Bois Clubs of America. Although the CPUSA places members in key positions in the SDS, it is unable to control the organization on its policies, largely because of a built-in resistance to Communist domination. SDS has been saluted by Gus Hall, CPUSA General Secretary, as a part of the "responsible left." In some ways SDS views are more radical than those of the Moscow-line Communists.

SDS considers itself a "broad" movement, designed to attract people with diverse views and interests concerning such issues as peace, civil rights, poverty, and educational reform. SDS has concerned itself especially with protesting the draft, denouncing the US presence in Vietnam, and "radically" transforming university life and the "decadent" American Way of Life in general.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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3. RADICAL EDUCATION PROJECT (REP)

The REP is the intellectual arm of SDS. It was established by SDS in 1966 as an independent education, research and publication organization devoted to the cause of "democratic radicalism," which has been commonly dubbed the New Left in America. REP is incorporated as a non-profit, educational organization.

Although claiming to be non-partisan, REP does "identify" with the "forces of radical democracy in America and abroad." REP's vision of the future calls for scrapping capitalism and the American "establishment."

The REP plans to develop a network of people, both in the US and abroad, to serve the movement as rapid "sources of intelligence" on issues as they develop. Such persons, including scholars, journalists, and youth leaders, will be expected to provide first-hand reports and analysis on insurgent movement and similar international developments. In this way the REP hopes to challenge "official truth" and to develop opposition resources.

The REP is already involved with SNCC and other organizations in establishing a Latin American affairs institute. This institute is to coordinate research, monitor information and maintain contacts in this hemisphere. The REP reportedly has contacts also in Canada, Japan, most European countries, and keeps in touch with the Viet Cong and African nationalists.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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4. TRI-CONTINENTAL INFORMATION CENTER (TCIC)

The TCIC was established in October 1966 as the result of a proposal by Gus Hall, Secretary General of the CPUSA. Hall urged that the Party form an "anti-imperialist" organizational center to maintain contact with world peace forces, including the Communist-front World Peace Council and other centers in Latin America and Asia.

The TCIC appears to be almost completely under the domination of the CPUSA, which named its director and provides its contacts. TCIC puts out a bulletin which Hall has ordered passed to Communist parties around the world. Recruitment of TCIC personnel is under the direct control of the CPUSA.

The TCIC helped to organize US participation in the Stockholm conference against the war in Vietnam last July. TCIC Director Mike Myerson attended the conference.

TCIC has been particularly active in the movement for Puerto Rican independence. The Center participated in an island-wide march to protest the war in Vietnam and the drafting of Puerto Ricans for service in Vietnam.

Dr. Benjamin Spock is a member of TCIC's advisory board.

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5. STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SNCC)

SNCC was one of the earliest groups to popularize the call for "Black Power." Through the energies of its demagogic leaders, Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown, SNCC has become the leading exponent of militant Negro action.

SNCC has become involved via the back door in the campaign against the war in Vietnam. Its leadership now makes a point of trying to turn Negro-Americans against the US Government, particularly with respect to the draft and service in Vietnam.

Carmichael recently has traveled extensively throughout the "Third World," in addition to North Vietnam and Cuba, railing against US "imperialism" and domestic repression. SNCC will be well represented, as it was at the Bratislava Conference in September, at any activity which offers it a chance to expound on its concepts of guerrilla warfare and racial violence.

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6. WOMEN STRIKE FOR PEACE (WSP)

The WSP was founded in 1961 as a nationally organized, women's pacifist organization especially opposed to American actions in Vietnam. The WSP is open to women of all political views who are interested in world peace. It has no officers. Known Communists are associated with the group.

Several women prominently associated with the WSP have maintained contact with Hanoi since visiting there on the invitation of the Vietnam Women's Union. Among these are Dagmar Wilson and Mary Clarke, who have participated actively in recent demonstrations.

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7. WAR RESISTERS' LEAGUE (WRL)

The WRL, headquartered in New York City, is the American affiliate of War Resisters International (WRI). The WRI dates back to the early 1920's and has a long record of helping pacifists and their national organizations around the world in working for peace and in aiding conscientious objectors financially and in other ways.

Although the WRL is a non-partisan pacifist organization of long standing, recently it has been active in promoting resistance to the draft and desertion from the US forces. It has emerged as one of the more active overt agencies assisting US servicemen who wish to desert their posts.

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8. THE BERTRAND RUSSELL PEACE FOUNDATION (BRPF)

The BRPF cannot be classified as an American "peace" organization per se. However, a substantial number of US citizens are involved in this activity, and particularly in its offspring, the "International War Crimes Tribunal" (IWCT). The major operator in both organizations is Ralph B. Schoenman, the American who is Lord Russell's personal secretary.

The BRPF, which Schoenman serves as director, has been described by Lord Russell as an organization "to investigate the causes of the Cold War and to pursue such measures as may diminish and eliminate the risk of war." Despite these aims, the BRPF rarely takes an objective approach to international problems. Its principal activities, largely governed by Schoenman, involve agitation against alleged US "imperialism" and advocacy of "Che Guevara" type revolutionary movements. (The latter interest apparently prompted Schoenman's recent excursion to Bolivia, from where he was deported to the US.)

Schoenman can perhaps best be described as an extreme leftist with Trotskyite tendencies. His views are so "red" that even the British Communist Party regards him with little enthusiasm.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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APPENDIX B

American Organizations Participating

In Anti-Vietnam War Activities

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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TOP SECRET [redacted]
SENSITIVE

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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APPENDIX B

American Organizations Participating

In Anti-Vietnam War Activities

Abraham Lincoln Brigade

Ad Hoc Committee for Peace in Vietnam

Afro-Americans Against the War in Vietnam

American Friends Service Committee

American Independent Movement

American Underground

Assembly of Unrepresented People

Atlanta Workshop in Non-Violence

Brooklyn Chapter, DuBois Clubs of America

Brooklyn Residents for Peace

Campus Christian Ministry

Campus Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam

Catholic Peace Fellowship

Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors

Chicago Branch Socialist Workers Party

Chicago Peace Action Council

Chicago Women for Peace

Citizens Coordinating Committee on Vietnam

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TOP SECRET [redacted]
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TOP SECRET [redacted]
SENSITIVE

Citizens of Conscience, Washington Heights and Inwood

Cleveland Area Peace Action Council

Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy

Committee for Direct Action to End the War in Vietnam

Committee for Independent Political Action

Committee for Non-Violent Action

Committee of Returned Volunteers (Peace Corps)

Committee on Democratic Education

Committee to Aid the Vietnamese People

Committee to End the War in Vietnam

Committee to End the War in Vietnam, University of Wisconsin

Communist Party of the USA

Congress of Racial Equality

Connecticut Area Mobilization Committee

Delaware Concerned Citizens About Vietnam

Diggers

Direct Action Committee

East Coast Front for United Action

Education Action Mobilization

Emma Lazarus Federation of Jewish Women's Clubs, New Haven Branch

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TOP SECRET [redacted]
SENSITIVE

Episcopal Peace Fellowship

Faculty-Student Committee To Stop the War in Vietnam

Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade

Foreign Policy Council at New York Democrats Vietnam Dollar Fund

Friends Peace Committee

Greater Seattle Committee of Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam

Henry Forbes Club

Houston Citizens for Action on Vietnam

Hyde Park Committee to End the War in Vietnam

Individuals Against the Crime of Silence

Inter-University Committee for Debate on Foreign Policy

Italian Committee of the Vietnam Day Committee (Associazione dei Lavoratori Christiani)

Kansas City Area Committee to End the War in Vietnam

Labor Committee To End the War in Vietnam

Luthern Campus Center for the University of Washington

Milwaukee Organizing Committee

Milwaukee Young Socialists

Minnesota Mobilization Committee

Mobilization Against War

National Citizens Campaign for New Initiatives to End the War in Vietnam

National Committee, Communist Party of the USA

National Conference for New Politics

National Continuations Committee

National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam

Northwest Convention of Federated Auxiliary of International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union

Northwest Regional Conference to End the War in Vietnam

Negotiate Now!

New York Peace Mobilizations

Peace Action Council

Paris American Committee to Stop the War in Vietnam (PACS)

Peace and Freedom Movement

Princeton Ad Hoc Committee to Bring about Negotiations in Vietnam

Progressive Labor Party, Puerto Rican Club

Port Chicago Peace Vigil

Port Chicago Vigil

Portland Committee to End the War in Vietnam

Puerto Rican Independence Movement

Resist

Resistance, (The)

Revolutionary Committee of the Fourth International

San Antonio Committee To Stop the War in Vietnam

San Francisco State College

Seattle Spring Mobilization Committee

Sixth AD Club

Socialist Labor Party

Socialist Workers Party

Southern Christian Leadership Conference

Spartacist

Spokane Committee for Peace in Vietnam (also Spokane Citizens for Peace in Vietnam)

Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam

Students for a Democratic Society

Students for Socialist Action

Students Mobilization Committee

Students National Spring Mobilization

Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee

Student Peace Union

Student Strike for Peace Conference

Sunset Club of the San Francisco County CP

Swarthmore Draft Resisters Union

Trade Unionists for Peace

Teachers Committee for Peace in Vietnam

United Campus Action Committee

United Peoples' Committee

University Committee on War and Peace

University of Chicago Student Mobilization

US Campaign

Veterans and Reservists to End the War in Vietnam

Veterans for Peace in Vietnam

Vietnam Summer

Vietnam Veterans Against the War

Vietnam Week Peace Mobilization

War Resisters League of Northern California

Washington Area Committee to End the War in Vietnam

W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America

Western District Mobilization Against War

Western Spring Mobilization

Wisconsin Draft Resistance

Women for Peace

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Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

Women's Peace and Unity Club, Chicago

Women Strike for Peace

Women's World Party

Workers World Party

World Workers Party

Yellow Springs Peace and Freedom Council

Young Socialist Alliance

Young Socialist Alliance, Chicago

Young Socialist Alliance - Socialist Workers Party

Youth Against War and Fascism

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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 94-28
Document # 16

NVN Leadership

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This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

[redacted]

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

S-E-C-R-E-T 211245Z CITE [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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DIST 21 NOVEMBER 1967

COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM

DOI: [redacted]

SUBJECT: COMMENTS [redacted] REGARDING DISCONTENT AMONG INTELLECTUALS IN NORTH VIETNAM AND NORTH VIETNAMESE PREMIER'S DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE THE WAR.

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BOWDLER
BUDGET
DAVIS
EVANS
FEIGHSBURGH
HAMILTON
JESSUP
JOHNSON
JORDEN
KEELY
LEONHART
ROCHE
SAUNDERS
TAYLOR

ACQ:

SOURCE: [redacted]

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SUMMARY. [redacted] NORTH VIETNAMESE PREMIER [redacted]

S-E-C-R-E-T [redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JAN 2001

TO FULFILL THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES.

3. AIR RAIDS HAVE DEMORALIZED THE PEOPLE IN CERTAIN AREAS, PARTICULARLY WHEN STEEL PELLET BOMBS WERE USED, SINCE THEY TEND TO "MAIM HORRIBLY" RATHER THAN KILL. HOWEVER, EVEN AN INCREASE IN BOMBING WOULD NOT SUCCEED IN SHAKING NORTH VIETNAMESE FANATICISM UNLESS THE TOP LEADERS WERE ELIMINATED. SUCH AN EVENT IS NOT LIKELY, SINCE THE LEADERS ARE NOT CONCENTRATED IN ONE SPOT.

4. DESPITE NUMBERS OF POLITICAL COMMISSARS SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, THE PEOPLE GENERALLY DO NOT APPEAR TO BE AS CONCERNED WITH IDEOLOGY AS WITH THE PROBLEM OF FIGHTING THE WAR. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DO NOT APPEAR TO BE RABID COMMUNISTS IN TERMS OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION OR STALINIST CONCEPTS. SEVERAL NORTH VIETNAMESE CONDEMNED THE CHINESE INFLUENCE ON NORTH VIETNAM AND EXPRESSED FEAR THAT COMMUNIST CHINA WOULD ONE DAY OCCUPY THEIR COUNTRY. NORTH VIETNAMESE NATIONALISM IS CHARACTERIZED BY FANATICAL PRIDE, WHICH IS NOT EXCEEDED EVEN IN CUBA OR CHINA.

5. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DO NOT APPEAR TO CONSIDER

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CONSIDERED NORTH VIETNAM DEFEATED. PHAM ALSO COMMENTED THAT THE POSITION OF THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM HAD IMPROVED.

2. [redacted] ALTHOUGH MOST NORTH VIETNAMESE, PARTICULARY IN RURAL AREAS, DEMONSTRATE A FANATIC DETERMINATION TO PURSUE THE WAR TO ITS ULTIMATE CONCLUSION, THERE ARE DISCONTENTED ELEMENTS IN THE CITIES, ESPECIALLY AMONG INTELLECTUALS WHO HAVE STUDIED ABROAD. THEY WANT THE GOVERNING REGIME TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE WAR THROUGH NEGOTIATION SO THAT THEIR COUNTRY CAN BE RECONSTRUCTED AND THE PEOPLE CAN HAVE A BETTER LIFE. SEVERAL CHEMISTS, DOCTORS, AND ENGINEERS SAID THAT THE WAR WAS LEADING NOWHERE AND IF CONTINUED WOULD "BLEED NORTH VIETNAM WHITE." THEY THOUGHT THAT THE PRESIDIUM OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PARTY, WHICH IS STAFFED WITH PARTY ELDERS, SHOULD BE REJUVENATED. SEVERAL SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS SAID A QUICK AND COMPLETE MODERNIZATION OF THE COUNTRY WAS NECESSARY BUT THAT PROGRESS WOULD BE SLOW AS LONG AS THE WAR CONTINUED. HOWEVER, THEY INDICATED NO SIGN OF WEAKENING AND CONTINUED

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PHAM VAN DONG STATED IN OCTOBER 1967 THAT NORTH VIETNAM WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE UNTIL MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST IT WERE ENDED AND WOULD NEVER NEGOTIATE WITH AN ENEMY WHICH CONSIDERED NORTH VIETNAM DEFEATED. [redacted] EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

[redacted] THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SEEM DETERMINED TO CONTINUE THE WAR, EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE NOT ARDENT COMMUNISTS. HOWEVER, INTELLECTUALS WHO HAVE STUDIED ABROAD WISH A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IN ORDER TO RECONSTRUCT THEIR COUNTRY. SOME MILITARY OFFICERS WOULD LIKE THE WAR TO END FOR THE SAME REASON, BUT THEY CONTINUE TO FAITHFULLY FULFILL THEIR DUTIES. END SUMMARY. EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

1. [redacted] NORTH VIETNAMESE PREMIER PHAM VAN DONG STATED RECENTLY THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR NORTH VIETNAM TO ACCEPT AMERICAN NEGOTIATION PROPOSALS UNLESS MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM WERE HALTED FIRST. THE PREMIER SAID NORTH VIETNAM WOULD NEVER SIT AT A CONFERENCE TABLE SO LONG AS THEIR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY WAS NOT RESPECTED AND WOULD NEVER NEGOTIATE WITH AN ADVERSARY WHO

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[redacted]

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(classification) (dissem controls)

WITH GREAT REGRET THE POSSIBLITY THAT HANOI MIGHT BE DESTROYED. IF IT WERE DESTROYED, THEY FEEL THAT THEY COULD BUILD A MODERN CITY, WHICH WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT TO DO OTHERWISE.

6. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACTHAI NSA CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF [redacted]

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T [redacted]

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S-E-C-R-E-T

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 98-136
Document # 21c

27 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: 17 November White House Data Meeting

1. At 1700 on Friday, 17 November, a meeting was convened in the White House Situation Room by Mr. Walt W. Rostow to review the Vietnam data problem and related actions currently in train, both in Saigon and Washington. The session was attended by Ambassador Robert Komer, Mr. William Jorden, Mr. Richard Moose, Mr. Philip Habib, Dr. Victor Heyman, Ambassador William Leonhart, Major General William DePuy, Mr. George Carver and Mr. George Allen.

2. The specific occasion for the meeting was consideration of a Washington reply to Saigon Embtel 10573, 7 November 1967. As Mr. Rostow explained, however, the more general objective was to get the US Mission in Saigon and the Washington community thinking together on the data problem and thus forestall a burgeoning exchange of lengthy cables attempting to argue ... differences of opinion better settled around a table. Mr. Carver pointed out that Ambassador Bunker had been advised at lunch on 17 November that such a meeting was going to be held and had expressed a great interest in attending. Since this was obviously impossible because of the conflict with a speaking engagement in New York, it was agreed that the results of the meeting would be shown to the Ambassador for his review prior to the dispatch of any further messages to Saigon.

3. Dr. Heyman went systematically through the argument of Saigon Embtel 10573 outlining the elements in the US Mission's position with which the Washington community had problems. These were, principally, the Mission's proposed treatment of recruitment, infiltration, and related net loss computations on VC strength.

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DATE: AUG 1998

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4. After some brisk but helpful discussion, two fundamental points were unanimously agreed to:

a) A sharp distinction must be and will be made between data series and computations used as management tools by the US Government and data publicly surfaced for general consumption to enlighten the world at large with regard to the status of the Vietnamese struggle.

b) Henceforth, public explanations of the state of the war and progress being reported therein will not be pegged on statistics, though statistics will be used where relevant as illustrative examples to support general qualitative judgments.

5. In line with the policy agreed to in (b) above, the thesis (that all accept) that the Viet Cong are having recruitment problems will henceforth be publicly argued on the basis of captured documents describing such problems and will utilize available evidence of the increasing number of North Vietnamese assigned to what were historically Viet Cong units. Our estimates of recruitment rates (probably 7,000 per month for 1966 and probably down to the order of 3,500 per month for 1967) may be cited, but as ancillary illustrations and not as the keystone of the argument. Infiltration rates and loss calculations will be similarly handled in a low key with appropriate caveats, so that we may let the facts speak for themselves without appearing to claim that our statistics are better than they are or prove points they do not necessarily demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt.

6. The Washington participants in the 17 November meeting reviewed all aspects of the data problem and work being done on it with Ambassador Komer. Ambassador Komer was given a copy of the 26 October 1967 preliminary report of the Washington interagency Data Task Force and brought up to date on the current activities of that Task Force's various components. He, in turn, outlined work going on in Saigon and new projects being initiated there. Of these, the most important was the development, under Ambassador Komer's aegis, of a reporting procedure designed to evaluate the effectiveness of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, and to give reliable information on the strength, disposition and current duties of Regional and Popular Force units. Ambassador Komer agreed to furnish this information to Washington and also agreed to furnish the Washington community with copies of the provincial pacification plans for each of South Vietnam's provinces. We, in turn, agreed to provide Ambassador Komer with analytic back-up and support, particularly computer support, to assist him in analysis required in the field.

7. The Hamlet Evaluation System was discussed in considerable detail. While acknowledging its weaknesses, Ambassador Komer praised it highly as the best thing ever developed and an indispensible management tool. There was unanimous agreement that HES was designed primarily as a management tool, not as a way of measuring population control, and that it should not be allowed to be corrupted for public relations reasons. Ambassador Komer emphasized that he had given personal instructions to every district advisor to report honestly through the HES mechanism, making it plain that he was interested in problems, not progress. Ambassador Komer gave his personal assurance that pressure for "results" would not be allowed to corrupt the HES system.

8. A number of other technical data questions were raised, discussed and resolved at this meeting. In general it was a most useful session which gave every appearance of achieving its principal object, i.e., getting Washington and Saigon on the same wave length. Ambassador Komer is now reviewing the Data Task Force report in detail. Dr. Heyman is charged with drafting a message to Saigon outlining our substantive agreements and making detailed recommendations in light thereof. This will be reviewed by the Data Committee and by Ambassador Bunker prior to transmission.

George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON

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BEIRUT L'ORIENT IN FRENCH 29 DEC 67 P I M
(ARTICLE IN SERIES WRITTEN BY "PROMINENT" FRENCH TELEVISION REPORTER FRANCOIS CHALAIS--AN EXCLUSIVE TO L'ORIENT--TITLED "LIFE IN HANOI" AND DESCRIBING THE REPORTER'S ONE-MONTH VISIT TO NORTH VIETNAM. DATE OF THE VISIT NOT GIVEN. THE SERIES WAS ANNOUNCED 25 DECEMBER AND BEGAN 27 DECEMBER. THIS INSTALLMENT IS TITLED "THE U.S. PRISONERS DO NOT UNDERSTAND")
(EXCERPTS) (PASSAGE OMITTED) I MET SOME AMERICANS IN HANOI--PILOTS, OFTEN WOUNDED, HAVING EJECTED FROM THEIR PLANES. THEY--LIKE THE VIETNAMESE THEY ARE MASSACRING, BUT FOR DIFFERENT REASONS--DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO THEM. HERE ARE SOME EXAMPLES OF THEIR THINKING:

"WE WILL REBUILD YOUR BRIDGES." TO THIS PILOT, SOMEONE HAS BROUGHT PICTURES OF DESTROYED BRIDGES. DO YOU RECOGNIZE THESE BRIDGES? YES, SAYS THE PILOT, THIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN MY WORK. (PASSAGE OMITTED) THEN HE IS SHOWN THE SAME PICTURES, TAKEN A SHORT WHILE BEFORE (THE FIRST PICTURES--ED.) THESE PICTURES SHOW MANY BODIES--SEVERAL SCORE--SCATTERED AROUND THE BRIDGE. IS THIS ALSO YOUR WORK? THE AMERICAN HESITATES, THEN SAYS: IT IS NOT MY FAULT IF PEOPLE ARE FOOLISH ENOUGH TO PASS OVER BRIDGES WHILE I AM BOMBING. AND SOON HE ADDS: MOREOVER I DO NOT UNDERSTAND YOU. YOU HAVE ONLY TO STOP THE

McLaurin
J.S.

ACT..DIA-15

INFO...CSAF-1 FILE-1(17)CAC/JP

Approved for Release
Date AUG 1997.

1.7

VAR: AS SOON AS YOU DO SO WE WILL RESUILD YOUR BRIDGES. (PASSAGE OMITTED) MY FATHER IS A MULTIMILLIONAIRE. I WILL PAY YOU FOR THEM. (PASSAGE OMITTED)

ANOTHER PILOT IS INJURED. THE DOCTOR ASKS HIM HOW HE FEELS. HE REPLIES: WELL, BUT I MUST TELL YOU SOMETHING DOCTOR, YOU ARE ALL QUITE KIND, BUT YOUR MEDICINES ARE WORTHLESS. ONLY AMERICAN MEDICINES ARE GOOD. YOU ARE DOING WHATEVER YOU CAN, BUT COMPARED TO U.S. DOCTORS, YOU ARE ONLY BEGINNERS. THEREFORE THIS IU WHAT I SUGGEST: WE HAVE CLARKBASE IN THE PHILIPPINES WHERE THEY HAVE EVERYTHING THAT IS NEEDED. YOU LET ME GO THERE AND AS SOON AS I RECOVER I WILL RETURN HERE TO GIVE MYSELF UP. (PASSAGE OMITTED)

DOWNED U.S. PILOTS ENERGETICALLY REFUSE TO ADMIT THAT THEY MAY HAVE BEEN SHOT DOWN BY VIETNAMESE PILOTS--AN INFERIOR SPECIES IN THE MINDS OF THE AMERICAN PILOTS. NO, THEY WERE HIT BY SAM MISSILES OR BY ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTERIES--BUT NEVER BY MIG PILOTS. ONE PILOT, FOR EXAMPLE, IS GIVEN ALL THE PROOF THAT HE WAS HIT BY ONE OF HIS VIETNAMESE COUNTERPARTS. HE DEFENDS HIMSELF VEHEMENTLY, NEVERTHELESS, HERE ARE IRREFUTABLE PICTURES. THEY EVEN BRING TO HIS HOSPITAL BED THE PILOT WHO DOWNED HIS PLANE. THE AMERICAN STILL HESITATES, THEN SAYS: I WOULD HAVE NEVER BELIEVED IT, BUT EVIDENTLY IT IS AS YOU SAY. (PASSAGE OMITTED)

A MEETING WHICH WILL LEAVE ITS MARK ON MY LIFE:

MY MEETING WITH JOHN SIDNEY MCCAIN WAS CERTAINLY ONE OF THOSE MEETINGS WHICH WILL AFFECT ME MOST PROFOUNDLY FOR THE REST OF MY LIFE. I HAD ASKED THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES TO ALLOW ME TO PERSONALLY INTERROGATE AN AMERICAN PRISONER. THEY AUTHORIZED ME TO DO SO. WHEN NIGHT FELL, THEY TOOK ME--WITHOUT ANY PRECAUTIONS OR MYSTERY--TO A HOSPITAL NEAR THE GIA LAM AIRPORT RESERVED FOR THE MILITARY. (PASSAGE OMITTED) THE OFFICER WHO RECEIVES ME BEGINS: I ASK YOU NOTT TO ASK ANY QUESTIONS OF POLITICAL NATURE. IF THIS MAN REPLIES IN A WAY UNFAVORABLE TO US, THEY WILL NOTT HESITATE TO SPEAK OF "BRAINWASHING" AND CONCLUDE THAT WE THREATENED HIM. (PASSAGE OMITTED)

MTHIS JOHN SIDNEY MCCAIN IS NOTT AN ORDINARY PRISONER.MHIS FATHER IS NONE OTHER THAN ADMIRAL EDMOND JOHN MCCAIN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES IN EUROPE. (PASSAGE OMITTED)

IN A WEAK VOICE, HE RELATES HIS STORY TO ME: I WAS CARRYING OUT A BOMBING MISSION, MY 23D TWENTYTHIRD RAID, OVER HANOI. IT WAS THEN

THAT I WAS HIT. I WANTED TO EJECT BUT WHILE DOING SO I BROKE BOTH ARMS AND MY RIGHT THIGH. UNCONSCIOUS I FELL IN A LAKE. SOME VIETNAMESE JUMPED INTO THE WATER AND PULLED ME OUT. LATER I LEARNED THERE MUST HAVE BEEN ABOUT 12 TWELVE OF THEM. THEY IMMEDIATELY TOOK ME TO HOSPITAL, IN A CONDITION TWO INCHES AWAY FROM DEATH. A DOCTOR OPERATED ON MY THIGH. OTHERS AT THE SAME TIME DEALT WITH MY ARMS.

HOW ARE YOU TREATED HERE?

VERY WELL. EVERYBODY IS VERY NICE TO ME.

HOW IS THE FOOD?

HE SMILESSFEELY. OBVUOUSLY, THE LEAST REACTION HURTS HIM. THIS ISN'T PARIS, BUT IT IS ALRIGHT.

DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING TO READ?

THEY HAVE SUGGESTED THAT I READ, BUT MY HANDS ARE UNABLE TO HOLD EVEN A NEWSPAPER.

HIS CIGARETTE HAS GONE OUT. HE TALKS TO ME ABOUT HIS WIFE WHO LIVES IN JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA, AND ABOUT HIS THREE CHILDREN. AND NOW HE ADDRESSES HIS FAMILY: I KNOW THAT THIS IS GOING TO TURN OUT WELL. I HOPE THAT I WILL SEE YOU SOON. I WIL B WELL. THIS IS AL RECEPEATS: THIS IS ALL. (PASSAGE OMITTED)

[redacted] 01/2232Z JAN

BT

RNNNN

12768

NLK 01-203-2-2
Encl 3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2001

STATUS REPORT
ON
COVERT ACTIONS IN VIETNAM
(Keyed to 28 November Report)

1. a. Montagnard (Highlander) Program:

Eighteen highlander paramilitary teams (averaging 12 men per team) completed training and departed for five central Vietnam provinces where each team will be assigned selected districts.

Twenty-one intelligence officers for highlander net began operations in 21 districts of five highland provinces.

b. Rural Reconstruction Operations:

No significant change.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
E0 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

c. Para-Military/Intelligence Operations Against Viet Cong [redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
E0 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
E0 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted] Viet Cong mined and booby trapped trails in area and prepared one ambush. Friendly losses, one killed, four wounded. Ambush dispersed by attack of CLAS unit. CLAS unit retreated [redacted] booby trapping trail behind them. Booby trap exploded by pursuing enemy force within 15 minutes after trap prepared. CLAS unit heard screams and cries of enemy wounded.

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

Copy of 1

d. Central Intelligence Organization:

The commissioner of the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) and other ranking CIO officers are planning to separate counter intelligence and communist penetration functions of the NPSS and to assign these functions to the Domestic Intelligence and Counter Espionage Service (DICS). The DICS has been previously identified as the Domestic Intelligence Service (DIS). A close working relationship between the DICS and the CIO is planned with the DICS relying upon the police at the village level to supply operational leads and logistical support.

Planning initiated with the DICS for establishment of units to concentrate upon identification and location of Viet Cong bands interrupting main highways, to provide targets for attack by regular military units.

e through i: No significant change:

2 through 6: No significant change.

7. Other Activities:

High levels of GVN discussed centralization of planning for the strategic hamlet program, possibly by interministerial committee. [redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

Eight civic-action ministry instructors completed six-week off-shore paramilitary and intelligence course. Returned Saigon and beginning instruction of civic action team members.

Class of 182 civic-action team members, including 22 young women, began six-week paramilitary training course near Da Nang (Tourane), which will stress defensive tactics related to organization of strategic hamlets.

UNITED STATES Servicemen's Affairs Committee

AFRICAN INTERVIEWS [illegible], MIDDLE EAST

Extract LIBERATION in French 29 Dec 67 p 3.

[Article in series written by Figaro [illegible] reporter Francois Cholain--on exclusive to L'[illegible]--titled 'Life in Hanoi' and describing the reporter's one-month visit to North Vietnam date of the visit not given. The series was announced 25 December and began 27 December. This installment is titled: 'The U.S. prisoners do not understand']

[Excerpts] I met some American fliers--pilots, often wounded, having ejected from their planes. They--like the Vietnamese they are massacring, but for different reasons--do not understand what has happened to them. Here are some examples of their bewilderment:

"We will rebuild your bridges." To this pilot, someone has brought pictures of destroyed bridges. Do you recognize these bridges? Yes, says the pilot, this should have been my work. Then he is shown the same pictures, taken a short while before [*** four pictures] These pictures show many bodies--several bodies--scattered around the bridge. Is this also your work? The American hesitates, then says: It is not my fault if people are foolish enough to pass over bridges while I am bombing. And soon he adds: However I do not understand you. You have only to stop the war. As soon as you do so we will rebuild your bridges. My father is a multimillionaire. I will pay you for them.

Another pilot is injured. The doctor asks him how he feels. He replies: Well. But I must tell you something doctor. You are all quite kind, but your medicines are worthless. Only American medicines are good. You are doing whatever you can, but compared to U.S. doctors, you are only beginners. Therefore this is what I suggest: We have Clark Base in the Philippines where they have everything that is needed. You let me go there, and as soon as I recover I will return here to give myself up.

Downed U.S. pilots energetically refuse to admit that they may have been shot down by Vietnamese pilots--an inferior species in the minds of the American pilots. No, they were hit by SAM missiles or by antiaircraft batteries--but never by MIG pilots. One pilot, for example, is given all the proof that he was hit by one of his Vietnamese counterparts. He defends himself vehemently. Nevertheless, there are irrefutable pictures. They even bring to his hospital bed the pilot who downed his plane. The American still hesitates, then says: I would have never believed it, but evidently it is as you say.

A meeting which will leave its mark on my life:

My meeting with John Sidney McCain III certainly one of those meetings which will affect me most profoundly for the rest of my life. I had asked the North Vietnamese authorities to allow me to personally interrogate an American prisoner. They authorized me to do so. When night fell, they took me--without any precautions or mystery--to a hospital near the Gia Lam Airport reserved for the military. The X officer who received me began: I beg you not to ask any questions of political nature. If this man replies in a way unfavorable to us, they will not hesitate to accuse of "brainwashing" and conclude that we threatened him. ...

This John Sidney McCain is not an ordinary prisoner. His father is none other than Admiral John McCain, commander in chief of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

PRIORITY

IN 29657

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/NMCC	(EXCDEF)	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	CIA/NMCC/USIB	NIC/FBIS	NSA/DCS	MOD/INR	ONE/AID	CRS/USIA
	DOT		EXO	NPIC		NPIC/IAS 2							

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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CONFIDENTIAL

131338Z CITE DIST 13 JANUARY 1968

COUNTRY: LAOS/NORTH VIETNAM

DOI: 12 JANUARY 1968

SUBJECT: AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THE ATTACK ON PHOU PHA THI (SITE 85)

ACQ: LAOS, VIENTIANE (13 JANUARY 1968) FIELD NO: (b)(1) (b)(3) 3.4(b)(1)

SOURCE:

1. FOUR DARK GREEN AIRCRAFT FLYING IN A NORTHWESTERLY DIRECTION PASSED THE VICINITY OF MUONG SANG (UH 8350) AT 1300 HOURS ON 12 JANUARY. WHEN THE FOUR AIRCRAFT REACHED BAN HOUEI SOUI (UH 7852), TWO OF THE AIRCRAFT, BROKE FROM FORMATION AND ORBITED IN THE HOUEI SOUK AREA, WHILE THE SECOND TWO AIRCRAFT, WHICH WERE AN-2 COLTS, CONTINUED TO PHOU PHA THI (UH 6860) AND COMMENCED BOMBING RUNS WHILE FLYING ON AN APPROXIMATE HEADING OF 304 DEGREES. (COMMENT: CONTAINED A PRELIMINARY ACCOUNT OF THE ATTACK ON PHOU PHA THI.)

2. EACH OF THE TWO ATTACKING AIRCRAFT MADE ONE BOMBING AND STRAFFING RUN AT 1310 HOURS. TWO WOMEN CIVILIANS AND TWO GUERRILLA

CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification) (limited controls)

3.4(b)(3)

SOLDIERS WERE KILLED AND TWO WOUNDED BY BOMBS. ONE MAN WAS WOUNDED BY FLYING DEBRIS. THE BOMBS, WHICH ALL APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN 250 POUNDS, INFLICTED SLIGHT DAMAGE TO SOME BUILDINGS, MOST OF WHICH WERE BILLETS.

3. THE FIRST AIRCRAFT CRASHED AND BURNED IN THE VICINITY OF UH 606865 SHORTLY AFTER IT HAD COMPLETED ITS BOMBING RUN. A GROUND TEAM FROM PHOC PHA THI SEARCHED THE AREA AT 1600 HOURS ON 12 JANUARY AND REPORTED NOTHING WAS SALVAGEABLE. SEVERAL ROUNDS OF SMALL ARMS FIRE ALSO HIT THE SECOND AIRCRAFT, WHICH BORE TAIL NUMBER 665, AS IT MADE ITS BOMBING RUN. IT CRASHED IN THE VICINITY OF UH 570895.

A. A GROUND TEAM THAT REACHED THE CRASH SITE AT UK 5789 AT 1600 HOURS ON 12 JANUARY RECOVERED TWO OF THREE BODIES IN THE AIRCRAFT. THE TEAM COULD NOT REMOVE A THIRD BODY WHICH WAS WEDGED IN THE WRECKAGE. THE TEAM REPORTED ALL OCCUPANTS OF THE AIRCRAFT APPEARED TO BE VIETNAMESE. THE TEAM ALSO RECOVERED A SOVIET MANUFACTURED HF RADIO AND A SET OF 71 ACCESSORY CRYSTALS AND CHARTS AND NOTEBOOKS IN VIETNAMESE. ONE AERONAUTICAL CHART WAS

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(classification) (classification controls)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
50 USC 3024(i)

ANNOTATED AND SHOWED THE FOLLOWING FLIGHT ROUTE DIRECT TO PHOU PHA THI: DUC THANG (XJ 0262) TO CANH MEO (WH 0274) TO SOP HAO (WH 4373), TO MUONG HAM (UH 9747) TO MUONG YUT (UH 7156) TO PHOU PHA THI. THE RETURN ROUTE WAS PLOTTED FROM PHOU PHA THI TO MUONG HET (UJ 9702) TO YEN CHAU (VJ 3926) TO VAN YEN (VJ 7129) TO SON TAY (WJ 5338) TO DUC THANG.

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY AIR USAID USIS USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC

REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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Intelligence Information Cable

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	DD/I		EXO										

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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SECRET 200712Z CITE [CORRECT]

DIST 20 JANUARY 1968

COUNTRY: LAOS/NORTH VIETNAM

DOI: 12 - 15 JANUARY 1968

SUBJECT: CONDITIONS AT PHOU PHA THI AFTER NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR ATTACK AND RECOVERY OF ITEMS FROM DOWNED ENEMY AIRCRAFT

(b)(1)s (b)(3) 3.4(b)(1)

ACQ: LAOS, VIENTIANE (15 JANUARY 1968) FIELD NO: FOV 12,986 (CORRECT)

SOURCE: [redacted]

SUBPARA 3. M. SHOULD READ ONE SOVIET-MADE RADIO TRANSMITTER RATHER THAN RADIO TRANSCEIVER AS ORIGINALLY REPORTED.

FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY AIR USAID USIS USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC [redacted]

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP-1

S E C R E T

(1)

REPORT CLASS [redacted]

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM

SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT ON HOI AN CITY AND QUANG NAM PROVINCE, AS OF 1800 HOURS ON 1 FEBRUARY

ACQUIRED: VIETNAM, DANANG (1FEBRUARY 68) [redacted]

SOURCE: THIS IS A SITUATION REPORT ON 1 FEBRUARY PREPARED BY CAS, [redacted]

1. IN HOI AN, QUANG NAM PROVINCE, LOUDSPEAKERS TOLD PEOPLE OF CURFEW AND OTHER RESTRICTIONS. PEOPLE WERE ADHERING TO RESTRICTIONS. THERE WAS NO APPARENT FEELING OF PANIC, BUT THE PEOPLE WERE NERVOUS AND ACTIVITY PROCEEDED AT A REDUCED PACE. ROAD BLOCKS RESTRICTED CIVILIAN TRAFFIC. VIET CONG (VC) WERE IN THE AREA IN VARIOUS DISGUISES, BUT MOST VC HAD LEFT THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF HOI AN TOWN.

2. DUY SUYEN DISTRICT WAS ATTACKED BY THE VC ON THE NIGHT OF 31 JANUARY AND THE DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS CONTINUED TO BURN IN THE AFTERNOON OF 1 FEBRUARY. SOME OF THE RESIDENTS HAD BEEN EVACUATED.

3. IN HOA VANG DISTRICT THE BUDDHISTS CLAIMED THEY HAD ONE THOUSAND REFUGEES IN NEED OF FOOD, AND THE AMERICANS WERE GOING TO LOOK INTO ASSISTANCE FOR THEM ON THE MORNING OF 2 FEBRUARY.

4. CONTACT WITH REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE (RDC) TEAMS WAS LIMITED DURING THE PAST THREE DAYS. TEAMS IN HOA

V

NND 941536 --- 63

[redacted]

1.5(c)(d) 12a
3.4(b)(1)(6)

LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 97-399
Document # 12a

31 January 1968

Status of Merchant Shipping in North Korea
as of 1100 31 January 1968

1. The last known locations of North Korea's five merchant ships (all dry cargo ships) are given below.* Four of these ships probably are attached to the fishing fleet. The other operates in the coastal trade. None has been detected in international trade, but two of the ships may have made voyages to the China coast.

a. Wisung Ho (1,500 GRT) -- a dry cargo ship in the coastal trade. May have made voyages to Communist China. Tentatively identified in Wonsan [redacted] 3 November 1967.

b. P'yong Hwa (1,935 GRT) -- a dry cargo ship attached to the fishing fleet. Previously may have sailed to China. Identified in [redacted] Wonsan of 26 January 1968.

c. Paektu-San (7,218 GRT) -- a fish factory ship probably based in Kimchaek. Located in Kimchaek [redacted] 3 November 1967. On 27 January 1968 was identified by a North Korean submarine chaser at 9.6 nautical miles south of Yongdaegap, near Sinpo.

d. MAG I (1,987 GRT) and MAG II (1,909 GRT) -- refrigerator ships attached to the fishing fleet. One was tentatively identified in Kimchaek [redacted] 12 December 1967, and one was tentatively identified [redacted] Wonsan of 26 January 1968.

2. The last known locations of the three Polish-flag dry cargo ships operated by the Joint Korean-Polish Ship Brokers' Co. (Chopolship) are given below. These are ships previously owned and operated by Polish Ocean Lines, and presumably are still Polish owned. The Mickiewicz is under time charter to Chopolship and has a mixed Polish-North Korean crew. The others probably are under time charter to Chopolship also, but the composition of their crews is unknown.

a. Adolf Warski (6,718 GRT) -- departed Chongjin 30 December enroute Poland. Departed Penang 20 January.

b. Mickiewicz (4,344 GRT) -- Probably arrived Hungnam 11 January and departed Hungnam 26 January after loading cargo for Djakarta, Karachi, and Huangpu to be transshipped at Singapore. On 31 Jan 0111Z was at 26:27N, 121:35E (opposite Foochow, China). ETA Singapore 4 February 1968.

* A sixth North Korean merchant ship, the refrigerator ship Daesong San, launched on 5 October 1967, was located at Nampo on 26 January 1968. This ship of approximately 2,000 GRT is still apparently being fitted out.

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JUN 2000

[redacted]

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(6)

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(6)

c. Narwik (7,065 GRT) -- Departed Santiago 21 Jan 1420Z. ETA Guantanamo 21 January. To load sugar for North Korea.

3. The following foreign merchant ships are in North Korean ports:

In Chongjin

Bucuresti (Rumanian--9224 GRT) arrived 22 January, ETD 31 January.

Eisbu Maru (Japanese--1,992 GRT) In port 25 January. To return to Chongjin 18 February to load cargo, including 12 tons graphite.

Pundua (British--7,295 GRT) ETA 24 January under North Vietnamese Time Charter. To load lighters and heavy lifts for Haiphong after having loaded fertilizer for North Vietnam in Hungnam.

Werner Seelenbinder (East German--8,003 GRT) ETA Chongjin 28 January. May load zinc and clinkers.

In Hungnam

Tikei (Soviet--9,501 GRT) Arrived 28 January from Nampo.

Yana (Soviet--3,231 GRT) Arrived 26 January to load cement.

In Nampo

Gornoaltaysk (Soviet--3,725 GRT) in port 26 January to load coal for Japan. ETD 28-29 January.

Kovrov (Soviet--9,250 GRT) in port 26 January.

Vyatkales (Soviet--3,261 GRT) Loading cement for Sakhalin.

4. The following foreign merchant ships are scheduled to arrive in North Korea:

Byzantion (Greek 7,276 GRT) ETA Hungnam 21 February, probably from Kosseir, UAR.

Genkai Maru (Japanese 2,346 GRT) ETA Nampo 10 February.

Hanoi (Polish 6,914 GRT) ETA Yokohoma 25 January. ETA North Korea 7 February.

Heiyo Maru (Japanese 2,973GRT) ETA 8 February. To load foundry pig iron.

Keihan Maru (Japanese ----GRT) ETA North Korea 1 February to discharge pitch coal.

Kotoku Maru (Japanese 2,278 GRT) ETA Hungnam 20 February.

TOP [redacted]

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(6)

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(6)

London (Greek 2,588 GRT) Departed Karachi 25 January with 2,509 tons unspecified cargo for North Korea.

Metalowiec (Polish 10,876 GRT) ETA Chongjin 1 February, to load 1,250 tons of magnesite.

Novorossiysk (Soviet 7,716 GRT) Lend-lease vessel enroute from Cuba to Nampo. Exited the Panama Canal on 29 January. Probable ETA 5 March 1968.

Perekop (Soviet -- 11,089 GRT) In Japan as of 21 January. Directed to depart Yokohama and arrive Chongjin in January.

Shoto Maru (Japanese 1,055 GRT) ETA North Korea 3 February.

Simba (Greek 5,957 GRT) ETA Nampo 1 February.

Taishu Maru (Japanese ----GRT) ETA Chongjin 10 February.

Takasago Maru (Japanese 2,579 GRT) ETA Chongjin 8 February.

Yamasho Maru (Tkr) (Japanese 199 GRT) ETA Chongjin 8 February.

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(6)

VANG AND DIEN BANH DISTRICTS HAD CONTACT WITH THE VC. TEAM 4's LEADER AND HIS ASSISTANT WERE KIA; TEAM 11 SUFFERED ONE KIA; TEAM 5, ONE KIA; TEAM 7, ONE KIA; AND TEAM 28 HAD CONTACT AT 0300 ON 1 FEBRURRY BUT RESULTS ARE UNKNOWN. TEAM 7 WAS STILL ON CAM THANH ISLAND, ABOUT 50 METERS ACROSS FROM THE MARKET IN HOI AN, WHICH IS CONTROLLED BY THE VC.

5. ONE RALLIER TO THE FIFTY FIRST ARVN BATTALION, ALLEGEDLY A MEMBER OF THE SECOND NORTH VIETNAM (NVA) DIVISION, ONE OF THREE VC ELEMENTS XXXXXXXX THAT ATTACKED THE DANANG COMPLEX, SAID THAT THESE FORCES (UNSPECIFIED) SUFFERED HEAVY CASUALTIES. HE CLAIMED HE WAS THE SOLE SURVIVOR OF HIS PLATOON, ONE REASON HE RALLIED. ACCORDING TO HIS STATEMENT THE MISSION OF THE THREE UNITS WAS TO ATTACK HOI AN AND DANANG CITY DURING THE FIRST THREE DAYS OF TET.

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV III MAF CORDS

REPORT CLASS [redacted]

END OF MESSAGE

NND 941536 --- 6 Y

AMB

REPORT CLASS
COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM
SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT ON QUANG TRI PROVINCE AS OF 0700 ON 1 FEBRUARY

ACQ: VIETNAM, DANANG (1 FEBRUARY 1968)
SOURCE: THIS IS A SITUATION REPORT ON 1 FEBRUARY PREPARED BY CAS,

(b)(3)

1. QUANG TRI PROVINCE HAS MUDDLED THROUGH TWO NIGHTS AND ONE DAY OF "THE OFFENSIVE." SOMEHOW WE HAVE ESCAPED SERIOUS FAILURE AND DEFEAT. THAT IS NOT TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT WE ARE OUT OF THE WOODS YET. THE ENEMY, VIET CONG (VC), HAS PLENTY OF MUSCLE; BUT HE HAS GIVEN US TIME TO GET SET, TO PLUG THE GAPS IN OUR DEFENSIVE LINEUPS, AND TO CORRECT SOME OF OUR GRIEVOUS WAYS.

2. THE VC OFFENSIVE IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE DEVELOPED EXACTLY AS AMERICAN ADVISORS PREDICTED IN THREE PHASES: INTERDICT LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS (PARTLY SUCCESSFUL); NEUTRALIZE U.S. COMBAT BASES (TOTALLY UNSUCCESSFUL); AND THEN ATTACK VIETNAMESE CENTERS

58

NND 941536 ---67

OF AUTHORITY THROUGH THE PACIFIED AREAS (SO FAR UNSUCCESSFUL).

A. SIX NORTH VIETNAM ARMY (NVA) OFFICERS, MOSTLY LIEUTENANTS, WERE EITHER KILLED OR CAPTURED IN THE 30 DAYS PRECEDING THE LAUNCHING OF PHASE III WHILE ON RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS IN THE PACIFIED AREAS. THEY HAD DETAILED MAPS OF PHASE III II AND I TARGETS.

B. FORWARD STOCKPILING OF WEAPONS, AMMUNITION AND RICE WAS DETECTED DURING THE PRECEDING 60 DAYS.

C. AGENT REPORTS, POW INTERROGATIONS, AND CHIEU HOI STATEMENTS CONSISTENTLY STATED THAT THE ENEMY PLANNED TO TAKE AND OCCUPY QUANG TRI CITY.

D. THE HUGE TROOP MOVEMENTS DETECTED BY ALL SOURCES WERE HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT, BOTH NORTH TO SOUTH AND WEST TO EAST. A SIMPLE PROJECTION OF THE ROUTE LED THEM CONVERGING ON QUANG TRI, DONG HA, TRIEU PHONG.

E. JUST BEFORE THE BIG ATTACK BEGAN ALLIES OBTAINED LARGE STACKS OF PROPAGANDA MATERIAL AND NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM (NFLSV) FLAGS. THE STUFF WAS NOT UNUSUAL IN CONTENT, JUST IN QUANTITY. APPARENTLY THIS ATTACK IN THE MINDS OF THE LEADERS IN HANOI WAS TO BE MORE OF AN "ANCHLUSS THAN A BATTLE FOR WARSAW."

NND 941536 --- 68

3. THE ENEMY SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN EXPECTING MORE THAN HE ACCOMPLISHED. APPARENTLY HE FAILED (SO FAR) BECAUSE HE MIS-CALCULATED THE U.S. AIR SUPERIORITY AND ALL THAT THAT SUPER-IORITY MEANS WHEN EMPLOYED MASSIVLEY AND BECAUSE HE EXPECTED MORE SUPPORT FROM THE PEOPLE. INSTEAD OF PLAYING DOGGO OR JOINING HIS STEAMROLLER, THE PEOPLE VOTED WITH THEIR FEET. QUANG TRI CITY'S POPULATION HAS TRIPLED OR QUADRUPLED IN THE LAST 48 HOURS. ORDINARY PEOPLE HAVE BEEN SUPPLYING ACCURATE INFORMATION ON ENEMY LOCATIONS AND THERE HAS BEEN NO PANIC.

4. THE TIME OF ATTACK, 0400 31 JANUARY, LEADS A/CAS OBSERVER BELIEVE THE ENEMY WANTED TO STAGE A COUP. WHEN PEOPLE WOKE UP THEY WOULD FIND A NEW FLAG FLYING. VC CADRE WOULD BE EVERYWHERE HANDING OUT LEAFLETS, BROADCASTING TO THE PEOPLE. ALL THE VC HAD TO DO WAS TO SEIZE THE CITADEL. BUT THAT WAS A TALL ORDER. PROBABLY A FULL REGIMENT WAS EMPLOYED ON THE ATTACK WITH ADDITIONAL SPECIAL ACTION SQUADS TO BREACH THE WALLS OF THE CITADEL. ONE BATTALION COMING FROM THE NORTH WAS DELAYED IN TRI BUU HAMLET BY ARVN AIRBORNE. SAPPERS GOT THROUGH INTO THE CITY, 24 WERE KILLED BY APCS, PRU'S, NUNG GUARDS AND TWO BY LOUIS BALIGHASAY - A GRENADE THROWING CHIEU HOI ADVISOR.

SOME OF THEM WERE CARRYING BIG SATCHEL CHARGES AND LADDERS BUT THEY SEEMD AT A LOSS WHERE TO USE THEM. TWO BATTALIONS TANGLED WITH THE ARVN AND U.S. TROOPS AT LA VANG BUT THEY GOT NOWHERE AND SUFFERED MORE THAN 100 KIA. REMNANTS OF THESE TWO FORCES TOOK REFUGE IN THE SUBURBS OF THE CITY NORTH AND SOUTH. SOME ARE STILL THERE AND ONE REPORT HAS IT THAT A GENERAL YE (PHONETIC) IS WITH THEM AT APPROXIMATELY YD 345513. AN ENEMY STRONG POINT HAS HELD OUT IN THIS VICINITY FOR 36 HOURS. THE ENEMY ALSO DUG IN IN TRI BUU HAMLET TO THE NORTH OF THE CITY. AS A RESULT THE HAMLET SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN DESTROYED IN THE FIGHTING DURING THE NIGHT OF 31 JANUARY.

5. PROVINCE CHIEF LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHAM AM HAS BEEN IN A FUNK. NO DECISIONS WERE MADE BY HIM. FEW OF THE SECTOR OFFICERS HAVE BEEN ON THE BALL. BUT ALL THE BATTALION COMMANDERS HAVE BEEN GREAT. COL. SNAPPER RATTAN, 1 BDE CMDR, OF 1ST AIR CAV HAS BEEN A PRINCE. US MACV DID A GOOD JOB OF DEFENDING THEIR COMPOUND. THEY HAD TWO KIA AND FOUR WIA. (DON'T KNOW IF THEY SUFFERED CASUALTIES THIS SECOND NIGHT NOW ENDING.) NO U.S. CIVILIAN OR THIRD COUNTRY CASUALTIES.

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE MACV III MAF CORDS.

REPORT CLASS [redacted] (b1)

GP-1

NND 941536 --- 70

REPORT CLASS
COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM
SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE AS OF 1800 HOURS ON 2 FEBRUARY

ACQ: VIETNAM, DANANG (2 FEBRUARY 1968)
SOURCE: THIS IS A SITUATION REPORT ON QUANG NAM PROVINCE PREPARED BY CAS, ON 2 FEBRUARY

1. FROM THE BEGINING OF THE VIET CONG (VC) ATTACK ON HOI AN AND OTHER AREAS OF QUANG NAM PROVINCE UNTIL 1800 HOURS ON 2 FEBRUARY, THE BODY COUNT OF KILLED IN ACTION (KIA) VC WAS 786, WITH 96 WEAPONS CAPTURED, AND 631 VC LABORERS UNDER DETENTION. VIETNAMESE SUFFERED 63 KIA AND LOST 15 WEAPONS.

2. TWO RATHER LARGE GROUPS OF REFUGEES (EXACT NUMBER UNKNOWN) ARE UNDERGOING INTERROGATION AT THE AIR FIELD AT HOI AN AND AT HIEU NHON DISTRICT. MANY APPEAR ILL AND INJURED, BUT THEY WILL NOT BE ALLOWED INTO HOI AN UNTIL THEY ARE SCREENED.

NND 941536 --- 6/

AMB

3. THIRTEEN OF THE THIRTY REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD) TEAMS IN QUANG NAM HAVE NOT BEEN IN RADIO CONTACT. SIX TEAMS SUFFERED 1 KIA; ONE TEAM, 2 KIA; AND ONE TEAM, 1 WIA. NINE TEAMS HAD CONTACT WITH THE VC AND SUFFERED NO CASUALTIES. THE RD CONTROL GROUP WAS AGAIN IN OPERATION AND MORE DETAILS ARE EXPECTED SOON. SIX OF THE TEAMS WERE BEING USED IN HOI AN ON OTHER DUTIES.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV III MAF CORDS.

REPORT CLASS
GP-1

NND 941536 --- 52

AMB

REPORT CLASS ...

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM

SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT IN QUANG TRI, QUANG TIN, QUANG NGAI, AND QUANG NAM PROVINCES AS OF 0900 ON 2 FEBRUARY 1968

ACQUIRED: VIETNAM, DANANG (2 FEBRUARY 1968) ..

SOURCE: THIS IS A SITUATION REPORT PREPARED BY CAS,

1. THERE WAS LITTLE ACTIVITY IN QUANG TRI CITY ON THE NIGHT OF 2 FEBRUARY. VIET CONG FORCES (VC) MADE A NUMBER OF CONCERTED ATTACKS IN THE DISTRICTS OF CAM LO AND HAI LANG, AND CONTACT WITH ALLIED FORCES IS CONTINUING IN THESE AREAS.

2. AT 2345 HOURS ON 1 FEBRUARY TAM KY CITY IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE RECEIVED ROCKET AND ARTILLERY FIRE WHICH LASTED UNTIL 0020 HOURS. OTHERWISE THERE WAS NO REPORTED ENEMY ACTIVITY. THE PROVINCE CHIEF HAS IMPOSED A VERY STRICT TRAVEL BAN MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTACT REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE TEAMS. REPORTS RECEIVED TO DATE INDICATE TEAM #1 HAS KILLED TEN VC, AND CAPTURED SEVEN WEAPONS; TEAM #12 HAS KILLED FIVE VC AND CAPTURED ONE WEAPON.

3. QUANG NGAI CITY WAS QUIET ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 FEBRUARY WITH LITTLE CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY IN THE CITY LIMITS. THERE WERE NO REPORTS AVAILABLE . .. OF DEVELOPMENTS IN

65

NND 941536 ---/2

OUTLYING DISTRICTS.

4. ARVN AND REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK) FORCES IN HOI AN CITY IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE HAD NO SIGNIFICANT ENEMY CONTACTS DURING THE NIGHT OF 1-2 FEBRUARY.

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV III MAF CORDS

REPORT CLASS [redacted] GROUP I

END OF MESSAGE

[redacted]

NND 941536 --- 125

REPORT CLASS
COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI: 31 JANUARY 1968
SUBJECT: BACKGROUND ON 31 JANUARY ATTACK AGAINST TAM KY CITY, QUANG TIN PROVINCE

ACQ: VIETNAM, DANANG (2 FEBRUARY 1968)
SOURCE:

1. THE TRANSLATIONS OF TWO DOCUMENTS RECOVERED FROM THE BODY OF A WOUNDED VIET CONG (VC) WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE 31 JANUARY ATTACK ON TAM KY CITY, QUANG TIN PROVINCE, DISCLOSED THAT THE ATTACK WAS TO BE UNDERTAKEN FROM THREE SIDES, WITH TWO-PRONGED CONCENTRATIONS ON PROVINCIAL HEADQUARTERS. THE VC 70TH MAIN FORCE (OR POSSIBLY THE 70TH BATTALION OF THE 21ST NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) REGIMENT), AND THE 72ND AND 74TH LOCAL FORCE BATTALIONS WERE AMONG THE UNITS THAT

NND 941536 ---/26

PARTICIPATED IN THE ATTACK. THE DOCUMENTS GAVE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE VC TO DESTROY THE BUS STATION, TRY TO OCCUPY THE AIR FIELD (THE 74TH), AND TO TRY TO OCCUPY PROVINCE HEADQUARTERS. AMONG THE NOTATIONS WERE CAUTIONS AGAINST WEARIVNG BLACK CLOTHES AND SIGNAL PLANS AND TIMES CERTAIN ELEMENTS, SUCH AS SAPPER UNITS, WERE TO CARRY OUT THEIR TASKS. INCLUDED WAS A SKETCH OF THE LINES OF INFILTRATION FOR THE ATTACK. LETTERS TAKEN FROM THE VC, WHO LATER DIED, REFER TO THE HARDSHIPS SUFFERED FROM UNITED STATES BOMBING AND MOURN FRIENDS WHO HAD BEEN KILLED. ONE WRITER SAYS HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE REVENGE FOR THOSE KILLED UNJUSTLY BY UNITED STATES AGGRESSORS. (FIELD COMMENT: THE VC SUFFERED A HIGH KILLED IN ACTION RATIO DURING THIS ATTACK AND APPARENTLY HAVE NOT INFLICTED HEAVY DAMAGE IN SUBSEQUENT ATTACKS AGAINST TAM KY AND THE SIXTH ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) REGIMENT.)

2. IN ONE INCIDENT OF THE VC ATTACK ON 31 JANUARY PROVINCIAL RECONNAISSANCE UNIT (PRU) MEMBERS CAPTURED 19 VC INDIVIDUAL AND CREW-SERVED WEAPONS, INCLUDING ONE 57MM RECOILLESS RIFLE. THE PRU'S KILLED 23 VC (UNITED STATES ADVISOR BODY COUNT) AND CAPTURED ONE VC. TWO PRUS WERE SLIGHTLY WOUNDED AND DAMAGE TO THE

NND 941536 --- 127

AMB

PRU CAMP WAS MINIMAL. THE ATTACK BEGAN AT 0445 WHEN APPROXIMATELY TWO BATTALIONS OF VC SUPPORTED BY AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF LOCAL VC COMPANIES ATTACKED THE QUANG TIN PROVINCE HEADQUARTERS COMPOUND UNDER COVER OF A MORTAR BARRAGE. ONE BATTALION OF VC ATTACKED FROM THE NORTHWEST, STRIKING AT THE PRU COMPOUND AND AN ARVN COMPANY ON COMPOUND'S EAST FLANK. THE ARVN COMPANY SOON WITHDREW TO THE PROVINCIAL INTERROGATION CENTER, LEAVING THE FLANK OPEN. THE PRU'S PUT THE AREA UNDER FIRE WITH THREE MACHINE GUNS AND FIVE M-79'S, PLUS THEIR INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS. AT ABOUT 0515 HOURS THE PRU'S BEGAN TO RECEIVE INTENSE MACHINE GUN FIRE FROM THE AREA ABANDONED BY ARVN. AT 0645 HOURS A THIRTY-MAN PRU TEAM MOVED TOWARD THE AREA FROM WHICH THE MACHINE GUN FIRE AND CAPTURED THE MACHINE GUN, WHICH LATER TURNED OUT TO HAVE BEEN LEFT BEHIND BY THE ARVN UNIT.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV III MAF CORDS.

REPORT CLASS
GP-1

NND 941536 --- 12

TOP SECRET [redacted]
No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only

[redacted]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
2 February 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Pueblo Sitrep No. 28
(As of 7:00 AM EST)

1. Public commentary from North Korea during the past 24 hours contains no new observations on the Pueblo incident. The authoritative Nodong Sinmun shifted its editorial theme from the ship's seizure to support for the Communist offensive in South Vietnam, noting that "with no big talk or bluffing can the US imperialists stave off their final defeat."

[redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
22 SEPT 99

[redacted]

6. The Soviets continue to shadow US naval units in the Sea of Japan. At latest report, the intelligence collecting ship Gidrolog was accompanying the Enterprise task group at a range of 12 miles. The Kotlin-class destroyer DD424 was reported observing the USS Ranger at a distance of seven miles.

7. The Soviet merchant vessel Kapitan Vislobokov is apparently proceeding to its destination after colliding with the USS Rowan. The Rowan is en route to Sasebo for repair of minor damage resulting from the collision.

REPORT CLASS
COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM
SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT IN HUE, TAM KY, QUANG TIN PROVINCE, AND DANANG CITY AS OF 1700 HOURS ON 3 FEBRUARY

ACQ: VIETNAM, DANANG (3 FEBRUARY 1968)
SOURCE: THIS IS A SITUATION REPORT ON 3 FEBRUARY PREPARED BY CAS,

(b)(1) (b)(3)

SUMMARY: IT APPEARS THAT THE VIET CONG (VC) IN THE HUE CITADEL AREA ARE REACHING THE END OF THEIR ROPE AND MAY BE WITHDRAWING. ALLIED FORCES ARE IN GOOD SHAPE AS A DEFINITE BUILDUP OF VC FORCES AROUND TAM KY, QUANG TIN PROVINCE, HAS BEEN NOTED. THE DETENTION OF SUSPECT RESIDENTS IN DANANG CITY HAS PRESENTED A PROBLEM IN FINDING INTERROGATORS TO SCREEN THEM. VC SAPPERS HELD AT THE PROVINCIAL INTERROGATION CENTER HAVE BEEN LOOKING AT THEM TO TRY TO IDENTIFY THE VC AMONG THE DETAINEES. THE POLICE ALSO ARE PLANNING A SEARCH FOR WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES IN THE HOUSES OF DANANG. END SUMMARY.

67

NND 941536 --- 129

1. AS OF 1700 HOURS, THE ASSISTANT DEPUTY ADVISOR TO I CORPS HEADQUARTERS HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT SUCH VC AS REMAIN IN THE CITADEL IN HUE CITY HAVE BEEN FORCED INTO THE SOUTHWEST CORNER BY ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) FORCES. THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE VIET CONG (VC) WILL BE CLEARED FROM THE AREA DURING THE NIGHT OF 3 FEBRUARY.

2. ON 3 FEBRUARY TWO POLICEMEN, LE NGOC XUAN AND NGUEYN PHU, WERE INTERVIEWED BY A CAS OFFICER AT THE SURGICAL HISPITAL IN DANANG, WHERE THEY HAD BEEN EVACUATED BY WAY OF PHU BAI AFTER BEING INJURED DURING THE VC ATTACK ON HUE. BOTH SAID THAT AT APPROXIMATELY 0330 HOURS ON 31 JANUARY THE VC BEGAN A HEAVY MORTAR ATTACK AGAINST THE CITY. ABOUT 0600 HOURS VC DRESSED IN ARVN UNIFORMS SUDDENLY APPREARED EVERYWHERE IN THE AREA OF THE HUE BROADCASTING STATION, WHERE THEY WERE ON GUARD. BOTH POLICEMEN THOUGH IT WAS A GROUND ATTACK AND COULD NOT DETERMINE IF THE VC WERE IN THE CITY AND ATTACKED FROM WITHIN. UP TO THE TIME THEY WERE FOUND BY U.S. MARINES 24 HOURS AFTER THE ATTACK, THE VC HAD NOT OCCUPIED THE HUE RADIO STATION. BOTH SAID THAT PEOPLE GENERALLY EXPECTED A VC ATTACK; BUT NOBODY EXPECTED A GROUND ATTACK ON THE CITY PROPER.

NND 941536 --- /30

3. ALLIED FORCES APPEAR TO BE IN GOOD SHAPE IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE. A DEFINITE BUILDUP IN THE SIZE OF VC FORCES HAS BEEN NOTED IN THE TAM KY AREA. THE GENERAL SITUATION FROM THE MILITARY STANDPOINT HAS BEEN QUIET THROUGHOUT THE DAY OF 3 FEBRUARY. THE POLICE REPORTED SPORADIC ATTEMPTS IN TAM KY CITY BY SEGMENTS OF THE POPULATIONTO FORM DEMONSTRATIONS. THE LEADERS HAVE BEEN APPREHENDED AND DEMONSTRATORS DISBURSED BY ARVN FORCES.

4. OF THE ARE ORIGINALL EARMARKED IN DANANG BY POLICE FOR A CHECK OF INHABITANTS, 750 OF 1,000 HOUSES HAVE BEEN CHECKED. MORE THAN 400 PERSONS HAVE BEEN DETAINED WHICH MAKES THE POLICE HARD-PRESSED TO FIND SUFFICIENT INTEROGATORS, ALWAYS A CHRONIC PROBLEM BUTPARTICULARLY ACUTE NOW. CONSEQUENTLY, PRISONERS ARE JUST BEING HELD WITH A MINIMUM OF SCREENING. SOME OF THE VC SAPPERS BEING HELD IN THE PROVINCIAL INTERROGATION CENTER HAVE BEEN LOOKING THE DETAINEES OVER TO TRY TO IDENTIFY THE VC AMONG THEM. APPARENTLY SOME PERSONS HAVE BEEN PICKED UP WITH NO FIRM REASON FOR CONSIDERING THEM VC. BOTH THE POLICE SPECIAL BRANCH AND UNIFORMED POLICE, THE 107TH POLICE FIELD FORCE (PFF) COMPANY AND A PLATOON OF THE 106TH PFF COMPANY HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE OPERATION. CITY POLICE ARE ALSO EMBARKING ON A SECOND PHASE OF THE OPERATION.

NND 941536 --- /3/

WHICH WILL HAVE THE ASSISTANCE OF ARVN TROOPS, TO CONSIST OF A SEARCH OF EVERY HOUSE IN DANANG TO TRY TO LOCATE WEAPONS EXPLOSIVES.

5. A FEW DAYS AGO THE POLICE LEARNED FROM AN INFORMANT WHO HAS REPORTED RELIABLE INFORMATION ON DANANG CITY VC MEMBERS IN THE PAST THAT HA XY KGO, CHAIRMAN OF THE VC DANANG CITY COMMITTEE, WAS IN DANANG IN A HOUSE ON THE WESTERN EDGE OF THE CITY. BY THE TIME POLICE WENT TO THE HOUSE, NO SUSPECT WAS THERE, ALTHOUGH A YOUNG BOY SAID THAT A STRANGER HAD BEEN THERE EARLIER. THE POLICE STILL HAVE AUTHORITY TO MAKE ARRESTS BUT ALL POLICE OPERATIONS MUST BE CLEARED THROUGH THE VIETNAMESE MILITARY DURING THE PERIOD OF MARTIALLAW.

6. ACCORDING TO ~~POLICE~~ BUDDHISTS IN DANANG HAVE BEEN QUIET SINCE THE VC ATTACKS BEGAN. THERE HAVE BEEN NO EXHORTATIONS OR APPEALS FOR DEMONSTRATIONS. A REGIONAL POLICE OFFICIAL COMMENTED THAT THIS LAST SERIES OF HARSH ATTACKS BY THE VC MAY HAVE MADE SOME BUDDHISTS REALIZE THAT THE VC DO NOT HAVE THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE AT HEART AS THEY MAY HAVE THOUGHT EARLIER.

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV CORDS III MAF 7TH AF USARV COMNAVFORV USAID DIR/JUSPAO (MR. ZORTHIAN ONLY) CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF

REPORT CLASS [redacted]

GP-1

NND 941536 --- /3

AMB

CJ

REPORT CLASS [redacted]
COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM
SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT IN I CORPS AS OF 1000 HOURS ON 3 FEBRUARY

ACQ: VIETNAM, DANANG (3 FEBRUARY 1968)
SOURCE: THIS IS A SITUATION REPORT ON 3 FEBRUARY PREPARED BY CAS. [redacted]

SUMMARY. I CORPS WAS GENERALLY QUIET THE NIGHT OF 2/3 FEBRUARY. THE INFLUX OF REFUGEES IN QUANG TRI AND QUANG NAM WAS CREATING PROBLEMS OF HOUSING AND FEEDING. THE VIET CONG (VC) WERE SPREADING RUMORS IN QUANG TRI THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD "SELL THE PEOPLE OUT" AND IN DANANG ATTEMPTING TO AROUSE THE PEOPLE TO DEMONSTRATE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM. POCKETS OF VC REMAIN IN AREAS AROUND HOI AN AND QUANG NGAI CITIES, BUT THESE ARE BEING CLEARED OUT. VC PRESSURE PROBABLY WILL CONTINUE FOR A FEW DAYS IN QUANG NAM, QUANG TIN, AND QUANG NGAI PROVINCES. MORALE IS REPORTED TO BE GOOD IN

63

NND 941536 ---/0

QUANG NGAI AND QUANG TIN. END SUMMARY.

1. ON THE NIGHT OF 2/3 FEBRUARY QUANG TRI CITY REMAINED QUIET. REFUGEES CONTINUED COMING INTO THE DISTRICTS AND QUANG TRI CITY, CAUSING PROBLEMS IN FEEDING AND HOUSING. THE VIET CONG (VC) ARE SPREADING THE PROPAGANDA AMONG THE PEOPLE THAT THE AMERICANS ARE GOING TO "SELL THEM OUT" AND ABANDON THE WAR. TO COUNTER THIS THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AND AMERICANS IN THE PROVINCE ARE LAUNCHING AN INTENSIVE PSYWAR OPERATION.

2. SINCE THE ARMY OF THE REPULBIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) REVOLUTIONARY DIRECT SUPPORT BATTALIONS ARE NOW ENGAGED IN MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF QUANG TRI CITY, THE QUANG TRI REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD) TEAMS HAVE BEEN RELOCATED TO PROVIDE THEM WITH THE BEST POSSIBLE SECURITY UNDER EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES. THE TEAMS HAVE ENCOUNTERED FEW VC ATTACKS AND SUSTAINED FEW CASUALTIES, BUT THEIR FIELD SIRENGTHS ARE LOW DUE TO THE CONFUSION RESULTING FROM THE LUNAR NEW YEAR HOLIDAY (30 JANUARY) AND THE CURRENT VC OFFENSIVE. THE TEAMS HAVE BEEN RESUPPLIED WITH AMMUNITION WHERE REQUIRED. THE RD CADRE CONTROL HAS SHOWN DEFINITE INEPTITUDE IN

NND 941536 --- 110

REORGANIZING TEAMS. EXPLOITING THE PSYWAR OPPORTUNITIES, AND CONDUCTING REQUIRED ADMINISTRATION.

3. ACCORDING TO REGIONAL POLICE OFFICIALS, THE POLICE HAVE DETAINED MORE THAN 400 PEOPLE IN THEIR SEARCH OF THE DANANG CITY AREA TO ROUND UP PERSONS WHO DO NOT HAVE PROPER IDENTIFICATION. ACCORDING TO A RETIRED ARVN MAJOR, AN EMPLOYEE OF CAS, RUMORS ARE CIRCULATING IN DANANG THAT THE VC AGENTS ARE ATTEMPTING TO PERSUADE THE POPULATION TO MUSTER A DEMONSTRATION TO PROTEST AGAINST THE GVN. ALSO THE VC ARE SPREADING RUMORS THAT THERE WILL BE VC SAPPER ATTACKS AGAINST VIETNAMESE WORKING FOR AMERICAN INSTALLATIONS.

4. INFORMATION FROM HOI AN, QUANG NAM PROVINCE, STATES THAT THE VC ARE STILL HIDING IN THE CITY IN SOME STRENGTH. THE PROVINCE CHIEF IS ATTEMPTING TO CLEAR THESEPOCKETS OF VC. ON 2 FEBRUARY REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK) FORCES, IN A SWEEP TWO KILOMETERS NORTH OF HOI AN, ENCOUNTERED A VC UNIT AND KILLED 100 BY BODY COUNT. SEVERAL ALLIED OBSERVERS HAVE NOTED THAT EARLIER ARVN OUTSHONE ROK TROOPS IN REPULSING THE ATTACK ON HI AN CITY. DISTRICTS AND HOI AN, ARE RECEIVING MASSES OF REFUGEES. THIS CAUSES PROBLEMS IN FEEDING AND HOUSING, AND THEIR

NND 941536 --- 111

PRESENCE IS SLOWING DOWN POLICE SCREENING AND OTHER SECURITY FUNCTIONS IN THE CITY. ACCORDING TO CENSUS GRIEVANCE REPORTS, THE VC PLAN TO CONTINUE PRESSURE IN THE PROVINCE. ONE INDICATION OF A RETURN TO NORMAL SITUATION WAS THE APPEARANCE OF BREAD ON THE MARKET. THE PROVINCE CHIEF STILL HAS A 24-HOUR TRAVEL BAN ON ALL EXECPT SECURITY TROOPS.

5. IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE ONLY THREE RD CADRES HAVE BEEN REPORTED KILLED IN ACTION, BUT THIS FIGURE MAY ICREASE WHEN ALL REPORTS ARE IN. MORALE OF THE LOCAL PEOPLE AND ESPECIALLY GVN FUNCTIONARIES IS HIGH. THIS IS DUE TO THE OBVIOUS HEAVY VC LOSSES AND THEIR INABILITY TO REMAIN IN THE CITY. SCATTERED VC POCKETS REMAIN IN THE VILLAGES AROUND QUANG NGAI CITY AND DISTRICTS REPORT SOME VC HARASSMENT STILL. PROVINCE SECURITY ELEMENTS ARE SWEEPING TO CLEAR THESE AREAS OF VC. A CAS OFFICER BELIEVES THAT VC PRESSURE WILL CONTINUE AT LEAST TWO MORE DAYS. THERE ARE NO FIRM REPORTS OF A MASSIVE VC ATTACK.

6. THE FEELING OF FEAR STIL HOLDS THE POPULACE OF TAM KY, QUANG TIN PROVINCE; HOWEVER, ON 3 FEBRUARY THE PEOPLE APPEARED TO BE MORE RELAXED. THE PEOPLE ARE APPRECIATIVE OF

NND 941536 --- // 2

THE PRESENCE OF ALLIED FORCES AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THEY REPULSED THE VC ATTACKS. IN FACT, THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE ALLIED FORCES LAUNCH STILL MORE ATTACKS AGAINST THE VC. THE PEOPLE WERE ANGERED BY THE VC FOR BREAKING TH LUNAR NEW YEAR TRUCE.

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV CORDS III MAF 7TH AF USARV COMNAVFORV USAID DIR JUSPAO (MR. ZORTHIAN ONLY) CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF.

REPORT CLASS [redacted]

GP-1

NND 941536 ---/13

AMB
CN

REPORT CLASS [redacted]
COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM
SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT ON I CORPS AS OF 0500 HOURS ON 3 FEBRUARY

ACQ: VIETNAM, DANANG (2, 3 FEBRUARY 1968) [redacted]
SOURCE: THIS IS A SITUATION REPORT ON 3 FEBRUARY PREPARED BY CAS, [redacted]

(b)(1) (b)(3)

1. DANANG CITY REMAINS UNDER MARTIAL LAW AND STRICT CURFEW, WITH AMERICAN MILITARY ON FULL ALERT. THE VIET CONG (VC) MADE NO MAJOR EFFORT IN THE DANANG CITY AREA DURING THE NIGHT OF 2/3 FEBRUARY, ALTHOUGH AMERICAN MILITARY ADVISORS CONTINUED TO BE CONCERNED OVER REPORTS THAT A REGIMENT OF THE SECOND NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) WAS MOVING TOWARD DANANG (SEE FVG-245). THE VC INITIATED SMALL ARMS FIRE IN TWO AREAS ON THE EDGE OF DANANG AIR BASE AT ABOUT 0310 HOURS, FOLLOWED BY HEAVY AMERICAN ARTILLERY FIRE IN RETALIATION. ALL ACTION ENDED SOON AFTER 0400 HOURS.

64

NND 941536 ---1/9

AMB

2. THE DANANG CITY POLICE AND THE POLICE FIELD FORCE (PFF) ARE CONDUCTING SEARCHES IN THE CITY AND THE IMMEDIATE HAMLETS AND ARE DETAINING IN A LOCAL SCHOOL ALL VIETNAMESE WHO DO NOT HAVE PROPER IDENTIFICATION PAPERS. THE EXACT NUMBER DETAINED IS NOT KNOWN, BUT IT RUNS TO MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED.

3. ALL WAS QUIET IN QUANG NGAI CITY, BUT AT ABOUT 0230 HOURS SON TINH DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS AND SUBSECTOR RECEIVED VC MORTAR FIRE. THE TWO INSTALLATIONS ARE LOCATED ABOUT 1,000 TO 1,200 METERS APART. AT 0245 HOURS THE VC WERE IN THE HAMLET IN WHICH DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS IS LOCATED, AND A DIMINISHING FIRE FIGHT CONTINUED AS OF 0330.

4. IN THE LATE EVENING OF 2 FEBRUARY ALL WAS QUIET IN HOI AN, QUANG NAM PROVINCE, AND IN QUANG TRI CITY, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMUNICATION FROM THESE TWO TOWNS, AS WELL AS FROM TAM KY, QUANG TIN PROVINCE, IT IS ASSUMED THE VC HAVE NOT INITIATED MAJOR ACTIVITY.

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV III MAF CORDS.

REPORT CLASS [redacted]
GP-1

NND 941536 --- 115

REPORT CLASS [redacted]

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM

SUBJECT: THIS IS A SITUATION REPORT IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE AS OF 0400 HOURS ON 3 FEBRUARY

ACQUARED: VIETNM, DANANG (3 FEBRUARY 1968) [redacted]

SOURCE : THIS IS A SITUATION REPORT ON 3 FEBRUARY PREPARED BY CAS, [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

MILITARY

1. ON 3 FEBRUARY QUANG TRI PROVINCE WAS MOVING INTO THE FOURTH DAY OF THE BATTLE FOR THE QUANG TRI LOWLANDS. THE ENEMY, IT APPEARED, EMPLOYED 12 BATTALIONS IN HIS DRIVE TO TAKE OVER TRIEU PHONG, MAI LINH, AND HAI LANG DISTRICTS AND QUANG TRI CITY. OVERT MILITARY OPERATIONS BEGAN IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF 31 JANUARY. HE LOST HIS INITIATIVE AFTER 24 HOURS AND WHETHER HE KNOWS IT OR NOT HE IS NOW ON THE DEFENSIVE.

2. THE ENEMY PROBABLY LOST APPROXIMATELY 1,500 KILLED IN ACTION (KIA) AND 1,000 WIA, OR ABOUT ONE-THIRD OF HIS FORCE. (MOSTLY NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) AND SOME VIET CONG (VC).) ALLIES HAVE TAKEN ABOUT 63 PRISONERS. IN A THREE-BATTALION ATTACK ON CAM LO DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS ON 1-2 FEBRUARY THE ENEMY LOST ANOTHER 150 KIA AND 23 PRISONERS OF WAR (POW), AND THESE FIGURES ARE NOT COMPLETE. THE ENEMY STILL HAS THE CAPABILITY TO REINFORCE AND HE STILL CAN NEUTRALIZE SOME ALLIED COMBAT BASES BY

[redacted]

NND 941536 ---7/

ROCKET AND SNEAK AIR ATTACKS (NOT YET EMPLOYED).

3. IF HE EXPECTS TO WIN THE BATTLE FOR QUANG TRI, HE MUST COMMIT THESE FORCES AND HE MUST ACHIEVE BETTER COORDINATION THAN HE HAS DEMONSTRATED SO FAR. PART OF HIS PROBLEM HAS BEEN ALLIED MASTERY OF THE SKIES DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS. THE ENEMY, AFTER SECURING TOEHOLDS ON THE NORTH AND SOUTH EDGES OF THE CITY OF QUANG TRI IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF 31 JANUARY, WAS UNABLE TO REINFORCE THESE UNITS WITH HIS RESERVES UNTIL THE NEXT NIGHT. THIS MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE ALLIES TO BLOCK THE TWO ROUTES THE NVA/VC PLANNED TO USE. FORTUNATELY THE WEATHER WAS FAIR. IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN A DIFFERENT STORY HAD PILOTS BEEN GROUNDED.

4. ANOTHER FACTOR WHICH MAY HAVE INFLUENCED THE OUTCOME OF THIS BATTLE WAS THE ENEMY'S FOOLISHNESS IN SETTING UP HIS COMMAND POST SO CLOSE TO QUANG TRI CITY (VICINITY OF YD343515) AND ALLIED LUCK IN WIPING OUT THIS COMMAND POST. ENEMY KIA INCLUDED A COLONEL AND THREE JUNIOR OFFICERS AND PROBABLY GENERAL NAM LONG AND HIS CHIEF OF STAFF. CREDIT FOR THIS COUP BELONGS TO THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) NINTH AIRBORNE BATTALION AND ELEMENTS OF THE ARVN SEVENTH CAVALRY (APC'S). THEY CAPTURED THE ENEMY'S COMMUNICATION FACILITY INTACT (RADIO DESTROYED). ONE OF THE LAST MESSAGES IN THE RADIO MESSAGE FILE WAS A REPORT TO HIGHER HEADQUARTERS ANNOUNCING THE DEATH OF GENERAL NAM LONG ALONG WITH HIS CHIEF OF STAFF. USING THE ENEMY'S SIGNAL OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS, THE AIRBORNE BATTALION COMMANDER, A NORTH VIETNAMESE HIMSELF, PERSONALLY CALLED THE ENEMY HIGHER HEAD-

NND 941536 --- 72

QUARTERS AND ASKED IF IT WERE TRUE THAT THE GENERAL WAS DEAD. THE HIGHER HEADQUARTERS CAME RIGHT BACK WITH A CONFIRMATION. THIS STORY SOUNDS FARFETCHED AND THERE ARE STILL MANY DETAILS MISSING. MAJOR NHAN, THE SECTOR COMMANDER, EXPLAINED MOST OF THESE DETAILS. A U.S. ARMY AIRBORNE ADVISOR WITH THE NINTH AIRBORNE BATTALION LATER TOLD AN ALMOST IDENTICAL STORY. THE BODIES OF THE TWO OFFICERS HAD NOT YET BEEN FOUND, BUT THERE ARE REPORTS FROM THE VILLAGERS THAT THEY WERE DRAGGED AWAY TOWARD THACH HAU HAMLET ON THE NIGHT OF 31 JANUARY. POLICE ARE HOT ON THE TRAIL OF THESE BODIES AND THE VILLAGERS ALL SEEM TO BE POSITIVE THAT THEY SAW THIS HAPPEN.

POLITICAL

5. THERE IS MUCH SENTIMENT AMONG THE PEOPLE OF QUANG TRI CITY AGAINST THE NVA AND AGAINST ANY FORM OF COALITION WITH THE COMMUNISTS. ONE GROUP, MOSTLY CATHOLICS AND MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DAI VIET PARTY (RDVP), APPARENTLY WOULD PREFER AN INDEPENDENT ANTI-COMMUNIST CENTRAL VIETNAM REPUBLIC COMPOSED OF QUANG TRI, THUA THIEN AND QUANG NAM PROVINCES IF SAIGON OPTS FOR THE COALITION COURSE OF ACTION. OBVIOUSLY THESE PEOPLE ARE NOT REALISTS BUT THE SENTIMENT IS SIGNIFICANT. ON THE AFTERNOON OF 1 FEBRUARY THE PROVINCE CHIEF HELD A VICTORY PARADE IN TOWN AND THE RESPONSE OF THE PEOPLE WAS ECLECTIC. THEY THREW FLOWERS, FOOD AND CIGARETTES TO THE PASSING SOLDIERS AND THERE WERE SPONTANEOUS SMILES, TEARS AND CHEERING, WHICH IS SURPRISING FROM A PEOPLE

NND 941536 --- 23

INURED TO WAR.

6. SENATOR HOANG XUAN TUU, RDVP MEMBER, HAS BEEN IN TOWN THROUGH ALL OF THIS AND HAS BEEN CHEERFUL AND OPTIMISTIC, AT LEAST OUTWARDLY. HE HAS BEEN VERY MUCH IN EVIDENCE DURING THE DAYLIGHT HOURS, VISITING THE MINED HAMLET OF TRI BUU AND THE HTHOUSANDS OF DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPING IN THE SCHOOLS AROUND TOWN. HE HAS NOT BEEN ESCORTED WITH AN OBVIOUS BODYGUARD.

7. SO FAR THE BUDDHISTS HAVE NOT RESPONDED TO THE STORY WHICH IS CIRCULATING IN QUANG TRI THAT THE MILITANT AN QUANG BUDDHISTS IN SAIGON HAVE DEFECTED TO THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM (NFLSV). THERE WAS A RUMOR THAT SOME RALLYING WAS IN PROGESS AT THE BUDDHIST HIGH SCHOOL BUT A CHECK REVEALED NO EVIDENCE OF THIS.

8. DURING THE LATE AFTERNOON OF 1 FEBRUARY THE COMBINED ACTION PLATOON (CAP) AND PROVINCIAL RECONNAISSANCE UNIT (PRU) REPORTED THAT THE ENEMY WAS HOLDING A VICTORY CELEBRATION IN THE EASTERN EDGE OF THUONG XA HAMLET (YD375497), MAI LINH DISTRICT, WHICH HAS BEEN UNDER CONTEST BY THE VC AND THE ALLIES FOR SOME WEEKS. ALLIED ARTILLERY PROMPTLY PLACED A 24 GUN TIME ON TARGET BARRAGE ON TOP OF THE CELEBRATION WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS.

9. THE PROVINCE CHIEF, LIEUTENANT COLONEL NGUYEN AM, WAS QUITE ASSERTIVE BY LATE AFTERNOON, 2 FEBRUARY. HE TOOK CHARGE OF THE DEFENSIVE ARRANGEMENTS AROUND THE TOWN AND "BOLDLY" GAVE UP THE POLICE FIELD FORCE PLATOON GUARDING HIS UNOCCUPIED RESIDENCE. THE PLATOON WAS NEEDED TO BOLSTER ONE COMPANY OF THE U.S. FIRST AIR CAVALRY WHICH WAS OBTAINED TO FILL THE GAP LEFT WHEN THE

NND 941536 --- 74

ARVN AIRBORNE BATTALION MOVED TO HUE. DURING THE FIRST TWO DAYS OF THE FIGHTING HOWEVER, CHIEF AM WAS A VEGETABLE. THE VIETNAMESE SECTOR STAFF IS A FAIRLY GOOD ONE, BUT IT TENDS TO FALL APART WHEN OPERATIONS DO NOT CONFORM TO CLASSIC PATTERNS. WITH THE FIVE, AND NOW SIX, AIR CAVALRY COMPANIES TO WORK WITH, CONVENTIONAL TACTICS HAVE TO BE SET ASIDE.

REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT AND REFUGEES

10. THE ENEMY NOW HOLDS ~~ABOUT~~ AT TWO-THIRDS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD) AREA MOSTLY IN TRIEU PHONG DISTRICT. THE ALLIES ARE GOING TO BE FORCED TO GO IN AND ROOT OUT THESE FORCES, WHICH MAY WRECK HAVOC ON THE HAMLETS IN THE PROCESS. IN ADDITION, THE ALLIES DO NOT HAVE THE TROOPS TO MAKE A THOROUGH CORDON AROUND THE AREA. A PSYOPS CAMPAIGN WILL BE TRIED LATER TODAY, BUT THIS IS AIMED MOSTLY AT CALMING THE NERVES OF THE PEOPLE. THEY SEEM TO BE CONFUSED BY ALL THAT HAS HAPPENED IN THE PAST 72 HOURS AND THE ENEMY IS PROPAGANDIZING TO WIN THEM.

11. WHEN THE ENEMY FINALLY CUTS OUT, IT IS HOPED HE DOES NOT TRY TO TAKE HOSTAGES WITH HIM. HE MAY KILL HAMLET AND VILLAGE CHIEFS WHOLESALE AND HE MAY EVACUATE EVERY YOUTH IN SIGHT. ANY OR ALL OF THESE COURSES OF ACTION WOULD HURT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE CAUSE FOR A LONG TIME TO COME.

12. ALTHOUGH QUANG TRI CITY IS FULL OF REFUGEES, THERE WILL NO DOUBT BE MORE IF THE ALLIES HAVE TO FIGHT THEIR WAY THROUGH THE RD AREA. ALREADY THERE ARE ~~THERE~~ ABOUT 300 CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN THE HOSPITAL FROM THE FIGHTING AROUND TOWN. MANY MORE CAN BE EXPECTED AS THE ALLIES PUSH THEIR WAY OUTWARD.

[redacted]

NND 941536 ---75

OUTLOOK

13. ALL IN ALL AMERICANS IN QUANG TRI CAME THROUGH BETTER THAN COULD BE EXPECTED AND AS THE SITUATION IMPROVES THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND OPERATIONAL MACHINERY IS BEING REORGANIZED TO PUSH AHEAD WITH PROVINCE PROGRAMS. THE ENEMY HAS LOST THIS ROUND. HE MAY TRY AGAIN BUT HE NEEDS A NEW PLAN AND LOTS OF RESUPPLY AND REINFORCEMENTS. ANOTHER MAJOR EFFORT PROBABLY WILL NOT OCCUR BEFORE ABOUT 7 FEBRUARY AND IF THE ALLIES MAKE THE MOST OF THE COUNTERSWEEPS, THIS EFFORT COULD BE DELAYED FOR MONTHS. IF THE ENEMY EMPLOYES AIR, HOWEVER, THE SITUATION COULD BE REVERSED. (COMMENT: THE VC PROPAGANIZED THAT IT HAD BEEN SUPPLIED WITH AIRCRAFT, WHICH WOULD BE USED ONLY IN AN EXTREME SITUATION, A FEW MONTHS AGO, ACCORDING TO INFORMANTS OF AN OFFICIAL VIETNAMESE SECURITY SERVICE.) KHE SANH IS A SEPARATE PROBLEM THE ENEMY SEEMS TO BE GATHERING HIS STRENGTH FOR A MAJOR PUSH AGAINST WELL-ENTRENCHED ALLIED FORCES THERE.

41. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV CORDS III MAF 7TH AF USARV COMNAVFORV USAID DIR/JUSPAO (MR. ZORTHIAN ONLY) CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF

REPORT CLASS [redacted] GROUP I

END OF MESSAGE

NND 941536 --- 76

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
3 February 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Pueblo Sitrep No. 30
(As of 5:00 P.M. EST)

1. Pyongyang radio has broadcast an 18-minute statement by a Frederick Carl Schumacher, who is described as the "operations officer" of the USS Pueblo. No further details are available at this time.

2. South Korean President Pak Chong-hui and one of his chief aides separately raised with the US Ambassador in Seoul the possibility that the ROK go into small-arms production to help counter increased North Korean infiltration.

3. President Pak told the Ambassador that he would like to see the ROK produce "M-2 type" carbines. He said it was clear that the government could not depend only on the army and police but must also train 2.5 million veterans, perhaps along the lines of Israeli and Swiss militia. Pak said Korean private interests--acting on the government's behalf--will get the program under way by purchasing 10,000 M-2 "type" weapons and 2 million rounds of ammunition from US firms and will seek their help in establishing a factory.

4. Yi Hu-rak, Pak's secretary-general, pointed out that the ROK should produce its own modern small arms to match the "major psychological advantage" North Korea enjoys from its own small-weapons production. He said 500,000 "AR-18" weapons could be produced at a cost of $3.5 million, with each weapon costing about $48. [redacted]

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5. The Panmunjom talks evoked varied public comments today from South Korean officials. The foreign minister said the ROK "is not opposed to the UN Command's decision to conduct talks at Panmunjom" but warned that "the talks must not be utilized by the North Korean puppets for propaganda." A presidential spokesman noted that ROK and US officials "have had close contacts in connection with the talks" and the ROK "is watching the talks with keen interest." The chairman of the National Assembly's Foreign Relations Committee, however, scored the US for conducting "secret talks" without South Korean participation, and charged that this was the first such occurrence in the Military Armistice Commission's 15-year history.

6. One more of the 31 North Korean guerrillas who tried to assassinate President Pak in Seoul on 21 January was shot dead today in a small town not far from the South Korean capital. ROK officials claim three of the guerrillas are still at large. Of the others, one was captured near the scene of the abortive attack and the rest are believed to have been killed.

7. Radio Pyongyang's domestic service and the South Korea beam today gave priority to reports relating to the Pueblo and the persecution of South Korean "revolutionaries," and placed less emphasis on the South Vietnam situation. Pyongyang highlighted the "confession" of Pueblo officer Lt. Stephen R. Harris (see Sitrep No. 29) but also covered pro-Communist "world" reaction to the case.

8. The (North) Korean Central News Agency today transmitted a photo allegedly showing the "spy" confession of Lt. Stephen Robert Harris, the Pueblo's "first officer." The word "confession" appears at the top of the first of ten fanned-out pages and Harris' signature on the last. Only the first page is readable in its entirety and follows word for word the "confession" broadcast yesterday by Radio Pyongyang.

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[redacted]

11. Several brief firefights were reported in the US sector of the DMZ during the evening of 2-3 February. No casualties on either side were reported. One North Korean was reported killed by the ROK police a short distance south of the DMZ.

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REPORT CLASS -

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM

SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT IN I CORPS AS OF 2000 HOURS ON 4 FEBRUARY 1968

ACQUIRED: VIETNAM, DANANG (4 FEBRUARY 1968) [redacted]

SOURCE : THIS IS A SITUATION REPORT ON 4 FEBRUARY PREPARED BY CAS, [redacted]

FI [redacted]

SUMMARY: NO MAJOR ENEMY ACTION WAS INITIATED IN I CORPS ON 4 FEBRUARY AS OF 2000 HOURS. IN QUANG TRI AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT STATES THAT A NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY REGIMENT (NEAR KHE SANH) HAS NOT JOINED IN THE ATTACK ON QUANG TRI, AND INCLUDES OFFICIALS AND NECESSARY ACCOUTREMENTS TO ESTABLISH GOVERNMENT MACHINERY. THE SITUATION CONTINUED TENSE IN HUE, AS FIGHTING CONTINUED AND THE U.S. MARINE CORPS FORCES WERE NEARING THE CORDS OFFICES, MAKING SLOW PROGRESS. THE DITADEL AIRPORT REPORTEDLY WAS IN VIETNAMESE HANDS, BUT NOT YET OPERATIVE. THE PEOPLE IN QUANG NGAI DID NOT APPEAR TO BE TAKING SIDES, ALTHOUGH THERE FEARED THE VIET CONG. END SUMMARY.

1. ACCORDING TO A REPORT [redacted]. THE 66TH REGIMENT OF THE 304TH NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) DIVISION HAS NOT YET JOINED THE ATTACK AGAINST QUANG TRI. ALLEGEDLY, THE REGIMENT TRAVELED WITH OFFICIALS AND THE ACCOUTREMENTS TO ESTABLISH GOVERNMENTAL MACHINERY. UNITS THAT APPROACHED FROM THE NORTH DURING THE ATTACK CARRIED CIVILIAN CLOTHES. (COMMENT:

NND 941536 ---9/

IT IS NOT KNOWN IF THIS REPORT WAS BASED ON RUMOR OR INFORMATION FROM AN ESTABLISHED AGENT. THE 2 FEBRUARY III MAF OB LISTING STATES THAT A RALLIER, A MASTER SERGEANT, FROM THE 66TH REGIMENT OF THE 304TH DIVISION SAID THAT THE 304TH LEFT THANH HOA PROVINCE, NVN, IN OCTOBER 1967 AND ARRIVED IN THE KHE SANH AREA IN JANUARY 1968.)

2. ENEMY FIRE CONTINUED IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, BUT NO MAJOR EFFORT HAD BEEN INITIATED AS OF 2000. THE SECURITY SERVICE ESTIMATED THAT THERE WERE STILL ABOUT 50 VIET CONG (VC) SAPPERS CADRES IN QUANG TRI CITY.

3. ACCORDING TO A CHIEU HOI (OPEN ARMS) ADVISOR A VC/NVA (?) COMMANDER SHOT AND KILLED ONE OF HIS WOUNDED WHO WOULD HAVE TO BE EVACUATED BY STRETCHER, PRESUMABLY BECAUSE HE WAS TOO IMPORTANT TO LEAVE BEHIND AND THE ENEMY DID NOT WANT TO BE SLOWED DOWN. IN ANOTHER INSTANCE IT APPEARED THAT AN ENEMY COMMANDER WAS URGING RELUCTANT TROOPS FORWARD. THE ATTACKERS ATTEMPTED TO ROUND UP AND TAKE THE CHIEU HOIS (RETURNEES) IN QUANG TRI CITY WITH THEM, BUT WHEN THEY CAME UNDER FIRE THE CHIEU HOIS ESCAPTED.

4. PROVINCIAL RECONNAISSANCE UNITS (PRU) IN QUANG TRI CITY ACTED SERVED AS REACTION UNITS AND SPED FROM ONE SPOT TO ANOTHER CLEARING OUT ENEMY ACTIVITY.

5. IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION FROM THE USMACV COMPOUND IN THE CITADEL, HUE CITY, THUA THIEN PROVINCE, AT 1930 HOURS, A CAS OFFICIAL SAID THAT THE SITUATION REMAINED TENSE WITH

NND 941536 --- 92

SMALL ARMS FIRE CONTINUING AROUND THE USMACV COMPOUND. FIGHTING CONTINUED IN THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE CITY. THE ROAD FROM PHU BAI TO HUE WAS STILL UNDER SNIPER FIRE. THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REACTION FORCE POSSIBLY WAS CLOSE TO THE U.S. CORDS OFFICES BUT WAS MAKING SLOW PROGRESS. CITADEL AIRPORT REPORTEDLY WAS IN ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) HANDS, BUT IT WAS NOT OPERATIVE.

6. DANANG CITY HAS REMAINED QUIET DURING 4 FEBRUARY. DANANG POLICE WERE DIGGING EMPLACEMENTS AND SEEKING MACHINE GUN POSITIONS IN THE CITY, WHICH THEY SAID WAS A ROUTINE ACTION TO IMPROVE SECURITY. THEY HAD RECEIVED NO REPORTS OF AN IMPENDING ATTACK.

7. HOI AN, QUANG NAM PROVINCE, ALSO WAS QUIET ON 4 FEBRUARY WITH THE PROGRESSION OF A FAIRLY NORMAL DAY. MORE AND MORE PEOPLE WERE ON THE STREETS, WELLDRESSED, AND MOVING ABOUT. SHOPS WERE MORE AND MORE OPEN. ONE ACT OF TERRORISM OCCURRED WHEN TWO VC DRESSED IN POPULAR FORCE (PF) UNIFORMS RIDING A HONDA SHOT A PF SOLDIER WALKING IN HOI AN. EXTENT OF INJURY IS NOT KNOWN. THERE WERE NO SIGNS OF PANIC OR RESENTMENT AGAINST THE AMERICANS OR THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN). NOR WERE THERE SIGNS OF ATTEMPTS AT POLITICAL DEMONSTRATIONS ON THE PART OF BUDDHISTS OR THE VIETNAM NATIONALIST PARTY (VNQDD). THE MANY REFUGEES IN THE CITY WERE GATHERED AT SCHOOLS AND CHURCHES AND BEING CARED FOR BY SOCIAL AND WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS.

[redacted]

NND 941536 --- 93

THE CURFEW CONTINUED IN FORCE FOR FROM 1900 TO 0700 HOURS.

8. THE SITUATION CONTINUED QUIET IN TAM KY CITY, QUANG TIN PROVINCE, ON 4 FEBRUARY.

9. THE SITUATION ALSO REMAINED GENERALLY QUIET IN THE AREA OF QUANG NGAI CITY ON 4 FEBRUARY. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION RECEIVED BY THE ADVISOR TO THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE PROGRAM IN QUANG NGAI:

A. VC TACTICAL BATTALIONS THAT REMAINED AROUND QUANG NGAI CITY INCLUDED THE 48TH AND 81ST LOCAL FORCES, THE 406TH MAIN FORCE, AND AN UNIDENTIFIED LOCAL FORCE FROM DUC PHO DISTRICT.

B. VC LOSSES ON 4 FEBRUARY WERE ESTIMATED AT MORE THAN 1,000 INCLUDING LOSSES FROM ACTION IN SOUTHERN QUANG TIN.

C. THERE ARE RUMORS, OR SPECULATION, AMONG THE PEOPLE THAT THE AMERICANS WILL NOT HELP QUANG NGAI. (COMMENT: HOW THESE RUMORS CAN BE CREDITED BY THE PEOPLE CANNOT BE UNDERSTOOD SINCE AMERICANS CERTAINLY ASSISTED IN OUSTING THE VC AFTER THEIR INFILTRATION OF THE CITY.) THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE PEOPLE ARE AFRAID OF THE VC, BUT THEY ARE NOT TAKING SIDES.

D. THE VC GENERALLY BYPASSED THE RD TEAMS. SOME TEAMS HAVE MOVED IN CLOSE TO DISTRICT COMPOUNDS TO SUPPORT LOCAL GVN FORCES.

E. THE PRUS HAVE BEEN SHOWING A GOOD ACCOUNT, KEEPING

NND 941536 ---94

CASUALTIES LOW (TWO WOUNDED IN ACTION) AND DISRUPTING THE ENEMY. ALL DISTRICT ARE HAPPY WITH THE PRU EFFORT.

F. HOW THE VC GOT IN AND OUT OF QUANG NGAI CITY IS STILL UNKNOWN.

10. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV CORDS III MAF 7TH AF USARV COMNAVFORV USAID DIR/JUSPAO (MR. ZORTHIAN ONLY) CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF (ALSO SENT SAIGON)

REPORT CALSS [redacted] GROUP I

END OF MESSAGE

NND 941536 --- 95

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REPORT CLASS [redacted]

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM, DANANG

DOI : 4 FEBRUARY 1968

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN I CORPS AS OF 1200 HOURS 4 FEBRUARY 1968

ACQUIRED: VIETNAM, DANANG (4 FEBRUARY 1968) [redacted]

SOURCE : THIS IS A SITUATION REPORT ON 4 FEBRUARY PREPARED BY CAS. [redacted]

1. DURING THE NIGHT OF 3-4 FEBRUARY THERE WERE NO FEW DEVELOPMENTS AND NO SIGNIFICANT VC ACTIVITY IN QUANG TRI, QUANG NGAI, AND QUANG TIN PROVINCES. IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK) TROOPS LAID AN AMBUSH IN THE VICINITY OF HIEU NHON DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS; CONTACT WAS MADE WITH THE VC WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS. THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) ENGINEER COMPOUND IN HOI AN CITY RECEIVED THREE ROUNDS OF 60MM MORTAR. IN DIEN BANH DISTRICT, QUANG NAM PROVINCE, THE VC KNOCKED OUT A POWER PLANT.

2. ON 3 FEBRUARY, THE DANANG CITY POLICE ARRESTED A 14 YEAR OLD BOY WHO WAS TRYING TO CONCEAL A PACKAGE AS THE POLICE APPROACHED. THE PACKAGE CONTAINED TWO K-54 PISTOLS AND 30 KILOS OF EXPLOSIVES. HE IS NOW UNDERGOING INTERROGATION. THERE WERE TWO SIGHTINGS OF FROGMEN REPORTED IN THE THANH BINH BEACH AREA OF DANANG BUT THESE REPORTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN CONFIRMED. OTHERWISE, THERE WERE NO INCIDENTS OF SIGNIFICANCE IN DANANG.

[redacted]

62

NND 941536 --- 76

3. A RETIRED ARVN MAJOR, NOW AN EMPLOYEE OF CAS, DISCUSSED THE PRESENT FIGHTING WITH NUMEROUS PERSONS IN DANANG. THE GENERAL CONSESUS AMONG THE POPULACE IN DANANG CONCERNING THE PRESENT FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIETNAM SEEMS TO BE THAT THE U.S. AND THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) DID NOT HAVE ANY ADVANCE INFORMATION OF VC MOVEMENT INTO THE CITIES. THE VC WON A POLITICAL VICTORY BY DEMONSTRATING TO THE WORLD THAT THEY HAVE SUFFICIENT FORCES WITH WHICH IN ONE NIGHT TO ENTER VIRTUALLY EVERY IMPORTANT CITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM. IT IS RECOGNIZED, HOWEVER, THAT MILITARILY THE U.S. AND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) TROOPS WERE VICTORIOUS AS EVIDENCED BY THE MANY VC KILLED AND WOUNDED AND THE MANY WEAPONS CAPTURED.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV CORDS III MAF 7TH AF USARV COMNAVFORV USAID DIR/JUSPAO (MR. ZORTHIAN ONLY) CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF (ALSO SENT SAIGON)

REPORT CLASS [redacted] GROUP I

END OF MESSAGE

NND 941536 --- 77

REPORT CLASS [redacted]

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM

SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT IN I CORPS AS OF 1200 HOURS ON 5 FEBRUARY

ACQUIRED: VIETNAM, DANANG (5 FEBRUARY 1966) [redacted]

SOURCE : THIS IS A SITUATION REPORT ON 5 FEBRUARY PREPARED BY CAS [redacted]

1. IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE RATHER HEAVY FIGHTING ERUPTED AT 0900 AND CONTINUED UNTIL AFTER 100 IN TRIEU PHONG DISTRICT MARKET PLACE. NO FURTHER DETAILS WERE AVAILABLE. FOUR VIET CONG/NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (VC/NVA) BATTALIONS AND POSSIBLY EIGHT, ARE REPORTED MOVING TOWARD QUANG TRI FROM THE SOUTHWEST. NO CONTACT HAS BEEN MADE WITH THEM AS YET. IF THESE UNITS ACTUALLY ARE LOCATED WHERE REPORTED THEY PROBABLY WILL NOT ATTACK DURING THE DAY BUT POSSIBLY MAY DO SO TONIGHT. THE WEATHER IS OVERCASE, SO LITTLE AIR COVER WILL BE PROVIDED. PEOPLE ARE EDGY AND NERVOUS BUT GOING ABOUT THEIR BUSINESS.

2. IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE REPORTS FROM A VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL POLICE AGENCY STATE THAT THE VC PLANS MASS ATTACKS ON TAM KY AND SEVERAL DISTRICTS BEFORE 10 FEBRUARY. PEOPLE ARE GOING ABOUT THEIR BUSINESS AS USUAL WITH FEW SIGNS OF PANIC. BOTH ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) AND VIETNAMESE POLICE UNITS CONTINUE TO SWEEP TAM KY CITY AND SURROUNDING AREAS. THE PEOPLE WILL

[redacted]

60

NND 941536 --- 87

NOT DEMONSTRATE FOR FEAR OF BEING PICKED UP BY THE POLICE. ACCORDING TO REPORTS RECEIVED, THE PRIME TARGET OF THE NEXT VC ATTACK WILL BE TAM KY CITY AND THE SECONDARY TARGET WILL BE THE TWO NEARBY REFUGEE CAMPS.

3. REPORTS FROM QUANG NGAI PROVINCE INDICATE THE VC WILL MAKE ATTACKS ON THE CITY AND IN THE DISTRICTS SOME TIME BEFORE 10 FEBRUARY. THE CITY POPULATION CONTINUES TO GO ABOUT ITS BUSINESS IN A NORMAL FASHION, BUTTHERE ARE SIGNS OF UNCERTAINTY.

4. IN HOI AN CITY, QUANG NAM PROVINCE, A MEETING WAS HELD BY LOCAL INHABITANTS ON THE MORNING OF 4 FEBRUARY WITH NO FURTHER DETAILS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE. A NORMAL ATMOSPHERE PREVAILS WITHIN THE CITY AND THERE ARE NO REPORTS OF ANY FORTHCOMING VC ATTACKS.

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV CORDS III MAF 7TH AF USARV COMNAVFORV USAID DIR/JUSPAO (MR. ZORTHIAN ONLY) CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF (ALSO SENT SAIGON)

REPORT CLASS [redacted] GROUP I

END OF MESSAGE

NND 941536 --- 88

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SC No. 07681/68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
7 February 1968

SANITIZED
AUTHORITY NLJ 91-164
BY [illegible] NARA, DATE 9-15-96

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Spot Report on the Situation in the Khe Sanh Area

1. Late reports indicate the North Vietnamese gained control of the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp on the afternoon of the 7th.

2. The Camp's defenders commenced evacuation from the area under cover of intensive friendly aerial and artillery bombardment. Six of the 24 Americans and over three-fourths of the 450 man Vietnamese garrison have not yet been accounted for. Earlier in the day, an estimated Communist company had controlled the camp above ground while friendly personnel were entrenched in underground bunkers.

3. Two relief columns were reportedly converging on the scene late in the afternoon for a combined raid on the camp. Neither had entered the camp-site at last report. One of the relief forces was composed of Special Forces personnel helo-lifted from Khe Sanh; the other was a local Laotian volunteer battalion.

4. The unit identity of the attacking Communist force is not yet clear. The attack was possibly conducted by elements from the 66th Regiment of the NVA 304th Division. A senior non-commissioned officer who defected one week ago, stated that when he left this unit, it was near Lang Vei awaiting orders to attack the camp. [redacted]

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5. It is also possible that elements of the 101D Regiment of the NVA 325C Division were involved. [redacted]

[redacted]

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6. According to a report from the scene, the Khe Sanh garrison was faced with potentially serious complications on the night of 7 February when approximately 6,000 Laotian refugees moved from Lang Vei to within one-quarter mile of Khe Sanh.

7. The Khe Sanh base commander has been advised to deter the refugees from moving closer. Officials in Saigon will ask the Laotian charge to fly to Khe Sanh tomorrow to encourage the refugees to clear the area.

8. Aside from the obvious political delicacy of the situation, the mass of refugees poses tactical problems for the base defenders. Should the enemy attack, the refugees could shield his approach or cause confusion among friendly troops.

9. It is possible that very large numbers of refugees are in the area. Some of the dependents of the Laotian defenders at Ban Houei Sane were in the vicinity of Lang Vei, along with dependents of the Lang Vei camp itself.

10. There have been no other significant developments reported by field elements on the military situation in South Vietnam, or with regard to DRV aircraft.

[redacted]

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Case # NLJ96-245
Document # 29a

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S E C R E T [redacted]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI 14 FEBRUARY 1968
SUBJECT VICE PRESIDENT KY'S INTENTION TO RELINQUISH HIS SPECIAL POWERS BECAUSE OF DISCOURAGEMENT WITH GOVERNMENT'S PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT CRISIS

1.5(c)
3.3(b)(1)

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (15 FEBRUARY 1968) [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.3(b)(1)

SUMMARY: VICE PRESIDENT KY [redacted] ON 14 FEBRUARY [redacted] WAS BITTER AND DISCOURAGED AT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM'S PERFORMANCE IN THE CURRENT CRISIS. HE THEREFORE HAD DECIDED TO RETURN TO PRESIDENT THIEU THE SPECIAL POWERS GIVEN HIM AS HEAD OF THE TASK FORCE. KY RESENTS CHARGES BY THIEU SUPPORTERS THAT HE IS ATTEMPTING TO USE HIS TASK FORCE POWERS FOR PERSONAL ADVANTAGE. HE IS ALSO FRUSTRATED BY PRIME MINISTER LOC'S POOR SHOWING AND BY THE TENDENCY OF CABINET MINISTERS TO INSIST ON BUREAUCRATIC PROPERITIES. END SUMMARY.

1. [redacted] 14 FEBRUARY 1968, VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY [redacted] WAS "BITTER AND DISCOURAGED" AT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM'S (GVN) PERFORMANCE IN THE CURRENT CRISIS. KY [redacted] HAD DEFINITELY DECIDED THAT [redacted] NEXT FEW DAYS HE WILL RETURN TO PRESIDENT NGUYEN

1.5(c)
3.3(b)(1)

VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY [redacted] WAS "BITTER AND DISCOURAGED" AT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM'S (GVN) PERFORMANCE IN THE CURRENT CRISIS. KY [redacted] HAD DEFINITELY DECIDED THAT WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS HE WILL RETURN TO PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU ALL THE "SPECIAL POWERS" CONFERRED ON HIM BY THIEU. [redacted] COMMENT: KY WAS REFERRING TO HIS CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE TASK FORCE ESTABLISHED BY THIEU TO COPE WITH THE AFTERMATH OF THE VIET CONG (VC) TET OFFENSIVE.) 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

2. KY SAID THE GVN HAD BEEN TOTALLY AND UNNECESSARILY PARALYZED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE VC ATTACKS. HE FELT THAT, GIVEN THE DESTRUCTION WROUGHT BY THE ATTACKS, IT WAS STILL MOVING WITH TOO LITTLE EFFECTIVENESS AND SENSE OF URGENCY. KY SAID THAT WHILE HE HAD ATTEMPTED AS CHAIRMAN OF THE TASK FORCE AND OTHERWISE WITHIN THE POWERS CONFERRED ON HIM BY THE CONSTITUTION TO MOVE RAPIDLY TO RETURN THE SITUATION TO NORMAL, ALMOST EVERY MOVE HE HAD MADE HAD COME UNDER FIRE FROM THIEU'S SUPPORTERS WHO CLAIMED THAT HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO SET HIMSELF UP AS A SECOND GOVERNMENT. [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

[redacted] HE EVEN HIS OWN "ANTI-FRAUD YOUTH CORPS", WHICH HE HAD HOPED COULD BE USED IN THE PRESENT EMERGENCY, WAS DOING LITTLE BUT COLLECTING ITS SALARIES.

3. [redacted] IT WAS NOW OBVIOUS TO EVERYONE THAT PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN VAN LOC IS A "DISMAL FAILURE." HE ADDED WITH CONSIDERABLE BITTERNESS THAT SINCE HE, KY, HAD BEEN THE CHIEF PROPONENT OF LOC FOR THE POSITION, HE FELT THAT LOC HAD LET HIM DOWN BADLY. KY ALSO COMPLAINED THAT MOST OF THE CABINET MINISTERS, DESPITE THE PROBLEMS FACING THE COUNTRY, SEEMED MORE CONCERNED WITH BUREAUCRATIC PROPRIETY THAN WITH PROVIDING MEANINGFUL ASSISTANCE TO THOSE DISPLACED BY THE FIGHTING.

4. [redacted] COMMENT: WHILE [redacted] KY NOW APPEARS TO RECOGNIZE THE ROLE [redacted] PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS CAN PLAY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION, [redacted] IT DISTURBING THAT KY SHOULD FEEL COMPELLED TO COMPLAIN AT SUCH LENGTH TO SOMEONE OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT. [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

[redacted]

5. [redacted] COMMENT: [redacted] KY TOLD SOME CLOSE ASSOCIATES ON 13 FEBRUARY THAT HE INTENDED TO RECOMMEND TO THIEU, PROBABLY ON 18 FEBRUARY , THE TASK BE ABOLISHED. [redacted] SOURCES NOTED KY'S IRRITATION WITH CRITICISM BY THIEU SUPPORTERS AND WITH THE DIFFICULTY OF GETTING CABINET MINISTERS TO DO THINGS, [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR, MR. ZORTHIAN) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND, GENERAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR KOMER, CHIEF OF STAFF, J-2) 7TH AIR FORCE (GENERAL MOMYER ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

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1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI 16 FEBRUARY 1968
SUBJECT [redacted] EXPECTATION OF A SECOND WAVE OF VIET CONG ATTACKS ON OR ABOUT 18 FEBRUARY

ACQ SOURCE VIETNAM, SAIGON (16 FEBRUARY 1968) [redacted]

1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

1. [redacted] THE VIET CONG (VC) TO LAUNCH A SECOND WAVE OF SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS IN KHE SAN, HUE, QUANG TRI, DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND SAIGON AROUND 18 FEBRUARY. [redacted] BASED [redacted] ON INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THE INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS, SOME OF WHOM WERE RECENTLY CAPTURED EN ROUTE FROM LONG AN PROVINCE TO SAIGON. [redacted] ALTHOUGH IT WAS DIFFICULT TO PIN DOWN THE EXACT DATE THE VC SECOND-PHASE ATTACKS WOULD OCCUR, THE VC DEFINITELY HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH FURTHER ATTACKS. [redacted] THE VC HAD NOT COMMITTED MAIN FORCE UNITS INSIDE SAIGON DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE. [redacted] IN THE SECOND ATTACK ON SAIGON THE VC MIGHT WELL USE FIFTH MAIN FORCE BATTALION. [redacted] THE AMERICANS SHOULD REMAIN ALERT, [redacted] THE VC ARE CAPABLE OF CONTINUING THE ATTACK ON SAIGON USING MAIN FORCE UNITS.

1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

2. [redacted] THE POLICE WOULD REQUIRE THREE MONTHS TO RESTORE THE SECURITY SITUATION IN SAIGON TO ITS PRE-TET LEVEL. [redacted] THREE ARVN BATTALIONS, IN ADDITION TO [redacted] POLICE UNITS, SHOULD BE STATIONED PERMANENTLY INSIDE SAIGON CITY TO SHARE RESPONSIBILITY WITH THE POLICE FOR THE CITY'S SECURITY. [redacted] HOPED THE UNITS OF THE U.S. 199TH LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE WOULD REMAIN IN SAIGON TO ASSIST [redacted] IN CLEANING OUT THE REMNANTS OF THE VC BUT [redacted] LEARNED EARLIER THAT DAY THAT THE U.S. UNITS WOULD BE PULLED OUT OF SAIGON ON 17 FEBRUARY. [redacted] THESE U.S. UNITS SHOULD REMAIN IN SAIGON AT LEAST UNTIL THE END OF FEBRUARY.

1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

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[redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

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1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ [redacted]

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM
SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS TO VIET CONG KIEN HOA PROVINCE COMMITTEE TO PREPARE FOR SECOND PHASE OF OFFENSIVE, TO BEGIN 18 FEBRUARY 1968
DOI : 14 FEBRUARY 1968
ACQ : VIETNAM, SAIGON (16 FEBRUARY 1968)
SOURCE: [redacted]

1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

[redacted]

1. THE VIET CONG (VC) KIEN HOA PROVINCE COMMITTEE HAS RECEIVED DIRECTIVES FROM THE CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM TO SUPPLY MAXIMUM REINFORCEMENTS TO THE CAPITAL LIBERATION FORCE FOR THE SECOND PHASE OF THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE AGAINST SAIGON WHICH WILL RUN FROM 18 FEBRUARY UNTIL THE END OF THE MONTH. THE OBJECT OF PHASE TWO IS TO SUPPORT THE VC REMAINING IN CAPITAL SLUMS AND TO PERMIT THEM TO ESCAPE. THE VC IN KIEN HOA SAY THAT THIS TIME THEY WILL LEVEL SAIGON TO THE GROUND. THEY ARE TELLING KIEN HOA RESIDENTS WITH RELATIVES IN SAIGON TO ADVISE THEIR RELATIVES TO EVACUATE TO THE SUBURBS OR TO NEARBY PROVINCE CAPITALS TO ESCAPE DEATHT AND DESTRUCTION.

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE MACV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT

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S E C R E T [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI 17 FEBRUARY 1968
SUBJECT SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1300 HOURS LOCAL TIME 17 FEBRUARY 1968

ACQ VIETNAM SAIGON (17 FEBRUARY 1968) [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

SOURCE [redacted] THIS IS A VIETNAM SITUATION REPORT PREPARED AT 1300 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 17 FEBRUARY 1968.

1. NUMEROUS UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF VARYING RELIABILITY SUGGEST THAT A RENEWED ATTACK ON SAIGON IS IMMINENT. SOME REPORTS POINT TO THE 18TH FEBRUARY AS THE DATE, OTHER REPORTS HAD INDICATED THE 11TH, 12TH, 13TH AND 15TH. FIRM INDICATIONS FROM ALL SOURCES, HOWEVER, DO NOT AT THIS TIME SUGGEST THE IMMINENCE OF AN ATTACK UPON SAIGON. (SOURCE: COMPETENT AMERICAN OBSERVERS)

2. A REFLECTION OF THE FOREGOING IS THE STATEMENT [redacted] THAT THE PRESENT CURFEW PREVAILING IN PRECINCTS ONE THROUGH FIVE MAY BE MODIFIED SOMETIME NEXT WEEK TO ALLOW MOVEMENT BY THE POPULACE UNTIL 2100 HOURS. (SOURCE: AMERICAN OBSERVER [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

3. WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN FURTHER SIGNIFICANT VIET CONG /NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY ACTIVITY CAN BE EXPECTED. MOREOVER, STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS WEIGH HEAVILY IN FAVOR OF A QUICK FOLLOW-UP TO THE TET OFFENSIVE. IN THIS REGARD, HOWEVER, THE ENEMY MUST REALIZE THAT THE LONGER HE WAITS, THE MORE DIFFICULT MILITARY TASK HE WILL HAVE. THE FIRST ATTACK, THE TET OFFENSIVE, WAS LAUNCHED UNDER THE COVER OF THE TET HOLIDAY, A KNOWN PERIOD OF SECURITY RELAXATION AND COUNTRYWIDE CONCERN ONLY WITH CELEBRATION. WHILE THE GENERAL OUTLINES OF THE TET OFFENSIVE WERE DESCRIBED TO ENEMY CADRES IN SOME CASES LONG BEFORE THE ATTACK WAS LAUNCHED, THE SPECIFIC DETAILS OF TIME AND PLACE WERE NOT PASSED OUT UNTIL THE FINAL MOMENT. WITHIN THE GENERAL PLAN, IT NOW APPEARS FROM PRISONER INTERROGATIONS THAT A SECOND ATTACK WAS ENVISIONED. WHETHER THE PLAN NOW REMAINS IN EFFECT, FOLLOWING THE MILITARY FAILURE OF THE FIRST STAGE, IS NOT KNOWN. (SOURCE: AMERICAN OBSERVER)

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

[redacted]

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1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

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CONFIDENTIAL

210517Z CITE

DIST 21 FEBRUARY 1968

COUNTRY: LAOS

DOI: 20 FEBRUARY 1968 EXCEPT AS STATED

SUBJECT: INCREASED ENEMY THREAT TO PHOU PHA THI (SITE 85) AND MEASURES BEING TAKEN FOR ITS SECURITY

ACQ: LAOS, VIENTIANE (21 FEBRUARY 68) FIELD NO. [redacted]

SOURCE: [redacted]

(b)(1)
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1. BY LATE ON THE EVENING OF 20 FEBRUARY 1968 AUTO-DEFENSE DE CHOC (ADC) COMMANDERS INVOLVED IN THE DEFENSE OF PHOU (MOUNTAIN) PHA THI (UH 6860), SITE 85, CONSIDERED THAT THE ENEMY HAD ADVANCED TO WITHIN HEAVY MORTAR RANGE OF PHOU PHA THI FROM THE SOUTH. THE SAME COMMANDERS BELIEVED THAT THE ENEMY COULD EASILY MOVE ARTILLERY TO PHOU DEN DIN (UH 7661) UNDER THE COVER OF THE FOG WHICH HAD PERSISTED DURING THE DAY AND WAS FORECAST FOR THE NEXT

(b)(1)c
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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(classification) (dissem control)

24 HOURS.

2. THE ENEMY OVERRAN MUONG YUT (UH 784563) ON THE MORNING OF 26 FEBRUARY, AND ITS DEFENDERS FELL BACK TO UH 692[illegible]1 AND THEN RETREATED CLOSER TO THE BASE OF PHOU PHA THI. BY 1600 HOURS 26 FEBRUARY 21 WOUNDED ADC TROOPS WERE AT THE BASE OF PHOU PHA THI. COMMENT: THE ENEMY TOOK MUONG YUT ON 14 FEBRUARY, BUT ADC FORCES WERE ABLE TO REOCCUPY IT ON THE SAME DAY.)

3. AT 1930 HOURS ON 26 FEBRUARY ADC FORCES RECOVERED A MAP OUTLINING AN ATTACK PLAN FOR PHOU PHA THI FROM THE BODY OF AN ENEMY SOLDIER KILLED IN AN AMBUSH ON 18 FEBRUARY. ACCORDING TO THE PLAN TWO REGIMENTS WERE TO BE USED. ONE BATTALION EACH WAS TO ATTACK HOUEI HOK (UH 6561), HOUEI MA (UH 6253), HOUEI MOUN (UH 5664), AND HOUEI KHA MOUN (UH 6868). ONE COMPANY WAS TO ATTACK EACH OF THE MAJOR TRAILS LEADING TO THE TOP OF PHOU PHA THI.

4. THE DEFENDERS OF PHOU PHA THI WERE PREPARING TO COORDINATE EXTENSIVE AIR STRIKES ON TARGETS CLOSE TO PHOU PHA THI. THE FOLLOWING ENEMY TARGETS

(b)(1) C

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
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WERE TO BE HIT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE: ENEMY COMPANY AND 82MM MORTAR (UH 783563), ENEMY STORAGE AREA (UH 735596), BIVOUAC AREA (UH 743591), BIVOUAC AREA (UH 793592), NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY PLATOON (UH 727598), AND A MORTAR TEAM (UH 732591). NO CIVILIANS WERE IN THE TARGET AREA BECAUSE THEY HAD STARTED TO MOVE OUT IN EARLY FEBRUARY WHEN ENEMY PRESSURES ON THE AREA INCREASED.

5. COMMENT: THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE CAPTURED MAP HAS YET TO BE ESTABLISHED, BUT T'E OPERATIONAL PLAN AS OUTLINED IN THIS MAP IS TACTICALLY SOUND. IF THE ENEMY IMPLEMENTS THIS PLAN QUICKLY AND IN A COORDINATED MANNER UNDER THE PROTECTION OF TWO OR THREE DAYS OF SUSTAINED FOG, HE WILL SEVERELY CHALLENGE THE ABILITY OF IRREGULAR FORCES TO HOLD SITE 85.

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY AIR USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC

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CONFIDENTIAL

2 40602Z CITE [redacted]

DIST 24 FEBRUARY 1968

COUNTRY: LAOS

DOI: 18-23 FEBRUARY 1968 EXCEPT AS STATED

SUBJECT: ENEMY ACTIVITIES IN AREAS EAST OF PHOU PHA THI AND AROUND SAM NEUA WHICH HAVE A BEARING ON THE SITUATION AT PHOU PHA THI

(b)(1) C
(b)(3)
34 (b)(1)

ACQ: LAOS, VIENTIANE (24 FEBRUARY 68) FIELD NO. [redacted]

SOURCE: [redacted]

1. ON 21 FEBRUARY 1968 FOUR NORTH VIETNAMESE BATTALIONS ARRIVED AT PHOU DEN DIN (UH 7660), WHICH IS JUST OUTSIDE A 12-KILOMETER RADIUS AROUND PHOU PHA THI (UH 6860), SITE 85. SOME OF THE NVA TROOPS TOOK UP POSITIONS AT UH 7764.

2. AT 1748 HOURS ON 22 FEBRUARY A ROAD-WATCH TEAM OPERATING ON ROUTE 6 AT VH 0460 REPORTED 32 TRUCKS WEST. AT 2048 HOURS THE SAME DAY THE TEAM

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REPORTED 27 TRUCKS EAST.

3. AT 1000 HOURS ON 22 FEBRUARY AN AUTO-DEFENSE DE CHOC PATROL CLASHED WITH AN ENEMY UNIT AT UH 693568 AND KILLED TWO ENEMY SOLDIERS.

4. ON 18 FEBRUARY A NVA BATTALION COMMANDER ARRIVED AT UH 735635 WITH ONE NVA SOLDIER AND FOUR MEO PATHET LAO. ONE OF THE MEO, WHO INTERPRETED FOR THE NVA COMMANDER, USED A MEGAPHONE TO TELL THE VILLAGERS NOT TO GO NEAR PHOU PHA THI BECAUSE HIS TROOPS INTENDED TO USE BIG GUNS AGAINST IT WHEN THEY ATTACKED.

5. ON 18 FEBRUARY 100 NVA TROOPS WITH ONE 75MM RECOILLESS RIFLE MOVED WEST PAST UH 945585.

6. ON 20 FEBRUARY ONE NVA BATTALION WAS IN POSITION BETWEEN UH 905647 AND UH 915642. TWO NVA COMPANIES WERE AT UH 916618 AND TWO NVA COMPANIES AND A COOPERATIVE STORE WERE AT UH 907644, ABOUT 600 METERS NORTH OF NUA XIENG (UH 9164).

7. ON 20 FEBRUARY ABOUT 300 ENEMY TROOPS MOVED FROM BAN NONG NOK (UH 8355) AND PHOU CHIK NOU (UH 8157) TO UH 9659 BECAUSE OF AIR STRIKES ON THEIR POSITION.

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PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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(b)(1) C
(b)(3)
3.4 (b)(1)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

5. ON 20 FEBRUARY 300 CONSCRIPTED COOLIES PASSED SOP HAO (VH 4273) MOVING TOWARD SAM NEUA (VH 0158). THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD CONSCRIPTED THESE COOLIES FROM MUONG HET (UH 9701) AND XIENG KHO (VJ 1101) ON 1 FEBRUARY TO CARRY SUPPLIES TO FORCES IN THE PHOU PHA THI AREA.

9. AT 0900 HOURS ON 21 FEBRUARY 400 ROAD WORKERS WERE WORKING ON THE EXTENSION OF ROUTE 602 AT UH 818594. HALF OF THESE LABORERS WERE WORKING EAST TO UH 814595 AND THE OTHERS WERE WORKING WEST TO UH 801591. SHORTLY AFTER 0900 HOURS AIRCRAFT STRUCK AND CUT THE ROAD. ONE HUNDRED TROOPS WERE AT UH 772625.

10. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY AIR USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC [redacted]

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3.4(b)(1)
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[ ]

IN THIS PREPARATORY EFFORT THE ENEMY HAS FOCUSED HIS ATTENTION ON PENETRATING FROM THE EAST THE 12-KILOMETER DEFENSIVE PERIMETER AROUND SITE 85 WHICH HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AND MAINTAINED BY IRREGULAR FORCES UNDER THE COMMAND OF GENERAL VANG PAO, COMMANDER OF THE SECOND MILITARY REGION. IN PENETRATING THE DEFENSIVE PERIMETER AROUND PHOU PHA THI THE ENEMY HAS CONCENTRATED ON ESTABLISHING POSITIONS WHICH COULD SERVE AS A FIRE BASE FROM WHICH HE COULD BRING THE SUMMIT OF PHOU PHA THI WITHIN RANGE OF HIS ARTILLERY AND MORTARS. DURING THE PAST 30 DAYS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE SECURITY OF PHOU PHA THI ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE ENEMY EXTENDED ROUTE 602 WESTWARD IN THE DIRECTION OF PHOU DEN DIN (UH 7668) TO ENABLE HIM TO MOVE SUPPLIES AND TROOPS FROM SAM NEUA TO THE OUTER PERIMETER OF THE IRREGULARS' DEFENSIVE PERIMETER AROUND PHOU PHA THI. ENEMY SOLDEIRS AND COOLIES SUCCEEDED IN EXTENDING ROUTE 602 BY ABOUT TEN KILOMETERS IN LESS THAN ONE MONTH. BY 21 FEBRUARY 400 COOLIES WERE WORKING ON THE ROAD AS FAR WEST AS OR 801591. ON 21 FEBRUARY AIRCRAFT STRUCK AND CUT THE

[ ]

3.4(b)(1) (b)(3)

NEW ROAD EXTENSION. THIS CUT WILL ONLY INHIBIT TRUCK TRAFFIC FOR A FEW DAYS IF THAT LONG. [CONTAINED INITIAL REPORTING ON THE ROAD CONSTRUCTION OF THIS ROUTE 602 EXTENSION AND [ ] FURNISHED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON ROAD-BUILDING IN THE AREA AROUND PHOU PHA THI. [/CONTAINED INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF THE EXTENSION OF THE ROAD AS OF 21 FEBRUARY.

B. ON 20 FEBRUARY THE ENEMY OVERRAN MUONG YUT (UH 704563), ABOUT SEVEN KILOMETERS SOUTHEAST OF THE CREST OF PHOU PHA THI, AND THEN SPREAD APPROXIMATELY ONE BATTALION ALONG THE RIDGE LINE NORTHEAST BACK TO PHOU HOUAY HOO (UH 735585). ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDING AUTO-DEFENSE DE CHOC (ADC) TROOPS LOCATED IN THE MUONG YUT AREA REPEATEDLY ATTEMPTED TO STOP THIS ENEMY PUSH, THE ENEMY DROVE THEM BACK EACH TIME AND INFLICTED RELATIVELY HIGH CASUALTIES. SEE [ ] [ ] FOR DETAILS ON THE ENEMY BREAKTHROUGH OF THE 12-KILOMETER PERIMETER AROUND PHOU PHA THI. OTHER REPORTS ON ENEMY MOVES TO CONSOLIDATE HIS POSITION AROUND PHOU PHA THI WERE [;].

(b)(3)
3.4(b)(1)

[ ] AND [ ] ADC TROOPS ARE CONTINUING TO EXERT EFFORTS TO RETURN TO THE AREA, AND BY 24 FEBRUARY A SPECIAL GUERRILLA COMPANY HAD REACHED MUONG YUI AND WAS READY TO ATTEMPT TO REOCCUPY IT.

C. ON 21 FEBRUARY FOUR NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY BATTALIONS ARRIVED AT PHOU DEN DIN, AND SOME UNITS FROM THIS FORCE TOOK UP POSITIONS AT UH 7764, ABOUT FOUR KILOMETERS NORTH OF PHOU DEN DIN. [ ] CONTAINED A REPORT ON THIS MOVE. SUBSEQUENT INFORMATION INDICATES THAT THESE NORTH VIETNAMESE BATTALIONS MAY HAVE ORIGINATED AT MUONG LIET (UH 1163). [ ] REFERRED TO ANOTHER NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY BATTALION TO THE EAST IN POSITION BETWEEN UH 985647 AND UH 915642.

D. ON 17 FEBRUARY ADC TROOPS TOOK A MAP OUTLINING THE ENEMY'S PLAN FOR HIS ATTACK ON PHOU PHA THI FROM THE BODY OF A NORTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIER KILLED IN AN AMBUSH, ABOUT EIGHT KILOMETERS EAST OF PHOU PHA THI. ACCORDING TO [ ], WHICH WAS BASED ON AN INITIAL EVALUATION OF THESE CAPTURED DOCUMENTS (WHICH WERE WRITTEN

(b)(3)

IN VIETNAMESE), THE ENEMY PLANNED TO USE AT LEAST FOUR BATTALIONS IN HIS ATTACK ON SITE 85, WITH ONE BATTALION EACH ATTACKING HOUEI HOK (UH 6561), HOUEI MA (UH 6253), HOUEI MOUN (UH 5664) AND HOUEI KHA MOUN (UH 6868). ONE COMPANY WAS TO ATTACK EACH OF FOUR MAJOR TRAILS LEADING TO THE TOP OF PHOU PHA THI. IN ADDITION THE ENEMY CALLED A SERIES OF PROPAGANDA MEETINGS FOR OFFICIALS AT VILLAGE AND C NTON LEVEL TO ANNOUNCE HIS INTENTION OF ATTACKING PHOU PHA THI IN THE NEAR FUTURE. NEO LAO HAK SAT OFFICIALS IN HOUA PHAN PROVINCE TOLD THOSE ATTENDING THE MEE...3S THAT THEIR FORCES ASSISTED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD ATTACK IN FEBRUARY AND MARCH AND USE 12MM MORTARS AND FROM TEN TO TWENTY AIRCRAFT

[illegible] RESPECTIVELY) CONTAINED REFERENCES TO ENEMY PLANS FOR THE ATTACK ON PHOU PHA THI.

2. SINCE THE ADC DEFENDERS OF PHOU PHA THI WERE THROWN BACK WITH SUCH HEAVY CASUALTIES WHEN THEY TRIED TO ELIMINATE ENEMY UNITS THAT HAD PENETRATED THE PERIMETER FROM PHOU HOUEI HAO (UH 7355B5) TO MUONG YUT, ADC COMMANDERS RESORTED

IN 37698

[1]

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TO SENDING OUT SMALL PATROLS TO SELECT TARGETS FOR AIR STRIKES AND ARTILLERY FIRE. THIS EFFORT HAS IDENTIFIED HARD TARGETS WHICH HAVE BEEN STRUCK EFFECTIVELY BY AIR AND ARTILLERY FIRE. THIS HARASSMENT BY FIRE IS RETARDING ENEMY ACTIVITYES BUT IT IS NOT ELIMINATING THE ENEMY PRESENCE IN THE 12-KILOMTER DEFENSIVE PERIMETER AROUND PHOU PHA THI.

3. SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS MADE UP OF IRREGULARS FROM GENERAL VANG PAO'S FORCES HAVE ALSO BEEN ACTIVE IN THE AREA EAST OF SAM NEUA IN AN ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY THE ENEMY'S LOGISTICAL BASE WHICH SUPPORTS THE EXPANSIONIST EFFORT IN AND AROUND PHOU PHA THI. THIS RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT HAS BEEN PRODUCTIVE AND TARGETS IDENTIFIED BY THESE TEAMS HAVE BEEN EXAMINED ON PHOTOGRAPHY, WITH THE RESULT BEING THAT 61 TARGETS EAST OF SAM NEUA CITY HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED FOR DESTRUCTION BY AIR STRIKES.

[redacted]

4. IN THE PERIOD 23 TO 25 FEBRUARY GENERAL VANG PAO HAS

(b)(3) 50 USC 3024(i)

TAKEN THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS TO ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF PHOU PHA THI:

A. TWO 4.2-INCH MORTARS HAVE BEEN SENT TO PHOU PHA THI.

B. ONE ADDITIONAL 105MM HOWITZER HAS BEEN SENT TO PHOU PHA THI.

C. THE GARRISON AT THE TOP OF PHOU PHA THI HAS BEEN INCREASED BY 50 MEN.

5. AS A RESULT OF THE ENEMY'S PENETRATING THE 12-KILOMETER RADIUS AROUND PHOU PHA THI IN FORCE AND OCCUPYING KEY POSITIONS WITHIN THE LOWER RIGHT-HAND (SIC) QUADRANT OF THIS PERIMETER AS WELL AS POSITIONS JUST OUTSIDE THE PERIMETER AT PHOU DEN DIN. HE REPRESENTS AN IMMINENT THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE TACAN SITE AND OTHER INSTALLATIONS AT PHOU PHA THI. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE ENEMY WILL CONTINUE TO ATTEMPT TO CONSOLIDATE HIS GAINS IN THE PHOU PHA THI AREA DURING THE NEXT TWO WEEKS WHILE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIS FINAL ASSAULT BY THREE OR FOUR BATTALIONS. IF, HOWEVER, ADC UNITS CONTINUE TO HARASS SUCCESSFULLY THE ENEMY ON THE GROUND AND IF AIRCRAFT CONTINUE TO STRIKE ENEMY CONCENTRATIONS IN AND AROUND PHOU PHA THI AND IN THE AREA EAST

[ ]

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S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

OF SAM NEUA THE TACAN AND OTHER SITES AT PHOU PHA THI WILL CONTINUE TO BE VIABLE FOR THE NEXT TWO WEEKS. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO PREDICT, HOWEVER, THE STATE OF SECURITY AT PHOU PHA THI BEYOND 18 MARCH BECAUSE OF THE ENEMY'S WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE TO ESCALATE HIS COMMITMENT IN THIS AREA.

6. THE AMBASSADOR HAS READ THIS REPORT AND HAS OFFERED NO OBJECTIONS.

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY AIR USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF, ARPAC[ ]
REPORT CLASS S E C R E T / NO FOREIGN DISSEM / CONTROLLED DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD / BACKGROUND USE ONLY /

S-E-C-R-E-T

[redacted]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

26 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: The Outlook in Vietnam

1. This Memorandum does not seek to explore all aspects of the situation in Vietnam, or its probable development over a long term. It is addressed only to the specific question put to us, i.e., whether developments in Vietnam are apt to involve a continuation of combat into the indefinite future at a level comparable or higher than current levels, or whether it is more probable that either the VC or the GVN will be unable to sustain such a level beyond a few months.

2. The current phase of combat will have a critical bearing on the further course of the war and may even prove to be decisive. We cannot be sure how long this phase will last, but it seems likely that by early summer the immediate results and the longer term implications will be fairly clear to Hanoi, Saigon, and Washington. At present, the key questions concern:

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[redacted]

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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941296-115

(1) the capabilities of the Communist forces to sustain their current challenge, and whether they can continue the fighting thereafter, and (2) the capabilities of the South Vietnamese political and military establishment to cope with the tasks imposed by the present Communist offensive.

Communist Plans and Prospects

3. Hanoi's aims in the present offensive phase are: to register significant military successes against US and especially ARVN forces, and to inflict such heavy losses, physical destruction and disorganization on the GVN as to produce a total situation favorable to a negotiated settlement on Communist terms. The Communists are not likely to have a rigid timetable, but they probably hope to achieve decisive results during the course of the summer. The high importance which Hanoi now attaches to forcing the issue is evident from the risks and costs of the enterprise.

4. The toll on Communist forces has been considerable, even if reported casualties are greatly inflated by inclusion of low level recruits and impressed civilians. To some extent these losses have been offset by measures already taken. Heavy

941296-116

infiltration of both new units and replacements from the North is continuing. A strenuous, last minute recruitment effort was made prior to the Tet attacks. A significant part of the guerrilla and Main forces could still be committed. And, at present, the Communists enjoy fuller access to the rural areas, where they are recruiting heavily. They will probably be able to recoup their recent losses, though at some sacrifice in quality.

5. In any case, the Communists probably will maintain their offensive for the next several months and be prepared to accept the high losses this entails. They cannot accept such losses indefinitely, however, and they probably will not be capable soon again of launching repeated mass attacks of the magnitude and widespread scale of 30-31 January. But they are almost certainly capable of sustaining a high level of combat, including major battles with US forces, assaults on selected cities, and rocket and mortar attacks on urban areas and military installations.

6. It is possible that the Communists regard the present campaign as so critical to the outcome of the war that they will commit their full resources to a maximum effort in the near term. On balance, however, we think it likely that even if their present

94296 · 117

push falls short they will wish to be able to sustain a protracted struggle. Hence they will probably not exercise their capabilities in such a profligate manner as to deny themselves the possibility of continuing the struggle should the present phase fail to produce a decisive result.

GVN/ARVN Prospects

7. The will and capability of the GVN and its armed forces remain the keys to the eventual outcome.

8. In the main, the ARVN has acquitted itself fairly well since 30 January, though the record is uneven. Morale has held up on the whole, and we know of no unit defections. However, the ARVN is showing signs of fatigue and in many areas it has now lapsed into a static defensive posture. Security in the countryside has been sharply reduced. A long and costly effort would have to be undertaken to regain the pre-Tet position. It is highly unlikely that the ARVN will be inspired enough or strong enough to make such an effort -- certainly not in the near future.

9. The GVN also performed adequately in the immediate emergency, particularly in the Saigon area. There now appears

to be a greater recognition of the need to push forward with additional measures, but the Communist challenge has not yet proved a catalyst in stimulating an urgent sense of national unity and purpose.

10. The overall position of the government has been weakened. Its prestige has suffered from the shock of the Tet offensive; its control over the countryside has been greatly reduced. Popular attitudes are confused and contradictory; the Viet Cong received virtually no popular support, but neither was there a rallying to the government side. Passivity is likely to continue as the dominant attitude in most of the population, but further military defeats could cause a sudden swing away from the government. While the central authority in Saigon is unlikely to collapse, its ability to provide energetic leadership throughout the country and all levels is in serious doubt. It is possible that over the next few months certain provinces, especially in I and IV Corps, will be lost to Saigon's effective authority.

11. The psychological factor is now critical for South Vietnam's whole political-military apparatus. The widespread rumors that the US conspired with the Communists are symptomatic

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of popular anxieties over the future course of the war and US attitudes toward a political settlement. As yet, however, there are no signs of a crisis of confidence within the government.

12. If major military reverses occur, the political and military apparatus could degenerate into general ineffectualness. If, on the other hand, US and ARVN regain the initiative and inflict some conspicuous setbacks on the Communists and the general offensive appears to be contained, then the GVN might manifest new energy and confidence and draw new support to itself. On balance, we judge that the chances are no better than even that the GVN/ARVN will emerge from the present phase without being still further weakened.

Alternative Outcomes of Present Phase

13. We believe that the Communists will sustain a high level of military activity for at least the next two or three months. It is difficult to forecast the situation which will then obtain, given the number of unknowable factors which will figure. Our best estimate is as follows:

941296 - 120

a. The least likely outcome of the present phase is that the Communist side will expend its resources to such an extent as to be incapable thereafter of preventing steady advances by the US/GVN.

b. Also unlikely, though considerably less so, is that the GVN/ARVN will be so critically weakened that it can play no further significant part in the military and political prosecution of the struggle.

c. More likely than either of the above is that the present push will be generally contained, but with severe losses to both the GVN and Communist forces, and that a period will set in during which neither will be capable of registering decisive gains.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

Abbot Smith

ABBOT SMITH
Chairman

941296 - 121

27 February 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Hanoi's Appraisal of its Strategic Position Prior to the Current Offensive

1. CIA has reviewed key Communist documents captured in Vietnam in order to bring into sharper focus Hanoi's own appraisal of its strategic position prior to the Tet offensive. One North Vietnamese document used for indoctrination of middle-level cadre seems to us to spell out Hanoi's arguments in particularly clear and explicit terms. This document, entitled "Clearly Understand the New Situation and Mission," was captured in late November but was not available in Washington until the end of January.

2. The North Vietnamese assessment has the ring of authority. Issued on 1 September for indoctrination purposes, it was drawn from an analysis prepared by a high-level party committee in Hanoi. The document reviews the development of the war from the summer of 1965, when US forces were introduced on a large scale, through each campaign season to the summer of 1967. Each stage of the struggle is represented in terms of Communist gains and allied reverses. Hanoi sees every step in the strengthening of US forces as a vindication of Communist strategy, and points to its success in keeping pace with the buildup.

3. Hanoi argues in this analysis that it has brought the conflict to a new stage, not because its "protracted war" strategy has failed but because it has succeeded. The introduction of the document describes in plain terms the opportunities now open to the Communists: "the immediate situation becomes increasingly more favorable for us and detrimental to the enemy." This will enable the revolutionary movement in the South to "secure

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4 SEPT 1999

great victories in a rather short period of time." These victories will entail the destruction of a "large part of the US combat forces" and the "main body of the Puppet Army."

4. Hanoi's confident assessment of the strength of its position clearly is central to its strategic thinking. Just as it provided the rationale for the Communists' "winter-spring campaign," it probably will also govern the North Vietnamese response to the present tactical situation. If Hanoi believes it is operating from a position of strength, as this analysis suggests, it can be expected to press its military offensive--even at the cost of serious setbacks. Given their view of the strategic balance, it seems doubtful that the Communists would be inclined to settle for limited military gains intended merely to improve their bargaining position in negotiations.

5. A few excerpts from the North Vietnamese document show how the Communists arrive at their conclusion that the time has come for "a great step forward" on the way to "complete victory."

> "In the winter-spring of 1965 and 1966, after pouring more than 200,000 US and Allied troops into SVN to join more than a half million puppet troops, the US imperialists launched their plans of strategic counteroffensive in the dry season, hoping to destroy a large part of our main body, disperse our troops, destroy the revolutionary organizations in our military installations, suppress the struggle of our people, wipe out the party forces and guerrilla forces, occupy our land, and reduce our area. Concurrently, they reinforced their air force and escalated the war in the North, hoping to prevent us from reinforcing the South.... They could not destroy any element of our forces and they were badly worn down...."

> "In the rainy season of 1966, the enemy did not have enough strength to launch great attacks against us....they were actively preparing to reopen greater strategic counteroffensive phases with larger forces in the coming dry season."

"In the dry season of 1966-1967, with an increased US force of more than 400,000 troops or more than one million including the Allied forces and the puppet troops, using modern weapons, aircraft, artillery, and mechanized means which had been increased four or five fold, the US imperialists launched a much fiercer counteroffensive phase than they had launched previously. They applied the tactics of "pincers" to seek and destroy our main force and concurrently launch raids to pacify and herd the people, hoping that they would be able to regain the initiative on the battlefield and avoid great defeats. They deployed all their forces and launched dozens of operations at a time, ranging from regimental level to army corps level on all battlefields. The most important of these operations was OPERATION JUNCTION CITY, in which they committed 45,000 of their troops against the northern part of Tay Ninh. They had concurrently pushed forward their pacification plan and stepped up their psywar and Open Arms activities... In the North, they increased the rate of destruction to a high degree and on a broader range...."

"They failed to achieve their goal of destroying us and they suffered an unprecedentedly high number of casualties and material losses. They boasted that with their great strength and their numerous weapons, aircraft, tanks and bombs, they would surely wipe out all our main units and installations. But our main installations remain intact, our armed forces continue to develop, and our rear bases and installations continued to fill the requirements for fighting the enemy. More importantly, we have also opened many special fronts and battlefields, especially the Tri Thien //DMZ// battlefields, in which we have destroyed many of the enemy. We have attracted the enemy toward such battlefields and caused confusion to them

941296-112

as well as prevented them from implementing their plans of bringing US troops to the Mekong Delta..."

"Their pacification plan, a program highly boasted by the US imperialists and puppet regime and carried out at the expense of 90 percent of the puppet forces with the assistance of the US imperialists, has also proven to be a failure. They themselves recognize their pacification failure. They are suffering political failure and they are striving to consolidate and stabilize the puppet army and regime, but these deteriorate steadily. Puppet troops have been degenerated from organic mobile soldiers to pacification and defensive troops. They have proved to be inefficient, have demonstrated pronounced defeatism and are continuing to disintegrate..."

"In the North, they have stepped up their destructive activities through intense deployment of their air force and navy. They have launched fierce operations, hoping to be able to scare our people and prevent us from reinforcing our brothers in the South. However, we remain unshakable in our determination. On the contrary, we have fought bravely and destroyed more than 2,000 of their aircraft, and right now we are standing side by side with the people in the South and are doing our best to support their revolution and to liberate the South...."

"In spite of the cunning plots of the US imperialists and their cruel henchmen, and in spite of their mammoth strength, their great firepower, and all their superior war means, the strategic objectives which had been selected by them could not be achieved. The defeats they are suffering become more burdensome and occur more frequently...."

"On our side...even though we have met a certain number of great difficulties...

we have caused the first phase of the greatest limited war ever waged by the US imperialists to fail...."

"At present, the situation has developed in such a way that it is very favorable for us and a critical deadlock for the enemy. After the failure of two major strategic counteroffensive campaigns, the leaders in the United States have become pessimistic over their war escalation policy in South Vietnam. The increase of combat troops in SVN met with many difficulties...."

"This is a perfect opportunity for us to emphasize attacking the enemy in all fields and taking advantage of the victories to push the SVN Revolution a great step forward....In this historical period, if our entire party, army, and population will fully understand the situation and rush forward to fight without fear of hardship and sacrifice, then we will certainly be able to bring about a turning point in our confrontation with the enemy and also cause the US limited war policy to be a failure which can no longer be carried out. From that situation, we can proceed toward realizing our immediate objective and secure a complete victory."

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[redacted]

WARNING

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code, Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

[redacted]

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Date 30 October 1980

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Central Intelligence Agency
28 February 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: International Connections of US Peace Groups -- III

1. We have continued to keep a close watch on the international connections of individuals and groups active in the US peace movement. During the two months since our last review of this activity,* there have been no major developments on the peace front nor has any new information come to light that would lead us to alter the conclusions reached in our original study.**

2. Contacts and communications on the international peace network appear to have dropped off sharply from the peak levels reached around the time of the world-wide protest demonstrations in October and the second session of the "International War Crimes Tribunal" in December. The only noteworthy events so far this year involving

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*SC-05701-67, 21 December 1967

**SC-05698-67, "International Connections of US Peace Groups," 15 November 1967.

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American activists on the international level were the release of three more prisoners of war and the large demonstrations against the Vietnam war held in West Berlin. [redacted] The following paragraphs discuss aspects of these recent developments.

3. Continuing coordination between US peace activists and the North Vietnamese, a development reviewed at length in our original study, was evident [redacted] The leading US activist, David Dellinger, was the principal contact for Hanoi in arranging the return of the three American prisoners earlier this month. Dellinger claimed publicly that the North Vietnamese had asked him to nominate two peace leaders to receive the prisoners in Hanoi and accompany them on their return to the US. [redacted]

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[redacted] escorted the prisoners as far as Vientiane, where the officers elected to transfer to US military aircraft.) The "Defense Committee" organized by Dellinger and Tom Hayden in November (see our report of 21 December 1967) to "encourage the release" of POWs and "defend" their rights presumably was instrumental in the negotiations with Hanoi, but no evidence of this has come to hand.

4. [redacted]

5. Hanoi also kept in touch with peace activists involved in other enterprises. For example, its women's front sent messages to women's peace organizations in Western Europe and the US (Women Strike for Peace) urging all-out support for former Representative Jeanette Rankin's peace march in Washington.

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6. [redacted]

7. The much ballyhooed "Vietnam Congress" held in West Berlin in mid-February was largely an all-German show. Despite speculation that a number of leading lights among US peace workers--including Dellinger and Stokely Carmichael--would attend, no major US leader turned up. American participation was limited to SNCC activist Dale Allen Smith and four little-noted members of Students for a Democratic Society.

8. Ralph Schoenman's activities seem to have taken a significant new turn. [redacted]

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[redacted]

The special target of Schoenman's efforts since his arrival here reportedly has been the Black Power movement, and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in particular. His objective apparently is to involve militant negro elements actively in the anti-Vietnam war agitation and to forge organizational links between the two movements. He hopes to achieve this by convincing the racist organizations that their struggle for "liberation" and the struggle against the war have the same adversary and are fundamentally the same struggle.

9. This is not an entirely new tack for Schoenman. His marked Trotskyite tendencies have predisposed him as much toward revolutionary struggle as toward peace. He has been an exponent of the "war of liberation" and a particular admirer of Che Guevara and the doctrines of Castro. Stokely Carmichael's vision of a "Third World" liberating itself from white oppression is one which

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is not only congenial to Schoenman's way of thinking but one which can be readily adapted to the Vietnam cause.

10. Schoenman claims to have carried his appeal to all the major Black Power strongholds in the US and to have been accepted by at least some militant groups. Much of this can be put down to Schoenman's tendency to exaggerate and to inflate his own importance. It would be surprising if more than a few Black Power advocates found either Schoenman himself or his ideas very appealing. Aside from a few internationally oriented leaders, the militant Negro movement has shown little interest in peace issues. Their concern over Vietnam generally is limited to such areas as the draft and racial discrimination in the services. Many Negro activists would, of course, be quite willing to use Schoenman, his funds, and his extensive contacts to serve their own ends.

11. Schoenman's missionary work among the Negro militants reportedly has produced several results. [redacted]

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[redacted]

12. In addition, Schoenman and John Wilson of SNCC have been involved in the establishment of a "commission" whose purpose will be to draw the various black communities into the war resistance movement. The composition and tactics of the commission, which will be staffed largely by SNCC personnel, are to be worked out at a "conference" to be held at some time in the future, possibly the national conference on "Blacks Against the Draft and In Resistance to the War" which Schoenman and SNCC leaders reportedly have been planning for April.

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Mr. John Warner
Legislative Counsel

We have prepared the attached Intelligence Memorandum for Senator Mundt.

There are a few unclassified statistics with respect to Communist aid to North Vietnam and two copies of an unclassified table are also attached.

Director
Economic Research

Attachments:
Communist Aid to North Vietnam, 7 March 1965

7 March 1963

(S-2659)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
7 March 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Communist Aid to North Vietnam

Introduction

1. Communist aid deliveries to North Vietnam have increased significantly each year since the US bombing program began. As shown in Table 1 average annual deliveries of both economic and military aid were at reasonably low levels prior to the bombing. In 1965, however, total aid deliveries jumped to $420 million and have increased rapidly each year since. We estimate that total aid deliveries in 1967 reached one billion dollars and that they will be even greater in 1968.

2. From 1954 to date North Vietnam has received over $3.2 billion in military and economic assistance from Communist countries. Over this long period, the assistance has been divided about evenly between military and economic goods. Since 1965, however, military aid has accounted for an increasing share of total assistance and in 1966 and 1967 it accounted for almost two-thirds of total deliveries.

3. The USSR and Communist China account for the bulk of the assistance provided to North Vietnam. The Soviet Union has

provided over $1.5 billion in military and economic assistance, or 60 percent of the total. Communist China has supplied just over $1 billion in economic and military assistance. The European Satellites have provided about $255 million in aid, almost exclusively in economic assistance programs. They are, however, assuming a greater role in providing military goods for delivery in 1968 under the terms of aid agreements negotiated in the summer and fall of 1967.

4. During the 11 years 1954-64 deliveries of combat materiel to North Vietnam amounted to only $140 million. Since the bombing began, the USSR and Communist China have greatly expanded their military aid to North Vietnam

The USSR has supplied almost 80 percent of the total value of military equipment delivered since 1965 and Communist China the bulk of the remainder. East European countries have supplied only negligible quantities of combat materiel.

5. Soviet military deliveries have concentrated on air defense equipment including surface-to-air missiles, antiaircraft guns, radar, and fighter aircraft including MIG-21's. Chinese military aid has concentrated on building up North Vietnamese ground forces and sustaining the military effort in South Vietnam. In addition, China apparently has supplied radar and in 1967 provided large numbers of MIG-17's -- most of them delivered to replace the heavy losses in the latter part of the year.

Table 1

Communist Aid to North Vietnam*

Military**

	1954-64	1965	1966	1967	Million US $ Total
Soviet Union	70	210	360	505	1,145
Communist China	70	60	95	150	375
East Europe	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.
Total	140	270	455	660	1,525

Economic

Soviet Union	365	85	150	200	800
Communist China	457	50	75	80	662
East Europe	129	15	50	60	254
Total	950	150	275	340	1,715
Total Economic and Military Aid	1,090	420	730	1,000	3,240

* Data show the value at Soviet Foreign trade prices of weapons, other military equipment and ammunition. They exclude aid for the construction of military installations and defense-related facilities.

** Totals may not add due to rounding.

6. The USSR and Communist China both have military personnel assisting the North Vietnamese, primarily in support and training roles. North Korea has a small contingent of pilots flying defense combat patrols for the North Vietnamese Air Force. China has a large military contingent estimated at up to 50,000 troops working on the construction, repair and defense of lines of communication and providing some military training. As estimated 2,000 Soviet military technicians presently are in North Vietnam advising and giving training on the SAM systems, aircraft, communications and logistics support. The value of this technical assistance has not been estimated but it could conceivably run to the tens of millions of dollars over the 3 year period since the bombing began.

7. Almost certainly all combat material delivered to North Vietnam has been grant aid. In the series of public announcements on military aid agreements signed with seven Communist countries in the fall of 1967, five specifically mentioned that military aid would be "non-refundable," "gratuitous" or "free". Besides its ideological claim to free military aid from its Communist allies, North Vietnam simply does not have the means for repaying present or past levels of aid.

Economic Aid

8. In addition to combat materiel Communist countries have provided an increasing amount of economic assistance much of it including war-related commodities, petroleum, trucks and construction

materials. The bulk of these goods are provided as grant aid although some are included under long term credit arrangements. Over $1.7 billion in economic aid has been provided to North Vietnam during 1954-1967. About 45 percent of this aid has been supplied during the past three years. Although economic aid has increased each year, from $150 million in 1965 to $340 million in 1967, it is much smaller than military aid.

9. The economic aid programs are also dominated by the USSR and Communist China. The USSR has supplied $800 million or 47 percent of the economic assistance provided during the past 11 years. Communist China accounted for over $660 million or 38 percent of the total. The European Satellites provided less than $255 million, or about 15 percent of the total. During the past two years, however the Soviet Union has also undertaken to provide an increasing share of the economic aid program and in 1967 it accounted for about 60 percent of the deliveries of economic goods.

10. The supply of almost every category of economic goods has increased during the past three years. Imports of about 256,000 tons of petroleum primarily from the USSR, were almost 10 percent greater in 1967 than in 1966 and 45 percent greater than in 1965. About 40 percent of the petroleum is consumed directly by the military and another large part is consumed in military support activities. Annual imports of about 4,700 vehicles in both 1966 and 1967 were a third higher than the number imported

in 1965. Imports of about 490,000 tons of miscellaneous and general cargo, that include construction machinery and materials, spare parts and other goods possibly satisfying military needs also were increased by a third in 1967 over 1966. Seaborne imports of bulk foodstuffs totalled over 450,000 tons in 1967, about 6 times the level of the previous year and almost 3 times the immediate pre-bombing level.

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PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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DIST 18 MARCH 1968

COUNTRY: LAOS

DOI: 11 MARCH 1968

SUBJECT: ENEMY ATTACK ON PHOU PHA THI, SITE 85, DURING EARLY MORNING OF 11 MARCH AND ARRIVAL OF ENEMY TROOPS AT TACAN SITE

ACQ: LAOS, VIENTIANE (11 MARCH 1968) FIELD REPORT: [redacted]

SOURCE: [redacted]

1. BY 0735 HOURS ON 11 MARCH 1968 ENEMY SOLDIERS HAD REACHED THE TACAN SITE AT PHOU PHA THI (UH 66637), AND ABOUT 100 ENEMY SOLDIERS WITH TWO MACHINE GUNS WERE FIRING DOWN ON THE HELICOPTER PAD. THE DEFENDERS STILL CONTROLLED THE TRAIL SYSTEMS TO THE SUMMIT (UH 6646151); IT APPEARS, THEREFORE, THAT THE ENEMY SOLDIERS SCALED THE SHEER ROCK CLIFFS ON THE NORTHWESTERN SIDE OF PHOU PHA THI. THE OUTPOSTS AROUND PHOU PHA THI WERE STILL

[redacted]

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Date APR 1999

PRIORITY

[redacted]

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

[redacted]

[redacted]

IN THE HANDS OF THE DEFENDERS. ONE HELICOPTER HAD SUCCESSFULLY EVACUATED SOME SOLDIERS WHO HAD BEEN WOUNDED AT THE 105MM HOWITZER POSITION AT XD 668683. THE PERSONNEL IN THE COMMAND BUNKER WERE OUT OF CONTACT WITH TACAN PERSONNEL.

2. AT 0135 HOURS ON 11 MARCH INCOMING ENEMY MORTARS WERE LANDING ON THE TOP OF PHOU PHA THI, AND SMALL ARMS FIRE WAS HITTING THE COMMAND BUNKER. THE DEFENDERS ON THE CREST OF THE MOUNTAIN TOTALLED 243 MEN. THE COMMAND BUNKER WAS OUT OF CONTACT WITH THE TACAN SITE, WHICH APPEARED TO BE BURNING.

3. AT 0440 HOURS ON 11 MARCH THE DEFENDERS WERE STILL BEING SUBJECTED TO HEAVY INCOMING FIRE AND THE SITUATION WAS SERIOUS. AT 0445 HOURS HEAVY MORTAR FIRE WAS COMING FROM THE SOUTH. SMALL ARMS FIRE WAS STILL HITTING THE VICINITY OF THE COMMAND BUNKER.

4. AT 0505 HOURS POST NUMBER ONE WAS RECEIVING HEAVY WEAPONS FIRE. INTERMITTENT HEAVY ROCKET FIRE WAS HITTING THE CREST OF PHOU PHA THI FROM THE SOUTH; THIS ROCKET FIRE WAS EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE. THE DEFENDERS WERE HOLDING, BUT THE COMMAND BUNKER WAS STILL OUT OF CONTACT WITH THE TACAN

[redacted]

[redacted]

359

SITE.

3. AT 0545 HOURS THE INCOMING FIRE CEASED.

4. AT 0610 HOURS SMOKE WAS OBSERVED FROM THE TACAN SITE.

AT 0615 HOURS A PATROL WENT TO ASCERTAIN STATUS OF TACAN PERSONNEL WAS ENGAGED IN A FIRE FIGHT NEAR THE TACAN SITE.

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY AIR GUARCV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

RAND
MAY 2 1968
W18433
WASH. OFFICE

1.3(e)(4)

[redacted]

COUNTRY : SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN)

SUBJECT : Two U.S. Soldiers Captured in DARIAC Province.

[redacted] 1.3(e)(4)

DATE OF REPORT: 11/3/68

DATE OF INFO : March 1966

NO. OF PAGES : 2

DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION : March 2, 1968 (X) [redacted]

REF: [redacted]

[redacted]

SOURCE: [redacted] 1.3(e)(4)

[redacted]

S U M M A R Y

In March 1966, two U.S. Soldiers were captured in DARIAC Province near the Cambodian border. The prisoners were captured during an ambush of a U.S. heliborne unit.

DISTRIBUTION:

US MACV

US EMBASSY (OSA)

[redacted]

ATTACHMENTS: 1.3(e)(4)

None

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Approved for Release
Date September 1993

[redacted]

APR 15 1968

Central Registry No. 190100

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

1. In March 1966, two U.S. Soldiers were captured by NVA Company 1, Division 325, in the YAMO area (location unknown) of DARLAC Province, near CAMBODIA during a VC ambush. The previous night Company 1 was informed that the following morning U.S. helicopters would land troops in the area. At 0900 hours the following morning, U.S. helicopters came into sight and saw a few VC in the area but did not observe the VC regiment which had dug trenches for an ambush. During the battle, 12 helicopters were shot down, and two prisoners were taken by Company 1.

2. The two U.S. POW's wore green fatigues, black boots with green nylon sewn into the ankle portion of the boots. One of the POW's was of medium build, blond hair and had a big nose. The other prisoner was wounded in the leg and carried on a stretcher. He was of large build, over 1.70 meters tall, brown hair and had an oval face.

[redacted]

7 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] ARLINGTON HALL STATION
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CNO
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STATE (RCI)
CIA-OCI
ZEM
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Restore

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI 13 FEBRUARY 1968
SUBJECT VICE PRESIDENT KY'S INTENTION TO RECOMMEND TO PRESIDENT THIEU THAT TASK FORCE BE ABOLISHED

ACQ SOURCE VIETNAM, SAIGON (14 FEBRUARY 1968) [redacted]

1.E(c)
3.4(b)(1)

SUMMARY: VICE PRESIDENT KY HAS DECIDED TO RECOMMEND TO PRESIDENT THIEU NO LATER THAN 18 FEBRUARY THAT THE TASK FORCE BE ABOLISHED. KY WILL ARGUE THAT THE TASK FORCE HAS ACCOMPLISHED ITS OBJECTIVE OF ESTABLISHING BASIC POLICES AND PROCEDURES FOR RELIEF AND THAT THE MINISTRIES SHOULD NOW BE ALLOWED TO TAKE OVER. HE IS ACTUALLY MOTIVATED BY FEAR OF ACCUSATIONS THAT HE IS USING THE TASK FORCE TO GRAB POWER. KY WILL TELL THIEU THAT IF THE TASK FORCE IS TO BE RETAINED, ITS NAME AND CHARTER SHOULD BE CHANGED. KY'S AIDES ARE DISTURBED BY KY'S DECISION, FEELING THAT WITHOUT KY'S HAND, RELIEF WORKS WILL FALTER. BEFORE KY TALKS WITH THIEU, HE WILL PROBABLY TRY TO INITIATE SOMETHING SPECTACULAR WITH REGARD TO ARMING THE PEOPLE. END SUMMARY.

1. [redacted] ON 13 FEBRUARY [redacted] VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION OF RECOMMENDING TO PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU NO LATER THAN 18 FEBRUARY THAT THE TASK FORCE BE DISSOLVED. KY'S RATIONALE, AS HE PLANS TO PRESENT IT TO THIEU, IS THE FOLLOWING:

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

A. SINCE THE TASK FORCE WAS DESIGNED FOR EMERGENCY RELIEF PUPOSES, IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN EXISTENCE ONLY UNTIL THE BASIC POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR RELIEF HAVE BEEN SETTLED. THIS HAS NOW BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.

B. THE GOVERNMENT HAS A DULY CONSTITUTED STRUCTURE OF MINISTIRES WITH ASSIGNED PROPER RESPONSIBILITIES. THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOW BE PERMITTED TO RUN IN A MORE NORMAL FASHION.

2. ALTHOUGH KY SEEMS TO BELIEVE THE ABOVE RATIONALE TO SOME EXTENT, HE IS MOTIVATED MORE BY A FEAR OF BEING ACCUSED OF GRABBING POWER IN THIS CRISIS FOR REASONS OF PERSONAL AMBITION. CRITICISMS FROM HIS CRITICS IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT HAVE REACHED HIM TO THE EFFECT THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT HAS ESTABLISHED A SUPERMINISTRY AROUND HIS OWN PERSON AND IN THE FORM OF THE TASK FORCE. KY INSISTS THAT HE IS NOT INTERESTED IN ASSUMING POWER IN THIS INDIRECT WAY AND THAT, REALIZING THE NEED FOR HIS SERVICES IN THE EMERGENCY, HE WAS PLEASED TO HAVE OFFERED THEM AND NOW WISHES TO STEP DOWN.

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[redacted] HE WAS PLEASED TO [redacted]
TO STEP DOWN.

3. KY WILL PROBABLY ATTEMPT TO DISCUSS HIS TENURE WITH THE PRESIDENT PRIVATELY AND WILL MAKE CLEAR THAT HE WILL DEFER TO THE PRESIDENT'S WISHES. HE WILL REMIND THE PRESIDENT THAT WHILE HIS OWN IDEA OF THE TASK FORCE REVOLVED AROUND A CONCEPT OF "NATIONAL RECOVERY," THE PRESIDENT'S STAFF HAD ALTERED BOTH THE CONCEPT AND THE TITLE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO "EMERGENCY RELIEF." IN THIS IS, IN FACT, THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW OF THE COMMITTEE'S FUNCTION, THEN ITS MISSION HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. IF THIEU WISHES KY TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE LEADERSHIP AND ENERGY TO THE COMMITTEE, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO CHANGE ITS FRAME OF REFERENCE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE ON-GOING AND LENGTHIER PROCESS OF RECOVERY IN THE LARGER SENSE OF THE WORD. [redacted] KY SEEMS TO BE ATTRACTED TO THE IDEA OF CONTINUING IN A POWERFUL EXECUTIVE ROLE BUT IS HOLDING HIMSELF VERY MUCH IN CHECK AGAINST ANY TEMPTATION TO "GRAB" THAT ROLE. HE FEELS STRONGLY THAT IT MUST BE GIVEN HIM BY THE PRESIDENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CONSTITUTION.) 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

4. SOME OF KY'S AIDES HAVE EXPRESSED SYMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING WITH KY'S REASONING AND, THEREFORE, HIS INTENTION. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY PREDICT THAT THE EMERGENCY RELIEF WORK, HARDLY COMPLETED, WILL SUFFER IF KY WITHDRAWS AND THE COMMITTEE IS DISSOLVED. SUCH A DISSOLUTION WOULD, OF COURSE, ALSO REMOVE THANG FROM DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE RELIEF ACTIVITIES, UNLESS HE WERE ASSIGNED SOME NEW ROLE BY CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN. THE BUSINESS OF RELIEF WOULD BE UNDOUBTEDLY DISCUSSED IN A DAILY MEETING OF THE CABINET UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF PRIME MINISTER LOC. THESE MEETINGS WOULD, LIKE MOST CABINET MEETINGS, INDULGE IN ENDLESS TALK AND FEW DECISIONS WITHOUT THE FIRM HANDS OF KY AND THANG BEING APPLIED. THUS, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD SOON BE FLOODED WITH UNSOLVED PROBLEMS AND UNFINISHED BUSINESS AND COULD PROBABL Y TAKE TWO WEEK'S TIME. THE EARLY RUMBLINGS IN THE ASSEMBLY AGAINST PRIME MINISTER LOC'S APPARENT HELPLESSNESS IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE VIET CONG ATTACK WOULD RESUME AND BECOME AGGRAVATED.

5. ONE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE OF KY'S INTENTION TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TASK FORCE ON 18 FEBRUARY IS AN APPARENT FEELING OF URGENCY ON HIS PART TO INITIATE SOMETHING SPECTACULAR AND CONCRETE WITH REGARDS TO "ARMING THE PEOPLE." PARTLY UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF GENERAL THANG, KY MAY BE MOVED TO BESTOW ARMS ON THE ALREADY WELL-ORGANIZED CATHOLIC PARISHES IN SOME OF THE MORE DIFFICULT AREAS OF SAIGON AND ON THE PERIPHERY OF THE CITY. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE RECEIVED 14 PRIESTS ON 13 FEBRUARY. [redacted] IT IS NOT KNOW JUST WHAT SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS, IF ANY, WERE MADE TO THE CATHOLIC REPRESENTATIVES.) WHILE KY HAS INDICATED HIS APPRECIATION OF SOME OF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN HASTY ACTION IN THIS FIELD, HE NEVERTHELESS IN INTENT ON EXPLOITING THE UPSURGE OF ANTI-VIET CONG FEELING AND BELIEVES THE CATHOLICS TO BE MOST READILY ABLE TO ABSORB AND USE ARMS AGAINST THE VC. [redacted] KY'S DESIRE TO BE PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN INITIATING SUCH A PROGRAM AMONG THE CATHOLICS DOES HAVE POLITICAL OVERTONES.) 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

6. (FIELD COMMENT: ANOTHER VERSION OF THE 13 FEBRUARY MEETING AND ANALYSIS OF KY'S PLANS WAS PUBLISHED AS [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND, GENERAL ABRAMS. AMBASSADOR KOMER, CHIEF OF STAFF, J-2) 7TH AIR FORCE (GENERAL MONYER ONLY) DIA/JUSPAO (MR.ZORTHIAN ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

[redacted]

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PAGE 1 OF 11 PAGES

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SECRET

181816Z CITE [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

DIST 18 MARCH 1968

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

SUBJECT PRESIDENT THIEU'S CONCERN OVER A POSSIBLE COUP, CONDITIONS IN THE DELTA, AND SUPPOSED AMERICAN USE OF THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT TO EFFECT A COALITION GOVERNMENT WITH THE VIET CONG

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (18 MARCH 1968) FIELD NO. [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

S-E-C-R-E-T [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

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AUG 07 1997

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

S-E-C-R-E-T [redacted]

(classification) (dissem controls)

SUMMARY: LIEUTENANT GENERAL KHANG, III CORPS COMMANDER, SAID THAT ON 14 MARCH 1968 PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT RUMORS OF A MILITARY COUP. KHANG REASSURED THIEU THAT IN SPITE OF THE RUMORS, HE IS NOT INVOLVED IN PLANNING A COUP. THIEU BELIEVES THAT THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT (NSF) WAS ORGANIZED BY THE AMERICANS TO GENERATE SUPPORT FOR A COALITION GOVERNMENT WHICH WILL INCLUDE THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM. THIEU IS CONCERNED WITH THE SITUATION IN IV CORPS. KHANG EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE IN THE NEWLY APPOINTED IV CORPS COMMANDER, MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN DUC THANG, BUT SAID THAT HE IS NOT CERTAIN THAT THANG HAS SUFFICIENT TROOPS. THIEU ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE US HAD ASSISTED THE VC DURING THE TET ATTACKS. [redacted] WHEN KHANG ASSURED HIM THERE WAS NOT, THIEU POINTED OUT [redacted] THAT THE U.S. MISSION IS NOT MONOLOTHIC IN ITS VIEWS. KHANG DIES NOT EXPECT AN ATTACK ON SAIGON IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HE TOLD THIEU HE QUESTIONS THE WISDOM OF MAKING THE CONTEMPLATED CHANGES IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE IN THE PROVINCES AT THIS TIME. END SUMMARY.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

S-E-[redacted]R-E-T [redacted]

(classification) (dissem controls)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1. DURING A LENGTHY PRIVATE CONVERSATION ON 14 MARCH 1968, PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU EXPRESSED CONCERN TO LIEUTENANT GENERAL LE NGUYEN KHANG, III CORPS COMMANDER, THAT SOME MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY MIGHT TRY TO OVERTHROW THIEU'S GOVERNMENT. KHANG TOLD THIEU HE KNOWS THERE ARE MANY RUMORS THAT HE AND BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN NGOC LOAN, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL POLICE, ARE PLANNING A COUP, BUT THE RUMORS ARE NOT TRUE. KHANG DOES NOT KNOW HOW THESE RUMORS GOT STARTED BUT HE SUSPECTS SOME VC COMPLICITY. IN AN EFFORT TO PREVENT SUCH RUMORS, KHANG SAID HE HAS BEEN AVOIDING POLITICIANS BECAUSE MANY OF THEM ARE PRONE TO TWIST SOME REMARK HE MIGHT MAKE ABOUT HIS DISSATISFACTION WITH THE GOVERNMENT INTO ALLEGATIONS OF COUP PLOTTING. RECENTLY KHANG TWICE REFUSED TO MEET WITH SENATOR DON. KHANG SAID THE PRESIDENT SHOULD NOT INTERPRET HIS OR LOAN'S REMARKS ABOUT THE NEED FOR STRONGER AND MORE DYNAMIC GOVERNMENT AS MEANING THEY ARE PLANNING A COUP. PRESIDENT JOHNSON IS ALSO SUBJECT TO STRONG CRITICISM BY THOSE IN THE UNITED STATES WHO DISAGREE WITH HIS POLICIES. KHANG SAID THAT HE CALLS THE PRESENT PHASE

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

S-E-C-R-E-T [redacted]

(classification) (dissem controls)

OF ENEMY STRATEGY "THE WAR OF TENSION". ONE IMPORTANT FACET OF THIS STRATEGY IS TO SOW DOUBT AND DISSENSION AMONG THE VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN LEADERS AND PEOPLE. KHANG TOLD THIEU TO IGNORE THESE RUMORS AND DEVOTE HIS ENERGIES TO COMING TO GRIPS WITH THE MANY REAL PROBLEMS OF THE NATION. IF THIEU HAS ANY SUSPICION ABOUT KHANG'S COMPLICITY IN PLOTTING A COUP, HE NEED ONLY SAY SO AND

KHANG WILL PUT HIS SIGNED RESIGNATION ON THIEU'S DESK. THIEU EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE IN KHANG. KHANG SAID THAT SUBSEQUENTLY HE SENT HIS WIFE TO VISIT MRS. THIEU AS ANOTHER MEASURE OF REASSURANCE.

2. NEVERTHELESS, THIEU THOUGHT HE HAD GENUINE CAUSE FOR CONCERN. HE KNOWS MANY AMERICANS ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH HIS PERFORMANCE, THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S DOMESTIC PROBLEMS ARE MOUNTING, AND THAT MANY VIETNAMESE ARE CALLING FOR A CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT.

3. KHANG SAID IT IS HIS IMPRESSION THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS VERY MUCH OPPOSED TO A COUP. THIEU SAID HE GOT THAT IMPRESSION FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER BUT UNFORTUNATELY THERE ARE "FOURTEEN PEOPLE WHO SPEAK FOR THE

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

S-E-C-R-E-T [redacted]

(classification) (dissem controls)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

U.S. GOVERNMENT IN VIETNAM." KHANG SAID HE TOLD THIEU THAT HE SEES MANY PARALLELS BETWEEN 1968 AND 1954 IN VIETNAM. DURING 1954 THE FRENCH WERE WINNING MILITARILY BUT THE DEFEATIST PSYCHOLOGY OF THE FRENCH PEOPLE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE FRENCH TO DEFEAT THE COMMUNISTS. TODAY KHANG FELS THE U.S. FORCES ARE WINNING MILITARILY BUT THE VOICES OF DEFEATISM GET LOUDER EACH DAY. HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT THIEU NOT BE VICTIMIZED BY RUMORS, MANY OF WHICH ARE SPREAD BY THE COMMUNISTS AND DESIGNED TO SOW SUSPICION AND DIVISIVENESS. KHANG SAID HE TOOK A PARTICULARLY STRONG POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT NOT ONLY BECAUSE HE FERVENTLY BELIEVES WHAT HE SAID, BUT BECAUSE IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THIEU WAS PREOCCUPIED BY MANY DOUBTS.

4. THIEU FEELS THE AMERICANS USED NGUYEN XUAN OANH AND DANG DUC KHOI TO ORGANIZE THE NSF WITH THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF GENERATING POPULAR SUPPORT FOR A COALITION GOVERNMENT WHICH WILL INCLUDE THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM (NFLSV). FOR THIS REASON, THE AMERICANS SELECTED SENATOR TRAN VAN DON, MAI HUU XUAN, AND OTHER FORMER GENERALS OF PRO-FRENCH, NEUTRALIST

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

POSTURE TO LEAD THE NSF. THIEU SAID HE IS FOLLOWING THE TACTIC OF PAYING LIP SERVICE TO DON'S REQUESTS FOR SUPPORT FOR THE NSF WHILE TRYING TO COUNTERBALANCE IT WITH POLIICAL EFFORTS OF HIS OWN GENERATED BY NGUYEN VAN HUONG, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PRESIDENCY, AND TRAN VAN AN. [redacted]

[redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[redacted] THIEU SAID FORTUNATELY THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THE NSF DOES NOT HAVE THE UNQUALIFIED SUPPORT OF VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY'S FOLLOWERS AND CITED LOAN AS AN EXAMPLE. [redacted] COMMENT: [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[redacted] KHOI HAS COMPLAINED THAT LOAN HAS BEEN ATTACKING THE NSF THROUGH THE NEWSPAPER CONG CHUNG.) THIEU ASKED FOR KHANG'S VIEW OF THE NSF. KHANG SAID HE COULD NOT GUESS THE NSF'S TRUE MOTIVES BUT HE SHARED THIEU'S SUSPICIONS OF MAI HUU XUAN.

5. IN DISCUSSING THE IV CORPS AREA, THIEU SAID HE IS CONCERNED THAT THE VIET KONG (VC) WILL BE ABLE TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR PRESENT CONTROL OF THE COUNTRYSIDE. THIEU SAID THAT

HE HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT SKEPTICAL OF PACIFICATION RESULTS CLAIMED IN THE DELTA BECAUSE HE FEELS THAT SOME OF THE EFFORT HAS BEEN SUPERFICIAL. HE SAID IT IS UNQUESTIONABLY TRUE THAT THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE IN IV CORPS HAS WORSENED MARKEDLY SINCE THE ENEMY'S TET OFFENSIVE. THIEU EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE NUMBER OF OUTPOSTS WHICH HAVE BEEN OVERRUN, AND SAID THE VC ARE EVEN ACTIVE POLITICALLY IN SOME AREAS AND APPARENTLY ARE RECEIVING SOME POPULAR SUPPORT. HE ASKED IF KHANG HAD ANY COMMENTS OR SUGGESTIONS ON THE IV CORPS SITUATION.

5. KHANG SAID THAT MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN DUC THANG, NEWLY APPOINTED IV CORS COMMANDER, HAS A VERY DIFFICULT ASSIGNMENT, AND HE (KHANG) IS NOT CERTAIN THAT THANG HAS SUFFICIENT TROOPS TO DO THE JOB. KHANG FEELS ONE STEP THAT COULD BE TAKEN TO LESSEN THAN'S SECURITY PROBLEM WOULD BE A WELL-PLANNED CONSOLIDATION OF HAMLETS. SUCH A CONSOLIDATION WOULD INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF STATIC DEFENSE AND POSSIBLY RELEASE FORCES FOR THE ALL-IMPORTANT STRIKES ON ENEMY BASES. EQUALLY IMPORTANT, IT WOULD FACILITATE THE CREATION OF INTERNAL CONTROL MECHANISMS

S-E-C-R-E-T [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

(classification) (dissem controls)

IN HE HAMLETS. AT PRESENT, KHANG ARGUED, THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH SECURITY FORCES TO PROTECT THE SCATTERED HAMLETS OR ENOUGH MANPOWER TO SET UP INTERNAL CONTROL MECHANISMS TO CONTROL THE MOVEMENT OF VC AMONG THE MANY HAMLETS. WHILE THANG FACES A SERIOUS CHALLENGE AND LIKE ALL THE CORPS COMMANDERS, COULD USE MORE TROOPS, KHANG FEELS THAT THANG WILL BE ABLE TO GAIN THE UPPER HAND MILITARILY. HOWEVER, IT IS INPORTANT THAT STRONG AND HONEST GOVERNMENT BE BROUGHT TO THE DELTA, AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S MESSAGE GETS THROUH TO THE PEASANTS. THE GOVERNMENT'S INFORMATION PROGRAM IS VERY IMPORTANT. THIEU REPLIED THAT HE HAD ASKED GENERAL W.C. WESTMOREAND TO SUPPORT AN INCREASE OF 130,000 TROOPS FOR THE VIETNAMESE ARMY (ARVN) AND THIS ADDITION, IF SUPPORTED BY THE AMERICANS, SHOULD GIVE THE CORPS COMMANDERS THE ADDED TROOPS THEY NEED.

7. THIEU ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY EVIDENCE IN III CORPS THAT THE AMERICANS HAD ASSISTED THE VC DURING THE TET ATTACKS. KHANG SAID ON THE CONTRARY THE REACTION OF U.S. ARMORED ELEMENTS IN THE EARLY HOURS WAS ALL THAT PREVENTED THE ENEMY FROM OVERRUNNING TAN SON NHUT AIR

1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

BASE. KHANG SAID BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE ATTACK HIS COOPERATION FROM LIEUTENANT GENERAL WEYAND, CHIEF, II FIELD FORCE, LEFT NO DOUBT IN HIS MIND OF THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT. KHANG ADDED THAT PRME MINISTER NGUYEN VAN LOC WAS PRESENT AT KHANG'S HOUSE DURING THE FIRST DAY OF THE ATTACKS AND WAS AWARE OF WEYAND'S COMPLETE COOPERATION. THIEU SAID IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE U.S. MILITARY IS FULLY OPPOSED TO THE VC BUT THAT CERTAIN OTHER LEMENTS OF THE U.S. MISSION MAY NOT BE. HE REITERATED HIS OPINION THAT THE U.S. MISSION IS NOT MONOLITHIC IN ITS VIEWS. KHANG SAID THAT WHILE THIEU DID NOT SAY HE BELIEVES THE RUMORS CONCERMNING U.S. COMPLICITY, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HE FEELS IT IS WITHIN THE REALM OF THE POSSIBLE. THIEU SEEMS VERY CONCERNED THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MIGHT REACH AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE NFLSV WITHOUT CONSULTING HIM AND THAT THERE MAY BE CERTAIN SECRET CHANNELS TO THE VC OF WHICH THIEU IS UNAWARE. THUS, DESPITE THIEU'S OBVIOUS RESPECT FOR AND DEPENDENCE ON THE AMERICANS, HE RETAINS A LATENT SUSPICION OF AMERICAN MOTIVES.

8. THIEU ASKED IF KHANG EXPECTS THE ENEMY TO ATTEMPT

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

TO ATTACK SAIGON IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. KHANG REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT. THIEU SAID KHANG WAS ONE OF THE VERY FEW VIETNAMESE MILITARY MEN WHO HAD, FROM THE EARLIEST DAYS OF THE FIRST ATTACK, GONE ON RECORD AGAINST A SECOND WAVE GROUND ASSAULT. KHANG SAID HE BASED HIS OPINION ON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE THAT THE ENEMY HAD BEEN HURT BADLY DURING THE FIRST ASSAULT AND NEEDS TIME TO REGROUP. KHANG SAID HE EXPECTS GENERAL VO NGUYEN GIAP TO TRY SOMETHING SPECTACULAR JUST BEFORE THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION AND JUST BEFORE THE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. KHANG OPINED THAT GIAP IS A MASTER AT WAGING POLITICAL WARFARE AND HIS PRESENT TIMETABLE IS ATTUNED TO POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE U.S.

9. KHANG ADVISED THIEU TO MEET MORE FREQUENTLY WITH HIS VIETNAMESE MILITARY COMMANDERS. HE SAID MOST OF THE SENIOR GENERALS FEEL THAT THIEU HAS BEEN IGNORING THEM SINCE HE BECAME PRESIDENT. KHANG SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE GOVERNMENT BUT HAD SAID NOTHING TO ANYONE THAT HE WOULD NOT SAY TO THIEU, AND BELIEVES THAT THE SAME IS TRUE OF MOST OTHER SENIOR GENERALS.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

S-E-C-R-E-T [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

(classification) (dissem controls)

THIEU SAID HE FINDS HIS EXCHANGE OF IDEAS WITH KHANG HELPFUL AND HE HOPES THEY WILL CONTINUE TO BE FRANK AND OPEN FRIENDS. THIEU ASKED IF KHANG HAD ANY OTHER SUGGESTIONS. KHANG TOLD THIEU HE QUESTIONS THE WISDOM OF MAKING SWEEPING CHANGES IN THE CORPS AREAS AT THIS TIME SUCH AS THE CONTEMPLATED CHANGES CONCERNING GOVERNMENTAL DELEGATES AND PROVINCE CHIEFS. HOWEVER, IF THIEU FEELS HE MUST MAKE THESE CHANGES NOW HE CAN DEPEND ON KHANG'S SUPPORT. THIEU SAID HE REALIZES THERE ARE TWO SIDES THE CONTEMPLATED CHANGES AND PROMISED TO GIVE THE PROBLEM MORE CONSIDERATION.

10. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND, GENRAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR KOMER, CHIEF OF STAFF, J-2) 7TH AIR FORCE (GENERAL MOMYER) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

REPORT CLASS SECRET [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

S-E-C-R-E-T

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PAGE 1 OF 11 PAGES

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SECRET

CITE TDCS DB-315/00977-68

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3.4(b)

DIST 19 MARCH 1968

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 17 MARCH 1968

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FILE COPY

SUBJECT SITUATION APPRAISAL: ASSESSMENT OF GENERAL THANG'S PERFORMANCE AS IV CORPS COMMANDER AND OF THE SITUATION IN THE DELTA AS OF 15 MARCH 1968

ACQ VIETNAM,SAIGON (16 MARCH 1968)

FIELD NO. [redacted]

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SOURCE [redacted] THIS IS A FIELD APPRAISAL OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. IT IS NOT AN OFFICIAL JUDGMENT BY THIS AGENCY OR ANY COMPONENT. IT REPRESENTS [redacted] INTERPRETATIONS [redacted] BASED ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE [redacted] AT THE TIME OF ITS PREPARATION.

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SUMMARY. THE SITUATION IN THE DELTA PROVINCES (IV CORPS TACTICAL ZONE) OF SOUTH VIETNAM IS NOT AS CRITICAL IN MID-MARCH AS IT WAS IN MID-FEBRUARY, BUT IT IS AS CRUCIAL AND WILL CONTINUE SO FOR THE NEXT TWO MONTHS. MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN DUC THANG HAS BEGUN TO REVITALIZE IV CORPS SINCE HIS ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND ON 29 FEBRUARY. GENERAL THANG DESCRIBES HIS PLANS AND PROGRAM WITH THE ONE WORD, "OFFENSIVE," AND FROM THE DAY OF HIS ARRIVAL HAS BEEN ENCOURAGING SUBORDINATE MILITARY LEADERS TO GO ON THE ATTACK. GENERAL THANG'S PROGRAM

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE AUG 07 1997

CALLS FOR THE MOBILIZATION OF ALL RESOURCES TO DESTROY VIET CONG (VC) MAIN FORCE UNITS, PROTECT LINES OF COMMUNICATION, RESTORE THE REGIONAL FORCES AND POPULAR FORCES, PRESS FORWARD WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND PUSH THE RECOVERY EFFORT. REGARDING CIVILIAN MOBILIZATION, GENERAL THANG SAYS THAT CIVILIANS MUST UNDERTAKE CIVIL DEFENSE MEASURES INCLUDING THE BUILDING OF SHELTERS AND MUST ORGANIZE TO CARE FOR REFUGEES. DURING FEBRUARY THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM WAS LOSING THE WAR PSYCHOLOGICALLY IN THE DELTA, BUT IT NOW APPEARS THAT GENERAL THANG HAS SUCCEEDED IN REVERSING THE POST-TET TREND OF THE WAR IN THE DELTA. VC MORALE IS CURRENTLY VERY VULNERABLE TO A SUDDEN REVERSAL OF THE WAR AND COULD QUICKLY CRACK IF THE VC COULD BE PERSUADED DURING THE NEXT TWO MONTHS THAT THEY WILL NOT ACHIEVE VICTORY IN EITHER THE SHORT OR LONG RUN. TO INFLICT A PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFEAT ON THE VC THERE MUST BE AGGRESSIVE AND EFFECTIVE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VC MAIN FORCE UNITS, ATTACKS AGAINST VC SUPPLY LINES AND PENETRATION OF THEIR BASE AREAS. END SUMMARY.

1. MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN DUC THANG HAS BEGUN TO REVITALIZE IV CORPS SINCE HIS ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND ON 29 FEBRUARY. HIS IMMEDIATE PERSONAL IMPACT AND INITIAL ACTIONS WERE IMPRESSIVE, BUT THERE WAS REASON TO BE SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ONE

INDIVIDUAL, REGARDLESS OF HIS ABILITY AND POSITION, IN REVITA- 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)
LIZING THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) ARMED FORCES AND PROVINCE GOVERNMENTS IN THE DELTA THAT HAD FOR SO LONG BEEN USED TO CORRUPT AND INEFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP. BY THE END OF GENERAL THANG'S FIRST WEEK IN COMMAND, HOWEVER, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE SMALL STAFF HE HAD BROUGHT WITH HIM FROM SAIGON IS ALSO EFFECTIVE, AWARE OF THE SITUATION IN THE DELTA, DECISIVE IN REFLECTING HIS VIEWS AS TO WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE, AND DETERMINED TO DO IT. WITH LEADERSHIP AT THE TOP IN SOME DEPTH, THE ENTIRE IV CORPS STAFF SWUNG INTO LINE AND BEGAN WORKING AS IT NEVER HAD BEFORE.

2. ON 9 MARCH, GENERAL THANG ASSEMBLED ALL THE PROVINCE CHIEFS AND BRIEFED THEM ON HIS PLANS AND PROGRAM, WHICH HE SAID CAN BE DESCRIBED BY ONE WORD, "OFFENSIVE." FROM THE DAY OF HIS ARRIVAL, GENERAL THANG HAD BEEN URGING SUBORDINATE MILITARY LEADERS TO GO ON THE OFFENSIVE, AND THE NUMBER OF BATTALIONS AND COMPANIES ASSIGNED TO OFFENSIVE ROLES GRADUALLY INCREASED EACH DAY. BY 14 MARCH THE NUMBER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS SCHEDULED FOR THE DAY THROUGHOUT IV CORPS HAD REACHED THE UNPRECEDENTED TOTAL OF 60: 2 DIVISIONAL, 8 REGIMENTAL, 9 SECTOR AND 41 SUBSECTOR OPERATIONS. DURING THE SAME PERIOD THERE WERE ONLY 17 VIET CONG (VC)-INITIATED OPERATIONS AND ALL WERE OF THE ECONOMY-OF-FORCE

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TYPE, THAT IS, 9 MORTAR ATTACKS AND 5 HARASSMENTS. ALSO ON 14 MARCH, 3392 VEHICLES TRAVELLED ON NATIONAL ROADS CONNECTING CITIES IN THE DELTA, AN INCREASE OF ROUGHLY 50 PERCENT WITHIN A FEW DAYS. IT NOW APPEARS THAT GENERAL THANG HAS SUCCEEDED IN REVERSING THE POST-TET TREND OF THE WAR IN THE DELTA WITHIN HIS FIRST TWO WEEKS IN COMMAND.

3. DURING FEBRUARY THE GVN WAS LOSING THE WAR PSYCHOLOGICALLY IN THE DELTA. THE VC CAMPAIGN OF TERROR AND INTIMIDATION WAS EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE IN UNNERVING GVN LEADERSHIP AT THE CORPS AND PROVINCE LEVELS AND THIS WAS RAPIDLY COMMUNICATED TO THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AND THE LOWER RANKS OF GVN ARMED FORCES WHO WITNESSED THE HASTY AND HEAVY DEFENSES PROVIDED TO HIGHER RANKING OFFICIALS AND GVN AND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) INSTALLATIONS AND THE RELATIVE ABSENCE OF DEFENSES TO PROTECT THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. AT A COST DURING THE LAST FEW WEEKS OF FEBRUARY OF ONLY A FEW THOUSAND MORTAR ROUNDS AND SOME GROUND PROBING ATTACKS AGAINST SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS, PLUS THE GENERATION OF A PROFUSION OF RUMORS OF THREATENED VC MASSIVE ATTACKS AGAINST THE TOWNS AND CITIES, THE VC MANAGED TO GAIN A VIRTUAL STRANGLEHOLD ON THE ECONOMY AND AROUND THE CITIES OF THE DELTA. BY MID-FEBRUARY A PALL OF GLOOM AND FEAR HUNG OVER THE DELTA. THERE WAS MUCH TALK

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AMONG SOUND AND SEASONED OBSERVERS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SIZEABLE DEFECTIONS FROM THE GVN ARMED FORCES IF THE VC SHOULD ATTACK IN STRENGTH. KNOWLEDGEABLE MILITARY OBSERVERS KNEW THAT THE VC COULD TAKE OVER FEW IF ANY OF THE CITIES AND TOWNS OF THE DELTA EVEN WITH A SERIES OF MASSIVE ASSAULTS IF THE GVN HAD THE WILL TO FIGHT, BUT IT WAS OBVIOUS DURING FEBRUARY THAT THE WILL TO FIGHT WAS EBBING. GENERAL MANH PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND EVEN CONTRIBUTED TO THE PESSISMISM BY HIS DEFENSE-ORIENTED ACTIONS. THIS WAS THE SITUATION IN THE DELTA WHEN GENERAL THANG TOOK OVER COMMAND AT 1600 HOURS ON 29 FEBURARY. 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

4. THE IMPACT OF GENERAL THANG'S TAKEOVER OF COMMAND WAS FELT ALMOST INSTANTLY IN CAN THO. WITHIN ONE HOUR, BY 1700 HOURS ON 29 FEBRUARY, THE BARBED WIRE AND BUNKER POSITIONS THAT HAD BLOCKED HALF THE MAIN STREET IN FRONT OF GENERAL MANH'S WELL-DEFENDED RESIDENCE HAD BEEN REMOVED AND VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS WERE AGAIN PERMITTED TO USE THE STREET FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE TET. THIS HAD AN IMMEDIATE IMPACT ON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. WITHIN TWO HOURS AFTER HE ASSUMED COMMAND, GENERAL THANG HAD ALSO ORDERED TWO RANGER BATTALIONS THAT HAD BEEN DEFENDING THE INNER PERIMETERS OF THE CITY AND

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THE ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS THAT HAD BEEN DEFENDING IV CORPS HEADQUARTERS AND THE CORPS COMMANDERS AND PROVINCE CHIEFS HOUSES TO MOVE IMMEDIATELY TO OFFENSIVE POSITIONS OUTSIDE THE CITY. THIS TOO HAD AN IMPACT ON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AND PROBABLY EVEN MORE SO ON ARVN.

5. THE IMPACT OF GENERAL THANG'S LEADERSHIP IS, OF COURSE, BEING FELT MORE SLOWLY IN OTHER PARTS OF THE DELTA THAN IN CAN THO, BUT HE IS FLYING DAILY TO VARIOUS PROVINCES AND BATTLE ZONES, AS ARE MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF. THE INCREASE IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS TESTIFIES TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE VISITS.

6. GENERAL THANG'S OFFENSIVE PROGRAM CALLS FOR THE MOBILIZATION OF ALL RESOURCES, INCLUDING CIVILIAN, TO FURTHER SIX PRIORITY OBJECTIVES AND TASKS, WHICH ARE AS FOLLOWS: (PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS WILL BE USED TO THE MAXIMUM IN ALL SIX EFFORTS.)

A. DESTROY VC MAIN FORCE UNITS,

B. PROTECT LINES OF COMMUNICATION,

C. RESTORE REGIONAL FORCES AND POPULAR FORCES,

D. PRESS FORWARD WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM,

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E. PROVIDE SECURITY FOR CITIES AND TOWNS, AND

F. PUSH THE RECOVERY EFFORT.

7. REGARDING CIVILIAN MOBILIZATION, GENERAL THANG INFORMED SENIOR AMERICAN ADVISORS THAT THE CIVILIANS MUST BE TOLD THAT IT IS A FACT OF WAR THAT THE VC HAVE LONG-RANGE MORTARS AND ROCKETS, GVN MILITARY FORCES MUST BE DEPLOYED OFFENSIVELY, AND THE GVN CANNOT GUARANTEE THE PROTECTION OF ALL CITIES AND TOWNS AGAINST MORTAR ATTACKS. THE CIVILIANS MUST UNDERTAKE CIVIL DEFENSE MEASURES, INCLUDING THE BUILDING OF SHELTERS AGAINST MORTAR ATTACKS. HE SAID CIVILIANS MUST ALSO ORGANIZE TO CARE FOR REFUGEES AND ABSORB THEM FROM REFUGEE CENTERS INTO THEIR HOMES UNTIL DEVASTATED AREAS CAN BE CLEARED AND RECONSTRUCTION COMPLETED.

8. THE SITUATION IN THE DELTA IS NOT AS CRITICAL IN MID-MARCH AS IT WAS IN MID-FEBRUARY, BUT IT IS AS CRUCIAL AND WILL CONTINUE SO FOR THE NEXT TWO MONTHS. HAD THE SITUATION THAT PREVAILED THROUGHOUT FEBRUARY CONTINUED INTO MAY, THE VC MIGHT NOT HAVE WON ANY HEARTS, BUT THEY COULD WELL HAVE TURNED THE MINDS OF THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE DELTA POPULATION TO FAVOR AN END OF THE WAR AT any COST, INCLUDING A CAPITULATION OF THE GVN TO THE VC DEMANDS FOR A COALITION GOVERNMENT.

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NEITHER SIDE HAS ANY PROSPECT IN THE SHORT RUN OF WINNING THE HEARTS OF THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE IN THE DELTA, BECAUSE THEY ARE SICK AND TIRED OF THIS WAR, BUT OUR SIDE MUST GIVE FULL ATTENTION TO WINNING THE MINDS OF THE PEOPLE BY CONVINCING THEM THAT THE VC CAN NOT POSSIBLY WIN AND THAT THE WAR WILL END MOST QUICKLY IF THE PEOPLE LINE UP ON THE SIDE OF THE GVN.

9. THERE IS A TIME IN EVERY MILITARY ENGAGEMENT WHEN A TURNING POINT IN THE TIDE OF WAR IS REACHED. THE VC UNDOUBTEDLY FELT THAT THIS TURNING POINT HAD BEEN REACHED IN THE DELTA IN FEBRUARY AND IN THEIR FAVOR. THE VC HAVE BEEN KEPT GOING BY A BELIEF IN THE INEVITABILITY OF VICTORY FOR THEIR SIDE. MOST RECENTLY THEY HAVE BEEN LED TO EXPECT VICTORY WITHIN A MATTER OF MONTHS. VC MORALE IS NOW, THEREFORE, VERY VULNERABLE TO A SUDDEN REVERSAL IN THE TIDES OF WAR. VC MORALE COULD QUICKLY CRACK IF THE VC COULD BE PERSUADED DURING THE NEXT TWO MONTHS THAT THEY WILL NOT ACHIEVE VICTORY IN THE SHORT RUN OR THE LONG RUN, AND THAT A VC VICTORY IS NOT ONLY NOT INEVITABLE, BUT IMPOSSIBLE. WORDS AND LEAFLETS WILL NOT CONVINCE THE VC OF THIS; ONLY EFFECTIVE OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS WILL DO SO. OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS HAVE

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BEEN INCREASING IN IV CORPS SINCE GENERAL THANG TOOK OVER, BUT HAVE NOT YET REACHED THE POINT OF BEING VERY EFFECTIVE. WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS, THE VC HAVE BEEN AVOIDING CONTACT. NO VC MAIN FORCE UNIT HAS YET BEEN ENGAGED AND DECISIVELY DEFEATED. THE EXPECTED SECOND CONFRONTATION IN THE CITIES HAS NOT OCCURRED AND BOTH SIDES ARE NOW MANEUVERING IN THE COUNTRY, BUT WITH VERY LITTLE ENGAGEMENT. IF THIS SITUATION CONTINUES THROUGH MAY AND INTO THE RAINY SEASON, ANOTHER STALEMATE WILL HAVE BEEN REACHED AND VC MORALE WILL HAVE BEEN IMPAIRED, BUT NOT CRACKED.

10. THIS WAR IN THE DELTA THAT COULD HAVE BEEN LOST BY MAY COULD ALSO POSSIBLY BE WON BY MAY. IF PSYCHOLOGY IS THE KEY TO THIS WAR, MILITARY POWER IS THE INDISPENSIBLE AND MOST POTENT PSYCHOLOGICAL WEAPON. THE VC PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY ATTAINED IN THE DELTA IN THE POST-TET WEEKS STEMMED IN PART FROM A VC FEELING OF INCREASING POWER RESULTING FROM THE ISSUANCE OF NEW AND EXCELLENT WEAPONS BEGINNING IN OCTOBER 1967. THE VC MUST BE PERSUADED THAT THESE WEAPONS WILL NOT ONLY NOT BE ADEQUATE TO ENABLE THEM TO WIN, BUT THAT OUR SIDE CAN CONTINUALLY UP THE ANTE REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY GET MORE NEW WEAPONS OR EVEN NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) ASSISTANCE IN THE DELTA. A PSYCHOLOGICAL DE-

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FEAT OF THE VC CAN BE ATTAINED ONLY IF WE CAN CREATE IN THE VC CAMP A HEAVY ATMOSPHERE OF DEFEATISM. THIS COULD HAPPEN IF THE VC SHOULD LAUNCH MASSIVE ATTACKS AGAINST THE CITIES AND TOWNS AND THESE ATTACKS SHOULD FAIL WITH HEAVY VC CASUALTIES RUNNING INTO THE TENS OF THOUSANDS. THIS WOULD DEPEND ON VC INITIATIVE TO UNDERTAKE THE ATTACKS AND THE WILL TO WIN OF THE GVN FORCES DEFENDING THE TOWNS, AND WE CANNOT COUNT ON EITHER OF THESE AT THE MOMENT. TO INFLICT A PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFEAT ON THE VC WITHIN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS, WHEN VC MORALE WILL BE MOST VULNERABLE TO CRACKING, OUR SIDE MUST: A. EMBARK ON AGGRESSIVE AND EFFECTIVE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VC MAIN FORCE UNITS; B. CUT THEIR SUPPLY LINES AND C. PENETRATE THEIR BASE AREAS TO DESTROY THEIR SUPPLY DUMPS AND CACHES. IF ALL THREE OF THESE STEPS COULD BE TAKEN AT ONCE, THE SUDDEN INSECURITY IT WOULD ENGENDER AMONG THE VC JUST AS THEY THOUGHT THAT VICTORY WAS WITHIN THEIR GRASP COULD CRACK VC MORALE.

11. GENERAL THANG HAS STAVED OFF DEFEAT BY PROVIDING VERY GOOD LEADERSHIP WHERE VERY BAD LEADERSHIP EXISTED BEFORE, BUT HE CANNOT PERFORM A MIRACLE. HE CANNOT INFLICT MAJOR DEFEATS ON THE VC WITH FORCES CURRENTLY AT HIS DISPOSAL.

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12. NONE OF THE ABOVE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH THE IV CORPS SENIOR ADVISOR OR WITH THE AMBASSADOR.

13. FIELD DISSEM: EXCLUSIVE FOR CINCPAC AND POLAD, EXCLUSIVE FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND.

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S E C R E T [redacted]
REPORT CLASS: S E C R E T
COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI:
SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1900 HOURS LOCAL TIME, 22 MARCH 1968

[redacted] LEGISLATIVE
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 96-271
Document # 25a

ACQ: VIETNAM, SAIGON (22 MARCH 1968) FIELD NO. [redacted]

SOURCE: THIS IS A VIETNAM SITUATION REPORT PREPARED AT 1900 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 22 MARCH

1. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE VIET CONG (VC) MAY BE PREPARING FOR ACTIVITY IN THE SAIGON AREA IN THE NEAR FUTURE. [redacted] PRISONER REPORTS, DISCOVERY OF VC ARMS CACHES AND THE ENEMY TROOP DISPOSITION TEND TO INDICATE IMPENDING VC ACTION IN OR NEAR THE CAPITAL.

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2. [redacted] THIS PREDICTION IS BASED ON ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE GAINED FROM ALLIED CONTACTS WITH ENEMY TROOPS NEAR SAIGON, VC RESUPPLY ACTIVITY AND THE LOSS OF FACE THEY INCURRED IN THE FIRST ATTACK ON SAIGON.

3. ON 19 MARCH A LARGE CACHE OF ENEMY AMMUNITION WAS DISCOVERED IN GIA DINH PROVINCE AND INCLUDED 31 ROUNDS OF 122 MM ROCKET, 1 200 ROUNDS OF MORTAR, 30 ROUNDS OF 75MM RECOILESS RIFLE AND 138 ROUNDS OF B-40 AMMUNITION. THE DISCOVERY OF THIS CACHE, AND OTHER SMALLER CACHES IN THE PAST FEW DAYS, INDICATES THE ENEMY IS TRYING TO INCREASE HIS STOCKPILE OF MUNITIONS IN THE IMMEDIATE CAPITAL AREA AND THAT HE IS HAVING SOME SUCCESS IN MOVING THE MATERIEL CLOSE TO SAIGON.

4. PRISONER REPORTS ALSO BEAR OUT THE FACT THAT ENEMY FORCES ARE MAKING A GREAT EFFORT TO MOVE SUPPLIES AND MEN INTO POSITION FOR A POSSIBLE SECOND ATTACK ON SAIGON. A PRISONER, STATING THAT HE WAS AN IMPRESSED AMMUNITION BEARER, REPORTED THAT LARGE AMOUNTS OF AMMUNITION WERE BEING MOVED EASTWARD THROUGH HAU NGHIA PROVINCE; A RALLIER FROM THE 506TH LOCAL FORCE BATTALION STATES THAT HIS UNIT WAS INFILTRATING INTO THE CITY IN SMALL GROUPS ON 16 MARCH; AND ANOTHER REPORT MENTIONS THAT PEOPLE IN HOC MON DISTRICT WERE FORCED TO MOVE AMMUNITION INTO GIA DINH PROVINCE TO TWO CACHES.

5. ANOTHER INDICATION IS THAT THE DISPOSITION OF ENEMY TROOPS IS NOW APPROXIMATELY WHAT IT WAS JUST PRIOR TO THE TET OFFENSIVE. MANY OF THE ENEMY UNITS HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM THE CLOSE PROXIMITY OF SAIGON THAT THEY MAINTAINED A WEEK OR TWO AGO. THIS TACTIC IS USED BY THE VC TO DRAW ALLIED FORCES OUT FROM AROUND SAIGON AND SPREAD THEM OUT RELATIVELY THINLY, THUS MAKING IT EASIER TO FILTER SMALL UNITS THROUGH ALLIED LINES AND INTO THE CITY.

6. THE CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT (CMD) PASSED THE COMBINED SECURITY COMMITTEE AT 1740 HOURS ON 22 MARCH A REPORT EVALUATED "B1" BY THE CMD ALLEGING THAT THE VC ARE MOVING LARGE QUANTITIES OF ARMS TO THE VICINITY OF XT 795050 AND XT 830065, NORTH OF TAN SON NHUT AIR FIELD, AND ARE INFILTRATING TROOPS TO THE SOUTH OF SAIGON IN AN EFFORT TO ATTACK THE SAIGON-GIA DINH AREA BETWEEN 21 AND 23 MARCH.

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF GP-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
AUG 07 1997

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

Soviet Seaborne Shipments to North Vietnam: Plans for 1968

~~Secret~~

ER IM 68-41
APRIL 1968

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
April 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Soviet Seaborne Shipments to North Vietnam: Plans for 1968

Summary

The USSR has announced plans to increase seaborne shipments to North Vietnam by 20 percent in 1968. The implied growth in North Vietnamese imports from the USSR above the 1967 level is about 125,000 tons -- less than the increases of 137,000 in 1966 or 141,000 in 1967. About 30 additional ship arrivals would be needed to carry the increase in tonnage planned for 1968.

In the first quarter of 1968, imports from the USSR ran 30 percent higher than the monthly average in 1967. All of this increase consisted of shipments of petroleum and foodstuffs; these commodities probably account for most of the planned growth for the year.

Note: This memorandum was produced July by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research.

Planned Increase for 1968

1. The Soviet Ministry of the Maritime Fleet has announced that deliveries by Soviet ships to Haiphong* will increase by 20 percent in 1968. A 20-percent growth would raise North Vietnamese seaborne imports from the USSR from 627,000 metric tons in 1967 to more than 750,000 tons in 1968.** An increase of this size would be smaller in both relative and absolute terms than those in 1966 and 1967. The year of greatest growth was 1966, when North Vietnam's imports from the USSR rose 39 percent, as shown in the following tabulation:

	Thousand Metric Tons		
Year	Yearly Total	Increase over Previous Year a/	Percentage Increase over Previous Year a/
1964	277	N.A.	N.A.
1965	349	72	26
1966	486	137	39
1967	627	141	29
1968	753	125	20

a. Based on unrounded data.

Record in 1968 and Prospects

2. The monthly average of North Vietnamese seaborne imports from the USSR in the first quarter of 1968 was 30 percent larger than the monthly average in 1967. Petroleum and foodstuffs accounted for all of the increase in the first quarter, as shown in the following tabulation of average monthly imports from the USSR:

* *About 99 percent of North Vietnam's imports by sea in 1967 were delivered to the port of Haiphong.*
** *Imports from the USSR made up 96 percent of the total volume delivered by Soviet ships in 1967. The remaining cargoes came from North Korea, Cambodia, Eastern Europe, Japan, and Communist China.*

Metric Tons

Commodity	Monthly Averages a/ 1965	1966	1967	First Quarter 1968
Fertilizer	6,500	9,300	8,200	8,200
Petroleum	12,900	16,500	15,700	24,900
Bulk foodstuffs	60	600	13,800	21,400
Miscellaneous b/	9,600	14,150	14,600	13,400
Total	*29,100*	*40,500*	*52,300*	*67,900*

a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
b. This category includes metal products, machinery, equipment, and unidentified cargo.

The pace at which petroleum will be imported in the remainder of the year will depend for the most part on the level of economic and logistic activity; actual imports of foodstuffs will depend on the results of the rice harvests. Imports of these commodities probably account for most of the planned increase in total seaborne imports from the USSR in 1968.

Ship Arrivals and Congestion

3. A 20-percent increase in Soviet exports to North Vietnam in 1968 would require approximately 30 additional ship arrivals and would raise the monthly average of Soviet ship arrivals from 15.1 per month in 1967 to 17.6 per month in 1968. Monthly averages of Soviet ship arrivals since the beginning of 1965 are as follows:

	Monthly Averages 1965	1966	1967	First Quarter 1968
Ship arrivals	6.6	10.2	15.1	18.0

4. Thirty additional Soviet ship arrivals during 1968 should not worsen ship congestion in Haiphong appreciably. Many will be tankers, which are easier to schedule, and which do not compete with dry cargo ships for berths and cargo-handling equipment.

Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 97-271
Document # 70a

DATE 2 APRIL 1968
IN 83225
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

The following intelligence information, transmitted from a CIA Field Station, requires review within the Clandestine Services before being released outside the Agency. Pending results of this review, a copy is being provided for your advance information.

Distribution for BACKGROUND USE ONLY to: SDO 24 D/CNE

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI 2 APRIL 1968

SUBJECT: REACTION IN HANOI TO SPEECH BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

ACQ: [redacted]

SOURCE: [redacted] 3.4(b)(1) c

A1. [redacted] 3.4(b)(1) c

THE STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON ON THE MORNING OF 1 APRIL 1968 CONCERNING THE SUSPENSION OF BOMBING HAS NOT YET BEEN PUBLISHED IN THE MEDIA OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (DRV) THE PEOPLE HAVE NOT YET BEEN INFORMED WHILE THE TEXT IS BEING STUDIED BY THE DRV GOVERNMENT.

2. THE REACTIONS OF THE DIPLOMATS FROM THE THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IS VERY KEEN AND SOMEWHAT SKEPTICAL BECAUSE BOMBING IS BEING CONTINUED CLOSE THE THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE. THE REACTION OF THE DIPLOMATS FROM NON-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IS HOPEFUL.

3. IN THE MEANTIME, PERSONS FROM THE UNITED STATES CENTER OF STUDIES OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS HAVE BEEN IN

Approved for Release
Date AUG 1999

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(classification) (dissem controls)

HANOI SINCE 29 MARCH 1968. QE

[redacted] 3.4(b)(1) c

THEY ARE IN HANOI WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, AND THEIR PURPOSE IS TO MAKE INFORMAL CONTACTS. THEY WERE REPORTED TO BE SENDING A CABLE TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN WASHINGTON, AND TO THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN VIENTIANE TO THE FOLLOWING EFFECT: ATTENTION AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN, VIENTIANE. PLEASE SEND URGENOMWILLIAM BUNDY WASHINGTON. EXTENDED DISCUSSIONS OF PROPOSALS REVIEWED WITH YOU HAVE PRODUCED A TENTATIVE AGREEMENT FOR A MEETING WITH THE DRV ONLY. THE STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON MAY REMOVE THE LAST OBSTACLE. EXPECT FORMAL AND OFFICIAL RESPONSE TOMORROW. WE CAN BE REACHED THROUHG THIS CHANNEL. BAGGS AND ASHMORE.7

4. THIS MESSAGE, [redacted] 3.4(b)(1) c PRESUMES A FAVORABLE RESPONSE FROM THE DRV.

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(classification) (dissem controls)

[redacted] 3.4(b)(1) c

[redacted] ALTHOUGH THE DRV WANTS A DIRECT MEETING BETWEEN THE DRV AND THE U.S. WITHOUT AN INTERMEDIARY, BAGGS AND ASHMORE HAVE REQUESTED THAT THIS MATTER BE TREATED AS STRICTLY SECRET.

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE AMBASSADOR ONLY) CINCPAC AND POLAD (ALSO SENT: SAIGON (AMBASSADOR AND COMMANDING GENERAL ONLY) [redacted] 3.4(b)(1) c

[redacted]

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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 00-20
Document # 46

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE
IN 85773 46

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	SDO	ONE	CRS
	DCI	EXO						OER	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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~~SECRET~~ 051834Z CITE [redacted] E0 12958 3.4(b)(1) (C)

DIST 5 APRIL 1968

NAME	ACT	INFO
WmL		
DC		
[redacted]		
[redacted]		

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 31 MARCH-4 APRIL 1968

SUBJECT VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT REACTIONS TO IMPENDING PEACE TALKS AND MEASURES BEING CONSIDERED BY THE GOVERNMENT

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (4 APRIL 1968) [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted]

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

SUMMARY: PRESIDENT THIEU AND VICE PRESIDENT KY HAVE BEEN MEETING PRIVATELY AND ALSO WITH CABINET MEMBERS TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATIONS. SPECIFIC SUBJECTS CONSIDERED HAVE BEEN FULL MOBILIZATION; THE NEED TO STREAMLINE THE GOVERNMENT (GVN), INCLUDING THE CREATION OF A WAR CABINET; AND THE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE NATIONAL UNITY AND DISCIPLINE. THIEU AND KY SEEM TO AGREE THAT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

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E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

MUST BE TOLD IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT IT CANNOT CONTINUE ITS PRESENT ROLE OF "NATIONAL IRRITANT". THE GVN IS UNPREPARED FOR NEGOTIATIONS; THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS NOT PREPARED POSITION PAPERS ON THE QUESTION, THE GVN HAS NOT DECIDED WHAT IT WOULD AND WOULD NOT ACCEPT, THERE IS A GREAT LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NFLSV) AND NORTH VIETNAM MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT ACCEPT. HOWEVER, ALL GVN OFFICIALS AGREE THAT A COALITION GOVERNMENT WITH THE NFLSV WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE. THIEU HAS MAINTAINED HIS COMPOSURE, BUT HE IS RELYING TOO MUCH ON THINGS THAT MIGHT NOT HAPPEN. KY IS TAKING A MORE REALISTIC APPROACH AND IS INSISTING THAT THE GVN SHOULD PREPARE FOR THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE U.S. MAY BE DETERMINED TO EXTRICATE ITSELF FROM VIETNAM REGARDLESS OF THE PRICE. AS A RESULT OF THE CRISIS, THIEU AND KY ARE WORKING MORE CLOSELY TOGETHER THAN EVER BEFORE, AND KY HAS BEEN TELLING HIS FOLLOWERS THAT THEY NEED THIEU AND MUST GIVE THIEU ALL POSSIBLE SUPPORT AND EXCELLENT COUNSEL. ONE DANGER FACING THE GVN IS THAT THE VIET CONG MAY SUCCEED IN CONVINCING THE PEOPLE THAT THEY HAVE WON THE WAR, THUS CREATING A BANDWAGON MENTALITY. IN SUCH EVENT, THE GVN WOULD BE UNABLE TO FUNCTION. ONE POSITIVE ASPECT IS THAT THERE IS NO EFFORT BY ANYONE TO HARRASS THE GOVERNMENT. EVEN POLICE CHIEF LOAN HAS

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(classification) (dissem controls)

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

OFFERED THIEU AN ABSOLUTE GUARANTEE THAT HE WILL NOT CREATE TROUBLE FOR THIEU IN THIS TIME OF CRISIS. END SUMMARY.

1. PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU AND VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY HAVE HAD SEVERAL PRIVATE MEETINGS AS WELL AS GENERAL MEETINGS ALSO ATTENDED BY CABINET MEMBERS TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE ONLY POSITIVE DECISION TO EMERGE THUS FAR IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) SHOULD IMMEDIATELY TAKE STEPS TO SHOW THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) AND THE WORLD THAT IT IS DETERMINED TO CONTINUE TO RESIST COMMUNIST AGGRESSION. THE STEP MOST OFTEN DISCUSSED HAS BEEN FULL MOBILIZATION SINCE THIS WOULD INDICATE THAT THE GVN WAS PREPARING TO CARRY ON ALONE IF NEED BE.

2. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION OF THE NEED TO STREAMLINE THE GOVERNMENT SO THAT IT CAN FUNCTION MORE EFFECTIVELY. THE MOST COMMONLY DISCUSSED STEP IN THIS DIRECTION IS THE CREATION OF A WAR CABINET. ONE PROPOSAL IS TO BRING FIVE POWERFUL NEW FIGURES INTO THE GOVERNMENT TO HEAD FIVE NEW SUPER-MINISTRIES--WAR, SECURITY, ECONOMY, POLITICAL WARFARE, AND ONE OTHER--UNDER WHICH THE PRESENT MINISTRIES WOULD BE GROUPED, AT LEAST IN TERMS OF POLICY DIRECTION. ANOTHER PROPOSAL IS TO KEEP THE PRESENT MINISTRIES BUT BRING IN MORE

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

(classification) (dissem controls)

DYNAMIC FIGURES TO HEAD SOME OF THEM. THEN, A HALF DOZEN OR SO OF THESE KEY MINISTERS WOULD BE SELECTED TO RUN THE GOVERNMENT ALONG WITH THIEU, KY AND PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN VAN LOC.

3. DURING THESE MEETINGS THERE HAS ALSO BEEN MUCH TALK OF THE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE UNITY AND NATIONAL DISCIPLINE. THIEU AND KY SEEM TO AGREE IN PRINCIPLE THAT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MUST BE TOLD IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT IT CANNOT CONTINUE IN ITS PRESENT ROLE OF "NATIONAL IRRITANT". THIS MESSAGE WOULD BE PASSED DISCREETLY BUT THERE WOULD BE AN "IRON FIST IN THE VELVET GLOVE". [redacted] COMMENT: MOST VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS AGREE THAT THE ASSEMBLY WAS SET UP ONLY BECAUSE THE AMERICANS INSISTED ON IT, THAT IT SERVES A VERY LIMITED PURPOSE IN TIME OF WAR AND THAT SVN IS NOT PREPARED FOR THE LUXURY OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN A CRISIS. AS LONG AS THE U.S. WAS PREPARED TO CARRY THE BURDEN, THE VIETNAMESE COULD AFFORD IT. NOW, HOWEVER, THE ASSEMBLY MUST BE WILLING TO SUBORDINATE ITSELF TO THE NATIONAL INTERESTS, I.E., IT SHOULD BECOME A RUBBER STAMP.)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1) (C)

4. IN GENERAL, THE GVN IS COMPLETELY DISORGANIZED AND UNPREPARED FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS NOT PREPARED ANY PAPERS ON [redacted] NEGOTIATIONS THAT SET FORTH POSSIBLE OPTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES. ALTHOUGH THE QUESTION HAS BEEN DISCUSSED BY THIEU AND KY, THE FACT

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SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yr
(C)

REMAINS THAT THE GVN HAS NOT DETERMINED ITS POSITION, THAT IS, WHAT IT WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS. THE ONLY FIRM POSITION IS THAT NONE OF THE PRESENT GVN OFFICIALS WILL AGREE TO A GENUINE COALITION GOVERNMENT WITH THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NFLSV). MOREOVER, THE GVN KNOWS VERY LITTLE ABOUT ITS ENEMY--LITTLE ABOUT THE NFLSV AND VIRTUALLY NOTHING ABOUT NORTH VIETNAM (DRV). IT DOES NOT HAVE A CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT THE NFLSV WANTS AND WHAT IT MIGHT SETTLE FOR; WHAT THE DRV MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT AGREE TO. IN ADDITION, THERE IS LITTLE OR NO AGREEMENT AMONG SENIOR GVN OFFICIALS NOW AS TO WHAT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS SIGNIFY.

5. THIEU HAS NOT LOST HIS COMPOSURE AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, WHICH IS A DECIDED ASSET SINCE LOC SEEMS TO BE COMPLETELY AT SEA. HOWEVER, THIEU IS LABORING UNDER SEVERAL HANDICAPS. FOR EXAMPLE, HE IS STILL SAYING IN THE PRESENCE OF MINISTERS THAT HE THINKS JOHNSON'S RENUNCIATION OF RENOMINATION IS A POLITICAL MANEUVER AND THAT JOHNSON WILL EVENTUALLY RUN FOR REELECTION. THIEU ALSO THINKS THAT JOHNSON IS A VERY SHREWD MAN WHO WILL GET THE BETTER OF THE COMMUNISTS, AND HE IS TAKING SOLACE IN THE STATEMENT THAT THE U.S. HAS NEVER LOST A WAR AND IS NOT ABOUT TO LOSE THIS ONE. ([redacted] COMMENT: SUCH THINKING IS BAD NOT BECAUSE IT SHOWS

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

A LACK OF APPRECIATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL REALITY BUT BECAUSE IT INDICATES THAT THIEU IS COUNTING HEAVILY ON SOMETHING THAT MAY NOT EVENTUATE. THIEU IS ALSO HAMPERED BY THE FACT THAT HIS STAFF IS NOT UP TO THE NEGOTIATION QUESTION.)

6. KY'S APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN QUITE REALISTIC. HE HAS TOLD THIEU HE THINKS JOHNSON'S DECISION NOT TO SEEK RENOMINATION IS IRREVOCABLE, THAT JOHNSON IS LOOKING TOWARD HIS PLACE IN HISTORY WHICH HE CAN ASSURE BETTER THROUGH LEAVING THE PRESIDENCY THAN THROUGH SERVING ANOTHER FOUR YEARS, ASSUMING HE COULD WIN REELECTION. KY BELIEVES THAT THE GVN MUST FACE UP TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE U.S. IS DETERMINED TO EXTRICATE ITSELF FROM VIETNAM REGARDLESS OF THE COST. KY SAID HE WAS NOT SAYING THAT JOHNSON WOULD GET OUT AT ANY PRICE BUT ONLY THAT THE GVN MUST PREPARE ITSELF FOR SUCH A POSSIBILITY. HE INDICATED HIS BELIEF THAT JOHNSON MIGHT WELL BE REGARDED AS A NATIONAL HERO IF HE GETS THE U.S. OUT OF VIETNAM, NO MATTER HOW HE DOES IT. IN THAT CONNECTION, HE REPEATED SOME COMMENTS BY GVN AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON BUI DIEM ABOUT THE STRONG PRESSURES IN THE U.S. AGAINST A CONTINUATION OF THE WAR.

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7. KY SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE GVN DEMONSTRATE TO THE SVN PEOPLE THAT IT WAS ON TOP OF THE SITUATION AND WORKING CLOSELY

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

WITH THE AMERICANS. IF THE PEOPLE GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT THE U.S. WAS GOING IT ALONE, HE CONTINUED, MOST EVERYONE WOULD THINK THAT ANOTHER 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENT WAS IMMINENT. KY SUGGESTED THAT A GVN REPRESENTATIVE GO TO GENEVA IF THAT WAS WHERE THE NEGOTIATIONS TOOK PLACE. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN, HOWEVER, THAT THE U.S. MIGHT AGREE TO HOLD THE NEGOTIATIONS AT SOME PLACE WHERE THE VIETNAMESE COULD NOT BE REPRESENTED. THIS WOULD BE BAD SINCE IT WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE VIETNAMESE WERE BEING EXCLUDED FROM DECISIONS OVER THE FUTURE OF THEIR OWN COUNTRY. THIEU SUGGESTED TO KY THAT HE MIGHT SEND BUI DIEM TO GENEVA. ([redacted] COMMENT: THIEU PROBABLY WOULD LIKE TO RID HIMSELF OF DIEM'S PRESENCE.)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

8. ONE GOOD THING TO COME OUT OF THE PRESENT DEVELOPMENTS IS THAT ALTHOUGH THIEU AND KY MAY NOT BE UNITED, THEY ARE WORKING MORE CLOSELY TOGETHER THAN EVER BEFORE. KY HAS BEEN EMPHASIZING TO HIS FOLLOWERS THAT "THEY" MUST GIVE HIM AS MUCH PRESTIGE AND EXCELLENT COUNSEL AS THEY CAN. WITHOUT THIEU, ACCORDING TO KY, A WEAK GVN HAND WILL BE EVEN WEAKER. THIEU SEEMS TO BE COMING AROUND SOMEWHAT AND LOWERING HIS GUARD, BUT NOT AS MUCH AS HE SHOULD.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: OCT 2000

9. EVERYONE AT THE PALACE ON 4 APRIL SEEMED TO AGREE THAT WHAT THE GVN DID AND SAID DURING THE NEXT TEN DAYS WOULD

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

BE VERY IMPORTANT. THE VIET CONG (VC) CAN BE EXPECTED TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION TO SOW DOUBT AND DISCORD AMONG THE PEOPLE. A MATTER OF CONCERN IS THE FACT THAT IT IS FAIRLY EASY TO GET A BAND-WAGON MOVEMENT ROLLING AMONG THE VIETNAMESE, AND THE VC WILL BE TRYING TO DO JUST THAT, I.E., TO MAKE THE POINT THAT THE WAR IS OVER, THAT THE U.S./GVN HAS LOST AND THAT THE VC WILL SOON BE TAKING OVER. IF SUCH A FEELING SHOULD BECOME WIDESPREAD, IT WILL BECOME VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE GVN TO FUNCTION. THE CHIEU HOI (OPENS ARMS) PROGRAM WILL END, THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WILL GO OUT OF EXISTENCE, THE NASCENT SELF-DEFENSE MOVEMENT WILL BE A THING OF THE PAST, ETC.

10. TO SUM UP, THIEU AND KY HAVE NOT PANICKED AND SEEM TO BE VIEWING THE SITUATION AS CALMLY AS CAN BE EXPECTED. EVEN DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN NGOC LOAN HAS SAID CALMLY THAT HE IS WILLING TO DO WHATEVER THIEU AND KY DECIDE HE SHOULD DO AND THAT HE IS WILLING TO GIVE THIEU AN IRONCLAD GUARANTEE THAT HE WILL NOT CAUSE THIEU ANY PROBLEMS DURING THESE CRITICAL TIMES. TO DO SO WOULD BE HIGHLY UNPATRIOTIC, AND LOAN SEES HIMSELF FIRST AND FOREMOST A PATRIOT. HOWEVER, DESPITE A LACK OF PANIC AT THE TOP, THERE IS WIDESPREAD CONCERN AND NEAR PANIC

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

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(classification) (dissem controls)

AT THE BOTTOM OF THE GVN HIERARCHY. AMONG THE MASSES, THE OPINION IS RAPIDLY GROWING, PROBABLY FANNED BY THE VC, THAT THE U.S. IS GETTING READY TO STAB THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE IN THE BACK. ALSO, THAT THE LACK OF PANIC AT THE TOP DOES NOT MEAN THE EXISTENCE THERE OF A COHERENT POLICY. AT PRESENT, THERE IS, RATHER, A TOTAL LACK OF PREPAREDNESS FOR NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL AS A REALIZATION THAT THE GVN IS OVERLY CUMBERSOME AND DESPERATELY IN NEED OF STREAMLINING. SOME SORT OF WAR CABINET WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY EMERGE. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, THERE IS NO EFFORT ON THE PART OF ANYONE TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT AND THE KY FORCES SEEM READY TO GO OUT OF THEIR WAY TO IMPRESS ON THIEU THE NEED FOR CLOSE COOPERATION. EVERYONE AGREES THAT A COALITION GOVERNMENT IS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE, BUT PEOPLE WILL ACCEPT SOMETHING THAT EXCEEDS THE ONE MAN-ONE VOTE CONCEPT.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>2 (C)

11. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR BERGER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND, GENERAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR KOMER) 7TH AIR FORCE (GENERAL MOMYER ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

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~~SECRET~~

Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 97-271
Document # 70a2

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE
IN 86498

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/JC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC OER	NIC FBIS	NSA DCS	SDO IRS	ONE AID	CRS USIA
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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[redacted]

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SECRET 061559Z CITE [redacted]

DIST 6 APRIL 1968

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI [redacted]

Rostow

SUBJECT PRESIDENT THIEU'S VIEWS ON PROBABLE NORTH VIETNAMESE DEMANDS DURING FORTHCOMING PEACE TALKS

3.4(b)(1) c

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (6 APRIL 1968) FIELD NO. [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted]

3.4(b)(1) c

SUMMARY: PRESIDENT THIEU [redacted]

3.4(b)(6) c

EXPECTS HANOI TO MAKE TWO DEMANDS DURING THE FORTHCOMING PEACE TALKS THAT WILL BE UNACCEPTABLE TO HIM: (1) THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NFLSV) AND (2) THAT THE GVN FORM A GENUINE COALITION WITH THE NFLSV. THIEU CONSIDERS IT ESSENTIAL THAT S-E-C-R [redacted]

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THE OPENING OF PEACE TALKS SHALL NOT LEAD TO A DIMINUTION OF U.S. AID AND THAT THE GVN EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO KEEP THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FROM SEPARATING THE QUESTION OF A BOMBING HALT FROM THAT OF A TREATY TO END THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THIEU SAID HE WAS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING DECLARING A GENERAL MOBILIZATION. [redacted] BRIEFED THIEU ON A NEW INTERMINISTERIAL COUNCIL CHARGED WITH STUDYING WAYS OF MAINTAINING GVN AUTHORITY IN THE EVENT OF ANOTHER EMERGENCY SIMILAR TO THE VIET CONG TET OFFENSIVE. END SUMMARY.

1. [redacted] PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU [redacted] 3.4(b)(1) c [redacted] EXPECTS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT (DRV) TO MAKE TWO DEMANDS OF THE AMERICANS DURING FORTHCOMING PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH THIEU WILL BE UNABLE TO ACCEPT. FIRST, THIEU EXPECTS HANOI TO REJECT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT (GVN) AND TO INSIST THAT THE GVN NEGOTIATE WITH THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM (NFLSV). THIEU SAID THAT WHILE THE GVN IS WILLING TO MEET ANYWHERE WITH DRV REPRESENTATIVES, IT WILL NOT NEGOTIATE

S-E-C-R-E-T [redacted]

WITH THE NFLSV. ALSO, THIEU THINKS HANOI WILL INSIST ON A GENUINE COALITION GOVERNMENT FOR SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN), INCLUDING THE NFLSV. THIEU SAID THAT NO SENIOR MEMBER OF THE PRESENT MILITARY OR GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHMENT IS WILLING TO ACCEPT A COALITION GOVERNMENT.

2. THIEU MENTIONED A NUMBER OF OTHER PRIORITIES TO WHICH HE WAS ADDRESSING HIS ATTENTION. HE SAID IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT THAT THE OPENING OF PEACE TALKS SHOULD NOT LEAD TO ANY DIMINUTION OF AMERICAN MILITARY OR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, SINCE THIS AID WAS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE SURVIVAL OF THE PRESENT VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THAT THE GVN SHOULD ALSO EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO KEEP THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (USG) FROM SEPARATING THE QUESTION OF A BOMBING HALT IN NORTH VIETNAM FROM THAT OF A JUST PEACE TREATY ENDING THE WAR IN SVN. EVEN WITHOUT A BOMBING HALT, TALKS COULD LAST A LONG TIME. WITH A BOMBING HALT, THEY WOULD PROBABLY LAST EVEN LONGER. DURING THIS PERIOD THE DRV NOT ONLY WILL STRENGTHEN ITS MILITARY FORCES BUT IT WILL INFILTRATE MANY POLITICAL CADRES INTO THE SOUTH. IF NEGOTIATIONS ABORT, THE GVN WILL BE FACED WITH A MUCH MORE DIFFICULT SITUATION SINCE THE COMMUNIST POLITICAL CADRES WILL

BE WORKING HARD TO WEAKEN POPULAR RESISTANCE. THUS, A BOMBING HALT SHOULD BE CLOSELY RELATED TO A SETTLEMENT IN THE SOUTH.

3. THIEU SAID HE HAS BEEN GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO DECLARING A GENERAL MOBILIZATION AS AN INDICATION OF GVN DETERMINATION. THE PRESIDENT ALSO SAID HE WAS SINCERE WHEN HE DECLARED THAT IT PROBABLY WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE ALLIES TO REMOVE SOME OF THEIR TROOPS BY THE END OF 1968. HE THOUGHT AT LEAST "SEVERAL BATTALIONS" SHOULD BE PHASED OUT BY THAT TIME AS A TOKEN INDICATION OF GVN DETERMINATION TO PLAY A LARGER ROLE IN ITS OWN DEFENSE.

4. [redacted] THE NEW INTERMINISTERIAL COUNCIL [redacted] CONSISTS OF THE MINISTERS OF INTERIOR, CHIEU HOI (OPEN ARMS) VETERANS, AND A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENCY, AMONG OTHERS. THE COMMITTEE IS CHARGED WITH STUDYING WAYS OF MAINTAINING GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN THE EVENT OF ANOTHER EMERGENCY SIMILAR TO THE ENEMY'S TET TRUCE ATTACKS. IT IS ALSO STUDYING WAYS TO COORDINATE THE GOVERNMENT'S POLITICAL-WARFARE PROGRAM NOW SCATTERED AMONG SEVERAL MINISTRIES AND THE ARMED FORCES. [redacted] THE COMMITTEE HAD ALREADY AGREED

ON THREE POINTS:

A. THE GVN MUST AKE ADVANTAGE OF ITS PRESENT INCREASED MORAL POSITION IN THE FORUM OF WORLD PUBLIC OPINION. SINCE THE GVN CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM THE USG IN THE BOMBING HALT AND IN THE INITIATIVES FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, IT BENEFITS FROM THE IMPROVED MORAL POSITION OF THE USG RESULTING FROM THESE MEASURES.

B. THE GVN MUST DEVISE WAYS TO KEEP UP THE "FIGHTING SPIRIT" OF THE PEOPLE DURING PEACE TALKS. IF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE CONCENTRATE ONLY ON THE HOPE OF PEACE AND FORGET THE REASONS WHY THE GVN IS FIGHTING THE WAR AND IF NEGOTIATIONS DO NOT LEAD TO PEACE, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO RECAPTURE THE SPIRIT OF THE PEOPLE.

C. ALL STEPS POSSIBLE MUST BE TAKEN TO CONVINCE THE PEOPLE OF THE NORTH THAT THEY MUST COMPEL THEIR GOVERNMENT TO ARRIVE AT A SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT. THIS WILL INVOLVE PRIMARILY THE DROPPING OF LEAFLETS OVER NORTH VIETNAM AND OTHER MEANS TO AFFECT PUBLIC OPINION THERE. [redacted]

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE DIR/JUSPAO (MR. NICKEL ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 97-27
Document #7062

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

IN 86484

7062

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC OER	NIC FBIS	NSA DCS	SDO IRS	ONE AID	CRS USIA
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SECRET 061558Z CITE [redacted]

DIST 6 APRIL 1968 3.4 (b)(1) C

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI Rostow

SUBJECT SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1800 HOURS LOCAL TIME, 6 APRIL 1968

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (6 APRIL 1968) FIELD NO. [redacted]

SOURCE THIS IS A VIETNAM SITUATION REPORT PREPARED AT 1800 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 6 APRIL.

1. IN THE LAST 24 HOURS THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN EITHER PUBLIC OPINION ON, OR GOVERNMENT REACTION TO, THE PROSPECT OF EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH HANOI. [redacted] KY HAS MET 3.4 (b)(1) C SEVERAL TIMES WITH PRESIDENT THIEU TODAY AND THAT THE TWO HAVE AGREED THAT THIEU SHOULD GO ON TELEVISION SOON TO EXPLAIN THE NEW SITUATION AND THE GOVERNMENTS STAND TO THE PEOPLE. A TENTATIVE AGREEMENT TO CALL FOR FULL MOBILIZATION HAS ALSO BEEN REACHED, THE SAME SOURCE REPORTS, AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE GENERAL NGUYEN VAN VY [redacted]

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Date AUG 1999

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HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH DRAWING UP A DETAILED MOBILIZATION PLAN; PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF MOBILIZATION IS NOT EXPECTED BEFORE THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK.

2. [redacted] PRESIDENT THIEU [redacted] EXPECTS HANOI TO PRESS IN ITS TALKS WITH THE U.S. FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT AND FOR FRONT REPRESENTATION IN A GENUINE COALITION GOVERNMENT; THIEU CALLED BOTH OF THESE DEMANDS UNACCEPTABLE TO HIM AND TO EVERY MEMBER OF HIS GOVERNMENT. THIEU WAS REPORTEDLY ANXIOUS THAT U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID CONTINUE UNABATED DURING ANY TALKS, CALLING AID ESSENTIAL FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S SURVIVAL. [redacted]

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3. INSISTENCE ON THE GVN'S CENTRAL ROLE IN ANY REAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH HANOI AND ON THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF A COALITION SOLUTION CONTINUE TO BE THE MAIN THEMES OF PRESS EDITORIALS AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF POLITICIANS. THE LOWER HOUSE INDEPENDENCE BLOC MADE THESE POINTS IN A 4 APRIL DECLARATION AND, [redacted] THE LOWER HOUSE IS EXPECTED TO DRAFT A PRO-GOVERNMENT RESOLUTION TODAY SIMILAR TO THE ONE PASSED EARLIER BY THE SENATE. [redacted]

3.4(b)(1)
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[redacted]

• S-E-[redacted]-E-T
(classification)

[redacted] TENTATIVE PLANS IN TWO LOWER HOUSE BLOCS TO EXAMINE POSSIBLE PEACE TERMS THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE WOULD FIND PALATABLE IF NOT IDEAL.

3.4 (b)(1)
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4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

SAIGON SIGCEN NOTE: "DOI" BLANK AS RCVD FROM ORIGINATOR. WILL CHECK IN A.M. AND ADVISE.

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69b

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 97-271
Document # 69b

8 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Speculation on Hanoi's Motives

1. Consistent with its past reactions, Hanoi might have been expected to reject President Johnson's initiative or any other move short of an "unconditional" cessation of bombing. Or it could have stalled for a time, while testing various international currents, and perhaps sounding out its Allies in Moscow and Peking. Instead, Hanoi moved quickly and invented a new stage called "contacts" with the US.

2. Assuming that such contacts are actually intended, several different interpretations are possible for a move of this significance. These rest on alternative appraisals of the total situation which Hanoi may be making. The basic factors which would enter into such appraisals would be the course and prospects of military

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action, the viability of the GVN/ARVN under continued pressure, and the effects of election year political currents on the US will to continue the struggle.

3. In theory, Hanoi's appraisal of the situation could range from high confidence through uncertainty to near desperation. In the following paragraphs we consider each of these cases in turn.

CASE I. Hanoi's Appraisal is Highly Optimistic

4. This hypothesis rests on a judgment by Hanoi that the military-political results obtained since Tet and those in prospect in the near future are turning the balance of the struggle in its favor. Hanoi has always said that at such a stage it would be correct to begin talking while still fighting. The fight-talk tactic has been portrayed as a forward move to exploit major military and political successes and leading to the final resolution of the conflict on Communist terms. What could not be known by Hanoi was when the most propitious moment would arise to employ this tactical line; there is considerable evidence suggesting that it believed 1968 would be the "decisive" year, and that it expected the Tet offensive to contribute greatly to this result.

5. The North Vietnamese could read the President's statement as confirming that a decisive stage had, indeed, arrived. They could interpret his decision not to stand for re-election as an admission of failure for his policy in Vietnam, just as they claimed that General Westmoreland's departure indicated a "comprehensive defeat" for his military strategy. They could believe the failure to send large reinforcements to South Vietnam vindicated their predictions that US international commitments plus domestic pressures would eventually limit the US buildup. And they could view the bombing restriction as a concession forced by increasing domestic pressures for peace in Vietnam.

6. The experience of the North Vietnamese leaders in 1953-54 would strongly incline them to such interpretations of American political developments. Even if the Tet offensive fell well short of its hopes, Hanoi would still regard its position as quite strong and Saigon's position as significantly weakened. They would expect negotiations to accelerate the decline of the GVN and exacerbate US-GVN tensions. And they would believe that continued and perhaps intensified military pressures would strengthen Hanoi's bargaining position vis-a-vis the United States. Thus, the confluence of events in South Vietnam and the United States could be regarded as having created optimum conditions for beginning the

"fight-talk" phase. Hanoi was able, with little time lost in deliberation, to move in the direction already anticipated by its basic strategy.

CASE II -- Hanoi's Appraisal is Uncertain

7. An alternative explanation would be that Hanoi is not entirely confident of its overall position and foresees a long and increasingly costly struggle. While able to endure this, it would prefer not to do so and the President's initiative offered an opportunity -- though not an ideal one -- to give greater emphasis to the political aspects of the struggle. Even if Hanoi believed the US position was weakened and Saigon shaky, it would also recognize the risk of escalation if the President's move had been totally rejected. Hanoi might calculate that by removing himself as a candidate the President was in a better position to adopt new military measures against North Vietnam if necessary. Added to these risks, Hanoi might have seen a certain loss in failing to respond when international reaction to the US move was generally favorable.

8. Under this hypothesis, Hanoi would still have some expectation of being able to combine the talks with fighting in such a way as to force a favorable settlement. They would recognize that

both sides would be under certain pressures not to allow a complete breakdown in the discussions. They would also recognize that some further concessions would probably have to be made to gain a complete cessation of the bombing; and though their forces would still be capable of further military successes, these would not likely be decisive in bringing about the collapse of the GVN/ARVN.

9. Nevertheless, Hanoi would still see advantages to opening discussions with the US. The bombing restrictions would be prolonged, at least for a while. Saigon would be more and more apprehensive about a secret deal at its expense. In this atmosphere even local military success might have a strong psychological impact on the Allied side. The pressures for continuing the talks would probably be greater on the US then Hanoi. And if, in the end, the talks failed, Hanoi would at least be no worse off.

CASE III - Hanoi's Appraisal is Pessimistic

10. A third alternative is that the North Vietnamese view the overall balance of forces as distinctly unfavorable and are more or less compelled to settle on whatever terms can be negotiated. The results of the Tet offensive might have forced a reappraisal of their military capabilities, leading to the

conclusion that the strains of the war were too great and the prospects of success too doubtful. Though physically capable of further fighting, it is conceivable that they have concluded that another round of attacks would almost surely fail, would be devastating to morale and raw capabilities and might force them to end the war on highly unfavorable terms or fade away, or call on the Chinese to help. On the other hand, a failure to deliver the promised "second wave" would be encouraging to the GVN and the US. The President's statement provided a way out. As long as Communist forces remained intact, negotiations might still hold some prospect of salvaging the Front as a legitimate political instrument and causing an eventual American withdrawal.

CASE IV -- Other Contingencies

11. A final explanation is that there has been some dramatic change in Hanoi. For example, the North Vietnamese populace could be far more restive than we can determine. This of course might prompt concessions to end the bombing, if not the war. Or it could be that there has been a change in the top leadership itself. There has always been the chance of a struggle to succeed Ho Chi Minh. Hanoi's quick move to establish contact with the US could thus be a move in an internal contest or even the first act

of a new and more flexible political leadership. While such a change in command would not in itself have to lead to a change in basic policy, it could explain a shift in tactics.

Conclusion

12. Among the alternative explanations suggested above, our current evidence suggests that the truth lies somewhere between Case I and Case II. This would mean that Hanoi considers that it can register further military successes at costs it can afford to bear even if it would prefer not to, that it believes the will to persist is beginning to crumble on the US/GVN side, and that hard bargaining combined with continued military pressure can bring a favorable outcome eventually.

13. If our interpretation is generally correct, then it is probable that Hanoi had for some time been preparing to make a diplomatic initiative -- that the President's statement merely offered an unexpectedly hopeful opportunity to get on with a policy already substantially determined. This is not to say that Hanoi's position in meetings will be conciliatory; on the contrary its representative will probably take a hard line,

demanding an unconditional halt to all bombing and reconnaissance over North Vietnam. We do believe, however, that Hanoi probably wants to talk, and that it will not seek pretexts to back away from establishing contact with the US.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

Abbot Smith

ABBOT SMITH
Chairman

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INTELLIGENCE WARNING OF THE TET OFFENSIVE IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(Interim Report)

A. Procedures

1. A working group has been formed under the chairmanship of R. J. Smith, on which CIA, DIA, INR, NSA, and the Joint Staff are represented. This group has compiled dossiers on the raw intelligence informa- and intelligence summaries and judgments received in various US headquarters before Tet, with emphasis on the period 15-30 January 1968, and on the finished intelligence disseminated to senior officers of the government as a result.

2. Representatives of the group from CIA, DIA, and the Joint Staff visited Vietnam from 16 to 23 March. They were joined there by observers from CINCPAC, MACV, and the CIA station in Saigon. In addition to collecting a large quantity of pertinent documents, the delegation received briefings and conducted interviews, both in Saigon and the field, with many senior officials, US and Vietnamese. On the US side, members of the delegation talked to Ambassador Bunker, General Westmoreland, General Abrams, Ambassador Komer, Lt. General Cushman, Lt. General Rosson, Maj. General Peers, Maj. General Eckhardt, and the commanding generals of 1st Marine Division and 4th Infantry Division. They also interviewed the G-2s of I and II Field Forces and the G-2 of III Marine Amphibious Force, and the G-2 advisers and the CIA Regional officers in all four Corps Tactical Zones (CTZs). They were briefed extensively by MACV J-2 and by the CIA station in Saigon, and contacted the Director of Intelligence, Seventh Air Force, NSA Representative Vietnam, and the Army Headquarters Area Command in Saigon. On the Vietnamese side, they interviewed the commanding generals of I and II Corps, J-2 of the Joint General Staff and his deputy, and the deputy director of National Police. In the course of these discussions members of the group visited Phu Bai, Da Nang, Pleiku, Camp Enari, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, Long Binh, and Can Tho.

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B. General Findings

3. As the DCI informed the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in February, there was evidence, both in Saigon and in Washington, that the enemy was engaging in his much-advertised "winter-spring campaign" and was preparing for a series of coordinated attacks, probably on a larger scale than ever before. There was evidence in January that some attacks in the highlands might be conducted during the Tet holiday. In the latter part of the month it was evident that other attacks were imminent, and some of the targets had been identified. Both in Saigon and in Washington this intelligence was communicated to senior military and political officers. As a result, a series of actions were taken in Vietnam which reduced the impact of the enemy offensive.

4. The warning thus provided represents no small achievement for the US intelligence apparatus in Vietnam. It has no high-level clandestine penetrations of the Communist hierarchy and high-level Communist communications are for the most part unreadable. It must therefore rely on classic indications techniques. This is difficult under any circumstances. The intelligence organization itself, military and civil, US and Vietnamese, is complex and the volume of material it handles is large. Thus, the recognition of significant reports from human sources through the blare of background noise presents a major problem. Moreover, the very nature of the war leads to the "crying wolf" syndrome. We have little doubt that at some level of the intelligence apparatus low-level reports could be found forecasting many of the attacks made at Tet; we have equally little doubt that similar reports could be found alluding to attacks on many other cities and on many other dates.

5. The enemy took great pains to conceal his intentions. Knowledge of his plans was fully compartmented and the actual attack order was disseminated to attacking units only in the final 24 to 72 hours. Although US and Vietnamese authorities received some reports of individual attack plans, probably no Communist officer below the

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level of COSVN, front, or military region was aware of the full scope of the offensive. General Westmoreland believes the Communists sacrificed coordination for security, and this is evident in the premature attacks by units of Military Region 5 (MR 5) on the night of 29-30 January, attacks which served to alert the US command to the much more extensive attacks on the following night.

6. Despite enemy security measures, communications intelligence was able to provide clear warning that attacks, probably on a larger scale than ever before, were in the offing. Considerable numbers of medium- and low-grade enciphered enemy messages were read. These messages appeared in many areas of South Vietnam. They included references to impending attacks, more widespread and numerous than seen before. Moreover, they indicated a sense of urgency, along with an emphasis on thorough planning and secrecy not previously seen in such communications. These messages, taken with such nontextual indicators as increased message volumes and radio direction finding, served both to validate information from other sources in the hands of local authorities and to provide warning to senior officials. The indicators, however, were not sufficient to predict the exact timing of the attack.

C. Impact of the Enemy Offensive

7. Although warning had thus been provided, the intensity, coordination, and timing of the enemy attack were not fully anticipated. Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland attest to this. The most important factor was timing. Few US or GVN officials believed the enemy would attack during Tet, nor did the Vietnamese public. There was good reason for this: Tet symbolizes the solidarity of the Vietnamese people. It is the most important holiday in Vietnam, an occasion observed by all members of every family whether they are Buddhist, Christian, or Communist. The Communists evidently believed they could exploit this solidarity to produce an antigovernment, antiforeign, antiwar uprising. This did not take place. The enemy therefore paid a price in the antagonisms he generated among the urban population,

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but he gained enormously in two ways: The GVN's army and police were generally far below their usual state of readiness, and the precedent of Tet made it possible for large numbers of VC to enter the cities without causing alarm. General Westmoreland expected heavy attacks either just before or just after Tet, and as Tet approached and major attacks had not materialized, the Vietnamese Joint General Staff had authorized 50 percent leaves. Evidence to upset this general belief did not come to hand until 24 hours or so before the attacks were launched, the most important being the premature initiatives in MR-5. The latter brought the intelligence already available into sharp focus and provided the missing element of timing. In the short time available, US and ARVN units could be alerted and were, but ARVN performance was reduced in many areas by Tet leaves.

8. A second major unexpected element was the number of simultaneous attacks mounted. US intelligence had given the enemy a capability of attacking virtually all of the points which he did in fact attack and of mounting coordinated attacks in a number of areas. He was not, however, granted a specific capability for coordinated attacks in all areas at once. More important, the nature of the targets was not anticipated. Washington and Saigon expected attacks on some cities, but they did not expect the offensive to have the cities, the civilian command and control centers, radio stations and police headquarters as primary objectives. Finally, the quantity of new, modern weapons in the hands of Main and Local Force Viet Cong who engaged in the attacks was higher than expected. The AK-47 rifle and RPG-7 antitank grenade were particularly effective against ARVN units and the Regional and Popular Forces.

9. Underlying these specific problems was a more basic one: most commanders and intelligence officers, at all levels, did not visualize the enemy as capable of accomplishing his stated goals as they appeared in propaganda and in captured documents. Prevailing estimates of attrition, infiltration, and local recruitment, reports of low morale,

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and a long series of defeats had degraded our image of the enemy. The general picture presented was an enemy unable to conduct an offensive of such scope and intensity. Commanders and intelligence officers saw his generalized calls for a "general uprising" as merely exhortatory, and not as a blueprint for what was to follow. Moreover, in the past many "great offensives" had blossomed in Communist propaganda but had not materialized on the ground.

D. Response to Warnings

10. Nevertheless, Washington and Saigon were, as stated earlier, fully aware that the enemy planned a major offensive, probably coordinated attacks in northern I CTZ, at Dak To in the highlands of II CTZ, and toward Saigon from virtually all sides in III CTZ. As early as 10 January, General Westmoreland had canceled certain planned operations in northern III CTZ in order to reposition US forces nearer to Saigon. In subsequent days he issued a series of warnings to his commanders, and to the US Mission, that the enemy was preparing to attack. Although he had not originally expected attacks during Tet, he recognized the significance of the premature attacks in MR 5 and on 30 January notified all his commanders to expect attacks that night. As a result all US units were fully alerted, although in most cases they did not have time or information to take offensive measures against the enemy prior to the actual attack. All Seventh Air Force bases were put on a maximum state of alert, and the 7th AF Director of Intelligence testifies that this step "saved Tan Son Nhut." Perhaps the best evidence that COMUSMACV's measures were effective and that the enemy's strategic intelligence was faulty is that, with the exception of Hue, the enemy failed to hold any of his major military objectives for a significant period of time.

11. The urgency felt in Saigon was not, however, fully felt in Washington in the immediate pre-attack period. As a result, finished intelligence disseminated in Washington did not contain the atmosphere of crisis present in Saigon. We do not believe this represents a failure on anyone's part. The information available

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was transmitted and duly analyzed, but atmosphere is not readily passed over a teletype circuit. Although senior officials in Washington received warnings in the period 25-30 January, they did not receive the full sense of immediacy and intensity which was present in Saigon. On the other hand, with Saigon alerted, virtually nothing further could be done in Washington that late in the game which could affect the outcome.

12. Within this general picture, there were significant differences among the four corps areas. III MAF expected assaults on Khe Sanh and Quang Tri. It had received from a local CIA operation the enemy attack plan for Da Nang, but not the date. General Cushman stated that he expected to be attacked during Tet, and enemy activities in northern I CTZ had prompted higher authority to cancel the Tet truce in I CTZ. As a result both US and Vietnamese forces were better prepared here than elsewhere. Most Vietnamese units were at nearly full strength. The extent and coordination of the enemy's attacks, considerably exceeded expectations, as did his tenaciously held lodgement in Hue. In general, however, his assaults were easily thrown back.

13. In II CTZ, allied forces in the coastal lowlands were for the most part attacked on the night of 29-30 January by MR 5 units. They did not have the advantage of forewarning which these attacks provided units farther south, nor were they in the "alert" posture of Allied forces in I Corps. The Allied forces were on a higher than normal state of alert, which was, however, directed against the inevitable cease-fire violations rather than attacks on the cities. In the highlands, singularly unlike any other area, intelligence was available from communications intelligence, prisoners, and documents reflecting specific plans for attacks during Tet. For instance, Communist plans for attacking Dak To, Pleiku, and Kontum were known well in advance, and the US 4th Division was able to correlate them with enemy deployments. This provided one of the few opportunities for US forces to take active measures against the enemy; Pleiku was the most successful US operation of the offensive. Elsewhere in the highlands intelligence was not as good, but there was enough information to lead two of the three ARVN division commanders in II CTZ to cancel all leaves on their

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own initiative. We do not believe, however, that these orders were totally effective in recovering personnel who had already departed.

14. It has been noted above that US redeployments in III Corps began before mid-January. These movements were triggered by the concentration of three enemy divisions along the Cambodian border north and northwest of Saigon and by indications that these units were beginning to deploy southward toward the city. In addition, US and ARVN intelligence officers had earlier deduced from a reorganization of the enemy command structure in MR 4, which surrounds the Saigon area, that its purpose was to improve command and control for the coordination of an attack on that city. III Corps and II Field Force were put on a general alert on 30 January (General Westmoreland's actions resulting from the attacks in MR 5 the previous night), and during the course of the day began to receive more specific information that Saigon was to be attacked that night. In most ARVN units in III Corps the troops appear to have been in their normal Tet condition.

15. In IV CTZ, the nature and extent of the enemy's attacks were almost totally unexpected. Allied forces were aware that Viet Cong capabilities had improved. An NSA report of 25 January, which warned of the possibility of impending attacks in other areas, noted that units in the "Nam Bo area," which includes the Delta, might also be involved. The supply of modern weapons had increased and the VC had shown an ability to conduct a series of coordinated attacks throughout the Delta. To some degree however, this could be interpreted as reactions to a more aggressive allied posture in the area. In the Delta cities the presence of the VC during Tet was so traditional as to be accepted as routine. General Eckhardt, Senior Adviser, stated that the only warning he received was General Westmoreland's alerting message of 30 January. General Eckhardt was able to alert the US support and logistic units in the Delta, but was unable in the time available to restore the readiness of ARVN units. The ARVN Corps commander and his three division commanders were present at their headquarters when the offensive struck, but their units were far below strength.

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E. Responses to Specific Questions

16. The preceding paragraphs have been responsive to General Taylor's questions a, b, f, and g. Our preliminary findings on questions c, d, and e are as follows:

c. (Provision of information by civilians

Prior to the offensive there were very few cases of civilians volunteering information on the impending attacks. This is not necessarily, however, a measure of the degree of civilian cooperation with the regime. The enemy's security measures, his rapid deployments through territory much of which was under his control, and the basic difficulty of rapid communication from countryside to city would have prevented friendly villages from passing warnings in many cases. As noted above the presence of infiltrators in the cities was unremarkable during Tet. During the Tet fighting, and since, there has been a marked increase in information volunteered from the populace.

d. (Exchange of information)

Given the size and complexity of the US and Vietnamese intelligence systems, we found cooperation and exchange in this case to be remarkably good. No case was reported to us of the deliberate withholding of significant warning information by one agency from another. With the mass of intelligence information acquired in Vietnam every day, there was inevitably some human error. Not all low-level reports got to everyone they should have. There is no evidence, however, that these minor shortcomings affected the general intelligence picture.

e. (Identification of units)

Most of the units engaged in the offensive have been identified. In general, there was a close correlation between US order-of-battle holdings in a given area prior to the attacks and the units identified in the attacks, although not all units deployed in any given area were actually committed in most cases, and some new provisional units were identified in the attacks. As noted above, the enemy's facade of

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a "general uprising" required him to attack with his Viet Cong units wherever possible. Especially in III and IV CTZs he held back many Main Force and most NVN units for follow-up. Because of the failure of the initial attacks, in all but a few instances a follow-up never came.

Sino-Soviet Relations

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RSS No. 0026A/68
9 April 1968

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report

ANNEX

TEN YEARS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN POLIC

Section II: South and Southeast Asia
(Reference Title: POLO XXVII)

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the seige of the Indian embassy in Peking on the 17th further strained relations. Sporadic demonstrations against the Indian embassy occurred, but by 1 October following the border clash, they were limited in scope.

The prospect seems to be for sporadic small-scale patrol clashes at various points on the border, for government-to-government political abuse, and for sustained Chinese support for Naga guerrillas and the new extremists of the Indian Communist movement. They will insist on complete support from any Indian Communist who is willing to be pro-Peking. By their action in firefights during September 1967 on the Sikkim-Tibet border, the Chinese have discarded the earlier policy contained in the pledge they had made to "first of all inform all the Colombo conference countries" before taking military action against Indian forces. (People's Daily article of 13 October 1963)

B. Old Enemies

1. Thailand

Chou En-lai had invited Thailand's representatives at the Bandung conference in April 1955 to visit Peking, and in this way he initiated the effort to move Bangkok to loosen its ties with SEATO and Washington. (Chou's invitation is referred to in his foreign policy report of 30 July 1955) At the same conference, Chen Yi worked with him and tried to mollify Foreign Minister Prince Wan (Chen interview of 28 July 1958) As a result, some Thais visited Peking and some trade developed, until it was restricted by Thai-imposed import controls in early 1959. Chou and Chen attained very little in all their efforts, the main difficulty for them having been the fact that Bangkok, with no experience of Western colonial domination to make its leaders anti-Western in attitude, preferred a strong assertive alignment with the U.S. and an assertive opposition to Communism in Southeast Asia. They openly rejected a policy of accommodation with Peking and Hanoi.

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Failure to move the Thais away from their close relationship with the U.S. and toward a neutral foreign policy position and the increased presence of the U.S. in Thailand impelled the Chinese leaders to drop their restraint and to begin to denounce Bangkok for its attitude of supporting anti-Communist efforts in the area. In mid-1962, Chen Yi referred to the authorities in Bangkok as "reactionary," and stated that the country was a "bridgehead for invading Laos" (speech of 12 July 1962). Regarding the war in Vietnam, they viewed Thai support of the South Vietnamese and American effort as sufficiently important to require warnings to Bangkok to cease this support or accept the consequences, namely, a subversive movement of insurgents in the Thai countryside. At some time between the central committee work conference of June 1964 and the U.S. airstrikes against North Vietnam in August 1964, the Chinese leaders apparently decided to create trouble for Bangkok by organizing all anti-government Thais, including prominent non-Communists, into a united front of political and military opponents. This action probably reflected a decision to discard the 1954-1964 policy of non-support, or low-key support, for Bangkok's internal enemies. According to Thai security services reports, in late summer of 1964, Communist-led insurgent activities (assasinations of police informants and propaganda attacks on the government) had increased considerably. As organizational activities moved forward among Thai insurgents, the Chinese leaders began to enlist the active support of prominent political figures, the most prominent having been sheltered in Canton. On 19 September 1964, the son of Pridi Banonmyong, the former Prime Minister, reported that "recently" the Chinese had permitted (or encouraged) leaders of the "patriotic movement" in Thailand to visit Pridi in his Canton sanctuary. These leaders apparently tried to induce Pridi to directly associate his name with their group in an effort to gain some support among non-Communist Thai political figures. Pridi apparently did not agree; further, he did not agree to any association with Thai Communists on the mainland or in Thailand.

Nevertheless, the Chinese continued on their course; on 13 December 1964, NCNA rebroadcast a manifesto issued

NND 941536 --- 3607

by the Independence Movement of Thailand (said to have been founded on 1 November and originally reported in the clandestine radio broadcast of the Voice of the People of Thailand on 8 December), declaring as policy the expulsion of U.S. personnel from Thailand and the "overthrow" of the Thanom government. The manifesto stated that the Independence group was willing "to cooperate" with "any" individuals or organization who were "patriotic" --i.e., anti-government--and in this usage it was similar to the greetings sent to the PRC on 1 October by the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). U.S. officials in Hong Kong noted this similarity and also commented that Thai was among the first three foreign languages to be studied in Peking's new (established on 5 September 1964) Foreign Language Institute. By January 1965, the Thai Patriotic Front was launched as the second anti-government organization which was "willing to cooperate with all compatriots... who love peace and democracy." (Voice of the People of Thailand broadcast of 23 January 1965 reporting the formation of the Front on 1 January) Both organizations were given wide and unprecedented coverage by Peking and Hanoi media, suggesting the primary role of these Communist capitols in organizing and supporting the subversives.

Activation of the Thai insurgent and subversive movement was one of the ways the Chinese had decided to react to increased U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Chen Yi had stated to the French ambassador in January 1965 that guerrilla warfare might "spread" to Thailand in 1965, and Chen apparently was making a statement of intent. Prime Minister Thanom declared on 19 January that the Chinese had already sent agents into Thailand and were financing them partly through funds made available in Thai currency in Hong Kong banks. By March 1965, Communist insurgent activity in northeastern Thailand was reported to be well organized and in the same month, Communist-led Independent Movement personnel were circulating propaganda tracts in Bangkok. The "liaison representative" of the Independence Movement, a Thai, reported that he had arrived in Peking on 24 March, had been provided broadcasting facilities, and then denounced the Thai government for permitting the country to be used as a base for attacks on North Vietnam ("neighboring countries"). Peking broadcasts in the Thai

NND 941536 ---3608

language intensified by May 1965 and the People's Daily on 30 July 1965 attacked Bangkok authorities for "playing the role of an accomplice of the U.S."

Direct Chinese participation has centered on training of Thai cadres and financing political and military operations. Thai cadres captured in December 1965 told Thai authorities that they had received two months training in Peking sponsored by the Thai front organization but conducted by Chinese instructors. A course in subversion and guerrilla warfare was conducted in Peking for a single Thai student in May 1965, and the reported route for trainees to travel to and from the mainland was either through Laos or by way of Hong Kong-Macao. A Sino-Thai, who had received training in Peking for one month in the spring of 1965 at a "tutorial" course conducted by three PLA officers, reported that building a "people's army in Thailand" was one of the main subjects; another was the strategy and tactics of Mao's guerrilla warfare doctrine. Another student reported in a letter from Peking (10 April 1965) that he was being instructed on the matter of accelerating the process of "world revolution," and he affirmed in this context that "An army capable of carrying out the revolutionary struggle has been formed in Thailand." By mid-1965, Communist-led insurgents and "patriotic" figures in Thailand were working actively along the lines of Mao's prescription for a revolutionary seizure of power, namely the building of an army in isolated territorial base areas and the organization of Communists and non-Communists in a broad united front in order to wage a protracted military and political war against the central government.*

*Thai Front leaders in Peking indicated to a Thai trainee in the fall of 1965 that the insurgency plan for Thailand was to (1) establish bases in the main mountain ranges which separate the country into three sections, (2) establish guerrilla training centers, one near Laos close to the route connecting Muong Sing with Yunnan Province, (3) send for PLA instructors while using Thai trainees from Peking for political indoctrination work, (4) gain control of as many remote villages as possible before the
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NND 941536 --- 3609

Mao himself participated in the effort to exploit Peking-based opponents of the Bangkok government when, on the morning of 6 October 1965, he received and had "a cordial, friendly conversation" in Peking with Pridi (with the help of Liao Cheng-chih and Wu Hsiu-chuan). Pridi's son is reliably reported to have viewed this as a move by the Chinese leaders to publicly associate his father with the two Peking-sponsored Thai front movements; he said that his father refused to lend his name to either front group. He also stated that the leader of the Independence Movement was "definitely a member of the Communist Party of Thailand." He also said that his father was strongly opposed to the Chinese strategy, namely, that the best way to support the North Vietnamese was to extend the armed struggle to "Laos and Thailand."* While he referred to

(footnote continued from page 138)
government can establish strategic hamlets, and (5) ultimately expand into the urban areas, using troops recruited "from the people."

The leader of the Thailand Patriotic Front indirectly confirmed that part of this plan was being implemented: "Our compatriots' armed uprisings, which were staged in the northeastern and southern regions of Thailand and which will be followed by our compatriots in other regions, are aimed solely at waging the struggle for self-defense and at repelling U.S. imperialists and the reactionary traitors." (Peking Radio Broadcast in Thai to Thailand of 7 December 1965) (emphasis supplied)

*Sihanouk claimed that Chou En-lai and Pham Van Dong were preparing a plan "to warn" the Thai Prime Minister against involvement with U.S. operations in Vietnam, but were unable to do so only because the Thai leader did not stay in Djakarta (at the April 1965 anniversary of the Bandung conference) long enough for the plan to be implemented. (Sihanouk speech of 30 May 1965) Peking and Hanoi support for the insurgents suggests some degree of cooperation between the two Communist regimes. Reliable reports indicate that not only the Chinese and Vietnamese but also the Pathet Lao have infiltrated instructors into northeast Thailand from Laos to assist and train Thai insurgents, the latter appearing in September and October 1965 in the northeast.

NND 941536 --- 3610

three PRC organizations as responsible for subversion in Thailand--viz., the Prime Minister's Office, the CCP, and the Thai section of the Foreign Ministry--it seems that Mao has engaged his own prestige in support of the effort to use Pridi's name to attract non-Communist recruits to the front movements, which are led by CPT members.*

By the fall of 1965, the Chinese leaders were actively engaged in reviving the armed struggle policy which Mao had permitted Chou En-lai to discard.** Thai Communists, who submerged in 1952 and who had made their way to Canton and Peking, were reported in September 1965 to be back in Thailand actively organizing youth front groups. According to several sources, some Thai cadres resent the Peking-oriented leadership (which includes ethnic Chinese) for national reasons and because they do not agree with the Maoist emphasis on armed struggle. In any case, Mao's personal intervention in early October 1965 seems to have resulted in a considerable step up in Peking's public

*High-level CPT members captured in the summer of 1967 have provided more precise information on the Chinese Communist departments which have been responsible since 1950 for maintaining contacts with Thai subversives. According to their accounts, the CCP's International Liaison Department had handled relations with the CPT; within this liaison department, the Afro-Asian and Latin American Committee has handled relations with Communist front organizations such as the Thai Patriotic Front. The Staff Office for Foreign Affairs of China's State Council--an office responsive to Chou En-lai and Chen Yi--has dealt with non-Communist groups (used for Communist recruiting and propaganda purposes) such as that of Pridi Panomyong.

**The CPT's Second Congress in 1952 is said by the Chinese to have proclaimed armed struggle as "the only path" for seizing power in Thailand. However, by late 1951, Mao was under pressure from Stalin's aides to drop the concept of his road as the model for Asian Communist revolutionaries, and he complied, moving toward a more diplomatic policy centered on improving Peking's international image.

NND 941536 --- 36/1

warnings to Thailand that closer Thai-U.S. military cooperation would lead to an intensification of the "patriotic struggle" in Thailand. (People's Daily article of 7 October 1965, published one day after Mao met with Pridi) A CPT cell was informed on 10 October that the party had "now" decided to shift from defensive to offensive tactics, and by late 1965, instructors from the mainland and North Vietnam were training Thai hill tribesmen at two centers in northern Laos under Thai Communist party direction.

Liao Cheng-chih, who appeared with Mao during the Pridi interview, continued to shepherd Thai front leaders in Peking, meeting with them on 1 November 1965 on the first anniversary of the founding of the Independence Movement and probably implementing a new policy of higher level Chinese leaders to make the fronts a more compact fighting unit by uniting them.* On 1 November 1965, the Independence Movement announced that it had joined the United Patriotic Front. The first Communist insurgent attack against a government installation, indicating a switch to more aggressive tactics, was conducted by a 12-man raiding group on 21 December 1965. Liao tied the subversive Thai political effort (he remained silent on insurgent activities) to peace "in Indochina" and the world and appealed for "bigger contributions" from various political groups "in 1966." (Liao speech of 2 January 1966) However, a People's Daily article of 28 January 1966 did refer to the insurgents: the Thais have taken up arms and are determined to overthrow "the reactionary

*In October 1966, the former Lao charge in Peking, who had met with Thai front leaders on the mainland, stated that the Chinese leaders had tried to induce Pridi to become the leader of the combined organization, but he is said to have refused.

NND 941536 --- 3612

rule of the traitorous Thanom Kittikachorn government by means of people's war." This article also was unprecedented in official party and government publications because it had dropped the equivocal euphemism, "Thai authorities," and had disparaged the Thanom government specifically and in highly derogatory terms. Peking increased its public support. On 24 March 1966, Peking Radio rebroadcast a Voice of the People of Thailand report that the Thailand Patriotic Youth Organization was established on 15 February 1966; on 13 April, Liao referred publicly to the Thai "people's war" and the readiness of the Chinese people to help "at any moment;" and on 27 April, a People's Daily article praised the battles fought by "the patriotic people's armed forces of Thailand."*

The Chinese leaders were careful to indicate that increased Thai involvement in the Vietnam war would be handled by others, by a riposte to be delivered by Thai insurgents and by the Vietnamese Communists and the Pathet Lao. For example, following the 6 January 1967 announcement in Bangkok that 100 Thai troops would be sent to Vietnam, Peking (following Hanoi by an interval of five days) warned that "the peoples of Vietnam and other Indochinese states will certainly deal you resolute counterblows and the Thai people, too, will certainly rebel against you extensively and in enhanced unity." (PRC Foreign Ministry statement of 19 January 1967) Peking's reaction to the announcement that B-52s would use Thai bases was attacked in a "Brief Commentary" in People's Daily on 25 March 1967 which warned that this action "will inevitably add fuel to the flames of the armed struggle of the

*The Chinese had been helping at earlier "moments" in subtler ways without using the PLA directly, that is, by training Thai insurgents over the years. For example, interrogation reports indicate that all six of the high-ranking members of the CPT, captured in the summer of 1967, had been trained in Communist China and that the party is dominated by its Chinese members.

NND 941536 --- 3613

Thai people." The Chinese leaders' reluctance to commit the PLA to any action, while hinting that the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao might retaliate, was a reflection of caution and a source of embarrassment. But in subsequent comment, they still avoided saying what Peking would do in response to the enlargement of U.S. military bases in Thailand, committing the Vietnamese to "hit still harder." (People's Daily editorial of 2 April 1967)

The prospect appears to be for greater Chinese encouragement of the Thai insurgents and Thai front groups. This almost certainly will include military training and covert financing.

2. Malaysia

Malay's leaders in the 1950s had refused to recognize Peking while Communist insurgent activity continued in the countryside. Prime Minister Rahman had stated this position on 23 August 1957, eight days prior to Malayan independence, and this was repeated by his successor on 11 May 1959. Before they had granted the Malayans independence, the British refused to accept any Peking representatives in the country, as the CCP's guidance of the Communist Party of Malaya made Chinese Communist officials a direct security threat. However, the Malayans viewed the early establishment of trade relations as a secure form of contact with Peking, and by 1964, the Chinese had exported $95 million to Malaya and had imported $210,000 in commodities. As noted earlier in the section of this paper discussing Indonesia, the Chinese Communist leaders were cautious after the establishment of Malaysia as an extended country on 16 September 1963, at first avoiding any direct commitment to support Sukarno's "confrontation" policy in the hope that a relatively non-antagonistic attitude would sustain their trade relations with Kuala Lumpur and Malaysia's friends, the British.

However, the Chinese leaders significantly increased their support of Sukarno in the fall of 1964 when the Indonesian leader became more assertively anti-U.S. and after the U.S. airstrikes of August 1964 on North Vietnam. On 15 April 1965, the CCP sent a message greeting the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) on its 35th anniversary (released

NND 941536 --- 3614

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47a

CONFIDENTIAL

Extract [redacted]

Subject: Situation in the Provinces of IV Corps as of 1300 Hours on 10 Apr. 1968

"2. [redacted] members of the VC 306th Regional main force battalion in Vinh Long province, reportedly told the people in Phouc Hau village, Chau Thanh district, that the regional main force battalions received orders not to launch any major operations until they received orders from the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN). This was supposedly done because of the prospects for peace negotiations.

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"3. The Viet Cong in Bac Lieu province have been explaining President Johnson's speech halting the bombing in North Vietnam and withdrawing from the Presidential race in the following manner according to information received from the provincial reconnaissance unit. The Viet Cong are saying that the Tet offensive demoralized the American people and lowered their confidence in the President and his government. The President, knowing this situation and realizing that he would be defeated if he sought reelection, therefore withdrew from the race. The bombing halt was announced, according to the Viet Cong, because it has proven a failure and the American people were against its continuation. The Viet Cong also state that the bombing halt will be advantageous to them because North Vietnam will be able to increase its efforts to send arms and ammunition to the South and thus make it easy to win a quick victory over the allied forces."

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VIETNAM

INTRODUCTION

Hanoi propaganda repeatedly claims that Washington is "creating difficulties" in selecting a site for DRV-U.S. contacts and is thus delaying talks between the two sides. The statement by a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on 13 April defends the suggested sites of Phnom Penh and Warsaw and says cryptically, without naming them, that "a number of sites" suggested by the United States "are not convenient for the DRV." The foreign ministry spokesman and other propagandists complain that the present U.S. attitude on the venue for contacts is not consistent with past declarations by the President and other officials of readiness to go anywhere, any time, to talk with the DRV.

The Liberation Radio, which had broadcast the 3 April DRV Government statement, has not acknowledged the exchanges between Hanoi and Washington regarding plans for contacts between the two sides.

Peking has still not mentioned the DRV Government statement or Hanoi's initiative on contacts; however, a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 15th cites President Johnson's rejection of Phnom Penh as a site for "contacts between the two parties" as further proof of U.S. hypocrisy regarding peace talks.

Moscow scores the United States for rejecting Phnom Penh and Warsaw as sites for contacts with the DRV and accuses it of procrastination on talks while continuing to bomb large portions of the DRV. Unlike Hanoi, Soviet media mention some other specific possible sites, but do not acknowledge that the United States has proposed five different venues.

Hanoi juxtaposes charges of U.S. procrastination on contacts with complaints that the air strikes against the DRV from the 17th to the 20th parallel have been intensified and that air "intrusions" are taking place throughout the country. But Hanoi stops short of suggesting that this would affect DRV "readiness" to establish contacts with the United States. Alleged air-defense victories continue to be reported routinely, and VNA on the 16th claims the downing of a plane over Haiphong, which, it notes, is "far north of the 20th parallel." The item puts the total of downed planes at 2,838, an increase of nine in the past week.

Hanoi on 10 April announces the visit, from 4 to 10 April, of an East German party-government delegation headed by SED Secretary and Politburo member Kurt Hager. According to Hanoi, the delegation was received by Le Duan and Truong Chinh, and it met with a DRV delegation

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which included Pham Van Dong, Nguyen Duy Trinh, Le Thanh Nghi, and Xuan Thuy.

On the 16th, VNA announces that the National Assembly Standing Committee has appointed Xuan Thuy as "minister of the DRV Government," and Tran Quang Huy as chairman of the cultural and educational board of the premier's office. Thuy, who was foreign minister from 1963 to 1965, is a Party Central Committee member and head of the foreign relations department of the CC. Huy is an alternate Party Central Committee member and deputy chief of the CC's central department of propaganda and training.

Hanoi reports on current military action in South Vietnam continue to highlight engagements in Quang Tri and in the Third Corps. A 9 April Liberation Radio commentary hailing the establishment of "revolutionary" or "people's" administrations claims that the people's administration will "rule over South Vietnam" and lead the resistance struggle to victory.

Moscow continues to stress Soviet aid to Vietnam, and a 13 April PRAVDA editorial praises the CPSU plenum's assertion of determination to continue aid to Vietnam and the WFTU General Council's special Moscow meeting on solidarity with Vietnam. Comment, including reports of protest meetings and a statement by the Soviet maritime union, continues to score the Chinese for obstructing Soviet aid by their detention of a Soviet tanker carrying fuel to Vietnam.

DRV-U.S. Contacts

HANOI Hanoi's first dicussion of the issue of a site for preliminary DRV-U.S. contacts following its 8 April release of Foreign Minister Trinh's interview with CBS' Collingwood comes in a 12 April NHAN DAN commentary, summarized by VNA and broadcast by Hanoi radio in the domestic service. NHAN DAN says that the United States is finding "unjustified pretexts" for refusing to agree to Phnom Penh as the site for the preliminary DRV-U.S. contacts. The commentary recalls that in his interview Trinh had expressed readiness for contact "in Phnom Penh or another place to be mutually agreed upon," but this reference to "mutual agreement" is not repeated in subsequent propaganda.

The first available reference in Hanoi propaganda to its alternate suggestion of Warsaw as a site comes in a NHAN DAN Commentator article carried by VNA early on the morning of the 13th. It says that after refusing to meet in Phnom Penh, the United States has rejected the idea of Warsaw and that on the 11th Presidential Press Secretary Christian said that the United States wanted contacts to be made in a neutral country.

Some eight hours after VNA's release of the NHAN DAN article, Hanoi radio broadcast the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement which gives Hanoi's version of the chronology of developments since the DRV Government statement on the 3d. The spokesman says that following the United States' 10 April rejection of Phnom Penh--"on the pretext that it had technical difficulties since it has no diplomatic mission there"--Hanoi on 11 April suggested Warsaw. And he adds that on the 12th, U.S. authorities, without answering regarding Warsaw, "demanded" that the site be in a neutral country where both sides have diplomatic missions and adequate communications. The spokesman acknowledges that on the 10th the United States had suggested other venues but he does not name them: He says only that "they suggested a number of sites that are not convenient for the DRV side."

The foreign ministry spokesman says that the U.S. rejection of Hanoi's proposals for the site of the contacts runs counter to past statements by the President and other U.S. officials expressing willingness to go anywhere to talk. And surrounding propaganda seeks to document this by citing specific remarks, including the President's statement in his 31 March speech that the United States is ready to send its representative to "any forum, at any time, to discuss the means of bringing this war to an end." The President's 29 September 1967 speech in San Antonio is cited frequently along with several other statements by him and by Secretary Rusk.

In revealing that Hanoi on the 11th had suggested Warsaw as a site, the foreign ministry spokesman avoids saying how or where this "suggestion" was made and does not refer to any private communications. A NHAN DAN article on the 16th, summarized by VNA and broadcast in Hanoi radio's domestic service, implies that private exchanges are not going on. NHAN DAN says that while the United States rejects the sites for contacts proposed by the DRV, "the spokesman for the U.S. President claimed that contacts between the DRV and the United States on the question of the site are continuing. This is yet another trick of the United States to delay contacts and appease public protest." DRV media in the past have displayed sensitivity to reports on private communications with the United States and have on occasion flatly denied such reports. But those denials were not made against a background like the current one of a specific public Hanoi initiative for preliminary contacts leading to possible formal talks.

President Johnson's complaint, in his remarks upon arrival in Hawaii, that the DRV had not responded to the U.S. suggestions of sites is promptly labeled "a distortion of the truth." A Hanoi radio commentary, broadcast in the domestic service on the 16th, counters with the argument that the foreign ministry spokesman on the 13th

"officially rejected the sites suggested by the United States as not convenient to the DRV side." But consistent with Hanoi's avoidance of mentioning any venues other than Phnom Penh or Warsaw, the commentary ignores the President's statement that he had proposed Geneva, Rangoon, New Delhi, Vientiane, Djakarta, or "any other suitable place." The broadcast interprets the President's statement that Hanoi has not made "a serious reply" in the two weeks since the U.S. limitation of air strikes against the North as a "demand for reciprocity." It routinely says that the United States has no right to demand reciprocity and repeats that what is needed is a complete and unconditional cessation of "acts of war" against the DRV and an end to the "aggression" against Vietnam.

A NHAN DAN commentary, reported by VNA on the 17th, rehashes other comment in saying that U.S. delaying of preliminary contacts is at variance with its professed willingness to go anywhere. In mentioning the President's trip to Honolulu, NHAN DAN quotes him as saying that "the U.S. limited bombing has been in force for two weeks without progress toward peace contacts." The paper says nothing about his complaint over the absence of a Hanoi response; however, it quotes State Department spokesman McCloskey as saying on the 15th that the United States hopes for an official message of response from Hanoi on other sites, and that it is trying to find a mutually acceptable site.

This latest NHAN DAN commentary echoes other propaganda in saying that world public opinion is demanding that the United States quickly agree to Warsaw. The commentary dismisses U.S. objections to Warsaw since it is not a neutral country, but does not defend it as a site. Other comment, however, repeatedly notes the size of the U.S. diplomatic mission there and says there would be no difficulty with communications. On at least two occasions, Hanoi brings up the fact that the United States has been using Warsaw as the site for contacts with the CPR. VNA on the 14th in rounding up press opinion as published in NHAN DAN quotes AFP to this effect. And the 16 April NHAN DAN commentary, as broadcast in the domestic service, quotes the Japanese MAINICHI as saying that it is difficult to understand why the United States refused Warsaw, where it has held talks with the CPR for years.

MOSCOW Before DRV media had mentioned Warsaw as a site for contacts, on 12 April a TASS dispatch from its Hanoi correspondents said that "it is believed in Hanoi official circles" that Washington's rejection of Warsaw as a site for preliminary contacts was unjustified for four reasons: The United States had expressed its willingness to meet any place, at any time; it said it was willing to establish contact with the DRV as soon as possible; Warsaw has a U.S. embassy, a staff of correspondents and communications; and Warsaw has been the site for over 10 years of Sino-U.S. contacts. Earlier, on the 11th,

TASS' Hanoi correspondents had cited "reliable sources" as saying that the DRV had suggested Warsaw as a site for contacts after the United States rejected Phnom Penh.

Moscow commentators, like Hanoi, charge the United States with procrastinating and trying to delay talks while continuing to bomb southern portions of the DRV and preparing for further escalation in the South. Yuriy Zhukov, in a PRAVDA article carried by the domestic service on 15 April, says that U.S. propaganda depicted President Johnson's 31 March announcement of a bombing limitation and readiness to discuss ways of ending the war as a great concession. And he adds that "many international observers" think that the United States expected the DRV to ignore the announcement and that U.S. "aggression" then could be intensified. Zhukov notes that while Washington delays the solution of the question regarding the venue for contacts it is intensifying its military operations in South Vietnam. He says that the United States is hoping to secure through force "an advantageous basis" for the solution of the Vietnam question, and is testing whether it can "extract some kind of concession from the Vietnamese."

Moscow on the 11th, in a domestic service review of the weekly NEW TIMES, notes that military writer Lt. Col. A. Leontyev recalls that the Soviet Government on 5 April officially endorsed the DRV's 3 April statement, observing that it shows a practical way toward ending the war. And Leontyev adds that "it is obvious that the time has come for a political settlement in Vietnam." (In discussing the war in the South, Leontyev says the allies' casualties are growing. But at the same time he says that "of course, in any war both sides suffer losses. The South Vietnam liberation forces, which are fighting a cruel and powerful enemy, suffer many losses." Such an acknowledgment is rare, but not unprecedented in Soviet propaganda; Leontyev, for example, broached the issue in commentaries last January and in November 1967)

TASS' 16 April report of the President's Honolulu trip cites him as saying on arrival that the United States is ready to meet any challenge in the field of battle, and interprets this as a U.S. intention to continue escalation. Comment, including a widely broadcast commentary by Shakov on the 16th, asserts that the President will discuss further escalation at Honolulu, and, as Shakhov says, the meeting thus confirms the impression that "Washington has never really wanted to negotiate on Vietnam."

Moscow's only available mention of the President's comments on Hanoi's negative attitude regarding contacts comes in a brief broadcast to the United Kingdom on the 17th which cites him as "alleging" that "Hanoi was to blame for the delay in choosing the site for preliminary

contacts." The broadcast accuses the State Department of making another move to "torpedo" contacts, now adding the condition that the site must allow for "participation in the talks of America's allies." The report further says that after rejecting Phnom Penh and Warsaw as sites, "Washington now intends to entrust a neutral partner with further negotiations."

Some Moscow comment--including a Moscow radio broadcast in Mandarin on 10 April and one in Rumanian on the 12th, as well as a Mandarin broadcast over Radio Peace and Progress on the 10th--attacks the Chinese for ignoring the DRV's 3 April statement declaring readiness for DRV-U.S. contacts. Referring to NCNA's 5 April commentary deprecating the bombing limitation, Moscow asserts that by failing to mention the DRV's statement the Mao clique shows that it is actually "opposed to this important political proposal of the DRV Government." The commentators also score NCNA for accusing the USSR of colluding with the United States against Vietnam, and recall that the USSR has given the Vietnamese "the largest share of aid." The commentators recall that Peking had also opposed DRV Foreign Minister Trinh's statement late last year on willingness to talk if the United States unconditionally halted the bombing. Moscow has periodically charged Peking with opposing talks and striving to "prolong" the war.

EAST EUROPE On 12 April Warsaw's PAP releases an "authorized" statement announcing the readiness of the Polish Government to "create all necessary and appropriate conditions" to facilitate a U.S.-DRV meeting in Warsaw. This is Warsaw's first official comment on the developments of the past two weeks; it had not officially endorsed the 3 April DRV Government statement although East Berlin, Bucharest, Sofia, and Prague had done so. In later routine comment Warsaw reports that the United States rejected Warsaw as a site for contacts.

On 15 April East Berlin's ADN reports that Deputy Foreign Minister Kiesewetter received the DRV acting charge d'affaires who handed him the 13 April DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement at which time Kiesewetter condemned U.S. "delaying maneuvers." On the same day Sofia's BTA releases a commentary by its editor scoring the United States for rejecting Hanoi's suggested meeting places. Other East European media denounce the U.S. moves in routine comment.

PEKING The CPR failure to acknowledge the 3 April DRV Government statement appears the more blatant in view of the 15 April PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article which discusses the issue of DRV-U.S. contacts. Commentator notes that the President has "rejected" Phnom Penh as the site of contacts, without indicating who proposed the site. He says that this incident alone

is "enough to reveal that the 'peace talks' of the U.S. imperialist chieftain are a big fraud." The article does not mention Warsaw, although it appears four days after reports that Hanoi had suggested the Polish capital as an alternate site.

Criticism of the President's announcement of a limitation of the air strikes against the DRV follows the line of the 5 April NCNA commentary--Peking's first and only other comment on the President's 31 March speech. Commentator says that in only two weeks the President's "murderous intentions are revealed," and the article cites the callup of reservists and the intensified bombing of the DRV. The USSR is typically charged with colluding with the imperialists and the article concludes with Peking's standard line that the United States must be thoroughly defeated on the Vietnam battlefield.

Air Strikes Against the DRV

The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the 13th and other propaganda on potential DRV-U.S. contacts complain of the intensity of air strikes since the President's 31 March announcement of limitation of the bombing. The spokesman says that aircraft and warships have intensified their bombing and strafing of DRV territory between the 17th and 20th parallels and that Secretary of Defense Clifford "brazenly declared that U.S. reconnaissance will continue north of the 20th parallel." The 16 April NHAN DAN article on the venue for contacts says that attacks from Thanh Hoa to Vinh Linh have been stepped up. And it claims that on the 13th and 14th many reconnaissance missions were flown near Hanoi. VNA reports of air activity list areas north of the 21st parallel where "air intrusions" allegedly have taken place, but these items do not mention reconnaissance. And VNA in claiming that a plane was downed over Haiphong on the 16th does not identify the type.

A NHAN DAN editorial on the 17th hails the "brilliant" air-defense victories on the 15th. It says that five planes were downed over Nghe An, Quang Binh, and Ha Tinh provinces, making it one of the biggest victories in a single day this year. The editorial claims "massive U.S. attacks from Thanh Hoa Province to the Vinh Linh area," but asserts that all attacks have been foiled. It gives credit to the antiaircraft forces, the missile force, the regional army, and the militia force. Like other comment it links the alleged U.S. delaying tactics on establishing contacts with the DRV with its intensification of air strikes in the North and escalation in the South.

Propaganda generally does not claim that there have been air strikes above the 20th parallel. But VNA on the 15th says that the People's

Air Force "blasted down" one of the U.S. aircraft "raiding a populated area 60 kilometers southwest of Ninh Binh Province capital between the 20th and 21st parallel." Ignoring the Defense Department denial, the 13 April NHAN DAN Commentator article repeats the earlier charge that on 4 April "U.S. aircraft attacked Lai Chau Province," and VNA inserts an editor's note explaining that "this is nearly 500 kilometers west-northwest of Hanoi." (A 5 April DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement included Lai Chau in a list of alleged targets without saying anything about its location. But a 5 April NHAN DAN Commentator article noted the target in Lai Chau Province "close to the Vietnam-China border.")

Military Developments in the South

Hanoi media still concentrate attention on battles connected with the two major allied operations in the First and Third Corps: Operation Pegasus around Khe Sanh, which ended on 15 April, and Operation Complete Victory--which began on 8 April--and its predecessor Operation Quyet Thang (determined to win). According to a VNA summary on the 15th, a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary that day claims that these operations were launched to conceal allied defeats, give a pretense of initiative, and cope with the insurgents' "mounting military and political offensive." The commentary says that the allies, having been pushed into the towns, are now unable to defend them and are "trying to ease the pressure by making desperate sorties into the countryside." The commentary says that the insurgents with various forms of attacks are "taking full advantage of the propitious moment with the enemy at last trickling out from their strongholds and dispersing in the field."

A 16 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on General Abrams' appointment as commander in Vietnam calls Abrams a last choice of the Administration who can "only worsen the situation." It says that the replacement of Westmoreland by Abrams "marks the bankruptcy of the search-and-destroy and pacification strategy" and, quoting REUTERS as saying that the United States was shifting to the clear-and-hold tactics advocated by Abrams, it claims this is a "step back strategically speaking." The article also disparages the policy of shifting more of the fighting to the ARVN troops. Like earlier Hanoi radio comment on the 12th and Liberation Radio comment on the 13th, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN asserts that Abrams will fail and it adds that he will be a scapegoat in the "final stage" of the war.

KHE SANH — The 15 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary claims that the PLAF struck allied forces on highway 9, causing them to "bog down" in their "attempt to lift the siege of Khe Sanh" and that "staggering blows" have been dealt "both to those under siege and to the reinforcements." It states that the latter "had five battalions and eight companies completely wiped out or heavily decimated before

the linkup could be made." A commentary in the army paper on the following day claims that, "far from relieving Khe Sanh," the air cavalry and ARVN paratroopers in Operation Pegasus "have thrown this base into greater confusion and danger" and have "thus fallen into the PLAF siege." It says that although the allies reached Khe Sanh, they "did not succeed in rescuing it because they could not revive the exhausted and weakened U.S. Marines there."

The PLAF command sent a congratulatory message to units on the Khe Sanh front, broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 13th, which claims that in the first three months of this year the insurgents in northern Quang Tri killed, wounded, or captured nearly 15,000 allied troops, mostly Americans, and downed or destroyed 250 planes.

VNA on the 11th claims that, in the week ending 9 April, the PLAF inflicted 2,193 allied casualties, mostly GIs, shot down or damaged 19 planes, and seized a large quantity of military equipment. VNA on the 14th claims that the PLAF on the 12th and 13th repeatedly "battered" U.S. cavalry and South Vietnamese paratroopers respectively in Khe Sanh and Lang Vei, causing many losses. VNA on the 15th alleges that from 13 to 15 April the PLAF on the Khe Sanh front "kicked the enemy" out of Lang Vei and continued besieging "Ta Con"--the Khe Sanh base--"tightening their noose around this position and encircling and attacking the enemy encampments in the Khe Sanh area." The item says that during this period over 300 U.S. and ARVN troops were wiped out, two helicopters destroyed, and many weapons seized, and claims that this brings the total of allied troops killed or wounded in this area to more than 3,000 from 3 to 15 April.

On the 13th, according to this same VNA report, the PLAF shelled Ta Con, the U.S. encampment at Lang Vei, and hills in the Khe Sanh-Lang Vei area. An attack on Hill 656, five kilometers southeast of Lang Vei, is alleged to have taken a toll of 70 U.S. air cavalrymen. Shellings on the 14th of Ta Con, Hills 571 and 845, and the eastern part of Pa Ka allegedly caused over 90 casualties and caused the allies to pull out of Lang Vei and many surrounding spots. VNA on the 16th claims that a 14 April surprise attack by the PLAF on Hill 656 completely wiped out a U.S. company of over 140 men.

The only action mentioned on the 15th is the shelling of the Ta Con position. VNA on the 16th, reporting action taking place that day, claims that PLAF gunners pounded a U.S. company which tried to push toward Hill 622, wiping out 50 GIs, and that the PLAF intercepted the rest of the U.S. force, causing 70 casualties, and attacked another U.S. company aiming for the same hill, causing 40 casualties. At Hill 519, northeast of Lang Vei, the VNA report claims that the PLAF fired on two U.S. companies moving toward the hill and "knocked down"

over 50 GIs. VNA says that on the 16th the PLAF inflicted a total of 210 casualties on U.S. troops in the Khe Sanh area.

SAIGON AND THE THIRD CORPS

QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in its 15 April commentary characterizes the two operations around the Saigon area, Operation Quyet Thang and its successor Complete Victory, as "merely loose combinations or small, separate police raids and a totaling of troops of all kinds who happen to be present in the theatre." It says that the allied forces are "operating without definite direction of attack and practically without coordination" and claims that the guerrillas frustrated Quyet Thang at the outset and that Operation Complete Victory will be defeated more ignominiously.

A Liberation Radio commentary on the 16th claims that in Operation Quyet Thang about 4,000 troops, mostly Americans, were annihilated and more than 200 tanks and armored cars and about 30 aircraft destroyed. In disparaging Operation Complete Victory, the commentary claims that the units taking part in the operation are those that were "seriously defeated" during the general offensive and in Quyet Thang. It asks how the allies, who were unable to control the five provinces around Saigon in Quyet Thang, can hope to drive the Viet Cong from the 11 provinces "as they have loudly boasted." The commentary concludes by asserting that the armed forces and people are determined to turn Complete Victory into "complete defeat."

Actions connected with these operations which have been reported by VNA are all located in Tay Ninh Province. VNA on the 15th reports that against Operation Complete Victory on 12 April, the PLAF mounted a surprise attack on the encampment of a U.S. battalion 16 kilometers north of Dau Tieng district town, wiping out over 400 GIs. The VNA item also reports a PLAF assault on a position of the U.S. 25th Division 77 kilometers northwest of Saigon on the 14th.

CRIMES

NHAN DAN in a commentary on 17 April carried by VNA that day lists several alleged "crimes" of the allies and claims that "annihilation is the fate that awaits the killers." The commentary asserts that these actions point to the fact that "the U.S. aggressors have been driven to the wall" and they are "taking vengeance on old people, women, and children." Saying that these acts "cannot pass with impunity," the paper concludes by recalling attacks by the PLAF on the allies in areas where the "crimes" reportedly occurred. There are several VNA items describing specific "crimes" allegedly committed by the allies, including one on the 16th which claims that U.S. and Korean troops killed 1,235 people in four districts of Quang Nam and Quang Ngai provinces since February.

KHMER NEW YEAR

The An Giang committee of the NFLSV issued a communique, summarized by VNA on 13 April, which ordered the PLAF in the area to cease military attacks during the Khmer new year, from 13 to 16 April. It says that the Khmer ARVN troops and personnel of the Saigon government will be allowed to return home provided they "do not go by groups and do not carry weapons or means of espionage." PLAF troops are urged to help the Khmers but also to heighten their vigilance and punish any allied attempts to disturb the festival. On 23 March the western Nam Bo NFLSV committee issued a communique allowing new year's visits by Khmer troops and government personnel but did not order a cease fire. VNA publicized this communique 27 March and Liberation Radio broadcast it on 10 April.

WESTERN, CENTRAL NAM BO COMMUNIQUES

The third special communiques of the PLAF commands of western and central Nam Bo were broadcast by Liberation Radio on 29 and 30 March but are only now available. The communiques update the "victories" since the beginning of the Tet offensive on 31 January and cover the period up to 15 March; the second special communique from each of these areas was broadcast on 7 March. (The third special communique of the southern Trung Bo PLAF command, dated 20 March, was also broadcast by Liberation Radio on 30 March, but poor reception precluded processing. The last communique for southern Trung Bo was broadcast on 11 March.)

The western Nam Bo communique--dated 20 March--claims the "annihilation or capture" of more than 18,000 allied troops, including 2,440 Americans, and the "disintegration" of more than 30,000 ARVN troops, policemen, and GVN personnel. The communique says that 375 planes were destroyed, 247 military vehicles smashed, and 77 tankers and fuel transports sunk or burned. The casualties, according to the commentary, put out of action over 40 percent of the ARVN force in the area.

The central Nam Bo command communique, dated 15 March, claims that insurgents killed, wounded, or captured more than 18,500 allied troops, including 3,100 GIs. It says that 430 military vehicles and 100 planes were destroyed and 60 ships sunk. Like the western Nam Bo communique, it claims the liberation of large areas. Hailing attacks on communication lines, it asserts that insurgents destroyed 20 allied roads.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

REVOLUTIONARY ADMINISTRATIONS

Expanded claims for the leadership role of the "revolutionary" or "people's" administration in South Vietnam are made in a 9 April Liberation Radio commentary. It asserts that the administration is being built "into a strong and stable administration which will lead the general

offensive and uprising quickly to complete victory" and that "the people's administration will become the single organization which will rule over South Vietnam and will lead the anti-U.S. national salvation resistance of the South Vietnamese people to final victory." At the same time, the commentary speaks of the NFLSV as being the leader of the South Vietnamese people.

The commentary repeats the claim of the fourth PLAF special communique last month that 1.6 million people in more than 600 villages and hamlets have been liberated and says that "the people's administration has been and is being established throughout the liberated areas, the rural areas, in many towns and areas close to large cities, and in important areas along the strategic communications lines of the enemy." A Liberation Radio broadcast in Mandarin on 12 April echoes the 9 April commentary and further claims the establishment of "peasants' revolutionary committees." It says "revolutionary political power" has been set up "in many streets of Saigon, Hue, and many other provincial cities."

THUA THIEN-HUE COMMITTEE

On 16 April Liberation Radio broadcasts the third communique of the Thua Thien-Hue Revolutionary Committee which, it reports, was adopted at a 1 April meeting, presided over by Le Van Hao, to review the situation during the past month and to set forth a number of new tasks. (The second communique of the committee was broadcast by Liberation Radio on 6 March.) The communique claims that, due to the massive allied troop buildup, the area holds an important position in the southern battlefield. Routinely claiming success in the spring offensive, the communique sets forth tasks for the people to take advantage of the "favorable situation." Stating that the "revolutionary administration at all echelons has been further strengthened and has become increasingly effective," it calls on these administrations to carry out tasks including opposition to conscription, preparation for establishing a "rural convention" as a basis for all relations in the village and to assure building a new village life, and several economic tasks such as studying the land problem, assuring a good harvest, and establishing a budget.

SECURITY

Liberation Radio on 15 April broadcasts a commentary on "vigilance" and the "safeguarding of secrets" attributed to "Tan Cong"—a pseudonym which can be translated as "attack." Tan Cong says that since the spring offensive the allies have tried to reestablish their control machinery in "recently liberated" areas by using "remaining troops for relief operations"

in an attempt to drive out the insurgent armed forces and by "every cunning trick and every form of espionage to collect information for their bombing and shelling and their rangers." He insists that allied efforts have failed because of "our network to safeguard secrets and guard against evil acts" throughout the liberated areas. The commentary stresses the role of the people in security efforts and cites alleged instances of the people's cooperation in discovering and capturing allied "agents."

~~SECRET~~ CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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4985

Drawings on Communist Economic Aid extended to Less Developed Countries
1954-1967

Million Current US $

Recipient Country	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	Communist China
Africa	452.7	244.8	82.8	125.1
Algeria	48.2	20.0	4.2	24.0
Cameroon	0	0	0	0
Central African Republic	2.0	0	0	2.0
Congo (Brazzaville)	9.2	2.2	0	7.0
Ethiopia	21.8	17.8	4.0	0
Ghana	58.8	31.0	24.3	3.5
Guinea	135.6	73.2	25.8	36.6
Kenya	6.5	3.5	0	3.0
Mali	69.0	43.1	5.9	20.0
Mauritania	0	0	0	0
Morocco	5.4	0.2	5.2	0
Nigeria	0	0	0	0
Senegal	0	0	0	0
Sierra Leone	1.3	1.3	0	0
Somalia	34.5	27.3	2.5	4.7
Sudan	12.0	12.0	0	0
Tanzania	26.2	0.5	2.9	22.8
Tunisia	20.6	12.6	8.0	0
Uganda	1.6	0.1	0	1.5
Zambia	0	0	0	0
Far East	378.2	111.7	144.7	121.8
Burma	36.6	13.1	1.5	22.0
Cambodia	70.0	14.2	5.4	50.4
Indonesia	270.1	82.9	137.8	49.4
Laos	1.5	1.5	0	0
Latin America	65.5	31.3	34.2	0
Argentina	36.5	31.3	5.2	0
Brazil	29.0	0	29.0	0
Chile	0	0	0	0
Ecuador	0	0	0	0
Uruguay	0	0	0	0

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SECRET
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Drawings on Communist Economic Aid Extended to Less Developed Countries
1954-1967
(Continued)

Million Current US $

Recipient Country	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	Communist China
Near East and South Asia	2,713.1	2,092.3	447.0	173.8
Afghanistan	517.3	505.2	7.1	5.0
Ceylon	56.7	21.0	3.4	32.3
Cyprus	1.3	0	1.3	0
Greece	7.7	7.7	0	0
India	852.3	714.8	137.5	0
Iran	30.2	12.0	18.2	0
Iraq	142.8	123.8	19.0	0
Nepal	42.2	16.7	0	25.5
Pakistan	91.4	55.7	3.6	32.1
Syria	105.3	67.5	29.7	8.1
Turkey	22.0	8.3	13.7	0
United Arab Republic	752.9	508.8	207.4	36.7
Yemen	91.0	50.8	6.1	34.1
Total of four areas	3,609.5*	2,480.1	708.7	420.7

* It is estimated that approximately $493 million of the total was drawn during 1967.

Communist Economic Technicians in Less Developed Countries a/
1967

Persons

Area and Country	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	Communist China
Total	**21,175**	**10,795**	**5,685**	**4,695**
Africa	**10,810**	**3,800**	**3,880**	**3,130**
Algeria	2,235	1,480	695	60
Cameroon	5	5	0	0
Chad	5	5	0	0
Congo (Brazzaville)	300	160	0	140
Ethiopia	460	380 b/	80	0
Ghana	70	0	70	0
Guinea	1,670	400	270	1,000 c/
Kenya	40	30	10	0
Libya	950	50	900	0
Mali	1,880	355	80	1,445 d/
Mauritania	40	0	0	40
Morocco	120	70	50	0
Niger	35	0	5	30
Nigeria	120	15	105	0
Sierra Leone	15	15	0	0
Somalia	455	370	30	55
Sudan	125	100	25	0
Tanzania	470	15	110	345 e/
Tunisia	1,765	315	1,445 f/	5
Uganda	35	25	5	5
Zambia	15	10	0	5
Far East	**965**	**230**	**100**	**635**
Burma	500	40	10	450 g/
Cambodia	320	90	45	185
Indonesia	145	100	45	0
Latin America	**115**	**10**	**105**	**0**
Argentina	25	0	25	0
Brazil	70	0	70	0
Chile	10	5	5	0
Mexico	10	5	5	0

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Communist Economic Technicians in Less Developed Countries a/
1967
(Continued)

Persons

Area and Country	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	Communist China
Near East and South Asia	**9,285**	**6,755**	**1,600**	**930**
Afghanistan	1,090	1,000	30	60
Ceylon	150	85	50	15
India	1,930	1,500	430	0
Iran	880	800	80	0
Iraq	850	500	350	0
Nepal	525	100	0	425
Pakistan	155	140	0	15
Syria	760	545	200	15
Turkey	5	5	0	0
United Arab Republic	2,000	1,600	400	0
Yemen	940	480	60	400

a. Minimum estimates of the number of persons present for a period on one month or more. Numbers are rounded to the nearest five.
b. The number was reduced to 120 by the end of 1967 as Ethiopians replaced Soviet technicians at the completed oil refinery at Assab.
c. The number was reduced to 600 by the end of 1967 with the departure of 400 Chinese technicians as the Kinkon dam project neared completion.
d. Including 35 North Vietnamese and 45 North Korean personnel.
e. Including 5 North Koreans.
f. The number was reduced to 1,195 by the end of 1967 with the departure of 250 Bulgarian technicians as the sports stadium neared completion.
g. All Chinese technicians were withdrawn from Burma during November.

Academic Students from Less Developed Countries
Being Trained in Communist Countries
as of December 1967 a/

Persons

Area and Country	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	Communist China
Total	14,345	10,240	4,105	b/
Africa	7,940	5,710	2,230	
Algeria	410	225	185	
Angola	35	35	--	
Botswana	30	25	5	
Burundi	60	60	--	
Cameroon	285	245	40	
Central African Republic	35	30	5	
Chad	40	40	--	
Comoro Islands	5	5	--	
Congo (B)	140	135	5	
Congo (K)	260	205	55	
Dahomey	135	125	10	
Ethiopia	155	70	85	
Gabon	--	--	--	
Gambia	30	25	5	
Ghana	620	500	120	
Guinea	350	240	110	
Ivory Coast	75	40	35	
Kenya	750	550	200	
Lesotho	--	--	--	
Liberia	10	5	5	
Libya	5	--	5	
Malagasy Republic	--	--	--	
Malawi	5	--	5	
Mali	545	285	260	
Mauritania	5	5	--	
Mauritius	40	30	10	
Morocco	85	80	5	
Mozambique	15	15	--	
Niger	--	--	--	
Nigeria	675	525	150	

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Academic Students from Less Developed Countries
Being Trained in Communist Countries
as of December 1967 a/
(Continued)

Persons

Area and Country	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	Communist China
Africa (Continued)				
Portuguese Guinea	5	--	5	
Rhodesia	15	15	--	
Rwanda	70	65	5	
Senegal	85	75	10	
Sierra Leone	260	250	10	
Somalia	565	510	55	
Sudan	1,265	700	565	
Tanzania	425	340	85	
Togo	--	--	--	
Tunisia	165	50	115	
Uganda	180	150	30	
Upper Volta	10	5	5	
Zambia	95	50	45	
Far East	1,210	745	465	
Burma	255	140	115	
Cambodia	65	15	50	
Indonesia	815	520	295	
Laos	75	70	5	
Thailand	--	--	--	
Latin America	1,410	1,110	300	
Argentina	110	85	25	
Bolivia	210	110	100	
Brazil	70	45	25	
Chile	215	200	15	
Colombia	65	60	5	
Costa Rica	95	55	40	
Dominican Republic	20	20	--	
Ecuador	70	70	--	
El Salvador	5	5	--	
Guatemala	30	20	10	
Guyana	75	30	45	
Haiti	15	15	--	
Honduras	20	20	--	
Mexico	130	130	--	
Nicaragua	70	65	5	
Panama	45	35	10	
Paraguay	--	--	--	

Academic Students from Less Developed Countries
Being Trained in Communist Countries
as of December 1967 a/
(Continued)

Persons

Area and Country	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	Communist China
Latin American (Continued)				
Peru	105	100	5	
Uruguay	--	--	--	
Venezuela	60	45	15	
Near East and South Asia	3,785	2,675	1,110	
Afghanistan	375	285	90	
Ceylon	220	160	60	
Cyprus	220	120	100	
Greece				
India	300	200	100	
Iran	50	50	--	
Iraq	1,035	755	280	
Israel	10	10	--	
Jordan	65	45	20	
Kuwait	10	10	--	
Lebanon	435	300	135	
Nepal	55	55	--	
Pakistan	25	25	--	
Saudi Arabia	--	--	--	
South Yemen	30	15	15	
Syrian Arab Republic	285	210	75	
Turkey	--	--	--	
United Arab Republic	345	205	140	
Yemen	325	230	95	

a/ Numbers are rounded to nearest five. Leaders indicate either that information is not available or that no students are known to have gone.

b/ An estimated 190 students from less developed countries are probably still in Communist China, but are not believed to have resumed their studies since the program was suspended in September 1966.

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~~SECRET SAVIN~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

Sc No. 08360/68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
3 May 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Hanoi's Paris Initiative and the Possibility of a New Communist Military Offensive

1. The timing of Hanoi's move to break the deadlock on selection of a site for talks with the US may well be related to Vietnamese Communist preparations--apparently nearing completion--to launch major offensive military actions. The North Vietnamese may hope to push political developments in the war along to the point where they can be most directly orchestrated with Communist military plans in South Vietnam. There have been numerous indications that the Communists are gearing up for another major offensive, most likely in the months of May or June. Hanoi may have feared that if the deadlock over the site of talks persisted much longer, the political impact of any new military push would have been largely lost. In view of its decision some months ago to move to a "fight-talk" stage of the war, Hanoi would probably wish to prevent such a development if possible.

2. At the time of their 3 April offer of "contacts" with the US, the North Vietnamese may have anticipated fairly rapid progress toward a full bombing halt and the initiation of formal talks on a settlement of the war. Communist military activities in April may have been specifically tailored to the prospective diplomatic dialogue. The drop in major enemy military initiatives in early April may have been intended in part to improve the atmosphere for preliminary contacts with the US designed to obtain a

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[redacted]

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full bombing cessation. Meanwhile, the Communists used the lull to prepare for large-scale offensive operations by early May, when Hanoi may have expected substantive discussions to be under way. Indeed the Communists may have expected the US response to a negotiating offer to be rapid and thus keep their military and diplomatic timetables synchronized. This could account for their quite precipitous addition of Warsaw to Phnom Penh, once the US had rejected the latter.

3. Heavy North Vietnamese infiltration and logistics operations in support of Communist forces in South Vietnam accelerated in April. Major Communist military units in several parts of the south continued the disengagements they had started in late March. Some units withdrew from their usual areas of tactical operations in order to resupply and to be reinforced. The heavy flow of infiltrators from North Vietnam doubtless is being used to beef up existing units and to help form new ones. The entire effort probably was carried on with a view toward applying heavy military pressures during a period of negotiations.

4. The question of exact timing in kicking off any new offensive is still highly conjectural, even if the Communists are attempting to tie it in with political developments. A number of reports [redacted] have said that major attacks would be launched between late April and early May. Other reports, however, have said such attacks would occur between early May and 19 May; still others have mentioned later dates. There are indications in some areas--especially Saigon and I Corps--that attacks may well be imminent, although their timing and scope may be upset by allied operations.

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5. In sum, the evidence suggests that attacks could come at any time but we are unable to state with confidence whether they will occur before 10 May. Hanoi could be planning to launch major military actions in South Vietnam just before or shortly after the opening of the Paris talks. We think it equally possible, however, that major Communist military initiatives in the South may be held back for a while in the hope that preliminary contacts will soon

bring about a full bombing halt. Once this is accomplished, offensive actions could be geared to obtain a maximum impact in ensuing discussions on substantive war issues.

6. The latest report we have of the timing of Communist military operations in the Saigon area indicates that attacks on the city and nearby installations may be launched in the next few days.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

PRIORITY

Intelligence Information Cable

IN 12467

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DD/I	EXO												

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

[redacted]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

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CITE [redacted]

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DIST 16 MAY 1968

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 15-16 MAY 1968

SUBJECT PRESIDENT THIEU'S MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT KY AND THE SENIOR GENERALS TO DISCUSS CABINET REORGANIZATION AND GOVERNMENT POLICIES

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (16 MAY 1968) FIELD NO. [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted]

SUMMARY: [redacted] VICE PRES-IDENT KY AND THE SENIOR GENERALS MET AT THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF COMPOUND ON 15 MAY TO DISCUSS KY'S SELF DEFENSE ORGANIZATION. AT A LATTER MEET-

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

S-[redacted]E-T [redacted]

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OCT 1999

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

S-E-[redacted]E-T [redacted]

ING THE SAME DAY WITH PRESIDENT THIEU, THIEU REFUSED TO DISCUSS WITH KY AND THE GENERALS HIS CABINET REORGANIZATION PLANS, BUT SAID HE WOULD REVEAL THEM BY 18 MAY. (KY CLAIMED LATER THAT THIEU HAD ALSO REFUSED TO DISCUSS HIS SPECIFIC PLANS WITH HIM IN PRIVATE.) THIEU ALSO TURNED ASIDE THE GENERALS' PLEAS FOR A MORE AUTHORITARIAN STYLE OF GOVERNING AND FOR A CANCELLATION OF THIEU'S REFORMS IN PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION [redacted] THE MILITARY WILL RELUCTANTLY ACCEPT THIEU'S DECISIONS AND WILL NOT OPPOSE TRAN VAN HUONG'S APPOINTMENT AS PRIME MINISTER BUT WOULD RESIGN ALONG WITH KY IF KEY MILITARY OR POLICE OFFICIALS WERE REMOVED. END SUMMARY.

1. [redacted] VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY AND THE SENIOR GENERALS MET WITH PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU ON 15 MAY TO DISCUSS THEIR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE PERFORMANCE AND POLICIES OF THE THIEU GOVERNMENT. [redacted] EARLIER THAT DAY THE GENERALS HAD MET WITH KY AT THE JOINT GENERAL

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(E)
3.4(b)(1)

S-E[redacted]-E-T

[redacted]

STAFF COMPOUND. IN ADDITION TO KY AND KHANG OTHERS ATTENDING WERE I CORPS COMMANDER LIEUTENANT GENERAL HOANG XUAN LAM, II CORPS COMMANDER MAJOR GENERAL LU MONG LAN, IV CORPS COMMANDER MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN DUC THANG, CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN, MINISTER OF DEFENSE LIEUTENANT GENERAL NGUYEN VAN VY, MINISTER OF INTERIOR LUEUTENANT GENERAL LINH QUANG VIEN, AND MINISTER OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT LIEUTENANT GENERAL NGUYEN BAO TRI.

2. IN THE MAIN THE GENERALS' THESIS AS PRESENTED TO THIEU WAS THAT DURING THESE CRITICAL DAYS, WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH VIETNAM MEETING IN PARIS, AND WITH THE ENEMY APPLYING MAXIMUM PRESSURE IN THE HOPE OF ATTAINING DECISIVE MILITARY AND POLITICAL VICTORIES AND OF INFLUENCING PEACE TALKS, THE GOVERNMENT MUST BE STRONG, DECISIVE AND TIGHTLY ORGANIZED. THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE MUST BE GRANTED FULL POWERS

1.5(E)
3.4(b)(1)

S-[redacted]R-E-T
(Classification) [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY UNTIL THE CRISIS SUBSIDES. THE GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY MUST FUNCTION AS ONE. NOW IS NOT THE TIME TO EXPERIMENT WITH CONCEPTS OF CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION WHICH MAY BE SUITABLE IN TIME OF PEACE BUT ARE INADEQUATE IN A WARTIME SITUATION.

3. THE CORPS COMMANDERS SPECIFICALLY ASKED THIEU TO CANCEL HIS PROJECTED OVERHAUL OF THE PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM UNTIL AFTER THE WAR. THEY COMPLAINED THAT THE CHANGES WHICH ALREADY HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED HAVE SO FRAGMENTED THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECISION MAKING AND WEAKENED COORDINATION BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES IN THE PROVINCES, THAT IT IS DIFFICULT FOR THE CORPS COMMANDERS TO DO THEIR JOBS.

4. IN RESPONSE THIEU SAID THAT HE TOO WAS DISTURBED BY THE DELIBERATE PACE OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, BUT THAT HE SAW NO ALTERNATIVE TO WORKING WITH IT. SEVERAL OF THE GENERALS SUGGESTED HE SECRETLY THREATENED TO PROLONG THE ASSEMBLY IF IT WAS NOT MORE RESPONSIVE. THIEU

S-[redacted]R-E-T [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

S-E-[redacted]-E-T [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

SUGGESTED THIS TACK WAS UNREALISTIC, AT WHICH POINT SEVERAL OF THE GENERALS SAID THAT THIEU COULD GET WHAT HE WANTED FROM THE ASSEMBLY IF THE MILITARY WAS BEHIND HIM AND IF HE USED THE FULL POWER OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENCY.

5. THIEU THEN EXPOUNDED ON HIS CONCEPT OF HOW THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD FUNCTION. THIS EXPOSITION MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT INTEND TO REVERSE ANY OF HIS ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS OR CHANGE HIS PLANS TO "CIVILIANIZE" THE GOVERNMENT.

6. DURING THE MEETING KY ASKED THIEU IF HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THE PLANNED RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, SPECIFICALLY HIS PLANS TO CHANGE THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE CABINET. HOWEVER, THIEU REFUSED TO COMMENT. WHEN PRESSED, THE PRESIDENT SAID HE WOULD MAKE HIS INTENTIONS CLEAR ON THIS SUBJECT BY 18 MAY. [redacted] ASKED [redacted] LATER IF THIEU HAD GIVEN KY THIS INFORMATION IN PRIVATE. KY SAID NO. KY SAID HE HAD HAD

1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

A PRIVATE MEETING WITH THIEU ON 13 MAY TO DISCUSS CHANGES IN THE GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, DURING THE MEETING THIEU TALKED IN GENERALITIES AND REFUSED TO SAY WHETHER OR NOT HE PLANNED TO REPLACE PRIME MINISTER LOC WITH TRAN VAN HUONG.

7. [redacted] THE GENERALS HAD NOT MET WITH THIEU TO DISSUADE HIM FROM REMOVING LOC. ALTHOUGH KY HAS RESERVATIONS ABOUT HUONG AS A "THIRD CENTER OF EXECUTIVE POWER" MOST OF THE GENERALS ARE NOT OPPOSED TO HUONG OR ANY STRONGLY ANTI-COMMUNIST PREMIER AS LONG AS HE AGREES NOT TO MEDDLE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE ARMED FORCES. IF THIEU OR A NEW PREMIER ATTEMPTS TO REMOVE BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN NGOC LOAN, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE, OR GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN, KY AND ALL THE SENIOR GENERALS WILL RESIGN.

8. [redacted] KY AND THE GENERALS AGREED THAT THE BEST WAY THE GVN COULD INFLUENCE THE PARIS TALKS WAS TO ACHIEVE SOLID

1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

S-E[redacted]R-E-T [redacted]
(classification) (handling controls)

MILITARY AND POLITICAL PROGRESS IN VIETNAM. TO DO SO THEY FEEL SOUTH VIETNAM MUST HAVE A STRONG AND UNIFIED GOVERNMENT LED BY THE MILITARY AND THIS WAS THE MESSAGE THEY WERE TRYING TO CONVEY TO THIEU.

[redacted] A RECENTLY CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT SAID THE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD WIN IN PARIS IF THEY WERE PATIENT BECAUSE OF THE SERIOUS CONTRADICTIONS IN THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT. THERE WERE CONFLICTS BETWEEN THIEU AND KY, BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND THE LEGISLATURE, BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE CIVILIANS, AND BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND THE VIETNAMESE. EVENTUALLY THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT WOULD COME APART FROM THE PRESSURE OF THESE CONTRADICTIONS. COMMUNIST STRATEGY WAS TO EXACERBATE THESE CONFLICTS. IF THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT COLLAPSED POLITICALLY, THE DISCUSSIONS IN PARIS WOULD BE ACADEMIC.

9. [redacted] THE GENERALS WERE VERY DISCOURAGED OVER THIEU'S UNWILLINGNESS TO MODIFY HIS COURSE. HOW-

S-E[redacted]R-E-T [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

S-E-[redacted]E-T
(Classification) [redacted] (Control(s))

EVER, KHANG MAINTAINED THAT THE GENERALS DID NOT PLAN TO TAKE ANY PRECIPITATE ACTION AGAINST THIEU OR THE GOVERNMENT, UNLESS THE PRESIDENT OFFERED SOME STRONG PROVOCATION. [redacted]

[redacted] THE PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED TO STRENGTHEN HIS PERSONAL POWER POSITION NOW WHILE HE STILL HAS THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND AMERICAN MILITARY POWER BEHIND HIM. MOST OF THIEU'S ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS, [redacted] ARE DESIGNED MORE TO STRENGTHEN THIEU'S PERSONAL POWER POSITON THAN TO STRENGTHEN THE GOVERNMENT. [redacted] THIEU FAVORS "CIVILIANIZING" THE GOVERNMENT SINCE THIS IS THE BEST WAY HE CAN NEUTRALIZE THE POWER OF THE MILITARY. [redacted] THIEU PLANS TO USE THE CHANGES IN THE PROVINCES TO ASSIST HIM IN BUILDING A PERSONAL POLITICAL PARTY IN THE MANNER OF EX-PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM.

10. [redacted] KY TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE MEETING AT THE JGS COMPOUND TO EXPLAIN TE NEW SELF DEFENSE FORCE. MOST OF THE GENRALS

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

S-E-[redacted]R-E-T [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

S-E[redacted]E-T
(classification) [redacted] (system controls)

WERE VERY SKEPTICAL OF ITS VALUE AND SAID THE MILITARY WANTED NO PART OF IT. HOWEVER, THE CORPS COMMANDERS AGREED TO PROVIDE ARMS AND TRAINING IF REQUIRED.

11. [redacted] NO IDEA WHO WOULD BE PRIME MINISTER NEXT WEEK. [redacted] RUMOR THAT HUONG WAS RELUCTANT TO TAKE THE JOB SINCE HE HAD HEARD OF KY'S OPPOSITON. ALL THREE GENERALS PRESENTLY IN THE CABINET, VY, TRI, AND VIEN, STATED AT THE MEETING AT THE JGS THAT THEY WOULD NOT REMAIN IN A SUBSEQUENT CABINET EVEN IF ASKED. [redacted] FAIRLY CERTAIN THAT THIEU WOULD ASK GENERAL TRAN THIEN KHIEM AND LIEUTENANT GENERAL DO CAO TRI TO JOIN A NEW CABINET.

12. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR BERGER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND, GENERAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR KOMER) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF [redacted]

[redacted]

GR[redacted]P 1

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

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Case # NLJ 97-325
Document # 49a

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[redacted]

GROUP [redacted] Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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[redacted]RET 211426Z CITE [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

DIST 21 MAY 1968

Rostow

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 20 MAY 1968

SUBJECT 1. SENIOR GENERALS' DECISION NOT TO OPPOSE TRAN VAN HUONG AS PRIME MINISTER AS LONG AS HE AVOIDS INVOLVEMENT IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
2. NATURE AND FORM OF AGREEMENT SIGNED BY GENERALS ON 30 JUNE 1967

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (21 MAY 1968) FIELD NO. [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted]

1. ON 20 MAY 1968, THE SENIOR GENERALS HELD A SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY IN THE LATTER'S OFFICE TO DISCUSS THEIR POSTURE TOWARD PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[redacted]

[redacted]RET

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
OCT 1999

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

S-E[redacted]-E-T [redacted]

(classification) (dissem controls)

AND PRIME MINISTER DESIGNATE TRAN VAN HUONG. THE GENERALS DECIDED TO TAKE NO ACTION AGAINST THIEU AND TO ASSUME A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE TOWARD HUONG. THE GENERALS WILL GIVE HUONG THEIR TACIT APPROVAL AS LONG AS HE DOES NOT MEDDLE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE ARMED FORCES.

2. THE GENERALS CALLED THE MEETINGS BECAUSE THIEU HAD NOT CONSULTED THEM REGARDING HUONG'S APPOINTMENT AS PRIME MINISTER. KY, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS NOT EVEN OFFICIALLY INFORMED BY THIEU OF HIS PLAN TO APPOINT HUONG UNTIL 1845 HOURS ON 18 MAY; WHEN THE NOTE ARRIVED FROM THIEU'S OFFICE, KY WAS IN NHA TRANG. THE GENERALS VIEW THIEU'S BEHAVIOR IN THE MATTER AS A VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT THAT THE SENIOR GENERALS, INCLUDING THIEU, SIGNED AFTER THE 30 JUNE 1967 MEETING AT WHICH THIEU WAS DESIGNATED THE MILITARY PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE.

3. ON 20 MAY 1968, KY SHOWED AN AIDE THE MUCH-DISCUSSED AND FREQUENTLY DENIED AGREEMENT, WHICH CONSISTS OF TWO TYPEWRITTEN PAGES. THE DOCUMENT STATES THAT WHOEVER AMONG THE SIGNATORIES IS DESIGNATED AS THE GROUP'S PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AGREES THAT HE WILL NOT MAKE ANY MAJOR POLICY DECISIONS AS PRESIDENT WITHOUT THE ADVISE AND CONSENT OF THE COUNCIL OF GENERALS. THE AGREEMENT

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

S-E[redacted]E-T [redacted]

(classification) (dissem controls)

THUS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THE COUNCIL OF GENERALS AS THE BEHIND-THE-SCENES POWER IN THE GOVERNMENT. KY SIGNED AS CHAIRMAN AND MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN DUC THANG AS SECRETARY GENERAL, WHILE THIEU SIGNED AS A MEMBER, HIS SIGNATURE APPEARING IN FOURTH PLACE ON THE DOCUMENT. KY TOLD HIS AIDE THAT THANG HAD ACTUALLY DRAFTED THE AGREEMENT.

4. (FIELD COMMENT: THE EXISTENCE OR NON-EXISTENCE OF THIS DOCUMENT WAS THE SUBJECT OF CONSIDERABLE REPORTING DURING THE FIRST PART OF JULY 1967.)

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR BERGER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND, GENERAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR KOMER, CHIEF OF STAFF, J2) 7TH AIR FORCE (GENERAL MOMYER ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF [redacted]

[redacted]

C[redacted]P 1

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

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212132Z CITE TDCS-314/08455-68

Content UNCLASSIFIED

per 058375

date 8 NOV 1976

DIST 21 MAY 1968

COUNTRY: LAOS

DOI: EARLY JANUARY 1968

SUBJECT: PROPAGANDA DISPLAY OF FOUR AMERICAN PILOTS IN HOUA PHAN PROVINCE

ACQ:

SOURCE:

1. DURING THE PATHET LAO NEO NEW YEAR CELEBRATION OF 1966, WHICH FELL BETWEEN 28 DECEMBER 1966 AND 3 JANUARY 1967, FOUR AMERICAN PILOTS WERE DISPLAYED FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES IN BAN HANG LONG (VH 1262). DURING THE HALF HOUR THAT THE PILOTS WERE ON DISPLAY, A PATHET LAO PROPAGANDIST EXPLAINED TO THE VILLAGERS

THAT THE PILOTS WOULD NOT BE KILLED, BUT WOULD BE HELD FOR PRISONER EXCHANGE AFTER THE START OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. THE PILOTS APPEARED TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH AND VILLAGERS SAID THEY HAD RECEIVED GOOD TREATMENT; THEY WERE GETTING MILK AND OTHER FOODS TO WHICH THEY WERE ACCUSTOMED. THE PROPAGANDIST TOLD THE VILLAGERS THE PILOTS' NAMES, BUT SAI VANG HEU COULD NOT REMEMBER THEM.

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY AIR USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

REPORT CLASS [redacted]

TOCS-314/08455-68

[redacted] 211725Z MAY 68

[redacted] THE SOURCE LOOKED AT PHOTOGRAPHS AND IDENTIFIED ONE PRISONER AS CAPTAIN DAVID L. HEDLICKA, AO 3855742. HE SAID THAT ANOTHER RESEMBLED CAPTAIN JAMES W. LEWIS, AO 2211197, BUT LOOKED MUCH OLDER THAN THE MAN IN THE PHOTOGRAPH. THE OTHER PRISONERS WERE SMALLER AND RESEMBLED LIEUTENANT JUNIOR GRADE WILLIAM E. SWANSON, 543832 AND CAPTAIN THEODORE E. DRYSZAK, FV 3859859.

Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 97-325
Document # 41a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

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IN 16202

41a

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

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		DD/I	EXO										

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[redacted] THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

[redacted]ET 221717Z CITE [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

DIST 22 MAY 1968

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 21 MAY 1968

SUBJECT MEETING OF HUONG AND KY ON 21 MAY

Reston

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (22 MAY 1968) FIELD NO.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. PRIME MINISTER DESIGNATE TRAN VAN HUONG CALLED ON VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY ON 21 MAY FOR WHAT HE SAID WAS NOT A COURTESY CALL BUT RATHER "A SEARCH FOR A CONFIDANT" AFTER MANY LONELY WEEKS OF TRYING TO DECIDE ON HIS POLITICAL ROLE IN THE COUNTRY. HUONG NOTED HE HAD REJECTED MANY REQUESTS FROM PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU TO SERVE AS PRIME MINISTER BUT THAT THIEU HAD FINALLY INSISTED, AT

[redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

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OCT 1999

[redacted]ET

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

WHICH POINT HE HAD FELT OBLIGATED TO ACCEPT. HUONG SAID HE WAS ALL TOO CONSCIOUS OF ALLEGATIONS THAT HE IS A SUDISTE, A SEPARATIST AND A POTENTIAL COMPROMISER WITH THE VIET CONG (VC). ALL THESE ACCUSATION HE SAID, ARE SIMPLY NOT TRUE. HE SAID HE WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE WIDELY-HELD ASSUMPTION THAT KY IS OPPOSED TO HIM, WHICH HE DOES REALLY BELIEVE IS TRUE.

2. KY RESPONDED BY ASSURING HUONG OF HIS CERTAINTY THAT HUONG IS NOT A SEPARATIST AND WOULD NOT COMPROMISE WITH THE VC. HE SAID HE IS NOT AGAINST HUONG, BUT HE DID EXPRESS SOME CONCERN ABOUT THE YOUNGER AGGRESSIVE AND SOMETIMES UNSTABLE SET AROUND HUONG WHO COULD "SPOIL IT FOR THE ADULTS." KY MENTIONED VO LUONG TRIEU AND NGUYEN VAN TRUONG BY NAME. HUONG SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE BENT OF SUCH PERSONS AROUND HIM AND DEPRECATED THE AMOUNT OF INFLUENCE THEY WOULD HAVE ON HIS POLICIES AND GOVERNMENT.

3. KY ENCOURAGED HUONG TO GO AHEAD WITH FORMING HIS GOVERNMENT AND NOT BE OVERLY DISTURBED BY RUMORS AND GOSSIP. HE PROMISED THAT AS LONG AS HUONG SERVED THE COUNTRY AND DID NOT COMPROMISE WITH THE VC HE (KY) WOULD BE WITH HUONG. HUONG SAID THAT EVEN THOUGH HE HAD EXPECTED TO BE REASSURED BY KY, HE FOUND KY'S REMARKS VERY SATISFYING. HE THEN TOLD KY THAT IF HE EVER TOOK ANY ACTION THAT KY THOUGHT WAS A

[redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

THIS SOURCE ALSO REPORTED THAT KY REMARKED TO A CLOSE ASSOCIATE AFTER THE MEETING THAT HE WAS IMPRESSED BY HUONG'S EVIDENT SINCERITY IN SEEKING HIS COLLABORATION.)

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE DIR/JUSPAO (MR. NICKEL ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF [redacted]

[redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

NLJ-141-022-3-3-8

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

1. [redacted] The average strength of these units, based on the 22 groups for which personnel complements are known, is 496, suggesting that as many as 17,000 troops are involved. This continuing high rate of infiltration from the North is significant because bad weather beginning in May in the Laotian infiltration corridor normally slows troop movements.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

2. [redacted] Some of the groups [redacted] have had fewer than 200 personnel, lowering the average strength of this month's infiltration groups to well below a norm of 586 since the first of this year. [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

3. [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

4. [redacted] the number of infiltrators [redacted] moving south in North Vietnam this year is estimated to be in excess of 100,000. [redacted] the actual number deploying since the first of the year may be substantially higher. How much higher is unknown at present.

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DATE: MAY 2001

23 May 1968

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

5. The evidence in support of the theory that more than 100,000 have already deployed from the North in 1968 is to be found in [redacted] captured documents, and prisoner interrogations. First is the movement of the 304th and 320th divisions into South Vietnam by January of this year. These units, totaling 16-20,000 troops, were not included in the estimate of 100,000 [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

6. [redacted] the 177 infiltration groups [redacted] probably do not include all the groups which have moved during the past four and a half months. Although they find it impossible at present to figure out how many are being missed while en route, they acknowledge that total deployments may be well in excess of current estimates.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

7. This impression is supported by the prisoners who have supplied infiltration group numbers [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

8. MACV notes that since 1 February 1968 it has learned of the existence of 218 infiltration groups-- [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

9. There is no solid indication that North Vietnam is depleting its strategic reserve of trained combat personnel in order to keep up the present high level of infiltration. Most of the major North Vietnamese units still assigned to the defense of the homeland show no signs of moving from the North at this time. Rather it appears that the current wave of infiltrating personnel is comprised largely of draftees, reserves, and an unknown number of labor personnel.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

10. Evidence is growing that North Vietnam is drawing heavily on "second echelon" manpower in order to carry on infiltration to the south. Captives taken in recent engagements in South Vietnam contain an increasing proportion of young, ill-trained, poorly motivated, and physically unfit troops. It seems likely that persons previously exempt from service for reasons of health now are being taken.

11. It is possible that Hanoi has decided that all such individuals can make a contribution during a year when so much is at stake. Some of them could be used in support of the expanded logistic system required by the deployment of an unprecedented number of troops. Those who are assigned to combat units may be regarded as cannon fodder in keeping up the kind of military pressure the enemy hopes to maintain during the next few months.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

23 May 1968

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~~Secret~~

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1998

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

Foreign Shipping to North Vietnam
After Three Years of Rolling Thunder

~~Secret~~

ER IM 68-76
June 1968

Copy № 18

Foreword

This memorandum describes the changes in foreign shipping to North Vietnam since the initiation of the Rolling Thunder program in early 1965. Changes in the volume and composition of North Vietnamese imports and exports by sea and in the role of Free World ships in carrying this trade are emphasized. The year 1964 is used as the basis of comparison. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown. All tonnages are given in metric tons.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
June 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Foreign Shipping to North Vietnam After Three Years of Rolling Thunder

Summary

Since the beginning of the Rolling Thunder program in early 1965, North Vietnam's seaborne imports have more than doubled, exports have dwindled, and Free World ships have been largely replaced in the trade by Communist ships.

As the war in Vietnam intensified, North Vietnam's dependence on its Communist allies for material assistance increased significantly. Imports by sea rose from 690,000 metric tons in 1964 to 1,420,000 tons in 1967. During the first four months of 1968, imports were 14 percent higher than during the same period in 1967. The largest increase occurred in 1967 when domestic grain production had to be supplemented by heavy imports of rice from China and wheat flour from the USSR. Imports of petroleum and general and miscellaneous cargoes (including steel, machinery, vehicles, soft coal, and chemicals) reached record levels during early 1968. Deliveries from Communist countries currently account for 98 percent of total import tonnage, compared with 74 percent in 1964. No imports of arms or ammunition by sea have been detected.

Exports, which made up 69 percent of the tonnage of North Vietnam's seaborne trade in 1964, began dropping in 1965, fell off more in 1966 and

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and information on ship arrivals was coordinated with the Naval Intelligence Command.

1967, and currently account for only 27 percent of total trade. The decline in exports is attributable almost entirely to the effects of the bombing program.

The combined effects of US diplomatic maneuvers, the lack of export cargoes, and the risks to ships and crews from the Rolling Thunder program caused many Free World ships to withdraw from the trade. Calls by Free World ships at North Vietnamese ports declined from 69 percent of total calls in 1964 to 20 percent in 1966 and 1967. However, Free World ship calls began to increase in 1968 and now account for about 27 percent of total calls.

The number of Free World countries participating in the trade also has been sharply reduced. In 1964, ships of 15 Free World countries sailed to North Vietnam. In 1966 and 1967, ships of only five Free World countries remained in the trade. Most of the calls by Free World ships during the last two years have been made by British-flag ships based in Hong Kong and owned by firms controlled by Communist China. These ships are engaged for the most part in carrying cargoes from China to North Vietnam.

As the role of Free World ships in the North Vietnam trade has diminished, the role of Communist ships has increased. Through 1966, Chinese vessels dominated the Communist shipping, but in 1967, Soviet ships made 181 calls, compared with 97 by Chinese ships. Soviet ships continue to predominate in 1968.

Since the end of US airstrikes north of the 20th Parallel, the pace of shipping to North Vietnam has quickened. The number of foreign ships calling at North Vietnamese ports in May was the highest since March 1965, and imports were at a record high level. A Japanese ship arrived in May, the first since March 1965. Turnaround time of ships in the port of Haiphong, which had averaged 28 days in March, dropped to 19 days in April, and to 14 days in May. Extensive dredging of the approaches to the port has been resumed after a lapse of two years. Extension and repair of the wharves has been continued.

The increase in shipping activity probably will continue. Imports are expected to continue at a high level; as coal processing and handling facilities are restored, exports of coal should increase significantly.

Changes in North Vietnam's Seaborne Trade

1. The volume of North Vietnam's seaborne trade has changed only slightly since 1964. It increased slightly in 1965, decreased in both 1966 and 1967, and is on the upswing in 1968. The composition of this trade, however, has changed drastically. Imports have more than doubled during the period, while exports have dropped to less than 40 percent of the 1964 level, as shown in the following tabulation:

	1964		1965		1966		1967		Jan-Apr 1968	
	Million Tons	Percent	Million Tons	Percent	Million Tons	Percent	Million Tons	Percent	Million Tons	Percent
Total seaborne trade	*2.3*	*100*	*3.5*	*100*	*2.2*	*100*	*2.0*	*100*	*0.8*	*100*
Exports	1.6	69	1.7	67	1.2	53	0.6	29	0.2	27
Imports	0.7	31	0.8	33	1.0	47	1.4	71	0.6	73

Contraction of Exports

2. North Vietnam's exports by sea actually increased in 1965 as various foreign aid projects began to show results. Exports would have been larger, however, if airstrikes in July had not interdicted the Hanoi - Lao Cai rail line and rendered further exports of apatite impractical. In 1966, exports decreased substantially, as shown in the tabulation below, because of the virtual absence of apatite exports and a reduction in coal exports, both of which were due to the effect of US airstrikes:

	Thousand Tons				
	1964	1965	1966	1967	Jan-Apr 1968
Total exports	*1,560*	*1,710*	*1,170*	*570*	*226*
Coal	950	1,150	940	430	206
Apatite	340	320	10	Negl.	Negl.
Cement	140	80	100	30	Negl.
Pig iron	40	50	40	20	Negl.
Miscellaneous and general cargo	90	120	80	80	20

3. The slightly larger decline in exports in 1967 was due mostly to the sharp drop in coal exports, which resulted from heavy US airstrikes on powerplants and facilities for the transportation processing, and dockside loading of coal. Cement exports also declined as the result of airstrikes in April 1967 that made North Vietnam's only major cement plant inoperable. Exports of pig iron ceased

after airstrikes in 1967 on the Thai Nguyen metallurgical plant.

Expansion of Imports

4. During the three years of Rolling Thunder, seaborne imports to North Vietnam have more than doubled, increasing 23 percent in 1965, 21 percent in 1966, and 38 percent in 1967. Imports during the first four months of 1968 were 14 percent above the very high level of January-April 1967. As shown in the tabulation below, imports from Communist countries increased from 74 percent of total imports in 1964 to 98 percent of total imports in early 1968:

	1964		1965		1966		1967		Jan-Apr 1968	
	Thousand Tons	Percent	Thousand Tons	Percent	Thousand Tons	Percent	Thousand Tons	Percent	Thousand Tons	Percent
Total imports	*690*	*100*	*850*	*100*	*1,030*	*100*	*1,420*	*100*	*610*	*100*
From Communist countries	510	74	700	82	910	88	1,370	96	600	98
From Free World countries	170	25	150	18	120	12	50	4	10	2

5. The sharp increase in imports has resulted largely from increases in foodstuffs, petroleum, and miscellaneous and general cargoes. Imports in each of these categories during the first four months of 1968 were approximately equal to or higher than those for the entire year 1964, as shown in the following tabulation:

	1964		1965		1966		1967		Jan-Apr 1968	
	Thousand Tons	Percent	Thousand Tons	Percent	Thousand Tons	Percent	Thousand Tons	Percent	Thousand Tons	Percent
Total imports	*690*	*100*	*850*	*100*	*1,030*	*100*	*1,420*	*100*	*610*	*100*
Petroleum	140	20	170	20	200	19	250	17	147	24
Fertilizer	140	20	160	19	230	22	150	11	59	10
Foodstuffs	160	23	120	14	80	8	460	32	186	30
Timber	30	4	20	2	10	1	10	1	8	1
Miscellaneous and general	210	30	380	45	510	50	550	39	210	34

6. Within the general and miscellaneous category, imports of steel, industrial and construction equipment, vehicles, bituminous coal, and chemicals have been the most important. The dramatic increase in imports of food in 1967 after two successive years of decreases apparently was in response to poor harvests at the end of 1966 and during 1967 and diversions of labor from agriculture. These imports were mostly wheat flour from the Soviet Far East and rice from China.

Imports of fertilizer have stayed at a relatively constant level since 1963, except for an unexplained surge in 1966. No seaborne imports of arms or ammunition have been detected.

7. The large increases in imports of petroleum have occurred despite the thorough bombing of petroleum storage facilities in mid-1966.

Reversed Roles for Communist and Free World Ships

8. The relative participation of Communist and Free World ships in the North Vietnamese trade has been reversed since the beginning of Rolling Thunder. In 1964, Free World ships made 69 percent of the calls by foreign ships at North Vietnamese ports. During 1965 and 1966, calls by Free World ships fell off sharply because of the effect of US bombing on the availability of export cargoes, crew morale, skyrocketing insurance and wage costs, and US diplomatic efforts to discourage participation in trade with North Vietnam. At the same time calls by Communist ships rose in order to handle increased imports from the USSR and Communist China. Communist ships steadily increased their dominance in the trade until early 1968, as shown in the following tabulation:

	1964		1965		1966		1967		Jan-Apr 1968	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Total arrivals	*580*	*100*	*530*	*100*	*379*	*100*	*386*	*100*	*158*	*100*
Free World ships	402	69	256	48	74	20	78	20	43	27
Communist ships	178	31	274	52	305	80	308	80	115	73

The Withdrawal of Free World Vessels from the Trade

9. Since 1964, one Free World country after another has withdrawn its ships from trade with North Vietnam. Ships flying the flags of 15 Free World countries, led by those of the United Kingdom, made 402 arrivals at North Vietnamese ports in 1964. In 1967, there were only 78 such calls, and only five Free World flags were represented. The leading Free World participants in the trade during this period are shown in the following tabulation (and in greater detail in the table):

	Number of Arrivals				
	1964	1965	1966	1967	Jan-Apr 1968
United Kingdom	177	136	50	67	36
Norway	43	29	0	0	0
Japan	74	37	0	0	0
Greece	35	28	7	0	0
Lebanon	20	9	0	1	1
Cyprus	0	3	12	5	2
Other	53	14	5	5	4
Total	*402*	*256*	*74*	*78*	*43*

10. Ships of five of the countries involved in the North Vietnam trade in 1964 -- West Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Indonesia -- have not participated in the trade since then. Ships of six other countries -- Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Panama, France,* and Liberia -- withdrew during 1965 and did not call in either 1966 or 1967. British-flag ships continued to make the most calls, but their number dropped because of the withdrawal during 1965 of all British-flag ships under the effective control of the British government. The British-flag ships remaining in the trade are based in Hong Kong and are owned by Chinese Communist-controlled firms. These ships are engaged almost exclusively in trade between China and North Vietnam. Japanese ships were withdrawn from the trade after March 1965 because of the reluctance of the Japanese seamen's union to expose its members to possible US bombing. Norwegian ships withdrew after November 1965 because of US diplomatic pressure. Cypriot and Maltese ships entered the trade for the first time in 1965 and continued to participate on a small scale in 1966 and 1967.

11. By 1966 the only Free World countries whose flags were still appearing in the North Vietnam trade were the United Kingdom, Greece, Italy, Cyprus, and Malta. Greek ships withdrew

* *A French ship made a noncommercial call at Haiphong in 1966 to pick up bodies of French soldiers killed in the Indochina War.*

North Vietnam: Foreign-Flag Ship Arrivals, by Flag
1964-67 and January-April 1968

	1964	1965	1966	1967	Jan-Apr 1968
Total arrivals	*580*	*530*	*379*	*386*	*158*
Communist countries	178	274	305	308	115
USSR	48	79	122	181	72
Communist China	72	144	138	97	34
Eastern Europe	58	50	44	29	7
Cuba		1	1	1	2
Free World	402	256	74	78	43
United Kingdom	177	136	50	67	36
Japan	74	37			
Norway	43	29			
Greece	35	28	7		
Lebanon	20	9		1	1
Italy	11	1	1	2	1
Panama	12	1			
Netherlands	8	5			
West Germany	8				
Liberia	7	3			
Sweden	3				
Denmark	1				
Finland	1				
France	1	2			
Indonesia	1				
Cyprus		3	12	5	2
Malta		2	4	3	
Singapore					2
Unknown					1 a/

a. This vessel arrived at North Vietnam illegally flying the Cypriot flag.

from the trade after June 1966. A Lebanese ship called in December 1967 for the first time since June 1965. A Singapore-flag ship called for the first time in March 1968, and a Japanese ship reappeared in the trade in May 1968.

12. The role of Free World ships in North Vietnamese trade also has been changed. In 1964 and 1965 they carried four times as many exports as imports. In 1967 they carried almost four times as many imports as exports. Actually the volume of imports carried by Free World ships has remained relatively stable, even though the number of Free World arrivals in 1967 was less than one-fifth that in 1964. The volume of exports carried by Free World ships in 1967, on the other hand, was less than one-tenth of the 1964 level.

Changes in Pattern of Communist Shipping

13. Soviet shipping accounted for almost two-thirds of Communist arrivals during the first four months of 1968. This is a sharp change from 1964 when Soviet ships made up only about one-fourth of Communist arrivals. The share of Chinese ships, which accounted for 40 percent of Communist arrivals in 1964, dropped to about 30 percent in 1967 and early 1968. Calls by Eastern European ships dropped steadily and in 1967 were only one-half of the 1964 level. Czechoslovak ships withdrew from the trade after June 1965. Eastern European ships accounted for only 6 percent of Communist arrivals during January-April 1968. The changes in Communist shipping to North Vietnam during this period are shown in the following tabulation:

	1964		1965		1966		1967		Jan-Apr 1968	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Total Communist arrivals	*170*	*100*	*274*	*100*	*305*	*100*	*308*	*100*	*115*	*100*
USSR	48	27	79	29	122	40	181	59	72	63
Communist China	72	40	144	53	138	45	97	31	34	30
Eastern Europe	50	33	50	18	44	14	29	9	7	6
Cuba			1	Negl.	1	Negl.	1	Negl.	2	2

14. In addition to the change in volume of Soviet shipping to North Vietnam since 1964, there has been a great change in its character. In 1964, 64 percent of the Soviet dry cargo arrivals came from the Black Sea ports and only 31 percent came

from the Soviet Far East. During January-April 1968, only 26 percent of Soviet dry cargo arrivals came from the Black Sea and 66 percent sailed from the Soviet Far East. This change occurred partly as a result of the closure of the Suez Canal and partly because of the very large increase in Soviet deliveries of bulk foodstuffs in 1967 and early 1968. The USSR has generally delivered foodstuffs to North Vietnam from ports in the Far East and fertilizer and general cargo from Black Sea ports.

15. The predominance of Soviet arrivals from the Far East diminishes considerably if measured in terms of gross tonnage. The ships sailing from the Black Sea are much larger than those from the Soviet Far East and despite their relatively small numbers continued to provide more than one-half of the aggregate gross tonnage of Soviet dry cargo ships calling at North Vietnamese ports in 1966 and 1967.

16. The tanker situation is different. Until the end of October 1966, almost all of the waterborne shipments of petroleum to North Vietnam originated in the Black Sea. Since then, most of the petroleum has been delivered from the Soviet Far East, directly or by way of Communist China. Direct deliveries normally are made regularly on small Soviet tankers and sporadically on larger tankers. Deliveries from China are made in Free World tankers. Occasional shipments have been made from the Black Sea even since the closure of the Suez Canal, but these are dwarfed by the shipments from the Soviet Far East.

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CITE [redacted]

DIST 3 JUNE 1968

COUNTRY CAMBODIA/NORTH VIETNAM/SOUTH VIETNAM/FRANCE

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (S)

DOI [redacted]

SUBJECT DISCUSSION BETWEEN SIHANOUK AND FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO CAMBODIA ON POSSIBLE COUP BY PRESIDENT KY DESIGNED TO TURN SOUTH VIETNAM INTO A NEUTRALIST COUNTRY

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (S)

ACQ [redacted] FIELD NO.

SOURCE [redacted]

1. AT A FAREWELL AUDIENCE WITH PRINCE SIHANOUK ON 22 MAY 1968, THE DEPARTING FRENCH AMBASSADOR, HUBERT ARGOD, SAID BOTH THE FRENCH EMBASSY AND HE HIMSELF HAD DEFINITE INFORMATION FROM SAIGON THAT VICE PRESIDENT KY WAS TENDING TOWARDS A NEUTRALIST SOLUTION TO THE VIETNAM WAR. ARGOD SAID THAT KY WOULD PROBABLY ATTEMPT A COUP D'ETAT WITH THE SUPPORT OF SOME OF THE MILITARY AND EVEN WITH THAT OF THE NEWLY FORMED ALLIANCE OF FORCES FOR NATIONAL DEMOCRACY AND PEACE IF THIS ORGANIZATION GUARANTEED, WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT, TO MAKE SOUTH VIETNAM A NEUTRAL COUNTRY LIKE CAMBODIA. PERSONS CLOSE TO KY HAD TOLD THE FRENCH CONSULAR REPRESENTATIVE IN SAIGON THAT KY

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NO LONGER WISHED TO DEAL WITH THE AMERICANS AND THAT HE HAD DECIDED TO WORK TOWARDS A "SIHANOUKIST" SOLUTION TO THE TROUBLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM. ACCORDING TO SOUNDINGS MADE ON KY'S BEHALF AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND HIGH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS, THIS WAS THE ONLY SOLUTION IMMEDIATELY ACCEPTABLE TO THE MAJORITY OF VIETNAMESE.

2. SIHANOUK SAID THAT HE ALSO HAD VERY RELIABLE INFORMATION TO THE SAME EFFECT AND THAT VIETNAMESE LIVING IN CAMBODIA HAD EVEN SOUNDED MEMBERS OF HIS GOVERNMENT TO DETERMINE WHAT CAMBODIA'S POSITION WOULD BE IF KY DECLARED FOR A NEUTRALIST SOLUTION AND AN ALLIANCE WITH THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT. SIHANOUK COMMENTED THAT IT WAS UNTHINKABLE THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE NLF WOULD LET HIMSELF BE SUPPLANTED BY A PERSON LIKE KY, AN ASSASSIN SEEKING A LAST SOLUTION BEFORE HIMSELF BEING LIQUIDATED.

3. [redacted] DISSEM. CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT [redacted]

[redacted]

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DIST 12 JUNE 1968

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 4-10 JUNE 1968

SUBJECT II CORPS SITUATION REPORT FOR THE PERIO
ENDING 10 JUNE 1968

ACQ VIETNAM, NHA TRANG (10 JUNE 1968)

SOURCE [redacted]

NAME ACT INFO [redacted]

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SUMMARY. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, [redacted], AND VC PROPAGANDA INDICATED THROUGHOUT II CORPS THAT THERE IS AN IMPENDING ATTACK ON THE AREA'S URBAN CENTERS. DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD, HOWEVER, THE CHARACTERISTIC ENEMY BEHAVIOR WITH RESPECT TO MILITARY ACTIVITY WAS THE AVOIDANCE OF MAJOR ENGAGEMENTS. INTERDICTION OF HIGHWAYS WAS NOTABLE IN THE HIGHLAND PROVINCES, AND STEPS PRELIMINARY TO THE FORMATION OF REVOLUTIONARY OR LIBERATION COMMITTEES WERE REPORTED IN BINH THUAN, PHU BON, AND PLEIKU. FOOD COLLECTION, TAXATION,

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RECRUITMENT/IMPRESSMENT, AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ACTIVITIES WERE OF SUFFICIENT SCALE IN VARIOUS OF THE PROVINCES TO HAVE BEEN SPECIFICALLY NOTED. THERE WAS LITTLE EVIDENCE OF INTEREST SHOWN IN THE ALLIANCE OF NATIONAL, DEMOCRATIC AND PEACE FORCES. THE REACTION OF II CORPS GVN OFFICIALS TO THE PARIS PEACE TALKS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN EITHER APATHETIC, BASED ON THE BELIEF THAT THEY WILL COME TO NOTHING, OR FEAR, BASED ON THE FEELING THE AMERICANS WILL MAKE MAJOR CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO GET OUT OF VIETNAM. END OF SUMMARY.

1. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, [redacted] AND VC PROPAGANDA INDICATED THROUGHOUT II CORPS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD THAT THERE IS AN IMPENDING ATTACK ON THE AREA'S URBAN CENTERS. DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD, HOWEVER, THE CHARACTERISTIC ENEMY BEHAVIOR WITH RESPECT TO MILITARY ACTIVITY WAS THE AVOIDANCE OF MAJOR ENGAGEMENTS.

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A. BINH DINH: THERE WERE THE USUAL REPORTS OF ENEMY STRENGTH AND MOVEMENT THROUGH THE COUNTRYSIDE OF BINH DINH BUT NO MAJOR CONTACT. THIS, TOGETHER WITH THE LESSENING OF ACTIVITY IN OTHER FIELDS OF VC ENDEAVOR IN BINH DINH, SEEMED TO LEND CREDIBILITY TO AN ARMY OF VIETNAM (ARVN) MILITARY

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REPORT THAT THE ENEMY HAD RECEIVED ORDERS TO RETREAT TO SAFE BASES IN ORDER TO AVOID CONTACT WITH FRIENDLY UNITS. ACCORDING TO A POLICE INFORMANT REPORT, SUICIDE SQUADS HAVE BEEN FORMED IN EACH VILLAGE WHICH ARE TO COORDINATE WITH VC/ NORTH VIETNAM ARMY (NVA) UNITS TO ATTACK THE DISTRICT TOWNS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THIS REPORT SUPPORTS THE CONTENTION THAT THE VC ARE PLANNING TO ATTACK SOMETIME DURING THE SUMMER. A POPULAR BELIEF WAS THAT VC/NVA FORCES HAVE WITH-DRAWN TEMPORARILY IN ORDER TO REGROUP AND REORGANIZE THEIR FORCES FOR JUST SUCH AN ATTACK.

B. TUYEN DUC. RUMORS WERE THAT THE VC HAVE RECEIVED SUBSTANTIAL REINFORCEMENTS FROM NINH THUAN AND A LARGE BATTLE IS EXPECTED. THE VC ACCORDING TO THE RUMOR, INTEND TO INFILTRATE DALAT, OCCUPY THE HIGH GROUND AND TALL BUILDINGS AND ENGAGE IN STREET FIGHTING AS IN SAIGON. THERE WAS SOME EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, OF SOMEWHAT HEAVY INFILTRATION IN THE HAMLETS IN THE SOUTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN PART OF THE CITY.

C. BINH THUAN. MAIN VC PRESSURE CONTINUED TO BE AGAINST OUTLYING VILLAGES AND HAMLETS WHICH WERE SHORT OF SECURITY,

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WITH OCCASIONAL SMALL GROUND AND MORTAR ATTACKS AGAINST THE MAJOR POPULATION AREAS. THE ATTACKS ON RURAL CENTERS SEEMED DESIGNED TO DRAW AS MANY TROOPS AS POSSIBLE OUT OF THE PHAN THIET AREA. THE RECENT ACTIVITY IN THE SONG MAO AREA DID JUST THAT, WITH THE RECENT MOVE OF THE ARVN 44TH REGIMENT TO THAT LOCATION. VC PROPAGANDA EXPOUNDING THEIR LATEST ATTACKS ON SAIGON AND OTHER MAJOR CENTERS IN AN EFFORT TO RAISE THEIR PRESTIGE AND BRING HOME TO THE POPULATION THAT THE VC HAVE THE STRENGTH TO ATTACK PHAN THIET AND THE DISTRICT CAPITALS HAS PROMPTED THE PEOPLE IN PHAN THIET TO PURCHASE SANDBAGS IN ORDER TO BUILD BUNKERS IN HOMES. A LIVELY BUSINESS HAS SPRUNG UP IN THE MARKETING OF FILLED SANDBAGS WITH THE GOING PRICE PER BAG ABOUT VN$20.00 (U.S. $.17 ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE OF VN$118 TO U.S. $1.00).

D. KHANH HOA : VC PROPAGANDA CONTINUED TO ATTEMPT TO IMPLANT THE IDEA OF THE INEVITABILITY OF A VC VICTORY, AND PRISONER INTERROGATIONS, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, AND AGENT REPORTS WERE UNANIMOUS IN PRADICTING ANOTHER BIG VC OFFENSIVE, PROBABLY ON THE CITIES. A CAPTURED DOCUMENT OUTLINED IN

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DETAIL A PLAN FOR ATTACKING NHA TRANG WITH A BIGGER (THAN DURING TET) ATTACKING FORCE. SEVERAL PRISONERS HAVE SPOKEN OF PREPARATIONS FOR A NEW ATTACK, BUT THERE WERE NO INDICATIONS OF WHEN.

E. NINH THUAN. THE ENEMY'S ANNOUNCED INTENTION AS REPORTED BY INFORMANTS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE LAST REPORTING PERIOD WAS TO LIBERATE MILITARILY THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT HAMLET OF TU TAN, FIVE KILOMETERS SOUTH OF PHAN RANG, AND THIS THEY ATTEMPTED TO DO DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD. THE HAMLET WAS PARTIALLY DESTROYED AND THE RD PROGRAM RECEIVED A SEVERE SETBACK. THE INTENTION TO ATTACK PHAN RANG STILL STOOD.

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F. KONTUM. [redacted] INDICATE THAT THE ENEMY'S INTENTIONS WERE TO CONDUCT SAPPER ATTACKS AGAINST GVN AND ALLIED MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN KONTUM CITY WHICH WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY A REGIMENTAL-SIZE GROUND ATTACK AGAINST THE CITY. DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD THE ENEMY CONTINUED TO AVOID MAJOR CONTACT BUT CONTINUED TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE COUNTRYSIDE WITH ATTACKS ON OUTPOSTS, FIRE BASES, AND GVN-DEFENDED HAMLETS.

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G. PLEIKU. A RECENT CAPTURED DOCUMENT FROM THE CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF VC GIA LAI PROVINCE COMMITTEE STATED THAT THE SECOND AND THIRD PHASES OF THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE WILL ENCOMPASS VIOLENT MILITARY OPERATIONS COMBINED WITH UPRISINGS OF THE POPULACE. THE MAIN OBJECTIVES WOULD BE CITIES AND THEIR OUTSKIRTS.

H. PHU YEN. [redacted] TENDED TO INDICATE A GENERAL OFFENSIVE WAS IN THE OFFING.

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2. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE CORPS AREA APPEARED TO BE GENERALLY NORMAL EXCEPT IN PHU BON, WHERE THE VC INTERDICTION OF HIGHWAY 7B WAS SPECIFICALLY REPORTED TO

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HAVE CAUSED A RISE IN THE PRICE OF RICE AND OTHER EVERY-DAY COMMODITIES, AND IN QUANG DUC, WHERE VC ROAD INTERDICTION CONTINUED TO BE SO WIDESPREAD THAT THE BULK OF THE PROVINCE'S SUPPLIES HAD TO BE AIR-LIFTED. ROAD INTERDICTION APPEARED TO BE A MAJOR PROBLEM IN THE CORPS' OTHER INLAND PROVINCES, SPECIFICALLY IN THE CASE OF HIGHWAY 14 IN KONTUM AND PLEIKU, HIGHWAY 19 IN PLEIKU, AND HIGHWAY 11 IN TUYEN DUC. THE MAJOR ROADS IN THE COASTAL PROVINCES, BY COMPARISON, WERE GENERALLY CLEAR. REVERSING THIS PATTERN, HOWEVER, WAS A NOTED INCREASE IN THE MINING OF ROADS IN COASTAL PHU YEN, WHILE HIGHWAY 20 THROUGH TUYEN DUC AND LAM DONG WAS REPORTED AS RELATIVELY SECURE.

3. VC INFRASTRUCTURE ACTIVITY GENERALLY CONTINUED UNABATED DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD. RICE-COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ON THE PART OF THE COMMUNISTS WERE SIGNIFICANT ENOUGH TO HAVE BEEN SPECIFICALLY NOTED IN EIGHT OF THE CORPS' TWELVE PROVINCES (ALL EXCEPT LAM DONG, PHU BON, TUEYN DUC, AND QUANG DUC). NEXT IN REPORTING FREQUENCY WERE VC RECRUITMENT AND IMPRESSMENT ACTIVITIES, SAID TO HAVE BEEN IMPORTANT IN BINH THUAN, BINH DINH, DARLAC, KONTUM, AND PLEIKU.

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TAXATION WAS NOTABLE IN BINH THUAN, BINH DINH, PHU YEN, AND QUANG DUC, WHILE AN EMPHASIS ON INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING ACTIVITIES WAS REPORTED IN KHANH HOA, BINH DINH, AND QUANG DUC.

4. GVN OFFICIALS AND THE PUBLIC ALIKE IN II CORPS CONTINUED TO SHOW LITTLE INTEREST IN THE ALLIANCE OF NATIONAL, DEMOCRATIC, AND PEACE FORCES. AN UNEVALUATED REPORT, [redacted]

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SERVICE IN BINH DINH PROVINCE, REVEALED THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES OF THE ALLIANCE: "THE PRESENT VC POLICY IS TO CLEAR THE SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLEFIELD, ELIMINATE MILITARY REGION (MR) 5, OBTAIN SOVEREIGNTY FOR THE PEOPLE SO THAT THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE ALLIANCE FRONT CAN TAKE CONTROL OF MR 5 AND PARTICIPATE IN THE FUTURE COALITION GOVERNMENT." THE ONLY TANGIBLE EVIDENCE THAT SUCH AN ALLIANCE EXISTS IN PHU YEN WAS A PROPAGANDA LEAFLET FOUND ON THE BODY OF A DEAD VC IN TUY AN DISTRICT ADDRESSED TO "U.S. SOUTH KOREAN OFFICERS AND MEN" AND SIGNED BY "THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY AND PEACE."

5. DURING THE PAST WEEK, [redacted] REPORTS AND A CAPTURED DOCUMENT REVEALED THAT THE ENEMY WAS ATTEMPTING

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OR PLANNING TO ESTABLISH REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES IN PHU BON, BINH THUAN, AND PLEIKU, RESPECTIVELY:

A. IN PHU BON, A VC/NVA PROPAGANDA TEAM WAS NOTED CONDUCTING AN INDOCTRINATION COURSE IN A THUAN MAN DISTRICT HAMLET ON THE SUBJECT OF "THE PEOPLE'S" COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION OF VILLAGES AND HAMLETS. IT WAS STATED AT THESE SESSIONS THAT VILLAGE COMMITTEES WOULD HAVE 5 TO 10 MEMBERS, HAMLET COMMITTEES WOULD HAVE 1 TO 5, AND THAT BOTH WOULD FUNCTION TO UNITE THE PEOPLE "FOR ALL TYPES OF MISSIONS."

B. IN BINH THUAN THE VC THUAN PHONG DISTRICT COMMITTEE SENT CADRES TO HOA VINH AND TUY HOA VILLAGES, THIEN GIAO DISTRICT, WHERE THEY CONDUCTED POLITICAL STUDY SESSIONS WITH A CAPTIVE AUDIENCE AND DISCUSSED AN ELECTORAL PLAN AND THE SELECTION OF CANDIDATES FOR THE FORMATION OF REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES.

C. A RECENTLY CAPTURED DOCUMENT OF THE VC GIA LIA CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE STATED THAT THE "MASSES" WERE DIRECTED TO SET UP A "PEOPLE'S" REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE" OR A "REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL" IN THE NAME OF THE NATIONAL FRONT

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FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM'S "WESTERN HIGHLANDS AUTONOMOUS MOVEMENT" IN WHICH VC CADRES MUST HOLD ALL KEY POSTS. THIS STRUCTURE WAS TO BE SET UP WITHIN THREE DAYS AFTER THE VC SEIZED POWER FOLLOWING A GENERAL OFFENSIVE AND UPRISING.

6. OFFICIAL REACTION IN II CORPS TO THE PARIS PEACE TALKS RANGED FROM APATHY TO FEAR--THERE WAS LITTLE ENTHUSIASM EXPRESSED ON THE SUBJECT. OFFICIALS IN DARLAC AND BINH DINH WERE NOTED AS BEING UNINTERESTED IN THE SUBJECT BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF ANYTHING CONCRETE COMING OUT OF THE TALKS SO FAR. INFLUENTIAL CITIZENS OF PLEIKU EXPRESSED THE FEAR THAT THE U.S. MIGHT AGREE TO CEDE THE GVN'S NORTHERN PROVINCES TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE IN ORDER TO GET A SETTLEMENT, WHEREAS OFFICIALS IN KONTUM WERE AFRAID THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD AGREE TO A COALITION GOVERNMENT FOR THIS SAME REASON. JUNIOR OFFICERS IN QUANG DUC APPARENTLY RELATED THEIR FEELING THAT AMERICAN MILITARY ADVISORS DID NOT WANT TO REMAIN IN VIETNAM TO A FEAR THAT THE TALKS PRESAGED A U.S. PULL-OUT UNDER SOMEWHAT LESS THAN DESIRABLE CIRCUMSTANCES.

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF IFFV CORDS II CORPS (ALSO SENT [redacted]

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DIRECTORATE OF
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Intelligence Report

The Effect of the Vietnam War on the Economies of the Communist Countries

~~Secret~~

July 1968

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Contents

		Page
Summary		1
I.	Introduction	5
II.	Effect on the Soviet Economy	6
	A. Direct Costs	6
	B. Indirect Costs	11
III.	Effect on the Economies of Eastern Europe	13
	A. Direct Costs	13
	B. Indirect Costs	14
IV.	Effect on the Economy of Communist China	15
	A. Military Equipment	16
	B. Military Manpower	19
	C. Industrial Equipment and Materials	19
	D. Consumer Goods	20
	E. Shipping Costs	21
	F. Foreign Exchange Implications	23
V.	COCOM Effect and Effect on General Economic Relations with the West	24
VI.	Effect on the Economy of North Korea	24
	A. Military Aid	24
	B. Economic Aid	25
VII.	Effect on Communist Aid Programs in the Free World	25
	A. Military Aid Programs	25
	B. Economic Aid Programs	27

		Page
VIII.	Effect on the Economy of North Vietnam	31
	A. Economic Damage	32
	B. Military Damage	35
	C. General Impact on the Economy	37
	D. Postwar Rebuilding Costs	38
	E. Sources of Postwar Aid	40
IX.	General Appraisal of These Costs	41
X.	Costs in the First Half of 1968	41

Tables

1.	Communist Countries: Aid to North Vietnam, 1954-67	3
2.	USSR: Distribution of Military Aid to North Vietnam, Total for 1965-67	7
3.	Communist China: Volume and Value of Military Aid Deliveries to North Vietnam, 1965-67	17
4.	North Vietnam: Imports from China, 1965-67	22
5.	Communist Countries: Military Aid Deliveries to Less Developed Countries, 1960-67	26
6.	Communist Countries: Extensions of Economic Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1960-67	28
7.	Communist Countries: Deliveries of Economic Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World and to North Vietnam, 1960-67	30
8.	USSR: Exports of Complete Enterprises to Major Areas, 1961-66	30

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
July 1968

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

The Effect of the Vietnam War on the Economies of the Communist Countries

Summary

By mid-1968, direct outlays by Communist countries in support of the war in Vietnam, plus the cost of repairing damaged facilities in North Vietnam, probably exceeded the equivalent of US $3 billion. Indirect costs -- consisting primarily of a portion of rising Soviet military spending, but also costs associated with the denial of sophisticated Western technology -- could have doubled these direct costs.

From early 1965, when the United States began bombing the North, until mid-1968, the USSR, Communist China, and the East European Communist countries have furnished more than $1-1/2 billion in military aid to North Vietnam. Before the bombing, this aid was trifling. From 1965 to mid-1968, the Communist countries sent $1 billion in economic aid to North Vietnam (for data for 1965-67, see Table 1). Additional direct outlays by the Communist countries -- for shipping costs, the stationing of military and civilian personnel in North Vietnam, and the maintenance of North Vietnamese students -- totaled about $150 million. In North Vietnam itself, damage to economic facilities from the bombing is estimated to be $300 million.

Note: This report was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and was coordinated with the Office of Strategic Research.

Two major indirect costs of the Vietnam war are mainly applicable to the USSR, although the trade control restraints have also had an effect on the economies of the Communist countries of Eastern Europe: (1) Heightened East-West tensions over Vietnam have strengthened the hand of the Soviet marshals and made it possible for them to obtain a larger allocation of resources than would otherwise have been the case. In the USSR, military spending in 1965-67 was 3-1/2 billion rubles greater than if it had been maintained at the 1964 level. It is not possible to specify what share of this increased Soviet military spending was due to Vietnam, but if the fraction were appreciable, then indirect military costs alone could be at least as large as the direct outlays made to North Vietnam by the Soviet Union. (2) The Soviet and East European support for the Vietnamese insurgency has slowed down the reduction of trade barriers with the Industrial West and particularly with the United States. This, in turn, has effectively denied access to some of the Western world's machinery embodying advanced technology as well as access to the technology itself -- for example, in the computer, communications, and electronics field. There has probably been a widening in the technological gap between the advanced Communist countries and the Industrial West.

Communist military and economic assistance to North Vietnam apparently has not limited the scale of Communist aid programs in the Free World. Deliveries of aid to the less developed countries of the Free World continued on the same general level as in 1965-66, despite sharply stepped up deliveries to North Vietnam. The massive Soviet resupply of the Arab states after the latter's disastrous war with Israel in June 1967 illustrates the USSR's ability and willingness to sustain substantial unplanned costs in its aid programs if the political gains are judged to be adequate.

Table 1

Communist Countries:
Aid to North Vietnam a/
1954-67

Million US $

	Total 1954-64	1965	1966	1967	Total 1965-67
Military b/					
USSR	70	210	360	515	1,080
Communist China	70	60	95	145	300
Eastern Europe	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.
Total	*140*	*270*	*455*	*660*	*1,380*
Economic					
USSR	365	85	150	200	435
Communist China	455	50	75	80	205
Eastern Europe	130	15	50	90	155
Total	*950*	*150*	*275*	*370*	*795*

a. Figures have been rounded to the nearest $5 million and may not add to the totals shown.
b. Data show the value at Soviet foreign trade prices of weapons, other military equipment, and ammunition. They exclude aid for the construction of military installations and defense-related facilities.

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I. Introduction

1. The measurement of the effect of the Vietnam war on the economies of the Communist countries presents several difficulties. In the first place, information is not complete. A great deal of effort has gone into analyzing available information, however, and the data presented in this report may be regarded as reasonable approximations to the real quantities.

2. A second difficulty concerns the adoption of a common unit for valuing widely varying items which originate in wholly different economic circumstances. Current US dollars is the standard used in this report. The chartering of a Greek freighter for the Vietnam run may present no problem in valuation, but the dollar valuation of an obsolescent Soviet jet fighter whose original ruble cost is even in doubt or the cost of shipping goods across a China disrupted by political turmoil present formidable problems.

3. Such problems are also related to the question of "opportunity cost" -- that is, the problem of identifying the best alternative use of resources shipped to North Vietnam. In some cases, a Communist country may be forgoing an important economic gain to support North Vietnam; in other instances, the support may represent only a minor burden or even a net advantage. For example, in dispatching antiaircraft artillery units to North Vietnam, the Chinese Communists would gain some advantage because the alternative use of these troops -- training within China -- polishes their skills much less effectively than does service in a combat area. On the other hand, a Communist country that charters Western ships forgoes the use of this hard currency for purchase of modern machinery in the Free World.

4. The direct economic costs underwritten by the Communist countries include the sending of men, equipment, and materials to Vietnam, for which no return is expected. For North Vietnam itself, the destruction of capital plant by bombing and the lowering of output are direct costs. The

detailed discussion in this report focuses on these direct costs, which are more concrete and relatively easy to measure. The indirect costs to the Communist countries are harder to pin down. They may be the result of the soured international political atmosphere -- for example, access by the Communist countries to US technology has probably been delayed. Or they may be the result of the preoccupation of Communist leaders with the problems of supporting the war rather than with the problems of modernizing their domestic economies.

II. Effect on the Soviet Economy

5. The direct economic costs of Soviet aid to North Vietnam include the cost of (a) the military and civilian goods sent to North Vietnam; (b) the Soviet military and civilian advisors stationed in North Vietnam; and (c) the Vietnamese students attending colleges and universities in the USSR. The indirect burden on the Soviet economy includes (a) the barriers to trade with the United States that might be removed if not for the Vietnam war; and (b) the increase in influence of the military leadership in the USSR in the competition for scarce resources, ascribable to the uncertainties and political atmosphere surrounding the Vietnam war.

A. Direct Costs

Military Aid

6. The value of military equipment and supplies sent by the USSR to North Vietnam during 1965-67 was approximately $1.1 billion. Almost one-half of this total represented ammunition (small arms, mortar, and antiaircraft), about one-fourth involved surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, and the remainder included artillery, aircraft, radar, armor, motor vehicles, and infantry weapons (see Table 2).

Table 2

USSR: Distribution of Military Aid
to North Vietnam
Total for 1965-67

Type of Equipment	Value (Million US $) a/	Percentage Distribution
Ammunition	509	47.1
SAM systems	291	26.9
Artillery	143	13.2
Aircraft	86	8.0
Radar	28	2.6
Armor	10	0.9
Motor vehicles	9	0.8
Small arms and infantry weapons	5	0.5
Total	*1,081*	*100.0*

a. In Soviet foreign trade prices expressed in US dollars.

7. Some of the military equipment sent to North Vietnam is obsolete by Soviet standards and is drawn from stockpiles that need no replenishment. The fire control radar sent to North Vietnam, for example, is patterned after US systems used by the USSR during World War II and is no longer used in the USSR. The IL-28 light jet bomber, the MIG-15/17 jet fighter, and the U-MIG-15 jet trainer are in storage in the USSR; they are not in current production and those that are sent to North Vietnam are not replaced. The antiaircraft artillery and much of the armor are similarly obsolete and no longer used by the USSR. It is not known whether ammunition is drawn from stockpiles or current production.

8. Much of the equipment sent to North Vietnam is not obsolete, however. The MIG-21 jet fighter, the MI-6 helicopter, the 122-mm howitzer D-30, and the Side Net radar are examples of Soviet equipment

sent directly from current production to North Vietnam. All trucks and other motor vehicles, as well as replacement missiles for the SAM systems, apparently are drawn from current production. Nevertheless, the quantities of such equipment sent to North Vietnam have been too small as a fraction of Soviet output to have any significant effect on the rate of production in the USSR. In the case of the MIG-21 jet fighter, for example, the USSR produced an estimated 2,000 units in 1965-67; the number of such fighters sent to North Vietnam over the three-year period is estimated at 67, or about 3 percent of total production.

9. The dollar value of the military aid cited above is not a good measure of the economic burden to the USSR because it is based on foreign trade prices expressed in US dollars. On the basis of internal Soviet prices, the total value of military aid to North Vietnam during 1965-67 amounts to about one-half billion rubles. That part of military aid that represents a claim on current production amounts to approximately 2 percent of Soviet production of military hardware in 1965-67.

10. During 1965-67 the USSR stationed about 2,000 military personnel in North Vietnam, primarily for training and support purposes. The number was probably larger during the first half of 1965, when Soviet technicians exercised operational control of the SAM system, and in mid-1966, when they temporarily resumed control of the system. In general, the Soviet military personnel stationed in North Vietnam provide assistance and training in the use of SAM and radar equipment, aircraft, and communications equipment. The salaries of these personnel, as well as the cost of their maintenance, are paid by the USSR. Because of the small number of military personnel involved, salaries and maintenance probably amount to less than 4 million rubles annually. Furthermore, the benefit from their training in a combat area may well offset any net cost of their assignment to Vietnam.

Economic Aid

11. In addition to the distinctly military aid discussed above, the USSR also provides North Vietnam with economic aid, mostly in the form of grants for which repayment is not required. In

the three-year period 1965-67, the USSR delivered a total of $515 million of non-military goods to North Vietnam. Only a small portion of this total -- about $80 million -- was offset by North Vietnamese exports to the USSR, so that $435 million of net economic aid was involved. Of this total, in turn, about $300 million represented grants-in-aid, and the remainder was delivered on a credit basis, subject to repayment in goods or hard currency. There is no evidence that North Vietnam made any payments on this trade deficit during the period under study.

12. The economic aid consists of such products as petroleum, trucks and other motor vehicles, and construction equipment as well as such consumer goods as cotton and silk textiles and bulk foodstuffs. Although designated as "non-military," these goods often play a direct role in sustaining military operations.

13. Whereas much of the military aid is drawn from stockpiles that need no replenishment, the economic aid in general is drawn from current production and represents resources forgone in the civilian economy. In domestic prices, the economic aid probably amounted to at least one-quarter of a billion rubles. Some of the aid, moreover, consisted of products that could have been sold elsewhere for badly needed hard currency. The diesel fuel and wheat flour shipped during 1965-67, for example, could have been sold in the West for almost $25 million.

14. As in the case of military goods taken out of direct production, the civilian goods sent to Vietnam represent only a tiny fraction of Soviet output of these items. The Soviet planners almost certainly have not had to readjust their output goals for any major civilian item as the result of the Vietnam war.

Other Aid

15. In addition to the goods described and valued above, the USSR underwrites three "service" types of economic aid for North Vietnam -- that is, the costs of (a) Soviet economic technicians stationed in North Vietnam, (b) North Vietnamese

students attending Soviet colleges and universities, and (c) the shipment of goods from the USSR to North Vietnam.

16. The number of Soviet technicians in North Vietnam has been minuscule, averaging only about 130 per year during 1965-67, and the total cost of their services probably was about one-half million rubles. Part of this cost, moreover, may have been assumed by North Vietnam. The number of North Vietnamese students in the USSR increased from about 2,000 in 1965 to 5,000 in 1967. The total cost to the USSR, including plane fare from Hanoi as well as tuition, room, and board, is estimated at about $25 million in the three-year period 1965-67. In addition to these costs of training and housing foreign students, there is an additional "cost" involved for the USSR because these students preempt vacancies in colleges and universities that would otherwise be filled by Soviet students.

Shipping Costs

17. As for the shipping costs of military and economic aid, the available price information permits the valuation of shipments by sea in terms of dollars and shipments by land in terms of rubles. Shipping costs by sea for the period 1965-67 are estimated at about $13 million, and shipping costs by land about 21 million rubles. If the official exchange rate is used for currency conversion, total shipping costs thus amounted to $36 million, or 33 million rubles.

18. Although the USSR used its own ships for practically all seaborne shipments to North Vietnam, the diversion of these ships made it necessary to charter Western shipping in some of its other trade. The ships involved, moreover, could otherwise have been used on a charter basis to Free World countries. Thus the costs of the North Vietnamese run are best represented by the loss in hard currency of $13 million.

19. Shipments over land to North Vietnam involved the use of the Trans-Siberian rail route and subsequent transshipment across China. The shipments represented a negligible fraction of

the overall capacity of the Trans-Siberian route, and thus constituted no particular burden to the Soviet domestic transportation system. Practically all of the overland shipping costs represent the costs of transshipment across China. The cost in resources to China of running the additional trains over its lines is quite small; thus the net cost of transshipment to the Communist countries as a whole also is quite small.

B. Indirect Costs

20. In addition to the direct costs of the Vietnam war, the performance of the Soviet economy is affected indirectly by the war because of (a) continuing restrictions on trade with the United States and (b) the increased preemption of scarce resources by the military establishment. These indirect costs cannot be assessed in terms of rubles and dollars, but they almost certainly are more important to the USSR than the small direct costs described above. For some years the USSR has been striving to buy Western machinery embodying advanced technology as well as the technology itself as part of its effort to modernize the Soviet economy. The United States has supplied very few of these imports -- partly because of trade barriers such as export controls and the USSR's inability to gain most-favored-nation treatment in its trade with the United States. More important, the USSR has had to rely on medium-term and long-term credits to finance its machinery imports, and these credits have not been available in the United States to the extent that they have been in other Western countries.

21. The Soviet position in the Vietnam war has restricted progress on reducing trade barriers with the United States. Therefore, the USSR has in effect been denied an important alternative source of machinery and technology. If US-Soviet trade were conducted on the same basis as West European trade with the USSR, the USSR would be able to increase its total imports of machinery and, in some instances, would have access to machinery better suited to its needs.

22. The United States has opened a well-publicized "technological gap" with Western Europe; the gap between overall US and Soviet technology is even wider. Computers and their auxiliary equipment are a leading example of US technological superiority. Access to this technology would appreciably benefit the Soviet economy even if only a few hundred million dollars were involved each year. Such imports would be feasible only if existing US restrictions were considerably relaxed. Other fields in which the USSR would benefit substantially from access to Western technology are communications and electronics.

23. The most significant cost of the Vietnamese war to the Soviet economy, however, may have been its role in bolstering military claims in the competition for economic resources. Soviet military expenditures, after ten years of relative stability, increased by about 11 percent between 1965 and 1967, despite urgent needs for more investment in industry and agriculture and growing difficulty in satisfying the demands of Soviet consumers.

24. Although much of the rise in defense spending had its origin in decisions made much earlier to upgrade the strategic attack and strategic defense systems, the outbreak of conflicts in the Middle East and Vietnam has drawn the attention of the Soviet military to the need to devote more resources to general-purpose forces capable of handling limited war situations. Moreover, the uncertainties and political atmosphere surrounding the Vietnam war undoubtedly strengthened the hand of the military leadership and its supporters in the Soviet leadership in the decisions made on resource allocation in 1966 and 1967.

25. The total cost of economic and military aid to North Vietnam in 1965-67 was less than a billion rubles; Soviet military spending in this same period was 3-1/2 billion rubles greater than if spending had been maintained at the 1964 level. It is not possible to specify what share of this increased Soviet military spending was due to Vietnam, but if the fraction were appreciable, then indirect military costs could be at least as large as the direct outlays made to North Vietnam by the Soviet Union. Furthermore, whereas the direct Soviet support of

the Vietnamese war involves a wide range of resources in fairly adequate supply, the rise in Soviet military spending takes high-quality machinery and materials badly needed for the modernization of the general economy.

III. Effect on the Economies of Eastern Europe

A. Direct Costs

26. The direct economic costs of the Vietnam war to the East European Communist countries* in 1965-67 totaled about $180 million. The costs include some economic aid, primarily in the form of trade credits and shipping costs, and the costs of training Vietnamese students. The total economic burden was shared fairly evenly among the six East European countries, with no single country contributing more than $35 million. Eastern Europe has provided only token military aid to North Vietnam.

Economic Aid

27. During 1965-67, North Vietnam imported goods from the East European Communist countries valued at about $195 million. These imports were offset in part by exports amounting to $55 million, leaving a trade deficit of about $140 million. Grants-in-aid amounted to about $15 million, so that net economic aid was about $155 million. The trade deficit probably will be converted ultimately to grants-in-aid. There is no evidence of North Vietnamese repayments on credits during 1965-67, and trade credits in the past have been converted into grants-in-aid.

28. Machinery and other heavy equipment, including transportation equipment, seems to dominate East European exports to North Vietnam. Other exports include cotton textiles, bulk foods, and medical supplies. As in the case of Soviet support to North Vietnam, the goods involved in economic aid often play a role in sustaining military operations.

29. Some of the consumer goods could have been marketed in the West for hard currency. The machinery would have found a less ready market in the West. The economic aid to North Vietnam, in any case, was too small to have any significant impact on rates of growth in any of the East European countries.

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* *Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania.*

Other Aid

30. The number of North Vietnamese studying in East European Communist countries was about 6,000 in 1967, 2,000 in 1966, and probably less than 2,000 in 1965. The opportunity cost of this training is the training which could have been given to the same number of native students. The financial cost, using a figure of $2,500 per head per year (a rough figure used for like students in the USSR), was about $25 million in 1965-67. The cost sometimes is handled through channels other than the state budget. In Czechoslovakia and East Germany, for example, contributions on behalf of the North Vietnamese students are solicited from workers in factories and offices.

31. The shipping costs of exports from the East European Communist countries to North Vietnam amounted to about $5-1/2 million in 1965-67. Although most of the shipping is done by Polish ships, each of the countries presumably pays its share of the shipping costs. These shipping costs, as in the case of the USSR, represent a loss in hard currency earnings to the extent that the ships involved could have been chartered for hard currency. Unless the other East European countries paid Poland in hard currency for delivering their aid to North Vietnam, Poland sustained most of this loss in potential hard currency earnings.

B. Indirect Costs

32. The indirect effects of the Vietnam war on the East European economies bear most heavily on the trade relations between the United States and the East European countries. East European trade with NATO countries other than the United States increased by 14 percent a year in 1965-67, and NATO countries provided the six East European countries with about $1.9 billion of new medium-term and long-term credits. During the same period, US trade with Eastern Europe has remained stable at about $250 million.

33. Eastern Europe has an urgent need for Western technology and capital goods, and its expanding trade with Western Europe reflects this need. The East Europeans would like to buy and sell more in the United States but the development of

Eastern Europe's trade with the United States has been held back by difficulties (a) in finding markets in the United States for East European goods and (b) in obtaining medium-term and long-term credits in the United States on the same terms available in Western Europe. Even if US-East European trade could not be increased significantly, the East Europeans would benefit by involving another powerful trading nation in the competition regarding prices of capital goods and the credit terms attached to purchases from the West. Because of the Vietnam war, the political atmosphere in the United States had not been favorable for the legislation or administrative measures required to relax export controls, grant most-favored-nation treatment, or increase the availability of medium and long-term credit to Eastern Europe. Indeed, new legislation prohibits the Export-Import Bank from supporting sales to countries giving aid to North Vietnam and thus hamstrings new initiatives the United States might make, for example, with regard to its economic relations with Czechoslovakia.

IV. Effect on the Economy of Communist China

34. Communist China's total aid to North Vietnam in the period 1965-67 is estimated at $505 million, including $300 million of military aid (military end items only) and $205 million of economic aid (both war-support items and consumer goods). Aid for 1968 may increase somewhat above the 1967 level. Since the start of the American bombing of North Vietnam, China's aid has increased sharply, as shown by the following tabulation:

	Million US $			
	Total 1954-64	1965	1966	1967
Military aid	70	60	95	145
Economic aid	455	50	75	80
Total	*525*	*110*	*170*	*225*

35. In 1965-67, China has given North Vietnam more aid in monetary terms than any country except the USSR. In tonnage terms, China's contribution

has far exceeded that of any other country. This support has been of great aid to North Vietnam, particularly in support of its subversive efforts in the South. Yet it has cost the Chinese economy very little.

36. China's greatest contributions have been in items that the Chinese can provide with the least strain on the economy -- rail and sea transport, small arms and ammunition, construction materials, light machinery and equipment, foodstuffs, textiles, and other consumer goods. In addition, China has maintained 30,000 to 50,000 engineering, antiaircraft, and radar troops for use in the reconstruction and guarding of transportation lines north of Hanoi.

37. China's aid to North Vietnam could become a perceptible economic burden if Mao's great political rectification campaign -- the Cultural Revolution -- continues. The growth of the Chinese economy has already been ended by the physical violence and administrative dislocations of the Cultural Revolution, and any extension of these problems would intensify the already serious economic problems. Nevertheless, because of the small cost of Chinese aid to North Vietnam, a cut in aid on economic grounds is unlikely in the near future.

A. Military Equipment

38. The increasing supply of small arms and ammunition to North Vietnam would be the only military aid having any real effect on China's economy, and that effect would be small (see Table 3). These items represent only a small proportion of the tonnage but more than half the value of material sent by China during 1965-67. China, however, can easily spare these materials from available stocks or replace them by increasing present production. For most of these items, the rate of supply to North Vietnam is probably no more than 25 percent of China's domestic manufacturing capacity. Only under sharply increased disturbances from the Cultural Revolution would any needed increase in production pose a serious problem.

39. Most of the other military items supplied by China have been in token amounts. In 1965, China supplied some 25 T-34 medium tanks and in 1967 some

Communist China: Volume and Value of Military Aid Deliveries to North Vietnam a/
1965-67

	1965		1966		1967	
	Units	Million US $	Units	Million US $	Units	Million US $
Aircraft	8	1	0	0	50	7
MIG-15/17 jet fighter	8	1			50	7
Naval craft	2	2	2	2	6	4
Shanghai-class fast patrol boat	2	2	2	2		
P-6 class motor torpedo boat					6	4
Armor	25	1	0	0	0	0
T-34 medium tank	25	1				
Artillery	320	6	140	4	645	8
57-mm AAA	100	4	100	4	100	4
37-mm AAA	200	2				
14.5-mm AAA					120	1
Field artillery (76-mm)	20	Negl.	40	Negl.	425	3
Radar	33	3	112	9	67	7
Trucks and other vehicles b/	600	3	400	2	700	4

Table 3

Communist China: Volume and Value of Military Aid Deliveries to North Vietnam a/
1965-67
(Continued)

	1965		1966		1967	
	Units	Million US $	Units	Million US $	Units	Million US $
Small arms and other infantry weapons		10		35		22
Ammunition (metric tons)	8,000	33	10,000	41	23,000	94
Total value		*60*		*95*		*145*

a. The data refer exclusively to combat materiel; they exclude aid designed for war-support purposes. Values reflect foreign trade prices charged by the USSR for equipment delivered to the less developed countries of the Free World.
Because of rounding, components may not add to the total values shown.
b. Estimates for vehicles assigned to the armed forces. Vehicles used for military-support purposes are not included.

50 MIG-15 and MIG-17 jet fighters and a number of artillery pieces. These items were either obsolescent or excess equipment of small value to China in monetary or strategic terms.

40. China has supplied Hanoi with most of its modern naval combatant vessels -- all patrol or PT boats -- but the number in this period (10) has not affected China's supply or production. In 1968, China could replace or increase the units in North Vietnam from its own operational units with no appreciable loss to its own order of battle.

B. Military Manpower

41. The cost to China of maintaining the 30,000 to 50,000 troops it has in North Vietnam is merely a matter of shipping costs for the necessary food and other supplies for these troops. China would have to maintain these troops if they were still stationed in China; thus the real cost to China is a shipping cost of approximately $200,000 for the estimated 12,000 metric tons of supplies shipped each year. Even this amount may exceed the true net cost, because these troops might otherwise be stationed at distant posts in China that also entailed long-distance shipment of supplies.

42. An important offset to this cost for China is the combat training acquired by these troops during tours in North Vietnam. China has rotated the troops periodically to spread the benefit of this training. The value of this experience has been particularly high for the antiaircraft and radar troops. The engineering troops probably would be of value to China for construction projects at home, but their loss is negligible in an economy where the labor supply is abundant.

C. Industrial Equipment and Materials

43. China has shipped substantial quantities of construction materials such as steel, cement, and railroad construction equipment as well as trucks, spare parts, drugs and medicines, and other machinery and equipment. Coking coal has also been supplied for the Thai Nguyen steel works, which was constructed by China for North Vietnam. Coal shipments ended after the bombing of Thai Nguyen in May 1967, and the total shipped in 1967 is estimated at 65,000 tons, a drop of 100,000 tons from each of the preceding two years.

44. All of these materials have accounted for more than half the total tonnage of China's economic aid for 1965-67 (1.8 million tons) but probably less than one-half of the total value of the aid for this period ($205 million). North Vietnam's needs presumably will change with the changed pattern of American bombing and the reduced need for railroad reconstruction. The composition of aid is expected to shift away from the bulk items in the industrial category toward the restoration of plant and equipment.

D. Consumer Goods

45. Among consumer goods, China's most important export has been foodstuffs. In 1967, more than 200,000 tons of grain and other bulk foodstuffs were identified in shipments to North Vietnam from China by sea. Undoubtedly other food shipments were among the estimated 300,000 tons of unidentified cargo shipped by China via rail and sea. Thus the total food shipments from China in 1967 probably were more than one-third of the economic aid in tonnage and about one-half of the value. Despite the small volume of identified shipments of food in 1965 and 1966, the ratio was presumably in the same proportion for these years, although smaller in absolute numbers.

46. China had a good harvest in 1967, and the shipments to North Vietnam represented only a small fraction of 1 percent of total domestic food supply. Shipments are expected to increase again in 1968 even though China's domestic output of food probably will drop.

47. China also sends North Vietnam sizable quantities of textiles, both cloth and finished clothing. The annual value in 1965-67 probably ranged from $5 million to $15 million. More than 20 million meters of cloth were shipped in 1967. Shipments in 1968 would normally be expected to increase; they would still remain less than 1 percent of domestic production. Because of the Cultural Revolution, which has led to a decline in textile production and to slashes in cloth rations, any additional supplies for North Vietnam would be at the expense of an already short-changed populace. Nonetheless, the amounts involved are small and the inconveniencing of additional consumers within China is not likely to be a decisive factor in Chinese policy.

48. The food and textile shipments to North Vietnam, however, may have been made, not at the expense of domestic consumption, but at the expense of exports to the Free World. This alternative is discussed briefly under "Foreign Exchange Implications," below. Other consumer goods supplied by China to North Vietnam are minor in volume and value.

E. Shipping Costs

49. The cost to China of transporting goods to North Vietnam is small in terms of both money and alternative opportunities. Costs of transshipment of the materials sent by rail from the USSR and the East European Communist countries are borne by those countries. The Chinese rail system has more than enough unused capacity to handle the additional burden. The Cultural Revolution, however, has placed China's rail system under a strain and has caused delays, bottlenecks, and shortages of raw materials, such as coal. Special efforts have been necessary to expedite goods bound for North Vietnam, both shipments and transshipments. These efforts are not to be regarded as an economic cost of the Vietnam war but rather as one attempt to straighten up the economic dislocations caused by the Cultural Revolution.

50. Total shipping costs for both economic and military aid are minor for rail transport -- approximately $12 million for 1965-67 -- particularly since the cost is internal and does not involve hard currency. Cost for seaborne shipments for the entire period are estimated at $15 million, but again most of the costs do not involve hard currency. The small hard currency costs involved are discussed below.

51. These costs are estimated from tonnages shown in Table 4. Miscellaneous and other cargoes have been estimated according to the principal commodities known to be supplied by China. Rates have been assigned according to the latest rates available. Shipping points have been estimated according to the type of commodity. Method of shipment, where unknown, has been arbitrarily assigned to fit the total tonnage estimated for the commodity. The resulting shipping costs are

reasonably good estimates for costs which in any case are not subject to normal economic valuation in the marketplace.

Table 4

North Vietnam: Imports from China
1965-67

	1965	1966	1967
	Volume (Thousand Metric Tons)		
Total (rounded)	*520*	*665*	*710*
By sea	247.8	305.9	501
Grain	17.1	37.2	213
Petroleum	13.4		56 a/
Miscellaneous	67.3	118.7	232
Other b/	150.0	150.0	
By rail	270	360	210
Military	13	15	25
Coal	165	165	65
Other	92	180	120
	Value (Million US $)		
Total	*130*	*190*	*235*
Military aid c/	60	95	145
Economic aid	50	75	80
Other economic d/	20	20	10

a. Presumably transshipment of Soviet POL.
b. Estimated volume carried by Chinese and North Vietnamese ships, most of which probably came from China.
c. Value of military hardware and ammunition, excluding the value of military troops or engineers, and their support.
d. Value of North Vietnamese imports paid for with exports.

F. Foreign Exchange Implications

52. The most important foreign exchange implication for China is the presumed loss of potential hard currency earnings -- estimated at $35 million to $45 million -- as a result of increased shipments of food and cloth to North Vietnam. The amounts of cloth being sent to North Vietnam, however, are far less than the amounts formerly shipped to the USSR and Indonesia before those markets were lost. China has had trouble finding alternative markets, and these shipments represent less of a hard currency loss than it seems at first glance. In the same way, the largest item of food sent to North Vietnam is rice -- at least 150,000 tons in 1967 worth approximately $25 million -- and the increase represented here is much less than the decrease in sales to Japan. China probably could improve its hard currency position by sales of these materials to the Free World, but not by as much as the total possible value. In effect, this judgment means that the food and cloth shipments to North Vietnam are partly at the expense of the domestic consumer -- where they are a drop in the bucket -- and partly at the expense of foreign exchange earnings -- where they could be used to expand imports of machinery and materials from the Free World.

53. Another potential hard currency cost to China is the cost of chartering Free World vessels to ship materials to North Vietnam. Almost all of the Free World shipping going to North Vietnam in recent years has been chartered by China, but usually from firms in Hong Kong that are believed to be controlled by China. In essence, China has been chartering ships from itself; thus the real hard currency costs would be in opportunity costs. Here, again, China's lack of an adequate merchant fleet to handle its own foreign trade means that the alternative use of these ships would have been in China's own trade with the Free World. The real hard currency cost, then, is the increased shipping costs to China in its Free World trade because these ships were not available. These costs have probably been about $10 million for the period 1965-67 based on an estimated 100,000 tons a year carried by these ships and using an average freight rate for the types of cargoes carried.

V. COCOM Effect and Effect on General Economic Relations with the West

54. The war in Vietnam is one, but only one, of the factors that are reviving the issue of a "China differential" in economic defense arrangements. China's support of North Vietnam probably has not made an appreciable difference in China's ability to import modern equipment and technology from non-Communist industrialized nations. China's general attitude toward trade with the West and toward admission of Western technicians has been more important in determining changes in its economic relations with the West than has the Vietnam war.

55. In any case, China is already receiving from Japan and Western Europe substantial quantities of machinery and equipment directly or indirectly related to its military effort. Through various means China already is getting technology related to advanced weapons from the West, and China's support or lack of support of North Vietnam does not seem to affect this situation. Whereas the USSR could profit from fuller access to US technology, Communist China is not able to absorb all the opportunities now available for technical support from the Free World.

VI. Effect on the Economy of North Korea

56. North Korean shipments of material aid to North Vietnam apparently have been only in token quantities. Accordingly, the cost is small but, in the absence of detailed information, is not quantifiable with any precision.

A. Military Aid

57. North Korea has shipped an unknown number of light weapons -- mostly 7.62-mm semiautomatic and automatic AK rifles, but also some light machineguns. North Korean ground forces in North Vietnam number only several hundred men, and they are employed mainly in the capacity of advisors. About 35 North Korean pilots have served in North Vietnam since 1965 on a rotational basis, flying combat missions in MIG jet fighters. The 175 North Korean pilots, however, have probably gained more in combat experience than they have contributed to the war effort.

B. Economic Aid

58. Economic aid agreements were signed with North Vietnam in July 1965, January and September 1966, and August 1967. No details on amounts of aid and commodities were publicized. Materials shipped under these agreements probably include small amounts of fish, steel products, farm equipment, railroad equipment, diesel engines, cement, fertilizer (ammonium sulfate), textiles, industrial products, and medical supplies. Barges and lighters have also been shipped in recent years, including 20 to 25 in 1967 and 3 to 5 in the first quarter of 1968.

VII. Effect on Communist Aid Programs in the Free World

A. Military Aid Programs

USSR

59. There is no indication that Soviet military and economic assistance to North Vietnam has limited the scale of Soviet military aid deliveries to less developed countries of the Free World or to Cuba. Notwithstanding the increased amount of aid channeled to North Vietnam since the start of the US bombing in early 1965, the USSR has consistently been able to carry out its programmed military aid obligations to the less developed countries and even expand the list of countries participating in the program. Barring a drastic increase in the dimensions of the Soviet aid program in North Vietnam, the USSR will be able to continue fulfilling its other military aid commitments for the foreseeable future.

60. The less developed countries receiving Soviet arms aid have been provided with practically all of the major items of Soviet military equipment supplied to the North Vietnamese, including MIG-21 jet fighters, SA-2 surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, and infantry weapons. In addition, the USSR has supplied the less developed countries with TU-16 jet medium bombers, SU-7 fighter-bombers, *Komar*-class and *Osa*-class missile patrol boats, and coastal defense cruise missiles, items not yet identified in the North Vietnamese inventory.

61. The 25 percent decline in Soviet military aid deliveries in 1965, compared with the annual average of 1960-64 (see Table 5), is largely explained by the curtailment of the program in Indonesia after the abortive Communist coup of September 1965. In 1965, Indonesia received only $50 million worth of military equipment -- about a 70 percent decline from the $170 million average of annual deliveries in 1960-64.

Table 5

Communist Countries: Military Aid Deliveries to Less Developed Countries 1960-67

Million US $

Donor	1960-64 (Average)	1965	1966	1967
USSR	448	336	450	373
East Europe	5	9	43	27
Communist China	2	3	46	
Total	*455*	*348*	*539*	*400*

62. In 1967 the value of Soviet military deliveries to less developed countries rose to $450 million, or the average annual level of deliveries in 1960-64. This increase was principally the result of large-scale deliveries to India of $165 million worth of equipment.

63. The massive Soviet resupply of the Arab states after the June 1967 war with Israel underscores the USSR's ability and willingness to sustain substantial unplanned costs in its arms aid program. Since mid-1967 the USSR has supplied the UAR, Syria, Algeria, and Iraq with an estimated $350 million worth of military equipment -- most of which has been earmarked for restoring Arab military inventories to pre-war levels.

64. In addition to its substantial deliveries of military aid to the Free World in 1965-67, the USSR provided increased amounts of military aid to Cuba. Soviet military aid deliveries to Cuba grew

from September 1966 to December 1967 to the highest level since the period prior to the missile crisis of late 1962. During this recent period the USSR shipped some 58,000 tons of military cargo -- largely replacements for worn-out or obsolete equipment. Among the items delivered were at least 27 MIG-21 fighters, six *Komar*-class guided missile patrol boats, seven SO-1-class subchasers, and a number of 200-mm multiple rocket launchers.

Eastern Europe

65. Eastern European (mostly Czechoslovak) military deliveries to the less developed countries have not been perceptibly affected by demands of the Vietnam war. The Eastern European countries delivered an estimated $79 million in military equipment to those countries during 1965-67, about three times the total amount delivered in the previous five year period.

Communist China

66. Lack of information precludes any definitive judgment on the effect of the Vietnam war on the small Chinese Communist military aid program in the less developed countries. The absence of any identified Chinese military aid deliveries in 1967, following substantial deliveries to Pakistan in 1966, may have been the result of the disruptive effects of the Cultural Revolution on China's foreign relations. Given the small size and scope of China's military aid program in the less developed countries, it is difficult to see how China's support of the Vietnam war would rule this program out on economic grounds. In any case, Chinese Communist military deliveries to several less developed countries have resumed in 1968.

B. Economic Aid Programs

General

67. Communist assistance to North Vietnam has had no discernible effect on the scope or character of Communist economic aid programs in the less developed countries of the Free World or on the willingness of Communist countries to implement aid previously committed to these nations. Communist countries have continued to extend additional aid to less developed countries where

opportunities exist, in spite of their commitments to the war effort in Vietnam. Both programs in the aggregate are a tiny fraction of Communist resources and, moreover, they represent demand that is "spread out" over a broad area of the donor economies.

Extensions

68. In 1965 and 1966, Communist commitments of economic assistance to the less developed countries rose to record levels at the same time that support of the war effort of North Vietnam was expanding (see Table 6). Although new economic aid commitments to less developed countries dropped in 1967 to a 12-year low, the decline is not attributable to a change in Communist aid policy or to the diversion of supplies to North Vietnam. Instead, it reflects the reduced opportunities in 1967 for extending additional aid to these countries, following three years of record-high extensions. Recent Soviet aid overtures to less developed countries demonstrate the high priority that the USSR continues to assign to economic aid where it may contribute to the containment or reduction of Western influence or provide long-run economic benefits to the USSR. In 1968, Communist extensions of economic aid to less developed countries are expected to rise again and, at a minimum, will exceed annual average extensions in 1960-64.

Table 6

Communist Countries: Extensions of Economic Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World
1960-67

Million US $

	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	Communist China
1960-64 Total	3,882	2,184	1,046	652
1965	1,404	650	635	119
1966	1,607	1,267	220	120
1967	214	90	75	49

Deliveries

69. In addition to supporting the long-run development efforts of less developed countries, the Communist countries also have continued to deliver equipment and to provide technical services for current aid programs. It is deliveries, rather than extensions, that would indicate any immediate impact of the Vietnam war. In 1966 and 1967 the East European countries and Communist China increased deliveries of economic aid to the less developed countries under previous commitments. Although Soviet deliveries declined in 1966 and 1967 (see Table 7), this decline was not caused by the diversion of resources to North Vietnam as the two programs do not compete for the same resources. The bulk of Soviet economic assistance to North Vietnam consists of commodities and small, light industrial and agricultural enterprises, and North Vietnam's share of Soviet exports of complete plants has changed very little from the prehostilities period (see Table 8). On the other hand, commodity assistance has accounted for less than 5 percent of total Soviet aid to the developing countries while approximately 70 percent of the total value of Soviet aid to the less developed countries has been allocated for industrial use, mostly for heavy industry.

70. The decline in Soviet deliveries of economic aid to less developed countries since 1965 is attributable chiefly to domestic problems in the recipient countries which have limited their ability to provide adequate local resources to complement Soviet aid. For example, the inability of India's depressed economy to absorb scheduled Soviet aid shipments for the construction of heavy industrial plants resulted in a 50 percent drop in deliveries in 1967 compared with 1966. Recent declines in Soviet aid deliveries also are related to the construction cycle for large projects, where major equipment deliveries are concentrated in a short period.

Table 7

Communist Countries: Deliveries of Economic Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World and to North Vietnam 1960-67

Million US $

	1960-64	1965	1966	1967
North Vietnam	435	150	275	370
USSR	216	85	150	200
Eastern Europe	62	15	50	90
Communist China	157	50	75	80
Less Developed Countries	1,723	521	506	493
USSR	1,262	350	328	288
Eastern Europe	343	90	93	110
Communist China	118	81	85	95

Table 8

USSR: Exports of Complete Enterprises to Major Areas 1961-66

Percent

	Total	Less Developed Countries	North Vietnam	Other Communist Countries	All Other Countries
1961	100.0	39.0	3.3	57.6	0.1
1962	100.0	44.3	5.3	49.6	0.8
1963	100.0	39.8	4.4	44.7	11.1
1964	100.0	49.2	3.1	47.6	0.1
1965	100.0	46.3	5.3	47.2	1.2
1966	100.0	38.1	5.2	54.0	2.7

Economic Technicians

71. The number of Communist technicians in the less developed countries declined in 1967 as several major projects, such as the Aswan Dam, neared completion and as political differences erupted with host countries -- for example, the Chinese Communist dispute with Burma. There is no evidence that technicians were withdrawn from less developed countries because their services were required either at home or in North Vietnam.

VIII. Effect on the Economy of North Vietnam

72. The effect of the war on the economy of North Vietnam itself is the compounded result of engaging in the war in the South and undergoing massive bombing attacks at home. The war in the South has drained off many of North Vietnam's physically fit young males and has required the movement through North Vietnam of weapons, ammunition, food, medical supplies, and the like that come primarily from other Communist countries. The bombing in the North has caused the diversion of large numbers of workers to the repair of bomb damage, to civil defense tasks, and to transport work and has also increased the requirement for imports of construction materials, transport equipment, consumer goods, and the weapons and ammunition for air defense. The economy of North Vietnam, therefore, has been mobilized to act both as a source of manpower for the battlefields in the South and as a funnel through which arms and supplies can reach these battlefields. The remainder of this section addresses the damage inflicted by the bombing attacks on the North.

73. Damage inflicted by the bombing of North Vietnam has caused substantial loss of output and has reduced potential economic growth. At the same time, increased aid from other Communist countries has permitted the North Vietnamese to prosecute the war effort without serious deterioration of their standard of living despite major disruptions to economic activities. Cumulative measurable damage through April 1968 is estimated at more than $440 million; the rate of damage reached a peak in 1967, as shown in the tabulation below. In addition to the measurable losses, there are other losses to the economy and the military establishment which cannot be measured but would be valued in the tens of millions of dollars.

	Million US $				
Facilities and Equipment	1965	1966	1967	Jan-Apr 1968	Total
Economic	36.2	93.3	158.1	17.6	305.2
Military	32.7	20.3	78.1	5.5	136.6
Total	*68.9*	*113.6*	*236.2*	*23.1*	*441.8*

A. Economic Damage

Industrial Facilities

74. A large part of North Vietnam's small industrial sector is out of operation because of direct bomb damage or a shortage of electric power. Cumulative measurable damage to industrial facilities is estimated at $60 million, as shown in the following tabulation:

	1965-Apr 1968 (Million US $)
Electric powerplants	33.1
Manufacturing plants	18.2
Petroleum supplies and facilities	7.8
Shipyards	0.9
Total	*60.0*

75. The bombing of large plants has forced the North Vietnamese to adopt a policy of decentralization and to emphasize development of local industry. A number of small manufacturing plants have been built, and some larger plants in areas subjected to bombing have been dispersed. Industry has not contributed substantially to North Vietnam's military capabilities, however, and the damage apparently has had little direct influence on the war effort.

76. Most of the damage to industry was inflicted during the first half of 1967. A decrease in the level of strikes during the latter part of 1967 and the first part of 1968 allowed the North Vietnamese to restore some capacity to operation. For example, at the end of April 1968, about 45 percent of the

national electric generating capacity was operational, compared with about 20 percent from June through October 1967. Repairs and an increase in the electric power output have also permitted operations to resume at several manufacturing plants, including parts of the Viet Tri Chemical Complex and much of the coal-processing facilities at Cam Pha and Hon Gai. An extensive system of dispersed POL sites has offset the destruction of fixed petroleum storage facilities in 1966. Damage to shipyards has not significantly hindered the production of boats or the fabrication of barges.

Transport Facilities and Equipment

77. Heavy damage to the transport system has increased the cost of moving goods and has forced the use of less efficient alternative facilities and methods. The flow of imports and domestic supplies, however, has not been seriously restricted, because of (1) extensive and rapid repair work, (2) the construction of new rail lines, roads, and bypasses, and (3) the infusion of substantial amounts of foreign aid. Both transport capacity and equipment inventories have been maintained or increased. Cumulative damage to transport facilities and equipment is as follows:

	1965-Apr 1968 (Million US $)
Transport equipment	81.8
Bridges	38.2
Railroad yards and shops	6.6
Ports	1.8
Other (including road and rail cuts)	2.4
Total	*130.8*

Indirect Losses

78. In addition to the direct physical damage, the economy has suffered considerable indirect loss. Although agriculture and fishing have not been targeted for attacks, their output has been curtailed because of the air and naval bombardment. Agricultural production has suffered from (a) disruption of work routines resulting indirectly from the bombing, (b) disruptions to the supply and

distribution of fertilizer, and (c) a weakening of economic administration in rural areas. The fish catch has decreased because of the threat of air and naval attacks against watercraft and the seeding of MK-36 influence bombs* in waterways. The cumulative loss in rice production, including an unknown share of losses as a result of adverse weather, and in the fish catch is estimated as follows:

	1965-Apr 1968 (Million US $)
Rice production	60.5
Fish catch	12.8
Total	*73.3*

79. Both of the rice crops in 1967 are believed to have been below average, but the shortfalls probably did not cause more than localized food shortages. Some of the decrease in rice output has been offset by increased production of subsidiary crops. Increased imports of bulk food in 1967 and 1968 have been greater than the estimated decrease in rice production.

80. Exports of bulk products that make up about 20 percent of the value of North Vietnam's exports also have been disrupted by bomb damage and by increased costs of domestic transport. Cement output was cut off in mid-1967 by bombing of the Haiphong Cement Plant. Coal output was curtailed drastically by damage to electric power and processing facilities in mid-1967. Output of pig iron at Thai Nguyen was halted in April 1967, and exports by sea of apatite were cut off in mid-1965 when interdiction of the Lao Cai rail line raised transport costs. The cumulative measurable loss in North Vietnam's seaborne exports attributable to the bombing is shown in the following tabulation:

* *The MK-36 is a modified bomb that is mechanically armed 25 minutes after delivery and is detonated by any magnetic disturbance generated by ferrous material or objects.*

	1965-Apr 1968 (Million US $)
Apatite	17.6
Coal	17.4
Cement	4.1
Pig iron	2.0
Total	*41.1*

81. Although substantial in terms of volume, measurable export losses each year have been less than 20 percent of the value of annual exports prior to the bombing, and have been minor compared with contributions of economic aid from other Communist countries.

B. Military Damage

Fixed Facilities

82. The cumulative value of damage to fixed military facilities is estimated at about $75 million, as shown in the following tabulation:

	1965-Apr 1968 (Million US $)
Barracks	31.2
Ammunition, supply, and motor vehicle depots	16.3
Air defense system (airfields and antiaircraft artillery, a/ SAM, a/ and radar sites)	15.0
Other (including naval bases, dispersed storage areas, truck parks, and communications sites)	12.2
Total	*74.7*

a. *Including equipment.*

83. Heavy damage to the military establishment throughout the air campaign has forced the North Vietnamese to disperse military facilities for men and supplies but has had little effect on North Vietnam's economy. Attacks against JCS-targeted barracks, the most important barracks complexes existing before the air campaign, destroyed about 20 percent of the national barracks capacity and forced the abandonment of an additional 7 percent. The North Vietnamese have not attempted to repair this damage, and the men have been dispersed to temporary shelters or civilian housing. Dispersal of ammunition, supply, and vehicle depots has increased logistic requirements, causing temporary local shortages but not seriously restricting the general movement of military or economic goods. Destruction of supplies has been offset by increased imports.

84. The cost of damage to air-defense-related facilities such as airfields and antiaircraft artillery, SAM, and radar sites has had little effect on the North Vietnamese economy. Most of the building material is obtained locally, and equipment is imported from Communist countries, probably as grants. The air defense system has been gradually expanded since 1965 despite the heavy damage inflicted. Communist China has contributed to this expansion by furnishing antiaircraft units and engineering construction battalions. The antiaircraft and SAM systems presently operate from a large number of temporary as well as fixed sites. Mobility is stressed and equipment is being made less vulnerable to attack.

Military Equipment

85. The air campaign has destroyed a substantial amount of military equipment which was provided by the USSR and Communist China. Most of the value of damage, estimated at nearly $62 million, resulted from destruction of MIG's and helicopters as shown in the tabulation below. (Estimates of antiaircraft and SAM equipment destroyed and damaged have been included with the value of fixed facilities.)

	1965-Apr 1968 (Million US $)
Aircraft	47.6
Radar	9.5
Naval craft	4.8
Total	*61.9*

86. The North Vietnamese have lost about 119 jet fighters since the beginning of the air campaign, of which 84 were lost in 1967. Replacements of MIG-21's from the USSR and MIG-17's from China have been more than sufficient to replace these losses. North Vietnam's small navy has been maintained through replacements from China, and modern equipment for the early-warning and ground-control-intercept systems has been provided in abundant quantities from both China and the USSR.

C. General Impact on the Economy

87. The war and the bombing have eroded the North Vietnamese economy, making the country increasingly dependent on foreign aid. However, because the country is at a comparatively primitive stage of development and because the bombing has been carried out under important restrictions, damage to the economy has been small. The basic needs of the people are largely satisfied locally. Imports from Communist countries have enabled North Vietnam to make up for losses in industrial production and to take care of new needs created by the war.

88. The overall level of economic activity probably did not change much in 1965 and 1966, but went down in 1967. Agricultural production dropped in 1966 and again in 1967, partly because of poor weather. Most of the important industrial plants and powerplants were not made targets of the bombing until 1967. Loss of industrial output, therefore, has been incurred largely since mid-1967. Some consumer goods have been in short supply, and the price of some of them has risen beyond the reach of the average consumer. The official rice ration has been maintained, but imported foodstuffs are being substituted to an increasing degree in the urban ration.

89. Significant losses to North Vietnam's economy that are not entirely offset by outside aid are (a) the almost complete hiatus in development since 1965, (b) the actual losses in manpower, and (c) the loss of man-hours of workers diverted to defense, to repair of bomb damage, and to the movement of goods. The disruption of normal work routines, the separation of families, and the physical anguish from the repeated bombings have taken an unmeasurable toll in productivity. Bombings have required the diversion of up to 200,000 workers to full-time repair of lines of communication and to transport tasks. Another 300,000 to 400,000 have been taken frequently from their normal work to perform parttime tasks related to the bombing. Several hundred thousand young and old have been evacuated from urban areas.

90. The bombing has resulted in casualties over the past three years totaling about 76,000, of whom one-third may have been killed. Approximately 100,000 troops have been tied up in air and coastal defense. For the past three years, increased military manpower requirements have taken most of the estimated 120,000 physically fit males reaching draft age annually.

D. Postwar Rebuilding Costs

91. The direct costs of restoring North Vietnam's damaged economy will be borne primarily by Communist aid donors. About $130 million in foreign economic assistance will be required to reactivate industrial capacity and to repair damage in the non-industrial sectors. In addition, aid in the form of consumer goods and raw materials will be required for several years until output of industry and agriculture can more nearly meet domestic needs. Foreign technical assistance will be needed in almost every sector of the economy. The present general level of economic assistance probably will be maintained during the immediate reconstruction years. The following tabulation shows a possible distribution of direct reconstruction costs among economic sectors:

	Million US $
Manufacturing	20
Fuels and power	30
Transportation	50
Military	30
Total	*130*

92. The North Vietnamese almost certainly will make a concerted effort to restore the economy rapidly to the state that existed before the bombing. This could be accomplished in two to three years. High priority will be given to restoring the transportation network, particularly bridges, and parts of the electric power industry. Repair of severely damaged equipment in the electric power industry may be deferred in favor of completing work on the Thac Ba Hydroelectric Powerplant which was being built with Soviet aid. Under an accelerated construction schedule and with an investment of $15 million -- about one-half the cost of restoring all damaged power facilities -- this powerplant could be put into service within 18 months, thus making available more generating capacity than has been damaged by the bombing.

93. Essential industries to be rebuilt will include chemicals, construction materials, and textiles. Among these a large effort will be needed to restore the Haiphong Cement Plant and the Nam Dinh Textile Plant. Concurrently with restoration, relocation of some dispersed industries will take place and production lines will be reoriented from wartime requirements. Earnings of foreign exchange could rapidly regain prewar levels. Even now, coal exports are approaching normal levels, and exports of handicrafts have been generally sustained during the past three years. Seaborne shipments of apatite could be resumed as soon as through rail service from Lao Cai to Haiphong is resumed. Exports of pig iron cannot be resumed until the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Complex is repaired, probably with Chinese Communist assistance.

94. The amount of commodity credits required in the postwar period will depend largely on conditions in agriculture. Substantial imports of food and of fertilizer probably will continue in

the immediate postwar years. Although agriculture has not been a target of the bombing program, it has been disrupted by a combination of unfavorable weather and indirect effects of the bombing.

95. North Vietnam probably will not initiate construction of new basic industries in the immediate postwar period since much of the country's industrial capacity had barely been assimilated into the economy when the bombing began. Several large plants -- for example, the Phu Tho Phosphate Fertilizer Plant, the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Complex, and the Bac Giang Chemical Fertilizer Plant -- either had just begun partial operation or were not yet in operation. North Vietnam had already negotiated for a number of small specialized plants which probably will be constructed in the immediate postwar years to increase regional self-sufficiency. Nonetheless, the postwar effort will consist primarily of restoration of existing facilities.

E. Sources of Postwar Aid

96. On the basis of past economic assistance, it is estimated that the direct reconstruction costs will be distributed as follows:

	Million US $
USSR	45
Communist China	65
Eastern Europe	20
Total	*130*

The USSR probably will provide a greater portion of the commodity aid. Communist China will play a key role in reconstruction because many of the major industrial installations in North Vietnam were Chinese aid projects. China also provided electric power equipment for several of the large powerplants including those at Thai Nguyen, Bac Giang, and Viet Tri. In addition, the heavy assistance by Communist China in construction, particularly of roads and rail lines, probably will be continued in the immediate postwar years. Among the European Communist countries, the principal postwar donor for reconstruction probably will be Poland, with Rumania and Hungary following in that order.

IX. General Appraisal of These Costs

97. The short-term costs of supporting the Vietnam war -- as described in the preceding sections -- are small, especially in comparison with the vast political and military issues involved. Since the start of the US bombing, military aid by the Communist countries has amounted to more than $1.5 billion and economic aid to about $1 billion. A portion of these sums does not represent a net loss, either because the best alternative use of the resources is unimportant or because the aid brings with it some offsetting advantages, such as the training of antiaircraft units under combat conditions.

98. The type of support furnished by each of the Communist countries usually has represented areas of economic strength. For example, China can readily furnish manpower and basic construction materials and the USSR can make use of its large stockpiles of obsolescing weapons. A further factor in easing the burden on the Communist economies is that shipments are "spread out" over a variety of fairly standard items. Thus the aid apparently created no severe bottlenecks for any major commodity or transportation line, nor has it required any major changes in overall economic plans.

99. The indirect costs are pertinent especially to the USSR, although they also have had an effect on the economies of Eastern Europe. The strained political atmosphere has postponed the lowering of barriers in US-USSR trade and has thus delayed Soviet access to the world's foremost source of advanced technology. Furthermore, if the rise of 3-1/2 billion rubles in the Soviet military budget since 1964 can be partly attributed to the Vietnam war, this would constitute another reduction in high-quality resources available to modernize Soviet industry over the long run.

X. Costs in the First Half of 1968

100. Information on Communist military aid to North Vietnam in the first half of 1968 suggests that it is continuing at about the same rate as in 1967. Information on economic aid suggests a rate for the first half of 1968 about 20 percent higher

than in 1967. Thus, in Table 1, if the first half of 1968 were added to the period 1965-67, the total figure for military aid would be increased from $1.38 billion to $1.7 billion and the total figure for economic aid would be raised from $795 million to $1.0 billion.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

1.3(a)(4)

REPORT NO. [redacted]

DATE DISTR. 15 AUGUST 1968

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI JULY 1968, EXCEPT AS STATED

SUBJECT VIET CONG POLICY AND TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR

B

Held for LtCR.

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (24 JULY 1968) [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

SOURCE THIS IS A COLLATION OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON THE SUBJECT, WHICH WAS PREPARED IN THE FIELD BY A CAS RESEARCH UNIT. IT IS NOT FULLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

SUMMARY-- THE VIET CONG /VC/ OFFICIALLY MAINTAIN A LENIENT AND HUMANITARIAN POLICY TOWARD PRISONERS OF WAR /POWS/, BUT THIS POLICY IS NOT ALWAYS IMPLEMENTED. THE VC HAVE ISSUED NUMEROUS DIRECTIVES AND ORDERED ITS MILITARY PROSELYTING SECTIONS TO HOLD SPECIAL CLASSES ON THE POLITICAL VALUE OF POWS AND HOW TO TREAT THEM. ALMOST ALL IMPORTANT POWS ARE TRANSFERRED TO THE PROVINCE OR REGION LEVEL. THOSE PRISONERS WHO ARE KEPT AT THE VILLAGE AND DISTRICT LEVEL ARE OFTEN RELEASED WITHIN TWO MONTHS WHEREAS THOSE AT THE HIGHER LEVEL ARE HELD MUCH LONGER. THE RELEASE OF THE FREE WORLD MILITARY FORCES PRISONERS POSES A SPECIAL PROBLEM SINCE IT MUST BE DONE AT THE REGIONAL OR CENTRAL LEVEL AND THEN IN CONNECTION WITH AN INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA COUP. BRUTALITY TO AND EXECUTION OF PRISONERS HAVE BEEN REPORTED BUT FOR POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY THE VC CONTINUE TO ADVOCATE A LENIENT AND HUMANITARIAN POLICY. END SUMMARY.

Approved for Release Date September 1993

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STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPOR

[redacted] [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

50.2-02.3d

1.3(a)(4)

1. DOCUMENTS CAPTURED OVER A PERIOD OF SEVERAL YEARS SHOW THE OFFICIAL VIET CONG /VC/ POLICY TOWARD PRISONERS OF WAR /POWS/ AS ONE OF LENIENCY AND HUMANITARIANISM FOR POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY. HOWEVER, IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT THERE IS A GAP OF SOME MAGNITUDE BETWEEN THE POLICY AND ITS APPLICATION. AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE POLICY, AFTER THE TET ATTACKS AND THE INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF POWS THE VC IN MY THO PROVINCE REISSUED A BASIC DIRECTIVE ON POW POLICY WHICH EMPHASIZED THAT A LENIENT AND HUMANE POLICY CAN SPLIT THE ENEMY'S RANKS AND THAT POWS, PARTICULARLY AMERICANS, CAN BE POLITICALLY EXPLOITED.

2. THERE ARE NUMEROUS VC DIRECTIVES ADMONISHING SUBORDINATE UNITS FOR NOT ADHERING TO THE POW POLICY AND ORDERING THE MILITARY PROSELYTING SECTIONS TO SET UP SPECIAL CLASSES TO CORRECT THIS SITUATION. SEVERAL DOCUMENTS ATTEST THAT IN MANY AREAS THE POLICY IS IGNORED MOST OF THE TIME. THE PARTY CONSTANTLY URGES THE CADRES TO EMPHASIZE IN THEIR CLASSES THAT KILLING, BEATING AND TORTURING POWS OR MUTILATING THE DEAD IS HARMFUL TO THE REVOLUTION. THE CADRES ARE TOLD TO MAKE THE POINT THAT IMPORTANT POWS CAN BE USED AS HOSTAGES ASSURING THE SAFETY OF CAPTURED VC AND THEIR RELEASE CAN WIN PROPAGANDA VICTORIES OF INTERNATIONAL IMPACT.

3. COMBAT UNITS ARE REMINDED CONSTANTLY TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF POWS, ESPECIALLY AMERICANS. THEY ARE INSTRUCTED TO ISSUE ROPES TO EACH SOLDIER FOR BINDING POWS, TO TEACH THE TROOPS ENGLISH PHRASES SUCH AS "HANDS UP" AND TO TEACH SUCH TECHNIQUES AS REMOVING THE SHOES OF U.S. POWS TO HINDER THEIR ESCAPE ATTEMPTS. FURTHER, THE SOLDIERS ARE TOLD NOT TO TAKE THE PERSONAL PROPERTY OF POWS BUT TO COLLECT IT AND MAKE OUT A RECEIPT AND PASS IT ALONG WITH THE POW. THE PARTY [illegible] GREAT DIFFICULTY IN GETTING INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS TO CARRY OUT THIS POLICY.

4. ONCE CAPTURED, THE POW IS HANDED OVER TO THE VILLAGE,

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DISTRICT OR PROVINCE AUTHORITIES. IF IT HAS NOT ALREADY BEEN DONE, THE POW WILL BE PLACED IN A CATEGORY OF WHICH THERE APPEARS TO BE TWO TYPES: THE FIRST IS BASED ON THE TYPE OF UNIT AND RANK. THE LESS ELITE HIS UNIT, THE MORE LIKELY THE POW WILL BE KEPT AT A LOWER VC ECHELON, GIVEN SHORTER INDOCTRINATION AND MORE LIKELY TO BE CONSIDERED AS A POTENTIAL RECRUIT FOR THE VC. GENERALLY, THE LOWER THE RANK THE LESS TIME THE POW WILL BE HELD. THE SAME HOLDS TRUE FOR ALL FREE WORLD MILITARY FORCES /FWMF/, INTELLIGENCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PERSONNEL AND OTHER SPECIALIST GROUPS. IN ADDITION, ENLISTED MEN, NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND OFFICERS USUALLY ARE SEPARATED IMMEDIATELY TO BREAK THE INFLUENCE OF THE HIGHER RANKING TROOPS OVER THEIR JUNIORS. THE SECOND CATEGORY IS BASED ON THE INDIVIDUAL'S ACTIONS. THOSE WHO SURRENDER IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE BATTLE AND EXHIBIT LITTLE PERSONAL LOYALTY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM /GVN/ GET SPECIAL TREATMENT. SUCH POWS DO NOT HAVE TO BE BOUND BUT THEY HAVE TO ATTEND INDOCTRINATION SESSIONS. THE LEGITIMATE POW, IN THEORY, IS TO RECEIVE LENIENT, HUMANE BUT FIRM TREATMENT, AND IF HE PROVES TO BE OBSTINATE, CERTAIN PUNNISHMENTS ARE SUGGESTED, SUCH AS STANDING IN THE SUN OR BEING PUT IN ISOLATION. IN SOME DOCUMENTS DEATH IS MENTIONED AS A LAST RESORT BUT ONLY AFTER UNTYING THE POW.

5. ALMOST ALL IMPORTANT POWS ARE TRANSFERRED TO THE PROVINCE OR REGION LEVEL. WHILE ENROUTE THE POW IS USUALLY BOUND, BAREFOOT AND BLINDFOLDED AND TAKEN ON A ROUTE WHICH THE PRISONER CANNOT REMEMBER. IN CAMP THE PRISONERS ARE USUALLY UNFETTERED. THE PRISON CAMP IS USUALLY SMALL CONSISTING OF FIVE OR FEWER THATCHED HUTS OR SEMIBURIED BUNKERS CONTAINING FROM 15 TO 70 INMATES. CAVES AND TUNNELS ARE ALSO USED. SOME CAMPS HAVE BEEN REPORTED TO CONTAIN 400 OR MORE PRISONERS. ONTHE OTHER HAND, SOME CAMPS REMAIN EMPTY FOR LONG PERIODS

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OF TIME. IT IS COMMON FOR PRISONERS TO BE TRANSFERRED TO SEVERAL CAMPS. USUALLY, SOME WORK IS PERFORMED, CERTAIN HOLIDAYS ARE ALLOWED AND SOME MEDICAL FACILITIES EXIST.

6. NEW PRISONERS ARE USUALLY GIVEN A BOOKLET ABOUT POW REGULATIONS OR IT IS READ TO THEM. ACCORDING TO THE DIRECTIVES, THIS IS CONSIDERED ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT IN THE CASE OF AMERICANS WHO HAVE BEEN LED BY THEIR COMMANDERS TO EXPECT INHUMANE TREATMENT. ALL MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS ARE CONFISCATED. PRISONERS WHO DIE ARE OFTEN BURIED SECRETLY AND THEIR POSSESSIONS SENT TO THE REAR. THIS PROCEDURE APPEARS TO BE FOLLOWED BECAUSE THE VC THINK IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY EXPEDIENT TO KEEP THESE DEAD MEN "ALIVE" FOR FUTURE RETALIATORY "EXECUTIONS."

7. THE VC BOMBARD THE POWS WITH A STEADY STREAM OF INDOCTRINATION. THE TYPICAL INDOCTRINATION IS TO HAVE THE POW MEMORIZE A LESSON AND THEN REPEAT IT IN WRITTEN TESTS. IN ADDITION, THE VC USE SELF-CRITICISM SESSIONS AND HAVE THE POW WRITE A PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT. THE VC HAVE SET UP A SLIDING SCALE OF WHAT THEY HOPE TO ACHIEVE WITH THEIR INDOCTRINATION. AT THE OPTIMUM, THEY HOPE TO ENLIST THE POW INTO THE VC ARMED FORCES. NEXT BEST, THEY WOULD LIKE HIM TO WORK IN SOME WAY FOR THE VC. NEXT, THEY WOULD LIKE HIM TO RETURN HOME AND ASSUME AN ANTI-GVN ATTITUDE. LAST, THEY HOPE HE WILL AT LEAST STAY NEUTRAL. IF THE POW FAILS TO PASS HIS TESTS, THE CAMP AUTHORITIES USUALLY RECOMMEND FURTHER TRAINING BUT NOT ANY PUNISHMENT SINCE THE GOAL IS REHABILITATION. AT THE VILLAGE AND DISTRICT LEVEL THE PERIOD OF INDOCTRINATION RANGES FROM ONE WEEK TO TWO MONTHS, AND THE PRISONER IS ALL BUT ASSURED OF BEING RELEASED. THE INDOCTRINATION PERIOD IS LONGER FOR HIGHER LEVEL PRISONERS, AND SOME PRISONERS MAY NEVER BE ABLE TO CONVINCE THE VC THAT THEY HAVE REFORMED ENOUGH TO BE RELEASED. THE FWMF PRISONERS POSE A PROBLEM SINCE THEY USUALLY CAN ONLY BE RELEASED AT THE REGIONAL OR CENTRAL LEVEL AND THEN ONLY

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IN CONNECTION WITH SOME INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA COUP. THE MORE OBSTINATE FWMF POWS ARE QUIETLY EXECUTED.

8. A FEW POWS INCLUDING AN OCCASIONAL AMERICAN, ARE TRANSFERRED TO SECURITY SECTIONS WHOSE DETENTION CAMPS ARE GENERALLY OCCUPIED BY VC DESERTERS, GVN OFFICIALS AND SPIES. THE TREATMENT TENDS TO BE HARSHER, THE EXECUTIONS MORE FREQUENT, AND THE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS MORE BRUTAL, SUCH AS THE USE OF BLINDERS AND LEG IRONS. STILL, THE ULTIMATE GOAL IN THESE CAMPS ALSO IS SUPPOSED TO BE REHABILITATION AND EVENTUAL RELEASE.

9. REGARDING THE RELEASE OF POWS THE MY THO PROVINCE DICECTIVE ON POW POLICY STATED THAT POWS MUST BE BOUND CLOSELY TO THE REVOLUTION SO THAT THEY WILL BE LOOKED UPON WITH SUSPICION BY THE OTHER SIDE. THE DOCUMENT CONTINUES THAT BEFORE EACH RELEASE, THE POW MUST BE PROVOKED TO WRITE SOME KIND OF PLEDGE IN FAVOR OF THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND MAKE COMMENTS ABOUT VC POLICIES AND THE TREATMENT AND ATTITUDES OF THE LIBERATION TROOPS. EACH RELEASE SCENE IS TO BE PHOTOGRAPHED.

10. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE NO COMPLETE STATISTICS ON THE NUMBER OF POWS RELEASED, SOME INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE. IN VC MILITARY REGION 5, THERE WERE 5,753 GVN POWS REPORTED TO BE DETAINED IN 1965. OF THE TOTAL 4,601 WERE RELEASED, 16 WERE TRANSFERRED TO SECURITY SECTIONS, 18 DIED OF SICKNESS AND 181 VOLUNTEERED TO SERVE WITH VC UNITS. A RETURNEE WHO CLASSIFIED POWS ARRIVING AT AN LINH VILLAGE, PHU YEN PROVINCE, STATED THAT 30 POWS ARRIVED IN JULY 1964, 35 IN NOVEMBER AND 110 IN DECEMBER 1965 AND NONE IN 1966. OF THESE 175 POWS, 150 WERE SENT TO PROVINCE AND 25 WERE KEPT FOR A TWO MONTH INDOCTRINATION AND RELEASED TO VC UNITS.

11. A DOCUMENT COVERING THE FIRST HALF OF 1967 FOR THE SECURITY SECTION OF BINH TAN SUBREGION REVEALED THAT OF 41 PRISONERS, ONLY SEVEN WERE RELEASED, ONE DIED, ONE WAS

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TRANSFERRED AND 32 WERE EXECUTED. THE SECURITY SECTION OF THE WESTERN NAMBO REGION REPORTED THAT IN THE SECOND QUARTER OF 1967 THERE WERE 1,450 PRISONERS. OF THESE, 23 ESCAPED, FOUR WERE SHOT ATTEMPTING TO ESCAPE, SIX WERE SENTENCED TO DEATH, AND 46 WERE EXECUTED WITHOUT SENTENCING. A VC WHO ESCAPED IN MARCH 1968 AFTER BEING SENTENCED TO THREE YEARS RETRAINING FOR ATTEMPTING TO CHIEU HOI MAINTAINED THAT THERE WERE EIGHT SECURITY COMPOUNDS IN PHUNG HIEP DISTRICT, PHONG DINH PROVINCE. HE SAID THAT THE COMPOUND CAPACITIES RANGED FRO 70 TO 120 AT THE "COURTHOUSE" WHERE UNTRIED PRISONERS WERE HELD. AT ONE OF THESE, THE 85 PRISONERS WERE KEPT TOGETHER AND MOVED FROM COMPOUND TO COMPOUND ABOUT EVERY TEN DAYS. ABOUT 40 WERE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM TROOPS AND ONE WAS AN AMERICAN. THE PRISONERS WERE KEPT CHAINED NEARLY 24 HOURS A DAY, BEATINGS WERE COMMON AND MEDICAL FACILITIES WERE NONEXISTENT.

12. THERE ARE SEVERAL INSTANCES, ESPECIALLY AROUND TET, WHERE GROUPS OF PRISONERS SUCH AS PROVINCIAL RECONNAISSANCE UNIT MEMBERS, INFORMANTS AND OTHER "BAD ELEMENTS" WERE MARKED FOR IMMEDIATE EXECUTION. IN ISOLATED CASES EVEN FWMF PRISONERS WERE PUT ON THESE LISTS, ALTHOUGH THIS MAY NOT HAVE BEEN DONE WITH HIGH LEVEL PARTY APPROVAL. VC POLICY CONCERNING DISPOSITION OF POWS WHEN IMMINENT DANGER ARISES IS NOT CLEAR. THERE ARE SOME DOCUMENTS SAYING TO KILL AND OTHERS SAYING NOT TO KILL UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES. THE CONTINUED RELEASE OF POWS, INCLUDING FWMF, AND THE CONTINUED APPEARANCE OF POW DIRECTIVES URGING A LESS THAN BRUTAL POW POLICY INDICATES THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL POLICY OF LENIENCY AND HUMANITY FOR POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY CONTINUES TO BE THE PREFERRED COURSE BY THE VC LEADERS.

13. FIELD DISSEM-- ATE USMACV USAID DIR JUSPAO /MR. NICKEL ON[illegible] ARV NAVFORV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

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SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
OCTOBER 1968

I GENERAL

A. October was one of the quietest months experienced in Saigon and the outstations in a long time except for the last day. On the night of 31 October, Tan Son Nhut received three rounds of 107 mm rocket fire with negligible damage. The same night, downtown Saigon received eight rounds of 107 mm and 122 mm of rocket fire causing two local personnel killed and six wounded.

B. October was the second worst month we experienced in gunfire incidents. 36 aircraft reported gunfire in February 1968 vs 24 aircraft in October.

C. Total block time for the month was 9,300 hrs which represents an increase of 164 hours over last month.

D. The new Company Cafeteria is doing a "land office" business serving primarily an American and TCN menu. A Vietnamese menu is served in the old messhall at approximately VN$60 per serving to hold the price to the established meal allowance. Because of the volume of business, it is apparent we must develop another facility for our indigenous personnel which conforms to the same facility standards as the new Cafeteria. The old messhall will be razed to make room for the new Training and Operations (Administrative) Building.

E. Cost reduction is a big subject here in Vietnam. I am gratified by the enthusiasm shown by all departments and outstations. I am confident we will make a significant contribution to this important program.

F. We were visited by Tropical Storm Hester on 19 and 20 October 1968. While some of our personnel experienced flooding and long power outages at their homes, the Air America area was virtually unaffected.

II Facilities Development

A. Form Fs have been obtained for the Transmitter Building and the Revetment Walls. We expect work to commence on both projects in the near future.

B. Work on the Utility Tunnel to the new GMD Complex is in progress.

C. Appropriation requests have been approved to relocate the BM office to the new BMD Building and to provide an Emergency Water Supply for the new GMD Complex. The relocation of the BM Office will alleviate the over-crowding which exists in the Flying and Operations Departments. Form Fs are being obtained for the Emergency Water Supply.

D. An appropriation request is being developed to rehabilitate the old carpenter shop to house all functions of the Personnel Office. This will further relieve the pressure in our existing Administrative Building and will permit the Accounting Department to spread out into a more efficient working environment. This will be an in-house project which we hope to start in the near future.

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III FLYING

A. The month of October is thankfully over, with hopes, but little expectation that November will see an improvement in the bind on flying time limitations. It seems that no matter how much effort goes into programming and planning the flight schedule and leave program, we continually fall behind the proverbal eight-ball. For one thing, our pilots just refuse to understand that it is vital to the operation that they only get sick when they are programmed for sick leave, not just at their convenience. In all seriousness, the schedule has been so tight at the end of the month and will be amplified as the end of the year approaches, that in several instances only because the customer did not request the standby aircraft, were we able to stay as close to the specified restrictions as we did.

Let's do something?

B. Morale is about minimum satisfactory. The same problems mentioned in past reports still remain a factor, and it would serve little purpose to reiterate them individually. Suffice to say, they have not cleared up nor improved appreciably.

C. It seems that the coordination and cooperation with maintenance has taken a definite upswing and if the trend continues, and there is no reason it should not, the whole station cannot help but benefit. Mutual assistance, discussions and constructive criticism have replaced most of the "just criticise" that both sides have been guilty of in the past on accasion. Hopefully this new trend will grow and expand.

D. The sudden announcement of the MPC conversion caused many of the pilots that were away from Saigon considerable concern. As it turned out, very adequate and liberal provisions were made by the "powers that be" for these people to convert their "old" for the "new". For those in Taipei and elsewhere still holding the old issue, it may come back to value, just like the Confederate Dollar.

E. Flying time for the month was up by 195 hours as compared to September. Totals by aircraft type are as indicated.

Increase		Decrease	
PC 6 = 1971	+ 346	C 46 = 857	- 74
204B = 1553	+ 181	C 47 = 1265	- 49
VTB = 600	+ 63	DHC4 = 200	- 96
		Beech = 1860	- 71
		H395 = 1111	- 55

F. The above figures, as compared to the contractual agreement, reflect a much more interesting outlook.

PC6 = 109	C46	+ 117
204B +233	C47	+ 5
VTB - 100	DHC4	- 75 (-25)
	Beech	+ 265
	Helio	+ 81

G. Only in the DHC4 did we fly less than contractual minimum the flight time standards are grossly affected by this overage. The challenge is here and we will meet it.

IV OPERATIONS

A. Curfew hours for Tan-Son-Nhut were extended the latter part of October to allow in-country flights to arrive as late as 2130L and international flights at 2100L. With these extended curfew hours Department Heads are studying means of eventually returning to a full three shift operation. We became more cost conscious last month and suggestions were submitted to the Base Manager as to how we would do our share for overall cost reduction. If the political situation remains stable we can forecast profitable months to follow.

B. Statistics:

	Sept	Oct.
Passengers carried Vietnam	45,715	48,741
Aircraft arrivals SGN	7,252	1,022
Aircraft departures SGN	1,252	1,017
Cargo carried VN	7,473,209	6,071,447

A. Flight Frequency (See attachment A)

B. Flight Time Report (See attachment B)

C. Accidents & Incidents (See attachment C)

D. Flight Time

Contract	Flight Time	Block Time	Hazardous Time	Legs	Passengers	Cargo
VN-41	6303 + 59	7294 + 59	5029 + 50	11,955	35,125	4,123,438 lbs
4395	1739 + 01	1938 + 44	1453 + 27	3,721	8,666	391,992 "
C-0007	57 + 42	62 + 59	36 + 56	44	117	875 "
TOTAL :	8100 + 42	9299 + 42	6520 + 13	15,720	43,908	4,516,305 "
CAL :	446 + 38	603 + 06	258 + 33	494	4,833	1,555,142 "

Non-Revenue

	Flight Time	Block Time
VN-41	243 + 25	293 + 38
4395	75 + 18	89 + 29
TOTAL :	318 + 43	383 + 07

V COMMUNICATIONS

A. It can be demonstrated that all communications personnel have received extensive cross-training within their individual limitations and capabilities in the various facets of Base communications activities.

B. This cross-training has a direct bearing upon Management's proposed cost saving and possible reduction-in-force throughout the various departments of the company as far as Saigon Base communications is concerned. Although we do not deem it practical to reduce our present number of communications personnel due to the ever-increasing workload placed upon this department

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report

The Sino-Soviet Dispute on Aid to North Vietnam (1965-1968)

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2-15-99 BY SP4BSA-MLB #421800

Reference Title: [redacted] F(b)(3) (U)

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[redacted] F(b)(3) (U)

Top Secret

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30 September 1968 F(b)(3) [redacted] (U)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: JUL 25 2000

109-12-330-383 enclosure

WARNING

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.

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GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE ON AID TO NORTH VIETNAM (1965-1968)

MEMORANDUM TO RECIPIENTS

On 20 December 1965, SRS published an Intelligence Study that traced the bitter private negotiations among the Soviets, the Chinese, and the North Vietnamese throughout 1965 over the question of Soviet military assistance to North Vietnam, particularly the struggle over Soviet aid to the DRV air defense system.[1]

The present staff study reviews and brings up to date the story of the protracted and acrimonious haggling among the three principals. It reveals that the major issues and motivations of each have remained essentially unchanged, and that suspicion, dispute, and Chinese obstructionism increased rather than abated as the war moved on. The Paris negotiations between North Vietnam and the U.S. have injected a further sour and disruptive note into Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnamese relations. However, neither delays in shipments nor denials of weapons appear to have impaired DRV military capabilities to such an extent as to affect the course of the war.

Although this study in draft benefited from the comments of other offices, it is entirely a product of the Special Research Staff.

A larger and more detailed version of this study, including citations of the sources used, will be published separately for the benefit of those who wish to pursue the subject in greater depth. [redacted] F(b)(3) (U)

[redacted] F(b)(3) (U)

Chief, DD/I Special Research Staff

1. "The 1965 Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese Controversy Over Soviet Military Aid to North Vietnam." [redacted] F(b)(3) (U)

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THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE ON AID TO NORTH VIETNAM (1965-1968)

Contents

		Page
CONCLUSIONS		i
I.	The Issue of Rail Transit of China	1
	A. The Initial Impasse and The Sino-Soviet Rail Agreement of 1965	1
	B. April-July 1965: The Issue of Soviet SAM Personnel	3
	C. August-December 1965: Another Blocked Shipment	4
	D. January-July 1966: DRV Rail Damage and Ho's Visit to China	5
	E. August-December 1966: A New DRV Role in Rail Transit	6
	F. January-March 1967: The Crisis	7
	G. April 1967 to Date: Effects of the Cultural Revolution	9
II.	The Issue of Air Transit of China	13
III.	The Issue of Shipment by Sea	14
	A. Private Chinese and Soviet Statements	14
	B. The Soviet Attitude Toward a Potential Blockade	16
IV.	The Weapons Withheld	18
	A. The KOMARs	18
	B. The Coastal Defense Missiles	20
	C. "Certain Aircraft"	21
	D. Caveats for the Future	22

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Soviet Aid Routes to North Vietnam



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CONCLUSIONS

For three and a half years the Soviet Union and Communist China have been haggling over the military aid each is providing North Vietnam and over the mechanics of moving Soviet aid to North Vietnam. The dispute is a facet of the broader Sino-Soviet conflict and is interwoven with issues arising from U.S.-North Vietnamese negotiations. Parts of the continuing argument have surfaced, periodically, in polemical exchanges between Moscow and Peking. [redacted] F(b)[1] F(b)[3] (S)

[redacted] the evidence does support three general conclusions. Firstly, both Moscow and Peking, throughout the dispute, have had other considerations in mind in addition to North Vietnam's war needs. A paramount Soviet purpose has been to use aid to Vietnam as a means of strengthening Moscow's influence over Hanoi and elsewhere at the expense of Peking. The Chinese have been motivated by similar desires to expand their influence, but they also have a greater and more direct stake then the Soviets in a Communist victory in Vietnam. F(b)[1] F(b)[3] (C)

Secondly, Sino-Soviet political enmity and military rivalry have worked to limit to some extent what aid the North Vietnamese have received and how they have received it. Because of China's insistance on a right to inspect Soviet shipments in transit to North Vietnam, the Soviets appear to have held back or delayed shipment of some sophisticated military equipment. For their part, the Chinese have refused certain Soviet requests for facilities to transmit aid to Vietnam, being unwilling to give either political or propaganda advantage to the USSR.

Thirdly, both Moscow and Peking have been constrained in their aid to North Vietnam by a desire to avoid a direct conflict with the U.S. Although Moscow and Peking

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frequently differ in their assessments of the level of tolerable risk, their constraint has had a restrictive influence on what military aid the North Vietnamese received and the channels through which it has been received.

The evidence also supports a number of tentative observations concerning the effect of the dispute on the North Vietnamese war effort. It is clear that difficulties between Moscow and Peking applied primarily to the receipt of sophisticated hardware for the defense of North Vietnam and to only a limited degree to the delivery of weapons and support items needed by the DRV to pursue the campaign in the south. Consequently, it does not appear that the dispute has had any significant effect on Hanoi's ability to maintain the war south of the 18th parallel.

However, the question of possible adverse effects on North Vietnam's aerial and coastal defense capabilities is much more complex. [redacted]

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Thus, the occasional periods when the rate of SA-2 firings seemed relatively low might have been associated with delays in Soviet missile shipments through China, but this is difficult to demonstrate. Similarly, it is not definitely known what plans the North Vietnamese leaders had for the Soviet Komar missile boats that were denied to them, that is, whether the DRV did indeed intend to use them to attack U.S. carriers.

Nevertheless, the evidence does point to an impressive array of incidents in which shipments of air and coastal defense equipment apparently were obstructed or denied. The evidence indicates:

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(1) that North Vietnam throughout the month of March 1965 was deprived of all Soviet military aid because of Sino-Soviet squabbling over the terms of rail transshipment;

(2) that operation of a Soviet-supplied SA-2 missile system was delayed from March until July 1965 at least in part because of Chinese pressures on North Vietnam;

(3) [redacted]

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(4) that there were again serious deliberate Chinese delays in Soviet military rail shipments to the DRV in January and February 1967;

(5) that there were other delays to Soviet shipments through China caused by Mao's reluctance to crack down on Red Guard disorders in the summer of 1967 and again in May-July 1968;

(6) that [redacted] SAM missiles were held up by the Chinese at the Sino-Soviet border for a month in September 1967, and again in June 1968, apparently because of these disorders;

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(7) [redacted]

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(8) that the USSR has declined DRV requests for KOMAR missile boats and coastal defense missiles, largely because of Soviet fears that use of such weapons might lead to a direct clash with the United States. In the case of the KOMARs, the Soviets apparently refused also because they were unwilling to deliver the vessels directly to North Vietnamese ports and the Chinese were

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unwilling to accept them in Chinese ports for transferral to North Vietnam by Chinese and North Vietnamese crews.

The conclusion indicated by this panorama of incidents is that at least for short periods the North Vietnamese air and coastal defense capability probably was impaired in some degree. Probably the political impact was greater than the military effect. There is no doubt that the DRV leadership was often greatly disturbed by, and still resents, Chinese obstruction of Soviet aid and Soviet caution in rendering aid. On several occasions North Vietnam has had reason to be seriously worried that difficulties and delays in aid shipments might be prolonged. But thus far the bottlenecks for items of prime importance such as missiles have been temporary, and those problems which became more or less permanent (such as the Soviet withholding of the KOMARs, or the Chinese curtailing of the Soviet air transport flights) have not seemed to be of critical importance.

This situation could change if the Chinese were to impose barriers to Soviet military rail shipments to the DRV, as they have done before, and maintain the barriers over a long period of time, as they have threatened but not yet done. Major North Vietnamese concessions in the Paris negotiations could provide the occasion for such a Chinese decision.

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I. THE ISSUE OF RAIL TRANSIT OF CHINA

A. The Initial Impasse and the Sino-Soviet Rail Agreement of 1965

The main disagreement on aid to Vietnam has revolved about the shipping of Soviet military goods by rail through China. The argument has been through several phases. The initial impasse came soon after Kosygin's return from his February 1965 visit to Hanoi and Peking. At that time the first Soviet arms to be shipped by rail to North Vietnam in accordance with Kosygin's promises to Hanoi were held up while Moscow and Peking haggled over the terms of shipment. The main point at issue was China's insistence on a right of rigorous inspection of all arms shipped across Chinese territory. The Soviets finally, and reluctantly, yielded but the inspection issue and the agreement have been continuing subjects of controversy between Moscow and Peking.

Although the agreement was not published, [redacted] a number of Chinese statements have revealed its basic provisions. It was dated and apparently became effective on 30 March, and it was for the two-year period, 1965 to 1967. The agreement was renewed in March 1967. The agreement, and the negotiations leading to it, were bilateral; in keeping with China's rejection of any "unity of action" with the Soviet Union, Mao's regime has refused to engage in any tripartite Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese agreements or negotiations. F(b)(1) F(b)(3) (S)

The agreement covers military supplies only. This is a point of importance in subsequent polemics because the Chinese agreed to transport free of charge only military goods, as defined by themselves. Everything else not covered by the original or by supplementary Sino-Soviet rail transport agreements was categorized as "economic supplies." Shipment of economic supplies was to be a matter of ad hoc arrangements between Chinese and

Soviet railroad authorities, and was to be paid for, as usual, in rubles. It seems likely that both sides have obfuscated in their later polemics on this matter, the Soviets charging that the Chinese were demanding payment for military supplies, the Chinese denying it. It appears that the Chinese define "military goods" narrowly to exclude many military-support articles and such items as medicines; the Soviets, on the other hand, define the term broadly.

According to the agreement, the Chinese were apparently obliged to transport only categories of weapons listed in the document. The agreement specified that a certain number of freight cars would be made available by China in each month, quarter, and year to carry a certain maximum tonnage of Soviet military goods in each time period, but only provided that the goods fell into the categories listed in the agreement. The Chinese did not agree in advance, in other words, to transport any weapons the Soviets might choose to send. Since the Soviets were also required by the agreement to file with the Chinese an "outline transport plan" for each specific shipment at least 30 days before the shipment was to arrive in China, the Chinese were given some lead time to deal with the matter in accordance with their political interests. If, for example, as a result of further Soviet-Vietnamese talks the Soviets were to agree to supply additional types of weapons not clearly specified in the 30 March agreement, the Chinese had a legal excuse to refuse to accept the shipments until a supplemental agreement was negotiated. Furthermore, they would not sign such a supplement until they had themselves confirmed that North Vietnam wanted the weapons. This provided the Chinese continuing opportunities to lobby privately with the North Vietnamese.

Soviet annoyance and concern with the provisions of the rail agreement have continued for a number of reasons. Delays occasioned by inspection--said to involve "inspecting every crate and dismantling every weapon," and to take days for each train--have been used in repeated Chinese efforts to pressure the DRV into restricting its reliance on Soviet military aid. [redacted] F(b)(1) F(b)(3) (S)

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[redacted] Also, the Soviets appear to have been influenced in their decisions as to which weapons to furnish the DRV by the knowledge that every shipment would be examined and might, therefore, assist indirectly Chinese weapons programs. And finally, the Soviets apparently do believe that the Chinese have occasionally removed parts of Soviet weapons during inspections, although most Soviet public statements on this subject are probably exaggerated. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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B. April-July 1965: The Issue of Soviet SAM Personnel

During the four months following the March rail agreement, shipments including many types of weapons transited China to the DRV apparently without serious difficulty. However, construction of SAM sites in North Vietnam seemed strangely protracted. The delay apparently was caused by a dispute over who was to man the SAM sites and over the transit of Soviet SAM and other military personnel through China.

[redacted]

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The Chinese strongly objected, but they repeatedly claimed in April and May that it was North Vietnamese reluctance to accept Soviet personnel that had caused the offer to be rejected. On the other hand, the Soviets claimed that the Chinese were placing a limit on the transit of Soviet personnel; [redacted]

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A [redacted] delegation in Hanoi, however, was told by a Pravda correspondent [redacted] that the North Vietnamese had refused to permit the Soviets to man the rockets being installed in order to avoid "alienating" the Chinese. He thus suggested that it was indeed the DRV that was preventing the Soviets from sending personnel to operate the SAMs, but only as the result of pressure from the Chinese. Some two weeks before this, Pham Van Dong is reported to have told Kim Il-sung in Djakarta that the Chinese had persistently demanded that North Vietnam cut off Soviet aid and had sometimes become threatening in trying to enforce the demand.

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All in all, the evidence suggests that throughout the spring of 1965 the DRV vacillated between yielding to Chinese pressure and thus deferring completion and activization of SAM sites until the fall, when North Vietnamese cadres could complete their training in the USSR to operate them, or flouting Chinese wishes and accepting enough Soviet personnel to put the SAMs into operation more promptly. Finally, under the influence of the mounting U.S. bombing, the DRV seems to have opted for the latter course, and prevailed upon Peking to permit a limited quota of Soviet SAM personnel to pass. [redacted]

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C. August-December 1965: Another Blocked Shipment

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[redacted] After extensive haggling the shipment was released for transit near the end of the year. Soon thereafter, leaked Soviet charges of Chinese obstruction led to repeated Chinese Foreign Ministry protests to the USSR and to a public Chinese denial.

D. January-July 1966: DRV Rail Damage and Ho's Visit to China

During the first half of 1966 the DRV had to cope both with transport problems resulting from U.S. bombing of DRV rail lines and with continued and increasingly public Sino-Soviet friction over transit arrangements. In early 1966 shipment of some Soviet economic goods was shifted from rail to sea because of temporary DRV rail disruption and in February the Chinese told the East European representatives in Peking that no more non-military rail shipments could be accepted.

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[redacted] F(b)(1)
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[redacted] At the time, the DRV apparently was deeply concerned over the pssobility that the United States might blockade the port of Haiphong and that Soviet and

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East European aid might be appreciably reduced in consequence. It seems likely that Ho was now anxious to determine whether, in such an event, the Chinese would permit increased transportation of Soviet aid across China.

E. August-December 1966: A New DRV Role in Rail Transit

A new turning point was reached in the late summer and fall of 1966. In brief, the evidence indicates that it was at that time--and not in the spring of 1967, as the Soviets later claimed--that North Vietnam first assumed a role in the "safeguarding" of Soviet military supplies entering China en route to the DRV.

[redacted] F(b)(1) F(b)(3) (T)

[redacted] It is not certain whether the North Vietnamese under this system actually accompanied the trains through China or whether they merely confirmed the arrival of Soviet weapons in good condition in China from the USSR. In any case, there appears to have been no serious difficulty for the rest of 1966.

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F. January-March 1967: The Crisis

Late in January 1967, the Chinese initiated their most serious threat to Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations --and to the Soviet overland supply route to Hanoi. Following a series of deliberately planned and provoked diplomatic incidents in Moscow and other capitals around the world, the Chinese organized a siege of the Soviet embassy in Peking. The siege lasted from 26 January to 11 February and appeared designed to force the Soviets to break state relations. That would have made it impossible for the Soviets to conduct negotiations with the Chinese necessary to continue rail shipments to Vietnam.

In January and February, DRV officials in various parts of the world made an unusual series of statements indicating that the Chinese had reimposed delays on Soviet military shipments through China, despite the new role the North Vietnamese had assumed in rail transport.

There are some grounds to support the conjecture that these Chinese actions in January and February were intended to inhibit the DRV from proceeding further toward negotiations with the United States by raising a direct threat of a permanent cut-off of Soviet aid to the war effort.

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[redacted] Chinese Central Committee official Wu Hsiu-chuan also told a foreign Communist in mid-December that the Chinese would oppose negotiations as "deviationist." In early January the DRV Foreign Minister issued a public statement which removed some of the previous ambiguity in the DRV position and indicated more strongly than before that a permanent bombing halt alone could suffice to bring talks. The Chinese actions against the Soviet embassy and apparently against Soviet shipments followed within the next three weeks.

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Moreover, the Chinese pressures were relaxed in the second week of February at precisely the moment when the North Vietnamese received a new offer on negotiations from President Johnson and informed the Chinese that they would reject it. Ten days of North Vietnamese-Chinese negotiations in Peking immediately thereafter appeared to unblock the Soviet shipments and reaffirm DRV responsibility for the shipments at the Sino-Soviet border. The February Sino-Vietnamese talks in Peking also probably facilitated the secret Sino-Soviet negotiations in March that resulted in the renewal of the 30 March 1965 Sino-Soviet rail transit agreement.

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the Chinese in the new agreement "consented to let only 9,000 to 10,000 tons of freight a month or 100,000 tons a year across Chinese territory" and claimed that "the actual requirements of the DRV in military freight, with due account of the additional deliveries earmarked for this year, add up to more than 30,000 tons a month." (These figures are all apparently in addition to economic rail shipments.) The Soviets charged that "the most essential forms of Soviet military aid reach Vietnam in the volume which the Chinese leaders consider permissible and useful to themselves." It is possible, however, that the Chinese insistence on more limited military tonnage reflected not malevolent intent but rather the objective difficulties encountered by or anticipated for the North Vietnamese and Chinese railroad systems.

With the conclusion of the new agreement, the Soviets --and to a lesser extent the DRV--began to disseminate many reports, often deliberately misleading, about the DRV role in assuming responsibility for Chinese transshipment of Soviet supplies. (Some such reports claimed that a "tripartite" Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese agreement had been signed, although others contradicted this.) The aim

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in floating these reports was apparently to convey to the United States the message that transshipment difficulties were a thing of the past. However, a new source of difficulties soon appeared.

G. April 1967 to Date: Effects of the Cultural Revolution

Since April 1967, the major problem for Soviet rail shipments to Vietnam has been disruptions on Chinese railroads resulting from Red Guard activity, particularly in the summer of 1967 and again in May-July 1968.

There is considerable evidence that Red Guard factions seeking weapons to use against their factional opponents seized weapons bound for Vietnam in July and August 1967. In a speech of 20 September reported in the Red Guard press, Chou En-lai revealed that "trains with military aid for Vietnam" had been "ambushed," and military stores destined for Vietnam looted. Chou's references to the passive attitude enjoined on the PLA generally by Peking in that frenetic period explained how special trains guarded by PLA troops could be successfully "ambushed." It was not until the fall that the PLA's instructions were changed to permit the army, among other things, to defend its weapons. These incidents may explain delays in certain September rocket shipments about which the Soviets later complained.* Peking may have wished to wait until order had been sufficiently restored so that embarrassing incidents would not occur with such sensitive weapons.

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[redacted] SAM missiles were held up by the Chinese for a month in September 1967. The Chinese apparently claimed at the time that the delay was necessitated by rail bottlenecks in Vietnam, but the troubles caused by Red Guards in China seem a more likely explanation.

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Similar difficulties recurred in the spring of 1968, when the Chinese cultural revolution again entered a leftist phase. Once again, it was Chou En-lai's task to cope with the damage. In a speech on 12 May Chou lamented traffic tieups at three major rail junctions on the main railroad line from the USSR to Vietnam, and said that at the town of Liuchow, in Kwangsi adjoining Vietnam, "traffic is at a standstill" and "material cannot be transported...to Vietnam." [redacted] F(b)(1) F(b)(3) (T) Passenger service between Peking and Hanoi was suspended in June and low-priority freight either halted or shifted to sea transportation.

[redacted] F(b)(1) F(b)(3) (T) Since it does not seem reasonable that the USSR would keep funneling shipments into China if none were reappearing in the DRV, the inference would seem to be that some shipments were actually arriving in North Vietnam, however much delayed.

Nevertheless, weapons shipments, the highest-priority traffic of all, seem to have been in a particularly precarious position because weapons were the special target of Red Guard factions harrassing the rail lines. A 13 June directive of the Chinese leadership revealed that a shipment of Chinese "support-Vietnam supplies" had been looted in Kwangsi. On 19 June Chou En-lai intervened once more (for the second time in two months) and demanded that these supplies be returned in toto and railway traffic restored. In this atmosphere it seems likely that Soviet military equipment bound for Vietnam was also affected, as the Soviets have in fact claimed. [redacted] F(b)(1) F(b)(3) (S)

[redacted] F(b)(1) F(b)(3) (S)

By early July the North Vietnamese had begun to complain to foreigners, perhaps as a means of putting pressure on the Chinese. For example, [redacted] F(b)(1) F(b)(3) (S) was told by the North Vietnamese that the flow of Soviet military supplies had been "disrupted" in China. The North Vietnamese may also have complained directly to the Chinese in early July. A 3 July directive, personally endorsed by Mao, reiterated in threatening tones the demand for the full restoration of rail traffic and the return of all supplies looted, and a convoy of three high-priority trains was rushed south through Kwangsi under military escort on 5 July. On 10 July a message from a PLA unit cited stern demands by both the Chief and Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff that traffic on the "whole line" be resumed "within two days." In mid-July a North Vietnamese delegation in Peking is reported to have pressed the Chinese for guarantees with regard to rail transportation. [redacted] other evidence F(b)(1) F(b)(3) (T) shows a gradual improvement in the rail situation in the remainder of July and August.

The chaotic rail transit picture was further complicated during May and June by the coincidence of another leftward shift in Chinese domestic policy and the beginning of North Vietnamese talks with the United States in Paris. To show the DRV his feelings about the talks, Mao authorized simultaneous unpublicized demonstrations in early June outside the DRV consulates in Nanning, Kunming, and Canton protesting the negotiatings.

The weight of the evidence, however, does not substantiate the view that the rail delays in south China were deliberately created by the Chinese regime in retaliation for the opening of the Paris talks. The factional struggles in Kwangsi that were the immediate cause of most of the rail troubles in 1968 were part of a larger pattern of factional strife which arose simultaneously in many parts of China in the spring. The Chinese regime evidently made efforts through Chou En-lai, in May and June, to try to curb the disorders on the rail line without

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sacrificing the current overall leftist line. When that did not suffice, the PLA in early July was ordered to crack down hard on railroad troublemakers despite the fact that the PLA at the time in some other places was still being forbidden to crack down on Red Guard factional struggle. The North Vietnamese war effort was temporarily a victim, but not a target, of one of Mao's domestic aberrations.

However, the possibility of a resumption of the politically-motivated Chinese obstruction of previous years remains an important weapon held in reserve by Peking. [redacted]

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The rail traffic provides China a means of applying pressure against North Vietnam, as it did in early 1967, on the subject of negotiations. After all that has transpired, it seems possible that Peking might indeed cut the flow of rail supplies to the DRV if a major decision unwelcome to Mao should be reached in the Paris talks.

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II. The Issue of Air Transit of China

The Sino-Soviet struggle over rail transit to Vietnam has been mirrored in the last three years in a secondary running battle over Soviet efforts to use military air transports across China. Despite Soviet protests, the Chinese remained adamant, and, consequently the Soviet airlift has been small-scale, intermittent, and marginal in importance.

The Soviets at one time--in February 1965--sought an "air corridor" across China for mass flights of transports to the DRV like the airlifts the Soviets have staged in other parts of the world. The Chinese on 28 February 1965 flatly refused, in part because the Chinese feared that such large-scale flights would be unduly provocative to the United States, and in part because they feared the Soviets would use these flights for espionage purposes. In addition, the Chinese may have felt a Soviet right of mass overflight would undercut their asserted "sovereign" right to inspect all Soviet military cargoes passing through China to Vietnam.

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III. The Issue of Shipment by Sea

A. Private Chinese and Soviet Statements

The questions of shipping military hardware to North Vietnam by sea, and of Soviet reluctance to do so, seem to have arisen in private Sino-Soviet negotiations from the time of the first controversies over rail and air transit in the spring of 1965. As recriminations over rail transit delays grew, Chinese private comments about sea shipment grew more sharp. [redacted]

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When Soviet-sponsored charges about Chinese rail obstruction began to multiply in the Western press late in 1965, the Chinese surfaced charges of a cowardly Soviet refusal to use the sea route.

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The USSR has repeatedly suggested that it believes the Chinese wish to provoke a conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Gulf of Tonkin. A widely-distributed CPSU letter to other parties in

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February 1966 claimed that the Chinese sought such a conflict "in order to be able to, as they themselves say, 'observe the battle of the tigers while seated on the hill.'" In April 1966, the Soviet leaders circulated a document at the 23rd CPSU Congress which accused the Chinese of trying to force the Soviet Union to ship its military aid by sea and risk a clash with the Seventh Fleet, and thereby to force a Soviet-U.S. showdown.

What the Soviets apparently have wanted is a way to carry weapons by sea to the Far East, yet have someone else assume the burden of actual delivery to the DRV. Such a solution would be available if the Chinese were willing to accept Soviet shipments at Chinese ports--such as Canton--for transshipment to the DRV either by rail or by Chinese ship. At various times the Chinese have accepted Soviet economic cargoes, such as POL, for transshipment. The Soviets apparently have tried and failed to get the Chinese to handle some military shipments in the same manner. [redacted] F(b)(1) F(b)(3) (T)

[redacted] F(b)(1) F(b)(3) (T)

[redacted] The Chinese, once more, were said to have refused and to have insisted that the Soviets send their shipments direct to Haiphong, This

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issue was surfaced on only one occasion in the Soviet press. On 30 March 1967, an Izvestiya article charged that the Chinese had refused the USSR "free access to one of South China's harbors, from which these (Soviet) weapons would be transported to Hanoi."*

To sum up: there is a body of substantial evidence [redacted] F(b)(1) F(b)(3) (S) that Soviet ships probably have not carried arms to North Vietnam. The conclusion is strongest regarding sophisticated, large, or bulky weapons, and less strong regarding small, simple weapons. Soviet ships may have made unobserved clandestine deliveries of rifles or ammunition to Haiphong as the Chinese may have done. But the political reason for Soviet restraint--the wish to avoid a direct clash with the United States in the Gulf of Tonkin--seems to be of such importance to the USSR as to make it unlikely that the Soviet Union would make exceptions to a general ban on arms shipments to convey lower-priority weapons which could as well be sent by rail.

B. The Soviet Attitude Toward a Potential Blockade

The USSR has obviously had great anxiety over the sea supply route to North Vietnam--the main channel for Soviet economic and military-support shipments to the DRV. The Soviets over the past three years have been concerned over U.S. bombing of DRV ports and over the possibility that the United States might take steps to close DRV ports by mining or blockade. Through repeated vigorous protests the Soviet Union has sought to convey the impression that the USSR regards access to DRV ports as important to Soviet

*It is possible, however, that Chinese ships have carried Chinese small arms to Vietnam, possibly from Canton or from Hainan ports. [redacted] such shipments of light weapons carried with other cargo would be quite difficult to discover. F(b)(1) F(b)(3) (T) In this connection, it should be noted that Foreign Minister Chen Yi, in a published interview of 30 December 1965, was quoted by NCNA as declaring: "Why can't Soviet military material for Vietnam be shipped by sea as is that of other countries?" (Emphasis supplied.)

interests. One report suggests that the Soviet leadership has decided its interests would justify serious risk of confrontation with the U.S.

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[redacted] in the spring of 1967 Czechoslovak Defense (S)
Minister Lomsky reported to the collegium of the Ministry that the Soviets had issued an order to the Soviet navy to provide escorts for Soviet merchant vessels in the event that Haiphong was blockaded or a Soviet vessel bombed in Haiphong harbor. This order also allegedly called for efforts to break any blockade, including steps to sweep minefields. Lomsky, who had just returned from Moscow, said that the Soviets had told him that they would resist any U.S. moves to prevent Soviet ships from going to Haiphong. The Soviet order was supposedly issued at a time when U.S. statements pointed to a possible blockade of Haiphong.

It should be noted, however, that this report speaks of the automatic provision of escorts for Soviet merchant ships if they were bombed in Haiphong harbor. After the 2 June 1967 strafing incident at the DRV port of Campha, a Soviet Foreign Ministry note threatened "to take appropriate measures to insure the safety of Soviet ships" if the incident were reported. On 5 January 1968, after two more incidents had actually occurred, a Soviet protest note said that "the corresponding Soviet departments will be compelled to take measures for insuring the safety of Soviet vessels bound for DRV ports." However, no Soviet naval escorts were in fact provided. It seems evident that this is a matter which the Soviet politburo keeps under close scrutiny and continuing review. To some extent the [redacted] report has been in error. F(b)(1) F(b)(3) (S)

It is possible that the Soviet navy, in the spring of 1967, was instructed to prepare contingency plans for a possible Soviet attempt to break a hypothetical U.S. blockade of Haiphong--leaving implementation open as a matter for politburo decision--and that it was this which Lomsky related to the Czech collegium and [redacted] reported in slightly garbled form. While it is conceivable F(b)(1) F(b)(3) (S)

(although we think on balance less than probable) that the Soviet leadership might come to the decision Sejna reports, it has probably not as yet decided what it would do in the event of a U.S. blockade.

IV. The Weapons Withheld

The Soviet Union has indicated that some of the weapons requested by the DRV have been denied. The CPSU document on Soviet military aid to Vietnam circulated among visiting foreign Communists in Moscow in November 1967, stated that "the USSR has speedily satisfied practically all the requests of the DRV for delivery of military equipment." A few paragraphs later, the document states, without elaboration, that "through the fault of the Chinese side, it has not been possible to deliver some types of weapons to the DRV."

A. The KOMARs

The DRV has not received the KOMAR or OSA-class guided-missile-firing patrol boat, which it wanted and, apparently, at one time thought it was going to receive. The failure to receive such boats must be particularly annoying to the DRV because, over the past decade, the USSR has distributed KOMARs and OSAs to about a dozen countries around the world, including some whom the DRV must regard as far less deserving than itself.

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The evidence suggests that after an original offer had been made in late 1964 to furnish KOMARs to the DRV, the USSR changed its mind after regular U.S. bombing began in 1965, the Soviets being unwilling to run a serious risk of conflict with the U.S. in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Unlike other weapons the USSR has supplied to North Vietnam, it was not practical to ship the KOMARs by rail or air across China; they would have to travel from Soviet ports to Haiphong as deck cargo under U.S. surveillance. The Soviets instead evidently offered, at some time between February and November 1965, to transfer the KOMARs to DRV control in Chinese ports, whence they could make their way to North Vietnam, as have the Chinese patrol boats transferred to the DRV by the Chinese. The Chinese apparently refused, primarily for political reasons.

It is also conceivable that the USSR was also reluctant to have the KOMARs in DRV hands at all because of concern at the possibility that the DRV would use them to attack major U.S. ships, with uncalculable possibilities of U.S. counteraction. If the Soviet Union was aware that the Chinese had laid down a blanket rule forbidding Soviet weapons transshipment via Chinese ports, an offer to send

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the KOMARs in this way might have been used to force the Chinese to share the responsibility for the DRV's failure to receive KOMARs.

B. The Coastal Defense Missiles

A separate but related issue is the question of Soviet willingness to supply North Vietnam with short-range land-based coastal defense guided missiles, such as the 35-40 n.m. Samlet or the 22 n.m. SS-N-2 (Styx)--the weapon carried on the KOMARs and OSAs. Supplying such weapons to the DRV would have been somewhat less dangerous for the Soviet Union than supplying KOMARs or OSAs. The Samlets or Styxs could be transported without great difficulty by rail, thus avoiding the painful question of who would carry them into Haiphong by sea past the waiting U.S. fleet. (The USSR, however, would then have to be willing to allow these missiles to be examined minutely in transit by the Chinese--a separate question.) Also, short-range coastal defense missiles are much more clearly defensive in nature than the KOMARs, and while useful against hostile ships operating close to the North Vietnamese coast are not as a rule usable against U.S. aircraft carriers which would generally be well out of range. Thus the use to which the North Vietnamese could put these weapons, unlike the KOMARs, would be limited and predictable for the Soviets, and the probable U.S. response would also be more readily calculated in advance.

However, longer-range weapons, such as the 300 n.m. cruise missile Shaddock, would present a real threat to American carriers and other major ships. Their possession by the DRV would conjure up for the USSR many of the same worrisome problems that would be created by the DRV's possession of KOMARs. In addition, the Soviets would presumably be even more reluctant to expose this longer-range missile to Chinese scrutiny en route to the DRV than they would the Styx or Samlet. On either count, it may be concluded that if the Soviets declined to furnish the DRV with the Samlet or Styx, they are quite unlikely to furnish the Shaddock or longer-range guided or ballistic missiles.

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It is probable that the Soviets have been so concerned over U.S. reactions that they have been unwilling to give the DRV even the short-range defensive missiles. It is conceivable that they may also have been reluctant to allow the Chinese to inspect such missiles during transit to Vietnam.* This seems less likely; the USSR is reported to have furnished models of these weapons to the Chinese before the Sino-Soviet break.

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D. Caveats for the Future

The Chinese are known to have built between eight and fourteen OSA and KOMAR guided missile boats. They have produced both the Samlet and the Styx missile, and there is evidence that they have deployed coastal defense missiles on land installations. To date they have furnished neither coastal missiles nor KOMARs to North Vietnam. The possibility that they will do so will grow as the small Chinese inventory of these items increases. Chinese diplomats [redacted] may have been alluding to the KOMAR and the coastal missiles when they told a [redacted] journalist on [redacted] 1968 that China was in a position to offer the DRV "quite a lot of sophisticated equipment, especially rockets which China is now making and which North Vietnam has not been able to get from Russia." Any possibility that the Chinese might give the coastal missiles or KOMARs to North Vietnam would dwindle if the North Vietnamese were to make a major concession in the peace talks. It is unlikely that the Chinese yet are in a position to give the DRV surface-to-surface guided missiles with a range much longer than that of the Styx, and it seems unlikely that China would do so even if such weapons were available to give.

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On the Soviet side, the marginal decision not to furnish North Vietnam with the Styx or Samlet might be reversed in time, but it is not likely that the Soviet's negative attitude on sending longer-range surface-to-surface guided missiles to North Vietnam will change.

A more pressing Soviet problem, and temptation, might arise if the Vietnam negotiations should lend to a ceasefire and the subsequent withdrawal of most U.S. naval units from the Gulf of Tonkin. Some Soviet leaders might then argue for transporting of some Soviet military hardware to Vietnam by sea in order to establish, under conditions of minimum risk, a precedent which the U.S. might thereafter accept, as it now accepts Soviet sea transportation of weapons to Cuba.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
8 October 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Thailand: The Present Political Phase

Summary

Thailand is entering a new phase of its political life. After ten years of rule by martial law, the military leadership is moving to legitimize its rule. A new constitution has been promulgated as the first step in this process, but the document virtually ensures that there will be no major changes, at least in the near future, in the way Thailand is governed.

The constitution does provide for the first nationwide elections in over a decade. Although the elections are now less than five months away, the government so far has done little to organize itself for them. Opposition forces are also divided and weak, but they may prove strong enough to deny the government a clear-cut majority in the lower house. Whatever the outcome, the present leaders will continue to rule Thailand after the elections and, at least for the short term, there is not likely to be any important change in Thai domestic and foreign policies.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.

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1. There is a timelessness about modern Thai politics that is as comforting as it may be misleading. On the surface, nothing important seems to change. For 36 years Thailand has been ruled by a tight coterie of military officers. In order to run the country, the military has maintained a profitable alliance with civilian politicians and bureaucrats, with whom it joined in 1932 to bring down the absolute monarchy. The civilians have exercised considerable influence, but the relationship has always been fundamentally one-sided. With the exception of a few short periods, the military establishment has called the tune.

2. Autocratic without being despotic, conservative without being reactionary, the ruling establishment has brought a reasonable share of economic progress and social change to Thailand. With a minimum of serious disruption, it has guided the country through factional strife and foreign occupation, changes in personalities, and the inevitable upsets of an evolving social system. The establishment's ability to cope with Thailand's problems has been due less to the wisdom or resourcefulness of its leadership than to the fortunate tractability of those problems. Whatever their shortcomings, however, the leaders seem to fit in with the country.

3. The promulgation on 20 June of a new and long-delayed constitution appears, then, to have inaugurated a new phase rather than a new era in Thai political life. The constitution was, after all, the product of five years of gentle agitation by civilian elements in the establishment, and the realization on the part of more enlightened military officers that after ten years of "martial law" the regime needed to legitimize its rule. It was not meant, nor has it been interpreted, as a sharp departure from past practice. On the contrary, Thailand has had seven constitutions since 1932, each establishing the rules of the game only until new players appeared, new sides were chosen, and new rules were needed. Although nine years in the writing, there is little in the present document that distinguishes it greatly from its predecessors.

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4. A crazy quilt of parliamentary and presidential systems, the Thanom constitution is designed to perpetuate the rule of the military-civilian establishment. It virtually ensures that the present leaders will be in power for the forseeable future. The document provides for a strong executive appointed by the King on the advice of the upper house of the legislature, or Senate. To complete the tight circle, the Senate is appointed by the executive (with the King's blessing). The Senate was chosen shortly after promulgation, and it should come as no great surprise that although the body's president is a civilian, 90 out of 120 Senate seats are filled by military officers. Almost all of the new senators held seats in the old constituent assembly, whose loyalty to the government was amply demonstrated during the nine years it spent drafting a new constitution. Any doubt about the purpose or political complexion of the Senate, moreover, is dispelled by the presence of several prominent generals, including Saiyud, who is in charge of the counterinsurgency effort; Kriangsak, from the supreme command headquarters; and, perhaps most revealing of all, General Samran, commander of the First Army, whose troops control Bangkok.

5. The only real departure from the quasi-constitutional arrangement under which Marshal Sarit and Prime Minister Thanom have ruled since 1958 is the lower house, whose members will be chosen in nationwide elections early next year. It will mirror, however imperfectly, long submerged political differences in the country, and will serve as an outlet for the expression of regional grievances. It will also provide a forum for those civilian politicians who have been on the outside looking in for the past ten years. Caught between a powerful executive and a stacked and dominant Senate, and without authority to vote no confidence in the government, the lower house's powers under the constitution are carefully circumscribed.

6. The new constitution, in short, does not give away the keys to the kingdom. Nor is there any reason to believe, at least at this juncture, that the constitution will set in motion unforeseen forces

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that will upset the applecart. On the contrary, the politicians, the parties, and the issues that have emerged thus far only add to the impression that nothing has changed in Thailand. Almost all of the leading players, both on the government side and in the ranks of the opposition, were active ten or more years ago. The leader of the major opposition Democratic Party, for example, was a prominent political figure 25 years ago, and although other opposition leaders are somewhat more contemporary, at this writing at least there is hardly a "young turk" in the bunch. It is as if Sarit's coup in 1958 put the country on a shelf, and now ten years later the old pieces are being brought down, dusted off and put back together. The Thai electorate will have to look elsewhere if it wants fresh faces and new ideas next year.

7. There is no guarantee, however, that this picture of political continuity will stand up. The fact remains that Thailand is entering a period of political change. The ten-year interregnum is about to end, and a different, albeit far from new, set of arrangements will follow in its wake. Against its better instincts, the military oligarchy is taking its case to the Thai people. Although there is every reason to believe the military leaders can negotiate the transitional period with their hold on power intact, the subtle pressures that brought them this far may take them a good deal farther than they are presently prepared to go. A great deal will depend on how they run the elections, and, finally, on how well they do.

Bangkok Municipal Elections

8. If the outcome of the September Bangkok municipal elections is any sign, the government may be in for a harder time than it anticipated in next year's elections. The Democratic Party, the only nationwide opposition party currently active, took 22 of 24 seats in the municipal assembly. Three recognized government slates managed to elect only two progovernment candidates. The first meaningful election in Thailand in ten years, the municipal election was touted as an important political barometer.

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9. The Democrats have always been strong in Bangkok, but their sweep came as a surprise to supporters and opponents alike. There are a number of reasons for the Democrats' extraordinary showing. For one thing, Bangkok has long been a party stronghold, and the Democrats apparently mounted a low-key but effective campaign there. The other causes, however, cut closer to the bone and have wider implications for next year's elections. In addition to rallying their normal supporters, the Democrats were the beneficiaries of an antiadministration vote that stemmed from local issues. It would be a mistake to dismiss the importance of the Democratic sweep because it was based, in part, on local issues, however. Rising pork prices and increased bus fares may not have much impact in the countryside, but every area of Thailand has local grievances and the regime is in trouble if voters cast ballots on the basis of fixing responsibility for local ills. The low turnout in Bangkok is a fairly good sign that a major voter revolt is not in the cards, but the voting does suggest that there may be more antigovernment sentiment in the country than has been recognized heretofore.

10. The Democratic victory can also be traced to the indecisiveness, disunity, and apparent complacency of the government. Administration strength was dissipated by the fielding of three slates, and organizers failed to get out the vote among those elements who might be expected to back the regime. If some elements thought that some last-minute chicanery might carry the day, they had not counted on student poll watchers who saw to it that the election was one of the country's cleanest.

11. Whatever the reasons for the Democratic sweep, it may have an important bearing on next year's legislative elections. For the Democrats, the victory provides a much-needed psychological boost. Out of the limelight for ten years and weakened by the death of their leading public figure, the Democrats are suddenly in the position of running, at least nominally, the nation's largest and most important city. Its greatest impact, however, may be on the government side. The election is a

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major disappointment to those elements who had hoped that a Democratic Party defeat in Bangkok would clear the way for an easy victory in the legislative elections. The Bangkok skirmish may prove to be a rude but much-needed awakening for complacent Thai leaders. The election results are a disquieting sign that the ruling oligarchy will have to put aside its squabbling and marshal its considerable resources if it hopes to gain a clear-cut victory in next year's elections.

The Government Prepares for Elections

12. With the opening round in the constitutional process already over, with nationwide elections less than five months away, and with three years of planning and organizing under its belt, the government still does not have a political party. There are a number of reasons for this state of affairs, including the fact that the individuals with the best organizational ability in the government are precisely the ones who have been against elections from the start. The major problem the government faces in forming a unified political party, however, is simply that the government itself is not unified. The prospect of elections has aroused rather than soothed long-standing factional differences within the ruling oligarchy. On the one hand, there is the fundamental split between civilian "liberal" elements, exemplified by Foreign Minister Thanat and Minister of National Development Pote Sarasin, and the old-guard military establishment. And on the other, there are the more important divisions within the military group itself. The breakdown is roughly between Prime Minister Thanom and Deputy Prime Minister Praphat, the two men whose working relationship has kept the country stable since Marshal Sarit's death in 1963.

13. These factional differences will have to be sorted out and some acceptable understanding reached before the government's political activity can move into high gear. Much of the responsibility for the slow progress belongs to Prime Minister Thanom. For all of his virtues, Thanom has shown little inclination or ability to harness the ambitions of the other factional leaders behind a unified effort. Indecisive and colorless, the prime minister has done little during the five years he has at least nominally ruled

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Thailand to build either a political organization responsive to him or the regime, or a following in the country that can be translated into political power in an election year. As a consequence, Thanom has no power base outside the establishment, and the regime has to build an organization virtually from scratch.

14. The military leaders hope to create a political party broad enough to include all of the factions that have helped rule the country for the past ten years while, at the same time, bringing under its umbrella political elements with some following in the country whose ties to Bangkok and the levers of power have been negligible. The faction associated with Prime Minister Thanom has been trying since late last year to line up former members of the National Assembly for the party. Independents, or former members of moribund parties, they are the professional politicians with local connections whose support could prove indispensable in the legislative elections. The effort has been halfhearted and has not gone particularly well. One problem is that many of these politicians, although flattered by their new-found importance and eager to collaborate with the establishment, are confused by conflicting instructions and leadership from Bangkok. Their difficulty has been in determining who speaks for the government.

15. After an initial period of studied detachment, Deputy Prime Minister Praphat has moved forcefully into the vacuum left by Thanom and his associates. Praphat is in an enviable position to organize grass-roots support for the regime. When he wears his minister of interior hat, Praphat commands an extensive and far-reaching provincial bureaucracy that stretches from provincial capitals to isolated villages. Whatever its weaknesses, it is the best apparatus in the country. Praphat's vehicle is the Free People's League of Thailand, a quasi-official, anti-Communist group set up last year by him and his crony, Director of the Department of Local Affairs Chamnan. The league will soon have a spin-off Free Peoples Party (FPP), and Praphat has already signed up an impressive array of supporters. Ironically, they include several well-known leftists such as

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Sang Patanothai, and Buddhist leader Phra Pi Montham. Neither Praphat nor the leftists apparently intend to let ideology stand in the way of good politics.

16. Praphat has assured other government leaders that his Free Peoples Party will merge with the government party once the latter gets off the ground. A shrewd political infighter, there is good reason to believe, as many of his opponents suspect, that Praphat intends to use the FPP to further his own ambitions.

17. The problem of determining who speaks for the government is complicated further by the uncertain role being played by Minister of Economy Pote Sarasin. As the most prominent and ambitious civilian in the cabinet, Pote was expected to be a key figure in preparing the way for the return to parliamentary rule. After getting the green light from Prime Minister Thanom to organize on behalf of the leadership, as early as 1965 Pote began to sound out old politicians and financial interests. He made some headway but the important people were still waiting for Praphat and the other generals to make their move. By the fall of 1967, when it was clear that the constitution would soon be out, Praphat swung into action and Pote soon found the ground cut from under him. In June 1968, Thanom picked General Dawee as secretary general of the still-unnamed government party--a post that Pote once thought he was in the running for--and the economic minister's organizational efforts came to a virtual standstill. At least for the moment, the regime appears to have lost the services of the leading figure of its civilian wing.

The Opposition

18. The ruling group is going into the elections divided and lacking a leader who can, on his own, command much support in the country. All is far from lost, however. The regime's deficiencies must be weighed against the fact that it still has far more resources at its disposal than do its opponents and that for a variety of reasons they are hardly in a comfortable position to take advantage of their opportunities.

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19. The Democratic Party is the only opposition group that comes out of the ten-year hiatus with a dedicated leadership, a small but loyal following, and a strong sense of identity. The party is the oldest in Thailand. Established in 1946 by a group of former followers of leftist leader Pridi Phanomyong, the Democrats are conservative monarchists, with strong ties to the royal family. The party has been an important factor in every Thai election, and although its strength is concentrated in Bangkok, it has some backing in both the northeast and the north.

20. The Democrats' prospects in next year's legislative elections may be importantly affected by their performance in running Bangkok. With little experience in municipal affairs, there is a real danger, as one of the newly elected Democratic assemblymen recently admitted, that the party will not make the grade. Nevertheless, the Democrats have an excellent opportunity to prove their mettle, and they may be able to uncover evidence of the corrupt practices of their predecessors which can be put to good use in the legislative elections. Even if things go well, there is little chance that the Democrats have enough followers or financial assets to pull off a major upset next year. Even the party's most optimistic supporters do not believe it can muster much more than one third of the seats in the lower house. It is possible, however, that the Democrats and other opposition parties of the center and left can together win enough seats to deny the government party a clear majority.

The Left

21. Of all the political groups that are now surfacing in Thailand, none faces the upcoming elections more dispirited, fragmented, or with slighter hopes than the Thai left. Harassed by the government and associated in the public mind with foreign interests, there is good reason to question whether once-influential leftist figures and parties can pull themselves together in time to be a factor in the elections. A number of the more prominent leftists, including remarkably enough some who have spent long

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years in government prisons for alleged Communist activities, will join government forces in the near future. Other leftists, like Thep Chotinuchit, leader of the socialist United Front, are keeping the faith. Thep has been working with old-time politicians and socialists, particularly in the northeast, in an effort to get the Economist Party ready for the elections. By all accounts, he has had a hard time getting financial support, and organizational efforts on behalf of the party are making little progress. Other splinter parties with left-of-center political colorations may yet appear--one called the Democratic Front has already surfaced--but they probably will not have much following.

22. It is possible, however, that the left may do better in next year's elections than its current strength would suggest. Although more than a decade has elapsed since the last election, the left has consistently turned in a creditable performance in Thai elections in the past. In the February 1957 election, for example, leftist candidates took 21 seats out of 160 in the lower house, and did almost as well in another election later in the year. There is no indication that the leftists were much better organized then than they are now. Most of the leftist politicians come from the northeast, where regional identity is strongest in Thailand, and have managed through the years to identify themselves with the region's aspirations. Some of these politicians paid a high personal price during the 1950s for airing the northeast's grievances in Bangkok. It is entirely possible that they will reap their reward at the polls next year.

23. The position of former prime minister Pridi Phanomyong, last of the promoters of the 1932 coup, is one additional factor on the left that could conceivably have some bearing on next year's election. Despite the fact he has spent the past 20 years exiled in Communist China, Pridi is still a name that has to be reckoned with in Thailand. As the country's best-known leftist, and the founder of its leading university, Pridi has become something of a legendary figure among intellectual circles in the capital.

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The amount of pro-Pridi sentiment in the country as a whole is difficult to determine, but judging by the regime's refusal to permit him to return to Thailand, it may still be a political factor. The revival of political activity in the country may give fresh inspiration to Pridi's periodic thoughts of leaving China. If he gets out, even if only to Western Europe, the weight of his voice and activities on behalf of opposition elements may exert some influence on the way the voting goes.

Amorphous Center

24. It is still too early to determine how many political parties will field candidates in the upcoming election. The government's political party law prohibits independent candidates, however, and as a consequence there may be a proliferation of small parties with little ideological standing and few direct ties to the past between now and the elections. In addition, there may be a number of second-echelon politicians with past connections to pro-Phibun and pro-Sarit parties who, not finding a home in the government's party, strike out on their own in the hope they can make a better deal after the elections. The electoral fortunes of these elements will depend on the local appeal of their candidates. Despite an electoral law that minimizes the influences of local-based politicians, splinter parties will probably manage to elect a few lower house representatives.

25. One politician from this field who may cut a somewhat wider swath in the election is Liang Chaiyakarn. An indefatigable politician with a taste for power that has long since outdistanced any strong ideological conviction he may once have had, Liang has been associated, at one time or other, with virtually every major faction in Thai politics since the war. He has been busy over the past year rallying old cronies and establishing ties with other questionable elements, but it is still not certain that his Peoples Party will get off the ground, much less win extensive support in the elections. Although his name may not be a household word in Thailand, after 20 years at the same game Liang should be well

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enough known in the northeast to ensure that his Peoples Party, if it participates in the election, will send at least a token contingent to the National Assembly. What it will do once it gets there is even less clear, although cooperation with the government party seems to be a good bet, especially if the government's price is right.

The Issues

26. The way the Thai voter casts his ballot next year is likely to be determined more by the personalities of the candidates and the impact of local or regional interests than by anything else. If past elections are any guide, the influence of substantive issues will be all but lost as the voting moves from Bangkok into the villages. Thai political parties, even those of an egalitarian stripe interested in doing so, have never managed to generate issues or a sense of dissatisfaction with the status quo that could precipitate a voter rebellion in the countryside. There is no indication, at this stage of the game at least, that they will be more successful this time.

27. This estimate, however, is not as firmly based as it may appear. First, a number of important if not revolutionary changes in the countryside have taken place in the ten years since Thailand's last election. New roads have opened up isolated areas, new markets have been created, new crops have been introduced, and new patterns of living and perhaps wants have been created in the villages. Even though the impact of these changes on the substance of rural life should not be overstated, there is little doubt that some of the insularity of the average Thai villager has been worn away in the past ten years. Since Thailand's last election, for example, transistor radios, and with them contact with the outside world, have appeared in virtually every village in the country. No one can predict with any confidence what changes in political attitudes they may have brought.

28. It is reasonable to assume, however, that although personalities and local interests will

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still be the most important factor in the voting, next year's election is likely to be more issue-oriented than any in the past. And the opposition, whether or not it is able to exploit them, has several reasonably good issues. By all odds, the most damaging to the government will be corruption. No one issue seems to evoke a more universal and deeply felt response among the Thai people than that of corrupt practices of Thai officials. Young or old, villager or urbanite, educated or illiterate, everybody is against corruption, and everybody thinks the government--from the wayward constable to the venal cabinet officer--is riddled with it. Even the Communists, who cannot seem to sell the Thai on anything else, strike a responsive chord when they rail against the corrupt practices of the "Bangkok clique."

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30. A thin and often indistinguishable line separates criticism of the corrupt practice of government leaders from a more fundamental questioning of the way in which Thailand is ruled. Some potentially influential elements in the capital are beginning to ask whether the close relationship between government leaders and business interests is a good thing for the country. Foreign Minister Thanat, for example, was recently attacked in the Bangkok press for accepting a high-ranking (although probably honorific) position with an American commodity trading company, not because of any corrupt dealings the foreign minister may have had in mind, but because it was felt that such a position conflicted

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with his government responsibilities. Such a notion still seems foreign to the Thai style of governing, but it could become more important. There is suspicion in at least some circles that the nexus of governmental and entrepreneurial power has led to a situation in which government leaders are motivated less by their concern for the country than for their pocketbooks. Such sentiments have not been given clear voice yet, nor do they appear to have widespread currency in the country. They are potentially serious, however, for under the guise of anticorruption, they constitute nothing less than an attack against the establishment itself and the power system that has ruled Thailand since 1932.

31. There are also a number of domestic issues relating to the allocation of economic resources and the establishment of developmental priorities that may provide grist for the opposition's mill. Although Thailand has made considerable economic progress under the military regime, and its growth rate compares favorably with that of other nations, the fact remains that its per capita income is still extremely low. There are some people in Thailand, although they are few in number and exercise only marginal influence, who are asking whether the country's economic gains are being made in the right areas and are reaching the right people. Criticism has been voiced, for example, over a decline in the number of secondary school students, despite a burgeoning population, and what some regard as the regime's neglect of Thailand's school system. It seems likely that some of the opposition politicians will try to make profit in next year's election by suggesting that there is more to economic progress than a building boom in Bangkok.

32. In doing so, the opposition will almost certainly argue the economic issues along the long-standing battle lines separating Bangkok and the central plain from the other major regions. As a general rule, the farther one gets from Bangkok, the easier it becomes to translate differences in economic policies into regional quarrels. Although it is not possible to be confident about such things,

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regional differences and attitudes appear to have yielded only grudgingly, if at all, to the considerable changes that have taken place in the countryside since the last election.

33. In the south, for example, observers have noted that local politicians, businessmen, and teachers--precisely the kind of people who normally would back the establishment--are growing increasingly bitter over what they regard as Bangkok's indifference and neglect. A decline in the price of rubber--a mainstay of the south's economy--has not helped matters, nor has the example of Bangkok's relatively new-found interest in the northeast sat particularly well. Even in the northeast, where Bangkok has mounted its strongest developmental effort over the past five years, there is little reason for believing that the area's strong sense of regional identity will not be a large factor in the lower house elections.

Foreign Policy and the US

34. Despite the fact that Thailand is on the periphery of the Vietnam war, that its bases have been used for bombing attacks against North Vietnam, and that both Hanoi and Peking have backed an insurgent movement in the countryside to underline warnings about the consequences of maintaining close relations with the US, Bangkok's foreign policy will probably not come under close scrutiny during the election campaign. This stems from the fact that the major opposition groups are in general agreement with the direction of the regime's foreign policy, and more importantly, because they probably calculate that there is not much political mileage in the foreign policy issue. This does not mean, however, that the ruling group's relations with the US will fail to generate debate or interest in the upcoming elections.

35. Close to 50,000 US military personnel have been moved to bases in Thailand in the relatively short period of three years. The ease with which the deployment has been made is testimony to

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the forthrightness of the government, the affability of the Thai people, and the prudence of US officials. It should come as no surprise, however, that it has also led to a growing uneasiness over what the Thai regard as the unfortunate by-products of the American presence. The sense of cultural shock, especially strong for a people who take pride in their independence and who simply have not come into contact with large numbers of Westerners before, has been felt throughout the society, including the ruling group itself. The publication of a bitter anti-US diatribe in one of Bangkok's most respected newspapers, the tongue-lashing US officials recently received from young Thai newspapermen, and exaggerated stories of the depradations of US soldiers, all point to a nascent anti-American sentiment in the country. Although difficult to gauge, such sentiment does not appear to be sufficiently strong or widespread to have a major impact in the elections, but it is likely that even conservative opposition groups, like the Democrats, will argue that the ruling establishment has gone too far in accommodating the US and has not been sufficiently solicitous of Thai interests.

36. For its part, the government has demonstrated some sensitivity to the possibility that it may be in trouble with the voters on various substantive issues. The leadership has taken a number of steps over the past six months that are clearly designed to improve its standing in the country and to deflate, even before they get pumped up, the arguments of the antiregime forces. An effort has been made to meet a mild but growing inflationary situation in the capital by breaking a pork monopoly [redacted] and keeping the price of rice down. An unpopular increase in bus fares was rescinded, and an effort is apparently under way to take some of the sting out of anti-American sentiment by suggesting that at least some government leaders feel the same way. [redacted]

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[redacted] How effective these eleventh-hour moves will prove to be is hard to tell, but if, as seems likely, personalities and local affairs still rule the political game, they may be enough to ensure that there are no major surprises after the votes are counted.

Prospects

37. There is good reason to question whether the government will come out of next year's elections with a clear-cut majority in the lower house. Certainly the record of legislative elections in past years, and the slow progress the government has made organizing for the upcoming one, suggest that the military group may have to settle for something less. The failure to win a majority of the 219 lower house seats will make the government's job somewhat more difficult, but with all of the considerable assets of both friendly and unfriendly persuasion at their disposal, the military leaders should have little trouble patching together a working parliamentary majority from among fragmented and, in all likelihood, opportunistic opposition elements.

38. Even if such an arrangement is not forthcoming or there is some major surprise in the election results, it is not likely that the lower house will prove overly obstreperous. Whatever their other traits, the opposition politicians currently on the scene are neither idealistic enough to push for fundamental changes in the way the country is ruled, nor foolish enough to think that they could possible succeed.

39. Although they may not enjoy quite as much freedom of choice as they once did, the present leaders will continue to rule Thailand after the elections and, at least for the short term, in pretty much the same way. The new constitution and the elections, then, are not likely to bring any important changes in Thai domestic or foreign policies in the near future. The larger question, which cannot

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yet be answered, is whether the new constitutional arrangement proves to be a first step toward fundamental change in the power system that has been in force since 1932, or only more of the same. Only time will tell.

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DIST 25 OCTOBER 1968

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM/CHINA

DOI [redacted] 1.3(a)(4

SUBJECT [redacted] COMMENTS ON DETERIORATING NORTH VIETNAMESE-CHINESE RELATIONS, AND CLAIM THAT AMERICANS WILL CEASE BOMBING AND OFFENSIVE MILITARY ACTION IF HANOI AGREES TO SOUTH VIETNAMESE COALITION GOVERNMENT WHICH INCLUDES VIET CONG

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FIELD NO.

ACQ [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted] 1.3(a)(

1. [redacted] THERE WERE RECENT HIGH LEVEL 1.3(a)
TALKS BETWEEN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND THE CHINESE. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ARE SAID TO BE RAPIDLY DETERIORATING. THE CHINESE OFFERED COMBAT TROOPS TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TO ENABLE THEM TO CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE, BUT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE REPORTEDLY REFUSED TO ACCEPT THEM. THE CHINESE CONTINUE TO REMAIN BITTERLY OPPOSED TO CONTINUATION OF THE PARIS TALKS WITH THE AMERICANS. FIGURES DIFFER, BUT A LARGE NUMBER OF CHINESE SAPPERS, BRIDGE AND ROAD SPECIALISTS, HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM NORTH VIETNAM.

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2. [redacted] THE AMERICANS HAVE TOLD THE NORTH 5 4 3 2 1 1.3(a

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● [redacted] [redacted]
(classification) (dissem controls)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE JAN 1995

• [redacted] [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)
(classification) (dissem controls)

VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT THAT THEY WOULD STOP THE BOMBING ALTOGETHER AND TAKE NO OFFENSIVE MILITARY ACTION ON THE GROUND IF HANOI WOULD AGREE TO A COALITION GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM WHICH INCLUDED SOME VIET CONG REPRESENTATION. [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

3. FIELD DISSEM. NONE.

5 4 3 2 1

• [redacted] [redacted] 1.3(a)
(classification) (dissem controls)

5 4 3 2 1

[redacted]

33a 1.3(a)(4)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 94-214
Document # 33a

25 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President

The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Results of Nguyen Phong Thiep's 21 October 1968 Visit to Saigon

1. [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

2. [redacted] Nguyen Phong Thiep, member of the South Vietnamese observer delegation to the Paris talks, [redacted] returned to Paris on 22 October 1968 from a one day visit to Saigon, South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Chanh Thanh instructed Phong to tell South Vietnamese Consul General and observer delegation chief Phan Dang Lam that, until the commencement of second stage talks, substantive discussions between the Americans and the South Vietnamese would take place solely in Saigon and Lam thus bore no responsibilities in this area. This was in response to Lam's complaint that he was not being kept fully informed about talks in Saigon. [redacted] Thanh promised to keep Lam better informed, and this has been borne out by an increase in reporting from Saigon to Paris. [redacted] 1.3(a)(4) 1.3(a)(

3. On the composition of the South Vietnamese delegation, Thanh told Thiep that Pham Van Thinh, South Vietnamese Ambassador in Bern, and Le Van Li, Vietnamese delegate to the United Nations Organizations in Geneva, were being added to the South Vietnamese

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[redacted] 1.3(a)(

[redacted]

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

delegation and would be arriving soon in Paris. Vu Vuong Bac, prominent Saigon lawyer, probably will not join the delegation because of the press of personal business in Saigon. Nguyen Ngoc Linh, Director of Vietnam Presse, has insisted that he be given the personal rank of Ambassador as a precondition for his joining the delegation as spokesman. [redacted] Linh 1.3(a)(4) bases this demand on his belief that Mr. William Jorden, U. S. Mission spokesman, has the same rank. Thanh told Thiep that he doubted that he could agree to this condition. For the job of military delegate, Thanh said that former IV Corps Commander and Revolutionary Development Chief General Nguyen Duc Thang was being actively considered but that no decision has been made.

4. During his visit to Saigon, Thiep had a private talk with 1.3(a)(4) President Nguyen Van Thieu. [redacted] Thieu said that there was no fundamental disagreement between himself and the Americans on the question of ultimately permitting the National Liberation Front to participate in the political life of South Vietnam by standing for public office in free elections. The main difference was rather the point of permitting the Liberation Front to take part in the negotiations without first having established their right to do so in this way. President Thieu said that he was afraid that chaos would result in Saigon if the Liberation Front joined the negotiations as a separate entity. He said that he expected trouble from the military, the Catholics and the militant Buddhists. Among the military, he believed the main trouble would come from company grade officers and lower ranks since the general officers were fairly well under control and the field grade officers could understand why it might be necessary to make concessions to the Liberation Front. He said that he was less confident of the ability of the Catholic hierarchy to control the Catholics, particularly if the militant Buddhists began causing trouble.

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

106

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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 00-233
Document # 106

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DATE: MAY 2001

26 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President

The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State

SUBJECT: President Thieu's Views Regarding the Issues Involved in Agreeing to a Bombing Halt

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

1. [redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

2. [redacted] President Nguyen Van Thieu conducted business very much as usual although his main concern during the period centered around the current talks relating to a bombing halt. He discussed the situation with almost everyone who visited his office including senior Cabinet officials, aides and secretaries, and religious and political personnages. Thieu's comments to his visitors indicate two main concerns about the discussions underway. The first concern involves the status of the NLF at the negotiating table following a halt in the bombing. The second point entails Thieu's strong conviction that DRV concessions in return for a bombing halt must be spelled out and guaranteed. On both points the President is adamant and his position remains consistent throughout the reporting period.

3. The President insists he will be intransigeant against separate NLF participation in negotiations. Thieu stated that he will never negotiate with the NLF as an equal. He has no objection to their inclusion in the North Vietnamese Delegation but he will not agree to their sitting at the conference table as a separate entity. NVN and SVN have recognized governments, Thieu noted, but this is not true of the NLF, which is only a tool of Hanoi. Thieu asked, "In whose Army do the Generals of the other side hold rank?"

4. Inherent in his concern about the status of participating delegations is Thieu's obvious desire to avoid appearing to be a "U. S. lackey". At one point the President stated that Hanoi wants to meet with the U. S., the GVN and the NLF. Thieu exclaimed that this would make the GVN appear to be a U. S. front. Unless the NLF is denied equal status with the GVN, he disagrees with the American argument that Hanoi's willingness to include the GVN in the Paris talks represents a victory. Negotiating with the NLF also raises the question of honor and he has stated: there is no honor in talking to thieves, let alone the servants of thieves.

5. Thieu stated that South Vietnam could be represented at Paris either separately or jointly with the U. S. However, the question of makeup and seating of all delegations should be clearly defined ahead of time so that no confusion exists about these points.

E0 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

6. As regards a bombing halt and POW exchanges, Thieu told his Foreign Minister on [redacted] that on these issues, which are the only ones which concern the U. S., he feels the U. S. can play the leading role. Thieu noted, however, his fear that the U. S. might disassociate the bombing issue from the issue of GVN participation. The President reiterated his belief that what constitutes reciprocity should be agreed to and clearly spelled out prior to a bombing halt.

7. Thieu also sees a definite connection between the moves now underway and President Johnson's wish to see Vice President Humphrey elected. Thieu referred many times to the U. S. elections and suggested to his visitors that the current talks are designed to aid Humphrey's candidacy. Thieu has said that Johnson and Humphrey will be replaced and then Nixon could change the U. S. position.

[redacted]

28a

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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 94-214
Document # 28a

27 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT : Response from Ambassador Bunker and the CIA Saigon Station to Your Query of 26 October 1968.

The following are the views of Ambassador Bunker and the CIA Saigon Station in response to Mr. Rostow's query concerning the effectiveness of having the Vatican reassure the Catholics in South Vietnam.

1. The Catholics here are essentially divided into three groups: (A) moderates responsive to Archbishop Binh; (B) leftists who, in the event, would probably give less trouble than the others; and (C) the radically nationalist northern Catholics who are not particularly responsive to guidance from the Archbishop nor, as far as we can tell, in close contact with the Apostolic Delegate here.

2. Certainly advice from the Vatican would be helpful with (A); it would be irrevelant with (B); and it might just possibly have a good effect, though only a limited one, with the critical group (C). Accordingly, my judgement is that there is probably no harm, and possibly some good, in trying to get the Vatican to spread the word among Catholic leaders here. The only possible risk is that some northern Catholics might resent what they could consider as "interference" by the Vatican in a non-religious matter.

3. The word could be, of course, not only that they should not fear the entrance of the NLF into the negotiations and that the U.S. is not abandoning them, but also that the U.S. has no intention of recognizing the NLF so that its participation in negotiations would not be as a "separate entity", as is feared here, even though the NLF would hold itself out to be a separate entity.

[redacted]

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tab A

103

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DATE: MAY 2001

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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 00-232
Document #103

29 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President

The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Views Concerning the Bombing Halt and the Paris Talks

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

1. [redacted]

2. Between 23 and 25 October 1968, President Nguyen Van Thieu continued to hold discussions with a number of government officials concerning a bombing halt and the Paris talks. Among others, Thieu spoke with Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, the Prime Minister, Thieu's Special Assistant Nguyen Phu Duc, the Interior and Foreign Ministers, possibly Ambassador Bui Diem, and the Chairmen of the Upper and Lower Houses.

3. While speaking with the Legislative Chairmen, the President said he had told the Americans that he had instructed several people to contact Hanoi to determine if Hanoi felt the time was propitious to engage in talks. If the DRV does not feel the time right, the Americans had been informed that the Paris talks as well as the fighting in Vietnam would continue as is. However, if Hanoi judges the occasion right, Hanoi must then talk directly to Saigon to resolve the issues. It is imperative though, that Hanoi be serious about wanting to engage in talks. Thieu added parenthetically that if Hanoi would not agree to talks with the GVN Ambassador, Thieu would be willing to dispatch a GVN Cabinet Minister to handle the discussions. If the DRV is serious, the two sides could sit down and discuss the future of Vietnam, the question of peace, or any and all issues that either side cared to bring up.



~~SECRET/CONSULTIVE~~

4. The President continued, then if Hanoi "tells me to recognize the NLF, I would be willing to make that sacrifice. However, if Hanoi demands a coalition government, I would say that is unacceptable. If Hanoi asks to return to nationalist activities, I would say OK."

5. Thieu said that he was willing to see the talks drag on for months or even a year, as long as NVN was serious about the talks. They should not be used for bickering or propaganda purposes, Thieu explained, and once the talks commence, the North Vietnamese "will realize that I am serious". Thieu reiterated that it did not matter if the NLF was included in the NVN delegation. However, he would never let NVN tell the GVN to talk with the NLF.

6. Thieu was obviously concerned that NVN was guaranteeing nothing in return for a bombing halt. He stated he had told the Americans that reciprocity was the most important issue. In Thieu's opinion, the best reciprocal act would be for Hanoi to begin talks with the GVN, rather than a military de-escalation or troop withdrawal from the DMZ.

7. He was also concerned that the U.S. Government wished to do something "dramatic" in order to help Humphrey on 5 November. The inclusion of the NLF at Paris would aid Humphrey, said Thieu, but the benefits are short-range. Thieu told Vice President Ky on 25 October that he was afraid the U.S. would force the GVN to deal with the NLF. He observed, however, that the U.S. was caught between the DRV and the GVN positions on the status of the NLF at a conference.

8. Ky said he felt Thieu should propose that a three-way conference be convened including the GVN, U.S. and DRV. Thieu responded that the Americans had told him that Hanoi may refer to a three-way conference between the DRV, the U.S. and the NLF. Thieu felt, however, that if the DRV would not accept the inclusion of the NLF within the DRV delegation, then Hanoi was not yet ready to engage in serious talks.

9. The President also mentioned that he was having difficulty with the Americans in that they were urging him not to speak to the press or make public statements to avoid leaks on the US/GVN talks. Thieu noted that he was trying to convey the impression that he was a man of peace who would die, not for the world, but for the people of SVN.

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31 October 1968

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SPECIAL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 58-1-68

Communist Capabilities and Intentions in Laos Over the Next Year

Submitted by

Richard Helms

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred in by the

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

As indicated overleaf

31 October 1968

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JAN 2001

Authenticated:

James S. Lay, Jr.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USIB

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA.

Concurring:

Vice Adm. Rufus Taylor, the Deputy Director, Central Intelligence

Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, the Director, National Security Agency

Abstaining:

Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, for the Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission and Mr. William O. Cregar, for the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

WARNING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN LAOS OVER THE NEXT YEAR

CONCLUSIONS

A. Over the past year the Communists have greatly strengthened their combat forces in Laos. The combined Pathet Lao (PL)/North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces now number about 56,000 combat troops; they could overwhelm the regular and guerrilla forces of the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) in the coming dry season. And we do not think that the RLG could expand the size or capability of its forces sufficiently in 6 or 12 months from domestic sources alone to contain the Communists.

B. We do not believe that the Communists intend to conduct a major drive to the Mekong, lest such a move provoke US entry into the Laotian corridor and perhaps upset any negotiations underway on South Vietnam. However, in the next few months, we expect the Communists to exert further military pressure on government forces, especially on guerrilla outposts, in order to strengthen their ultimate bargaining position. They now demand that US bombing of Laos be halted as a prerequisite to discussions of an internal settlement that must be based on "the realities of the current situation."

C. Even if NVA resources were released from South Vietnam, we doubt that this would in itself alter Hanoi's intentions in Laos, since the forces already there can launch an offensive without further reinforcement. Though developments in Vietnam could change Hanoi's calculations concerning Laos, in general we believe that the Communists hope to achieve their objectives without running great risks of military counteraction.

DISCUSSION

1. Hanoi has ambitions to control all of Laos, but has been unwilling to take actions there which would jeopardize higher priority goals in South Vietnam. In particular, Hanoi has limited the scope of its military actions in Laos, in part, at least, out of concern for provoking a large-scale US ground action against the vital supply routes to South Vietnam which run through Laotian territory.

2. Since the 1962 Geneva settlement, the war in Laos has been characterized by Royal Lao Government (RLG) offensives during the rainy season (May to October) when the mobility of Pathet Lao (PL) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces is restricted, and by Communist counteroffensives during the dry season (November to April) to retake lost areas, often just in time to seize the rice harvest. Thus an uneasy equilibrium has been established, with military factors operating on the RLG and political factors on the Communists to restrain actions that might provoke a major reaction by the other side.

3. In the political field, both sides have continued to pay lip service to the 1962 Geneva Accords, which neutralized Laos, and until recently to the Zurich and Plaine des Jarres Agreements, which established a tripartite government—rightists, neutralists, and the PL. This arrangement has persisted despite the fact that the PL vacated their cabinet seats in April 1963. These are still kept open for them by Souvanna, the neutralist Prime Minister. Until this July it seemed as though the PL objective, despite their denunciations of Souvanna, was the restoration of the tripartite arrangements.

I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

4. Several recent events, however, suggest that the Communists are developing a new position. For the first time, they have made a bombing halt a specific prerequisite to discussions of an internal political settlement. Moreover, while still reaffirming the 1962 international agreements, they have demanded that the internal settlement must take into account "the realities of the current situation."

5. In private, PL and Soviet spokesmen have explained that such "realities" mean a recognition of PL control over large areas of Laos (they claim two-thirds of the territory and one-half the population). In addition, they contend that the US and its "puppets" have destroyed the tripartite structure, that Souvanna no longer represents a neutralist faction, and that the present government is, in effect, illegal. Apparently, the PL are laying the ground work to claim a larger role in a new government, and may demand that the neutralists aligned with them in the so-called "National United Bloc" occupy the positions now held by Souvanna's neutralist faction.

6. While thus signaling their intention to reorder the old tripartite arrangement, the Communists have reaffirmed their regard for the monarchy as a "permanent feature" of Lao national life. Indeed, the whole point of the rather odd visit of the North Vietnamese Ambassador in July after a four year absence seemed to be to make a dramatic distinction between the King and the present Lao government, and this line has been supported by the new Soviet Ambassador and the Neo Lao Hak Xat (NLHX) spokesman in Vientiane. The Communists have always paid deference to the King's position and may hope that the King's desire to preserve the kingdom and establish a united national community can be played upon to their advantage.

7. The Communists are taking other steps to improve their political position. During the past rainy season, they have made more of an effort than ever before to consolidate control over their territory. After unsuccessful attempts to terrorize mountain people who have been assisting RLG guerrillas in the north, the Communists are seeking to win them over by cajolery. This is apparently part of a wider effort to improve their hold over the mountainous and sparsely populated reaches of Phong Saly, Luang Prabang, and Houa Phan (Sam Neua) Provinces, where they have been stepping up their propaganda and political indoctrination programs. Newly constructed roads give the Communists access to hitherto isolated areas. In the south, PL troops have been busy trying to consolidate their hold over the rice-rich Sedone Valley, where the government carried on a development program from 1965 until July 1967. There are recent reports that the PL civil administration is being reinforced by Lao political cadre who have just completed political training in North Vietnam. One report indicates that in Savannakhet Province North Vietnamese political cadre have been attached to the Communist administration for the first time.

8. By the fall of 1967, the RLG had made considerable inroads on territory that the Communists held in 1962.[1] The Communists finally responded by turning an RLG offensive in the Nam Bac area into a debacle for the government in mid-January 1968. During the remainder of the dry season, the Communists administered a series of defeats to the RLG which added up to the worst government setback since the precarious days of 1961 and 1962. The psychological impact was considerable. There was a good deal of apprehension in Vientiane that the Communists would break out from the previous pattern of military action and push on to the Mekong.

9. But this did not happen, and perhaps the most notable feature of the rainy season now drawing to a close was the lack of significant new moves by either side. The Communists did not press their advantage, but devoted themselves to a more intensive political consolidation of their territory than heretofore. RLG forces, who for their part, usually regain considerable terrain in the rainy season, had only some limited successes in the northeast and in the

[1] See centerspread maps.

area around Muong Phalane. RLG progress has been nil in the Sedone Valley in the south, in Borikhane Province, and in other potentially significant regions.

10. These developments in the military and political fields seem to form part of a pattern related in large part to Communist strategy in South Vietnam. In anticipating that 1968 would be a "decisive" phase in Vietnam, Hanoi moved to increase its logistic capabilities in Laos, strengthen its forces there, recover lost ground, and set back and demoralize RLG forces. And in their recent statements they have set the stage for demanding a new settlement on more favorable terms should the situation in South Vietnam move into serious negotiations. In short, the Communists have developed a stronger military position while at the same time they are preparing, if the situation in Vietnam warrants, to move into a more active political phase in Laos.

II. CAPABILITIES

11. Our estimate of current PL/NVA strength in Laos is about 98,000 (51,000 PL and 47,000 NVA), compared to about 72,000 a year ago. The most important increments have been in combat troops, where PL strength has grown from 28,000 to 31,000 and NVA strength from 16,000 to 25,000. To oppose these Communist forces the RLG has a total of some 100,000 men. These include approximately 29,000 combat troops of the regular army (FAR), about 5,000 combat troops of the neutralist forces, and some 39,000 guerrillas, about 22,000 [2] of whom are Meo tribesmen commanded by General Vang Pao in the northeast.[3]

12. PL and FAR troops are probably about evenly matched in terms of the general effectiveness of individual troops or battalions, and man for man the Meo guerrillas are probably better fighters than either. The NVA forces, however, are definitely better than the FAR, and the psychological impact on the latter when attacked by the NVA is often sufficient to precipitate their defeat. This qualitative inferiority is somewhat compensated for, however, by air support provided by Royal Lao Air Force T-28s, additional T-28s operating out of Udorn in Thailand with Thai pilots, and USAF aircraft operating out of Thailand. In good weather, the Lao fly about 100 tactical sorties per week, the Thai pilots about 70, and the USAF some 100-200. Such success as the RLG has enjoyed since 1962 is due largely to the combination of this air support with effective use of friendly guerrilla forces.

13. For several years, Souvanna and other RLG leaders, including the military, have felt that if it were not for the presence of NVA troops, RLG forces could probably quickly dispose of the PL threat. In our view, this is probably too optimistic. Although in terms of present strengths on both sides, Royal

[2] This figure is for background use only and is not to be used or republished in any other publication by holders of this estimate.

[3] See Annex for a detailed breakdown of order of battle for both Communist and RLG forces.

Lao combat forces would then outnumber those of the Pathet Lao by more than two to one, we do not believe that this numerical advantage would be decisive, in view of the many weaknesses and divisions that will continue to limit FAR effectiveness whatever enemy it confronts. We do believe that the PL need a considerable amount of NVA support to mount a major attack, and that without it, the RLG could almost certainly contain them. We also believe that in northern Laos the Meo guerrillas could put considerable pressure on the PL. But RLG forces could probably not reduce PL forces and territory very rapidly—if at all—without substantial outside logistical and air support.

14. We continue to estimate, however—as we did in March 1968[4]—that the combined PL/NVA forces now in Laos have the military capability to reduce the RLG area of control to a few enclaves in fairly short order. They could do so without diverting resources from South Vietnam or drawing significant reinforcements from the North. And we do not think that RLG forces could expand their size or capability sufficiently in 6 or 12 months from domestic sources alone to contain the Communists.

III. COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

15. There are several options open to the Communists over the next six months or so. There are various indications of preparations to resume military activity as the dry season commences, and it is possible that the Communists have decided to exercise their military superiority and quickly overrun most of Laos. They might think this would be an effective means of putting the US under new pressures to reach a general settlement in Indochina. We believe this is unlikely. The Communists would necessarily feel considerable uncertainty over US countermoves in the Laotian corridor, especially at a time of changeover in American administrations. And, as long as the outcome in Vietnam is in doubt and under some sort of negotiation, we believe that Hanoi would not run needless military risks in Laos before the chances of a new political settlement there had been tested.

16. We do expect, however, that Communist forces will keep up substantial military pressure on RLG forces in the coming dry season. In the northeast, where General Vang Pao's Meo guerrillas have long been a thorn in their side, particularly in Houa Phan and Xieng Khouang Provinces, they will probably make a considerable effort to reduce a number of guerrilla sites and consolidate their claims. They will probably also try to clear the guerrilla outposts along the border of northeastern Khammouane Province with North Vietnam, as well as in the northwest Provinces of Houa Khong and Luang Prabang. In the south, they will maintain the threat to the Mekong from Thakhek to Champassak Province. They will attempt to disrupt US-sponsored aid and development programs. And, of course, they will protect their vital infiltration and supply routes to South Vietnam in the Laotian corridor.

[4] See SNIE 58-68, "Communist Intentions in Laos," dated 21 March 1968, SECRET.

17. We anticipate more direct political pressures on Vientiane and the King, which these military moves will serve to reinforce. At some point, depending again on developments in South Vietnam, the Communists might offer to open negotiations, providing the bombing in Laos ended. In any case, Hanoi would believe its military pressures would improve the chances for eventual negotiations on better terms.

18. Obviously, a major change in the situation in Vietnam could affect Hanoi's calculations. But we do not believe that the release of NVA assets from South Vietnam would, in and of itself, be a decisive factor in changing Hanoi's policy in Laos. In the event of a Vietnam settlement favorable to them, the North Vietnamese would anticipate that political pressures would cause Laos to fall into their hands fairly soon. They would therefore see no need for ambitious moves in Laos that might risk upsetting any agreements reached on South Vietnam, particularly respecting US military withdrawals. Should the settlement be unfavorable to the Communists, we believe that military caution in Laos would appear even more desirable to them.

19. Eventually, if the Communists cannot achieve what they want in Laos through a combination of pressures, they may resort to a vigorous military campaign. But for now, they appear to be moving slowly, calculating that the outcome in Vietnam will be such that a new settlement in Laos can be reached which would provide them an improved power position, from which they could ultimately take control.

MILITARY CAPABILITIES

1. Order of battle information on the Communist forces in Laos is derived from a number of sources. The most important are informants contacted by clandestine friendly guerrillas and by road-watch teams. Other useful information is obtained from prisoners and ralliers, from civilian refugees—particularly low-level administrative functionaries—and from special sources. The estimates of enemy strength are best in those provinces where friendly guerrillas and other assets are most active: Houa Khong, Luang Prabang, Xieng Khouang, Khammouane, Savannakhet, Saravane, Attopeu, and Sedone. It is least reliable along most of the South Vietnamese border, in northern Phong Saly, southern Sayaboury, and northeast Houa Phan (Sam Neua) Provinces. In the other provinces, where we rely largely on the Laotian Army reporting, the quality varies—it is reasonably good for Vientiane and Borikhane, but poor for Champassak, Sithandone, and Wapikhamthong. Estimating the number of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Pathet Lao (PL) troops is also complicated by the mixture of NVA and PL personnel within many individual battalions.

2. On the whole, we think the estimates are reasonably accurate and support our conclusion that Communist strength in Laos is greater than at any time in the past. Strengths fluctuate somewhat between the dry and rainy seasons, however, as the NVA tend to put combat troops in for the dry season campaign—particularly elements of the 316th NVA Division—and then withdraw them during the rainy season. NVA combat troops outnumber the PL troops in the southern provinces of Saravane, Attopeu, and Sedone, where, as might be expected, the defense of their supply and infiltration corridor to South Vietnam is most critical. There are about an equal number of NVA and PL troops in Houa Phan (Sam Neua) Province. In the remaining provinces, the PL outnumber the NVA substantially, and there are no known NVA battalions at all in four provinces: Sayaboury, Vientiane, Champassak, and Wapikhamthong. The dissident neutralist troops are all in Xieng Khouang and Phong Saly Provinces.

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SECRET

LAOS
COMMUNIST CONTROLLED AREAS, OCTOBER 1968

- Communist controlled area
- Contested area
- Communist-held location
- Government-held location
- Road
- Trail

0 25 50 75 100 Miles
0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers

SECRET

Differences between this map and the corresponding one showing Communist controlled areas in SNIE 58-68 COMMUNIST INTENTIONS IN LAOS (21 March 1968) reflect some changes in the situation since that time. In large part, however, they represent a more detailed and accurate presentation of the military situation than previous maps have attempted. For this map we have used the following definitions:

Communist Controlled Areas: The Communists have military and/or administrative presence and the RLG has little or no presence. Although RLG patrols or teams may occasionally move through or conduct clandestine operations in the area, armed clashes are infrequent. (Similar criteria are applied for RLG controlled areas shown in white.)

Contested Areas: Those in which neither side has sufficient military and/or administrative presence to exclude the other. This includes areas where both sides are present in strength and clash frequently, where patrols of either side may be ambushed and civilians taxed by both sides, as well as other areas where both sides show few forces and do not make much effort to exclude the other.

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ANNEX

TABLE A

ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF COMMUNIST FORCES IN LAOS

North Vietnamese Forces		
Independent Infantry	16,500	
Troops and Advisors in Mixed Units	7,800	
AAA	200	
Total NVA Combat Troops	24,500	
Command and Support Troops	8,000	
Engineers and Coolies	14,700	
TOTAL NVA Forces		47,200
Lao Communist Forces		
Independent PL Infantry	6,500	
Infantry in Mixed Units (with NVA troops or advisors)	15,000	
Dissident Neutralist Infantry	2,600	
Armor	400	
Artillery	3,500	
AAA	3,000	
Total Lao Communist Combat Troops	31,000	
Command and Support Troops	15,400	
Engineers and Construction Troops	4,800	
TOTAL Lao Communist Forces		51,200
GRAND TOTAL		98,400

TABLE B

ROYAL LAO GOVERNMENT FORCES

FAR (Royal Lao Army)		
Infantry	27,400	
Artillery	1,000	
Armored	700	
Total Combat	29,100	
Support Troops	16,900	
TOTAL FAR		46,000
FAN (Progovernment Neutralist Forces)		
Infantry	5,000	
Artillery	400	
Armored	100	
Total Combat	5,500	
Support Troops	3,000	
TOTAL FAN		8,500
ADC ("Auto-defense de Choc"—Regional Defense Forces)		5,000
RLAF (Air Force)		1,500
River Flotilla		500
GUERRILLA FORCES*		
Northwest Tribal Guerrillas (Yao and Others)	7,000	
Northcentral Tribal Guerrillas (Irregulars in Luang Prabang and Phong Saly Provinces)	2,000	
Meo Tribal Guerrillas	22,000	
Central Laos Tribal Guerrillas (Lao)	4,000	
South Laos Tribal Guerrillas (Lao & Kha)	4,000	
TOTAL Guerrillas		39,000
GRAND TOTAL		100,500

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

Sources of Military Equipment to Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Military Forces

~~Secret~~

ER IM 68-141
November 1968

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

Foreword

This memorandum is primarily a listing of Communist weapons and combat equipment known to be in use by North Vietnamese units in North Vietnam and by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong military units in South Vietnam. Some military-related equipment such as motor vehicles and medical supplies has not been included. The country of origin of each item is reported insofar as intelligence will allow a determination to be made. Since the USSR supplies most of the military equipment used by Eastern European countries, some combat materiel attributed to the USSR may be of Soviet manufacture but may actually have been supplied by Eastern Europe. No attempt is made in this memorandum to quantify the weapons and equipment being supplied to the Communist forces. For the most part, data on weapons used in South Vietnam come from analysis of captured weapons; data on weapons used in North Vietnam that have not yet appeared in the South are derived from photography, limited actual observations, and other sources. Data are current through September 1968.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
4 November 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Sources of Military Equipment to Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Military Forces

Summary

Most of the military equipment and ammunition now being used for the defense of North Vietnam and for the Communist war effort in South Vietnam has been supplied by other Communist countries in recent years. Until mid-1965 the Communist forces fighting in South Vietnam were equipped for the most part with old Free World weapons from the French-Indochina War and captured US materiel. Only limited amounts of Soviet and Chinese weapons were in use at that time. Military production in North Vietnam is limited to small amounts of infantry weapons, mortars, and grenades, some of which have been observed in South Vietnam. North Vietnam serves primarily as the funnel for the infiltration into South Vietnam of military supplies from other countries.

Communist China and the USSR have been the major donors of military equipment to North Vietnam and to Communist forces in the South, but some infantry weapons, mortars, rockets, and light artillery have come from North Korea and the Eastern European countries. Most of the more complex materiel for the defense of North Vietnam has come from the USSR, including heavier field and antiaircraft artillery, the SA-2 missile system, more advanced radar and aircraft, and

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and has been coordinated with the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of Current Intelligence, and the Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs.

various types of armored vehicles.* China has supplied most of the infantry weapons, mortars, and rockets used in South Vietnam. Antiaircraft artillery up to 57-mm, ammunition for howitzers and field guns up to 130-mm, and PT-76 amphibious light tanks have also been captured in the South. Most of this equipment has been supplied by the USSR, although a few smaller antiaircraft and field guns from Communist China and Poland have been observed. Infantry weapons from North Korea, East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania have also been observed in South Vietnam.

The weapons now being used by Communist forces in North and South Vietnam include equipment still used extensively by Soviet, Eastern European, and Chinese armed forces. Most of the weapons observed in the South since 1965 were manufactured since the Korean War,

Some observed equipment has reached South Vietnam six months after leaving the factory.

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* *For a listing of Communist military equipment in North and South Vietnam, by country of origin, see the Appendix.*

Introduction

1. Since mid-1965, Communist military forces in North and South Vietnam have been equipped increasingly with a modern family of weapons supplied by other Communist countries. Before 1965, weapons of Free World origin accounted for almost 60 percent of those captured in South Vietnam. Most of these were older French models, holdovers from the French-Indochina War, as well as captured US equipment. North Vietnam's inventory of military equipment before 1965 consisted largely of older infantry equipment left by the French and some ground equipment, propeller aircraft, and naval craft supplied by Communist countries during the years 1954-64.

2. With the initiation of the Rolling Thunder program in 1965 and Hanoi's increasing direct involvement in the war in the South, both North Vietnamese and Viet Cong regular forces have been equipped with modern weapons, including types that are standard equipment within the Communist donor countries. North Vietnam's defenses have been greatly expanded and strengthened by the introduction of MIG-15/17 and supersonic MIG-21 jet fighters and the SA-2 missile system as well as by the addition of light and medium antiaircraft artillery and radar. The USSR has been the major contributor to the buildup of North Vietnam's air defense. Communist China has upgraded North Vietnam's naval capability and has provided most of the infantry weapons used by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces. The European Communist countries are not known to have supplied appreciable quantities of weapons to North Vietnam or to the Communist forces in the South. However, the fact that the armed forces of these countries are equipped with large amounts of materiel manufactured in the USSR makes it probable that some of the captured equipment nominally of Soviet origin actually may have been provided by the European Communist countries.

Ground Equipment

Infantry Weapons

3. North Vietnam has had to rely on outside assistance for the vast amount of infantry weapons

and ammunition required for its forces in North Vietnam and for the reequipping of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces fighting in South Vietnam. Only a few light infantry weapons, grenades, and ammunition are manufactured in North Vietnam. Communist China has been the major source of infantry weapons, and smaller amounts are supplied by the USSR, the Eastern European Communist countries,* and North Korea (see Table 1). Most of the combat materiel furnished Communist forces in South Vietnam is infiltrated from North Vietnam through Laos, although small amounts probably are infiltrated through Cambodia.

4. Communist regular forces in North and South Vietnam are now equipped primarily with modern infantry weapons. Almost all of the weapons observed in South Vietnam since 1965 that originated in Communist countries have been of post-Korean War vintage.**

some being captured as soon as six to nine months after leaving the factory. A few Soviet sniper rifles and carbines and the Chinese 57-mm recoilless rifle were manufactured prior to 1950. Although the USSR and the Eastern European Communist countries have supplied weapons manufactured primarily in the late 1950's, most of these are still used extensively in their own armies. Soviet infantry weapons of recent manufacture (1960 or later) include the 82-mm recoilless gun, the 40-mm antitank grenade launcher, and the 122-mm rocket launcher. Eastern European infantry weapons include the 7.62-mm assault rifle, the 40-mm antitank grenade launcher, and the 82-mm recoilless gun.

Mortars and Rockets

5. The USSR and China continue to be the main suppliers of mortars and rockets for the Communist

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* *Eastern European Communist countries supplying weapons have included East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria. Although no weapons of Hungarian manufacture have been observed, reports indicate that Hungary has supplied small amounts of infantry combat materiel.*

** *Observed enemy weapons are those that have been photographed. This is a small but representative sample.*

forces in North and South Vietnam. The Chinese have provided 60-mm, 82-mm, and 120-mm mortars and several types of rockets. The USSR has sent 82-mm mortars and 140-mm rockets as well as ammunition for 60-mm and 120-mm mortars. Some 120-mm mortar ammunition produced in North Korea was captured in South Vietnam in late 1967. In addition to a large number of single-tube rocket launchers, Communist offensive capability in South Vietnam has been strengthened recently by the addition of a Chinese 107-mm multiple rocket launcher, first observed in mid-September 1968. These weapons give enemy forces an increased capability for inflicting damage to Allied supply bases and airfields and represent an awesome threat if used for indiscriminate firings on urban areas.

Field and Antiaircraft Artillery

6. The USSR has supplied most of the larger field and antiaircraft artillery pieces. Light artillery weapons of Chinese origin have also been observed, and reports indicate that Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary have contributed some antiaircraft artillery (see Table 2). Both the Soviets and Chinese have given field artillery still regarded as standard in Communist armies, including the 122-mm and 152-mm howitzer. The 85-mm field gun and ammunition for the 122-mm corps gun have been observed in South Vietnam. In addition, ammunition for the Soviet 130-mm field gun, the largest caliber field gun normally used by Soviet and Eastern European armed forces, has recently been captured.

7. Antiaircraft artillery in North Vietnam includes 85-mm and 100-mm guns supplied by the USSR and possibly by China as well as Soviet and Chinese 37-mm and 57-mm, Soviet 23-mm, and Czech 30-mm weapons. The 57-mm antiaircraft weapon is the standard light automatic antiaircraft weapon used by Warsaw Pact forces,* while the 23-mm is the newest addition to the Soviet arsenal of antiaircraft weapons.

30-mm antiaircraft weapons of Czechoslovak origin in North Vietnam. The

* *The Warsaw Pact countries include the USSR, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria.*

23-mm and 30-mm weapons are more mobile and have a higher rate of fire than the 37-mm weapon, and the addition of large numbers would significantly upgrade North Vietnam's defense capability against low-altitude fighter aircraft.

8. Enemy efforts to create in South Vietnam an effective air defense system, initiated by the Viet Cong in late 1962, were confirmed in July 1967 with the discovery of Polish and Chinese 37-mm antiaircraft artillery ammunition. Since mid-1967, all antiaircraft weapons that are in North Vietnam except the 85-mm and 100-mm guns and the Czech 30-mm weapon have been observed in South Vietnam.

Surface-to-Air Missile Systems

9. The USSR introduced equipment for an estimated 15 surface-to-air missile (SAM) firing battalions into North Vietnam in 1965, all of which were positioned in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. Since then, the SAM air defense system has been augmented by an additional 20 to 25 battalions, most of which remain in the Hanoi-Haiphong area, although coverage has been extended over most of North Vietnam. No SAM's have yet been moved into South Vietnam. Although operating conditions and US countermeasures have limited the effectiveness of the SAM system against US aircraft over North Vietnam, it still represents Moscow's most complex and costly contribution to North Vietnam's air defense system.

10. Up to 12 modified Fan Song B SA-2 radars have been noted in the Hanoi-Haiphong area, differing in configuration from any known Soviet variant of the Fan Song. Equipment observed with some of these modified Fan Song's indicates that the radars may be of Soviet origin, although the Chinese have the capability to produce them.

Armor

11. The USSR is the major supplier of armor to North Vietnam, but China reportedly has sent in medium tanks and possibly a few of the assault guns and armored personnel carriers given to China by the USSR during the 1950's. Czechoslovakia reportedly has provided a number of armored personnel carriers, but these have not yet been confirmed by observation. The North Vietnamese Army is estimated to have two armored regiments with an

inventory consisting primarily of Soviet and Chinese T34/85 and T54 or T55 medium tanks, a few of which have been reported in South Vietnam. These models are still widely used by Soviet, Eastern European, and Chinese armies, as are most of the other items of armored equipment carried in the current North Vietnamese inventory. A Communist attack in February 1968 against the US Special Forces camp at Lang Vei was the first instance of armor being used by the enemy in South Vietnam. The PT-76 amphibious tank used in this attack is the standard reconnaissance tank of Soviet and Eastern European forces.

Radar

12. The Vietnamese Communists' radar inventory is a mixture of Soviet and Chinese types with some US and British radars that were originally given to the USSR and the Republic of China during World War II. Almost all the radars currently used in North and South Vietnam were designed by the USSR in the 1950's and subsequently copied by the Chinese. Only fire-control radars are in use in South Vietnam. The fire-control radars known to be associated with North Vietnamese and Viet Cong antiaircraft units were first produced in the late 1940's and early 1950's, but are still standard equipment with most Soviet, Eastern European, and Chinese antiaircraft artillery units. Most of the early-warning ground-control-intercept (EW/GCI) radars supplied by the USSR and China were designed in the 1950's, although the USSR has given North Vietnam a few models from the early 1960's. The only Chinese radar of late design in North Vietnam is the Cross Legs EW/GCI, first produced in 1965.

Communications Equipment

13. Communications equipment being supplied to the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong is primarily of Soviet and Chinese origin. North Vietnam has produced copies of a Chinese transceiver and field telephone, as well as receivers of native design. There is evidence of small amounts of communications equipment coming from Eastern Europe. Most of the equipment observed in South Vietnam consists of models still used extensively in Soviet, Eastern European, and Chinese armed forces.

Communications equipment recently captured in South Vietnam includes parts associated with the Soviet-designed R-110 mobile high-frequency station, the USSR's largest and most complicated. The R-110 could be used to communicate directly with Moscow and has an output power far in excess of that required to reach Hanoi. Its presence, if proved, would be the first time the R-110 has been noted outside the Warsaw Pact countries.

Aircraft

14. Prior to initiation of the US bombing campaign in early 1965, North Vietnam's aircraft inventory consisted of 36 MIG-15/17 jet fighters sent in from Communist China immediately after the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964 and several transport and trainer aircraft from the Soviet Union. After the bombing began, the USSR supplemented China's original shipment of MIG-15/17 jets and supplied more than 80 MIG-21 supersonic jet fighters, many of which probably are the more advanced 21D and 21F all-weather types. Peking continued deliveries of MIG-15/17 fighters and may have supplied a few MIG-19's, although their presence in North Vietnam has never been confirmed. At the end of September, North Vietnam had an inventory of 153 MIG's, including 38 MIG-21's. Of this total, 28 MIG-21's and 19 MIG-15/17's were deployed at airfields in North Vietnam.

15. The Soviet Union has also provided North Vietnam with eight IL-28 light jet bombers and a small number of helicopters, including MI-6 Hook's, the largest helicopter in the world. In addition to supplying MIG-15/17's, the Chinese have permitted the use of several air facilities in southern China for training North Vietnamese pilots, for repair and maintenance of aircraft, and as a sanctuary for North Vietnamese aircraft. The Eastern European countries have not provided aircraft to North Vietnam, but Czechoslovakia has engaged in training a number of advanced North Vietnamese pilots. No Communist jet aircraft have been detected over South Vietnam, although the capability to stage such flights exists.

Naval

16. The Chinese have provided most of North Vietnam's current inventory of about 40 small

naval craft and an unknown number of armed landing craft. The USSR has sent only two SO-1-class subchasers, 12 P-4 motor torpedo boats, a few armed landing craft, and two *Poluchat-I*-class motor gunboats. Before 1965, North Vietnam had 12 motor torpedo (PT) boats and 24 patrol craft of both Soviet and Chinese origin. The eight to ten patrol craft destroyed by US aircraft in 1964 were quickly replaced by China. Since 1965, Chinese shipyards have continued to supply Hanoi with new naval craft and to repair older models. A recent notable addition to North Vietnam's naval inventory is the high-speed *Huchwan*-class hydrofoil-stabilized motor torpedo boat, first produced in about 1966.

Table 1

Communist Weapons Observed in South Vietnam

Type of Weapon	Country of Origin	Date First Observed
Infantry		
7.62-mm Pistol	China	1965
7.65-mm Pistol with silencer	China	1967
9-mm Pistol	USSR	1965
22-caliber Target rifle	USSR	1966
7.62-mm Sniper rifle	USSR	1965
7.62-mm Carbine	China	1964
	USSR	1964
	North Vietnam	1965
	East Germany	Jun 1968
7.62-mm Carbine rifle grenade	North Vietnam	Jul 1966
7.62-mm Assault rifle	China	1965
	USSR	1965
	North Korea	1965
	Bulgaria	Jul 1968
	Czechoslovakia	Feb 1967
	East Germany	Aug 1968
	Poland	1968
	Rumania	Feb 1968
7.62-mm Assault rifle antitank rifle grenade a/	Poland	1968
7.62-mm Assault rifle fragmentation rifle grenade a/	Poland	1968
7.62-mm Submachine gun	China	1964
	USSR	1965
7.62-mm Light machinegun	China	1964
	USSR	1965
	North Korea	Jun 1966
	Czechoslovakia	Sep 1965
	Rumania	Jul 1967
7.62-mm Heavy machinegun	China	1966
	USSR	1965
	Czechoslovakia	Oct 1967
	Poland	N.A.
7.62-mm Heavy machinegun mounts	North Vietnam	Jan 1968
7.92-mm Light machinegun ammunition	Czechoslovakia	Jan 1964
12.7-mm Heavy machinegun	China	1964
	USSR	Jan 1966

[p.10 blank]

Table 1

Communist Weapons Observed in South Vietnam
(Continued)

Type of Weapon	Country of Origin	Date First Observed
Infantry (Continued)		
14.5-mm Heavy machinegun	China	N.A.
40-mm Antitank grenade launcher, RPG-2	China	1965
	USSR	Jun 1966
	North Korea	Jun 1967
	Rumania	Feb 1968
40-mm Antitank grenade launcher, RPG-7	USSR	Jan 1966
	Bulgaria	Jun 1968
	Rumania	Aug 1967
50-mm Antitank grenade launcher	North Vietnam	Jul 1966
57-mm Recoilless rifle	China	1964
75-mm Recoilless rifle	China	1964
	USSR	1965
82-mm Recoilless gun	USSR	1965
	North Korea	Mar 1968
	Bulgaria	Jun 1968
Flamethrower, LPO-50	China	1965
Mortars and Rockets		
60-mm Mortar	China	1964
	North Vietnam	Dec 1967
60-mm Mortar ignitors	USSR	Apr 1966
82-mm Mortar	China	1964
	USSR	1964
120-mm Mortar	China	Aug 1967
120-mm Mortar ammunition	North Korea	Nov 1967
	North Vietnam	Feb 1967
120-mm Mortar fuze	USSR	N.A.
90-mm Rocket	China	N.A.
102-mm Rocket	China	Apr 1967
107-mm Spin-stabilized rocket	China	Feb 1968
107-mm Multiple rocket launcher	China	Sep 1968
122-mm Rocket launcher	USSR	Dec 1967
122-mm Rocket	USSR	Aug 1967
140-mm Rocket	USSR	Mar 1967
140-mm Rocket launcher tube	USSR	Feb 1967

Table 1

Communist Weapons Observed in South Vietnam
(Continued)

Type of Weapon	Country of Origin	Date First Observed
Field and Antiaircraft Artillery		
23-mm Antiaircraft gun	USSR	May 1968
37-mm Antiaircraft gun	China	Aug 1967
	USSR	May 1968
37-mm Antiaircraft gun ammunition	Poland	Jul 1967
57-mm Antiaircraft gun ammunition	USSR	Apr 1968
57-mm Antitank field gun ammunition	Poland	1968
76-mm Antitank field gun ammunition	Poland	May 1968
70-mm Howitzer ammunition	China	N.A.
85-mm Antitank field gun	China	May 1968
	USSR	Apr 1968
100-mm Antitank field gun ammunition	USSR	N.A.
122-mm Corps gun ammunition	USSR	May 1968
130-mm Antitank field gun ammunition	USSR	Mar 1968
Radar		
Surface search/navigation, Skin Head	China	Jun 1968
Armor		
Amphibious light tank, PT-76	USSR	Feb 1967
Communications Equipment		
50-watt Transmitter	China	Mar 1967
Manpack transmitter, 81	China	Mar 1968
Transmitter-receiver, 55A	China	Jul 1966
Transmitter-receiver, 55B	China	Nov 1965
Manpack transmitter-receiver, 81 (102E)	China	Nov 1966

Table 1

Communist Weapons Observed in South Vietnam
(Continued)

Type of Weapon	Country of Origin	Date First Observed
Communications Equipment (Continued)		
Manpack vehicular transmitter-receiver X-D63	China	Feb 1967
Naval transmitter-receiver, R-607	USSR	Nov 1967
Manpack transceiver, 63	China	Mar 1967
Manpack transceiver, 71B1	China	Mar 1966
	North Vietnam	Feb 1968
Manpack transceiver, R-105D	USSR	May 1968
Manpack transceiver, R-105M	USSR	Apr 1968
Manpack transceiver, R-108D	USSR	Jul 1968
Manpack transceiver, R-116	USSR	Apr 1968
Vehicular transceiver, R-113	USSR	May 1968
Antenna tuner for vehicular transceiver, R-113	China	May 1968
Manpack receiver, 139	China	Apr 1967
Receiver, 7512B	China	Oct 1967
Receiver, WS-430II	China	Apr 1968
Receiver, VTS-2	North Vietnam	Feb 1966
Spare parts for mobile high-frequency station, R-110	USSR	Apr 1968
Field switchboard, JCX-1	China	Feb 1968
Field switchboard, 5421	China	N.A.
Field switchboard, 252B	China	Apr 1966
Field telephone, 0743	China	Jul 1968
Field telephone, CX-2	China	Feb 1968
Field telephone, E0754	China	1967
Field telephone, Q-07.1	China	Feb 1968
	North Vietnam	Jan 1968
Field telephone, TA-57	USSR	Aug 1968
Field telephone, 3FP-120 22	Czechoslovakia	N.A.

. Both rifle grenades are attachments for the 7.62-mm assault rifle. Poland is the only other Communist country which uses rifle grenades on assault rifles.

Table 2

Major Communist Weapons in Use in North Vietnam

Type of Weapon	Country of Origin
Ground Equipment	
Antiaircraft Artillery a/	
12.7-mm Heavy machinegun on antiaircraft mounts	USSR/China
14.5-mm Heavy machinegun on antiaircraft mounts	USSR/China
23-mm	USSR
30-mm	Czechoslovakia
37-mm b/	USSR/China
57-mm	USSR/China
85-mm	USSR/possibly China
100-mm	USSR/possibly China
Field Artillery	
57-mm Antitank field gun	USSR/China
70-mm Howitzer	China
76-mm Antitank field gun	USSR/China
85-mm Antitank field gun	USSR/China
100-mm Antitank field gun	USSR
122-mm Howitzer, M1938/Type 56	USSR/China
122-mm Howitzer, D-30	USSR
122-mm Corps gun	USSR
130-mm Antitank field gun	USSR/possibly China
152-mm Howitzer	USSR/China
152-mm Gun/Howitzer	USSR
Surface-to-Air Missile System	
SAM firing battalion, SA-2 c/	USSR
Radar	
Fire Control	
Beam Track	USSR
Fire Can	USSR/China
Whiff	USSR/China

Table 2

Major Communist Weapons in Use in North Vietnam
(Continued)

Type of Weapon	Country of Origin
Early Warning/Ground Control Intercept	
Big Bar B	USSR
Score Board	USSR
Flat Face	USSR
Spoon Rest A	USSR
Side Net	USSR
One Eye	USSR
Dry Rack	USSR
Witch Four	USSR
Bar Lock	USSR
Knife Rest A/B	USSR/China
Rock Cake/Stone Cake	USSR/China
Rus 2	USSR/China
Token	USSR/China
Cross Slot	China
Dumbo	China
Hi Dumbo	China
Moon Face	China
Cross Legs	China
Armor	
Amphibious light tank, PT-76	USSR
Medium tank, T-54 or T-55	USSR/China
Medium tank, T-34/85	USSR/China
Armored car, BA-64	USSR
Armored personnel carrier, BTR-40	USSR/possibly China
Armored personnel carrier, BTR-50p	USSR
Medium tracked artillery tractor, AT-S	USSR
Heavy tracked artillery tractor, AT-T	USSR
Tracked amphibian, K-61	USSR
Assault gun, SU-76	USSR/possibly China
Twin 57-mm self-propelled automatic antiaircraft gun, ZSU-57-2	USSR
Aircraft	
MIG-15/17 Jet fighter, Fagot/Fresco	USSR/China
MIG-21 Jet fighter, Fishbed	USSR

Table 2

Major Communist Weapons in Use in North Vietnam
(Continued)

Type of Weapon	Country of Origin
Aircraft (Continued)	
UMIG-15 Jet trainer, Midget	USSR
IL-28 Light jet bomber, Beagle	USSR
AN-2 Light transport, Colt	USSR/China
AN-24 Transport, Coke	USSR
IL-14 Transport, Crate	USSR
IL-18 Transport, Coot	USSR
LI-2 Transport, Cab	USSR
MI-1 Helicopter, Hare	USSR
MI-4 Helicopter, Hound	USSR
MI-6 Helicopter, Hook	USSR
Naval	
Subchaser, SO-1 class	USSR
PGM Motor gunboat, *Poluchat*-1 class	USSR
Motor torpedo boat, P-4 class	USSR
PGM Motor gunboat, *Shanghai* class	China
PGM Motor gunboat, *Swatow* class	China
Motor torpedo boat, P-6 class	China
PTH Hydrofoil motor torpedo boat, *Huchwan* class	China
LCM Armed mechanized landing craft	USSR/China
YP Patrol craft, *Cua Cam* class	China

a. Hungary is supplying unidentified types of antiaircraft artillery to North Vietnam.
b. Poland has provided 37-mm antiaircraft ammunition but there is no evidence to confirm its supplying the weapon.
c. A normal Soviet firing battalion includes the Fan Song missile-control radar, six launchers, vans, transporters, and an initial complement of nine SA-2 "Guideline" missiles per launcher. In North Vietnam, firing battalions have varied from two to six launchers with an estimated ten missiles per launcher.

APPENDIX

Communist Military Equipment in North and South Vietnam

Country of Origin	Type of Weapon
Communist China	**Infantry**
	7.62-mm Pistol
	7.65-mm Pistol with silencer
	7.62-mm Carbine
	7.62-mm Assault rifle
	7.62-mm Submachinegun
	7.62-mm Light machinegun
	7.62-mm Heavy machinegun
	12.7-mm Heavy machinegun
	14.5-mm Heavy machinegun
	40-mm Antitank grenade launcher, RPG-2
	57-mm Recoilless rifle
	75-mm Recoilless rifle
	Flamethrower, LPO-50
	Mortars and Rockets
	60-mm Mortar
	82-mm Mortar
	120-mm Mortar
	90-mm Rocket
	102-mm Rocket
	107-mm Spin-stabilized rocket
	107-mm Multiple rocket launcher
	Field and Antiaircraft Artillery
	12.7-mm Heavy machinegun on antiaircraft mounts
	14.5-mm Heavy machinegun on antiaircraft mounts
	37-mm Antiaircraft gun
	57-mm Antiaircraft gun
	57-mm Antitank field gun
	70-mm Howitzer
	76-mm Antitank field gun
	85-mm Antitank field gun
	122-mm Howitzer, type 56
	152-mm Howitzer
	85-mm Antiaircraft gun (possible)
	100-mm Antiaircraft gun (possible)
	130-mm Antitank field gun (possible)

(P. 18 Blank)

Country of Origin	Type of Weapon
Communist China (Continued)	Radar
	Fire Control
	Fire Can
	Whiff
	Early Warning/Ground Control Intercept
	Cross Slot
	Dumbo
	Hi Dumbo
	Knife Rest A/B
	Moon Face
	Rock Cake/Stone Cake
	Rus 2
	Cross Legs
	Token
	Surface Search/Navigation
	Skin Head
	Armor
	Medium tank, T-54 or T-55
	Medium tank T-34/85
	Assault gun, SU-76 (possible)
	Armored personnel carrier, BTR-40 (possible)
	Communications Equipment
	50-watt transmitter
	Manpack transmitter, 81
	Transmitter-receiver, 55A
	Transmitter-receiver, 55B
	Manpack transmitter-receiver, 81(102E)
	Manpack vehicular transmitter-receiver, X-D63
	Manpack transceiver, 63
	Manpack transceiver, 71B1
	Antenna tuner for vehicular transceiver, R-113
	Manpack receiver, 139

Country of Origin	Type of Weapon
Communist China (Continued)	Communications Equipment (Continued)
	Receiver, 7512B
	Receiver, WS-430II
	Field switchboard, JCX-1
	Field switchboard, 5421
	Field switchboard, 252B
	Field telephone, 0743
	Field telephone, CX-2
	Field telephone, E0754
	Field telephone, Q-07.1
	Aircraft
	MIG-15/17 Jet fighter, Fagot/Fresco
	AN-2 Light transport, Colt
	Naval
	PGM Motor gunboat, *Shanghai* class
	PGM Motor gunboat, *Swatow* class
	Motor torpedo boat, P-6 class
	PTH Hydrofoil motor torpedo boat, *Huchwan* class
	YP Patrol craft, *Cua Cam* class
USSR	Infantry
	9-mm Pistol
	22-caliber Target rifle
	7.62-mm Sniper rifle
	7.62-mm Carbine
	7.62-mm Assault rifle
	7.62-mm Submachinegun
	7.62-mm Light machinegun
	7.62-mm Heavy machinegun
	12.7-mm Heavy machinegun
	75-mm Recoilless rifle
	82-mm Recoilless gun
	40-mm Antitank grenade launcher, RPG-2
	40-mm Antitank grenade launcher, RPG-7
	Flamethrower, LPO-50
	Mortars and Rockets
	60-mm Mortar ignitors
	82-mm Mortar

Country of Origin	Type of Weapon
USSR (Continued)	Mortars and Rockets (Continued)
	120-mm Mortar fuze
	122-mm Rocket
	122-mm Rocket launcher
	140-mm Rocket
	140-mm Rocket launcher tube
	Field and Antiaircraft Artillery
	12.7-mm Heavy machinegun on antiaircraft mounts
	14.5-mm Heavy machinegun on antiaircraft mounts
	23-mm Antiaircraft gun
	37-mm Antiaircraft gun
	57-mm Antiaircraft gun
	85-mm Antiaircraft gun
	100-mm Antiaircraft gun
	57-mm Antitank field gun
	76-mm Antitank field gun
	85-mm Antitank field gun
	100-mm Antitank field gun
	122-mm Howitzer, M1938
	122-mm Howitzer, D-30
	122-mm Corps gun
	130-mm Antitank field gun
	152-mm Howitzer
	152-mm Gun/howitzer
	Surface-to-Air Missile System
	Surface-to-air missile firing battalion, SA-2*
	Radar
	Fire Control
	Fire Can

* *A normal Soviet firing battalion includes the Fan Song missile-control radar, six launchers, vans, transporters, and an initial complement of nine SA-2 "Guideline" missiles per launcher. In North Vietnam, firing battalions have varied from two to six launchers with an estimated ten missiles per launcher.*

Country of Origin	Type of Weapon
USSR (Continued)	Radar (Continued)
	Fire Control (Continued)
	Whiff
	Beam Track
	Early Warning/Ground Control Intercept
	Big Bar B
	Score Board
	Flat Face
	Knife Rest A/B
	Spoon Rest A
	Rock Cake/Stone Cake
	Side Net
	Rus 2
	One Eye
	Dry Rack
	Witch Four
	Bar Lock
	Token
	Armor
	Amphibious light tank, PT-76
	Medium tank, T-54 or T-55
	Medium tank, T-34/85
	Assault gun, SU-76
	Armored personnel carrier, BTR-40
	Armored personnel carrier, BTR-50p
	Twin 57-mm self-propelled automatic antiaircraft gun, ZSU-57-2
	Armored car, BA-64
	Medium tracked artillery tractor, AT-S
	Heavy tracked artillery tractor, AT-T
	Tracked amphibian, K-61
	Communications Equipment
	Naval transmitter-receiver, R-607
	Manpack transceiver, R-105D
	Manpack transceiver, R-105M
	Manpack transceiver, R-108D
	Manpack transceiver, R-116
	Vehicular transceiver, R-113
	Spare parts for mobile high-frequency station, R-110
	Field telephone, TA-57

Country of Origin	Type of Weapon
USSR (Continued)	Aircraft
	MIG-15/17 Jet fighter, Fagot/Fresco MIG-21 Jet fighter, Fishbed UMIG-15 Jet trainer, Midget IL-28 Light jet bomber, Beagle AN-2 Light transport, Colt AN-24 Transport, Coke IL-14 Transport, Crate IL-18 Transport, Coot LI-2 Transport, Cab MI-1 Helicopter, Hare MI-4 Helicopter, Hound MI-6 Helicopter, Hook
	Naval
	Subchaser, SO-1 class Motor torpedo boat, P-4 class LCM Armed mechanized landing craft PGM Motor gunboat, *Poluchat-I* class
North Korea	Infantry
	7.62-mm Assault rifle 7.62-mm Light machinegun 40-mm Antitank grenade launcher, RPG-2 82-mm Recoilless gun
	Mortars and Rockets
	120-mm Mortar ammunition
North Vietnam	Infantry
	7.62-mm Carbine 7.62-mm Carbine rifle grenade 7.62-mm Heavy machinegun mounts 50-mm Antitank grenade launcher
	Mortars and Rockets
	60-mm Mortar 120-mm Mortar ammunition
	Communications Equipment
	Manpack transceiver, 71B1 Receiver, VTS-2 Field telephone, Q-07.1

Country of Origin	Type of Weapon
Bulgaria	Infantry
	7.62-mm Assault rifle
	40-mm Antitank grenade launcher, RPG-7
	82-mm Recoilless gun
Czechoslovakia	Infantry
	7.62-mm Assault rifle
	7.62-mm Light machinegun
	7.62-mm Heavy machinegun
	7.92-mm Light machinegun ammunition
	Antiaircraft Artillery
	30-mm Antiaircraft gun
	Communications Equipment
	Field telephone, 3FP-120 22
East Germany	Infantry
	7.62-mm Carbine
	7.62-mm Assault rifle
Hungary	Unknown*
Poland	Infantry
	7.62-mm Assault rifle
	Antitank rifle grenade**
	Fragmentation rifle grenade**
	7.62-mm Heavy machinegun
	Field and Antiaircraft Artillery
	37-mm Antiaircraft gun ammunition

* *Although no weapons of Hungarian manufacture have been observed, reports indicate that Budapest has supplied small numbers of infantry combat materiel and unknown types of antiaircraft artillery.*

** *Both rifle grenades are attachments for the 7.62-mm assault rifle. Poland is the only other Communist country which uses rifle grenades on assault rifles.*

Country of Origin	Type of Weapon
Poland (Continued)	Field and Antiaircraft Artillery (Continued)
	57-mm Tank gun ammunition
	76-mm Tank gun ammunition
Rumania	Infantry
	7.62-mm Assault rifle
	7.62-mm Light machinegun
	40-mm Antitank grenade launcher, RPG-2
	40-mm Antitank grenade launcher, RPG-7

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DIRECTORATE OF
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(1) Rostow
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Central Intelligence Bulletin

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8 November 1968

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8 November 1968

Central Intelligence Bulletin

CONTENTS

South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)

Communist China - Laos: The Chinese have apparently resumed building roads into Laos. (Page 2)

Korea: A large group of North Korean infiltrators seems trapped in South Korea. (Page 3)

Yemen: A break in royalist ranks may presage an end to the fighting. (Page 4)

Czechoslovakia: There have been more anti-Soviet demonstrations. (Page 5)

West Germany - Berlin: Student demonstrations (Page 6)

USSR: Circumlunar flight (Page 6)

USSR: Nuclear test (Page 6)

USSR-Iraq: Aircraft deliveries (Page 7)

[redacted]

F(b)(1)
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Venezuela: Terrorist plans (Page 7)

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

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[South Vietnam: The Saigon government is casting about for a face-saving formula for participation in the Paris talks.

One proposal, [redacted] F(b)(1) F(b)(3) (S) involves a variation of the "our side - your side" position which would allow the South Vietnamese to be acknowledged publicly as the chief spokesman for the allied side at the talks. President Thieu reportedly feels that this proposal would ensure equity with Hanoi and hopefully give Saigon a superior position over the National Liberation Front. At the same time it would render the government's decision to go to Paris palatable to the Vietnamese public and political elite.

Thieu wants the proposal passed to Ambassador Bunker as soon as possible, so that discussions can begin. According to the source, Thieu does not believe that the Americans will accept the proposal, but he is hopeful that it might serve to open up a new dialogue with Washington and eventually lead to some sort of acceptable compromise.

* * * *

Communist military activity on 6-7 November was confined to light mortar attacks against a few towns and villages and a US Marine base. Three district towns in the Saigon - III Corps area and civilian hamlets on the outskirts of Quang Ngai and Hoi An were hit with light mortar fire. Casualties were light. A US Marine base south of the DMZ was hit by 34 rounds of 140-mm. rocket fire in four separate incidents with no casualties or damage.

Although major enemy units continue their stand down, [redacted] F(b)(1) F(b)(3) (S) main force units of regimental size are expecting attack orders in the near future. Two regiments in the area of the Demilitarized Zone--the 27th and the 164th Artillery--and another two in the highlands--the 95B and the 66th--discussed attack plans in messages of 5 November. (SECRET [redacted] F(b)(3) (U) [redacted] (Map)]

Chinese Resume Road Construction in Northern Laos



F(b)(3) (U)

[redacted]

SECRET

Communist China - Laos: The Chinese have apparently resumed construction of a road from southern Yunnan Province into northern Laos.

F(b)(1) F(b)(3) (S)

[redacted] since early September several thousand Chinese have been working on a road leading southward from the border village of Ban Botene. The laborers apparently are accompanied by Chinese security troops.

F(b)(1) F(b)(3) (S)

[redacted] that the road will continue south to Nam Tha, with one spur heading southeast toward Muong Sai.

Roads linking Nam Tha and Muong Sai with China would facilitate the flow of supplies to Pathet Lao troops in remote areas of northern Houa Khong and Luang Prabang provinces that are not connected by road to North Vietnam. The new road construction may be the Communists' reaction to the increased activity of government guerrillas in the area during the past year.

The Chinese have been engaged in intermittent road building in the area under the terms of an agreement reached with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma in 1962. The current activity is the most significant since 1963, when similar numbers of Chinese laborers were used to complete the Meng-la - Phong Saly road. At that time, the Chinese publicly announced plans to build a road system linking southern Yunnan with larger Laotian villages across the border. Little had been done to carry out this plan, however, except for sporadic work on the Meng-la - Ban Botene section of road by small labor gangs. (SECRET) (Map)

F(b)(3) (U)

F(b)(3) (U)

Korea: The North Korean guerrillas who landed on the South Korean east coast on 3 November appear trapped. More than 15,000 South Korean security forces, including offshore naval units, have blocked possible escape routes. South Korean authorities estimate that two 30-man infiltration teams are in the area, and thus far seven guerrillas have been killed. The roundup is expected to take considerable time because of rugged terrain and bad weather.

The North Korean infiltration attempt appears to be the largest since the Korean war. Another unique aspect was the forced indoctrination of villagers, the first instance of "armed propaganda" since the war. (SECRET [redacted]

F(b)(3) (U)

F(b)(3) (U)

Yemen: A major break in Yemeni royalist ranks may represent a first step toward an end to the fighting.

On 3 November a prominent royalist tribal leader, Qasim Munassir, agreed to end the fighting around Sana and to merge his tribal forces with those of the republic, [redacted] F(h)(1) F(h)(3) (S) Munassir was rewarded by being appointed military commander of the eastern zone. In addition a council of elders is to be established before 21 November to discuss changing the name of the Yemeni Arab Republic to something more palatable to the strongly Muslim tribal leaders, such as eliminating the word republic.

Coming at a time when the republic was facing a new royalist offensive as well as internal disorders in the capital, this change-over by the most tenacious of the royalist leaders must be regarded as more than simple defection. The conditions he extracted from the republicans appear to support this view.

There is no clear evidence, however, that his action is connected with the tenuous peace negotiations which have been dragging on between the two sides and with the Saudi Arabian Government. It is more likely that, as the tribal leaders have become increasingly independent of both royalist and republican governments, they have tended to carry on their own negotiations. A continued trend among royalists in switching allegiance to the republicans could substantially reduce the area of fighting and might result in a general tribal peace. (SECRET [redacted] F(h)(3) (U)

F(b)(3)
(U)

AREAS OF ANTI-SOVIET DEMONSTRATIONS IN DOWNTOWN PRAGUE 6-7 NOVEMBER 1968



CONFIDENTIAL [redacted]

F(b)(3)
(U)

F(b)(3)
(U)

[Czechoslovakia: There were more anti-Soviet demonstrations in Prague yesterday.

Czechoslovak soldiers and police used force to attempt to break up crowds shouting anti-Russian slogans. The demonstrators included several thousand young people, students, workers, and office employees. The presence of white- and blue-collar workers is a sign of the unusual depth of the anti-Soviet feeling in Prague.

Some of the marchers were apparently demonstrating against their own leaders--including Dubcek--for participating in ceremonies on 6 and 7 November commemorating the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution.

Early on 7 November there were manifestations of anti-Russian sentiment centering on the Esplanade Hotel, and the police exercised restraint in breaking them up. During the late afternoon and evening the situation deteriorated, especially near the party central committee building, and the police began using their clubs.

The Soviets seem to have been expecting the disturbances. On 5 November [redacted] Soviet combat elements 15 kilometers from the city and near the best high-speed roads leading to downtown Prague. [redacted] some small Soviet units in the outskirts of the city where none had previously been stationed.

F(b)(1) F(b)(3) (S)

F(b)(1) F(b)(3) (S)

Moscow will undoubtedly consider the demonstrations a serious affront. The Soviets will see additional evidence that the Dubcek leadership is either unable or unwilling to live up to its promise to control anti-Soviet manifestations. The Soviets, however, probably intend to intervene with their troops only if the situation gets out of control of the Czechoslovak security forces.

There may be more demonstrations or even street clashes on 10 November, when pro-Soviet party conservatives plan to hold a public rally. (SECRET) (Map)]

NOTES

West Germany - Berlin: Radical student groups plan nationwide demonstrations tomorrow to commemorate an abortive Communist revolution in 1918 and to protest the Vietnam war. Some groups are planning deliberate violence in order to provoke the police and thereby recover the broader student support the activists had last year. West Berlin police, despite many casualties, acted with restraint in putting down radical-initiated violence on 4 November; the authorities hope thus to undercut the radicals. (CONFIDENTIAL)

USSR: The Soviets probably will attempt an unmanned circumlunar flight within the next several days. Space support and recovery ships in the Pacific and Indian Oceans are heading for circumlunar support stations and should arrive by the 9th. [redacted] F(b)(1) F(b)(3) (T)

USSR: On 7 November the Soviets conducted an underground nuclear test at the Novaya Zemlya test area. The yield of the device tested was in the intermediate range--200 kilotons to one megaton. [redacted] F(b)(1) F(b)(3) (S)

(continued)

USSR-Iraq: Ten SU-7 fighter-bombers arrived in Basra on 27 October, the first Soviet delivery of SU-7s to Iraq in a year. In addition, the USSR delivered by air three AN-12 cargo transports and two AN-24 passenger transports last month. Four more SU-7s out of a total of 32 remain to be shipped under an agreement signed in May 1966. Another arms pact was concluded in July 1967, and an Iraqi military delegation went to Moscow last September, probably to seek additional military equipment. (TOP SECRET [redacted] F(b)(3) (U)

[redacted] F(b)(1) F(b)(3) (S)

Venezuela: A dissident Communist terrorist group reportedly plans some unspecified action against "an American colonel" in the near future. Other terrorist groups are also reportedly planning to try to disrupt the national elections on 1 December. US business facilities as well as US nationals would be easy targets for hit-and-run terrorist attack, and it is doubtful that government forces unless forewarned would be able to prevent such action. (SECRET [redacted] F(b)(3) (U)

F(b)(3)
(U)

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

The United States Intelligence Board on 7 November 1968 approved the following national intelligence estimates:

NIE 12-68 "Eastern Europe and the USSR in the Aftermath of the Invasion of Czechoslovakia" (SECRET)

SNIE 11-16-68 "Soviet Approach to Arms Control" (SECRET)

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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 00-233
Document # 84a

8 November 1968

The following is a report by a reliable and trustworthy American of his breakfast meeting with the Government of Vietnam (GVN) Ambassador Bui Diem on 8 November 1968, at the residence.

1. On the way to this meeting, the news had come over the radio that President Thieu had proposed that, under the "our side, your side", formula, South Vietnam be designated head of the Allies delegation while North Vietnam be head of the Communist one. Bui Diem had the full text of Thieu's statement. He commented that the GVN position represented only a small change in the original U.S. proposal - rather than a totally new and different formula - but that it satisfied a number of Vietnamese concerns: it gave the GVN a more prominent status than the NLF, it would put negotiations on a Vietnamese-to-Vietnamese basis rather than a U.S.-to-Vietnamese basis, and it would clearly represent a new stage of negotiations rather than a continuation of the previous phase. Asked if he thought there was much chance of Hanoi's acceptance, he replied "no," but he added that it put the GVN on the offensive rather than in the position of appearing to scuttle negotiations.

2. Asked if he thought that, under one formula or another, the negotiations would be able to resume soon, Bui Diem said that he thought it would take some time. He said that he thought the fact that the U.S. now had a President-elect would slow down the planning process on the U.S. side, since President Johnson would wish to inform and seek the opinions of the President-elect's team, and it would also take some time to repair the damage to GVN-U.S. relations. Regarding the latter point, Bui Diem said that, while there was minor substantive difference in the U.S. and GVN positions - such as the U.S. willingness to leave GVN and NLF status at the peace talks ambiguous while the GVN wanted more precision - much of the difficulty

in GVN-U.S. relations had derived from misunderstanding and misinterpretation. He said that there were delicate nuances in the concept of negotiations and that the two governments "used the same language but gave it different meanings". Bui Diem said he had discussed this problem with Mr. Bundy and that they had agreed that, at some time in the near future, they should go over all that has transpired between the governments in recent days and seek to find in it some guidelines for future policy.

3. Asked if the GVN felt there was any U.S. attempt at deception, referring specifically to the apparent conflict between what Ambassador Bunker reportedly told President Thieu about proposals made to Hanoi and what Ambassador Phan Dang Lam had been told by Ambassador Harriman, Bui Diem replied he could not say that that was the case, but there apparently was some feeling in the GVN that President Johnson acted with undue haste and that he may have been influenced in part by domestic politics.

4. Bui Diem said that though he would handle things differently if he was in Ambassador Lam's position, he could not criticize Lam's actions because Lam's cables only pointed up substantive differences which did exist. Although the GVN and the U.S. did agree on the bombing halt, they did not agree on the arrangements proposed for negotiations, but these disagreements could probably have been resolved amicably if the announcement of the bombing halt had not been made so precipitously.

5. Asked how he would have handled things differently if he had been in Lam's place, Bui Diem said that relations between the U.S. and GVN delegations in Paris should be warmer than they now are. He said that when relations are stiff, it is impossible to chat at length informally and assure that each side understands all the nuances of the other side's position. He said that, for example, he knew Jorden and Vance well and could joke with them; if they had disagreements, each side would know fully the reason for the disagreement and they could still joke with each other. Bui Diem said that while he could risk a joke with Ambassador Harriman, Lam could not.

6. When asked if he knew of any planning in the GVN for sending a delegation to Paris, Bui Diem replied that if the newly-proposed GVN formula was accepted, Vice President Ky could lead a delegation without having to face a woman (Mrs. Binh). He thought General Nguyen Duc Thang should accompany Ky. However, Bui Diem cautioned that a delegation should not be composed of too many Northerners. For example, if Dang Duc Khoi went, it would probably be better that he not be a member of the delegation but a behind-the-scenes public relations man. Bui Diem said he would recommend that Senator Tran Van Lam (a Southerner) be included in the delegation, and Nguyen Luu Vien might also be considered.

7. Bui Diem said he expected to return to Saigon soon. He could not state precisely when, but would wait a short time to see if his return was requested, and if that did not happen he would propose it himself. He felt it would be normal for him to report back to Saigon in person on the results and implications of the U.S. elections.

8. He repeated the statement made at our last meeting that he had no desire to be included in a GVN delegation to negotiations, but he added that he would like to visit Paris from time to time during negotiations to assist behind the scenes in any way he could.

9. In a final comment on the elections, Bui Diem said he was pleased that Senators Morse, Gruening and Clark had not been re-elected, and he said that Senator Fulbright's re-election was offset by the election of Barry Goldwater.

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FM CIA
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OSD EYES ONLY FOR MCNAMARA, GILPATRIC, TAYLOR, KRULAK,
MR. WILLIAM BUNDY
WHITE HOUSE EYES ONLY FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY.
BT
S E C R E T EYES ONLY CITE CAS SAIGON 2439
FOR STATE, DOD, JCS [redacted]
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1. THIS IS THE THIRD OF THREE MESSAGES IN RESPONSE REFERENCE AND DEALS WITH SUPPORT OF NVN OPERATIONS.

2. REFERENCE DICTATES THAT MACV AND CAS CONSIDER AND RECOMMEND TO THE AMBASSADOR WHETHER NORTH VIETNAM OPERATIONS SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED BY CAS TO MACV IN WHOLE OR IN PART. THIS MATTER HAS BEEN UNDER STUDY BY THESE TWO ORGANIZATIONS WHO HAVE MADE THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS IN WHICH AMBASSADOR LODGE CONCURS:

A. IF THE PROGRAM IS TO CONTINUE AT SUBSTANTIALLY ITS PRESENT LEVEL AND UNDER CURRENT POLICY ORIENTATION, THE PROGRAM SHOULD REMAIN UNDER CAS SUPPORT AND GUIDANCE. IT WILL REQUIRE CONTINUED AND EXPANDED MACV SUPPORT, ESPECIALLY THE MARITIME PROGRAM.

B. IF THE PROGRAM IS TO BE EXPANDED IN SCOPE AND IN POLICY ORIENTATION TO THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL VISUALIZED IN THE CINCPAC 33 AND 34 PLAN SERIES AND IF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT A REDUCTION OF PLAUSIBLE DENIAL TO A LEVEL OF DISCREET OVERT OPERATIONS, AND TRANSFER CAN BE RECONCILED TO MACV PHASE-OUT, IT IS DEEMED FEASIBLE AND IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST TO TRANSFER THE PROGRAM FROM CAS TO MACV. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, CAS PERSONNEL WOULD PHASE OUT THE PROGRAM OVER A SIX-MONTH PERIOD FROM THE DATE OF APPROVAL. CAS WOULD CONTINUE SUPPORT OF MACV IN CERTAIN SPECIALIZED AREAS.

C. UNDER BOTH CONCEPTS CAS SHOULD RETAIN DIRECTION AND COORDINATION OF THEHPSYOPS AND DECEPTION PROGRAM JOINTLY CONDUCTED WITH THE VIETNAMESE AGAINST NVN.

3. WE ARE PREPARED TO OUTLINE IMPLEMENTSING PROCEDURES AND AMPLIFYING DETAILS APPLICABLE TO COURSE B ABOVE DURING THE 20 NOVEMBER HONC CONFERENCE.

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PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES

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DIST 18 NOVEMBER 1968

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

SUBJECT PRESIDENT THIEU'S COMMENTS ON PEACE TALKS

IMPASSE [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

SOURCE [redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
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SUMMARY: PRESIDENT THIEU [redacted] E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C) [redacted] HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED BY THE PRESSURE EXERTED ON HIM BY THE U.S. DURING THE PRE-BOMBING HALT DISCUSSIONS. HE TERMED THE U.S. ACTION A "BETRAYAL" AND SAID VICE PRESIDENT KY FULLY SUPPORTED HIS POLICY ON THE PEACE TALKS ISSUE, INCLUDING HIS TWO-DELEGATION PROPOSAL. HE INDICATED HE MIGHT RESHUFFLE HIS CABINET IN AN EFFORT TO PLEASE THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION. [redacted] THIEU REITERATED HIS DETERMINATION NEVER TO TALK WITH NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NFLSV) REPRESENTATIVES OUTSIDE OF SAIGON. THE ONLY FORMULA FOR THE PARIS TALKS HE WILL ACCEPT IS ONE WHICH REQUIRES THE NFLSV REPRESENTATIVES TO BE A PART OF THE HANOI DELEGATION. THIEU THINKS PRESIDENT-ELECT NIXON WILL LET PRESIDENT JOHNSON TRY TO SOLVE THE TALKS IMPASSE SINCE A SOLUTION BY JOHNSON WOULD MAKE NIXON'S JOB AFTER INAUGURATION EASIER. E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

END SUMMARY.

1. [redacted] COMMENT: OTHER INFORMATION [redacted] INDICATES THAT BY 15 NOVEMBER PRESIDENT THIEU HAD RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE U.S. AND FOR THE REVERSAL OF THE HARD LINE ON THE PARIS PEACE TALKS THAT HE TOOK IN HIS 2 NOVEMBER

SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THIS REPORT IS, THEREFORE, ALREADY OUTDATED AS AN INDICATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY ON THE PARIS TALKS. IT DOES SERVE TO SHOW, HOWEVER, THE STRENGTH OF THIEU'S RESENTMENT OVER AMERICAN POLICY AND SEVERAL OF THE MISCONCEPTIONS ON WHICH HIS OWN STAND WAS BASED. IT ALSO SHOWS THAT, AS LATE AS 11 NOVEMBER, THIEU WAS STILL ENJOYING PLAYING THE POPULAR ROLE OF DEFENDER OF VIETNAMESE NATIONAL INTERESTS.)

E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

2. [redacted] PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU SPOKE CRITICALLY OF THE UNPRECEDENTED PRESSURE TO WHICH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD SUBJECTED HIM DURING THE PRE-BOMBING HALT DISCUSSIONS. ACCORDING TO THIEU, THE AMERICANS HAD CITED THE SIZE OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT IN BLOOD AND MONEY AS JUSTIFICATION FOR INSISTING THAT U.S. INTERESTS PREVAIL AND HAD CITED THE PRESENCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) OF A HALF MILLION U.S. TROOPS. THIEU SAID HE HAD HAD TO REMIND THE AMERICANS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) CONTRIBUTION TO THE WAR WAS IN FACT, LARGER THAN THE U.S. COMMITMENT.

3. THEIU CHARACTERIZED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTION AS A

"BETRAYAL" COMPARABLE TO THE U.S. ABANDONMENT OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK AS A RESULT OF THE YALTA, TEHERAN AND CASABLANCA CONFERENCES. HE COMPLAINED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD SENT THE AUSTRALIAN AND KOREAN AMBASSADORS TO BADGER HIM INTO ACCEPTING THE U.S. POINT OF VIEW. THIEU OBSERVED THAT VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY, WHO WAS NOT PRESENT, WAS FULLY IN ACCORD WITH HIS POLICY ON THE PARIS TALKS QUESTION, INCLUDING HIS RECENTLY ENUNCIATED "OUR SIDE-YOUR SIDE" FORMULA.

4. THIEU [redacted] DURING THE U.S. ELECTION CAMPAIGN [redacted] HAD SENT TWO SECRET EMISSARIES TO THE U.S. TO CONTACT RICHARD NIXON. HE INDICATED HE MIGHT RESHUFFLE THE CABINET IN AN EFFORT TO PLEASE THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION, MENTIONING SPECIFICALLY THE POSTS OF PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

5. THERE WAS SOME CONFIDENTIAL TALK AMONG THE PRESIDENT'S GUESTS ABOUT ORGANIZING CATHOLICS "TO SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT THROUGH DEMONSTRATIONS WHEN THE TIME COMES." THIEU HIMSELF REFERRED ONCE TO HIS "KNOWLEDGE" OF AMERICAN-PLANNED DEMONSTRATIONS FOR PEACE BY THE AN QUANG BUDDHIST FACTION.

6. [redacted]

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[redacted] E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

7. [redacted] ASKED [redacted] TO EXPLAIN HIS "TWO-DELEGATION" FORMULA, THIEU SAID HIS IDEA WAS THAT ALL POLITICAL DISCUSSION IN PARIS SHOULD TAKE PLACE BETWEEN THE GVN AND HANOI REPRESENTATIVES, ALTHOUGH THE GVN WOULD DEFER TO THE U.S. ON SUCH MATTERS AS DISPOSITION OF MILITARY BASES AND TROOPS. E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

8. IN RESPONSE TO ANOTHER QUESTION [redacted] THIEU SAID HE WAS FIRM IN HIS DETERMINATION TO TALK ONLY WITH HANOI. HE WILL NEVER TALK DIRECTLY WITH THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NFLSV) OUTSIDE OF SVN, THIEU SAID, ALTHOUGH HE CONTINUES TO HOLD OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT TALKS WITH NFLSV SPOKESMEN IN SAIGON. THE OFFER OF SAFE PASSAGE TO AND FROM SUCH TALKS STILL STANDS. THIEU SAID HE HAS A PARTICULAR OBLIGATION TO OLDER PEOPLE TO KEEP UP THEIR CONFIDENCE HE WILL NEVER RECOGNIZE THE NFLSV. TALKING WITH NFLSV REPRESENTATIVES E0 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

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OUTSIDE OF SAIGON WOULD AMOUNT TO SUCH RECOGNITION. HE EMPHASIZED HE WOULD WELCOME AS WITNESSES TO GVN/HANOI TALKS ALL COUNTRIES BELONGING TO THE UNITED NATIONS BUT WOULD REMAIN FIRM ON HIS STAND THAT THE ONLY FORMULA ACCEPTABLE TO HIM IS ONE WHICH REQUIRED THE NFLSV REPRESENTATIVES TO BE PART OF THE HANOI DELEGATION IN PARIS.

9. THIEU SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO REACTION FROM WASHINGTON TO HIS TWO-DELEGATION PROPOSAL SINCE THE RECENT MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PRESIDENT-ELECT NIXON. HE EXPECTS NIXON TO LET JOHNSON TRY TO SOLVE THE TALKS CRISIS AND TO GO AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TOWARD REACHING A SETTLEMENT. THIS WOULD MAKE NIXON'S OWN JOB EASIER AFTER INAUGURATION AND WOULD LEAVE FOR THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION THE OBVIOUS MEASURES TO BE TAKEN TO DISENGAGE THE U.S. FROM SVN, THUS ALLOWING NIXON TO BE THE "HERO" WHO DE-AMERICANIZED THE WAR.

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10. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR BERGER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL ABRAMS, MR. COLBY, MAJOR GENERAL DAVIDSON) 7TH AIR FORCE (GENERAL BROWN) [redacted] REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report

Geographic Brief on
North Thailand–Northwest Laos Border Area

SECRET

CIA/BGI GR 69-1
December 1968

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FOREWORD

The north Thailand-northwest Laos border area is a locus of subversive insurgency that increasingly plagues the Thai Government. Rugged, remote, and densely forested, the area is well suited to covert cross-border movement and is very inhospitable to the Government's counterinsurgency operations.

This report is intended for use as a brief orientation aid by persons concerned with events or programs in Thailand. A similar report is available on Laos (CIA/BI GR 67-14, *Geographic Brief on Laos*, February 1967).

NND 941536 --- 3737

CONTENTS

	Page
Terrain and Vegetation	1
Climate	4
Thailand-Laos Boundary	6
Population	7
Distribution and Composition	7
Settlement	9
Insurgency	12
Economy	13
Transportation	15
Roads	16
Waterways	21
Airways	21

TABLE

	Page
Mean Precipitation	5

PHOTOGRAPHS

		Page
Figure 1.	Densely forested, steeply sloped ridge in northern Thailand	2
Figure 2.	Broad valley floor in Chiang Rai Province	3
Figure 3.	Meo family of Nan Province	8
Figure 4.	Main street of Chiang Khong, in northern Chiang Rai Province	9
Figure 5.	Thai village in valley, Chiang Rai Province	10
Figure 6.	Typical Meo village in hills of northern Thailand	11
Figure 7.	Crudely built, windowless Meo house	11
Figure 8.	Opium poppyfield in northern Thailand	14
Figure 9.	Meo girl collecting raw opium	15

NND 941536 --- 3738

		Page
Figure 10.	Young teak plantation in northern Thailand	16
Figure 11.	Elephant dragging teak log to road	17
Figure 12.	Road through town of Sayaboury	17
Figure 13.	Dry-season view of road between Nan and Pua in Nan Province	18
Figure 14.	Ford and footbridge across Mae Nam Nan	19
Figure 15.	Laterite road between Chiang Rai and Mekong River town of Chiang Khong	20
Figure 16.	Makeshift vehicular ferry constructed from two native pirogues	20
Figure 17.	Small native crafts navigating rapids on Mekong River near Paklay	22
Figure 18.	Landing strip for STOL aircraft in northern Nan Province	22

MAP

	Following Page
North Thailand-Northwest Laos Border Area (59652)	22

NND 941536 --- 373

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
December 1968

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Geographic Brief on North Thailand-Northwest Laos Border Area

1. The Thai provinces of Chiang Rai, Nan, and Uttaradit and the Laotian province of Sayaboury occupy some 22,000 square miles, a region slightly larger than Vermont and New Hampshire combined. The northernmost tip is less than 80 miles from Communist China (see Map 59652). The region is rugged, densely forested, and underdeveloped. Slopes are populated by seminomadic hill peoples who have traditionally been unresponsive to governmental controls and who pay scant heed to the international boundary slicing through their homelands. These factors combined make the region susceptible to and well suited to subversive insurgency, and they hamper government counterinsurgency operations.

2. Although Sayaboury Province (formerly part of Thailand) has remained relatively free from Pathet Lao (PL) influence, PL forces have been active in the northwestern part of the province, west of Hongsa. They have also played a role in the support of Communist insurgency in the northern Thai provinces where hill peoples (principally Meos) have been the targets of Communist propaganda and recruitment for several years. Serious clashes between insurgents and Thai security forces have occurred in Chiang Rai and Nan since late 1967.

TERRAIN AND VEGETATION

3. Highly dissected, steeply sloped ridges and valleys trending in a north-northeast – south-southwest direction characterize the terrain of the region (see Figure 1). Because secondary ridges branch off at all angles from the main terrain features, movement for more than a few miles is difficult in all directions except along major valleys. Much of the higher terrain is so difficult that it is unadministered by the central government on either side of the border. Ridgelines are generally 3,000 to 6,000 feet above sea level, with the highest point—6,896 feet—along the Sayaboury-Uttaradit border. Flat to gently rolling valleys and intermontane basins lie 1,000 to 3,000 feet below the ridgelines (see Figure 2). The most rugged territory in the region flanks the northern segment of the north-south trending range that forms the Sayaboury-Nan border; prevailing crest elevations here are well over 6,000 feet. Terrain in other parts of Nan Province and in most of Chiang Rai and Uttaradit is less rugged, and broad, relatively gentle slopes are more common.

Note: This report was produced by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence.

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

FIGURE 1. Densely forested, steeply sloped ridge in northern Thailand. Such terrain, well suited to guerrilla operations, is typical of most of the region.

4. All of the streams in Sayaboury Province as well as in the northern two-thirds of Chiang Rai drain into the Mekong River, which forms the northern and eastern borders of Sayaboury. Streams in the southern one-third of Chiang Rai and all of those in Nan and Uttaradit drain into the Mae Nam Nan, which flows southward into the central lowland of Thailand.

5. Although streams meander slowly through the broader and more level valleys and basins, for most of their courses they flow swiftly through deeply entrenched valleys. Gradients are steep, beds are strewn with boulders, and courses are punctuated by numerous falls and rapids. In places the streams (including the Mekong) flow in canyons well over 1,000 feet below the flanking terrain. During the low-water season (November through April) smaller streams and upper courses of larger ones are dry or their flows are reduced to a trickle. During the high-water season (May through October), however, flows become torrential and flash floods are common. Discharge may be up to 30 times as great as during low water, and water levels may rise as much as 60 feet in constricted channels.

6. Broadleaf forests containing both evergreen and deciduous species blanket all of the region except valley floors and lower slopes that are under cultivation and ridges that support mainly coniferous growths. Evergreens predominate in wetter areas such as along streams or on windward, rain-swept slopes; deciduous trees prevail on drier tracts. Slash-and-burn farming has denuded extensive slope areas of their original forest cover and, after the cleared land has

NND 941536 --- 374



FIGURE 2. Broad valley floor in Chiang Rai Province. Valleys usually are blanketed by fields of wetland rice, especially in the Thai provinces, and are surrounded by terrain rising to 3,000 feet above them. After the harvest, in October or November, the fields are dry and would not significantly deter movement.

been abandoned, lower but more tangled secondary growths have developed. Tall, open stands of virgin forests are restricted to remote tracts of rugged terrain where slash-and-burn activities have not been practiced. Trees in the deciduous forests are leafless for varying periods from December to late March or early April, and their capacity to conceal insurgent operations from air observation is diminished accordingly. Nearly pure stands of teak are common in the deciduous forests. Grasslands with grasses up to 12 feet high are scattered throughout the region. Tracts with short grasses could be used for drop zones in counterinsurgency operations.

7. The rugged mountains and densely foliated forests of the region greatly favor guerrilla operations. In the Thai provinces, insurgent groups are composed mostly of Meos but include other hill peoples. Their Thai adversaries are lowlanders who not only lack the insurgents' knowledge of the mountains but also lack speed and endurance when traveling in such terrain. The insurgents therefore are able to attack Thai military installations in the valleys, as well as patrols in the mountains, and then withdraw into their mountain redoubts with little fear of apprehension. The dense forest canopy, although somewhat diminished by leaf fall in the deciduous stands from December to April, effectively conceals

NND 941536 --- 37

insurgent movements (including infiltration of agents into northern Thailand from Laos) from air observation. On the other hand, the region is poorly suited to conventional military operations. Airpower and artillery are difficult to apply effectively in the mountainous, densely forested terrain. All forms of surface movement by ground forces, too, are severely limited.

CLIMATE

8. Like the rest of Southeast Asia, the border area has a monsoonal climate characterized by two major seasons—the wet southwest monsoon from mid-May to mid-September and the dry northeast monsoon from mid-October to mid-March. These major seasons are separated by two transitional periods—one from mid-March to mid-May, the other from mid-September to mid-October.

9. The southwest monsoon is a season of heavy and frequent precipitation. Approximately two-thirds of the yearly rainfall occurs during this period. Streams become swollen, the ground becomes saturated and muddy, surface transportation becomes difficult or impossible, and the dense cloud cover curtails air transport. Humidities are persistently high and, except at higher elevations, mean daily maximum temperatures climb into the high 80's or low 90's (Fahrenheit degrees). Although such weather hampers the logistic support of Government counter-insurgency operations, it has relatively little effect on guerrilla activities. The cloud cover, for example, actually helps to conceal insurgent movements from air observation.

10. The northeast monsoon is a season of very little precipitation. Temperatures (which may dip into the low 40's at higher elevations) and relative humidities are at their lowest and skies are clearest during this season.

11. The mid-March to mid-May transitional season is characterized by increases in the frequency and amount of precipitation and in relative humidity. Maximum annual temperatures—in the upper 90's—occur at this time, generally near the end of April. The mid-September to mid-October transitional season is characterized by decreasing precipitation, temperature, and relative humidity. The table on page 5 shows mean monthly and annual precipitation for selected stations in the region.

NND 941536 ---37 43

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Mean Precipitation
(*Inches*)

Station	Elevation	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Annual
	(*Feet*)													
Chiang Kham (19°32′N. 100°18′E.) ..	2,000	0.4	1.0	0.9	1.9	6.1	5.3	7.8	15.4	9.8	2.1	0.5	*	51.2
Chiang Rai (19°54′N. 99°50′E.)	1,365	0.4	0.4	0.7	2.7	7.6	8.6	11.5	14.1	10.9	4.8	1.7	0.7	64.1
Nan (18°47′N. 100°47′E.)	660	0.4	0.4	1.0	3.3	6.3	5.6	8.2	11.0	8.9	2.6	0.9	0.2	48.8
Paklay (18°12′N. 101°25′E.)	984	*	0.2	1.3	3.5	8.9	7.5	10.9	8.0	10.5	4.2	0.9	0.2	56.1
Pua (19°11′N. 100°55′E.)	800	0.3	0.8	2.9	3.3	7.1	5.2	9.8	12.4	10.1	3.2	0.9	0.1	56.1

* Less than 0.05 inch.

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THAILAND-LAOS BOUNDARY

12. The Thailand-Laos boundary, for nearly all of its extent through the region, is alined along remote mountain crests. Although entirely undemarcated, no part of it is in dispute. North of the region the 59-mile segment between the Thai province of Chiang Rai and the Laotian province of Houa Khong is formed by the thalweg (middle of the chief navigable channel) of the Mekong River. Between Chiang Rai and Sayaboury—some 48 miles—the boundary follows a mountain range that forms the water divide between two minor river systems that drain northward to the Mekong. Between Sayaboury and the Thai provinces of Nan and Uttaradit—approximately 238 miles—the boundary is formed by the water divide between streams flowing northward and eastward to the Mekong and streams flowing westward and southward to the Mae Nam Nan.* South of the region the boundary between Sayaboury and the Thai province of Loei—about 86 miles—follows the thalweg of the Nam Huang to its confluence with the Mekong.

13. Laos originally gained control of what is now Sayaboury Province during the period 1902-04 when a series of treaties between Siam (now Thailand) and France (colonial administrator of Laos until 1949) ceded territory on the west bank of the Mekong to France. In 1941, Thailand—with the backing of Japan—took advantage of the 1940 collapse of France and the resultant weakening of its colonial empire by reclaiming the west bank territory. She retained it until 1946 when a France-Thailand accord annulled the 1941 treaty that had accompanied the Thai seizure and reestablished the pre-1941 boundary. This boundary exists today. Some Laotian leaders undoubtedly suspect Thailand of harboring ambitions to reannex all of the Laotian territory west of the Mekong River (including the southern provinces of Champassac and Sithandone, as well as Sayaboury) that Thailand had annexed during World War II. Control of the west bank territory would give Thailand continuous frontage on the Mekong from its northern border to Cambodia and would greatly facilitate the operations of Thai timber rafters and boatmen.

14. The present boundary traverses rugged terrain inhabited by hill peoples (principally Meos) who pay little attention to it. They commonly have family ties on both sides of the border. Some villages are situated on one side of the border and have fields on the other. Villagers in Kene Thao, in southern Sayaboury, reportedly cross the Nam Huang to a well on the Thai side to obtain drinking water. The hill people in some sections of the Sayaboury border areas trade in Thai towns that are closer to them than Sayaboury, Paklay, or other towns on the Laos side of the border. These people may travel as far into Thailand as Pua, 20 miles from the border, or Nan, 30 miles, to shop. A recent American visitor to the Thai town of Chiang Khong, across the Mekong River from Houei Sai in Houa Khong Province, reported considerable traffic of people and goods across the river, with no documents being shown to immigration or customs

* The southern 8 miles or so of this segment actually are alined along the Nam Huang Nga to its confluence with the Nam Huang.

NND 941536 --- 3745

officials on either side. Thai Government officials reportedly are becoming concerned by the laxity of such local officials and the generally porous nature of the border, particularly in view of the current Communist-supported insurgency festering in the region and the ease with which agents can infiltrate from Laos into the northern provinces.

15. Illegal border crossings are difficult to curtail. The Sayaboury segment of the border is alined along rugged, heavily forested terrain that is impossible to patrol effectively; hence illegal crossings are likely to continue. River segments of the border, too, are difficult to control; both Laotian and Thai Government officials have traditionally closed their eyes to the hundreds of small boats that cross the Mekong daily. Because of the apparent increase in infiltration of Communist agents into its northern and northeastern peripheries, Thailand has drawn up plans to improve security along the border. These plans call for an increase in river patrols, the addition of selected hill tribesmen to existing security forces in the border regions, and the establishment of a buffer zone 5 kilometers (about 3 miles) wide along the Thai side of the Mekong (but not, apparently, along the land boundary with Sayaboury Province). All people of questionable allegiance living within the buffer zone are to be resettled outside the zone.

POPULATION

Distribution and Composition

16. Some 1,500,000 people inhabit the region. The total population and population density of each province are as follows:*

Province	Population Number	Population Density (Per Square Mile)
Chiang Rai	811,771	112
Nan	240,471	53
Uttaradit	259,919	88
Sayaboury	167,350	24

Densities vary considerably within each province; generally, they are higher in the wider valleys and basins that are populated by Thais or Laos and are lower in the more rugged mountainous tracts peopled by tribes such as the Meos or Yaos (see Figure 3). Contrary to popular conception, lowlanders constitute a substantial majority throughout the region. In Nan Province, for example, the Governor estimated that of a total population of about 300,000 in 1967, only 15,600, or about 5 percent, were hill people; approximately 3,000 of these hill people were Meos, the major insurgency force in northern Thailand.** Meos

* Figures for the Thai provinces are from the 1960 census; Sayaboury figures are 1967 census claims.

** There are an estimated 50,000 Meos in all of Thailand.

NND 941536 --- 374

FIGURE 3. Meo family of Nan Province. Note the albino girl. Dark clothing with brightly colored trim typifies the attire of most hill peoples.

therefore account for only about 1 percent of the population of Nan Province. Most of them are clustered in Pua and Thung Chang districts in the northern part of the province, near the Laos border. Hill people presumably constitute about the same percentage of the population in Chiang Rai Province but are fewer in Uttaradit where mountainous tracts, too, are less numerous. In Sayaboury, an estimated 67 percent of the population are ethnic Laos, with Meos comprising most of the rest.*

17. Like the rest of northern Thailand and all of Laos, the region is ethnographically complex. Most people belong to the Tai ethnic group, which comprises chiefly Thais (in Thailand) and Laos (in Laos). The remaining population consists largely of non-Tai hill peoples such as the Meos and Yaos whose ancestors have filtered southward from the southern provinces of China in the past 100 years.** Revolts by these groups against their Chinese rulers and subsequent repressions accelerated the search for unoccupied land to the south. These migrations have about reached their peak, as little unoccupied hill land is left

* There are somewhat more than 130,000 Meos in all of Laos.

** For authoritative accounts of the hill peoples of northern Thailand, see *The Hill Tribes of Thailand* by Gordon Young, Siam Society, Bangkok, 1962.

NND 941536 --- 3747

farther south. In Laos, Meos have made no significant penetration south of 18°N, but in Thailand some have migrated south into Phetchabun, Loei, Phitsanulok, and Tak Provinces.

18. In addition to the Tai and hill peoples, several thousand Haw Chinese live in the region—most of them in Chiang Rai Province, along the borders with Burma and Laos. They moved into the Burma-Laos-Thailand border region from Yunnan Province in China after the defeat of the Nationalist Government in 1949. Most are sedentary farmers; many, however, are engaged in trade—much of it illegal, in opium or small arms. Those in the border area have, in effect, served as a buffer against Communist infiltrations from Laos. With the increase in Communist-supported insurgency in the region, the Thai Government has considered using the former Kuomintang (KMT) Army members of the Haw communities in a more active counterinsurgency role. Most Chinese merchants and traders are found in the Thai towns and villages; few of them live in Sayaboury.

Settlement

19. Urban areas are few and small. Generally they function as administrative, military, and/or transportation centers and provide markets for consumer goods not available in the villages (see Figure 4). Phayao and Chiang Rai in Chiang Rai Province have populations of 18,000 and 12,000, respectively; Nan has a population of 14,000; Uttaradit has 9,000 inhabitants.* On the Laos side of the

* Figures from 1960 census, rounded to nearest thousand.

FIGURE 4. Main street of Chiang Khong, in northern Chiang Rai Province. There is considerable movement of people and goods between this town and Houei Sai, across the Mekong River in Laos.

NND 941536 --- 3795

border, Sayaboury and Paklay have estimated populations of only 3,000 and 2,500, respectively.

20. In the lowlands, villages vary from tiny hamlets of a few families to settlements of several hundred people. Village patterns vary—houses may be clustered in the ricefields (see Figure 5) or strung along a dirt road or stream. Hill villages are small and formless, seldom with more than 200 inhabitants (see Figures 6 and 7). They are abandoned for new sites every 10 to 15 years as soils become depleted and crop yields diminish. The Yaos live at elevations of 2,000 to 3,000 feet; the Meos inhabit the slopes above them, up to 5,000 feet or so.

21. For several years the Laotian Government, with the support of USAID, has operated a refugee relief program for the thousands of hill people displaced by the military and political instability throughout much of the Laotian countryside. Under this program, refugees have been resettled and provided with food, seeds, clothing, and educational and medical services. Some 250,000 refugees—a high percentage of them Meos—received some form of assistance in 1966. Sayaboury Province, because it has been relatively free from PL influence, has resettled many of the refugees.

22. During the past year, resettlement of refugees from hill villages that have been infiltrated by Communist insurgents has become a problem on the Thai side of the border as well. Increasingly, the Thai Government has been evacuating

FIGURE 5. Thai village in valley, Chiang Rai Province. Throughout the region, villages are far more numerous in the valleys than in the hills.

NND 941536 — 3749



FIGURE 6. Typical Meo village in hills of northern Thailand. The corral is used for horses. Croplands are slashed from forest, commonly some distance from the village.



FIGURE 7. Crudely built, windowless Meo house. Flimsy bamboo aqueducts like the one in front of this house carry water down the mountainsides to the villages.

NND 941536 --- 3750

villagers from the border hills of Chiang Rai and Nan Provinces, where insurgency has developed, and has been moving them into resettlement camps. As of April 1968, nearly 2,000 refugees (mostly Meos) jammed the largest of these camps, in a valley near Pua in northern Nan Province. In its early stages resettlement encountered difficulties. Few of the refugees have been satisfied with conditions in the camps, and in June several hundred were reported to be planning to flee into Laos where they hoped they could live free from government interference. Other Meos reportedly fled into Laos after Thai Government reprisals against their villages for pro-Communist activity. Continued Thai Government mismanagement of the hill peoples presumably could produce a flow of such refugees into Sayaboury.

23. Most of the problems with the Thai resettlement program are related to hasty planning and implementation. Poor timing (allowing insufficient time to clear land for planting before the rainy season), inadequately constructed resettlement camps, and overcrowding have been characteristic. Other problems, however, are deep seated and likely to persist. Among these are unfamiliarity of the hill people with lowland agricultural practices, hostility toward their lowland neighbors, and conflicts with these neighbors over land use.

Insurgency

24. The Thai Government, recognizing that the security of the northern frontier region requires the loyalty of the hill people living there, in the past decade or so has undertaken a program to gain that loyalty. The chief vehicle for the implementation of this program has been the Border Patrol Police (BPP), a paramilitary force of some 7,000 men that has carried out civic action projects in the north with US advice and assistance. These projects have included the building of roads and landing strips, the construction and operation of elementary schools and medical facilities, and the provision of limited agricultural assistance. In addition to carrying out such projects, the BPP is responsible for border reconnaissance and security.

25. Insurgency in the northern Thai provinces involves intense ethnic tensions that heretofore have overshadowed BPP attempts to improve Thai-uplander relations. Since early 1967, Communist subversive activity among the hill peoples has eroded much of the civic action work achieved by the BPP and has significantly heightened tension and fear in the area. The hill people are highly independent; usually they are loyal only to the individual village or tribe and prefer to live free from Thai Government controls. They mistrust the Thais and look upon the BPP and Thai Army patrols as intruders. Frequent theft and destruction of property by these patrols have not helped the Government cause. Threats and penalties (including bombing and burning) applied to villages suspected of harboring insurgents have further aggravated Thai-hill people relations. The uplanders feel that laws forbidding the growth of opium and the felling of timber for slash-and-burn cultivation, both of which have been traditional among the hill people, reflect the Thai disdain for their way of life.

NND 941536 --- 3757

26. Communist insurgent leaders have exploited grievances among the Meos by promising to establish a "Meo Kingdom" in which the Meos will be allowed to grow opium and practice slash-and-burn agriculture free from Government interference. In line with these promises the Communists have urged the Meos to take up arms against the Thai "intruders." Several hundred Meos reportedly have been recruited during the past several years and have been taken either to PL-controlled areas of Laos or to North Vietnam for training in subversion. In northwestern Sayaboury the PL have had some success in recruiting Meos to fight against the Royal Laotian Government, largely because Government forces have been unable to provide adequate protection for the Meos against PL hostilities.

27. Ethnic groups other than the Meo are not deeply involved in insurgent activities on either side of the border, although their villages may be used as involuntary shelters or way stations for passing insurgents. Unlike the hill tribes in Laos, whose leaders fit into the governing hierarchy, the Meos in Thailand have little effective voice in the Central Government. In Sayaboury, Meos occupy all of the national administrative posts in their own villages and share with the Laos the higher provincial posts. Moreover, strong Meo leaders in Laos, such as Vang Pao, have effectively organized the Meos into fighting forces, and Meo village defense units have become important adjuncts to the Government military forces. There are no such leaders in the Thai provinces. Little cross-border unity exists among Meo villages; the traditional leaders in Laos have no known authority over Meos living in Thailand.

ECONOMY

28. Nearly the entire population of the region is engaged in agriculture. Sedentary cultivation of wetland rice predominates in the lowlands, semimigratory slash-and-burn cultivation of rice or corn in the hills. Although the region is normally self-sufficient in food, rice has been imported into Sayaboury Province in recent years to feed the thousands of Meo refugees who have been resettled there from other parts of northern Laos. Rice has also been provided for the refugees who have more recently been forced out of the Thai hills by insurgent activity.

29. The only noteworthy occupations other than subsistence farming are opium cultivation and lumbering. Such cash crops as cotton, kapok, and tobacco are grown, but they are not significant money earners.

30. Opium is the primary cash crop for hill farmers on both sides of the border (see Figures 8 and 9). Only a small portion is consumed locally. The value of opium illegally exported from Laos is estimated at some 2 million US dollars, or about twice the value of all legal exports. Opium annually earns the average hill farmer up to 200 US dollars with which to buy rice to supplement his own crop (the average Meo family produces only about half its annual rice needs)

NND 941536 --- 3752

FIGURE 8. Opium poppyfield in northern Thailand. The poppies are usually planted in August and harvested in February or March.

as well as to buy necessary consumer goods. The farmer typically sells his opium to a Chinese trader in the nearest valley town who, in turn, smuggles it on to Bangkok or to Vientiane. Government officials commonly "muscle in" on the operation somewhere along the line.

31. The region has some of the best stands of teak left in Southeast Asia (see Figure 10). Teak grows in mixed deciduous forests up to about 2,500 feet elevation. In the Thai provinces the stands have been greatly depleted by overcutting and conservation measures have had to be implemented, but in Sayaboury logging has been less intensive and overcutting has not been a serious problem. The most extensive stands in Sayaboury are in the south, near Paklay. Elephants are widely used in the extraction of teak logs. In the Thai provinces they haul the logs to a road for truck transportation (see Figure 11) or to a stream where they are floated singly to a point below which the current is slow enough for the logs to be lashed together and rafted downriver to Bangkok. Two or 3 years may elapse between the cutting of the log and its arrival at the Bangkok markets. In Sayaboury the teak is shipped via elephant or truck southward from Paklay to Kene Thao, thence across the Nam Huang into Thailand and via truck to the railhead at Khon Kaen.

32. Much of Sayaboury has closer economic ties with Thailand than with the rest of Laos. The northwestern and southern parts use the Thai baht as frequently as—or perhaps more than—the Lao kip as monetary exchange. Consumer goods for much of the province move up the Mekong from Vientiane or from the Thai river town of Chiang Khan; in the northwestern section, however, they may move downriver from Houei Sai. Some goods are flown in from Vientiane.

NND 941536 --- 3753

FIGURE 9. Meo girl collecting raw opium. Each pod has been incised with a special three-bladed tool, leaving a series of cuts from which oozes the plant fluid. Government attempts to prohibit the cultivation of poppies by hill tribes have generally been ineffective.

TRANSPORTATION

33. The only railroad in the region is a short section of the Bangkok-Chiang Mai line, which passes through Uttaradit in the southwestern corner of the study area. The road net is sparse. Mountainous tracts may be without roads, and valleys may be traversed only by narrow roads untrafficable in rainy weather. Major waterways such as the Mekong and the Mae Nam Nan are important for moving people and goods between lowland settlements, but most mountain

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

FIGURE 10. Young teak plantation in northern Thailand. Because of overcutting, timber operations have had to be controlled in recent years.

streams are unnavigable by any type of craft. A number of crude landing strips capable of handling short takeoff and landing (STOL) aircraft have been constructed throughout the region. In Sayaboury, many resettled Meo villages depend on such strips—along with cleared areas for drop zones—for much of their food supply.

Roads

(See Figures 12 through 16)

34. The densely forested, mountainous terrain in most of the region precludes the development of an adequate road network. Roads—most of which are narrow, unsurfaced, and motorable only under favorable climatic conditions—serve the lowland towns and villages but rarely extend into the mountains, where footpaths and horse trails prevail.

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

FIGURE 11. Elephant dragging teak log to road where it will be hauled to sawmill by truck. Rivers are also used to get the teak to market.



FIGURE 12. Road through town of Sayaboury. This road extends southward for 110 miles to Kene Thao. Because of lack of maintenance much of it may be unusable, even by jeeps, at all times of the year. 1960

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FIGURE 13. Dry-season view of road between Nan and Pua in Nan Province. During much of the wet season, sections of this road become extremely muddy and are impassable to wheeled vehicles. Tobacco grows on either side of the road. January 1963

35. In Sayaboury the road system is particularly underdeveloped. The few existing roads are not integrated with one another or with roads in other parts of the country, and vast tracts are roadless. There is no direct road connection with Vientiane. The Sayaboury road system was more extensive during the French colonial administration, but much of it has since been "swallowed up" by encroaching vegetation. Most of the currently motorable roads have been constructed or improved through a program of the US Bureau of Public Roads operating under the administration of USAID. Of the former French road that extended for 110 miles between Sayaboury and Kene Thao, only the 19-mile segment between Sayaboury and Muong Phieng and the 37-mile segment between Paklay and Kene Thao are currently maintained. Even these are unsurfaced and unusable during much of the rainy season. Other sections may be jeepable during dry weather. The 17-mile road that connects Sayaboury with the Mekong River port of Tha Deua is usable for most of the year. A ferry crosses the river at Tha Deua and connects with a road to Luang Prabang. Another road, completed in 1968, extends for 14 miles between Hongsa in the north and the Mekong port of Ban Tha Soeng.

36. In the Thailand portion of the border region, roads are somewhat better integrated than in Sayaboury; major valleys are served by adequate all-weather roads. Chief among these is the road from Bangkok, which extends through Chiang Rai Province to the border town of Mae Sai, thence northward into the Shan States of Burma. Another all-weather road extends southwestward from Nan into the neighboring province of Phrae and thence southward to connect with the east-west road between Tak and Lom Sak. A fair-weather road con-

NND 941536 --- 3757



FIGURE 14. Ford and footbridge across Mae Nam Nan on Nan-Pua road during dry season. Deep water and strong currents probably would preclude the use of this ford during most of the wet season. January 1963

tinues northward from Nan along the Mae Nam Nan to a point north of Pua. An 85-mile laterite road goes from Chiang Rai, via Thoeng, to the Mekong River town of Chiang Khong. Some sections may be unusable for brief periods during the rainy season. A number of other unsurfaced roads—many of them built in recent years as part of a US-Thai security program—extend through the valleys of the region.

37. The movement and logistic support of a conventional military force would be severely hampered throughout the region by the sparse, primitive system of narrow, unsurfaced roads with limited capacity to sustain heavy military traffic. Bottlenecks include narrow and low-capacity bridges, sharp curves, steep grades, fords, and ferry crossings with primitive facilities. Vehicles crossing the Mekong between Chiang Khong and Houei Sai, for example, are ferried on a raft supported by two pirogues. All but the few surfaced roads are impassable during much of the rainy season, when they become extremely muddy, bridges wash out, fords flood, ferry landing slips submerge, and roads in mountainous terrain become blocked by landslides, rockfalls, or fallen trees. Off-road dispersal and cross-country movement of vehicles are precluded the year around

NND 941536 --- 3 of 5

FIGURE 15. Laterite road, built with US aid, between Chiang Rai and Mekong River town of Chiang Khong. March 1967

FIGURE 16. Makeshift vehicular ferry constructed from two native pirogues. Ferries like this are typical on the upper Mekong and its major tributaries.

NND 941536 --- 3759

in most areas by steep slopes and dense forest. Cross-country movement by foot troops would be arduous to those not accustomed to travel in mountainous terrain. Difficulty in cross-country movement for both vehicular and foot traffic is compounded during wet weather.

Waterways

38. Rivers are important arteries for the movement of people and goods in the larger valleys. High-powered, maneuverable, shallow-draft launches and long, narrow pirogues ply the Mekong and the Mae Nam Nan as well as the lower parts of their principal tributaries. The Mekong has heavy traffic despite its numerous rapids, gorges, abrupt turns, and other navigational hazards (see Figure 17). It is the principal supply route to the towns of Sayaboury Province. Because of the swift currents and dangerous rapids, steamers cannot operate on the Mekong above Vientiane. Launches, however, can move upriver as far as Luang Prabang during high water (July through November). They are unable to navigate through the more difficult sections during much of the low-water period (December through June),* so through traffic virtually ceases at this time. Local traffic continues, as launches with engines at full speed are pulled through the rapids by men using ropes and cables. Rapids are more numerous between Luang Prabang and the Burma border, and craft are limited to narrow pirogues powered by outboard motors.

39. During high water, motorized cargo-passenger vessels and large river barges towed by tugs can navigate up the Mae Nam Nan as far as Uttaradit, occasionally as far as Tha Pla. Above Tha Pla, vessels are limited to shallow-draft pirogues powered by outboard motors.

Airways

40. Because of the inadequacy of surface transportation systems, air transportation is of major importance in the logistic support of counterinsurgency operations. Facilities within the region, however, are limited. Only one airfield—Chiang Rai—has a hard-surface runway and can handle year-round traffic. Runway length of the Chiang Rai field is 4,980 feet, greatest in the region. Airfields with earth or laterite runways, which may be closed for periods during the rainy season, are located at Uttaradit, Sayaboury, Paklay, and Kene Thao. In addition, a number of unimproved earthen or grass landing strips—many in remote mountainous tracts—can accommodate STOL craft such as the Pilatus Porter or Heliocourier (see Figure 18).

41. Chiang Rai, Uttaradit, and Sayaboury are served by scheduled commercial flights. Weather permitting, Royal Air Laos (RAL) runs three DC-3 flights weekly between Vientiane and Luang Prabang via Sayaboury. Thai Airways has daily flights between Chiang Rai and Bangkok and three flights a week connecting Uttaradit with Chiang Rai and Bangkok. Thai Airways flies DC-3s and Hawker Siddeley 748s.

* High- and low-water periods of the Mekong start 1 to 2 months after those in its tributaries.

NND 941536 --- 3760

FIGURE 17. Small native crafts navigating rapids on Mekong River near Paklay. The numerous exposed rocks prevent launches from navigating this section during most of the low-water period.

FIGURE 18. Landing strip for STOL aircraft in northern Nan Province. Numerous earthen landing strips such as this have been carved into the hillsides of the region. 1963-64

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

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

Shipping to Cambodia in the Third Quarter of 1968

Secret

ER IM 68-158
December 1968

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Page 1 of 11

Foreword

This memorandum analyzes the pattern of foreign shipping to Cambodian ports to help in determining whether arms or military-related goods are reaching the Viet Cong through Cambodia. It updates CIA/ER IM 68-109, *Shipping to Cambodia in the Second Quarter of 1968*, August 1968, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM, and is the fifth report written on a quarterly basis.

The time lag between the end of each quarter and the date of publications in this series is the result of delays in the receipt of the *Bulletin of the Mixed Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture of Cambodia*, an important source of data on ship arrivals and cargo deliveries.

The data in this memorandum are preliminary and may be modified as additional information becomes available. For the purposes of this memorandum, Yugoslavia is considered to be a country of the Free World. Cargo weights are expressed in metric tons. The term *imports*, as used in this memorandum, refers only to imports by sea. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
December 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Shipping to Cambodia in the Third Quarter of 1968

Summary

There were at least two deliveries of military cargo to Cambodia in the third quarter of 1968. A Soviet ship arrived at Sihanoukville on 31 July with 900 tons of military aid materiel from the Soviet Union, and in September a French ship unloaded tanks and 34 tons of military equipment from Western Europe. A possible military shipment, reportedly 2,000 tons, arrived aboard a Chinese ship in August.

Total shipping activity dropped from the very high level of the second quarter. Ship calls declined from 192 in the second quarter to 139 in the third quarter, and imports dropped from a record 227,800 tons to 134,600 tons, apparently for seasonal reasons. In the third quarter, for the first time in 1968, imports at Phnom Penh exceeded those at Sihanoukville -- by 24,200 tons. Free World ships made 48 fewer calls and discharged less cargo than in the previous quarter. Communist ships, which visit only Sihanoukville, also made fewer calls but unloaded more cargo than in the second quarter. More than 90 percent, or 126,900 tons, of imports came from Free World countries; the remaining 7,700 tons, more than one-half of it unidentified, came from Communist China and the Soviet Union.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and information on ship arrivals was coordinated with the Naval Intelligence Command.

Ship Arrivals and Imports by Sea

1. Ship calls at Cambodian ports dropped sharply from 192 in the second quarter of 1968 to 139 in the third quarter. Most of the decline was in Free World ships, which made 48 fewer calls. Fifty-seven percent of total calls were at Phnom Penh and 43 percent were at Sihanoukville. Imports through Cambodian ports decreased from the record high of 227,800 tons in the second quarter to 134,600 tons in the third. This drop appears to be largely seasonal as imports have fallen to about 130,000 tons in the third quarter for three consecutive years. Imports of cement, petroleum, and coal all declined.

Shipping to Sihanoukville

Ship Traffic

2. Ship calls at Sihanoukville decreased from 101 in the second quarter to 60 in the third quarter. Free World ships -- mostly French, Panamanian, Greek, Japanese, and Liberian -- made 54 of the 60 calls (see Tables 1 and 2). Eight of these calls were by ships under charter to Communist China. There were six calls by Communist ships: three Chinese, two Soviet, and one Polish. Two Communist ships -- one Soviet and one Chinese -- arrived in ballast to load lumber and rice for North Vietnam and China. The other Chinese ships discharged foodstuffs, unidentified cargo, and a possible consignment of ammunition. The second Soviet ship delivered military cargo, and the Polish cargo liner unloaded cement.

Imports

3. Seaborne imports to Sihanoukville fell from 128,500 tons in the second quarter to 55,200 tons in the third quarter, the lowest level of imports since the third quarter of 1967. The absence of asphalt, coal, and petroleum imports accounted for most of the decrease. The petroleum deliveries in the first two quarters were mostly diversions occasioned by closure of the Mekong River. Crude oil imports to Sihanoukville are anticipated in the fourth quarter after the new refinery near the port is opened.

4. The composition of imports to Sihanoukville during the first three quarters of 1968 and the

third quarter of 1967 is shown in the following tabulation:

	Thousand Metric Tons			
	1968			1967
	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	3rd Qtr
Military	0.3	Negl.	0.9	--
Cement	48.1	32.1	15.9	20.2
Chemicals and explosives	1.1	3.5	0.7	1.4
Foodstuffs	5.4	7.5	6.2	2.6
Metal products	10.4	2.4	10.2	0.5
Jute	4.3	--	--	--
Coal	13.2	14.0	--	--
Asphalt and pyrites	--	3.4	--	--
Other general cargoes	3.7	8.0	9.1	4.4
Unidentified	31.5	39.9	12.2 a/	11.0
Petroleum	38.3	17.6	--	--
Total	*156.4*	*128.5*	*55.2*	*40.1*

a. Includes possible military cargo delivered by the Fo-Shan *and an unknown tonnage of tanks delivered by the* Nausica.

5. Only 7,700 tons of cargo -- 14 percent of total imports to Sihanoukville -- arrived directly from Communist ports during the third quarter, compared with 28,000 tons in the first quarter and 32,400 tons in the second. The largest portion, 6,800 tons, came from Communist China, and the remaining 900 tons came from the USSR. Imports from China included medicines, foodstuffs, chemicals, and metal products; imports from the USSR consisted almost entirely of military cargo. Sixty tons of additional cargo of Soviet origin -- mostly chemicals, metals, and general cargoes -- were delivered to Sihanoukville after transshipment at Singapore.

6. Imports from Free World countries dropped from 96,100 tons in the second quarter to 47,500 tons in the third quarter, less than one-half the average for the first two quarters in 1968. Approximately 80 percent (37,000 tons) of these cargoes were

loaded in Asian countries, and the remainder (10,500 tons) came from Western European countries (see Table 3). Deliveries from the Free World included foodstuffs, chemicals, and cement from Singapore, India, Western Europe, and Thailand; and metals and other general cargo from Japan, India, South Vietnam, Western Europe, and Singapore.

Military and Military-Related Cargoes

7. At least two military shipments -- one from the USSR and the other from Western Europe -- arrived in Sihanoukville during the third quarter. The Soviet ship *Svoboda* arrived on 31 July and unloaded 900 tons of military equipment, the initial installment under the new agreement signed with the USSR in February 1968.* The cargo, variously reported to include MIG aircraft, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and ammunition, was transported to the Pochentang military airbase at Phnom Penh and to the Longvek supply depot. In September, the French ship *Nausica* delivered civilian goods, an unknown quantity of tanks, and 34 tons of tank tracks from Western Europe. The Chinese ship *Fo Shan* reportedly delivered 2,000 tons of military cargo from China in August. Although it is possible that some ammunition or small arms were discharged, the evidence is tenuous and the actual amount is unlikely to have approached 2,000 tons. Small quantities of military-related goods -- medicines and dry cell batteries -- were delivered to Sihanoukville in the third quarter.

Unidentified Cargoes

8. Seventy percent of the 12,200 tons of unidentified cargoes discharged at Sihanoukville came from Communist China (4,460 tons) and other Asian countries (4,080 tons). The remainder was loaded at Western European ports (3,370 tons) and Yugoslavia (250 tons). Some of the commodities -- mostly metals and automotive parts -- have been identified, but their quantities are not known.

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* *The second delivery under this new aid agreement arrived on the Soviet ship* Partizanskaya Slava *on 11 October. The shipment consisted of 217 cases (12 tons) of unidentified military equipment.*

Shipping to Phnom Penh

Ship Traffic

9. Ship calls at Phnom Penh declined from 91 in the second quarter to 79 in the third quarter. Forty-nine calls were made by tankers and 30 calls by dry cargo ships. Ships of six Free World countries called during the quarter, but Panamanian and Japanese ships predominated, accounting for almost two-thirds of the arrivals (see Table 2).

Imports

10. Imports to Phnom Penh dropped in the third quarter to 79,400 tons but were well above first quarter levels (see Table 1). As shown in the following tabulation, imports of petroleum accounted for most of the decline in total imports:

Thousand Metric Tons

	1968			1967
	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	3rd Qtr
Petroleum	26.5	73.4	56.4	59.4
Metal products	4.3	3.9	1.1	5.3
Foodstuffs	--	Negl.	2.3	0.4
Asphalt and pyrites	2.6	--	0.6	--
Chemicals and explosives	Negl.	1.0	0.4	1.3
Cement	6.3	0.3	5.5	4.8
Other general cargo	0.9	3.0	1.6	2.2
Unidentified	5.7	17.7	11.3	17.1
Asbestos	--	--	0.1	--
Total	*46.4*	*99.3*	*79.4*	*90.4*

11. Deliveries of petroleum, which made up 71 percent of total imports to Phnom Penh, fell from the abnormally high level of 73,400 tons in the second quarter to 56,400 tons in the third quarter. Japanese, French, Cambodian, and Panamanian tankers delivered most of the petroleum from Shell storage facilities near Saigon and from the Esso storage facility on the Indonesian island of Bintan. Dry cargo ships delivered more than 2,000 tons of petroleum in drums.

12. Imports of dry cargoes through Phnom Penh (23,000 tons) were slightly below those in the second quarter of 1968 (25,900 tons). All of them were carried by Panamanian, Singapore, Japanese, and Somali ships. More than two-thirds (16,200 tons) of these cargoes came from Singapore and Japan; the remainder (6,800 tons) came from Hong Kong.

13. Fourteen percent (11,300 tons) of the cargo discharged at Phnom Penh was unidentified. All of it came from Southeast Asia.

Table 1

Cambodia: Merchant Ship Arrivals and Cargo Discharged, by Port a/
First, Second, and Third Quarter 1968

	Ship Arrivals		
	First Quarter	Second Quarter	Third Quarter
Sihanoukville	112	101	60
Phnom Penh	37	91	79
Total	*149*	*192*	*139*
	Cargo Discharged (Thousand Metric Tons)		
Sihanoukville	156.4	128.5	55.2
Phnom Penh b/	46.4	99.3	79.4
Total	*202.7*	*227.8*	*134.6*

a. Including only arrivals of seagoing ships from foreign ports; excluding arrivals from Cambodian ports.
b. Including a small volume of cargo in transit for Laos and petroleum deliveries upriver to the Cambodian ports of Kompong Cham and Tonle Bet.

Table 2

Cambodia: Merchant Ship Arrivals and Cargo Discharged at Sihanoukville and Phnom Penh, by Flag a/
Third Quarter of 1968

Flag	Arrivals			Cargo Discharged (Metric Tons)		
	Sihanouk-ville	Phnom Penh	Total	Sihanouk-ville	Phnom Penh b/	Total
Communist	6		6	4,730		4,730
Communist China	3		3	3,750		3,750
Poland	1		1	80		80
USSR	2		2	900		900
Free World	54	79	133	50,490	79,390	129,880
Cambodia		7	7		4,160	4,160
Denmark	1		1			
France	21	12	33	11,010	17,880	28,890
Greece	6		6	2,560		2,560
Japan	5	22	27	4,330	26,710	31,040
Liberia	4		4	4,500		4,500
Norway	2		2	1,420		1,420
Panama	7	27	34	24,300	25,550	49,850
Singapore	1	6	7	240	2,760	3,000
Somalia	2	5	7	1,870	2,340	4,210
United Kingdom	3		3			
Yugoslavia	2		2	260		260
Total	*60*	*79*	*139*	*55,220*	*79,390*	*134,610*

a. Including only arrivals of seagoing ships from foreign ports; excluding arrivals from Cambodian ports.
b. Including a small volume of cargo in transit for Laos and petroleum deliveries upriver to the Cambodian ports of Kompong Cham and Tonle Bet.

Table 3

Cambodia: Cargo Discharged at Sihanoukville and Phnom Penh by Country of Loading a/ Third Quarter 1968

Metric Tons

Country of Loading	Port of Discharge		
	Sihanoukville	Phnom Penh b/	Total
Communist	7,700		7,700
Communist China	6,800		6,800
USSR	900		900
Free World	47,510	79,390	126,900
Belgium	430		430
France	1,540		1,540
West Germany	100		100
Hong Kong		6,820	6,820
India	18,180		18,180
Indonesia		15,100	15,100
Japan	4,330	9,600	13,930
Netherlands	20		20
Singapore	10,070	8,720	18,790
South Vietnam	1,550	39,150	40,700
Thailand	2,310		2,310
Yugoslavia	260		260
Unidentified Europe	8,110		8,110
Unidentified	600		600
Total	*55,220*	*79,390*	*134,610*

a. In most cases the country of loading is the same as the country of origin, but in some cases it is the country at which the cargo was off-loaded for transshipment.
b. Including a small volume of cargo in transit for Laos and petroleum deliveries upriver to the Cambodian ports of Kompong Cham and Tonle Bet.

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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 96-109
Document # 4a

4a

2 December 1968

SUBJECT: Possible ChiCom Adventure

Following points may be related:

a. Soviet area coordination/communication center in Phnom Penh is loaded with middle level agents who express worry that China is going to expand initiatives in SEA.

b. Increased Burmese and Thai nervousness about ethnic Chinese dissident groups and their encouragement by Peking, and the increased vitriol in anti-Burmese, anti-Thai propaganda.

c. Chinese road building in N Laos.

d. Increasing NVN-PL military activity in North and Central Laos may be coordinated with c. above.

e. Increased NVN attacks in SW Laos may be aimed at opening trans-Mekong Laos to PL-NVN troops supplied thru Cambodia-Mekong routes. This action would put NVN and Chinese on the North, Northeast and Southeast flanks of Thailand.

f. Sihanouk is getting worried about the Chinese and NVN "camels in his tent," looking for an accommodation with the US.

g. Withdrawal of Chinese laborers from NVN makes them available for use elsewhere.

h. The instability of the ChiCom governmental structure is becoming more evident, with the Red Army now providing the principal bond of order and administration in China, heightening its influence.

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SECRET

i. ChiCom reinforcement of the Northeast Frontier Provinces of India, and Indian reinforcements there in the last two months.

Except in Tibet, which has been quiet for some months now, the ChiComs are stirring. A cross-border military adventure now from interior lines, would find India, Burma, Thailand and Laos unable effectively to respond. It would divert internal ChiCom pressures to external "threats," would let the Red Army have a good "exercise" and, unless done against S. Korea, the GRC or Soviet Mongolia, would be unlikely to draw more than protests and alerts in response. The US is in no mood for broader involvement in Asia, and only to defend US forces in Thailand against overt attacks would broader involvement in SEA gain sure public support in the US.

Accordingly, the current NE Monsoon season looks like a good time for a ChiCom cross-border excursion into SEA, particularly in NE Burma and NW Laos. Although their progress in SEA insurgency is going along well enough, and there is no apparent reason for such an excursion, the probability is, in my view, nonetheless considerable.

[redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

[redacted]

NR

[redacted]

Insurgent Activity Gains in North-Central Thailand

The recent upsurge of Communist activity in the north-central area is a fresh reminder of the difficulties the Thai Government faces in bringing insurgency under control.

Security has deteriorated rapidly in the Phitsanulok-Phetchabun-Loei border region, where only three months ago there was no overt insurrection. Guerrillas successfully attacked a government hill-tribe training center in late November and since then have almost continuously harassed police and military units. For almost two weeks, the guerrillas have been beating back efforts to evacuate provincial police platoons surrounded in two tribal villages. At least one helicopter has been shot down as it tried to resupply the beleaguered men.

[redacted]

NND 941536 ---

[redacted]

It is not clear how many insurgents are involved in the north-central offensive, or whether they have been augmented with elements from Laos. The tenacity, skill, and planning that the insurgents have demonstrated, however, make this their best effort since the Thai insurgency began four years ago and suggest that veterans are leading the insurrection.

The guerrillas are disrupting the government's embryonic village security programs, and the already tenuous hold of the government on the allegiance of the tribal people has been further weakened. Government reaction thus far has been limited to sporadic air strikes and piecemeal reinforcements. A new joint command headquarters has been set up in the area, however, in an effort to improve coordination among the various security elements operating there.

The reverses the government has suffered in the north-central region over the past month have had a strong psychological effect that may be prolonged. Rumors among the Thai population in the area about other impending guerrilla attacks reveal a sense of insecurity and foreboding that the Communists have failed to generate elsewhere in Thailand. Strong racial feeling has also been whipped up by the fact that the insurgents are largely Meo tribesmen.

The difficulties the Communists have been encountering in the northeast, where insurgent activity is still at a low level, may be one reason that Communist efforts in the north and north-central areas have increased. Although the Communists probably believe that the future of the insurgency will not be decided among the tribal people, they may calculate that dramatic progress in the tribal areas will provide a needed sense of momentum for their over-all effort. [redacted]

* * *

[redacted]

NND 941536 ---32

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
JANUARY 1969

I. GENERAL

1. The new year started off rather badly with an increased accident rate and decreased flying time. The overall activity is effected by the flight time level which has decreased to 8,923 hours. The month of February is expected to be considerably lower.

2. The decrease in USAID flying is believed due to the uncertain future resulting from the fact new policy lines have not been laid down, and many bureaucrats wonder if their jobs will survive an expected reorganization.

3. Both customers have indicated the flying will be further reduced to the minimum order quantity which will establish a flying level around 600 hours per month.

4. With the approaching of "TET" there are increase tensions resulting from continued exposure to the fact the VC can, and do move equipment around Vietnam. The increase in terrorist activities in town and other factors connected with living in Saigon does have an effect on the intangible factor called "Morale".

II. FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT

1. Facilities Development continues at a slow pace due to the customer budget. The surfacing of the West Ramp is progressing on schedule. All other projects are minor, and are being cleaned up as rapidly as possible.

2. The Operations and Administration building have been turned down by the VN-41 customer pending negotiation of the follow-on contract.

III. FLYING

January proved to be a most tragic month - safety wise. We suffered four major accidents with one aircraft completely destroyed, twelve fatalities and three injured. This is not impressive, we are taking a good hard look at our policies and procedures to preclude recurrence.

2. Flight time is most variable and unpredictable throughout. With the input of four more Volpars the dropping from contract of more airplanes we now have 23 spare aircraft on station. It would seem that with so many aircraft off contract there should be a marked reduction in time. The lowest group for the month were the C-46's. Forecasting of program flying time, and planning for manpower requirements is getting to be a ticklish proposition.

The local situation is very quiet. The biggest threat to life and property is the vehicular traffic. Here we have been fortunate, no traffic accidents reported.

3. The Flying Department has operated a full month in new quarters. Though it seems as if there was no great increase in space, it is much quieter and much less pedestrian traffic in the offices. Overall it is an improvement.

4. The Beechcraft Program turned out good the month of January Projected time for the month was 1677 hours. Actual time for the month was 1688.07.

At the present time we have 9 aircraft on contract. 7 on VN-41, 1 on 4395 and 1 on 0005. During the month, spare aircraft was used on many occasions. During the month of January Beech pilots spent 245 days at outstations and average of 11.1 days per pilot.

5. The morale for the most part is very good. Customer relationship between the pilots has been complementary in all instances.

Beechcraft flight time will drop to contract hours or below in Feb. due to a short month and unforeseen activities during TET.

6. The C-46 fell 128 hours short of the projected flight time for January. Average time for captains was 72 hours, three captains were under 70 hours for the month. With only four aircrafts on contract the program should stay about the same for the next month. One interim check was given and a confirming check by MFSD was accomplished later in the month. If the time for the program doesn't pick up there will be little, if any, overtime for the pilots assigned.

7. The C-47 program finished up 255 hours less than forecast. All captains except two involved in accidents were on overtime. Average flight time was 90 hours. Next month should be a bit less as the VN-41 customer has dropped two aircrafts from contract. There were two accidents during the month 6147 struck a bundle of PSP at V260 and sheared the right main gear. 949 crashed north of Danang in bad weather killing all aboard.

8. Actual PC6C fleet time of 1714 hours for January was down 300 hours from forecast time. This appeared to be primarily due to a lack of requirements by the customer rather than aircraft availability.

There were (29) pilots assigned during the month with the average pilot time being 74 hours. One pilot resigned during January and February manning level will thusly be (28) pilots. This in conjunction with an anticipated pick up in customer usage should raise the average pilot time to 90-85 hours.

9. The customer (4395) again raised the issue of airdrops in the I and II Corps area. Our capability was made known to him and only the requirement for and scheduling of, remains.

Pilots have all received copies of, and briefings on, actual aircraft ACL's and the techniques of reduced fuel loads in order to increase payloads. This should be advantageous to all concerned.

10. Pilot confidence is somewhat at a low ebb due to the occurence of two engine failures in one month. Morale remains high but would be even better could the actual cause of these engine failures be determined. It is difficult to "sell" the program and induce confidence in the customer and passengers when all concerned are aware of the two mishaps.

Several occurences, including the recent visit of Flight Standards Examiners, seems to confirm a high level of training on the aircraft and procedures, and it is felt that during this year we will be able to continue to improve.

The year 1968 was a good year for the 204B program in Saigon. The total time was 16,565 hours, or an average of 60 hours a month over maximum contract time. The average flying time per aircraft was 180 hours a month. This in itself is a real tribute to the maintenance department. Average time per pilot was 892 hours for the year, which of course, made them happy. So now that 1968 is behind us we can start working to make 1969 an improvement.

11. January has not gotten the year off to a good start. Time for the program in January is about 1300. The loss of time is due mainly to the cutback by both customers. It appears they have a crash program on to reduce the cost of operation.

12. The AMF/MFSD/RW spent a week in Saigon this month. He was kept quite busy with 13 proficiency checks and 2 initial captain proficiency checks. Three route checks and one SIC check were given during the month. Ground school was held on the 10th and 11th with seven pilots attending. This brings the program up-to-date.

One first officer was transferred to Saigon from Udorn this month. He has been SIC qualified and is flying on the line. Two first officers were upgraded to captain and are now receiving their 25 hours of supervised line training. The two remaining F/Os are progressing normally and should start training for their captain's check ride in the very near future.

January's pilots meeting was held on the 15th with 15 pilots attending. The rest of the pilots were briefed throughout the month.

The morale of the pilots is very good. For the most part all the pilots have been kept busy. Busy people are happy people.

IV. OPERATIONS

1. January flight time was 428 hours less than the forecasted figure. More emphasis will be placed on customer minimums when compiling future flight time forecasts in expectation of forecasting a more accurate report. We predict revenue hours will be in the vicinity of 8,000 a month from March thru June. Volpar flight time will increase while Beech time will decrease proportionally.

To relieve our OM shortage FIC is sharing the night duty for one half of each month. This system will release CM [redacted] to work office hours 8 days/month.

. The completion of the new FIC office has been delayed so it will robably be the middle of March before FOD can expand to what is resently FIC.

hree FOD personnel will be trained as Ramp Coordinators in February. his should reduce the number of delays as the OM can switch the ircraft or change the schedule if he knows, in advance, of a problem.

		Dec	Jan
tatistics:	Passengers carried Vietnam	43256	45070
	Aircraft arrivals SGN	1142	1079
	Aircraft departures SGN	1129	1080
	Cargo carried Vietnam	5,011,947	5,198,778

: (a) Flight time report (See Attach. A)

: (b) Accidents & Incidents (See Attach. B)

: (c) Flight Time Information (See Attach. C)

: (d) Flight Frequency (See Attach. D)

3. Communications. COMENG visited Danang and Nha Trang during the month in connection with the Motorola remote systems installation at both stations.

The 620 Tac Con Sq. [redacted] have no objection to our co-locating our equipment within their facilities and have indicated this in a formal letter to Hqs Seventh Air Force. The Seventh Air Force in turn has assigned us rack no. 21 for our equipment and pole no. 7 for our antennas. In a letter to CINCPACAF (DEPPN) they recommended approval of their action and requested CINCPACAF to effect appropriate co-location agreements with Air America. However, they stated in part that although "CED 1722.2 outlines the provisions for an agreement when other government agencies are involved but... no guidelines for civilian agencies..."

4. In light of the above we prepared a letter for BM-SGN addressed to Hqs Seventh Air Force and CINCPACAF, among others, citing a letter from the Judge Advocate's office, Clark AFB to SZ-CIA which rendered the opinion" ...Air America constitutes an agency of the Government for the purpose of ...contract". Further, we pointed out that Air America operates in Viet Nam as a contractor exclusively and solely to agencies to the U.S. Government. It is hoped this will enable them to reach a favorable decision more rapidly.

5. The installation at Nha Trang was completed during the latter part of December. However, it has experienced some difficulties of a minor nature. But minor troubles in Nha Trang tend to become major ones due to the problems involved trying to reach Hon Tre Island. If a chopper is not available the Motorola technicians must take a ferry across to the island and thence a jeep to the top of the mountain - and all this is very time consuming. SZ-NHA has promised to aid as much as possible. Personnel of Det. 11, 619 Tac Con Sq. at Hon Tre and their parent organization at Tan Son Nhut have been most cooperative

6. Letters were written to MACV J6 and Posts and Telecommunications via both customers seeking allocation of HF frequencies to Air America as sole user. To date no response has been received but we are hopeful of a favorable decision from both agencies.

7. We have contacted Motorola concerning a lease/maintenance contract for equipment to be used on a ramp control net. We have dicided that Motorola Model PT-300 Series walkie-talkies will fill our requirement. Specifically, the unit is P 33DEN-1100, 5 watt, FM, solid state, 132-174 MHz, with integral charger. We will utilize 147 MHz which has been allocated to us for this purpose. The EK 212s presently in use will be assigned to Nha Trang and Da Nang. The unit sells for $884 but leases for $30.32 per month. The integral charger costs $176 and leases for $6.40. Thus twelve such units could be installed, leased and maintained for approximately $5,000 per annum. Authority to lease would be based on the same legal opinion handed down by Judge Advocate's office, Clark AFB. In face, the above cited opinion was rendered in a similar contract agreement between Motorola and SZ-CLK. An AR will be submitted shortly for Management's approval.

8. The TR-35 unit installed in Can Tho for communications with RMD, Saigon Base has been only marginal. We are utilizing 5529 KHz but a great deal of fading is experienced. SCM has cable ordered crystals for 9818 KHz and we will try this higher frequency in hopes that it will solve the problem.

A/SZ-DNG has received four TR-20's from VN-41 customer for an intra-city net. Crystals will be ordered shortly.

9. SCM has been given loop resistance readings and other technical data relating to our commercial and military mainlines by Posts and Telecommunications and 1879 Signal Company. This information will be forwarded to Purchasing Agent, TYO via MCRD. This data is required by CKI for the fabrication of our PABX.

10. Statistics :

	Dec	Jan
Incoming	1,560,923	8,870
Outgoing	141,116	12,273

V. TRAFFIC/USAID

1. Statistics:

	Cargo (including AF Caribout A/C)	
	Dec	Jan
Outbound (lbs) SGN	1,560,923	1,307,416
Inbound (lbs) SGN	141,116	91,821

VI. TRAFFIC/AAM

1. Several SOP's have been written regarding the general management procedures of a Base Traffic Section. More are in the offing and upon completion it is the intent to incorporate them into a Base Traffic Management Handbook.

2. In an effort to comply with the 9 hour maximum overtime per week restriction and to reduce even further the CTO program, the Traffic Section will operate from 0630 thru 2100 daily with no around the clock coverage. The building security will now become the responsibility of the security Section during hours 2100-0630 effective 01 February 1969.

3. Some difficulty is being encountered in the control of the time cards. Although it is felt that a considerable cutdown in the number of false entries has been made it is known that some fraud is still going on but efforts are being made to rectify the situation. The BM has agreed to place the time cards and a time clock with the Traffic complex as soon as the new clocks arrive (anticipated April receipt). This should then allow sectional control of the personnel and alleviate this present problem

4. Statistics:

	Dec.	Jan
Passenger departures SGN (All Contracts)	5277	5534
" arrivals " (All contracts)	6181	6439
Outbound cargo	104,632	70,566
Inbound cargo	133,068	151,537

VII. GROUND TRANSPORTATION

During January, 10 microbuses were in commission daily.

Statistics: Aggregate Microbuses Mileage

X-4033	3215 Km
X-4034	3367 Km
X4035	2141 Km
X-0417	3232 Km
X-0418	531 Km
X-0419	3048 Km
X-0420	2861 Km
X-1140	2516 Km
X-1141	3021 Km
X-1142	2883 Km
	24835 Km = Approx. 1521 miles

Total microbuses down-time: 201 hrs.

Total microbuses pas carried: 5821 pax

Isuzu bus mileage:

X-01057	2330 Km
X-01058	2675 Km
X-04329	2834 Km
	7839 Km = Approx. 4899 miles

Total Isuzu bus down-time: 68½ hrs.

Isuzu bus pax carried: Cholon route : 8876 pax

Saigon route : 5296 "

Supply vehicles mileage:

EB-8176	1987 Km
EB-1780	1246 "
EC-7953	166 "
	3399 Km = Approx. 2124 miles

Supply vehicles down-time: 89½ hrs.

3 wheeler mileage: X-04328 33 Km = Approx. 20 miles

3 wheeler lambretta down-time: 21 hrs.

Grand total pax carried: 19975 pax.

VIII. HOSTEL OCCUPANCY

1. During this month, 163 beds (including SRSD's bed for 11 days) were available. Total of beds occupied: 103
Occupancy rate : 63.5%
Non-availability slips issued: 6

IX. PERSONNEL

1. Incoming Personnel: a. US : 8
b. TCN : 7
c. VN : 19

2. a.) Resignation - 1. US : 3
2. TCN : 3
3. VN : 12
(None for mil. service

b.) Separation - 1. US : 3 (2 surplus, 1 fixed term contract)
2. TCN : 1
3. VN : 4

c.) Transfer - TCN : 2

d.) Deceased - 1. US : 2
2. VN : 2

2. The big departure from routine activities was the time spent with DTT and various USAID and Vietnamese government officials discussing the possibilities of establishing an aircraft line maintenance course for Vietnamese citizens at Tainan. All concerned expressed a great deal of enthusiasm over the prospects of such training, and advised that they would assist, to the extent possible, in obtaining passports and visas for the trainees selected (the largest stumbling block to this proposed program).

3. Total number of personnel, by nationality, at Saigon, Nha Trang and Danang (See attachment E).

X. MEDICAL

1. Number of sick call: There were totally 1975 sick calls in the month of Jan.

2. Accident - There were totally 140 accidents, six of them were more serious and one of them was fatal - causing the death of an employee [redacted]. Carpenter [redacted] was transporting 3 pieces of 1/4" x 4' x 8" plywood from the RCAD Supply to the new personnel building under construction on a 4 wheel forney type cart. [redacted] asked [redacted] to sit on the phywood who was returning from the payroll window of Accounting Office. This is the normal way of transporting lumber and plywood. While enroute the two men passed about 126 feet behind Porter A/C N153L which was running up its engine. [redacted] was flipped down to the ground from top of the plywood by the force of air. He was immediately taken to the Base Clinic, and was unconscious. He was then sent to Seventh

Day Adventist Hospital right away. He passed away in the morning of January 22, 1969. Cause of death given by the hospital was "Basilar skull hemorrhage with subarachnoid bleeding"

3. Hospitalized sick call - None
Hospitalized accident - 3
Unhospitalized accident - 137
Outcall - 4
Physical examination: 1 Flt. crew phy. 30
2 Pre-employment phy. 9
2 Accident flt. phys 2
Total: 41
Sanitation: Cafeteria - Satisfactory
Toilet - Fair
Vaccination: 50
Total man days lost by reasons of sickness: 287½ days
Total man days lost by reasons of accident: 85 days

XI. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. The year has started very badly with a very high accident rate. One PC-6C ditched in the ocean, one C-47 crasshed into a mountain, another C-47 hit a bundle of PSP on landing and had the right MLG collapse on touchdown, another PC-6C had engine power loss and crashed. There were a few ground accidents which added to an already costly month.

2. We were honored by visitors from MMB; Director of Shops, Technical Assistant to VPTS, Manager Powerplant Dept and Director Technical Training. Three out of the four men had never previously visited Vietnam, so considerable benefit should be realize at both ends. Some very good suggestions were received from these men and improved support to us was promised. It is always an eye opener to see the daily problems that personnel in the field must resolve, when parts are not available, or parts are received in an unserviceable condition from MMB, observing conflicting manuals/procedure sheet information, and lack of test equipment/facilities. Out beg, borrow or swap activities that result from the N.I.S. status with aircraft parts always amazes people who are accustomed to the MMB Supply and overhaul shops capabilities. A ceiling fan swapped for a 204B stainless steel firewall, three bottles of booze to use the heat/treat furnace at USAF Shops, ten gallons of paint for a new 204B overspeed governor, a bottle of scotch to get a tail rotor hub magnafluxed, four pieces of plywood to repair a T53 fuel control, a case of sirloin steaks for a 205 tail boom etc.. This approach is frowned upon by some but is forced upon us because of a lack of spare parts. In most cases the stock level is adequate but cannot bemaintained by MMB Supply. This is particularly true with 204B parts.

3. Considerable efforts and progress was put into improving our ground handling practices and reducing incidents. All concerned RMD personnel are going through a complete recertification for engine run up, towing and taxiing. This includes written examinations in all phases of new and old qualifications. Every skilled and unskilled man in the RMD Ramp Crew will attend a ground (ramp) safety course. All personnel are being

reviewed for Company driver license needs and qualification.

4. The West Ramp resurfacing project is moving along at a steady pace and we are still hoping the contractor can beat his deadline for completion of 1 April 1969. Being unable to park some ten (10) of the larger aircraft on the West Ramp plus the fact that we have about ten (10) large aircraft on station but not assigned to a contract and four (4) more Volpar Aircraft have been assigned to Saigon does not help us to reduce ground handling accidents/incidents. Verbal and written requests have been made move some of the spare aircraft out of Vietnam. "Ramp Saturation" is a very appropriate term to describe the situation we have at Saigon.

5. RMD/FW dispatched 1,256 flights during the month of January 1969. This is up some from last month. The maintenance delay factor went down again this month. If the tfend keeps going like it is, our delays will soon be down to an acceptable level.

From the total of 1,256 departures, only 23 delays could be attributed to maintenance. This is a fair record and we are striving to improve on it.

We had 18 engine changes for the month of January. Of these 18 engines, only one was a scheduled change. There were 11 Garrett TPE 331 Turbo Prop engines changed and the other 7 were reciprocating engines of one type or another. The reasons for the unscheduled engine changes were varied and no pattern was followed.

Out station recoveries this month were 10.

6. Approximately 1,450 rotary-wing hours were flown during the month with no major problems, but we are finding it rather hard to keep the choppers flying on N.I.S. slips. Also some parts drawn from Supply are not acceptable for various reasons, these are being returned to MAB with an attached memo to DQC explaining the problems. Numerous parts had to be "procured through local source" to prevent extended down time of helicopters. The engines that have been extended to 2,000 hrs are now nearly out of time again, so in the very near future Saigon will be in need of a couple engines. We do not have a spare engine at this time at Saigon.

7. The overall shop activities remained on an even par, with the exception of an increase in overtime in the Sheetmetal Shop, and an accident on 11 January 1969, when C-47 number 147 sustained major damage to the right main landing gear, hitting a stack of PSP and then collapsing.

Depending upon Air Vietnam, Continental Air Service or the U.S. Air Force should be reduced to a minimum. The skill level of our mechanics in the shops is relatively high. The proverbial weak link in the chain of production is lack of tools. Motivating our own personnel into putting forth that extra effort when the pressure is on is not very difficult but depending upon other outfit to meet our schedules in another story.

8. The New Year has got off to a good start in Quality Control. The month of January went by in a very routine manner with the normal types of problems being uncovered.

9. General Maintenance : Renovation of the old GMD Carpentry Shop is nearing completion. The Toilet facilities are presently being installed. The major set back now are the electrical fluorescent fixtures being procured out-of-country. These have been on order since the 23 December 1968. As soon as these light fixtures arrive, AAM Personnel and CAT Ticketing Offices will be moved into the building.

Renovation of the new FIC office, AR No. 8089 is underway and is about 85% complete.

Power cable which was installed in underground conduit since 1965 were pulled out from the transmitter room towards the Traffic Terminal junction box to reinstall a 50 pair communications cable. Other power cables in the conduit, not in use, will be pulled as soon as possible.

A bench grinder was fabricated in the GMD Welding Shop using a spare motor from Supply and will be put into service as soon as painting is completed. The Welding Shop is still overloaded repairing damaged and cracked Tow bars and work stands.

All RGMD Departments were kept busy this month due to many CWRs and urgent projects going on. GMD has fabricated a large steel rack to accommodate pipes, angle iron, G.I. sheets and other assorted steel for various projects. Also being fabricated this month is a Lathe Machine which will be used to turn down brake drums and fabricate motor bushings. This will save considerable time and expense now incurred taking than downtown. A hydraulicly operated fire escape is nearing completion to be installed at the rear of the RMD Shops building. Both Lathe Machine and fire escape were designed by Oscar V. Bernardo SPMD/SGN.

A concrete fundation has been poured for Saigon's new 60 KW emergency power unit. The power unit will be installed on it as soon as the concrete has sufficiently curred.

Utilities:

(a) Base power plants - Nil

(b) City power - Invoice not yet received

(c) Base water consumption:

1. Potable water VN$70,250.00 (for 1-15 January)
2. Commercial water - Bill not yet arrived

10. Facilities Development: The Utilities Tunnel is approximately 63% finished. We are experiencing some difficulties due to the fact that the backhoe being rented broke down. We expect it to be back in operation in the next couple of weeks.

The connecting of pipe outlets and vents are being installed on the 5000 gallon kerosene tank located at the back of the GMD Shops.

ary was the most successful month to date in our Technical Training program. emphasis being placed on [redacted] training, many of our department heads i people for various training and many courses were started. The Helicopter cs Course finished its first group of 10 men; the Vietnamese Ramp Service is in progress; a course for GTD drivers has turned out two classes; the AES quipment Course was completed with 5 AES Mechanics; a Ramp Service and Ground ng Course is being given to all personnel that work on and around the ramp; A Airframe and Powerplant students are on their last course subject and will he FAA written examination in March.

echnical Training department has acquired a section of shop space that now .ts us to OJT students in shop courses. Tools for sheetmetal and general anic training are on order and as soon as received, a sheetmetal course for [redacted] will be started. The DTT visited Saigon; the purpose of his [redacted] was to interest the Vietnamese Government in permitting [redacted] to go to Tainan for advanced training. With our expanded local training, plus nan Aircraft Mechanics Course, Air America will lead in the training [redacted] sonnel within the field of aviation.

. Supply

new POL monthly report in Stock Control will indicate total receipt and daily ssues of mobile gasoline, diesel fuel and kerosene in addition to the monthly eport on mobile jet oil. With the new set up of Bien Hoa and Cantho station, otal 102 line items of parts and equipment have been shipped to Bienhoa; 269 line items of parts and equipment was shipped to Cantho station (Project 55555) as an initial support. The procurement function has experienced about the same work load as that of the last month. To place a more tight control on AR spending, all DDPs and PRs pertaining to approved AR purchases must be processed with a cost estimation from the vendors and have the station Accounting Office certified that the AR fund is available. This will cut down the over spendings on AR purchases. Property & Inventory has completed the cycle inventory of classes OlC and OlE for a total of 998 line items. There were 11 Aircraft AGP cases in contrast to December's 35. Only three hours total revenue time lost was charged during this period. The stores operation remained normal. Undertaken were the ever continous relocation projects;; space again is becoming a problem. Recently, we received a large amount of backlogged cargo from MMB, and proper storage of these parts especially the bulky items is becoming more difficult. The tool Crib had a total of 6098 line items loaned out during this reporting period, of which 6084 line items were returned and left 14 line items outstanding.

The General Maintenance/POL Issue Unit experienced normal operations during this reporting cycle with only a slight increase in its work load. Still to be accomplished within the main storage area is the relocating of the existing lighting equipment. The POL area is nearing completion as the protective fencing for the outside stores is being put into place.. Movment of POL products to new POL area scheduled for 31 January. Shipping and receiving remained normal.

Company Services	Dec	Jan
	374	381
	832	798
Transit	31	27
Overnight	31	27
No. 1 Service	10	7
2 "	1	5
3 "	12	22
4 "		

Line Items

	Dec	Jan
Requisitions	3325	3267
Receipts	2072	2180
Store Issues	6587	6342
Stock Credits	605	485
Posted to Cards	18167	17226

X - SAFETY (See Attachment F)

Original signed by
E. J. THIESEN
AEM—SGN

M. Hulse

ontract VN-41.

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT
JANUARY 1969

A/C No.	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time
N67984	50:35	62:53	18:05	20:34
B910	68:22	85:52	3:20	4:35
B926	70:38	84:35	-	-
B928	97:00	125:22	6:18	6:58
N67985	101:22	126:32	3:13	3:44
B138	70:00	83:16	3:20	4:19
B146	52:50	62:28	22:24	25:14
B154	45:31	57:00	-	-
B829	129:45	157:20	13:30	15:30
6083	145:51	173:01	0:13	0:40
6084	147:26	173:15	-	-
6147	34:39	45:36	-	-
5559	87:40	117:56	6:27	8:01
5949	34:51	41:48	8:00	9:45
5998	131:44	159:28	-	-
B817	132:16	158:42	19:55	21:56
N539Y	69:12	80:26	20:27	22:29
N544Y	49:21	58:16	-	-
N6154U	79:39	96:18	2:35	4:13
N9518Z	96:43	117:18	0:42	1:06
N9956Z	85:34	103:27	6:28	7:37
N3674G	10:14	11:58	-	-
N7695C	5:18	6:23	-	-
N91295	13:49	16:47	-	-
N3728G	3:48	4:46	9:48	11:00
N7770B	-	-	17:18	21:23
N9577Z	8:53	11:00	12:16	15:17
N9664C	21:49	25:43	8:21	9:35
N9838Z	28:52	33:54	6:41	8:01
N77Y	99:03	124:32	-	-
N5269V	111:20	133:43	1:03	1:40
N7950C	112:47	139:45	1:09	1:56
N9521Z	112:26	136:02	2:37	4:13
N9573Z	137:16	167:43	-	-
N21412	84:50	103:59	-	-
N51259	106:56	131:02	-	-
N6622C	38:45	47:45	-	-
N137L	2:31	3:44	-	-
N9592Z	31:47	39:09	7:04	8:41
N9855Z	107:56	124:58	-	-
N9871Z	76:07	89:04	6:59	8:25
N9898Z	104:33	123:05	-	-
N4933C	45:41	57:37	2:31	3:12
N5254V	44:03	53:10	-	-
N9073Z	122:33	144:46	0:38	0:51

	N153L	150:28	175:03	2:52	4:00
	N198X	119:00	141:28	4:45	5:50
	N285L	117:03	132:25	-	-
	N358F	134:40	153:15	4:06	5:00
	N391R	125:52	150:18	-	-
	N394R	70:08	82:50	7:49	9:17
	N9444	122:14	146:47	1:54	2:53
	N152L	35:17	41:42	-	-
	N184L	11:05	13:43	-	-
	N185K	9:17	10:19	-	-
	N192X	11:12	12:50	-	-
	N194X	8:36	11:26	-	-
	N393R	7:16	7:55	-	-
	N748N	11:27	12:52	-	-
	N12450	28:30	31:57	-	-
	N1303X	174:03	174:03	23:10	23:10
	N1304X	141:02	141:02	5:05	5:05
	N1305X	138:13	138:13	10:17	10:17
	N1306X	190:25	190:25	5:45	5:45
	N1307X	164:53	164:53	9:25	9:25
	N8512F	1:55	1:55	-	-
	N8513F	18:10	18:10	-	-
	N8514F	19:47	19:47	-	-
	N8535F	19:05	19:05	-	-
	B839	121:49	142:59	2:28	3:37
	B857	81:21	91:45	1:46	2:17
	B865	98:22	112:31	3:07	3:50
	B867	122:25	137:51	-	-
	B869	104:48	117:55	0:56	1:00
	XWPBS	14:06	16:52	-	-
	XWPBT	7:47	9:22	-	-
	B849	83:48	95:12	5:39	7:55
	B875	102:07	119:48	-	-
	Sub-total	5778:27	6737:58	300:26	350:16
2. Contract 4395.	N539Y	7:53	9:29	-	-
	N544Y	42:43	55:53	0:30	1:00
	N3674G	78:03	92:01	4:59	5:29
	N7695C	69:36	84:16	2:23	2:59
	N91295	44:30	54:23	3:34	4:31
	N6154U	6:13	7:13	-	-
	N9518Z	2:20	2:45	-	-
	N9956Z	2:52	3:26	-	-
	N9577Z	7:45	8:35	-	-
	N9838Z	9:55	11:35	-	-
	N137L	49:21	73:19	1:11	1:38
	N6622C	-	-	12:08	13:55
	N7950C	0:49	1:19	-	-
	N4933C	3:32	4:39	-	-
	N9073Z	1:33	1:45	-	-
	N152L	63:04	71:55	4:11	4:56
	N184L	95:10	111:15	4:11	5:25

	N185K	89:09	99:47	-	-
	N192X	76:25	89:11	5:58	7:02
	N194X	73:36	85:44	2:46	3:29
	N393R	82:47	93:12	-	-
	N12450	43:27	47:52	1:33	2:19
	N198X	12:34	15:31	-	-
	N285L	2:59	3:20	-	-
	N391R	5:14	7:16	-	-
	N394R	67:11	75:18	-	-
	N9444	11:56	14:29	-	-
	N8512F	193:21	193:21	2:00	2:00
	N8513F	59:27	59:27	10:48	10:48
	N8514F	53:41	53:41	9:43	9:43
	N8535F	103:37	103:37	1:45	1:45
	N1304X	3:57	3:57	-	-
	N1305X	3:05	3:05	-	-
	N1306X	4:41	4:41	-	-
	N1307X	0:46	0:46	-	-
	XWPBS	77:10	89:41	3:06	3:43
	XWPBT	60:59	72:19	1:25	2:07
	B839	1:03	1:30	-	-
	B857	21:59	26:06	-	-
	B865	1:30	1:58	-	-
	B867	19:19	22:27	-	-
	B849	24:22	28:02	-	-
	B875	2:39	3:37	-	-
	Sub-total	1582:13	1793:43	72:11	82:49
3. Contract 0005.	N6622C	34:32	40:22	-	-
	N5254V	6:53	8:00	-	-
	N137L	2:40	3:01	-	-
	N77Y	2:50	3:12	-	-
	N391R	1:10	1:19	-	-
	N8535F	2:58	2:58		
	Sub-total	51:03	58:52		

Total Revenue Flight Time	7441 + 43
Total Non-Revenue Flight Time	372 + 37
Total Revenue Block Time	8590 + 32
Total Non-Revenue Block Time	433 + 05
GRAND TOTAL FLIGHT TIME	7784 + 20
GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	9023 + 37

FLIGHT INFORMATION CENTER
SAIGON
MONTHLY ACTIVITY REPORT
1 - 31 JANUARY 1969

PART I
AIRCRAFT INCIDENTS

Date	A/C No, Type & Contract	Place	Description
8 Jan	N1303X 204B VN-41	BS 6040	Acft was flying low due wx. PIC heard one round pass near acft. A high speed turn was executed. No acft damage or personnel injury involved.
10 Jan	N393R PC6C 4395	3 miles E. of V-272	Acft received one hit in the left rear portion of the horizontal stabilizer. Acft was on third trip into V-272 at low level due wx. No personnel injuries involved.
15 Jan	N1304X 204B VN-41	BS 5276 between V-204 and V-23	PIC was flying at 1000' passing over a bend in the river when he noticed personnel poling bamboo rafts on the river. The personnel commenced firing on the acft with moderate intensity. PIC continued on course clearing the area.
17 Jan	N1307X 204B VN-41	YS 1054	Acft was inroute to VO1 when the AHD heard enemy gunfire. No acft damage or personnel injury involved.
22 Jan	15559 C-47 VN-41	SW of V-17 final approach	PIC was letting down through the haze, turning into final for a landing at V-17 when the acft took one hit in the left wingtip. PIC continued the approach and landed safely at V17. No personnel injury involved.
22 Jan	XW-PBT H-395 4395	V-247	On right downwind for rwy 10 at V-247 six rounds of enemy gunfire were directed at the acft. No acft damage or personnel injury involved.
22 Jan	B-817 C-47 VN-41	On ramp at VO3	Danang AB received 15 rounds of rocket fire at 0600L. During pre-flight inspection, PIC found three small in fabric on top side of left airleron which PIC attributes to flying debris caused by nearby rocket impact point.

25 Jan	N9871Z C-45 VN-41	VOI	Acft was in traffic pattern at VOI when PIC observed muzzle flashes of enemy small arms fire presumably directed at his acft. No acft damage or personnel injury involved.	
29 Jan	N1303X 20AB VN-41	An Outpost at YS 7388	Acft was on final approach to an outpost when one round of small arms fire was heard believed to have originated from a treeline in the vicinity of the outpost. No acft damage or personnel injury involved.	

PART II
SITUATION SUMMARY

The enemy continued to move large amounts of supplies and ordnance into South Vietnam. Many large caches were discovered, some near Saigon. Terrorists acts appear to be increasing, the primary targets being Government Officials and facilities. Many of our crews are breaking curfew restriction in the mornings in an effort to meet the schedule imposed by the customer. This practice is becoming increasingly more dangerous with the arming of more teenager by the Government. They have killed or wounded numbers of people who were out during curfew, including a palace guard on his way to work and military personnel. Several times they have opened fire on one of their own units. They will shoot at anything or anyone that moves during curfew.

There has been an increase in Anti-Aircraft fire in I Corps. Airburst have been reported up to 16,000 feet.

There have been a number of UFO's reported in II Corps. They apparently are Choppers, as the speed is usually under 100 M.P.H. The sightings are mostly at night and could be a movement of troops and supplies by the enemy. Indication are that the enemy plan to launch their spring offensive prior to TET. Major targets are reported to be Danang, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, Saigon and Can Tho.

ATTACHMENT " B "

F L I G H T T I M E I N F O R M A T I O N

CONTRACT	FLIGHT TIME	BLOCK TIME	HAZARDOUS TIME	PERCENTAGE OF HAZARDOUS TIME TO FLT TIME	PERCENTAGE OF HAZARDOUS TIME TO BLK TIME	LEGS	PASSENGERS	CARGO	FLT TIME NON-REVENUE	BLK TIME NON-REVENUE
VN-41	5,778 + 27	6,737 + 58	4,596 + 04	79.53%	68.21%	11,263	33,223	3,156,273	300+26	250+16
4395	1,582 + 13	1,793 + 43	1,273 + 16	80.47%	70.98%	3,467	7,858	251,030	72+11	82+49
C0005	51 + 03	58 + 52	33 + 22	65.36%	56.68%	39	89	2,125	-	-
SUB TOTAL:	7,411 + 43	8,590 + 33	5,902 + 42	79.64%	68.71%	14,769	41,170	3,769,428	372+37	333+05
CAL	381 + 38	522 + 44	192 + 12	50.36%	36.76%	392	3,900	1,429,350		
GRAND TOTAL	7,793 + 21	9,113 + 17	6,094 + 54	78.20%	66.87%	15,161	45,070	5,198,778		

ATTACHMENT "C"

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT FREQUENCY

JANUARY 1969

	C-46		C-47		DHC-4		BEECH		PORTER		204-B		VTB		HELIO		TOTAL	
	DEP	ARR	DEP	ARR	DEP	ARR	DEP	ARR	DEP	ARR	DEP	ARR	DEP	ARR	DEP	ARR	DEP	ARR
CONTRACT	78	78	156	154	39	38	295	300	199	198	90	90	124	124	99	97	1080	1079
FERRY	3	3	1	2	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	4	12
TRAINING	7	7	10	10	2	2	5	5	13	13	19	20	6	6	3	3	65	66
MAINTENANCE	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3	4	4	1	1	-	-	1	1	10	9
TEST	1	1	-	-	1	1	8	8	11	11	10	10	10	9	15	15	56	55
OTHER (NON-REV.)	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	4	4
TOTAL	89	89	167	166	43	43	313	318	227	226	120	121	142	146	118	116	1219	1225

ATTACHMENT "D"

S A I G O N B A S E

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted]												TOTAL	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	66	186	187	17	216	1	34	4	606#	16**	2		3	2*	1116	224
TEMPORARY																
FTC																
PRE-PROCESSED									15						15	
TOTAL	66	186	187	17	216	1	34	4	621#	16**	2		3	2*	1131	224

(*) : [redacted]
(**) :
(#) :

GROUND PNL : 1131
FLIGHT PNL : 224
TOTAL : 1355

ATTACHMENT " E "

DA NANG SUB-BASE

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted] GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	TOTAL GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	5		16		32		110		163	
TEMPORARY										
FTC										
PRE-PROCESSED							10		10	
TOTAL	5		16		32		120		173	

GROUND PNL : 173

FLIGHT PNL : 0

TOTAL : 173

ATTACHMENT " E "

NHA TRANG SUB-BASE

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted]				TOTAL	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	6		15		30	88	139	
TEMPORARY								
FTC								
PRE-PROCESSED						3	3	
TOTAL	6		15		30	91	142	

GROUND PNL : 142

FLIGHT PNL : 0

TOTAL : 142

ATTACHMENT " E "

SAFETY MONTHLY REPORT - JANUARY 1969

1. GENERAL

Pilot meetings.

- Porter - 3 January. Discussion of the military Operational Hazard Report program. AAM has received a number of these OHR reports, mainly concerning the Porter and Beechcraft operations. All of them concern air traffic pattern and taxiway conflicts. In most of the instances, a lack of proper radios and/or frequencies on Company aircraft has resulted in our pilots not being able to receive tower instructions or advisories.

- Beechcraft - 10 January. Same topic as above.

Investigation.

During the months of January and February the frequency and scope of accident investigations has prevented completion of the following accident investigations has prevented completion of the following accident reports:

PC-6C N748N, 4 January 1969 - Completion of this report delayed by (1) seven subsequent accidents, (2) Captain Segarra departed on emergency leave 4 February, prior to final meeting with Investigation Team. (3) Non-receipt of PC-6C maximum glide performance data, (4) Non-receipt of tear down analysis. Estimate Local Review Board by 10 March.

C-47 16147, 11 January 1969 - This report has been delayed by non-receipt of engineering profile of V-260, Bao Loc Airfield. Estimate Local Review Board by 4 March.

C-47 15949, 16 January 1969 - In country investigation completed, report being assembled in Taipei.

Fatal ramp accident at V-01, 20 January 1969 - Preparation of report delayed by subsequent investigations. Estimate Local Review Board by 7 March.

PC-6C N391R, 31 January 1969 - Tear down analysis not received by Investigation Team. Estimate Local Review Board by 14 March.

VTB N91295, 3 February 1969 - No information received to date regarding victim fatally injured by landing aircraft. Estimate Local Review Board by 17 March.

Preparation of report data for above accidents delayed one additional week by inactivity during TET holidays.

2. Safety Suggestions

Undated Safety Comment - Problem of lack of identification by enroute and approach control radar. Suggests installation of transponder. Comment forwarded to DSAFE.

Undated Safety Comment - During January, PIC was vectored through thunderstorm by Departure Control, vectored out of a cloud directly into an airstrike, lost on GCA final at V-07, lost turning GCA final at V-03, all because of lack of transponder. Recommends installation of transponders. Forwarded to DSAFE.

3. Follow-up Action

Reference Safety Hazard Report No. 05057, dated 28 November 1968, regarding Beech C-45/10-2 carburetors leaking under pressure. It was determined by the Supervisor, Accessory and Hydraulic Shop, TNN that the pressurization test should be limited to one minute. Everyone concerned has been advised.

4. Unfriendly Action

DATE	A/C NO./TYPE	LOCATION	REMARKS
04	C-47/B&17	UNK	Left landing light lens had 2½" bullet hole.
10	PC6/N393R	V-272, 31 mi E	A/C hit in stabilizer by one rd of small caliber AW, no injury. Flying at 500' due WX.
17	204B/N1303X	BS6040	Near miss by 1 rd small arms while flying at 1800' due to WX.
21	204B/N1307X	YS1054	Near miss by 30 sec of small arms fire while proceeding to V-01 at 2500'.
22	204B/N1304X	BS5276	Near miss by 5 sec of small arms fire from raft in river while flying at 1000 from V-204 to V-23.
22	C-47/B&17	V-03, on ramp	A/C hit by 3 small rocket fragments top of left aileron. Found on preflight after V-03 received 15 rds of rockets.
22	Helio/XW-PBT	V-247, downwind	PIC informed by tower be had near miss by 7-10 sec AW fire on downwind at 500'
22	C-47/15559	V-17, in traffic	A/C hit by one rd small arms in left wing tip while turning final at 950'.
26	C-45/N9871Z	V-01, downwind	PIC and tower observed 10 sec of AW fire while on downwind at 1000'.
30	204B/N1303X	YS7388	On descent to outpost at 800', copilot heard 1 rd small arms fire.

5. Minor Incident/Inflight Irregularities

DATE	A/C NO./TYPE	LOCATION	REMARKS
23	VTB/N7695C	V-01	Landed W/flat tire - 70% of inboard sidewall blew out, brake and wheel damaged. Tire failure with tread in good condition.
27	10-2/N9573Z	V-07	Pilot tube bent and right main wheel dented by Marketeer cart on ramp. Corrective action - remedial training and establishment of minimum approach distance from A/C for carts.
29	Helio/B857	V-20	A/C stopped on runway, could not unlock tail wheel. Crash crew pushed A/C rearward damaging wingtip and aileron on fire truck. Pilots have been advised to closely supervise manhandling of small A/C.

6. Accident Reports

DATE	A/C NO./TYPE	LOCATION	REMARKS
04	PC6/N748N	CP0538	Flame out at 11,000' - radar descent through clouds - ditched 200 yds off Cam Ranh beach. Under investigation, engine teardown analysis not available.
05	C-45/N9871Z	V-01, ramp	While backing A/C towbar slipped off, broke wheel assy fins. Ramp crew negligent-received discipline.
11	VTS/N3674C	V-01, ramp	Torque links bent and bolt sheared-tow tug exceeded turning limits. Entire ramp crew scheduled for ground-handling ramp safety course on 20 January.
11	C-47/B147	V-260	Right main gear broken by obstacle on runway while landing. Under investigation.
16	PC6/N394R	V-242	Full power go-around W/full flaps due to motorbike pulling on runway. Rivets pop and skin torn at left flap center bracket.
16	C-47/B949	ZD1506	A/C destroyed, 12 fatalities. Impacted on high terrain in bad weather. Under investigation.
18	204B/N8535F	UNK	ADF antenna and A/C belly each had 2½" hole, cause unknown, probably landed on enemy.

20	N/A	V-01, ramp	AAM employee fatally injured - sitting atop plywood panels on towed cart - prop blast blew panels off and employee was thrown 15' landing on head.
21	204B/N8535F	UNK	T/R blade had ¼" dent on leading edge. Found on post-flight, cause unknown, probably small stone.
22	10-2/N77Y	V-07	6" crack in pilot's windshield - log item found on return to V-01. Cause unknown.
23	PC6/N194X	V-133	Right main tire flat, found small cut on sidewall, probably sharp object on runway.
23	VTB/N7695C	V-01	Right main tire went flat on landing roll. A/C taxied some distance on flat to clear runway. Tire cut around sidewall, probably at rough strip.
23	PC6/N12450	V-07	Landed with right main tire flat, found large nail in tire. Tire and wheel assy had to be replaced.
29	10-2/N7950C	V-01, in hangar	Marketeer cart damaged right rudder, brakes on cart failed, found plunger in master brake cylinder damaged.
29	C-46/B146	V-27	Right main tire flat, tread worn through. Probably due to excess braking.
31	C-47/B817	V-50	Pilot reported hard landing. Both main gear wheels replaced, damaged beyond repair.
31	PC6/N391R	V-53	Flame out on precautionary go-around, A/C crashed in level attitude from 50 feet. Two pilots had cuts, abrasions, and bruises, one VN pax critically injured, still in coma. Under investigation. PRES informed MSAFE fuel pump spline shaft failed due no lubrication. Have not received tear down analysis from MMB. (Note - MSAFE was informed by AAM employee TDY from another base several days before PRES called.)

MONTHLY REPORT
NHA TRANG
JAN. - 1969

GENERAL

This month started off with a bang with porter 48N loseing its engine and ditching in the ocean at Cam Ranh Bay, happily there were no injuries and part of the wreckage was recovered.

Much effort is being devoted to the cost reduction program, with good results for the comeing year. A review of the past year, discloses all projects planned and undertaken were completed, which speaks well for all departments at this station.

Although the customer has informed us there will be a 30% reduction, an increase in all departments for the month belies the fact. Planning personnel wise is very difficult under the curcumstances.

TRAFFIC

	DEC	JAN
A/C arrivals	643	740
A/C departures	654	751
A/C Ron	354	358
Flt time Nha based AC	1182:42	1249:21
Block time "	1381:34	1484:26

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

Relations remain good.

OPERATIONS

This department has been routine for the month. One OM is on H/L and we are getting an assist from one OM from DaNang. Our new pilot lounge should be completed this comeing month and hope fully we will be able to cut down congestion in operations.

SECURITY

Remains good, with very little activity in the area.

Ray M Beatty

RAY M. BEATTY
Station Manager
VC7

REPORT CLASS
COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM
SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT ON QUANG NGAI ON 1 FEBRUARY

AMB

ACQ: VIETNAM, DANANG (1 FEBRUARY 1969)
SOURCE: THIS IS A SITUATION REPORT ON 1 FEBRUARY PREPARED BY CAS.

(b)(3)

1. BY THE EVENING OF 30 JANUARY ALL INTELLIGENCE REPORTS INDICATED THAT THE VIET CONG (VC) WERE IN THE PROCESS OF A BUILDUP WITH THE INTENTION OF ATTACKING QUANG NGAI CITY. DIVERSIFIED TARGETS WERE CITED, BUT MOST GAVE THE CITY AS THE MAIN TARGET. WHILE SUCH REPORTS ORIGINATED IN THE OFFICIAL VIETNAMESE/AMERICAN COMMUNITY, THE QUICKLY SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE CITY ACTIVITY IN THE CITY CONTINUED NORMAL, HOWEVER, FOR THE PRE-TET (CHINESE NEW YEAR ON 30 JANUARY) PERIOD. ON 31 JANUARY, AFTER THE INITIATION OF THE VC ATTACK ON THE NIGHT OF 30 JANUARY, THERE WAS REDUCED "NORMAL" ACTIVITY, BUT THERE

NND 941536 ---141

WAS CONSIDERABLE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE ABOUT THE CITY. THOSE MOVING APPEARED TO BE GOING FROM ONE POINT TO ANOTHER, PROBABLY TO GATHER WITH FRIENDS AND RELATIVES FOR COMFORT AND SECURITY. NO MOVEMENTS APPEARED AIMLESS.

2. ON 1 FEBRUARY ACTIVITY AND MOVEMENT IN QUANG NGAI CITY APPEARED NORMAL, SHOPS WERE OPEN AND MANY CURIOSITY SEEKERS WERE MOVING ABOUT THE CITY TO SEE WHAT WAS GOING ON AND VIEWING THE VC BODIES AND DAMAGE RESULTING FROM THE MILITARY ACTION OF THE PAST TWO NIGHTS.

3. ACCORDING TO A REPORT FROM MACV G-2, I CORPS HEADQUARTERS, TWO UNIDENTIFIED ENEMY BATTALIONS WERE MOVING TOWARD QUANG NGAI CITY FROM THE WEST AT APPROXIMATELY 2000 HOURS ON 1 FEBRUARY. THEY WERE UNDER HEAVY HARASSMENT AND INTERDICTION FIRE.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV III MAF CORDS

REPORT CLASS
GP-1

NND 941536 ---/4

MONTHLY REPORT

NHA TRANG

FEBRUARY 1969

GENERAL

All activities have been routine for the month. The TET holidays plus the short month cut all totals considerable but not as bad as was expected.

Our only worthwhile report would be the closeing of our large hostel and moving the crew members into the Nautique hotel. This will have a threefold effect, crew moral, financial savings and a better operations all the way around.

TRAFFIC

This department under Mr DIAMOND's direction and reorganization is providing the customer with much better service -

	Feb	Jan
A/C arrivals	476	740
A/C departures	465	751
MON	294	358
Pax handled	4657	4088
Cargo handled	616,182	613,962
Flt time Nha based A/C	857:22	1249:21
Block time " "	1030:19	1484:26

COMMUNICATIONS

This department has functioned well despite the constant equipment break down that has plagued us this month. Our Motorola remote station has been out of commission most of the month for one reason or the other.

SECURITY

Terror activity has picked up in town, also the base has been shelled twice, luckly nothing has fallen in the AAK area.

PERSONNEL

See SCN break down.

TECHNICAL SERVICES

The office building has been painted, which has improved the appearance of the area. A well was put down and water tank installed for the A/C washing area. We are very short on storage area for supply and move shops area, the lean to extension is badly needed.

Ray M Beatty

RAY M. BEATTY
Station Manager
Nha Trang

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
FEBRUARY 1969

I. GENERAL

1. The month of February when reviewed with an unemotional approach to problems such as sub-standard housing at exorbitant prices, police harassment, continual exposure to newspaper propaganda of VC capabilities, increased terrorist activities, 122mm rockets and the tension created by waiting for the expected ground offensive against Saigon and other major cities in Vietnam, was just like any other dull month in Vietnam.

2. Flying time was the lowest since 1965. The short month, TET holidays and general reduction in customer activity resulted in 6469 hours flying which was only 67% of our forecast. It is generally expected there will be considerable changes in overall activity during the next few months. Both customers have gone on a five and half day week for their management personnel. This should reduce Sunday flying to a minimum; however, there is no apparent effect at this time.

3. Our new contingency plan was exercised for the first time on 26 Feb 69 when Tan Son Nhut was placed on a red alert. All Vietnamese were denied to 1500L. Our afternoon shift assembled in the designated assembly area (about 2 Km from the main entrance gate) and awaited further instructions. We obtained authority to shuttle our employees to the AAM area in company transportation with minimum loss of manhours. As a matter of interest, AAM is the only company with an assembly area designated by an appropriate sign to cover such contingencies as VC activity, security restrictions, strikes etc.. In this way we can maintain control over employees and reduce the total loss of manhours when various contingencies occur whereas the employees of other companies return to their homes to "try again tomorrow."

II. FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT

1. The TET holidays coupled with the VC activities between Saigon and Bien Hoa have slowed down the progress of the West Ramp surfacing. The contractor was unable to get to his quary for crush rock because of the VC. Other projects are moving towards completion with usual number of problems, i.e. Personnel Office completed except for lighting which have been ordered from Japan. Supply was unable to obtain satisfactory fixtures in SEA, HKG or Taiwan.

III. FISCAL

1. Move to larger quarters is being held up by lack of lighting in new PND Office. Personnel continues to be a problem with the Vietnamese Government drafting present employees and refusing to grant visa to TCN personnel. This has resulted in extra heavy work loads for remaining employees thereby decreasing efficiency and accuracy.

Piaster payroll - [redacted]	7,693,736	= $65,201.15
" " - [redacted]	2,855,880	= 24,202.37
" " - American	1,366,791	= 15,829.75
Total Piaster Expenditure	19,669,626	= 166,691.75

IV. FLYING (See 204B report on page 10)

1. With the prospect of TET occuring during the month, low flight time and long periods of stand-by at the airport was forecase. The forecasted activities prevailed throughout the month. The only bright spot was "Charlies" activities did not reach the expected proportions, though we did suffer a loss of an aircraft at the hands of the VC.

2. On 22 February while landing at Tra-Vinh (V52) the landing gear of N137L folded. This necessitated change of both engines and propellers. This was done on 24 February. During the night of 24 February the aircraft was destroyed. In the charred wreckage we found the tail pipe of a Chinese B-40 rocket.

3. DFD concluded his visit in SVN with visits to Nha Trang and Da Nang. During the course of his visit at Da Nang, he was confronted with the persistent obstacle to our operation; communication with Da Nang RAPCON. Captain Stallman made a station visit at Da Nang for the purpose of eke-ing out the reason for our lack of communications with RAPCON. Basically his findings were our lack of UHF communication equipment and transponder equipment installed on our aircraft. This point will be reiterated later on in this report. All in all DFD visit was most constructive and his counsel was most appreciated. We would like to see him more ofter.

4. A joint meeting consisting of BM, ABM, MSAFE, MTS, MFD and all AMFs was conducted to study our method of operation in I Corps Area and to make recommendations to the President for safer operations. Though we have suffered many losses in the I Corps Area the recommendations made by the counsel were directed toward all areas in SVN. Basically the recommendations were: install transponder, UHF, and TACAN equipment in all aircraft; accept the VFR restrictions outlined in ICAO regulations; emphasize safety and professionalism in pilot's meetings; implement a safety award incentive program.

5. On 11 February Air America, Inc. was represented at a briefing of the 1st Air Brigade at Long Binh by BM, ABM, DSAFE, MSAFE and MFD. Purpose was to acquaint Air America with the operation of the air arm of the US Army. We were the guests of Major General John Williams, Commander of the First Air Brigade. This is indicative of closer liaison of all Units operating in the airspace of SVN which should effect a greater mutual understanding of problems encountered.

6. On 28 February the MFD made a station visit to Bien Hoa with the CORDS Assistant for Air Operation for III Corps area, Mr. Bill Cain. During the course of the visit, a trip ensued to Long Be. This airstrip had been closed by the MFD due to uncontrolled pedestrian and vehicular traffic on and around the strip. A meeting with the US Military, CORDS Province Representative, and MACV Advisory personnel was convened to determine a course of action to control hazardous traffic. A joint effort towards positive control of the field was assured and the MFD re-opened the field. Capt Ackley transferred to VTE departing 13 Feb. Captain Waller arrived 22 February and assumed duties AMF for VTB and DHC-4. Captain Mccarthy is welcomed to the staff as A/AMF for H-395.

7. The month closed out with MF/AW's return. Both are to be commended for jobs well done.

8. Beechcraft - Total flight time for the month was 971 hours, a drop of 706 hours over Jan. 69 and 129 hours under programmed flight time.

We have seven aircraft on contract. At the present time it appears that we are about nine pilots over in the Beech Program at the present.

The flight time programmed for March is around 1400 hours approximately 300 hours over the present month.

Safety is one of the thoughts foremost in our minds these days. The pilots are beginning to talk safety, hoping this will help toward making a better safety record.

9. Total C-46 time for the month dropped 179 hours. Most of this was due to the Tet holidays plus the lack of Customer cargo to be moved.

Average time per captain was 55 hours while the average for first officers was 60 hours.

The lack of flying has caused the usual drop in morale. With inactivity we can expect some incidents as the old saying goes: "Idle hands are the devil's workshop". The flying should pick up a bit in March. Should the program continue to slump some resignations may be forthcoming.

10. The C-47 droped 262 hours from the previous month. The customer dropped two bailed aircraft from the contract plus the loss of 949 cut the number of contract aircraft to five. Since the bailment contract precluded the use of 083 and 994 on a daily call basis, the flying time dropped drastically.

It would appear that the customer was a bit premature in dropping the two aircraft as he is now trying to get one back on contract and the other on a daily call basis.

If these two aircraft are put back on contract the time should build back up a reasonable amount.

Morale is fair but inactivity is a dangerous and trying thing and if the situation continues as is there will be resignations forthcoming. Unfortunately the ones that resign are usually the people you would most like to keep.

11. The DHC-4 program continues to be slow and unpredictable. Captains averaged 59 hours with only one reaching the 70 hour mark. First officers flew an average of 53 hours.

12. The Helio program flew 870 hours this month slightly over the 810 hours that were estimated. The time was flown by 15 pilots were on station throughout the month. One pilot flew 77 hours and one flew 70; the others were close to the average of 58 hours. One pilot Capt D.E. Morris was grounded after 13 hours and is waiting release to flight duty from Taipei. Capt McCarthy flew only 28 hours before assuming duties as AMF/Helio on 24

Proficiency and route check are up to date and all pilots are current in ground school.

March should prove to be a better month time wise with 1148 hours estimated.

13. Fleet time for PC6s during February was 1663 hours, even lower than January's total of 1711. The drop-off (both January and February) can be attributed primarely to lesser requirements for the aircraft by the customer. In February an additional reason for low time was the lack of two aircraft (which were non-available due to maintenance repair) and the fact that February was a short month, which included the Tet holidays.

14. It is anticipated that March will be a better month flight-time-wise, with an AMP estimate of 1800 hours. Should this evolve, our present manning level of 28 pilots will still be two pilots over. Should there be a return to 1900-2000 hours a month the program will be appropriately manned.

15. A great stress has been placed on safe operating procedures, to include the re-emphasizing of adequate consideration being given to the conduct of flights under VFR outside controlled airspace. Two pilots meetings were held in Feb. during which extensive discussion was conducted on the above subject. The pilots were infact knowledgeable concerning the "Rules and Reg's" but a re-emphasizing of the company's goal and intent in this operation was definitely required. It is believed a safer, better alighed operation will result.

16. OPS 815's and "SAFETY COMMENT" forms have been re-explained to the pilots and timely submission of same has been encouraged.

There has been some reluctance to engage heartily in this program inasmuch as previous requests and suggestions submitted have gone without response.

During Februafy a balanced leave program for 1969 was firmed up and submitted, and the outlook shows no catastrophies.

17. Projected VTB flight time was 735 hours. Actual aircraft time was 690:07 hours. All pilots finished the month with less than 70 hours. The captains averaged 46 hours and first officers 37 hours. It may appear that the program is over manned; however, this is not the case because of the many standby requirements at Saigon and outstations.

Moralo could be much improved if a suitable facility could be provided for night standby at the airport in Saigon. See additional FLYING at the 10th page of the report.

V. OPERATIONS

Due to our previous inaccurate flight time forecasts we continued to struggle thru February in search for a formula to enable us to foresee what the future flying hours would be. We are preparing a daily performance chart of our aircraft similiar to the one done at Taipei. With this we

can see how our forecast compares on a daily basis.

Work on the new FIC progressed slower than expected and it will probably be sometime in April before Operations can expand to what in presently FIC.

1. Our Ramp Coordinators have been keeping the duty OM timely advised of any ramp problems even though the walkie talkie radios continue to be under repair most of the time. The Ramp Coordinators submit to A/SOM a daily delay report. This report still lacks refinement but should be satisfactory for distribution by 1 April. The Traffic Department has been preparing the delay report for the past 18 months.

2. GTD has improved but we continue to have the problem of Saigon traffic congestion and curfew restrictions. We had reservations about hiring female drivers but some of them have proven to be better than their male counterparts. The GTD drivers are now required to attend driver education classes for two weeks. Mr. Kohler, Supr./Trng set up this course and 15 drivers have attended so far.

We will go into a 3 shift operation for clerks and OD's this month. The only problem with this is an overlap of 3 hours in the afternoons. Again, curfew restrictions do not allow us to schedule personnel as we would like. The Emergency Equipment room is functioning orderly. Two locals have replaced the slots previously held by TCN's.

SOM/SGN should be relieved of his duties as A/SZ-DNG the end of March. He will then take 3 months home leave. The OM shortage remains the same.

		Jan	Feb
3. Statistics:	Passengers carried VN	45,070	33,150
	Aircraft arrivals SGN	1,079	895
	" departures SGN	1,080	921
	Cargo carried VN	5,198,778	3,998,173

3(a) Flight time report (See attachment A)
3(b) Accidents & Incidents (See attchment B)
3(c) Flight time information (See attachment C)
3(d) Flight Frequency (See attachment D)

4. Communications - All pertinent information including equipment specifications and data concerning our request to locate the Motorola UHF/VHF remote systems within military facilities was forwarded to Hqs Seventh Air Force for their consideration and recommendations. They in turn forwarded same to Hqs Pac GEEIA Rgn with the recommendation that installation authorization be granted. Thus far, there has been no reply from Pac GEEIA Rgn and we are still awaiting CINCPAC's decision.

5. An AR was prepared for BM to procure a lease-maintenance agreement with Motorola for walkie-talkies to be employed on a ramp control network. In regard to this agreement, Embassy customer wrote to 7th AF Judge Advocate's office seeking that office's ruling to allow Air America to enter directly into such an agreement. Copies of the 4395 contract was forwarded along with similar documents obtained from SZ-CLK in which the SJA, Clark AB, [illegible]hat Air America constitued an agency of the U.S. Government when [illegible] a similar contract. We hope to have the decision soon.

6. Post and Telecommunications turned down our request for allocation of HF frequencies since the frequencies desired had already been reserved for ITU use for international point-to-point circuits. MACV J6 advised they are holding up RFA for 10115 KHz pending CINCPAC approval of all Air America frequency allocation requests submitted by NCRD.

Crystals for 9818 KHZ were installed in the Can Tho and Saigon RSD TR-20 sets and excellent results have been obtained.

A daily pouch schedule has been set up for Can Tho for Company mail. There are two flights daily to that so no problems are anticipated.

7. Arrangements have been made locally whereby Cathay Pacific has agreed to deliver Company mail to Hong Kong aboard their flights. This is a verbal agreement with CX's Saigon Station Manager and no payment is expected. We have asked SCC and KC Hong Kong to make a similar agreement for direct delivery to Saigon. Such arrangements will greatly assist CPRL and MFA in conducting their business.

CCMENG has reluctantly been assigned Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the company APO mailroom with all due prerequisites.

8. Message traffic

	Jan	Feb
Incoming	8870	6901
Outgoing	12273	9851

VI. TRAFFIC/USAID

1. Statistics

	Cargo (including AF Caribou A/C) Jan	Feb
Outbound (lbs) SGN	1,307,416	1,018,392
Inbound (lbs) SGN	91,821	98,639

2. TRAFFIC/AAM

Results of review of the new operating hours coupled with new curfew restrictions has again necessitated a change in schedule operating hours for March to 0630-2030 daily. Personal review of the 2100 hour closing indicated that little or no work was performed after 2030, the government has imposed some 2000 and some 2200 hour curfew restrictions and AAM GTD has rearranged the bus schedule, thereby necessitating the operating hour change.

3. A review of the thermos loss situation revealed that not placing them on the small aircraft did not adversely affect the operation. Consequently the firm policy has been enforced with approval of MFD and BM to issue only to aircraft having and AFD/AFS or FM assigned, VIP and International flights and the Danang and Nhatrang circuit flights. An appreciable decrease in losses has been noted.

A review of lost and found baggage procedures indicated need for improvement. Therefore a comprehensive procedure has been formalized and will be sent out to other stations for guidance.

4. During ADTD's visit he suggested a change in our procedure for returning tie down equipment for repair. We immediately put his idea in force and will now turn the straps in to Supply thru QC and request immediate re-issue,

leaving the repair and shipment procedures up to Supply.

A CWR was initiated to review the hot water system and instructions given to either repair or give a detailed account as to why repairs cannot be effected.

5. With one PTT line and one Company telephone extension servicing the SRTM, TM, Terminal and Cargo sections it was necessary to request a buzzer system be installed to preclude delayed communication. This has not been completed as of this writing.

6. Due to lack of classroom space and the TET holicays the English class has been temporarily discontinued.

7. Difficulty has been noted in shipment of damaged aircraft on board the B727 aircraft. A separate letter is being prepared by the SRTM in this regard.

8. Time Card problems again arose, and it has been necessary to have the cards checked in and out with the supervisor to preclude falsification of records by various individual. This is only a stop gap measure until the new time clocks arrive.

Additional workload has been placed on the terminal agetns to insure VN-13D approvals have been received on all travel of company personnel on board USAID sponsored aircraft. This is a new requirement imposed by CORDS and agreed to by Air America Station personnel

9. Statistics

	Jan	Feb
Passenger departures SGN (All contr.)	5,534	4,805
" arrivals SGN " "	6,439	5,432
Outbound cargo	70,566	77,322
Inbound cargo	157,537	90,279

VII. GROUND TRANSPORTATION
See attachment "E".

VIII. HOSTEL OCCUPANCY
1. During Feb. 1969, only 64 beds were occupied for a percentage of 45.6%. This low percentage is due to Tet holidays and very few visitors during last 15 days of the month. Non-availability slips issued: 7

IX. PERSONNEL
See attachment "F"

X. MEDICAL
1. Number of sick call: 1454
Accident: 40 minor, and only one of them was considered to be a little more serious.
1(a) [redacted] - RGMD Welder - Employee was on his way to work, before reaching the Main Gate of AAM one man on a scooter overpass him hitting the rear end of his motor. He fell on the ground causing laceration of the right foot. He was treated in Base Clinic and 4 days sick leave was granted.

Hospitalized sick call - None
Hospitalized accident - None
Unhospitalized accident - 40
Outcall - 1
Physical examination: 1. Flight crew phy. 18
2. Pre-employment phy. 8
3. Accident flight phy. 4

Total: 30

Sanitation: Cafeteria - Satisfactory
Toilet - Fair
Vaccination: 22
Total man days lost by reasons of sickness: 936½ days
Total man days lost by reasons of accident: 42½ days

XI. SAFETY

1. Pilot meetings

- Porter - 7 Feb, 14 present. Theme of this meeting was: "IF IT CAN'T BE DONE SAFETY, DON'T DO IT." Emphasis on use of the Safety Comment, and "GO NO GO" weather criteria were also discussed.

- Porter - 24 February, 10 present. This meeting repeated the above subjects for pilots not attending the first meeting.

- Beechcraft - 12 Feb, 14 present. Discussion concerned use of the Safety Comment, and compliance with all regulations governing flight operations.

- C-46 and C-47 - 14 Feb, 29 present. Discussion points were:

1. Use of Safety Comment as a pilot tool to improve flight operations and reduce hazardous conditions.

2. IFR and SVFR: The watchward is; if you cannot complete the flight in a safe manner, don't fly.

3. Dangers involved when pilots fail to report hard landings.

4. Accident rates and the need for a more serious and professional approach to flying.

2.

Investigation

1. Local Board of Review of C-47, 43-16147 accident of 11 January completed on 11 March.

2. Status of other investigations listed in January Safety Report is unchanged.

3. VTB, N9638Z accident of 2 March 1969 is also under investigation. The PIC involved proceeded on STO before completing the required accident information. BMSGN has issued a Memorandum precluding flight crews and Investigation Team members from further flying duties, TDY, STO, or leave, except emergency leave, until released by the Investigation Team Head.

3. Ground Safety Inspection. The quarterly inspection was accomplished 13-22 February by MGS TNN. General impressions were that there has been improvement in reducing equipment and facility hazards, and the supervisors are definitely aware of the need for a tighter approach to ground safety. Lack of needed safety equipment and supplies affects the safety program, however, the supervisors have shown ingenuity in improving material and facilities available. Emphasis will now be placed on correcting the safety hazards which were picked up as repeat items.

4. Coordinating Meetings - On 11 Feb., the BM, ABM, MFD MSAFE SGN and DSAFE TPE attended a briefing on U.S. Army Aviation in Vietnam at the request of Major General Robert R. Williams, USARV Aviation Officer. Mutual problems in operations and flight safety were discussed. Pilot fatigue is a definite problem in USARV, however operational requirements take priority. USARV has limited Army Aviators to 140 flying hours in any 30 consecutive day period.

On 26 Feb., MFD and MSAFE SGN attended a meeting of the Joint Air Operations Group. The composition and purpose of this group has been discussed in previous reports. Frankly, Air America does not enjoy a good image with the military. AAM was grouped with VN civilians entering runway, and Air Vietnam flights as hazards over which the military is cognizant but has no effective control. As stated before, the great majority of traffic conflicts are due to lack of UHF and FM radios in AAM aircraft. The conflicts will be largely eliminated by installation of these vital radios.

XII. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. February was a very low month for flying times. Several factors are involved (1) The short, 28 day month (2) The 4 day Tet holidays (3) The Viet Cong starting their new military offensive in the last week (4) The City curfew restrictions (5) Airport Security reducing our graveyard work shift by 30%, affecting production schedules.

The Can Tho RMD Project is continuing to improve in capability and performance. We finally received our new radio HF crystals from Conus, with very prompt action/support from DED-TNN. RMD now has a maintenance radio set up that gives RMD Can-Tho direct contact with RMD Maintenance Control Office Saigon. The TR-35 HF sets are on long term loan from the Customer. The improved communications has enable prompt support to Can-Tho and reduce down times of the aircraft based there.

2. Concentrated efforts are being made to reduce the employees' accumulated CTO, on the books. We have held down the scheduling of overtime and positive results reflect it. The the Viet Cong dropped a few rockets into Saigon and the curfew changes and greater restrictions on the airfield cut into our production and forced us to schedule overtime, particularly on the graveyard shift.

3. The West Ramp repaving project is moving at a steady pace, but it now appears the contractor will not make the completion deadline of 1 April 1969. A more realistic date is probably 1-15 May 1969.

4. PEMD has taken over the daily/periodic maintenance of all powered ground equipment and reliability is expected to improve considerably.

5. PMD has been assigned more plant daily maintenance responsibilities, such as trash disposal formerly handled by RMD. In addition PMD has arranged a custodial service crew that will take care of the office cleaning to include polishing of floors.

6. Statistics:

Company Services

	Jan	Feb
Transit	381	346
Overnight	798	636
No. 1 Service	27	27
No. 2 "	27	25
No. 3 "	7	5
No. 4 "	5	0
Engine change	22	16

Line Items

	Jan	Feb
Requisitions	3267	4225
Receipts	2180	2843
Store Issues	6342	5556
Stock Credits	485	264
Posted to cards	17226	17689

IV. FLYING (Continued of page 2)

18. For the 204Bs, February turned out to be disastrous to say the least. Between the customers' cut back, the Tet holiday and the temporary breakdown in liaison with TNN maintenance on major over haul parts, the program will end up with 950 hours of flying. This is down about 300 hours from last month.

19. The monthly pilots' meeting was held on the 14th with 16 attending. The rest were briefed throughout the month. MFD sat in on the meeting. He also made some comments about the professional attitude of the pilots.

20. Four route checks were given this month. The AMFSD/RW did not make his regular trip to Saigon. The program was not hurt too bad, due to fact that we were ahead on proficiency checks. The two First Officers up for initial Captain checks will be held up till next month.

21. The manning level for the 204B program is down to 33 pilots with one more pilot resigning effective 10 March 1969, with the loss of flying time and pilots, the situation has equaled itself out. In fact, the pilot flying time is down. This month the average pilot time will be about 60 hours a month.

22. During the month it was discovered locally that TNN, in the process of over hauling major components, was putting parts back into major components that were out of time and should have been thrown away. The components were in the control systems of the helicopter. Immediate grounding orders went out to all aircraft affected; then the long process of getting the 7 aircraft flying again. It took 4 days plus 8 hours of C46 Non-Revenue time

and countless hours of lost revenue time on the grounded helicopters.

23. The overall morale in the program is very good despite the lack of flying. For the most part, everybody is very optimistic about the months ahead.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
M. HULSE
M. Hulse

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT

FEBRUARY 1969

1. Contract VN-41

A/C No.	Revenue		Non Revenue	
	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time
N67984	57:01	69:26		
B910	40:16	53:13	2:00	2:30
B926	91:57	117:51		
B928	69:05	80:48	3:38	5:49
B138	40:47	50:44		
B146	71:43	88:21	1:24	2:01
B154	12:02	15:17	10:26	11:40
N67985	74:56	94:46		
B829	139:17	169:13		
5559	113:30	133:54		
5994	5:04	7:01		
6083	2:46	3:52		
6147	104:04	128:59		
8084	90:24	110:07		
B817	125:18	149:37	0:42	1:08
N539Y	86:31	102:34	2:55	3:55
N544Y	17:23	22:32	7:21	8:56
N6154U	84:28	101:20	0:25	0:55
N9518Z	49:33	59:16	2:33	3:17
N9956Z	46:30	56:22	2:02	2:46
N7770B	30:40	36:16	2:35	4:05
N7695C	2:14	2:38		
N3728G	57:05	69:10	5:11	6:01
N9664C	21:48	25:29	3:42	5:20
N9577Z	30:07	35:58	3:00	3:34
N9671C	0:32	0:43	10:21	12:12
N9838Z	13:50	16:19	7:59	10:30
N137L	15:15	18:52	2:06	4:02
N21412	42:28	53:07	1:56	6:30
N6622C	40:47	51:07		
N51259	119:31	136:18		
N5269V	62:49	78:09	1:53	3:17
N77Y	70:00	87:05	0:43	1:13
N7950C	61:25	76:25	1:45	3:12
N9521Z	65:37	78:45	4:45	5:30
N9573Z	99:12	123:03		
N4933C	31:27	38:22	2:50	3:12
N5254V	10:40	13:14	1:27	1:48
N9073Z	33:42	39:17	2:50	3:27
N9855Z	43:31	50:35		
N9592Z	33:01	40:29		
N9871Z	16:21	19:26		
N9898Z	12:11	15:17	2:18	3:12
N152L	2:12	2:34		
N153L	115:14	130:31	5:28	7:11

N184L	70:40	84:36		
N185K	2:31	2:53		
N192X	60:06	73:04		
N194X	42:08	51:33		
N198X	59:28	66:46	2:05	3:14
N12450	19:12	21:08		
N285L	96:01	106:09	0:29	1:00
N358F	121:24	143:48	0:25	0:36
N393R	10:01	11:13		
N394R	98:54	115:37	0:33	1:14
N748N	7:22	8:04		
N9444	109:03	125:16	0:53	1:23
N1303X	176:15	176:15	1:00	1:00
N1304X	180:20	180:20	3:00	3:00
N1305X	105:21	105:21	4:15	4:15
N1306X	116:54	116:54	3:00	3:00
N1307X	130:53	130:53	8:15	8:15
N8513F	3:00	3:00		
N8514F	5:48	5:48		
N8535F	24:46	24:46		
B839	91:42	109:54	1:40	2:14
B865	48:20	56:14		
B867	97:28	110:52		
B869	80:27	86:20		
B875	94:24	107:58		
XWPBS	13:34	16:28		
B849	68:45	78:59	3:56	4:38
B857	41:24	48:25	0:49	1:12
XWPBT	42:52	49:16		
Sub-total	4373:15	5023:20	124:35	162:14

2. Contract 4395

N544Y	20:47	27:14		
N66220	2:16	3:09		
N3674G	70:48	85:19	1:43	2:30
N76950	29:54	46:46		
N91295	67:01	82:00		
N7770B	7:17	8:51		
N9664C	10:26	12:02		
N12450	43:21	47:17		
N152L	47:50	53:52		
N153L	4:41	6:01		
N184L	36:14	43:47	3:54	5:02
N185K	88:34	106:24	4:56	5:44
N192X	64:47	71:44		
N194X	55:17	68:11	1:05	1:47
N198X	23:54	27:00		
N358F	0:52	1:12		
N393R	68:27	75:32	0:16	0:20
N394R	7:12	9:46		

N748N	37:54	43:00	8:22	10:05
N9444	4:25	5:20		
N1304X	1:53	1:53		
N1305X	5:42	5:42		
N1306X	5:15	5:15		
N8512F	32:52	32:52	2:35	2:35
N8513F	91:58	91:58	2:15	2:15
N8514F	42:54	42:54	5:32	5:32
N8535F	38:57	38:57	1:00	1:00
B839	1:13	1:41		
B867	16:38	20:23		
B875	4:28	5:30		
XWPBS	30:56	37:12	2:44	3:24
XWPBT	21:31	27:35	0:17	0:22
B849	3:22	4:10		
B857	52:21	58:25		
Sub-total	1041:59	1198:44	34:39	40:36

Contract 0005

N6622C	16:03	20:34
N77X	2:16	2:48
N137L	2:03	2:41
N5254V	1:15	1:40
N9073Z	2:16	2:52
N9871Z	2:48	3:32
N9898Z	3:37	4:02
N1305X	0:53	0:53
N1306X	1:15	1:15
N1307X	0:47	0:47
B865	0:52	1:11
XWPBT	1:47	2:27
Sub-total	35:52	44:42

Total Revenue Flight Time	5451 + 06
Total Non-Revenue Flight Time	159 + 14
Total Revenue Block Time	6266 + 46
Total Non-Revenue Block Time	202 + 50
GRAND TOTAL FLIGHT TIME	5610 + 20
GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	6469 + 36

Flight Time by type of Aircraft:

	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
Type of A/C	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time
C-46	457 + 47	570 + 26	17 + 28	22 + 00
C-47	580 + 23	698 + 51	0 + 42	1 + 08
DHC-4	124 + 41	152 + 20	10 + 16	12 + 51
VTB	522 + 11	638 + 29	39 + 31	51 + 10
10-2 (Beech)	599 + 42	687 + 03	13 + 08	23 + 44
C-45	190 + 49	228 + 46	9 + 25	11 + 39
PC-6	1297 + 46	1502 + 18	28 + 26	37 + 36
204-B	965 + 43	965 + 43	30 + 52	30 + 52
H395	712 + 04	822 + 50	9 + 26	11 + 50
TOTAL =	5451	6266 + 46	159 + 14	202 + 50

ATTACHMENT "A"

FLIGHT INFORMATION CENTER
SAIGON
MONTHLY ACTIVITY REPORT
1-28 FEBRUARY 1969

PART I
AIRCRAFT INCIDENTS

Date	A/C No, Type & Contract	Place	Description
1 Feb	N1306X	CR 0963	Pilot was flying low down the coast due to weather when he took one round in the heater compartment, door, passing through the transmission deck, puncturing a hydraulic line and exiting through a rotor blade.
2 Feb	N9664C	V-01	Pilot was turning base for 25R when he observed 2 tracers off his right wing. No hits.
10 Feb	5559	V-23	PIC was climbing out from V-23 when they took one hit in the right prop dome. They had to shut down the right engine and returned and landed.
13 Feb	8084	V-23	Plane was turning on right base for lndg on rnwy 10 when PIC heard small arms fire directed at his aircraft. He added and continued his approach for a landing.
13 Feb	N539Y	V-68	Plane was climbing out from the strip when approximately one mile out it came under fire, sustaining two hits in the tail section.
20 Feb	N51259	V-40	Plane was on final for runway 29 when a rifle shot was heard, and the round was heard passing close aboard the aircraft. No hits.
22 Feb	N1305X	XS 9326	Aircraft was enroute to V-184 at an altitude of 1200' when three small arms rounds were heard passing nearby. PIC climbed into the overcast and continued on course. No hits.

22 Feb	N1305X	XS 9225	Six rounds were heard and observed being fired from this position. No damage. Aircraft had a different PIC from the incident above.
27 Feb	XM-PBT	V-236	Shortly after take off from the field PIC heard small arms fire directed toward the aircraft. No hits.
28 Feb	9592Z	WR 3585	While flying from V-167 to V-225 at 700' due to low weather conditions, plane came under fire at this position. PIC climbed into the overcast and departed the area. No hits.

PART II
SITUATION SUMMARY

The enemy launched their spring offensive in the early morning hours of 23 February instead of before TET as mentioned in last months report. The attacks by fire on military units and civilian populated areas have been too numerous to count. During the reporting period, Saigon was hit by a number of rounds of rocket and mortar fire on several occasions, resulting in a number of dead and wounded. Hundreds have been made homeless. VC penetrated both Saigon and Danang. The small unit which entered Saigon distributed propaganda in the Cholon area. The enemy entering Danang were driven from the city by allied troops. Their actions restricted our activities at Danang because of a 24 hour curfew imposed on the area. Bien Hoa was the scene of one of the heaviest ground attacks so far in the offensive. The attacks on the Base there caused an increased alert status here, which delayed many employees on their way to work. Terrorists activities greatly increased in Saigon, as well as other cities, immediately prior to, and since the start of the new offensive. The enemy has brought a number of AA gun were reported in operation within four kilometers of the field. One was captured and another destroyed. Another 37 MM gun was reported three miles south of the field at Quang Ngai (V-23). A number of smaller AA gun positions were reported, mostly in Region III. In one of the largest caches found in Region III northwest of Saigon, the enemy had stored 250 122MM rockets with oversized war heads. Many AA machine guns were also in the cache. A thirty truck enemy convoy was sighted just 15 miles from the Bien Hoa Airbase. The number of truck and vehicle sightings have been increasing monthly.

The enmy has committed only a small part of his available troops and resources so far. There are indications that the ground attacks on Long Binh, Bien Hoa and other installations have been probing actions and the major assault is yet to come and will probably be sometime in the next 30 to 45 days.

ATTACHMENT "B"

FLIGHT TIME INFORMATION

TRACT	FLIGHT TIME	BLOCK TIME	HAZARDOUS TIME	PERCENTAGE OF HAZARDOUS TIME TO FLT TIME	PERCENTAGE OF HAZARDOUS TIME TO BLK TIME	LEGS	PASSENGERS	CARGO	NON-REVENUE FLT TIME	NON-REVENUE BLK TIME
41	4,373+15	5065+14	3492+19	79.86%	68.95%	8910	26.039	2,599,450	124+35	162+14
95	1,038+36	1,197+08	846+55	81.53%	70.72	2403	4800	215,243	34+39	40+36
005	35+52	44+42	25+51	71.82%	57.43	49	118	710	-	-
SUB TOTAL	5,447+43	6,307+04	4365+05	80.13%	69.21	11.362	30.957	2,815,403	159+14	205+50
CAL	254+02	345+38	117+37	46.21%	33.98	263	2193	1,182,770		
GRAND TOTAL	5,701+45	6,652+42	4482+42	78.62%	67.38	11.625	33.150	3.998,173		

ATTACHMENT "C"

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT FREQUENCY

FEBRUARY 1969

	C-46		C-47		DHC-4		BEECH		PORTER		204-B		VTB		HELIO		TOTAL	
	DEP	ARR	DEP	ARR	DEP	ARR	DEP	ARR	DEP	ARR	DEP	ARR	DEP	ARR	DEP	ARR	DEP	ARR
CONTRACT	60	61	139	139	23	24	168	167	206	185	104	99	146	146	75	74	921	895
ARMY	1									1	-	-		2			1	3
TRAINING	4	4			1	1	4	4	6	6	5	5	8	8	2	2	30	30
MAINTENANCE					3	3	1	1	1	1	2	2	4	5			11	12
TEST							20	20	10	10	11	11	9	9	5	5	55	52
OTHERS (NON-REV.)																		
TOTAL	65	65	139	139	27	28	193	192	223	203	122	117	167	170	82	81	1018	995

ATTACHMENT "D"

GROUND TRANSPORTATION

February 1969

During the month of Feb. 69, 11 Microbuses were in commission daily.
Following are the GTD statistics for Feb. 1969.

11 Microbuses on station and in daily operation

AGGREGATE MICROBUSSES MILEAGE

X-4033	2710 km
X-4034	2619 km
X-4035	3922 km
X-1140	1840 km
X-1141	2653 km
X-1142	2214 km
X-0417	2787 km
X-0418	765 km
X-0419	3203 km
X-0420	2430 km
EC-0003	1503 km
	26646 km = Approx. 16653 miles

TOTAL MICROBUSSES DOWN-TIME

264 hrs

TOTAL MICROBUSSES PAX CARRIED:

5908 PAX

ISUZU BUS MILEAGE

X-01057	1689 km
X-01058	2544 km
X-04329	2659 km
	6892 km = Approx. 4397 miles

TOTAL ISUZU BUS DOWN-TIME

82 hrs

ISUZU BUS PAX CARRIED:

Cholon route	8858
Saigon route	5209
	14067 PAX

SUPPLY VEHICLES MILSAGE

EB-8176	1735 km
EB-1780	785 km
EC-7953	187 km
	2707 km = Approx. 1691 miles

SUPPLY VEHICLES DOWN-TIME:

64½ hrs

2 HONDA 50-cc REPLACE LAMBRETTA IN DELIVERING SCHEDULES

TX-0014 (P/T No. 35-25018)
TX-0013 (P/T No. 35-25019)

HONDA DOWN-TIME:

14 hrs.

GRAND TOTAL PAX CARRIED: 19975 PAX

ATTACHMENT "E"

MEMORANDUM

TO : BM/SGN

DATE: 05 February, 1969

FROM : A/SZDNG

REF. No. SZDNG/69/009

SUBJECT : DANANG Station Monthly Report for January, 1969

Airport facilities continue to reflect improvements although progress is slower than desired. Utilizing in-house capabilities does not, due to the limited member of personnel, permit the most suitable work schedules but with close coordination and tighter controls projects are being completed on a priority basis.

Painting of the Operations/Administration building has been completed. White semi-glass ceilings and flat pastel green walls present a more cheerful atmosphere accented by dark gray doors, door and window casings and a 4 inch baseboard in each office - which harmonizes with the lighter gray floor tile.

The winter weather to date has been less severe than during previous years. This has worked to our decided advantage in that the sunny dry days have assisted our continued improvement of the AAM access road. On 21 January the USAF completed the asphalting, including the AAM parking area to a depth of 3 to 4 inches. This hard smooth surface not only improves the overall appearance but eliminates much dust, and will eliminate mud during the rains.

Several signs fabricated in Saigon have been received and installed. The most recent addition is the new Air America, Inc. sign received on 30 January and installed the same day. The completion of others is pending and as received will be positioned to further identify departments and assist passenger and visitor information.

Several other small projects are pending in this building area and are receiving attention in accordance with priorities and manpower availability. The general theme, however, has been to begin improvements at the front door and continue through the back door. This then, with a few exceptions, now positions us in the area behind the Operations/Administration building.

Construction of the drainage ditch at the rear the facilities continues, with it being approximately 60% completed. While this work continues we are researching ways and meas of leveling and packing the ground around the warehouse and nose hangar area in preparation for pouring concrete. It is hoped that in next month's report we will have much more favorable comments regarding this project.

Routine work continues at both hostels. Transportation has been arranged for the Engineer to make routine inspections and follow up actions, as required, to maintain both units in proper serviceable condition. Additionally periodic inspections are made by the undersigned and a form devised and posted on the bulletin board which encourages crew members to comment on deficiencies, or suggestions, noted during their stay at DaNang.

Paint has been procured for painting the inside of the old hostel. This we plan to begin in early February; again using pastel non-glass shades, but in four colors: azure blue, apricot tangering, and two shades of green. Additional colors were sought but not available at NSA.

Further improvements, such as floor resurfacing, window curtains and pictures on the wall are planned for the back rooms of the old hostel. When accomplished we hope the above will provide a much more pleasant atmosphere in the "home away from home" for our crew members and other visitors.

Due to the occupancy of the new hostel being considerable lighter than the old the upkeep is proportionally reduced. Nevertheless close contact is maintained with the building and its custodian to reduce maintenance and provide suitable support.

Other areas, both at the downtown and airport locations do require attention and we are cognisant of their existance. As time and workloads permit each will be reviewed and corrective action implemented.

Customer and Company relations remain very good to excellent. Since all concerned are in daily contact any or all problems are discussed and appropriate action taken before they are allowed to become major issues. Outstanding support was received from both 4395 and 0041 during the recent search and recovery operations involving C-47, 43-15949.

This period DaNang station has had several visitors from Saigon, including the ABM, who remained overnight. Additionally the VPFO spent same time with us, having arrived on 18 January and departed in the afternoon of 19 January.

Original Signed By
L. G. PARRISH
L. G. Parrish

cc: file

MONTHLY REPORT

NHA-TRANG

MARCH 1969

GENERAL

Responsibility for the Nha-Trang Station was turned over to Mr. DAN LAWSON on 30 March 1969. Mr. LAWSON arrived on station 26 March 1969 for review of station with Acting Station Manager Mr. THEISEN. [redacted] (CCTR USAID) and [redacted] (Deputy CCTR USAID) accompanied Mr. LAWSON to NHA and were provided a station inspection.

The station turn-over proceeded smoothly. Mr. LAWSON's personal effects have arrived from DNG in good order and station administration is progressing in good order.

TRAFFIC

A. GENERAL : Station Traffic activities for March reveal increases in Cargo, passengers, and aircraft movement over the previous month.

The Traffic area of the building is undergoing maintenance and repairs to allow a better passenger flow and to keep unauthorized personnel off of the ramp. The TM office is now in the passenger terminal, however TM is well aware of his primary work at the Ground services warehouse and is not letting the physical separation affect his work there.

B. SATISTICS :

Passengers		March	Last month	1968
Departing		3,411	2,366	1,344
Arriving		3,407	2,291	566
CARGO				
1. Ground Services				
Departing	(lbs)	347,309	407,870	132,599
Arriving	(lbs)	284,187	166,100	241.464
	TOTAL	631,496	573,970	374,063
2. Company Cargo				
Departing	(lbs)	12,066	23,170	5,274
Incoming	(lbs)	22,315	19,042	17,623
	TOTAL	34,381	42,212	23,347
3. GRAND TOTAL (1+2)		666,877	616,182	398,670

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

At this point, the customer relations appear transitive. The New SZ has not been on station long enough to chart a definite course but is well aware of the need to reverse the previous situation. SZ was welcomed warmly (if not sincerely) by both customers and will work towards a feeling of mutual

OPERATIONS

A. GENERAL

Good weather prevailed throughout the month. The sole trouble spot was considerable cloud build-up in inland areas in the afternoons. This did not noticeably hinder operations but is expected to be more troublesome in the next two months.

A standard ANA information board has been requested for the pilot lounge. This is the same type used at DIG and will provide for a central location for posting of all required reading.

Esso apparently lacks some proper defueling equipment, and has so for some time, SZ will have more to say on this in the next report.

Crew billiting has improved in closing hostel 1 and placing the crews in the Nautique Hotel. Some complaints were voiced by a few pilots as to room size, cleanliness, and facilities however, the hotel Manager has been very cooperative in correcting deficiencies when found. A gradual improvement can be expected.

B. FLIGHT FREQUENCY (see attached)

C. ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE COMPARISON

	This month	Last month	Last year
Arrivals	614	476	671
Departures	611	465	661
Ron's	340	294	312

D. DELAYS 39 50 —

Percentage on time departures 94% 90%

E. ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS .... None

FISCAL

The major change in this department was that the Accounting Representative has been given control of all station funds. Station funds will no longer co-mingle with those of the SZ.

LEGAL

No major problems.

SECURITY

No major problems.

TECHNICAL SERVICES

Aircraft Maintenance :

Aircraft maintenance :

	This month	Last month	Last year
1. Transient services	226	182	453
2. Overnight services	340	294	312
3. Engine changes	2	2	2
4. Propeller changes	1	1	-
5. No.1 services	6	4	8
6. No.2 services	1	0	1
7. Intermediate services	1	1	-
8. Delays (Maintenance/Mech)	10	5	17
9. MAR's	16	13	18
10. Outline recoveries	4	0	3
11. Accident report (CA/C)	3	2	1
12. Accident report (F.R.)	1	0	0

The workload took a sharp rise during the month. Much of this was due to the recent increase in trouble with the Lycoming IO/2 engines. With the increase in operations, the delays went up. The contributing factor being MIS parts.

ELECTRONIC MAINTENANCE

The Motorola UHF/VHF relay continues to perform poorly with numerous outages and inteferance. All required assistance will be given the technical representative and SCF and TPE kept informed of results.

SUPPLY

Activities were fairly routine. The workload increased with increased flying and maintenance. ACP's increased due to MIS parts but this is being overcome.

Mr. ANDERSON (Asst.Dupt.-MSD) visited the station in connection with the disposition of property items removed from Hostel no.1.

ADMINISTRATION

No major problems encountered by the present SA. Having been assigned to MPA for one day during this report period, this situation is not likely to continue.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

Dan Lawson

DAN LAWSON
Station Manager
Nha-Trang

MONTHLY FLIGHT TIME REPORT

NHA TRANG VIETNAM

March 19 69

April 1, 1969

CONTRACT	0041		4395		NON-REVENUE	
TYPE A/C	BLOCK TIME	FLT TIME	BLOCK TIME	FLT TIME	BLOCK TIME	FLT TIME
C-46	154+43	121+32	—	—	—	—
C-47	187+57	167+58	—	—	—	—
VIB	234+05	195+49	80+15	64+41	4+58	3+59
PC6C	31+59	28+33	125+59	112+25	8+05	7+18
10-2/C-45	280+33	233+56	—	—	3+43	3+02
20AB	32+24	32+24	54+56	54+56	—	—
DHC4	15+41	13+47	—	—	—	—
HELIO	—	—	2+22	2+09	—	—
SUB TOTAL:	937+22	793+59	263+32	234+11	16+46	14+19

GRAND TOTAL: BLOCK TIME: 1217+40 FLT TIME: 1042+29

OM NHA J.D.PAULDING

cc: BM SGN
SOM SGN
SZ NHA
FILE

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
MARCH 1969

I. GENERAL

1. The overall activities returned to normal with flight time higher than the previous month, but lower than January. Otherwise, the month passed rather uneventable with the exception of the continued combat environment which complicates living in Saigon

2. The cost of living continues to spiral with the upward trend, house owners are again returning to practice of the late fifties, requiring two years rent in advance. A one small bedroom apartment in downtown Saigon brings US$640.00 per month with advance payment. Minor items such as eggs, which are seldom found in the commissary are an indicator of inflation. Cost per egg US$0.128 each or US$1.54 per dozen.

3. There is continued police harassment of our personnel by the police. The U.S. Embassy advises not to pay circulation taxes on vehicles, however, the word has not been received by the Vietnamese Government who instructs the police to impound vehicles that have not paid the tax. It is one big happy merry-go-round, but very discouraging to the individual who has his car impounded.

II. FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT

1. West Ramp Concreting (SGN)

Contractor has placed approximately 95% of the base course. First shipment of cement has arrived at the jobsite and concrete placement is underway (approximately 5% complete). Work on drainage structures is now approximately 90% complete, Contractor has his paving operations fairly well organized; steady progress is anticipated.

2. Transmitter Building and Antennas (SGN)

Procurement action for hardware and equipment has been held up due to the lack of a Form F. Customer insists on a Form F with detailed invoice costs before he will consider Form F reimbursement approval. SCM has received most of the Worksheets from TNN which are based on firm vendor quotations. When all such worksheets are on hand, a Form F will be prepared and presented to the Customers. Hopefully, this will occur in April.

3. Blast Fence, West Ramp (SGN) AR Closure Notice initiated by SFD/SGN on 20 March 1969 due to Airport Commandant's desire that this project not be implemented.

4. Utility Tunnel Section B (SGN) The Utility Tunnel itself has now been completed to a point immediately in front of the MGMD Complex. Contractor's backhoe is now operating and progress on this important project is speeding up.

5. Temporary Personnel Office (SGN) This project was completed during this month; AR Closure Notice initiated by SFD/SGN.

6. Cafeteria Annex (SGN) Roof trusses for the extension have been completed and GI sheet roofing is in place. Masonry work (bricks) has been completed on all exterior walls and plastering is underway. The base for the floor slab is being leveled and compacted.

7. Revetment Walls (SGN) Vendor has completed approximately 100 panels and will begin delivery to jobsite during April. MGMD personnel will commence foundation work, etc., in the near future.

8. Danang Nose Hanger Work is continuing on the installation of lighting fixtures and electrical circuits. It is believed that the project will be completed in April.

9. Power distribution (NHA) Work is continuing on this project as men are available and as materials arrive.

10. Concrete Areas (DNG) AR Closure Notice initiated by SFD/SGN during March 1969 due to exhaustion of funds.

11. Concrete Accessway (DNG) AR Closure Notice initiated by SFD/SGN during March 1969 due to exhaustion of funds.

12. FIC Office Renovation (SGN) This project was completed this month. AR Closure Notice initiated by SFD/SGN.

13. TSN Common Use Water Supply (SGN) Air America and Air Vietnam have given formal approval of this project. The Airport Commandant is ready to sign the contract with the Contractor but is being held up by Pan Am who have still not received N.Y. approval. Airport Commandant is applying pressure on Pan Am to act.

14. Completion of Base Area Lighting (SGN) Long lead procurement items were ordered in February and have not yet arrived at Saigon Base.

15. Completion of South Ramp Revetment Wall This AR was approved on 27 March 1969. Contract documents are being prepared.

16. Miscellaneous AR 2123, Power Poles for CITCA, was approved 27 March 1969. This AR is supplemental to AR 5532, CITCA Relocation. Poles have been installed and AR Closure Notice will be initiated in the near future.

The design of a 3 Bldg ADMIN OPS Complex as an alternative to the 2 story Operations and Administration Building (rejected by Customers) is nearing completion.

III. ADMINISTRATIVE

1. March was in general, a typical month: (1) a little progress here and there in the form of important new projects; (2) a little more attention to old, still-unfinished business; (3) still more time spent in coping with the ever-changing administrative requirements of USG and GVN; all of this during (4) temporary absences of key BMSGN staff members.

2. Under Category 1, comes our current efforts to form a group of 25 to 50 qualified [redacted] employees for the intensive 50-week MMB training course in basic aircraft mechanics. On 31 March, 42 employees had filed applications and were taking [redacted] mechanical aptitude tests while APM was continuing efforts in PM's absence on leave to resolve questions of pay, recruiting new-hires and further liaison with USAID and GVN. The 1 May target date for arrival of a final-selection team from TWN seems a bit ambitious as of now, but we can report some headway and much enthusiasm.

3. Numerous items comprise Category 2. Noteworthy among them are our 45-, month-old, $16,326,36 claim against Air Vietnam for damage incurred by Porter N184L on 5 July, 1965 (our local file now contains 72 different pieces of paper); our 27-months-old effort (now amounting to 75 pieces of paper) to settle, to the satisfaction of offices and parties concerned, the case of Mr. Hua Khac PHUOC, who was killed by a Vietnamese military vehicle on 31 Dec, 1966; lease-renewal negotiations on the SGN hostel and the BMSGN residence; and others, such as liaison with the Cafeteria, Base Manual revisions, etc.

4. Category 3 includes continuing attempts to gather vehicle census data from employees and GTD while the Embassy, which wants this data for the GVN, repeatedly changes instructions; attempts through the Embassy, to retrieve vehicle registration cards - and vehicles themselves - from the Vietnamese National Police, who are confiscating them for non-payment of the controversial Vietnam road tax, which the Embassy for the past 13 months has been advising our employees not to pay; etcetera.

5. Category 4. Because of annual leave, illness, resignation and TDY, the Base Manager's staff operated at about 69% of capacity during the month.

IV. COMMUNICATIONS

1. Since it was notified that CPA has confirmed by letter to ship Company mail pouch SGN-HKG-SGN, and per DCD's instructions that one Company mail pouch must be shipped from each end each day 7 days a week, we started to use this service immediately. But it is not one each 7 days in a week because mail bag and personnel shortage problem. However, M/C was advised that they must follow up this new system of handling from April 1969.

2. Message Traffic

	February	March
Incoming	6901	8111
Outgoing	9851	1831

V. SAFETY

1. Pilot meetings

Following safety topics were discussed at pilot meetings in March

1. Necessity of visually checking Beech and VTB landing gear members several times daily for obvious fatigue, misalignment, and overloaded down stops.

2. Continued emphasis on SAFE 15, Safety Comment, as the pilot's tool for accident prevention.

3. Operational Hazard Reports continue to flow in regarding traffic violations by AAM aircraft. Attention was drawn to page 5 of the March Tactical Aerodrome Directory for South Vietnam. General rules are given for traffic at uncontrolled airfields. Non-compliance with these rules will continue to result in OHR's. Some pilots ignore NOTAMS which set up traffic control by Combat Control Teams at forward airfields.

2. Investigation

There are 8 investigations in varying degrees of completion. Hopefully, 6 of them will be processed forward to Taipei by the end of April.

3. Safety Suggestions

SAFE 15, Safety Comments for March:

02 March - Helio pilot comment on XW-PBY accident of 3 January 1969. Suggests tighter precautionary measures in bad weather. Forward to DSAFE.

04 March - Change USAID radio antennae blinkers to shorter intervals. These obstructions lights have been altered to burn steadily, were previously blinking at 50 second intervals.

05 March - Numerous gripes by one pilot about C-45 shortcomings. Still being processed locally.

05 March - Lack of response to transmissions on 118.0. Forwarded to DSAFE.

07 March - Hazards to pilot in field while loading or unloading Beech 10-2 nose baggage compartment. Forwarded to DSAFE.

07 March - Improper loading of SAT 727 at V-01 on 7 February 1969. Local investigation forwarded to DSAFE.

11 March - Army helicopter onto runway at V-14 while AAM aircraft was on take-off roll. Process through USARV - info to DSAFE.

12 March - C-47 seat belts too long at buckle portion. Forwarded to DSAFE.

12 March - C-45 lost twice on radar final at Danang because of no transponder Later cancelled IFR flight to Quang Tri because their APC not VHF equipped. Forwarded to DSAFE .

14 March - Phony radio beacon at Dong Ha. Notified all pilots, info to DSAFE.

[illegible] March - PC-6 pilot suggests green tinted plastic and fresh air louvres to [illegible]eve heat problems, and removal of cockpit curtains for better [illegible]. Forwarded to DSAFE.

4. Follow-up Action
Letter to Embassy Air Operations regarding hazards at Hon Quan, V-133.

5. Unfriendly Action

DATE	A/C Type/No.	Location	Remarks
28 Feb	C-45/95922	WR3535	Under overcast at 600', PIC came under 5 sec SA fire, climbed into overcast to avoid.
02 Mar	204B/N1306X	BT1249	2-3 sec SA fire at 1000', PIC turned tai toward fire.
02	204B/N1306X	BT1747	A/C hit in belly by one rd SA while at 1400'. Rd passed through fwd pax seat through roof and lodged in spoiler stabilizer. No injuries.
08	C-46/B928	BS5972	A/C took 2 hits by AW while turning final for rwy 10 at V-23 at 800'. 1 rd leading edge of left wing, 1 rd through belly damaged elevator turnbuckle. No injuries.
12	10-2/N77Y	XR4293	A/C drew AW fire while at 1500' on long final for V-52. Climbed out and made close-in approach.
13	C-47/994	BT1510	A/C drew 10 sec AW while descending at 1800'. Evaded by diving right hand turn.
22	204B/N8512F	BT0454	A/C drew 3 rds SA while flying at 50' below WX. Increased airspeed and descende to know friendly area. Did not climb because of traffic above.
24	204B/N1303X	BT2424	A/C drew 1 short burst AW while at 2400' with sling load. No hits.
30	204B/N1306X	BS7332	A/C drew 5-8 rds SA, and 2 5-6 sec bursts of AW enroute between sites at 1000'. No hits, reported to Army gunships in vicinity.
31	204B/N1306X	BS2217	A/C drew 2-5 rds SA, and 2 bursts of AW enroute at 1200' due to WX. No hits.

6. Minor Incident/Inflight Irregularity

Date	A/C Type/No.	Location	Remarks
07	C-46/B146	Cheo Reo	CORDS jeep driven by Homer Chae, V-27 dented left elevator tip just after A/C parked on ramp. Pilot says this also a potential hazard at V-04. Requests to customer through OM V-07, to correct have been fruitless.

10	10-2/N9573Z	V-03	Left engine very rough and backfired just after take-off. PIC feathered and landed after engine quit. Replaced carburetor and # 3 cylinder.

7. Accident Reports (SAFE 4)

Date	A/C Type/No.	Location	Remarks
02	VTB/N9838Z	V-133	A/C substantially damaged on landing. Under investigation, suspect hard landing.
Unk	C-47/16147	Unk	Rudder bracket found cracked on # 2 Svc at V-01. Suspect A/C parked w/o control locks.
06	10-2/N5269V	V-02	Left main tire flat on landing, no obvious damage.
07	C-46/B146	V-27	Damaged elevator tip described in SAFE 9 above.
08	C-46/B928	V-23	Bullet damage described in Hostile fire above.
09	PC-6/N192X	V-01 Ramp	Aft cabin door blew open on run-up frame broken and latch pushed in. Not locked prior to run-up.
12	Helio/B839	V-132	Engine and prop being removed as unit, due prop could not be pulled. Engine assy and hoist tipped over in strong wind one prop blade bent rearward.
12	C-45/N9855Z	V-01 Ramp	10-2 was being run up by mechs 15' in front of 55Z. 55Z was improperly chocked (too close proximity anyway). 55Z blew back into APU damaging left elevator.
13	2C4B/N1304X	XT9125	A/C substantially damaged when M/R blade struck tree on take-off. Under investigation, suspect engine FCU malfundtion.
14	PC-6/N152L	V-07	Parking brake failed to release on left brake. Left brake, wheel assy, and tire damaged beyond repair when PIC attempted to taxi.

16	PC-6/N285L	V-01 Ramp	AES mech ran APU into lower right nose section. 6-8" cut in skin. Improper operation of ramp equipment.
22	PC-6/N185K	V-14	Rotor wash from CH-47 caused right wing tip to scrape ground on landing. No SAFE 9 or PIC statement has been submitted.
23	Helio/B875	V-17	LH inboard flap bellcrank found broken. Suspect flaps extended at too high airspeed.
25	C-46/B926	V-27	Left main tire blew while taxiing on parking ramp. Casing gave way or recap parted. Numerous large rocks at Cheo Reo.
28	Helio/B867	V-01	Fuselage and wing found damaged during unloading from B1014. Airshipped from TNN to SGN.

FLYING

1. Many resignations were tendered during the month of March. Three captains in the C-47 program. In addition Capt JB Henson was terminated. F/O's [redacted] Brown, J.F. tendered their resignation during the month. Capt Aultman submitted his as well. Captains Ball and Aultman, [redacted] resignations are to be e effective during the month of April. It was felt the C47 resignations would be of benefit until the trend in flying time started rising. We could have used all four captains who departed during the month very nicely.

2. Our advertisement in the Saigon Daily newspapers for pilot positions to be filled was answered by one prospect. The review of his qualifications posed some questions not previously considered. What are the minimum qualifications? The question was asked of DFD. The answer was in accordance with the MFD manual "FAA Commercial license with an instrument rating". If these are the qualification it is most dubious that any of the indigenous applicants would ever qualify. If the qualifications in the MFD manual were amended to "Equivalent of FAA commercial license with instrument rating" what aircraft would they be allowed to crew? It is by word of month that all new applicants for pilot positions require a STANINE examination. For this requirement we were referred to PMBKK. [redacted] Enlifhtenment on these questions would be rewarding.

3. We were not free from accidents during the month. We suffered two major accidents. Preliminary investigation is indicative of material failure in both accidents. One accident VTB N9838Z experienced landing gear failure and Bell 204 N1304X encountered power failure on lift off. Minor injuries were incurred only in the 204 accident. No geound or traffic accidents were reported.

4. Capt JE Stallman had his car impounded by local police for non payment of the Vietnamese circulation tax. This tax was deemed not applicable by the US Embassy. We have encountered much harrassment by the local authorities heretofore. It is felt Captain Stallman's case will resolve this at last.

VII. TRAFFIC/AAM

1. No major items of interest occurred during the month. Lt. Freeman CORDS liaison officer departed for the ZI and was replaced by Mr. White.

2. Another helio was transhipped via SAT [redacted] of TAW Traffic was on hand to observe.

3. A question arose as to the authenticity of VN passengers. CORDS requested a check for 2 weeks of each VN passenger by I.D. Card against manifest and/or ticket. No unauthorized passengers were discovered.

4. Due to the many varied Supply letters issued regarding shipments of items to Bangkok on board AAM aircraft, a meeting was held between Supply/ Traffic to try and reduce the verbage to plain English. A mutual understanding of Supply and Traffic documentation was reached and a local Traffic SOP will be formulated and followed. It is noted that some Supply indicates are not passed on to Traffic while others are sometimes difficult to interpret.

The new baggage lost and found procedure has been sent to the other stations and seems to be working out as expected.

5. Statistics

	February	March
Passenger departures SGN (All Contracts)	4,805	5,957
Passenger arrivals " (" ")	5,432	7,274
Outbound cargo	77,322	94,692
Inbound cargo	90,279	120,974

VIII. HOSTEL OCCUPANCY

1. During March 1969, only 74 beds were occupied for a percentage of 47.7%. In compliance with Internal Auditor Report, the hostel report will be computed on a five bed availability basis for each day. During this period a total of 5 non-availability slips were issued.

IX. PERSONNEL

(See Personnel Strength Attachment A)

X. MEDICAL

1. Number of sick call: 1989

2. Accident: 71, and only two of them were considered to be a little more serious.

3. Miscellaneous cases: 1) [redacted] Operations Dispatcher and [redacted] of Emergency Equipment both suffered from food poisoning after eating ham and cheese sandwiches in the AAM Saigon Base cafeteria. Both of them were sent to hospital for treatment. [redacted] stayed in the hospital for one day and [redacted] went home after the treatment.

2) The late [redacted] RMD Quality Control was found dead in his residence by his housekeeper at the night of March 15, 1969. Cause of death unknown.

4. Hospitalized sick call : One
Hospitalized accident : None
Unhospitalized accident: 71
Outcalls : Two

Physical examination:	1. Flight crew physical	34
	2. Pre-employment physical	15
	3. Accident flight physical	5
	Total:	54

Sanitation: Cafeteria - Fair (except two employees suffered food poison)
Toilet - Fair

Vaccination: 76

Total man days lost by reasons of sickness: 383½ days
Total man days lost by reasons of accident: 44 days

XI. SECURITY

1. On 19 March 1969 at 0.30 A.M., Tan Son Nhut airport experienced to one alert which last about 30 minutes when 3 VC rockets landed outside the VNAF security fence.

2. During this month, VC shelled the rockets almost to all parts of the South and Central Vietnam. Saigon capital had been also shelled.

- On 3 March, at 5 A.M., two rockets (one hit the Bach Dang quai, 1st precinct and another hit Do Thanh Nhan street 4th precinct and caused insignificant damage).

- On 6 March, at 6 A.M., 6 rockets hit the agglomeration of the 4th precinct, killing 22 civilians and wounding 17 others.

- On 16 March, at 6 A.M., 2 rockets (one hit the Bach Dang quai, killing 1 civilian, destroying one house and damaging 10 vehicles; another hit the 9th precinct, no damage was reported).

- On 30 March, 3 rockets (2 landed at 4th precinct and another landed at 9th precinct, no damage was reported).

3. Several insignificant terrorism cases were noted during this month in Saigon capital. On 30 March at 10 A.M., the main post office located at Nguyen van Trach street, Cholon was blown up by terrorism causing serious damage to the building.

4. These VC activities proved the presence of the VC in all the parts of the South and Central Vietnam as well as to support the political objective of the communists at Paris Peace Talk as so far it does not bring any success to the communists of North Vietnam and meantime by the political military activities to make a pressure to the Republic Government of Vietnam to a direct negotiation with the Liberation Front of South Vietnam for the fate of South Vietnam.

XII. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. Aircraft Maintenance production in all SVN Stations, measured in flights handled, overnight checks, heavy service checks, and shop support work increased along with the approximately 23% increase in flying over the

month of February (a short month with a long holiday). Flying and the relative workload were still down from that of January by approximately 20%.

2. Unscheduled workload as measured in aircraft delays recoveries, premature replacements, incidents and accidents indicated slight improvement in relation to flying hours. We hope this to be the beginning of an upward trend; however, the trend is questionable only because of two accidents, still under investigation for cause: A landing gear failure on Volpar N9838Z, which has been repaired and returned to service; and Helicopter N1304X.

3. The Can Tho RMD Project continues to go well, and has helped practically to eliminate recoveries from that station.

The curfew restrictions at the airport still requires working unbalanced shifts, which is an obstacle to the reduction of CTO and best man power utilization.

4. Visits to SVN by DGM and MAC from Tainan, and S/POL VTE were beneficial to SVN Stations, and it is hoped that we will see more of such visits.

5. The drive towards "Safety Thinking" continued with the installation of additional aircraft grounding pins; fire extinguisher and ramp equipment marking and location, etc. Decidedly noticeable improvement was made at all SVN Stations in general housekeeping, and in equipment and facilities appearance. The review of all SVN refueling equipment this month promises improvement in aircraft fuel servicing equipment and procedures. Recertification of personnel for taxi, towing and run up continues as a regular program.

6. Facilities continue to improve with the near completion of the Utilities Tunnel; with continued progress on the West Ramp repaving project, now estimated at approximately mid-May completion; with approval for completion of the South Ramp wall; and with approval for the Communications Transmitter Building installation.

7.

Company Services

	February	March	
Transit	346	415	[illegible]
Overnight	636	701	[illegible]
No. 1 Service	27	29	[illegible]
No. 2 "	25	22	[illegible]
No. 3 "	5	5	[illegible]
No. 4 "	0	2	[illegible]
Engine change	16	20	25

Line Items

	February	March	
Requisitions	4225	2983	2330
Receipts	2843	2501	3191
Store Issues	5556	6421	6901
Stock Credits	264	643	310
Posted to cards	17689	17857	19556

M. Hulse
Base Manager

SAIGON BASE

MARCH 1969

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted]												TOTAL	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	52	188	188	17	213	1	36	5	612#	15**	2	2	1*	1106	226
TEMPORARY															
FTC															
PRE-PROCESSED									13					13	
TOTAL	52	188	188	17	213	1	36	5	625#	15**	2	2	1*	1119	226

(*) : 1 Swiss
(**) : 1 French
(#) : 4 French

GROUND PNL : 1119
FLIGHT PNL : 226
TOTAL : 1345

ATTACHMENT " A "

DA NANG SUB-BASE

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted]						TOTAL	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	4		16		31		111	162
TEMPORARY								
FTC								
PRE-PROCESSED					1		3	4
TOTAL	4		16		32		114	166

GROUND PNL : 166

FLIGHT PNL : 0

TOTAL : 166

NHA TRANG SUB-BASE

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted]				TOTAL	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	7		16	29	86	138
TEMPORARY						
FTC						
PRE-PROCESSED					2	2
TOTAL	7		16	29	88	140

GROUND PNL : 140

FLIGHT PNL : 0

TOTAL : 140

MEMORANDUM

TO : BM/SGN

DATE : 04 March, 1969

FROM : A/SZDNG

REF. No. SZDNG/69/019

SUBJECT : DANANG Station Monthly Report for February, 1969

The month of February proved to be another productive month in the area of facilities improvements. Much of the work in the operations/ administration building has been completed - the most significant outstanding project is the installation of signs. A few have been received from Saigon and installed, however many more remain on order and their arrival is expected within the month of March.

Continued emphasis has been placed on preparing the ground in the area of the nose hangar for concreting. Excuvation to the desired depth was accomplished by the USAF grading (after their normal duty hours) and dirt removal by the Civic Action Group who were in need of dirt fill. Forms have been laid for concreting approximately 120 ft X 13 ft which will extend from the present ramp to the nose hangar. On completion of this section the process will be repeated until area is completed to the edge of the perimeter drainage ditch. Actual pouring of concrete is expected to begin about 5 March and construction will continue through this reporting period.

Painting of walls and ceilings in the old hostel continues. To date all rooms in the main building have been painted, but one complete room and the walls of a second in the back rooms remain to be done. Following this, planned are: interior woodwork painting, tiling floors in all back rooms, painting showers, hanging curtains (in back rooms), hanging pictures, tiling floors in back showers and painting dividers. Target date for completion of the above had been set for 15 March 1969, but due to the first day of TET falling. On Monday several workers failed to report for duty on the following Friday & Saturday, and presumably planned a full week of holidays, thus causing project completion date to be slipped. Work schedules were further hampered due to the airfield being closed to Vietnamese personnel on both Sunday and Monday (24 & 25 February), as results of the recent attacks on the cityand Airbase.

While hostile activity was unexpectedly quiet during the TET season the anticipation became a reality on the night of 20 February. Action that night throughout the area resulted in a 24 hour curfew on the Airbase which was later revised to 0700L to 1800L (for VN personnel) with in town curfew being revised to 0600L to 1900L. While Danang curfews do not normally pertain to US & TCN personnel, it has been highly recommended that only essential travel be conducted, until the situation improves, by these cateogory of personnel after curfew hours.

CS-4 R2

Deadline for the renewal of the Company NSA credit account was set at 1 February. This was accomplished in a timely manner, after the approving authority had ascertained the Companys authorized participation and emphasized the Company's responsibilities in prohibiting illegal transactions of these duty free products, and reminded that NSA procurement would be authorized only for items to be used in South Vietnam.

Due to the TET holidays, and the local activity which followed, these were fewer apportunities for visiting personnel to observe the station under normal operating conditions. Still, quite a few visitors did arrive and we hope they benefited from their visit with us as we profited by our visit with them.

One significant change which transpired during this period was the assignment of CM Jack Burton, on the 28th. This is Jack's second tour of duty at Danang and we have every reason to believe that we will experience the same fine performance that he displayed during his first tour.

Original Signed By
L. G. PARRISH
L. G. Parrish

cc: file

M O N T H L Y R E P O R T
N H A - T R A N G
APRIL 1969

GENERAL

Mr. H. CHUNDY and Mr. M. HULSE paid a visit to NHA this month. All personnel are proud of NHA and appreciate the interest shown in the visit.

The month went by calmly. We were mortered and rocketed on 21 April with no damage to AAK property or personnel. This was the only incident during April. May might prove more active if HUMAN is correct. We hope not.

TRAFFIC

A. GENERAL

Station Traffic activities declined slightly in April compared to March. This resulted from runway closures on April 18th and 19th in preperation for and celebration of VietNam Air Force day. Another contributing factor was the mechanical problems on our C46 and C41 aircraft. From the Traffic standpoint, the month passed rather smoothly with only minor operational problems handeled well.

Better contract over cabin equipment (Thermos Jugs, Fans; etc) is being exercised and a decrease in losses is expected. One female employee was terminated when it was learned that she had taken at least one unit home.

New gate signs, and new fences were installed and a new baggage-conveyer system completed this month.

B. STATISTICS

		April	Last Mo.	1968
PASSENGERS				
	Departing	3580	3411	2659
	Arriving	3522	3407	1200
CARGO				
1. Ground services				
	Departing (Lbs)	376,229	347,309	446,499
	Arriving (Lbs)	234,530	284,187	244,341
	TOTAL	610,759	631,496	690,840
2. COMPANY CARGO				
	Departing	17,337	12,066	6,498
	Arriving	24,735	22,315	13,642
	TOTAL	42,072	34,381	20,140

...2

3. GRAND TOTAL (1+2)

Departing	393,566	359,375	452,997
Arriving	259,265	306,502	257,983

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

From this point of view, the relationship between ourselves and the customers has shown some improvement. We are back to speaking to each other and there appears to be less tension in the air. There were two occasions on which SZ/NHA played the role of moderator between department heads and customer but, all in all, relations were quiet. Better improvement is expected as we work out our problems together.

OPERATIONS

A. GENERAL

The first 20 days of April ran rather smoothly however, the last 11 days very hectic due to extensive maintenance problems. The situation now appears back to normal. Maintenance problems and customer cut back in scheduling resulted in a slower than usual month. The 4395 contract reduced its aircraft by one PC6C "Porter" but, we have added another VTB "Volpar" with the signing of the 0069 contract. This becomes effective 1 May 1969.

B. FLIGHT FREQUENCY (See attached)

C. ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURES COMPARISON

	This No.	Last No.	Last year
Arrivals	573	614	649
Departures	571	611	654
Hon's	324	340	309

D. DELAYS 31 39 -

Percentage on time Departures	95% 94%

E. ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS . . . . None

FISCAL

The accounting Representative has been made custodian of the piaster working fund. We are in process of having SZ/NHA custodian of the PFC fund but, will be handeled by the Accounting Representative.

LEGAL

No major problems -

. . . 3 . .

SECURITY

The one problem involving an assult on our security representative has been reported to CSY/SGN. In an attempt to be certain of our A/C gas deliveries, Security/Nha now "Spot" monitors deliveries to the aircraft. This supplements the RMD efforts. Each delivery checked is compared with the fuel delivery slip.

TECHNICAL SERVICES

	This No.	Last No.	Last year
1. Transient services . . .	449	326	340
2. Overnight services . . .	324	340	309
3. Engine changes ; ; .	11	2	3
4. Prepeller changes . . .	1	1	-
5. No. 1 services . . .	5	6	10
6. No. 2 services . . .	1	1	3
7. Delays (Maint/Mech) . .	17	10	7
8. Intermediate services . .	1	1	-
9. AGP's . . .	21	16	-
10. Cutline recoveries . . .	3	4	1
11. Accident report (CA/C) . .	3	3	1
12. Accidnet report (FNL) . .	0	1	1

Work load this month increased sharpely due primarily to a rash of engine changes. We had 11 engine changes this month versus a "Norm" of two or three. AGP incidents assisted in accounting for the increase in delays.

ELECTRIC MAINTENANCE

The UHF/VHF relay was finally put back into service on 25 April with no outages since that time. The performance of this unit, while effective, still does not perform as well as it can. We are testing the unit for further improvements.

SUPPLY

Activities reasonably routine. Area given thorough cleaning and refurnishing including painting inside warehouse and floors.

ADMINISTRATION

No major problems encountered. Have established a construction work request system for minor maintenance and upkeep of the area. This allows the Chief Mechanic to schedule the general maintenance personnel a day or two in advance.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

Dan Lawson

DAN LAWSON
SE-MPA

MONTHLY FLIGHT TIME REPORT

NHA TRANG VIETNAM

APRIL 19 69

CONTRACT	0041		4395		NON-REVENUE	
TYPE A/C	BLOCK TIME	FLT TIME	BLOCK TIME	FLT TIME	BLOCK TIME	FLT TIME
C-46	145+06	111+09	-	-	2+42	1+57
C-47	219+05	162+01	-	-	1+36	1+20
VIB	314+14	266+09	94+13	78+11	3+40	2+47
P06C	34+34	31+27	83+55	79+56	2+10	1+43
U-2/C-45	125+06	99+42	-	-	2+45	1+54
[illegible]	22+55	22+55	53+34	53+34	1+05	1+05
SUB TOTAL:	865+00	716+23	236+42	211+41	13+58	10+46

GRAND TOTAL: BLOCK TIME: 1115+40 FLT TIME: 938+50

OM NHA _____

cc: BM SGN
SQM SGN
SZ NHA
FILE

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
APRIL 1969

I. GENERAL

The overall situation in Vietnam remains about the same. The direct military pressure on Saigon has decreased but the terrorist activities continue unabated. Danang has received the majority of rocket attacks during the past month. There were six attacks in Danang compared with one attack in Saigon.

2. The overall activities remain approximately the same as the previous month. Flying time for the month was 8053 + 36 hours which was approximately 100 hours below the previous month. The Helio program for Vietnam ended on 30 April. It is expected there will be some Helio flying, but it will be extremely low. The movement of the Helio aircraft out of Vietnam has been requested.

3. The VN-41 COTR has departed on Home Leave and customer relations continue to improve.

II. FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT

There is one major and several minor projects underway and progressing slowly. The West Ramp is approximately 60% completed. There have been several delays due to police refusing to let the contractors trucks on base. This is a continual problem for all small contractors.

2. Several of the smaller projects, i.e. Revetment walls, Utility Tunnel, Lighting, Antenna Relocation etc.. are in various stages of completion. It is hoped most of these will be completed during the month of May.

III. OPERATIONS

1. Actual flight time for April was approximately 400 hours more than forecasted. This was primarily due to the VN-41 customer acquiring an additional Porter. Also there were more special VIP flights than normally scheduled.

2. Toward the end of April the VN-41 customer was advised to implement additional cost reductions. As a result they dropped all Helios from contract effective 1 May 1969. This should not drastically effect the over-all flying picture as the customer will probably schedule more effectively the Porter and Beech aircraft. Dropping the Helios from contract will present a manning problem for the Flying Department as the Helios will only fly as spares when the Porter commitments can not be made.

3. Effective 1 May 1969 a Volpar was assigned to the new 0069 contract; adding an additional 85 hours/month to this program.

4. There has been a noticeable reduction in controllable departure delays. BM, MTS, MFD, SRTM and SOM are receiving each night, at their homes, a revised printed schedule for the following day. This way, Department Heads are

finding errors which might result in a delay which previously were not found until the following morning. The same Department Heads are receiving advance notification on forms of VIP flights and they are giving these flights their personal attention.

5. Senior Operations Specialist made an Orientation Trip to VTE and UDN last month. We will attempt to schedule this trip for all of our OMs and OPSPs this year.

Flight Time Report (See Attachment A)

Aircraft Incidents (See Attachment D)

IV. TRAFFIC/USAID

1. Statistics

	Cargo (including AF Caribou A/C)	
	March	April
Outbound (Lbs) SGN	1,556,474	1,544,585
Inbound (lbs) SGN	141,568	80,117

TRAFFIC/AAM

1. TM/SGN has been fulfilling the additional duties of SRTM since 15 April during SRTM TCS to Danang.

2. There have been no major items of importance during the month with shipments of both passengers and cargo going fairly smoothly. No complaints have been received from the customers and on a couple of accasions they have been heard to pass on complimentary remarks.

3. We have been handling increased amount of CAX cargo, therefore have begun reporting total movement with this report.

4. A new contract was effected so that we now handle passengers for 4 separate activities.

5. Statistics

	March	April
Passenger departures SGN (All Contracts)	5,957	6,144
Passenger arrivals " (" ")	7,274	7,633
Outbound cargo	94,692	116,067
Inbound cargo	120,974	119,553

V. HOSTEL OCCUPANCY

1. During April, only 93 beds out of 150 were occupied during this period for a percentage of 62% occupancy. Also during this period, a total of two Non-availability slips were issued.

VI. GROUND TRANSPORTATION

(See Attachment B)

VII. MEDICAL

1. Number of sick call: 1710

2. Accident: 65. One traffic accident causing two utilitymaids died instantly and [illegible]racture case.

(a) [redacted] RGMD - Mech. 1/C was assigning working night shift to take care of the water pump & power unit. When he found that one water pump located in front of Main Building was out of order, he tried to start the engine, in order to supply water to the cafeteria, while cranking the engine his hand slipped and cut the little finger of his right hand resulting in fracture & laceration. He was treated in the 7th Day Adventist Hospital, Saigon.

(b) The late [redacted] both RGMD Utilitymaids - April 5, 1969, [redacted] was riding her Honda going home after work from AAM base with [redacted] sitting on the back seat. On the Bien Hoa highway about a few miles from Binh Thanh, a big Army truck came from the other side of the road hitting them right in the front. Both of them died instantly on the accident spot. [redacted] was 3½ months pregnant [redacted] was 9 months pregnant.

3. Hospitalized sick call: 3

4. Hospitalized accident: 1

5. Unhospitalized accident: 64

6. Outcalls: 9

7. Physical examination:

1.	Flight crew phy.	21
2.	Pre-employment phy.	11
3.	Accident flight phy.	1
	Total:	33

8. Sanitation: Cafeteria - Fair - It is suggested that air conditioners be installed in the cafeteria. A few ceiling fans are not able to keep the room cool enough especially during lunch time when all tables are occupied.

9. Vaccination: 78

10. Total man days lost by reasons of sickness: 374 days

11. Total man days lost by reasons of accident: 169 "

VIII. PERSONNEL
(See Attachment C)

IX. FLYING
1. Three more resignations were submitted during the month. Captain Koch, F/Os [redacted] with F/O [redacted] to be effective during the month of May.

2. No other indigenous applicant for pilot positions were received. The questions submitted in the Monthly Report for last month were answered. A general pilots' meeting was conducted on 8 April. The main topic was VN-41

Customer requirement in FSO's. This customer has adamantly avered that no payment would be made on deviated FSO's. All trips flown by our crews has to be entered on the FSO prior to flight and attested to by a customer representative. The schedule "Customer Direction" is no longer a valid order.

3. April was an accident free month. It is hoped that we have accident proneness out of our system for the rest of the year. No ground nor traffic accidents were reported. We had one incident of note which is still under investigation. This is an alledged misapplication of flap control during a minimum run take-off in a C-47.

4. The incident involving Captain Stallman's car ended with a typical indigenous twist. The American Embassy wrote many pieces of correspondence protesting the action by the National Police. The Minister of Finance withdrew the order of payment of circulation tax on tax exempt automobiles. On 5 April, after one week of having his car impounded, Captain Stallman's car was released along with the coveted registration papers. A few more registration papers on other cars were released as well. Three days later the Minister of Finance reversed his order. We are now required to pay the circulation tax.

5. All but two Helio Courier are off contract. Effective 1 May 1969 the final two Helios will be dropped from contract. This poses an acute problem in finding a new home for old Helio pilots. There was some rumor that three of these pilots would be transferred to Vientiane. This question has been posed to DFD without answer. Regardless we plan to train four Helio pilots into the PC6C.

6. Beech - Due to Customer changing to Volpar on many of their requirements the Beechcraft program has taken quite a set back, however, we feel we have reached a leveling off point now.

We flew over 1000 hours the month of April and should fly about the same during the month of May.

Beechcraft program has enjoyed 67 accident free days. Think safety and fly safely.

7. C46 & C47 - To fulfill C123 manning requirements at Vientiane, we were assessed with the requirement to furnish 3 nominees.

Forecast hours for the month were:	C46	718 hours	- 789 hours flown
	C47	838 "	- 994 " "

8. Helio - April was a bad month for the Helio program 1004 hours were forecast but only 759 hours were flown.

The VH-41 customer has removed all Helios from his inventory effective 1 May and the program is about dead.

9. PC6C - The April flight time estimate of 1633 hours was exceeded by approximately 400 hours and only one of the twenty-eight captains assigned failed to make minimums. This pilot was on company business and after returning could not catch up even though sent to a high time station.

This time increase is due mainly to the PC6 assuming the work load of the Helios which went off contract with both customers on 1 May 1969. We had contemplated checking out two Sr. F/Os but are holding this in abeyance until the problem of what to do with Helio PIC's can be resolved.

The pilot morale situation, which is good, seems to be most negatively influenced by the low flight hours per duty day which this month was 3.8 hours per duty day with the average duty days being twenty. This is in keeping with the previous month and seems to be quite normal when dead heads, night standby, airport standby, home standby, etc. are considered.

Barring any serious incidents and with continued increasing reliability on the Garrett power plant the coming month should approximate a new high for the SVN Porter program.

10. VTB - Projected flight time for April was 1,000 hours. This proved to be quite a close estimate as 970 aircraft hours were flown.

Four Beech pilots were cross-trained into the VTB during the month.

We have started a project to train every pilot in FCF procedures by taking them on test flights. The training value is well worth while even though they may not be designated as test pilots.

11. 204B - April has shown a slight increase in flight time over last month. The total hours for the month were 1250.

Tainan again is costing the program flying time. In March two helicopters were grounded for a period of 17 days for engines. This month we are again hurting for engines, with one helicopter grounded at the present time. The fuel control problem is a growing concern.

The average pilot time for the month should be about 83 hours. This in itself is a good morale builder.

X. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. April was a good month in that Customer/Company funding approvals were received for several long-awaited projects i.e. additional toilets for RMD, Fire Brigade Building, water system expansion, Nose Hanger Lean-To (DNG), Motorcycle Shed (NHA) and Nose Hangar Lean-To (NHA). The majority of these projects will be executed by outside contractors. The availability of contractors to accept these small construction projects is something new for us. In the past, we have always had to do these projects with in-house manpower. Our daily Preventive Maintenance of buildings and ground equipment took second place and suffered considerably. Construction Work Request (CWR) type projects were very slow in getting done, as manpower from the Plant Maintenance Shops were overloaded on "Major" construction projects. Hopefully

now we can devote the proper time and manpower into developing a good custodial service and an effective preventative maintenance system of buildings and ground equipment.

2. The overall flying hours was down some 300 hours from the previous month. Actually this is about average considering a 30 day month with one holiday. We can expect to see our flying hours average out to something like 250-270 hours for each calendar day. Flying time per aircraft on station has increased, as we transferred four C45 types to Tainan in March and two H395 types to Laos in April. We expect to send three more H395 types to Udorn next month, yet we have received only one PC6C as additional.

3. This month saw RMD plagued with tire/wheel shortages on Porters, Helios and Volpars. It got so bad that we had two Helios in the hangar with main wheel assys removed, in order to keep the other Helio's flying. A Porter in Can Tho had to ferry to Saigon where the last spare main wheel assy was. A Volpar VIP flight that came in with a main tire scuffed had to get a tire from a bird in the hangar undergoing heavy service. The stock levels are established but are not being maintained. Engine oil coolers were in shortage again this month. The revised engine change sheets call for the oil cooler to be replaced, no matter what the reason is for the engine being changed. This is a very good precautionary maintenance practice, but we must be supported with spare coolers or suffer lost revenue flying hours. When an engine is being replaced for reasons other than internal metal failure and the oil system inspection reveals no contamination, it is almost a crime to ground the aircraft when a spare oil cooler is not available. We has about six aircraft grounded for oil coolers during this month.

4. Spare engines were in the spot-lights again - the lack of sufficient spare engines that is. With our engine changes showing about 93% as unscheduled and only 7% scheduled, our spare engine situation is not helped. The stock levels established is adequate to meet our needs but the total spares on-station rarely even gets near 40% of that authorized. TPE-331 and T-53-11A types are the most critical shortages.

5. It would be interesting to see what our aircraft availability and flying hour figures would be if our stocks of spare parts (engines, oil coolers, tires, brakes, etc) were reasonably maintained somewhere near the established stock levels.

Company Services

	March	April
Transit	415	390
Overnight	701	760
No. 1 Service	29	27
No. 2 "	22	28
No. 3 "	5	5
No. 4 "	2	2
Engine change	20	25

Line Items	March	April
Requisitions	2983	2330
Receipts	2501	3191
StoreIssues	6421	6901
Stock Credits	643	810
Posted to cards	17957	19526

E.J. Theisen
A/Base Manager

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT

APRIL 1969.

1. Contract VN-41

A/C NO.	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
N67984	68+40	55+08	8+53	6+68
N67985	99+03	78+38	19+06	16+50
B910	149+38	123+08		
B926	131+43	100+51	2+42	1+57
B928	90+11	74+22	20+22	18+03
B138	80+28	66+43		
B146	85+01	68+22		
6147	134+28	112+38	24+49	20+13
8084	152+59	125+33		
5559	161+53	146+00		
5994	126+40	107+22		
B817	85+24	69+06	21+52	19+37
B829	157+15	22+02	0+55	0+35
6083	131+03	108+05		
N544Y	30+54	25+40		
N9518Z	84+02	71+37	0+25	0+21
N6154U	52+46	39+12	2+05	1+24
N9956Z	99+45	84+01		
N7770B	53+33	43+45	17+43	14+34
N9838Z	102+57	88+25	3+34	2+07
N9664C	18+54	14+46	22+17	18+36
N9577Z	11+36	9+04	13+47	11+29
N3728G	59+17	49+38	9+16	6+12
N9671C	8+10	6+57	2+09	1+35
N3674G	75+00	64+03		
N7695C	16+55	14+36		
N91295	11+13	8+49		
N9521Z	110+36	90+00	4+35	1+11
N9573Z	89+18	73+10	9+34	9+22
N5269Y	140+59	114+16	0+47	0+20
N77I	87+30	75+02	2+50	1+34
N7950C	136+55	112+19	0+57	0+43
N51259	101+18	88+40	1+00	0+35
N21412	38+47	30+33	26+43	21+25
N6622C	16+56	13+44		
N9073Z	40+53	32+52	5+21	3+26
N9871Z	71+35	57+28	1+56	1+34
N9898Z	84+51	70+10	32+27	1+35
N358F	56+32	48+02	7+21	5+12
N285L	169+17	142+56	1+05	0+35
N391R	148+22	132+17	3+12	1+51
N394R	164+43	143+06	8+18	7+09
N9444	123+39	103+32	5+38	3+23

	N198I	201+43	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	N153L	172+09	149+42	1+00	0+47
	N180K	20+05	17+33	0+59	0+44
	N12450	31+05	26+30	0+36	0+31
	N1303I	223+02		8+59	
	N130EX	122+54		2+15	
	N1306I	200+45		2+55	
	N1307I	169+31		6+45	
	N8512F	2+45			
	N8513F	12+13			
	N8514F	25+59			
	N8535F	21+42			
	B839	110+04	97+06	3+23	2+24
	B865	82+47	72+31	1+57	1+36
	B875	95+14	84+48	[illegible]	
	B867	71+55	62+49	3+[illegible]	2+27
	B869	145+03	124+03	0+[illegible]	0+20
	B857	51+28	46+06	5+55	4+47
	B849	84+36	71+48	2+54	2+28
	INFBT	40+03	36+20		
	N748N	1+25	1+07		
	N152L	17+15	15+55		
	N184L	21+00	17+57		
	N185K	3+03	2+40		
	N192I	25+44	23+21		
	N393R	11+35	10+21		
	N194I	6+24	5+44		
	Sub-total	5833+16	5015+13	294+44	238+54
2. Contract 4395					
	B138	16+20	13+20		
	B146	28+05	22+11		
	B817	46+26	34+53		
	N539I	41+08	32+39	25+40	22+21
	N544I	49+51	39+30	2+58	2+08
	N3674G	4+38	3+58	3+30	2+18
	N7695C	69+42	56+55	1+22	1+05
	N91295	52+37	42+58	3+51	2+40
	N9664C	1+07	0+42		
	N9518Z	3+26	2+26		
	N6154U	16+08	10+17		
	N7770B	4+09	3+20		
	N9638Z	8+43	6+58		
	N9577Z	27+22	20+21		
	N3728G	4+14	2+44		
	N9671C	90+47	70+31		
	N9871Z	1+21	1+00		
	N748N	100+30	90+28	0+36	0+31
	N152L	45+48	42+51	4+10	3+07
	N184L	67+41	58+39	2+55	1+53
	N185K	126+47	103+02	4+52	3+16

	N192I	111+14	97+12	1+32	0+53
	N393R	161+14	140+25	3+17	2+47
	N194I	92+44	82+40		
	N285L	2+03	1+43		
	N394R	4+48	4+14		
	N944A	12+06	10+20		
	N153L	6+03	4+53		
	N180K	14+21	13+15		
	N12450	74+04	65+43		
	B867	8+59	7+18		
	B857	10+26	8+15		
	B849	5+32	4+2[illegible]		
	XNPBS	13+46	12+1[illegible]		
	XNPBT	6+10	5+50		
	N8512F	171+50	8+40		
	N8513F	101+26	2+20		
	N8514F	111+01	10+20		
	N8535F	28+36			
	N1303I	4+29			
	N1305I	3+40			
	N1306I	2+56			
	N1307I	1+50			
	Sub-total	1756+18	1544+01	76+03	64+19
3. Contract 0005					
	N6622C	62+47	52+38		
	N9664C	3+21	2+58		
	N21412	9+19	8+26		
	N9871Z	4+36	3+45		
	B867	5+45	4+59		
	N393R	1+07	0+52		
	N8535F	5+09			
	Sub-total	92+04	78+47		
4. Contract 0069					
	N3728G	1+11	0+59		
	Sub-total	1+11	0+59		

Total Revenue Block Time	7682+49
Total Non-Revenue Block Time	370+47
Total Revenue Flight Time	6639+00
Total Non-Revenue Flight Time	303+13
GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	8053+36
GRAND TOTAL FLIGHT TIME	6942+03

Flight Time by Type of Aircraft:

Type of A/C	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
C-46	749+09	602+43	51+03	43+58
C-47	707+03	599+38	24+49	20+13

Flight Time by type of aircraft: (continue)

Bailed C-47	289+05	226+01	22+47	20+12
DHC-4	121+53	97+49	28+38	24+29
VTB	881+35	720+00	79+59	62+21
10-2 (Beech)	794+31	658+48	46+26	35+10
C-45	203+16	165+16	9+44	6+35
PC-6	1994+41	1720+22	46+36	33+29
Helio	731+48	638+35	18+31	14+32
204B	1209+48	1209+48	42+14	42+14
TOTAL	7682+49	6639+00	370+47	303+13

ATTACHMENT " A "

S A I G O N B A S E

APRIL 1969

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted]										TOTAL	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	50	182	190	17	206	1	34	6	610#	15**	3	2	1*	1096	221
TEMPORARY															
FTC															
PRE-PROCESSED									13					13	
TOTAL	50	182	190	17	206	1	34	6	623#	15**	3	2	1*	1109	221

(*) : [redacted]
(**) :
(#) :

GROUND PNL : 1109
FLIGHT PNL : 221
TOTAL : 1330

ATTACHMENT " C "

NHA TRANG SUB-BASE

APRIL 1969

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted]						TOTAL	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	8		16		29		82	135
TEMPORARY								
FTC								
PRE-PROCESSED							2	2
TOTAL	8		16		29		84	137

GROUND PNL : 137

FLIGHT PNL : 0

TOTAL : 137

DA NANG SUB-BASE

APRIL 1969

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted]				TOTAL	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	4		16		31	110	161	
TEMPORARY								
FTC								
PRE-PROCESSED					1	4	5	
TOTAL	4		16		32	114	166	

GROUND PNL : 166

FLIGHT PNL : 0

TOTAL : 166

FLIGHT INFORMATION CENTER
SAIGON
MONTHLY ACTIVITY REPORT
1-31 MARCH 1969

PART I
AIRCRAFT INCIDENTS

Date	A/C No, Type & Contract	Place	Description
02 Mar	N1306X 204B VN-41	BT 1249	Acft was enroute to V-206 when PIC heard small arms fire pass near his acft. Acft immediately departed the area. No acft damage or personnel injuries involved.
02 Mar	N1306X 204B VN-41	BT 1747 (2NM NE V-63)	Acft was enroute to QUE SON carrying a sling 2000 lb sling load when an estimated 5 to 6 enemy weapons fired on the acft. The acft sustained one hit in the forward belly area. No personnel injuries involved.
08 Mar	B-928 C-46 VN-41	BS 5972 V-23	PIC was turning in for final to rwy 10 at V-23 when the acft came under fire. Acft took two hits, one in the leading edge of the left wing - the other through the belly, dameging a turnbuckle on the elevator control cable. No personnel injury was involved.
12 Mar	N77Y 10-2 Beech VN-41	V-52	While on final approach, acft received enemy ground fire from XR 4293. PIC elected to abort approach and proceeded to climb and make a close-in approach. Acft landed without further incident. No personnel injuries or acft damage involved.
13 Mar	994 C-47 VN-41	BT 1510 3NM SE V-239	Acft was on descent to V-239. After making a turn to avoid military acft pulling of their target, the acft received ground-fire. PIC elected to make a right-hand diving evasive turn. No acft damage or personnel injuries involved.
23 Mar	N8512F 204B 4395	BT 0454	Acft was flying below weather when PIC heard three rounds directed at N8512F. PIC increased airspeed and descended. Acft continued mission without further incident. No personnel injuries or acft damage occurred.

MEMORANDUM

TO : BM/SGN

DATE: 4 April, 1969

FROM : A/SZDNG

REF. No. SZDNG/69/028

SUBJECT : DANANG Station Monthly Report for March, 1969

ABM/SGN arrived in DaNang on 29 March after one week TCS at Nha-Trang as Acting Station Manager there. At the moment he is finding the DaNang area a much more complex environment (over-all) to because adjusted to VS Nha-Trang because of geographic considerations and the immense scope of military operations in the area. Otherwise the level of AAM operations appears to be quite similar.

It is obvious my predecessor has done much in a short period of time to improve our facilities. Three major projects remain to be done: Paving of the open ramp area around the nose hangar and completion of the hangar lean-to to provide an efficient working environment for the Chief Mechanic, his staff and also automotive maintenance. These functions have been "camping out" for too long. Also the completion of our remote VHF/UHF facilities [redacted] needs stimulated action. In coordination with COMENG SGN, this will be done.

Less strategic to our local situation is our Snack-Bar operated by the Air Force NCO Club - it needs a good cleaning up plus more space to configure it into a more efficient and pleasant facility.

With the completion of the hangar lean-to, cited above, and the movement of the Chief Mechanic's office from the Administrative Operations Building, we will be in position to correct this problem.

Meanwhile the squeeze is on the Air Force management to improve their standards.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:
E. J. THEISEN

E. J. Theisen
ABM SGN/DNG
Acting SZ/DNG

cc: file

CS-4 R2

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
MAY 1969

I. GENERAL

1. With only 6755 revenue block hours, May 1969 was our lowest month in over two years. This we attribute to several factors:

a. The general decline in U.S. military and non-military activities since the commencement of the Paris Peace Talks;

b. The normal end-of-the-fiscal year doldrums which affect all U.S. Government activities;

c. A change in customer requirements which has put the Helios and Caribous out of business and is about to close out the Beech C-45's.

2. The new fiscal year should begin at a fairly stable level of approximately 6500 monthly revenue block hours. Since it is too early to make a more solid forecast, we are watching the trend closely with a view to reducing our resources should there be any further cutbacks. Although precipitate action right now would be unwise, especially while "the road ahead" is not yet too clear we are nevertheless letting normal attrition reduce our manpower gradually and painlessly.

3. Viet Cong terrorism and other harrassments continue with occasional inbound rocket and mortar ordnance to keep things tensed up, but the over-all level of conflict appears to have been reduced to that which prevailed before the infamous 1968 TET offensive. The "celebration" of Ho Chi Minh's birthday on 19 May did not materialize as advertised except for a brief increase in terrorism in Saigon and other populous cities.

4. Twenty-five [redacted] candidates and fifteen alternates have been selected from test results to attend Air America's formal technical training course at AMB Tainan. It is expected initial student input will commence within thirty days.

II. FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT

1. Contracts were signed for a Fire Brigade Station and a Toilet and Shower Facility at Saigon Base. Both projects are underway.

2. The West Ramp Paving Project is nearing completion (80% paved) and should be usable by the end of June.

3. The Cafeteria Annex will be ready for business approximately 1 July 69. This facility will be superior in size and equipment to the original Cafeteria. It will have a Vietnamese Menu featuring a VN$60 lunch whereas the Main Cafeteria, because of lower volume of business will continue [redacted]

4. The Revetment Wall project is now being erected by RCHD. Footings and columns are being poured. The Base Area Lighting Project will get underway when materials arrive from Japan.

It should be noted that the Saigon Electric Power Company is preparing a

proposal to provide Air America with an additional 200 KVA of badly needed power; a Proforma AR will be initiated upon receipt of the proposal.

5. A & M Enterprise completed the South Ramp Revetment Wall Project. The Utilities Building is well underway. The TSN Common Use Water Well and Distribution Systems jointly funded by AAM, PAA and AVH via advanced water rent will start soon.

6. At Danang Station a contract was signed for the erection of the Nose Hangar Leanto. Contractor has begun excavation and foundation work.

At Nha Trang, two contracts were signed, one for the erection of a Nose Hangar Leanto and one for a Parking Lot and Scooter Shed to be located behind the Nose Hangar. Proforma ARs have been initiated for the completion of the Concrete Paving and for a Power Distribution System including a city power hook-up.

III. FISCAL

1. Customer Relations - A number of routine contacts were made with each of the two primary contracts and no serious problems were encountered. The VN-41 customer requested information on obtaining "carnay cards" for flight crew purchasing of POL for GFA of locations where Esso is not available. The customer was advised that the company cannot obtain these cards - that it is the function and responsibility of customer personnel to provide such for these particular aircraft.

2. General Comments: The subject of the T Reports has come under discussion again, here in Saigon, as it did during my recent assignment in Vientiane. It has been discussed with base management here in Saigon and several department heads passing through Saigon. No one I have discussed the T reports with are able to read them much less effectively use them. It would seem that there is a great cost incurred by the company for a report that serves no great meaningful purpose in the field since it seems a "well guarded secret" just what goes into the various accounts including how allocations are made. Several department heads have expressed a keen dislike at having certain "Base expenses" charged to their particular department, instead of a method of allocation being established to distribute many of these costs to the using departments.

3. The Monthly Base Manager's Report was briefly discussed with the ABM, with the current formats for the T Report and Base Manager's Report, management is unable to determine how the two are related and how they harmonize if they indeed do.

IV. FLYING

1. Flying time has undoubtedly been the greatest source of perplexity for all. Lack of flying time affects the pilots, and the spasmodic utilization of aircraft induces havoc in crew scheduling and crew manning. At present the morale in the Porter Program is excellent, in the 10-2 Program is good and in the others, comme-ci comme-ca. The VTB Program has proved our biggest

headache. We are confronted with long duty days and low flying time for the pilots. The present utilization factor for manning the VTB has proved useless. We are attempting to counteract these deficiencies with dual qualification. We have dual-qualified quite a few 10-2 pilots into the VTB, but manning has prevented training the VTB pilots into other aircraft. At best it is a "one-at-a-time" deal.

The Helio Program was another source of mal-contentment. That is until we received the order to put the remaining Helios in storage. This allowed full concentration on training those pilots who were covering the spare Helios. The storage of the Helios also gave us an excellent source for Porter Program input. The flight time from the Helio Program was picked up by the Porter Program. This levied an additional requirement for Porter pilots to fill the gap.

2. All plans came to a screeching halt with the proposal of reverting four Junior captains to F/O. This will entail cross training two more VTB pilots and possibly three more Porter pilots from another source. We are at present training two pilots to fill gaps in the C46 program. Since the flight time in the C47 program has deteriorated this is an excellent source. All programs will be reviewed.

Beech

1. The Beech program finished the month with approximately 1019 hours. Programmed flight time for June should be about the same. All proficiency and route checks are current at the present. The Beechcraft program had 98 accident and incident free days.

C-46

1. Forecast time for the month was 695 hours and actual time was 741 hours. This made a lot of people very happy/ Two captains were transferred to Vientiane which put the work on the balance of captains.

2. The customer has indicated that he will increase the utilization of the C46 and cut down on the C47. Time will tell. There were no accidents or incidents for the month.

C47

1. Forecast flight time for the C-47 was 942 hours and actual time flown was 653 hours. Few of the assigned pilots made minimums. If the trend continues, serious thought will be given to cross-checking some C47 PIC's in the C46 to spread the time and the wealth more evenly.

DHC-4

Caribous are still unemployed. An off-the-top guess projected 121 hours for the month and 77+49 aircraft hours were flown. Captains averaged 38 hours and First Officers 20.

H-395

1. During May there were no Helios on contract; however, we flew 31+08 revenue hours of which 12+08 were flown for the 4395 customer and 19 hours for the 0041 customer. The 19 hours resulted from ferrying three helios to LOS (B865-B869 & B857). 12+45 hours of non-revenue were flown. The non-

revenue hours consisted of three proficiency checks one route check 2 airfield check outs and test flights.

2. Three of our cross qualified pilots were deleted from the program, and six were transferred to other programs: five to the PC6C and one to the DHC-4. Of the six remaining captains, 3 are on leave.

3. The AMF did not get 40 hours nor did any of the line captains get 70 hours as the entire program flew only 44 hours total. June looks even more grim unless we can cross-qualify some of our Helio pilots into other programs to enable them to get some flight time and maintain some degree of proficiency.

PC6

1. This month lived up to expectations, the PC6 program logged an all-time high of 2385 hours with no accidents or major incidents.

2. Average pilot time was approximately 85 hours with two pilots exceeding the maximum time allowable by four hours each. In one case the PIC informed us of his reaching 90 hours and all efforts to relieve him at VO7 prior to exceeding 100 hours failed. Nha Trang consistently is low time for the PC6 but in this case VTB's in maintenance created a requirement for the Porter. The other PIC was negligent and has been reprimanded.

2. PC6 total time is inflated somewhat due to considerable non-revenue training time being charged to five Helio PIC's transitioning into the PC6. Also FSD VTE flew seven pilot proficiency flight checks during their stay.

3. The transition training of the Helio captains, including line checks, should be completed by 8 June 1969. Interim proficiency checks were flown by the Acting AMF with TPE approval.

4. This action was necessary since final word on Helio PIC transfers to VTE was not received until after FSD pilots were finished and preparing to leave SGN, although we had requested clarification of Helio PIC transfer status several weeks before.

5. The number of duty days per pilot remains high but when high flight time is considered work days are not a morale problem

June should be a repeat of May in flight time, but we will have our manning level to 31 PICs which will permit a more relaxed operation.

6. During May we received excellent maintenance support and all maintenance personnel associated with the PC6 are to be commended. Without their cooperation we would never make it.

VTB

1. May aircraft time of 911+40 was approximately 10% short of the projected 1,063. With 19 line captains effective, their average was 55 hours with none in excess of 70 hours. The 5 effective First Officers averaged 39 hours and again no overtime.

The ratio of duty time versus block time is still most undesirable. There has been a change of personnel in the customer Air Operations at VO7 and I expect a noticeable improvement in II Corps.

2. One accident occurred during the month. N3728G at V206 on 27 May 1969 encountered a combination of factors all working together to produce a double propeller to runway accident which is still under investigation.

204B

1. May has shown a slight increase in flight time over last month. The total hours for the month were 1185.

The monthly pilots meeting was held on the 30 of April, 16 pilots attended. The remainder of the pilots will be briefed on the meeting.

2. AMFS/RW Capt. Webb did not make his regular trip to Saigon this month. One interim proficiency check was given by MF/RW. Two route checks and three spot evaluation checks were given; also three SIC training rides were given to Capt. Bengtson. There was no ground school instructor available so the ground school was administered by MF/RW. With the exception of one pilot on sick leave and another on home leave, the program is caught up on all check rides as of this date.

3. The manning level is currently at 32 pilots, one of which is under training. The average pilot's time will be about 80 hours. With this amount of flying time versus pilots available, there is no need to update our manning level.

V. OPERATIONS

1. Total revenue block time for May was 900 hours less than April's time. This reduction in flying was due to a lack of cargo to be moved by the VN-41 customer and the termination of all the Helio contracts. Helio time for April was 731 hours versus 31 hours for May. We can expect further reductions in flying time, especially in the C-47 program. The VN-41 customer indicates there will be further cut-backs in cargo flights and wherever possible he will utilize C-46's instead of C-47's.

2. There were 32 controllable delays in May versus 51 in April, but there were 153 less Saigon departures in May. In the coming months we must expect an increase in uncontrollable delays due to weather.

3. There were considerably less GTD complaints during May. We are encouraging users to note their complaints on the GTD trip tickets in an effort to alleviate recurrent problems.

FIC and the Emergency Equipment Room are in good order.

Due to the decrease in revenue flying a study on FOD cost reduction is underway at this time.

4. Flight Time Report (See attachment B)
   Accidents & Incidents (See attachment C)
   Ground Transportation (See attachment D)

VI. SAFETY

VII. COMMUNICATIONS

1. Monsoon rains have played havoc with our leased teletype landlines between the exchange at the Tan Son Nhut civil terminal and the Saigon Post Office. Since the first heavy rainfall, these landlines have been intermittently inoperable approximately 70% of the time. The Post Office thus far has been unable to effect permanent repair to the cable. This has required Message Center personnel to route traffic to Bangkok via our CW Link for onward transmission and also to pouch cut message tapes to HKG for entrance into the SEA Teletype Network.

2. Because of the above we have sent a letter through the Embassy Customer to the Director General, Posts and Telecommunications requesting that Air America be permitted to establish a direct full duplex radioteletype circuit, using either VHF or UHF equipment, between Air America and the Post Office. Air America would have full financial responsibility to provide equipment, installation and maintenance. We more than likely would also have to pay a fee for rental of space within the Post Office building. We are not optimistic; PTT has disapproved similar demands from other contractors.

3. The inauguration of the new message format and procedures on April 30th which was necessitated by the change over to the semi-automatic relay system at Cable and Wireless Company, Hong Kong proved to be a relatively easy one and only minor problems were encountered. Saigon M/C personnel had been well briefed by C/Comm-SVM [redacted] and any questions regarding proper procedures and techniques were quickly and efficiently solved by advice and guidance from C&W personnel.

4. A burn-in period of approximately four or five months will be required to ensure that all procedures are understood and used effectively before C&W will convert to the full time and completely computerized automatic relay of traffic for the Company's SEA Teletype Network.

5. This period can be reported as favorable. Major projects long delayed by interlocking with each other and with other facilities development projects are now showing progress. Primary to such progress was course the satisfactory compromise of funding difficulties. The only major remaining difficulty is the establishment of adequate facilities in the communication center to accommodate the expansion now within the grasp of reality.

	Message Traffic	
	April	May
Incoming	9912	10436
Outgoing	12969	12854

VIII. TRAFFIC/AAM

1. TMSGN has remained in the position of SRTM as additional duty during the reporting month. [redacted] reportedly expires 14 June 1969.

In regard to the above position TMSGN made two visits during the month, the first to Can Tho and then second to Danang.

Loss of equipment at NhaTrang has been attributed to thievery by one of the Traffic employees and proper property control is now underway.

2. A request by TMSGN to have porter seats remodified by addition of an extra track lock was turned down by Saigon QC. Separate correspondence will be forthcoming in this regard.

3. The average of daily passengers handled was 395. Monthly total for May was 12,252, an decrease of 11.07% from last month. Company cargo handled for the month of May was 286,236 lbs which was an increase of 21,48% from the last month. Total CAX outgoing cargo handled for May was 21,077 lbs, which was an increase of 124.65% from the last month.

4. As stated previously we are experiencing difficulty in hiring acceptable replacement agents. Six applicants meeting the requirements have been approved for hire but thus for none have shown for duty. Personnel has been requested to assist in this matter as the vacation season is approaching and the remaining agents are due annual leave.

5. Customers use of plush Burns seats on the C-47 Can Tho runs is presenting difficulty in the safe stowage of baggage/cargo during flight. This is under discussion between base and customer; and the customer has been informed that we are required to refuse baggage in some instances due to the lack of adequate tie-down area.

6. Statistics -

	April	May
Passenger departures - SGN (All contracts)	6,144	5,539
Passenger arrivals - SGN (All contracts)	7,633	6,713
Outbound cargo - SGN	116,067	135,663
Inbound cargo - SGN	119,553	150,573

7. Traffic/USAID

	(Cargo including AF Caribou A/C) April	May
Outbound (lbs) SGN	1,544,585	1,317,907
Inbound (lbs) SGN	80,117	50,522

IX. HOSTEL OCCUPANCY

During May 1969, 97 beds were occupied out of 165 for a percentage of 58.7% occupancy. Also during this period, nine non-avail. slips were issued. Since 22 May until approximately 6 Sept 69, the occupancy rate will be computed at a six beds per day basis as the Hostel Custodian will be on Home Leave during this period.

X. PERSONNEL

1. Apart from routine activities, a large amount of time was spent on work relating to the impending technical training course [redacted] in Tainan. Applicants were interviewed and tested during the first half of the month. Testing of non-Company applicants was conducted in RVN vocational school classroom space provided by the Ministry of Labor. DTT Max A Mims visited; evaluated and selected candidates; and met with RVN government officials, together with APM, GAM and PM, for the purpose of promoting and keeping alive interest in the program.

2. The Ky Con Employment Office was closed on 29 May. Local employment activities are being handled from the Phu Kiet Office temporarily until such time as a suitable location can be found.

See Personnel Strength (Attachment E)

XI. MEDICAL

Number of sick call : 1882

Accident: 70, and one of them was considered to be serious

Mr. R.B. Hohmann - RMD Crew Chief - On May 22, 1969 Mr. Hohmann was installing transmission cowling of a helicopter and while the main motor running at 90 percent for purpose of tacking tail motor Mr. Hohmann slipped from left engine deck fell and struck back of his head on left passenger step. He was taken into Base Clinic immediately with 4 inches laceration posterior skull with profuse bleeding but conscious. He was then taken to the US 3rd Field Hospital and later transferred to 24th Evacuation Hospital at Long Binh. Doctor reports stated that he suffered a compound depressed skull fracture and his general condition is good. Operation was performed on May 24th and his condition was good. He was evacuated to Yokota, Japan on May 29th and then airevacuated by chopper to Yososuka Naval Hospital where he is now hospitalized. As recommended by doctor in Long Binh that Mr. Hohmann will remain in Japan for about two weeks convalescence and after that time he will probably be able to return to Saigon. Upon return he will have to make periodic check up visits to Long Binh until full recovery.

2. Hospitalized sick call: 2
Hospitalized accident : 1
Unhospitalized accident: 69
Outcalls: 3
Physical examination: Flight crew phy. 34
Pre-employment phy. 38
Accident flight phy. 0
Total: 72

Sanitation - Water exam. - Satisfactory
Cafeteria Fair
Toilet Fair

Vaccination: 37

Total man days lost by reasons of sickness - 298½ days

Total man days lost by reasons of accicnet - 78 days

XII. SECURITY

1. The extensive security precautions had been taken by Vietnamese Government throughout Saigon and Gia Dinh province to prevent VC terrorist activities and possible demonstration on the Commemorative of the Buddist birthday which took place on 30 May 1969. VC had intensified their terrorist activities in Saigon and in Gia Dinh province causing 9 incidents as follows:

- Six TNT blasts that damaged three electric transformer stations; the Dien Hong overpass near the Saigon Central market; the Gia Dinh Information Service.

- Two attempted attacks the 5th Police Precinct and a sub-police station of the 3rd precinct with TNT charge.

- [illegible] at Van Don populated area of the 4th Precinct.

2. The curfew at Tan Son Nhut airport is from 1930L-0630L.

3. Due to the escalation of the cost of living under these circumstances in Saigon, civil servants and servicemen will receive a 25-30 percent increase on their basic salaries. This increase will be effective from 1st July 1969.

XIII. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. A welcome decrease was made in the percentage of maintenance delays versus aircraft departures this month. The delays chargeable to maintenance at Saigon Base was only nine (9) for the 1058 departures. One these should be charged to the pilot, when he refused to accept a C-47, because the electric starter was inoperative at departure. The Flight Manual clearly states this is a "GO" item, if the manual engage system is working. This was a SGN/DNG RON flights with no stops in between. Even with this extra delay, the nine delays is a record low, unequalled for over a year at Saigon. (had 28 in April).

2. Our new Cafeteria Annex Building will open for business on 9 July 1969. This building will seat 90 employees at a time, (the Main Cafeteria Building seats 80). All food services will be moved to the Cafeteria Annex on 9 July. At this time, we will perform some renovations general cleaning, painting and rescreening the windows and doors. This work will take about 2-3 weeks and then we will operate both buildings. [redacted] with a daily low priced special lunch for 60$VN. All employees will be welcome to eat in either of the two Cafeterias, depending on their personal choices.

3. Additional toilet facilities are finally under construction for the RMD hangar area. This amounts to two stools and two sinks for the ladies, four stools, six urinals and a large oval hand wash basin for the men, plus two shower stalls adjoining the men's room. The facility is located between the RMD hangar and the RMD Shops Building at the west end. This is a long awaited and highly appreciated addition to the facilities.

The flying hours for the month were down to a total of 7018:40 with the following breakdown by types:

PC6C	2384:29	C-46	741:18
204B	1185:22	C-47	653:24
102/C45	1019:59	DHC-4	77:49
VTB-18	911:40	H395	42:39

Company Services	April	May
Transit	390	287
Overnight	760	633
No. 1 Service	27	21
No. 2 "	28	21
No. 3 "	5	7
No. 4 "	2	3
Engine Change	25	22

Line Items

	April	May
Requisitions	2330	3052
Receipts	3191	3154
Store Issues	6901	7013
Stock Credits	810	991
Posted to cards	19526	20539

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
E. J. THEISEN
ABM - SGN

E.J. Theisen

SAFETY REPORT

May 1969

1. General

Pilot meetings.

MSAFE was unable to attend any pilot meetings during the month, however all meetings stressed monsoon hazards and the safety precautions to be observed with adverse winds, thunderstorms, and rain-slick runways.

Accident investigations.

1. Hard landing incident of C-47, 48C84 has been investigated. Report will be submitted in June.

2. Local Board of Review was completed for VTB, N9838Z accident of 2 March 1969, has been completed and placed in Company mail.

3. Local Board of Review for Beech 10-2, N137L accident of 22 February 1969 was convened on 27 May, but was recessed because of VTB, N3728C accident the same afternoon. N137L Board rescheduled for 2 June.

4. Review Board is pending for 204B, N1304X accident of 13 March, estimate completion by 12 June.

5. VTB, N3728C accident of 27 May at V-206, Hoi An is under investigation at present.

6. Mr. R.V. Hohmann, 204B Crew Chief was serio sly injured in a fall from N8535F on the V-01 ramp on 22 May. SAM/nW investigation stated that safe work practices were being followed. This is questionable and will be further investigated.

7. On 22 May, C-46, B-138 was overloaded with steel pipe at DNG, resulting in a landing at V-01 5,175 pounds over maximum landing weight. This is under investigation by A/SAFM/SGN. In view of past cargo loading problems at DNG vigorous corrective action is indicated.

2. Safety Suggestions.

Safety Comments and Pilot Reports.

13 May - Captain J.F. Smith cited inadequacy of the PC6 brake assembly due to excessive disc wear. He recommended a double puck assembly or more rigid adherence to disc tolerances. Processed to MTS, MFD, AMP/PC6, and USAFI.

13 May - Captain J.F. Smith cited the possibility of inadvertent movement of the engine switch to the stop position on the PC6. He suggests a spring loaded guard over the switch.

Captain McCauley stated the Beechcraft cross-chest safety belt cannot be fastened properly, restricts movement, and will not remain securely fastened. Processed to USAFI.

30 May - Captain Hildebrand's complaint about the length of C-47 seat belts (12 March 69) is still being circulated. MTS is now trying to determine what the Company standards are for seat belt lengths.

30 May - Captain McCauley cited the problem of being lost by radar because of no IFF, while flying through thunderstorms and artillery vectors. Routed to DSAFE.

30 May - Captain McCauley requested study of R-985 engine reliability due to the recent increase in failure and malfunction incicents. Routed to DSAFE.

30 May - Recommendation was submitted to study the use of inferior fluorescent ballasts as a result of numerous ballasts fires (140 some odd in the past three months). A/SSSD has requested authorization to purchase approved ballasts. Info has been forwarded to DSAFE.

3. Follow-up Action

Airfield Survey. - On 20 May the local Company Airfield Evaluation Team inspected V-243, V-151, V-242, and V-203 as a result of several accident/incident report recommendations. The Team consisted of MFD, SFD, Chief PIC, MSAFE, and Mr. Sparks of CORDS Air Operations. Copy of the report has been forwarded to DSAFE for info. SFD should be highly complimented for an excellent report.

Ground Safety - MTS has established a form, "GROUND SAFETY VIOLATION", to report individual violations of Company Safety Regulations. This will improve the ground safety program by "putting some teeth" into enforcement of the rules. MTS interest in both ground and flight safety is noteworthy. A copy of the new form is attached.

4. Unfriendly Action

DATE	A/C TYPE/NO	LOCATION	REMARKS
01	10-2/N77Y	XT9295	PIC observed AW tracers directed at A/C at 1800'. Evaded by steep left turn.
08	2048/N1305X	XS9459	PIC observed 2-5 sec bursts of AW fire at 3500' above terrain. En position was under attack by Army gunships.
08	C-46/B928	V-23	A/C sustained 8 30 cal hits at 500' while turning final. 4 rds rt inbd wing, 2 rds rt inbd flap, 2 rds left inbd flap. No injuries.
10	PC6/N9444	VS8517	PIC heard and saw 10 sec burst of AW at 2,500 feet. Evaded by flying out over water.

5. Minor Incident/Inflight Irregularity (SAFE 9)

None submitted to date.

6. Accident Reports (SAFE 4)

DATE	A/C TYPE/NO	LOCATION	REMARKS
03	C-45/N90732	V-01, South ramp	Tug driver towed A/C so that right wing struck wall. Wing tip walker gave erroneous signal. Personnel received 3 days LWOP.
06	10-2/N7950C	V-12	Right tire blew out while taxiing. Suspect FOD on runway.
08	C-46/B146	V-01	Embassy fork lift driver loading C-46 CA-3, backed into right horizontal stabilizer tip. Substantial damage.
08	C-46/B928	V-23	Aircraft hits described in paragraph 4.
09	PC6/N393R	V-01	Right rear pax door flew open during O/N runup. Fuselage bent and door stringer broken. Disciplinary action taken for crew failure to lock door.
09	VTB/N3728G	V-104	Rt main tire went flat after A/C parked Suspect FOD.
10	DHC-4/N539Y	V-17	Left fuselage torn by fork lift driven by Embassy driver. Submitted to COMUS Air Ops for corrective action. (Note - No action taken.)
11	C-45/N9896Z	V-01	Tug operator was turning to park A/C, left rudder struck wing tip of N9573Z. No signalman used, disciplinary action taken against ramp crew.
14	10-2/N9521Z	Unk	Damage to rt wing tip found on O/N svc. Dirt & asphalt stuck in 4 in scrape on bottom of trailing edge. Pilot claims he noticed damage on preflight but did not make log entry. SAFE 9 will be submitted.

"ATTACHMENT A"

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT

MAY 1969.

1. Contract VN-41

A/C No.	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
N67984	65+01	51+31	9+08	7+19
N67985	109+30	88+11	6+32	4+50
B910	107+26	85+49	4+46	3+55
B926	134+31	108+10	24+21	22+18
B928	142+15	115+31		
H138	60+19	48+43	0+50	0+32
H146	56+32	45+50		
6147	66+43	53+30	1+10	0+40
8084	96+51	81+12	1+22	0+22
5559	142+30	105+50		
5994	98+33	84+09	2+40	2+19
B817	10+04	7+48		
B829	47+11	35+05	2+54	1+28
6083	108+08	91+11		
N539Y	6+55	6+00	10+50	8+53
N544Y				
N9518Z	67+19	55+01	3+53	2+52
N6154U	88+11	76+22	2+10	1+21
N9956Z	56+03	46+38	10+28	9+25
N7770B	90+07	78+01	3+06	2+24
N9577Z	31+03	25+17	6+15	4+43
N9838Z	115+34	102+38		
N3728G	45+33	39+09	8+08	6+54
N9664C	16+30	13+54	1+52	0+54
N3674G	16+56	13+48		
N7695C	12+48	9+48		
N6622C	16+59	13+41		
N9521Z	104+58	84+13	21+47	19+20
N9573Z	116+26	95+35	15+06	12+43
N5269V	139+28	118+50		
N77Y	143+01	114+42	1+59	1+26
N7950C	116+31	94+33	1+46	0+43
N51259	38+43	29+22		
N2141Z	95+39	80+27	1+19	0+52
N9073Z	115+40	98+43	3+30	2+44
N9871Z	19+00	14+36	2+10	1+47
N9898Z	20+30	16+03	5+41	3+55
N358F	166+48	140+57	12+25	10+36
N285L	148+32	130+22	3+13	1+33
N391R	155+59	140+55	1+00	0+50
N394R	161+23	139+34	12+19	10+34
N9444	168+03	142+59	0+58	0+30
N198K	145+41	123+56	6+44	4+53
N153L	106+15	92+23	3+22	2+36
N180K	164+02	140+27	4+34	4+02

	N12450	107+54	91+54	16+54	13+46
	N748N	10+46	7+17		
	N152L	11+10	10+03		
	N184L	8+18	7+16		
	N185K	10+19	8+13		
	N192X	44+39	39+50		
	N393R	16+06	13+49		
	N194X	3+45	3+33		
	N1303X	138+16	138+16	3+25	3+25
	N1304X	37+30	37+30	17+29	17+29
	N1305X	160+34	160+34	8+00	8+00
	N1306X	154+18	154+18	3+25	3+25
	N1307X	282+53	282+53	1+50	1+50
	N8512F				
	N8513F	5+24	5+24		
	N8514F	10+22	10+22		
	N8535F	19+30	19+30		
	B839			2+09	1+44
	B875			0+45	0+30
	B867			1+27	1+08
	B849			3+29	3+05
	B865	6+20	5+58	0+46	0+26
	B869	6+20	5+58		
	B857	6+20	5+58		
	Sub-total	4976+55	4290+00	256+48	215+01
2.	Contract 4395				
	B928	7+13	6+01		
	B146	10+36	7+58	5+25	5+00
	B817	58+38	44+53		
	B829	23+35	18+53		
	N539Y	49+01	39+54		
	N544Y	8+36	7+02	2+25	1+58
	N3674C	56+28	46+55	3+13	2+10
	N7695C	40+07	31+46	24+34	21+25
	N91295	58+07	45+40	5+03	3+41
	N9518Z	0+54	0+43		
	N6154U	9+39	7+34		
	N9956Z	18+52	16+48		
	N7770B	8+35	7+34		
	N9577Z	36+06	29+03		
	N9838Z	8+47	17+18	1+39	1+03
	N3728G	5+45	5+00		
	N9664C				
	N51259	2+26	1+43		
	N9521Z	6+32	5+58		
	N21412	2+23	1+37		
	N77Y	3+34	2+42		
	N6622C	1+14	0+57		
	N748N	96+00	85+17	0+38	0+27
	N152L	92+21	82+17	1+40	1+19
	N184L	146+22	125+47		
	N185K	88+35	78+13	5+36	4+34
	N192X	79+46	67+32	13+21	10+52
	N393R	137+38	113+27	12+50	11+20

	N194X	111+04	99+42	1+30	1+16
	N358F				
	N285L	16+57	14+48		
	N391R				
	N394R	7+29	6+33		
	N9444	8+08	6+24		
	N198X				
	N153L	34+23	31+35		
	N180K				
	N12450	29+17	23+08		
	N8512F	172+51	172+51	4+03	4+03
	N8513F	107+47	107+47	2+00	2+00
	N8514F	52+55	52+55	4+09	4+09
	N8535F	35+53	35+53	7+08	7+08
	N1303X				
	N1304X				
	N1305X				
	N1306X				
	N1307X	1+54	1+54		
	N9871Z	1+17	0+57		
	B867	2+30	2+06		
	B839	5+58	4+23	1+00	0+35
	B875	3+40	3+22	1+25	1+03
	Sub-total	1649+46	1452+49	97+37	84+03
3. Contract 0005					
	N6622C	34+37	28+42	1+09	0+30
	N77I	1+44	1+11		
	N7950C	0+55	0+35		
	N9073Z	0+58	0+37		
	N358F	4+23	4+02		
	N1305X	0+43	0+43		
	N8514F	0+46	0+46		
	Sub-total	44+06	36+36	1+09	0+30
4. Contract 0069					
	N9664C	47+03	42+08	2+45	2+06
	N3728G	26+14	22+26		
	N7770B	0+37	0+16		
	N3674G	2+37	2+21		
	N9956Z	2+56	2+47		
	N9577Z	5+02	4+23		
	Sub-total	84+29	74+21	2+45	2+06

Total Revenue Block Time	6755+16
" " Flight Time	5853+46
" Non-Revenue Block Time	358+19
" " " Flight Time	301+40
GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	7113+35
" " FLIGHT TIME	6155+26

FLIGHT TIME BY TYPE OF AIRCRAFT:

Type of A/C	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block time	Flight time	Block time	Flight time
C-46	693+23	557+44	51+02	43+54
C-47	512+45	415+52	5+12	3+21
Bailed C-47	139+28	106+39	1+54	1+28
DHC-4	64+32	52+56	13+15	10+51
VTB	867+53	733+18	73+04	58+58
Beech 10-2	825+10	674+48	43+06	35+34
C-45	157+25	130+55	11+21	8+26
Porter	2281+56	1972+13	96+55	79+08
2 o 4B	1181+36	1181+36	51+29	51+29
H395	31+08	27+45	11+01	8+31
TOTAL =	6755+16	5853+46	358+19	301+40

ATTACHMENT B

FLIGHT INFORMATION CENTER
SAIGON
MONTHLY ACTIVITY REPORT
1-31 MAY 1969

PART I
AIRCRAFT INCIDENTS

Date	A/C No, Type & Contract	Place	Description
01 May	N77Y Beech 10-2 VN-41	XT 9295 5 miles NE of V147	After observing groundfire, PIC immediately executed a hard left turn. No acft damage or personnel injuries occurred.
08 May	N1305X 204-B VN-41	XS 9459	Acft was enroute to an outpost when PIC observed two burst of gunfire directed at his acft. PIC executed immediate departure from the area. No acft damage or personnel injuries occurred.
09 May	B928 C-46 VN-41	BS 6272 left Base leg for rwy 10 at V-23.	Acft sustained eight hits while turning from base to final for rwy 10. Acft. landed without further incident. No personnel injuries involved.
10 May	N9444 PC-6C VN-41	VS 8517	Acft was enroute to V-56 when PIC heard and observed a short burst of automatic weapons fire off his right wing. No acft damage or personnel injury occurred.

PART II
SITUATION SUMMARY

Although the aircraft incidents were the lowest since August 1966, the terrorist incidents and attacks by fire during the reporting period ranked among the highest since TET, 1968. Things were relatively low key the first ten days of the period. Then, on 10/11 May, a country wide upsurge of terrorist incidents took place. In Saigon alone, there were over 20 incidents. On the eleventh, the VN Information Center was 70% destroyed. Tan Son Nhut and near-by areas were attacked by rockets on three different occasions. All the RON stations were hit. Danang three times by rockets, Can Tho at least once, and Nha Trang 15 to 20 RR rounds on 31 May at approximately 1400 hours. Ban Me Thuot, another field where we RON aircraft occasionly, took over 50 rounds of mixed rockets and mortars. On 21 May, an ammo dump at TSN was destroyed.

In Saigon there were over 20 grenade throwing incidents, 20 explosive charges detonated and 4 power stations blown, resulting in extensive damage or destruction to vehicles and property, as well as loss of life and numerous wounded.

Terrorist activities were not confined to Saigon alone. The other areas came in for their share.

The outlook for the coming period is more of the same, possibly on an increasing level, with the possibility of the summer offensive commencing in June. Personnel should exercise caution, limiting their movements during the hours of darkness to those essential. Travel during curfew hours should be done only as required to protect life. Many violators are being shot.

ATTACHMENT C

GROUND TRANSPORTATION

During the month of May 69, 10 microbus were in commission daily.
Statistics: Aggregate microbuses mileage

X-4033	2461 km
X4034	2863 km
X-4035	2235 Km
X-1140	1971 Km
X-1141	2713 Km
X-1142	2051 Km
X-0417	3609 Km
X-0418	2936 Km
X-0419	3566 Km
X-0420	3216 Km
	28621 Km = Approx. 17888 miles

Total microbuses downtime: 312 hrs
Total microbuses pax carried: 5062 pax

Isuzu bus mileage:	X01057	3094 Km
	X-01058	2662 Km
	X-04329	2763 Km
		8519 Km = Approx. 5324 miles

Total Isuzu bus downtime: 185 hrs.

Isuzu bus pax carried:	Cholon route	8656
	Saigon route	5082
		13738 pax

Supply vehicle mileage:	EB-8176	2298 Km
	EB-1780	1060 Km
	EC-7953	324 Km
		3682 Km = Approx. 2301 miles

Supply vehicles downtime: 29 hrs 6'

3 wheeler lambretta and honda 50cc downtime: 27 hrs 24'

Grand total pax carried: 18800 pax

ATTACHMENT D

SAIGON BASE

MAY 1969
(Including Can Tho Sub-Base)

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted]												TOTAL	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	51	180	187	15	201	1	33	6	614#	15**	3		2	1*	1092	217
TEMPORARY																
FTC																
PRE-PROCESSED	1								16						17	
TOTAL	52	180	187	15	201	1	33	6	630#	15**	3		2	1*	1109	217

(*) : 1 Swiss
(**) : 1 French
(#) : 4 French

GROUND PNL : 1109
FLIGHT PNL : 217
TOTAL : 1326

ATTACHMENT E

DANANG SUB-BASE

MAY 1969

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted] GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	TOTAL GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	4		15		32		105		156	
TEMPORARY										
FTC										
PRE-PROCESSED							7		7	
TOTAL	4		15		32		112		163	

GROUND PNL : 163

FLIGHT PNL : 0

TOTAL : 163

NHA TRANG SUB-BASE

MAY 1969

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted]				TOTAL	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	8		18	29	82	137
TEMPORARY						
FTC						
PRE-PROCESSED					2	2
TOTAL	8		18	29	84	139

GROUND PNL : 139

FLIGHT PNL : 0

TOTAL : 139

CAM THO SUB-BASE

MAY 1969

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted]				TOTAL	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	1		9		4	14
TEMPORARY						
FTC						
PRE-PROCESSED						
TOTAL	1		9		4	14

GROUND PNL : 14

FLIGHT PNL : 0

TOTAL : 14

BYWEEKLY REPORT ON VISAS AND PASSPORTS

PASSPORT & VISA SECTION PO-SGN

MAY 1969

SVN Exit entry	Extension of Stay	Brown Book	Laos	HKG	TPE	TYO	BKK	PPT Renewal	Add page	Military Reservist	Sponsorship
124	133	58	19	1	1	12	0	6	2	0	255

MONTHLY REPORT
NHA - TRANG
MAY 1969

GENERAL

May was a rather quiet month again. On Saturday 31 May we received about ten rounds in the afternoon but with little damage to the base and no damage to AAM facilities. There were a few incidents in town where two servicemen were killed. These were attributed to conflict with some of the local popular rather than an organized effort of hostile forces.

The station continues with a general clean-up and improvement campaign. Mr. D.A. STRAND, Senior Air Operations Officer of USAID/CORDS relinquished his position to Mr. Thomas Lilly at this station on 29 May. Mr. Lilly, arriving from Can Tho, was previously assistant to Mr. Strand at Nha Trang prior to his transfer to Can Tho. Initial contacts indicate a great improvement in customer relations.

TRAFFIC

A. GENERAL

Overall Traffic activities decreased very slightly from the last month with an increase in passenger handeling of some 801 persons.

MTD visited NHA during this month and assisted by pointing out areas of potential improvement. All suggestions will be handeled during June.

B. STATISTICS

Passengers	May	Last Mo.	1968
Departing	4824	3580	2726
Arriving	4079	3502	1303
Cargo			
1. Ground Services			
Departing (Lbs)	298,339	376,229	170,805
Arriving (Lbs)	288,349	234,530	396,580
TOTAL	586,688	610,759	567,385
2. Company Cargo			
Departing	39,679	17,337	29,045
Arriving	40,246	24,735	18,567
TOTAL	79,925	42,072	47,612
3. GRAND TOTAL (1+2)			
Departing	328,018	393,566	199,850
Arriving	328,595	259,265	415,147

. . . 2 . .

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

Customer relations continue to improve slowly with the arrival of Mr. T. Lilly who has replaced Mr. D.E. Strand as Sr. Air Operations Officer USAID/CCIDS. An initial coolness is expected until such time as both parties evaluate each other. We are not overlooking the fact that previous difficulties may have been between subordinates and clears of both groups. The most important faced is to build and retain good communications between PAF and USAID/CCIDS at the highest local/airport level in order to moderate any difficulties at a lower administrative level. Mr. Lilly and SZ/NEA already concur on this point and we are both working towards this.

OPERATIONS

A. GENERAL

SCR J.D. Paulding returned to the United States on A/L. Mr. T.Sheely has assumed his duties. All in all a smooth month.

B. FLIGHT FREQUENCY (See attached)

C. ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE COMPARISON

	May	Last No.	1968
Arrivals	570	573	560
Departures	573	571	571
Ron's	331	324	332

D. DELAYS

Percentage on time

Departures	97%	95%	-

E. ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS . . . None

FISCAL - No major problems

LEGAL - No major problems

SECURITY

The station was shocked by the sudden and violent death of one of our Utilitymen on 5 May. He was shot at 0550 (Ten minutes before the end of curfew) by a Revolutionary Development Cadre. All pertinent offices have been informed and reports submitted.

TECHNICAL SERVICES	May	Last No.	1968
1. Transient Overnight	239	449	239
2. Overnight services	331	324	332
3. Engine changes	5	4	7
4. Propellor changes	0	1	1
5. No. 1 services	4	5	9
6. No. 2 services	0	1	1
7. Delays - Maint/Mech	11	17	16

. . . . 3

		May	Last Mo.	1968
8.	Intermediate Services	0	1	0
9.	AGP'S	17	21	21
10.	Cutline recoveries	20	3	2
11.	Accident Report (CA/C)	1	3	1
12.	Accident report (FSNL)	0	0	0

ELECTRONIC MAINTENANCE

UHF/VHF relay continues to operate in a fairly good mode. [redacted] arrived from DNG to assit in "peaking-up" our overall station radios. He will return in June to complete the work and much improvement is expected.

ADMINISTRATION

While May was a fairly routine month, June is expected to be quite busy. We begin construction of the hanger leanto, the parking lot, and Maintenance improvements of the Administrative/Traffic Building. June should prove to be a month of many accomplishments.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

Dan Lawson

DAN LAWSON
SZ-NPA

MEMORANDUM

TO : BM/SGN

DATE: 05 May, 1969

FROM : A/SZDNG

REF. No. SZDNG/69/038

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for April, 1969

GENERAL

The undersigned arrived on station on 14 April and assumed Acting Station Manager duties upon the departure of ABM/SGN on 19 April.

Hostile activity was limited to one incident, fifteen 122mm rockets were launched against the city of DaNang during the evening of 16 April, two of which impacted on the airbase. Casualties were reported as twelve Vietnamese killed, thirty wounded, and one American wounded. No company property or personnel were physically affected by this attack; one rocket did partially destroy a Vietnamese house approximately 600 yards from the Air America facility. From a briefing by USAF Security it was learned that these attacks are usually launched from an area formed by a seven and eleven kilometer radius from the city.

At 1030 AM on 27 April a U.S. military ammunition/bomb dump located on the southwest perimeter of the airbase was ignited by a grass fire causing explosions which continued for approximately 12 hours. The control tower was evacuated in the early afternoon when 2000 pound bombs started to explode which resulted in the base being closed to air traffic except for take-offs at pilot's discretion. Two Air America flights were cancelled for a total revenue loss of two hours. Our fixed wing aircraft were moved to the northeast parking ramp and the one 204B parked adjacent to a USAF revetment. Only minor concussion damage was sustained by company structures which has all been repaired; one piece of shapnel did land on the ramp. No personnel injuries were reported.

The air base was closed to all Vietnamese personnel on 28 April for no apparent reason since the activity from the ammunition dump had completely subsided. Those personnel who were able to report for duty performed admirably, handling eleven additional and special flights without a delay.

Notification was received from the American Consul that the Vietnamese authorities intend to enforce the 2000 to 0600 hours city curfew and make it applicable to all nationalities. A list of all American and TCN personnel will be submitted to the Mayor of DaNang on 5 May as requested, in order to obtain curfew passes. It is not known at this time what special proceedures might be required for our HON crew-members.

Ten Southern Air Transport flights were scheduled into DaNang during the month, however, only nine were handled by company personnel due to non-receipt of a portion of the relevant re-scheduling message. Fortunately this flight was a ferry return and no maintenance problems developed. It should be pointed out that these flights do place a significant burden on station personnel when they arrive after normal duty hours, especially on the Traffic Department when round trips are scheduled.

In the area of Facilities Development, the contract for the construction of the RMD Nose Hangar lean-to has been signed and the contractor should commence work during the last part of May. Final plans for the completion of the hangar accessway and work area paving have been formaulated and hopefully funding will be approved for this project in the not too distant future.

The estimate for making city electrical power available to the facility has been received and preliminary reports indicate that customer funding for this work may be rapidly forthcoming. The completion of these three projects should alleviate all the major problems at this station concerning facilities.

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

The only significant problems voiced by the VN-0041 customer during the month concerned the performance of 2043 number 2 services at DaNang and Security for the Ground Service warehouse. The capability for performing these services is in the process of being established and should be available by the end of May, although personnel support on a TCS basis from Saigon will be required for each one. The warehouse security problem will be examined in detail upon the arrival of a Security Team from Saigon in mid-May and two Ground Services utility positions are being presently held vacant for possible upgrading to guard slots.

Overall, rapport with both customers remains excellent.

FISCAL

One time clock has been received, but installation and use is being deferred pending a visit from MFA/SGN in May. AR/DNG will require a detailed briefing on timekeeping procedures required in conjunction with this equipment and it is possible that a requirement for a timekeeping clerk may generate.

[redacted] payroll for the month totaled: [redacted]

Petty cash expenditures for the month totaled: 49,313$VN

OPERATIONS

Revenue flight time decreased by 120+36 hrs as compared to March. VN-0041 and 4395 flying was reduced 64+31 and 64+33 hours respectively. Revenue losses during April were the lowest to date, primarily due to good weather.

The following is the break-down of flight time generated by this station during April:

VN-0041	751+25 hours
4395	306+35 hours
0005	16+25 hours
Non-Revenue	1+49 hours
Grand Total	1076+14 hours

Revenue losses for the month are broken down as follows:

Weather	19+40 hours
Maintenance	6+45 hours
Other*	2+00 hours
Customer Cancellations	1+00 hours
Grand Total	27+25 hours

* Two flights were cancelled on 27 May due to the air base being closed during the afternoon.

COMMUNICATIONS

The Motorola remote VHF relay system was installed at the Monkey Mountain site on 18 April. It cannot as yet be considered operational since there have been but six days when it has worked properly. Coverage during these times has been excellent, and it appears that the effective range of the equipment approached 180 nautical miles. AESU and Motorola personnel visit the site at least twice weekly to make adjustments on the equipment and the problems being experienced are considered normal.

Incoming and outgoing messages totaled 2280 and 1558 respectively.

TRAFFIC

The VN-41 customer office located in the CORDS warehouse was completed on 15 April and is planned for occupancy on 10 May. This move will vacate one large office in the administration building which may be utilized for expanded passenger processing facilities. The first

CORDS contracted Continental Air Services C-47 cargo flight arrived on 17 April and during the month 12 such flights were handled by Traffic Ground Services. A total of 664 departing and 661 arriving flights were handled.

Passenger and cargo statistics for the month are as follows:

	Passengers In	Passengers Out	Cargo In	Cargo Out
VN-0041	2640	2866	304,373 lbs	385,140 lbs
4395	475	544	17,700	29,457
0005	17	12	None	200
Ferry	32	32	None	None
AAM	84	140	5,527	23,032
TOTAL	3248	3594	327,600 lbs	437,829 lbs

PERSONNEL

One Third Country National employee had to delay starting his annual leave due to non-receipt of his exit/re-entry visa and extension of stay. This problem is expected to be compounded in May and could result in the re-scheduling of some leave plans. The requisite paperwork for obtaining the above visas are presently being submitted two months in advance of travel, but it appears that even more lead time is required.

The personnel breakdown for DaNang Station during April is as follows:

	[redacted]			
Permenant	4	17	33	113
Temporary	1	0	0	1
Pre-Process	0	0	0	7
Daily Hire	0	0	0	0
TOTAL (176)	5	17	33	121

TECHNICAL SERVICES

Only 3 maintenance delays were incurred during the month out of a total of 635 departing flights. The number of heavy services totaled 9, a decline of 3 from the previous month. There were no engine changes and two aircraft were grounded for parts. AGMD expended a total of 1756 man-hours of which 294 were utilized for hostel maintenance. All work on the nose hangar was completed with the installation of overhead flourescent lighting. A replacement cylinder head for the GMC truck was received but was found to be unusable due to hairline cracks. No significant problems were encountered in the realm of MSA procurement.

Original Signed by
WINSTON C. CAMBRE
Winston C. Cambre

cc: file

Tab A

SECRET
No Foreign Dissem

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
9 May 1969

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Liberation Front's New Peace Proposal

1. The Vietnamese Communists have proposed a new approach to a settlement of the Vietnam war. Their goal remains, as before, the unilateral withdrawal of US forces and the replacement of the present government of South Vietnam with a coalition government which the Communists will have a hand in forming and be able to control. The latest Communist proposal, however, is packaged in what Hanoi hopes is a much more attractive wrapping that conspicuously avoids attacks on the US and the South Vietnamese Government. The new proposal was probably stimulated by the Communists' desire to regain the propaganda initiative from Thieu and to maximize the opportunities for creating confusion and disarray among non-Communist political elements in Saigon. Nevertheless, the public dialogue which has taken place between Thieu and the Communists has now served to move them both somewhat in each other's direction. Both sides have now set forth the terms under which they would agree to discussions on a political settlement.

2. In essence, the National Liberation Front ten-point proposal of 8 May, called "the Main Principles and Contents of the Total Solution," seeks to eliminate the US from discussions on all issues except that of the withdrawal of US and other free world forces, which still must be complete and unconditional. The status of North Vietnamese troops would be taken up by the Vietnamese delegations.

Note: This memorandum was prepared largely by CIA, with contributions from the Department of State, which concurs in it.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE 6/29/98

SA99 D-64

NND 942005-700

10

6. A number of omissions appear to be intended to suggest a softer line toward the South Vietnamese Government and its constitutional structure. Thus, the Front statement makes no demands for the overthrow of the "lackey puppet administration," in conspicuous contrast to the emphasis placed on this demand in the 1967 Front program. By this omission the Front appears to be suggesting that the South Vietnamese Government can be included among the "political forces" that are to negotiate the establishment of a provisional coalition government. This impression is reinforced by the prohibition of discrimination against those who have "cooperated with one side or the other" and the absence of references to "repentance" in one form or another as a precondition to equal treatment, although the Front does insist on adherence to "peace, independence, and neutrality". This wording is sufficiently vague that it does not necessarily exclude the South Vietnamese Government; it would certainly allow such political forces as the Alliance, the militant Buddhists and virtually every other disparate Vietnamese politician to participate. Point five may also have been intended to suggest that the negotiations for a provisional government could take place while US forces are still in country, although a cease-fire would be in effect. This would also be a first for the Communists.

7. The Front statement deals in familiar terms with the normalization of North-South relations and reunification. (Point Seven) It reiterates that the demarcation line as established in the 1954 Geneva Agreements is "provisional" and "not a political or territorial frontier." Pending reunification, "the two zones will agree upon the status of the Demilitarized Zone and set forth the regulations for crossing the provisional demarcation line of the Demilitarized Zone." This statement appears to require bilateral control of the Demilitarized Zone and, by implication, to exclude the Zone question as something to be negotiated multilaterally as part of the peace settlement.

8. Another new and hard element tossed into the Front proposal is point nine, which calls for negotiations on the release of prisoners of war but which couples this with a virtual demand for the reparations from the US to both North and South Vietnam for war damage.

NND 942005-701

M O N T H L Y R E P O R T

H E A - T R A F F I C

JUNE 1969

GENERAL :

June proved to be another quiet month with respect to non-friendly activity. Incidents between local populace and non-indigenous persons are increasing, however. The effect of the much-publicized "troop pull out" has not been felt as yet. There has re-location of some support units within the PHA Delta area, but no noticeable decrease of military personnel.

The new lean-to adjacent to our hanger is 90% completed. Upon completion, the scooter shed will be begun with a construction time of 15 days. All material and base pass problems have been resolved and we will finish with in the allowance [illegible] protection fins.

The radio room was enlarged, pilot lounge relocated, and a new S-2 office completed. All with locally obtained material and in-house labor.

All-in-all a smooth month with only minor problems involved.

TRAFFIC :

A. CARGO

Station activities declined while a C-46 was replaced with a C-47. While per flight uplift will be effected, we will increase flexibility in scheduling smaller cargo loads to smaller fields in II Corps.

In line with the cost reduction, and at the request of COMUSMACV, a report has been submitted to COMUSMACV and II/SOTA recommending surplusing of 5 persons from the ground services contract. We wait a decision on this. Reduction of base traffic personnel is undergoing scrutiny.

B. STATISTICS

PASSENGERS	JUNE	LAST No.	1968
Departing	3,402	4,871	2,310
Arriving	3,774	4,019	1,206

CARGO

1. GOOD SHABLE

Departing	(Lbs)	354,646	298,335	319,944
Arriving	(Lbs)	282,360	288,349	152,123
TOTAL . .		637,006	586,684	472,067

2. QUARTZ CARGO

Departing	14,256	35,679	2,037
Arriving	11,624	40,246	3,629
TOTAL . .	25,880	75,925	5,666

3. CARGO TOTAL (1 + 2)

Reporting	328,018	321,641
Arriving	322,575	155,762

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

From this point of view, Customer relations remain fair with no MAJOR complications this month. The one problem area existing is the one in which two of our base Traffic personell are physically located in the CHDS office. The major portion of their work is an Air Service function, the other work is strictly a CHDS responsibility. Difficulties develop from time to time when supervisory responsibility/ authority for these positions is questioned by either party. Ultimately we hope to have these persons transferred to the CHDS payroll thus resolving this problem.

OPERATIONS

A. COMMUNICATIONS

No equipment outage this month. The radio room was enlarged, wiring cleaned up and routed in an orderly manner and receivers and transmitters separated by the length of the room.

Relocation of the UHF/VHF Antennae and tuning of the equipment on [illegible] Island is providing improved operating conditions.

One Radio Operator has resigned, and in keeping with the cost reduction program, he will not be replaced.

B. WEATHER

Inland weather has been extremely bad. Weather along the coast remains comparatively good.

C-46 Aircraft no longer Ops. at LHI. The one remaining C-46 was replaced with a C-47.

C. FLIGHT REGULARITY (See attached)

D. [illegible] MILITARY CONTRACT

	MAY	LAST Yr.	1968
Arrivals	531	570	572
Departures	533	572	583
ECH	275	311	323

E. DELAYS

Percentage on time	98.	97.	-

FLIGHT : No major problems.

LOAD : No major problems.

SECURITY :

Action has been taken to reduce the security staff by 5 persons. This results from closing the No.1 hostel.

TECHNICAL SERVICES :

		JUNE	EAST Mo.	1968
1.	Transient overnight	256	239	260
2.	Overnight services	275	331	323
3.	Engine changes	1	5	2
4.	Propeller changes	1	0	0
5.	No. 1 services	3	4	10
6.	No. II services	1	0	0
7.	Delays maint/Mech.	9	11	7
8.	Intermediate services	1	0	0
9.	A C P	23	17	9
10.	Cutline recoveries	3	20	3
11.	Accident reports (CA/C)	2	1	0
12.	Accident reports (PSNL)	0	0	0

ADMINISTRATION :

Of course, the major problem facing us now is the cost reduction program. All department heads are aware of the necessity for this and we continue to do everything possible to reduce and avoid costs. RPA's have been submitted for a reduction of 13 personnel now surplus to our requirements.

PERSONNEL	: [redacted]	TOTAL
Pres.	21 (A) : 1 : : :	22
AK	1	1
FCD	2 : 2 : : : 3	7
FD	1 : : : :	1
COM	1 : : : : 4	5
TFC	8 : 1 : 2 : :	11
VW41	14 : : 5 : :	19
SY	16	16
RMD	5 : 4 : 21 : 5	35
EMD	1 : : 2 : :	3
PEMD	2 : : : 1	3
RCND	6 : : : :	6
RSD	2 : : 1 : 2	5
CTD	4	4
	84 8 31 15	138

(A) Includes SZ Labor Pool
Labor assignments:
RMD : 12
TFC : 4
Hostel: 1
Comm. 2
Terminal 1

DAN LAWSON
SZ-RPA

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
JUNE 1969

I. GENERAL

1. Revenue block hours declined to a new low of 6220 in June. The previous low over the past two years was 6755 as reported for last month. It appears our SVN operations will stabilize at the 6500 block hour level.

2. Keeping pace with our reduced work load, 148 personnel have been terminated "for the convenience of the company". This does not include the normal attrition due to resignations, terminations for disciplinary reasons etc., The pereonnel terminated are of the following categories: [redacted]

3. Except for sporadic rocket attacks against Saigon and Danang, enemy activity has declined to the level which existed prior to the infamous 1968 TET offensive.

II. FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT

1. June saw considerable construction activity at Saigon, Danang and Nha Trang. At Saigon, Contractors have completed the Utilities Building and made substantial progress on the Fire Brigade Station and RMD Toilets & Crew Shower.

Despite a delay due to theft of wire mesh, the west Ramp should be completed by 25 July. 90% percent of the ramp surface is now cured and in use. The Utilities Tunnel is 40 Linear ft. from completion.

2. The Revetment Wall project is moving faster than expected; the Northeast Ramp portion is complete.

The Saigon Base Area Lighting Project and the RCMD Water Supply Project are about to get underway as materials are being received.

The TSN Common use Water Distribution System project will be installed in July. This should bring a much needed water supply to AAM area in August.

3. RMK-BRJ, at the request of AFRCE, installed a culvert under the main taxiway leading into the Air America area. This will considerably help the drainage of the area west of the main hangar.

4. The Leanto project at Danang is moving rapidly. The Contractor has the shell erected and is working on the partitions.

The Nha Trang Leanto is nearing completion; siding and roofing are being installed.

The Parking Lot and Scooter shed project at Nha Trang will be completed by the Contractor before 1 August

The Power Distribution System Project at Nha Trang is in work and should be completed in September.

5. Link Trainer. Our Link Trainer became fully operational on 11 June 1969. It is being scheduled for four, two hour periods, six days per week.

III. FLYING

1. The unprecedented reduction of four Reserve captains has induced much concern among other Junior captain. Speculation ran high as to further reduction. Requirements from Vientiane has reduced, somewhat, our pilot inventory. Four First Officers have transferred to VTE to fill slots there. One Captain and one First Officer transferred to UTH to fill H-34 vacancies there.

Manning in the VTB program is still a cockle-burr under a horse blanket. The program itself; considering flight time, does not authorize the manning needed. We were relieved of night standby requirements (a welcome relief) but other low flight time, long duty days are still in evidence.

2. The flight time in the PC6 program is most flexible. We were called upon to expect reconversion of two of the PC6C to PC6A. The other programs are running smoothly.

3. ANF Anderson is temporarily with FSD/VTE as Flight Examiner for VTB, 10-2/C45 during F/E Meier's absence on Home Leave.

Beechcraft

The program took another set back this month due to Customer in III Corps VO2 replacing the Beechcraft with a Porter. We gained one more Beechcraft in Can Tho IV Corps.

Morale in the Beechcraft program continues to be good. All the customers feel that our pilots are doing a good job throughout the system/

Safety is one everyone's mine - we have approximately 118 accident free days. We hope to continue.

4. C-46 - Forecast time for June was 726 hours but the actual time flown was 696+34 which was less than time for May. One minor accident marred the safety program.

5. C-47 - The program picked up a bit from the previous month but is still rather slow. The forecast hours were 776 and only 679+40 were flown.

One taxi accident marred the safety program and the PIC was awarded two weeks LWOP.

6. Helio - All but one Helio are in temporary storage here in Saigon. The one remaining Helio B867 is still in commission and 2 hours and 53 minutes were flown on 2 non-revenue flights.

7. 204B - The flight time for June dropped about 55 hours for a total of 1131 hours.

With the addition of one captain the manning level is 32 captains and 1 First Officer. With the manning level and the loss of flying time, the program is holding up very good on pilot time. The average pilot time was 78 hours for the month.

The possibility of transferring some captains to Udorn in the future has boosted the morale of the pilots. Especially some of the old pilots that have been in Saigon for 3 years.

8. PC6C - June fell below the predicted flight time by 200 hours and a realistic porter flight time average will be 2250 instead of 2400. We have been advised by III Corps Air Ops. that flight 431 will not be flown on Sunday, and flights 131 and 231 will be reduced on Sunday from eight and ten hours to five and five each. This is an average loss of sixty hours per month.

AMF/PC6C has expressed to MTS-SVN his concern and requested MTS's assistance in trying to overcome the problem of engine failures on power plants with low time since overhaul. Since AMF/PC6C has had overhauled engines fail after 24, 5, 340 and 425 hours. There was one other for sure but the elapsed time since overhaul is not known to him.

As June ended the Porter Program was taking on a more suitable air.

9. VTB - The program was manned with 15 captains and six First Officers as we started the month. Pilot qualifications in the VTB are at a new all time high and improving.

Projected aircraft flight time was 1,113 hours with 938+03 being flown. Some loss was due to temporary non-availability of aircraft and some to weather, however, these were minimal. Lack of utilization accounted for the majority of the difference.

We have once again shaken the yoke of night stand-by. This commitment cost us four man days for two pilots to standby each night. Relief from this requirement will permit a better regulated STO program.

IV. OPERATIONS

1. Total revenue block time for June was 6220 + 43 as compared with 6755 + 16 for May and 7682 + 49 for April. Three Helios, B875, B849 and B839 are in temporary storage in Saigon

2. Flight time report (See attachment A)
   Aircraft Incidents Report (See attachment B)
   Flight Frequency Report(See attachment C)
   Flight Time Information (See attachment D)
   Ground Transportation (See attachment E)

3. Communications - Posts and Telecommunications technicians succeeded in repairing the damaged cable which carries our leased teletype circuit. Since mid-June we have enjoyed good service and outages have been negligible.

We have not yet received any reply from Posts and Telecommunications regarding our proposal to establish a direct radioteletype circuit between Tan Son Nhut and the Post Office Building. This proposal is not as pressing as heretofore but it still remains quite desirable. We hope to hear from them soon - yea or nay.

The remote VHF/UHF automatic retransmission systems at Da Nang and Nha Trang worked well.

SCM composed a memorandum advocating that the company establish the necessary stock level of spare parts and procure the test equipment required to enable the Company to provide direct maintenance support for the systems utilizing ED personnel rather than depend upon Motorola's technicians.

We have received no official correspondence regarding our request for allocation of additional HF frequencies. However, we have been informed by MACV Frequency Branch that CINCPAC did in fact recommend that Air America be allocated five frequencies. Formal authorization is pending approval action by DOD Frequency Allocation Board in Washington.

Air America signed two lease agreements with Posts and Telecommunications for the transfer of phone lines 21298 and 22726.

New procedures for intra-SVN Company mail pouch handling were published whereby the M/Cs will use only scheduled passenger flight aircraft since there are adequate daily flights to all stations.

SCM continues to receive hardware for the relocation of transmitter sites at Saigon, Danang, and Nhatrang. Word was received that the antenna towers are on the high seas and should be in hand in approximately a month's time. The cable for the Base telephone distribution system has been received and installation will begin shortly. OKI has indicated a delivery date of mid-October for PABX.

No word has been received from AMTRACO regarding GE's willingness to provide equipment for our Base ramp control network.

4. EMD

The favorable trend of continued progress on long dormant projects continues. With the exception of excessive outages on leased teletype lines between AAM Airport Base and the Central Saigon Post Office, (PTT), we encountered no major problems. SCM visited Danang and Nhatrang stations with the duel objectives of formulating a Company maintenance capability on the UHF/VHF Retransmission Installations, and updating on the HF relocation projects, for which material procurement is in progress.

Telephone cable ordered under FE-5000 for Saigon Base telephone cable distribution has been received and installation will commence shortly.

5. A plan for the company to acquire a maintenance capability for the Motorola UHF/VHF Retransmission facilities at Danang and Nhatrang has been formulated and forwarded to DED and MCRD. This action is considered mandatory if the operational advantages gained by these installations are to be retained.

6. We have begun phasing all company owned teletype equipment held at Saigon and Danang to MMB for IRAN in anticipation of long planned Company radio-teletype circuits finally approaching activation.

	Message Traffic	
	May	June
Incoming	10436	9615
Outgoing	12854	10979

V. TRAFFIC/AAM

TM/Base has remained in the temporary additional position of SRTM/SVN. During this month, the primary mission [redacted] was to tag all aircraft seats with AAM property tags and initiate proper traffic inventory control. All ramp agent slots have been filled thus giving full strength in that area of responsibility

	May	June
Passengers departure SGN (All contracts)	5539	5375
" arrival SGN (All contracts	6713	6137
Outbound cargo - SGN	135663	72742
Inbound cargo - SGN	150573	90017

TRAFFIC/USAID

	Cargo (including AF Caribou A/C)	
	May	June
Outbound (lbs) SGN	1,317,907	1,092,917
Inbound (lbs) SGN	50,522	86,747

VI. HOSTEL OCCUPANCY

During the month, 77 beds out of 180 were occupied for a 42.7% occupancy rate. Also during this period a total of three non-avail. slips were issued, one for the month of April.

VII. CANTHO SUB-BASE

1. Can Tho facilities have been improving during the past month. The new terminal building is presently occupied by CORDS Air Operations while AAM RMD is occupying the Pre. Fab. and a CORDS 110V generator accommodated the whole area. The construction of a ramp from the PSP to the concrete area adjacent to our building is pending Air Field Commanders decision. 191 ASO numbers were assigned for routine and light non-routine maintenance; 2 heavy service ASOs were assigned for engine changes on aircraft N9664C and N5269V.

VIII. SAFETY - See attachment F.

IX. MEDICAL

1. Number of sick call: 1769
2. Accident: 40
3. Hospitalized sick call: 1
   Hospitalized accident: None
   Unhospitalized accident: 40
   outcalls: 5
4. Physical examinations: Flight crew phys. 12
   Pre-employment phys. 7
   Accident flight phys. 1
   Total: 20
5. Sanitation: Cafeteria - Fair
   Toilet - Fair
6. Vaccination: 36

Total man days lost by reasons of sickness: 206 days

Total man days lost by reasons of accident: 53 days

X. PERSONNEL

1. Incoming personnel - [redacted] : 1
   : 0
   : 14

2. Outgoing personnel [redacted]
   a. resignation - : 2
   : 2
   : 15
   b. separation - : 1
   : 8
   : 9
   c. transfer - : 7
   : 2
   d. deceased - : 1(at child-birth)

2. Personnel strength (see attachment G)

XI. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. There was a decrease of 600 flying hours this month representing some 8.7% of our total for June. We all like to think this drop is because of the customers fiscal year (spending) is coming to its end. A portion of the lower flying no doubt can be contributed to this, but not all.

2. Available manpower must be reduced to align with the workload, as programmed to the flying hours. We are programming a "phased reduction" to better evaluate the changing requirements without putting ourselves in a bind. Unfortunately we are now having to select many good performers as excess, because the workload has decreased below that anticipated.

3. The RMD aircraft reliability has shown considerable steady improvement with the stress on better troubleshooting and Log Book reviews, not to mention closer supervision. Training classes are also being given on engine conditioning to include ignition systems. General ground safety habits have improved within all Technical Service Departments, particular on the ramp.

4. Near elimination of aircraft heavy services at our sub-bases has helped to balance the workload at Saigon Base and personnel reductions were then possible at Da Nang and Nha Trang. Supply stock levels are under process at Sub bases to meet the lower station classifications. We would like to eventually discontinue all heavy services at Danang. At present we are doing Number 1 Services on the 3 Porters at Danang using Danang personnel and in addition we send a field maintenance team from Saigon to perform Number 2 Services on the 204B's which occurs about 4 times each month.

5. We have visited by USAF Contract personnel from Japan. They reviewed our facilities for possible maintenance contract work to be done in Saigon. C-47 IRAN work capabilities was the main topic. These men have previously toured the Tainan and Udorn Facilities, so we could not compare, but they felt our aircraft looked better and were impressed with the quality of the end product in view of our limited hangar space, facilities and supporting shop equipment

6. The flying hours for the month were down to a total of 6408:07 with the following breakdown by types:

PC-6C	2169:39	C-46	676:34
204B	1131:02	C-47	679:40
10-2/C45	770:42	DHC-4	36:42
VTB-18	938:03	H395	5:45

Company Services

	May	June
Transit	287	254
Overnight	633	556
No. 1 Service	21	20
No. 2 Service	21	26
No. 3 "	7	1
No. 4 "	3	0
Engine change	22	19

Line Items

	May	June
Requisitions	3052	3589
Receipts	3154	1750
Store Issues	7013	6555
Stock credits	991	1132
Posted to cards	20539	18503

E.J. Theisen

5

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT

JUNE 1969.

1. Contract VH-41

A/C No.	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
N67984	38+01	30+45	10+00	8+27
N67985	128+16	105+53	11+58	1+05
B910	120+55	94+57		
B928	132+18	106+52		
B138	116+37	97+06	20+29	18+41
B146	57+02	48+02	21+11	19+11
6147	59+15	46+53		
8084	157+32	133+07		
5559	166+23	152+22		
5994	110+14	90+14	0+20	
B817	16+18	14+04	7+25	6+16
B829	18+00	13+29	7+44	6+12
6083	103+33	86+49		
N539Y	1+44	1+05	7+19	5+59
N544Y	2+57	2+04		
N9518Z	55+04	46+10	1+33	0+56
N6154U	92+20	81+56	1+37	0+53
N9956Z	71+22	62+00	13+27	11+54
N7770B	120+38	104+50	1+05	0+42
N9577Z	49+21	41+10	16+39	15+07
N9838Z	95+26	84+17	9+09	7+24
N3728G	12+14	10+04	7+49	6+20
N9664C	5+52	4+59		
N3674Q	10+45	9+24		
N7695C	20+58	18+26		
N91295	2+20	1+42		
N9521Z	71+20	58+34	3+02	1+50
N9573Z	90+29	74+35	0+21	0+13
N5269V	109+14	90+51	1+57	1+20
N77Y	56+28	46+17	8+36	5+10
N7950C	91+09	71+18		
N51259	34+27	29+50		
N21412	133+47	115+11	2+35	1+24
N9073Z	11+25	9+49		
N9871Z	67+06	56+29	2+00	1+23
N9898Z	9+08	6+38		
N358F	165+57	142+57		
N285L	131+32	107+00	8+16	6+34
N391R	132+31	119+05	1+08	0+58
N394R	222+50	189+59	5+55	4+46
N9444	155+18	140+38	1+50	1+00
N198K	208+09	173+30	1+57	1+34
N153L	30+47	26+15		
N180K	101+18	85+06	6+43	4+55
N12450	183+26	163+54	0+40	0+20

N152L	25+08	22+04		
N184L	10+26	8+05		
N185K	20+27	17+39		
N192L	13+02	10+29		
N393R	6+57	5+29		
N194X	3+10	2+40		
N1303X	223+48	223+48	3+15	3+15
N1304X	123+02	123+02	3+00	3+00
N1305X	125+18	125+18	3+25	3+25
N1306X	155+07	155+07	7+51	7+51
N1307X	120+51	120+51	8+43	8+43
N8512F	16+39	16+39		
N8513F	9+34	9+34		
N8514F	2+29	2+29		
N8535F	2+41	2+41		
B867			3+57	2+36
Sub-total	4630+25	4042+31	202+56	169+24

2. Contract 4395

B138	9+50	7+54		
B146	14+01	11+01		
B817	11+22	9+42		
B829	21+27	16+20		
B084	3+36	3+21		
N539Y	14+43	11+22		
N544Y	7+07	5+31	2+52	2+29
N3674G	53+59	44+14	2+35	2+02
N7695C	68+14	56+01	1+13	1+00
N91295	61+11	45+29	6+57	4+35
N9518Z	2+34	2+06		
N6154U	3+18	2+43		
N9577Z	21+42	19+24		
N9838Z	6+12	4+23		
N3728G	24+54	20+47		
N9664C	10+01	7+12		
N6622C	8+29	7+34		
N51259	3+43	3+14		
N77Y	3+05	1+55		
N748N	98+53	87+29	3+17	2+47
N152L	74+59	68+23	1+56	1+16
N184L	95+32	79+32	4+26	3+22
N185K	101+05	84+42	2+07	1+37
N192L	67+13	58+35	4+45	4+03
N393R	80+20	69+35	1+54	1+24
N194X	102+11	91+10	1+04	0+56

N358F	5+01	4+11		
N285L	4+16	3+43		
N391R	3+22	3+03		
N153L	62+22	55+06		
N180K	32+19	27+26		
N12450	4+58	4+16		
N8512F	66+14	66+14	2+35	2+35
N8513F	113+59	113+59	1+00	1+00
N8514F	74+53	74+53		
N8535F	84+06	84+06	1+45	1+45
B867	1+48	1+23		
Sub-total	1422+59	1257+58	40+56	32+51

3. Contract 0005

N77F	6+11	5+34		
N6622C	60+57	50+21		
N51259	1+24	1+04		
N9573Z	6+16	5+27		
N358F	1+30	1+06		
N13C4X	1+20	1+20		
N13C6X	2+20	2+20		
Sub-total	78+34	66+08		

4. Contract 0069

N9664C	57+50	49+18	1+39	1+03
N7770B	3+17	2+59		
N3728G	25+38	22+24		
N9956Z	2+00	1+36		
Sub-total	88+45	76+17	1+39	1+03

Total Revenue Block Time	6220+43
" " Flight Time	5442+54
" Non-Revenue Block Time	245+31
" " " Flight Time	203+18
GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	6466+14
" " FLIGHT TIME	5646+12

FLIGHT TIME BY TYPE OF AIRCRAFT

Type of A/C	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block time	Flight time	Block time	Flight time
C-46	617+00	502+30	53+38	47+24
C-47	600+33	512+46	0+20	0+00
Sailed C-47	67+07	53+35	15+09	12+28
DHC-4	26+31	20+02	10+11	8+28
VTB	877+10	743+34	63+43	51+56
Beech 10-2	675+35	560+41	19+01	11+57
C-45	87+39	72+56	2+00	1+23
Porter	2144+59	1853+06	45+58	35+32
204B	1122+21	1122+21	31+34	31+34
H395	1+48	1+23	3+57	2+36
TOTAL	6220+43	5442+54	245+31	203+18

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT FREQUENCY

JUNE 1969

	C-46		C-47		DHC-4		10-2 + C-45 BEECH		PORTER		204B		VTB		HELIO		TOTAL	
	Dep	Arr	Dep	Arr	Dep	Arr	Dep	Arr	Dep	Arr	Dep	Arr	Dep	Arr	Dep	Arr	DEP	ARR
Contract	81	82	102	102	11	11	124	123	226	227	66	65	135	132	1	1	746	743
Ferry	2	2											1	2			3	4
Training	3	3	7	7	4	4	1	1	8	8	6	6	5	6			34	35
Maintenance							1	1	3	3	1	1	1	1			6	6
Test	2	2					15	15	13	13	13	14	2	2			45	46
Others (Non-rev.)			1	1									2	2			3	3
TOTAL	88	89	110	110	15	15	141	140	250	251	86	86	146	145	1	1	837	837

June 1969

Monthly Report

GROUND TRANSPORTATION

During the month of June 1969, 10 microbuses were in commission daily. Following are the GTD statistics for June 69.

10 microbuses on station and in daily operation

X-4033	2304 km
X-4034	3091 km
X-4035	2053 km
X-1140	2061 km
X-1141	3144 km
X-1142	3212 km
X-0417	1259 km
X-0418	2766 km
X-0419	740 km
X-0420	3131 km
	23761 km * Approx 14850 miles

Total microbuses downtime : 487½ hrs

Total microbuses pax carried : 4802 pax

ISUZU BUS MILEAGE

X-01057	1965 km
X-01058	2434 km
X-04329	2585 km
	6984 km = Approx 4365 miles

Total isuzu bus down-time : 37 hrs

Isuzu bus pax carried : Cholon route 8434
Saigon route 4240
12674 pax

Supply vehicles mileage:

EB-8176	2367 km
EB-1780	146 km
EC-7953	542 km
	3055 km = approx 1909 miles

Supply vehicles down-time : 12 hrs 18 mn

3 Wheeler lambretta and Honda 50-cc down-time : 14 hrs 48 mn

GRAND TOTAL PAX CARRIED : 17476

S A I G O N B A S E

JUNE 1969

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted]												TOTAL	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	50	172	184	14	189	1	29	6	615#	15**	3		2	1*	1073	208
TEMPORARY																
FTC																
PRE-PROCESSED									7						7	
TOTAL	50	172	184	14	189	1	29	6	622#	15**	3		2	1*	1080	208

(*) : 1 Swiss
(**) : 1,French
(#) : 4 French

GROUND PNL : 1080
FLIGHT PNL : 208
TOTAL : 1288

DA NANG SUB-BASE

JUNE 1969

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted]				TOTAL	
	GRD FLT	GRD FLT	GRD FLT	GRD FLT	GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	4	14	28	102	148	
TEMPORARY						
FTC						
PRE-PROCESSED				8	8	
TOTAL	4	14	28	110	156	

GROUND PNL : 156

FLIGHT PNL : 0

TOTAL : 156

NHA TRANG SUB-BASE

JUNE 1969

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted]						TOTAL	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	8		17		30		78	133
TEMPORARY								
FTC								
PRE-PROCESSED							5	5
TOTAL	8		17		30		83	138

GROUND PNL : 138

FLIGHT PNL : 0

TOTAL : 138

CAN THO SUB-BASE

JUNE 1969

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted]						TOTAL	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	1				9		4	14
TEMPORARY								
FTC								
PRE-PROCESSED								
TOTAL	1				9		4	14

GROUND PNL : 14

FLIGHT PNL : 0

TOTAL : 14

BYWEEKLY REPORT ON VISAS AND PASSPORTS

PASSPORT & VISA SECTION PO-SCN

1 JUNE - 30 JUNE 69

SVN Exit entry	Extension of stay	Brown book	Laos	HKG	TPE	TYO	BKK	PTT Renewal	Add page	Military Reservist	Sponsorship
144	113	58	11	17	2	0	0	6	4	4	107

The overall exemptions for this document are (b)(1) and (b)(3).

[redacted]

~~Secret~~
~~No Foreign Dissem~~

8

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

Expansion of North Vietnam's
International Radiobroadcasting Effort

~~Secret~~

ER IM 69-78
June 1969

Copy No. 132

3143203 - 1

[redacted]

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~
~~No Foreign Dissem~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
June 1969

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Expansion of North Vietnam's International Radiobroadcasting Effort

Summary

Since early 1968, international radiobroadcasts controlled by Hanoi have climbed from nearly 300 hours per week to more than 500 hours. Radio Hanoi and Radio Liberation (the clandestine voice of the Viet Cong) have accounted for most of this expansion, with smaller increases in the clandestine broadcasts known as Radio Pathet Lao and Radio of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces (Laos).

The primary target audiences for Hanoi's official and clandestine international broadcasting are the indigenous populations of South Vietnam and Laos. Allied forces in South Vietnam also have begun to receive substantially increased attention, and since the beginning of the Paris talks, Hanoi has initiated radiobroadcasting to the European area. Transmissions to Europe now amount to almost 40 hours per week.

The clandestine broadcasts of Radio Liberation, Radio Pathet Lao, and Neutralist Forces Radio are not independent operations originating from South Vietnam and Laos, as represented by North Vietnam and other Communist countries. From all indications, these clandestine broadcasting operations are tightly controlled by North Vietnam and probably are carried out from the Radio Hanoi transmitting complex located at Me Tri.

North Vietnam has achieved this rapid expansion in international programing by importing seven new

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and was coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence [redacted]

transmitters -- bringing to at least 18 the number of transmitters in international service -- and by making more intensive use of existing facilities. Hanoi is procuring more broadcasting equipment from both Communist and Free World countries, and it can be expected that the North Vietnamese radio propaganda effort will be further stepped up.

North Vietnam's Radio Propaganda Apparatus

1. North Vietnam's international radio propaganda apparatus is tightly controlled by both the Lao Dong (Communist) Party and the government. To reach its target audiences, located primarily in Indochina, Hanoi has developed a coordinated schedule of both overt and clandestine broadcasting. At the policy level, guidance and control over the international broadcasting effort is exercised in tandem by the Propaganda and Training Department of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee and by the General Directorate of Information, attached directly to the Office of the Premier. Provision of facilities, equipment, and technical personnel is the responsibility of the Directorate of Broadcasting, a subordinate arm of the Ministry of Communications.

2. For day-to-day operations, the focal organizations are the Vietnam News Agency (VNA) and Radio Hanoi, as shown in Figure 1. The VNA provides Radio Hanoi with the information used in daily international broadcasts and utilizes Radio Hanoi's facilities to broadcast its international radio-teletype news service.*

3. There is strong evidence that in addition to its own official radiobroadcasting effort North Vietnam exerts direct control clandestinely over the radio propaganda activities of the Viet Cong (the so-called National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, or NFLSV) and the indigenous Communist forces in Laos -- both the Pathet Lao and the less important dissident Neutralist Forces. The VNA in Hanoi maintains direct radio communications with the Liberation News Agency of the NFLSV in South Vietnam and with the Pathet Lao News Agency in Laos. There also is evidence that the dissident Neutralist Forces in Laos use the Pathet Lao radio communications facility to stay in contact with Hanoi.

4. From all current indications, the clandestine stations share with Radio Hanoi the use of the transmitter complex at Me Tri, just outside Hanoi,

---

* *In addition to their international radio propaganda activities, VNA and Radio Hanoi are also responsible for domestic radiobroadcasting.*

although their broadcasts are represented by North Vietnam and other Communist countries as independent operations carried out from South Vietnam by the NFLSV's Radio Liberation and from Laos by Radio Pathet Lao and Radio of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces. Daily international radio-teletype services operated by the Liberation News Agency and the Pathet Lao News Agency also are broadcast clandestinely over the Me Tri facilities.

Broadcasting Buildup

5. North Vietnam has substantially increased its volume of international broadcasting -- both official and clandestine -- since early 1968. The total volume of programing rose from 294 hours per week in February 1968 to 508 hours per week by May 1969, with most of the increase directed at audiences in South Vietnam and Laos (see Figure 2).* Within this period, the number of broadcast hours targeted at South Vietnamese audiences alone jumped from 94 hours to about 168 hours per week, an increase of nearly 80 percent.

6. Overt international broadcasting by Radio Hanoi climbed from 152 hours to 270 hours weekly. This was sufficient to raise North Vietnam from eleventh to eighth place among Communist countries in the volume of official international broadcasting. Radio Hanoi's international broadcasts are directed mainly at South Vietnamese and Montagnard audiences, but an increased amount of broadcast time has also been allocated to Allied forces in South Vietnam, to Thailand, and to Cambodia. Until 1968, North Vietnam beamed no broadcasts to Europe. Since the beginning of the Paris talks, however, Radio Hanoi has developed a schedule of voice news broadcasts to Europe that currently consists of 21 hours a week in English, French, and Vietnamese. These broadcasts are nominally directed to VNA offices in Paris and Moscow but can be heard by anyone tuned to the right shortwave frequencies.

7. Liberation Radio's international programing has more than doubled since early 1968, increasing

* *In contrast, the volume of domestic broadcasting by central radio stations in Saigon and Vientiane has remained relatively static since 1966.*

from about 53 to 125 hours per week. As the voice of the Viet Cong, its broadcasts are targeted primarily at the South Vietnamese population, but it does carry some programs in Cambodian, Mandarin, French, and English. Like Radio Hanoi, Radio Liberation began in 1968 to broadcast to Europe and has recently increased its programing to this area from 14 to 17.5 hours per week.

8. Radio Pathet Lao has increased its programing output by about 30 percent to almost 80 hours per week since early 1968, with all of its broadcasts aimed at Laotian audiences. About 55 percent of Radio Pathet Lao's weekly broadcast hours are in the Lao language, with the remainder allocated to programs in minority languages such as Lao Theung, Lao Soung, La Ve, and French.

9. Radio of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces showed a relatively modest increase of more than 20 percent -- from about 29 to about 36 hours per week -- between early 1968 and early 1969. This broadcast operation evidently was originally organized and sustained by North Vietnam for the purpose of winning over moderate neutralist sentiment in Laos to the Communist side. Coincident with the beginning of a North Vietnamese military offensive in Laos, however, Neutralist Forces Radio went off the air abruptly on 6 February 1969 and remained silent for almost three months. Since resumption of operations late in April, Radio of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces has abandoned its relatively moderate propaganda line and now is virtually indistinguishable from Radio Pathet Lao.

Transmitting Facilities

10. The Me Tri radiobroadcasting complex, located about four miles southwest of Hanoi, houses the only known international radiobroadcast transmitters in North Vietnam. The main transmitter building at Me Tri is connected by cable to the control area of the Hanoi International Radio Transmission Station at Dai Mo, which is North Vietnam's principal international point-to-point communications facility and is located about two miles southwest of Me Tri. It is probable that Dai Mo is the facility used by the VNA in maintaining its out-of-country radio communications

with Liberation News Agency and Pathet Lao News Agency headquarters. Another cable and a wireline lead northwest from the Me Tri control building toward the Hanoi Citadel. These landlines are probably used to link studio facilities and government authorities in central Hanoi with the two transmitting stations.

11. The number of transmitters used by Radio Hanoi for overt international broadcasting evidently increased in 1968 from three to 13, all but one operating in the shortwave band. Of the ten transmitters added to Radio Hanoi's schedule, one probably was transferred from the domestic service, two apparently were reassigned from Radio Liberation broadcasting, and the remaining seven were newly procured from foreign suppliers (four from Communist China and three of unknown origin). At least five other transmitters are assigned to the clandestine broadcasting effort, and it is also possible that Radio Hanoi allocates some program time on its own transmitters to clandestine broadcasting.

Outlook

12. North Vietnam can be expected to continue expanding its international radiobroadcasting effort in terms of both total broadcasting hours and geographic coverage. A new 20-kilowatt shortwave broadcast transmitter -- ordered from Japan in late 1968 -- probably will go into operation before the end of 1969, and North Vietnam has concluded contracts with other Communist and Free World countries for an unknown quantity of additional broadcast equipment. Hanoi also may choose to expand its broadcasting output by using existing transmitters more intensively. South Vietnam and Laos will remain the primary targets for radio propaganda out of Hanoi, but broadcasting to other parts of southeast Asia and to the European area -- including the Communist countries -- probably will share in any increase in the broadcasting effort.

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Figure 1

Organization of North Vietnam's Radio Broadcasting Effort



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[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

Figure 2

Expansion of North Vietnamese International Radio Propaganda by Target Area in Weekly Hours

February 1968 and May 1969



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MEMORANDUM

TO : BM/SGN

DATE: 07 June, 1969

FROM : A/SZDNG

REF. No. SZDNG/69/055

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for May, 1969

GENERAL

During the month of May there were approximately five occasions in which the city of DaNang received hostile fire from enemy rockets. None of these incidents were of sufficient intensity to merit detailed reporting, but they do point out Viet Cong's continued capability to launch such attacks. The increased enemy activity anticipated prior to Ho-Chi-Minh's and Buddha's birthdates failed to materialize, therefore plans for night stand-by crews at the airbase were cancelled.

A curfew exemption for our essential personnel was received from the Office of the Mayor of DaNang, but it was in the form of one approved list. The requests for curfew exemptions were so numerous that the issuance of individual passes was precluded, but other than a few TCN employees being stopped at check points, no serious curfew incidents were reported. The American Consul advised they would offer all possible assistance should any personnel be arrested as a result of a curfew violation.

The number of Southern Air Transport flights into DaNang increased from April, totaling eight round trip and three one way missions. All these flights were met by representatives from MED, Operations and Traffic even though there were several arrivals during curfew and the early morning hours. None of these personnel ever failed to report for work as scheduled due to handling these flights but there were generalized complaints as to their efforts going seemingly unrewarded.

One outstation recovery was necessary; on 27 May VTB 3728G sustained damage to both propellers during a landing at Hoi-An, approximately 15 miles south of DaNang. Efforts to have the aircraft lifted back to DaNang that evening by helicopter were discontinued due to high surface winds. Repairs were made the following day, which included changing both propellers and one engine; the aircraft was flown to DaNang for further inspection, and subsequently ferried to Saigon.

LEGAL

The lease for the company hostel [redacted] was renewed during to the month for an additional year. A supplementary agreement was negotiated for a fifteen thousand piaster annual rent reduction for the duration of the contract which deleted the requirement for the lessor to repaint the building at least every two years. Past experience seems to indicate it would be next to impossible to enforce the painting provisions of the lease contract at other than renewal time.

..... Cont'd

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for May, 1969

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

The VN-41 customer has expressed particular satisfaction over the performance of 2048 number two services at DaNang, the expeditious arrival of a VT3 to replace 37228 (arrived the evening of the above incident), and our parking of C46 and C47 scheduled passenger flights adjacent to the boarding gate rather than on the back ramp. It was not possible to perform the third number two service required on the VN-41 assigned 2043 at DaNang during the month, but since a replacement aircraft arrived in time to permit an uninterrupted flight schedule, no strong complaints over the ferry expense were received.

The 4395 customer continues to be far more reasonable and understanding of the problems involved in the operation, and those which do develop can usually be resolved on the local level.

FACILITIES

Contractor construction of the lean-to extension to the nose hangar commenced on 16 May, and by the end of the month, work representing twenty per cent of the bid price was completed. The lean-to componets were all received from Nha-Trang and to date the contractor has not expressed any disenchantment as to the obvious amount of materials which will be required in addition to the basic framework and siding.

The requirement for a reliable source of electrical power is becoming more and more apparent. The USAF supplied 100 KVA generator was inoperative on several occasions, and was shut down the greater part of a day in two instances. The third generator in six weeks was installed, each successive unit seeming less reliable than the one it replaced. These power failures are more than just an inconvenience since all routine work ceases for the duration due to lack of interior lighting in the Operations/Administration building. A pro forma Ad for the installation and distribution of city power to the facility has been submitted and expeditious approval of this project would be most appreciated.

FISCAL

The use of a time clock for timekeeping purposes was deferred until at least 16 June due to the time clock received being a 50 cycle unit which is incompatible with the 60 cycle electricity presently available. Minor problems of the instruction booklet printed in Japanese, and company timecards which are too wide to fit the time clock slot will be more easily resolved. The clock is being shipped to Saigon for possible modification or further shipment to Japan for conversion to 60 cycles.

[redacted] payroll for the month totaled: [redacted]

Petty cash expenditures for the month totaled: 56,235$VN

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for May, 1969

OPERATIONS

Revenue flight time increased over the previous reporting period for the first time this year. VH-41 and 4395 flying increased 87+41 hours and 5+33 hours respectively over April. Revenue losses during May were down considerably from April for a total of 5+30 hours as compared to 27+25 hours.

The following is the breakdown of flight time generated by this station during May:

AID/VH-41	839+06
4395	312+08
0005	Nil
Non-Revenue	4+48
Total	**1,156+02**

Revenue losses for the month are broken down as follows:

Maintenance	3+30
Customer Cancellations	2+00
Weather	Nil
Other	Nil
Total	5+30

COMMUNICATIONS

The Motorola remote UHF/VHF system seems to be becoming more and more reliable with experience; it was out of service on eight occasions during the month. The use of the station VHF as a back up unit has minimized difficulties during the above periods.

Incoming and outgoing messages totaled 2402 and 1648 respectively.

TRAFFIC

The only significant problem encountered during the month was the decrease of the passenger seat allocation on Flight 12 to eight for this station. Consequently it may prove more difficult to move company personnel from DNG to NHA as this flight provides the most frequency between these two points travelling southbound.

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for May, 1969

TRAFFIC (Cont'd)

Passenger and cargo statistics for the month are as follows:

	Passengers In	Passengers Out	Cargo In	Cargo Out
VR-41	2,705	3,023	225,466 lbs	329,665 lbs
4395	569	758	11,820	14,027
0005	3	2	Nil	Nil
Ferry	29	29	Nil	Nil
AAH	139	137	29,502	32,387
TOTAL	3,445	3,949	266,788 lbs	376,079 lbs

Eleven Continental Air Service and fourteen USAF caribou flights were handled by this department during May.

SECURITY

Based on the recommendation of the Security Team Survey conducted during May, the VR-41 customer has verbally approved the upgrading of two Ground Services UTM positions to guard slots to provide overnight guard surveillance of the CONUS warehouse. Written confirmation of this approval is expected shortly.

An NSE was submitted requesting authorization for the position of Guard Supervisor, which if approved, will provide effective direction and supervision of the security effort at this station which is presently lacking.

PERSONNEL

A change in processing procedures at Saigon has shown some signs of relieving the backlog of visa and extension of stay applications for DaNang personnel. The problem has become less serious than that which prevailed during April.

The personnel breakdown for DaNang station during May is as follows:

	[redacted]			
Permanent	4	16	33	106
Temporary	1	0	0	0
Pre-Process	0	0	0	11
Daily Hire	0	0	0	0
TOTAL (171)	5	16	33	117

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for May, 1969

TECHNICAL SERVICES

RMD handled a total of 683 arriving and 684 departing flights, of which only 5 of the latter were delayed due to maintenance. The VTB 3728G recovery accounted for the only engine change and two of a total of three propeller changes. Ten heavy services were performed, including three 204B number two services which were supported by TCS personnel from Saigon. With the exception of 28G, no aircraft were delayed due to being grounded for parts.

BCMD expended a total of 1478 manhours, of which 268 were utilized in hostel maintenance and painting. The cylinder head discrepancy on the GMC truck was remedied when a serviceable head was obtained from local sources. This vehicle should be back in service during the early part of June.

A more detailed examination of each MSA invoice is planned so that a large outstanding credit balance can be reconciled with their fiscal office. Assurances have been given by MSA that this problem will be rectified in the May invoice.

Original Signed by
WINSTON C. CAMBRE
Winston C. Cambre

cc: file

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[redacted] 63

WORKING PAPER

The Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN):
Its History, Organization and Functions

10 June 1969

This is not an officially approved publication of CIA. It is circulated for information subject to the enclosed statement of limitations.

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SCOPE

The Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN): Its History, Organization and Functions, 10 June 1969, 83 pages plus a 4-page Table of Contents, a 3-page list of abbreviations used, a 6-page attachment summarizing schematically COSVN's organization and personnel, a similar 3-page attachment concerning the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV), and a 15-page index of all personal names cited. The paper, after a brief review of the steps leading up to the formation of COSVN in October 1961, discusses in detail the organization, functions and personnel of the various COSVN components, both civilian and military. In many cases, biographic data are included on the individuals mentioned. The paper ends with a discussion of the role of the NFLSV in the communist insurgency and the nature of COSVN's relations with its subordinate echelons. The paper was prepared by a CIA research unit in the field on the basis of all information available to it. A discussion of the sources used constitutes the first paragraph of the body of the paper.

LIMITATIONS

Any questions with respect to the use of this document or the material therein in a manner contrary to the dissemination controls should be addressed to Document Division, OCR.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT

APT's	Armed Propaganda Teams
ARVN	Army, Republic of Vietnam
BN	Battalion
CAC	Current Affairs Committee
CAPT.	Captain
CDEC	Combined Document Exploitation Center
CI	Counter-Intelligence
CICV	Combined Intelligence Committee, Vietnam
CMD	Capital Military District
CMIC	Combined Military Interrogation Center
CMPS	Capital Military Proselyting Section
CNC	Cuc Nghien Cuu (North Vietnamese Intelligence Service)
CO	Commanding Officer
COL.	Colonel
COSVN	Central Office of South Vietnam
DPO	Deputy Political Officer
FDS	Field Report, Vietnam, Saigon
GOV	Government of Vietnam
HQS	Headquarters
ICC	International Control Commission
JGS	Joint General Staff
LF	Local Forces
LSA	Liberation Student Association

ABBREVIATIONS (continued)

LT. GEN.	Lieutenant General
LWA	Liberation Women's Association
LYA	Liberation Youth's Association
MAC	Military Affairs Committee
MACV/SRA	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam/ Strategic Research and Analysis
MAJ. GEN.	Major General
MF	Main Force
MI	Military Intelligence
MR	Military Region
NFLSV	National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
NIC	National Interrogation Center
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
NVN	North Vietnam
PLAF	People's Liberation Armed Forces
PO	Political Officer
POW	Prisoner of War
PRP	People's Revolutionary Party
PRYG	People's Revolutionary Youth Group
[redacted]	[redacted]
REGT.	Regiment
RSG	Rear Services Group
SEN. GEN.	Senior General
SR	Sub-Region

ABBREVIATIONS (continued)

SVN	South Vietnam
SVNLA	South Vietnam Liberation Army
TTH	Tri-Thien-Hue
U.S.	United States
VC	Viet Cong
XO	Executive Officer

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS — Pages i, ii, iii

I. CAVEAT — Page 1

II. BACKGROUND — 2

Map #1 - Viet Minh Inter-Regions — 2A
Map #2 - Viet Cong Provinces and Regions -1967 — 2B
Map #3 - Viet Cong Provinces and Regions — 2C

III. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE — 3

IV. CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (CAC) — 6

A. Nuoi Cuc — 7
B. Pham Hung — 8
C. Hai Van — 9
D. Others: — 10
Hai Hau — 10
Tran Van Tra — 11
Hoang Van Thai — 13
Tran Do — 14
Kiet, Xe, Buong, and Dang — 14

V. THE "CIVILIAN" SECTIONS — 15

A. Organization Section — 15
a) Correspondence Sub-section — 15
b) Personnel Affairs Sub-section — 16
c) Planning and Policies Sub-section — 16
d) Movement Sub-section — 16
e) Cadre Administration Sub-section — 16
f) Party Construction Sub-section — 16

B. Propaganda, Culture, and Indoctrination Section — 17
a) Propaganda or People/Culture Sub-section (B.7) — 17
b) Education Sub-section (B.18) — 18
c) Entertainment Sub-section (B.5) — 18
d) Liberation Radio Broadcast Station (B.3) — 18
e) Liberation Press Agency (B.6) — 19
f) Foreign Relations Sub-section (B.19) — 19
g) Newspaper Sub-section — 19
h) Editorial Office (B.21) — 19
i) Indoctrination and Training Sub-section — 20
j) Administrative Sub-section (B.4) — 20
k) Tran Phu Printing House (B.8) — 20
l) Medical Sub-section (B.13) — 20
m) A Rear Services Sub-section (B.9) — 21

I. CAVEAT

1. While some original research has gone into the preparation of this report, the bulk of it is based on other reports. Due to a short due date for the report and the extremely broad range of coverage, the compilation could not be especially critical either. In some instances, for example, parts of other reports were incorporated without any significant changes. An attempt has been made to credit some of these sources within the text. In general, the most used sources were MIC and CMIC interrogation reports, FVS's, Documents and Research Notes No. 23 and 40 of CICV Newsletters and Special Studies, JACV J2 SRA Newsletter 11, the [redacted] study on Security Sections, CDEC Translation Summaries, and [redacted] Memoranda. (See the list of abbreviations for the above acronyms.) (61 63 (5))

2. Given the Viet Cong (VC) propensity for clandestine working procedures and their use of pseudonyms, an itemization of COSVN leadership is tentative at best.* In addition, there never has been any one source of information on COSVN as a whole, therefore, the information is spotty. Nor is there an abundance of current information; much of what is available is out of date. The currency gap is particularly a vulnerable drawback because under the current pressures of the war and peace talks, it is certain that COSVN has undergone even more than the usual number of alterations.

3. The whole VC structure always has been flexible and subject to continuing reorganization, and COSVN is no exception. Thus, the major value of this study is that it pulls together under one cover the products of numerous other studies. As such, it should be viewed and utilized more as a framework for future compilations and as a background against which future changes can be measured, rather than as a definitive study of COSVN.

4. At present, the VC flexibility seems to be evidencing itself in a trend toward closer control by COSVN personnel in the forward areas around Saigon and to a lesser extent in the Delta. This is particularly true in the staffing of the Sub-Regions (SR) surrounding Saigon and Forward Military Command Posts (Fronts). Another area where COSVN personnel appear in great numbers in exposed forward areas is in the field of espionage and intelligence. Particularly vulnerable in this

*See Attachment A for a listing of COSVN leaders.

C. Finance and Economy Section Page 21
a) Administration Sub-section 22
b) Finance or Statistics Sub-section 22
c) Currency Sub-section 23
d) Trade or Commerce Sub-section 23
e) Transportation Sub-section 23
f) Production Sub-section 23
g) Finance and Economy School Sub-section and the Medical Sub-section 23

D. Forward Supply Council 23

E. Security Section 24
a) Administrative Sub-section (B.1) 26
b) Internal Security or Political Protection Sub-section (B.2) 26
c) Research Sub-section (B.3) 26
d) Guard Sub-section (B.4) 27
e) Production Sub-section (B.5) 27
f) Internal Security and Intelligence School (B.6) 27
g) "Organic Mobile Unit" (B.7) 28
h) Commo-Liaison Sub-section (B.8) 28
i) Logistical Sub-section (B.9) 28
j) Interrogation and Detention Sub-section (B.10) 28

F. Military Proselyting Section 29
a) Administrative Sub-section 30
b) Training Sub-section 31
c) Propaganda Sub-section 31
d) Fifth Column or Penetrations Sub-section 31
e) NOW Sub-section 31
f) Organization Sub-section 32
g) Research or Management Sub-section 32
h) Military Officer Proselyting Sub-section 32
i) Capital Military Proselyting Sub-section (CMPS) 32

G. Civilian Proselyting Section 35

H. Civil Health Section 37
a) Administration Sub-section (B.1) 39
b) Hospital (B.2) 39
c) Dispensary (B.3) 39
d) Bacteriological Institute (B.4) 40
e) Pharmaceutical Factory (B.5 or B.29) 40
f) Cadre's Formation and Advanced School (B.25) 40
g) Drug Preparation and Storage Unit 41
h) Military Health Sub-section 41
i) Civil Health Sub-section 41
j) Eating Sub-section 42
k) Protection Sub-section 42

VI. THE HEADQUARTERS SECTIONS Page 42

1. Le Trong Tan 44
Nguyen Huu Xuyen 44
Nguyen Thi Dinh 45

VII. THE STAFF DEPARTMENTS 46

A. The Military Staff Department 46
Combat Operations Staff (B.1) 46
a) General Combat Situation Staff (A.1) 46
b) Planning Section (A.2) 49
c) Main Force Section (A.3) 49
d) Local Battlefield Section (A.4) 49
e) Campaign Section (A.5) 49
f) Tactical Research Section (A.6) 50
g) Combat Control Envoy Section (A.7) 50
h) Battlefield Preparation Section (A.8) 50
i) Administrative Section (A.9) 51
j) Map Section (A.10) 51

Military Intelligence (B.2) 51
a) Enemy Situation Study Section (A.1) 52
b) Reconnaissance Section (A.2) 52
c) Espionage Section (A.3) 53
d) Crypto Section (A.4) 53
e) Administration Section (A.5) 53
f) Political Section (A.6) 53
g) People's Intelligence Section (A.7) 54
h) Technical Section (A.8) 54
i) Signal and Radio Communication Section (A.13) 54
j) Technical Reconnaissance Section (A.29) 54
k) Campaign Intelligence Teams 55
l) "Tactical Intelligence Teams" 56
m) C.252 Combat Reconnaissance Battalion 56

The Formation and Functions of B.22 (Strategic Intelligence Office) 58

Signal Staff (B.3) 61

The Military Personnel (or Armed Force) Staff (B.4) 62

The Engineer Staff (B.5) 62

The Military Training Staff (B.6) 63

The Political Staff (B.7) 63

The Cryptographic Staff (B.8) 63

The Adjutant Staff (B.9) 63

C O N F I D E N T I A L

[illegible] Center (B.12)
The Combat Staff (B.12)
The Military Data Service (B.14)
Others:
Medical Staff
Artillery Staff
Engineer Staff
The Artillery Staff Department
a) Procedures and Training Staff (B.9)
b) Enemy Strength Staff (B.2)
c) Organization Staff (B.13)
d) Cadre Staff (B.4 or B.7)
e) Security Staff (Either B.4 or B.8)
f) Administrative Staff
The Rear Services Staff Department
a) Plans Staff (B.1)
b) Political Staff (B.2)
c) Quartermaster Staff (B.3)
d) Ordnance Staff (B.4)
e) Medical Staff (B.5)
f) Financial Affairs Staff (B.10)
g) Supply, Transportation, and Secretary Staffs
Rear Services Groups
THE "FRONT"
HIGHER HEADQUARTERS' RELATIONS WITH ITS SUBORDINATE ECHELONS
ATTACHMENT A
ATTACHMENT B
INDEX

-2-

[illegible] are cadres assigned to Military Intelligence, Military Proselyting, and Security. Even more vulnerable are its communication lines between the COSVN base areas and teams of its undercover cadres, although COSVN appears to be turning to radio and other electronic means of communications to overcome this weakness. However, the fact that cadres are operating out of COSVN is no guarantee of their importance since COSVN sees and does draft people from lower echelons.

5. The bulk of this paper probably will preclude a complete reading by any but the most dedicated. For this reason, it should be pointed out that the introductory section and the discussion of the members of the Current Affairs Committee are of general interest. At the end, the discussion of COSVN's relationship with its subordinate regions and MR's is also of general interest although less so. The detail contained in the intervening discussion of the sections of COSVN, civilian and military, and of the Front are not designed for the casual reader.

II. BACKGROUND

6. During the Viet Minh period (1946-1954), the whole of Vietnam was divided by the Vietnamese Communists into nine inter-regions. With the exception of two provinces, the area of SVN was covered by two of these; Inter-region V (Southern Trung Bo) and Inter-region VI (Nam Bo). The two exceptions were Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces which were part of Inter-region IV. In 1951, the Nam Bo Regional Committee was replaced by COSVN as the key communist control element in South Vietnam (SVN). After the Geneva Accords were signed in 1954, COSVN was dissolved. Control of communist activities was again divided between the Trung Bo and Nam Bo Regional Committees. In May 1959, the Politburo of the North Vietnamese Lao Dong (Communist) Party formulated its plans to wage war to recover SVN. On 10 September 1960, the NVN Third Party Congress adopted the resolution that led to the creation of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) and the re-establishment of COSVN. The NFLSV was brought into being on 20 December. On 15 February 1961, the South Vietnam Liberation Army (SVNLA), now "officially" called the People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF), was christened and COSVN was re-established in October 1961. As such, COSVN became the central organ for the entire Southern Branch of the Lao Dong Party, as distinct from control over just the Nam Bo region during 1951-54.

7. When the Communist People's Revolutionary Party (PRP)


I
II
III
TONKIN
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
Viet Cong
Provinces & Regions
1967
5
GIA LAI
WESTERN HIGHLANDS FRONT
(B-3 FRONT)
DARLAC
10
6
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GIA DINH
RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE
3
MR Boundary


Việt Cong
Provinces & Regions
QUANG TRI
THUA THIEN
QUANG DA
QUANG NAM
QUANG NGAI
KONTUM
BINH DINH
GIA LAI
(B3 FRONT)
PHU YEN
DAC LAC
KHANH HOA
QUANG DUC
TUYEN DUC
LAM DONG
NINH THUAN
TAY
SR-6
U-1

was established on 1 January 1962, COSVN then became the Central Committee of the new Party for the South with its highest leaders making up the Standing and/or Current Affairs Committee of the PRP. Establishment of the PRP was a tactical maneuver prompted by Hanoi's strategy of depicting the revolution in SVN as a movement strictly indigenous to the South. Actually, the PRP operated as the Southern Branch of the Lao Dong Party. Since COSVN was re-established in 1961, most members of the COSVN Current Affairs Committee (CAC) also have been members of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi. In addition, most senior military officers at COSVN and the SVNLA headquarters are also members of the high command of the Army of North Vietnam (NVN). It is by means of such an interlocking organization that COSVN is able to control the Party, the Front, and the SVNLA simultaneously.

8. COSVN has been a mobile and dispersed headquarters. Located in "War Zone D," north-northeast of Saigon in the early 1960's, more recently it has moved to "War Zone C," a heavily forested area in Tay Ninh Province near the Cambodian border, and part of COSVN now is believed to be in Cambodia. The different components of COSVN are generally dug-in and widely dispersed under triple canopied jungle. According to one source, it took four days to travel by foot from the site of the Organization Section to that of the Finance and Economy Section.

9. It is possible to approach the subject of the organization of COSVN by separating it into four components: the Central Executive Committee and its CAC; the "civilian" Party sections of the Central Committee; the Military Affairs Committee (SVNLA or PLAF Command); and the Front organization. These four components will be the basis for the organization of the text that follows. The fifth and final section of the paper will deal with the relationship of COSVN to its subordinate sections.

III. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

10. Leadership at all levels within the VC Infrastructure is provided by the PRP, through Party Committees set up at each echelon. According to the statutes of the PRP, the Central Committee--or more formally, the Central Executive Committee--is the highest decisionmaking body of the PRP between Party Congresses. A Congress is supposed to convene

every four years to elect a new Central Committee, though there is no evidence of any Congress having taken place since the inception of the PRP in January 1962. The Central Committee, in turn, is supposed to elect the Party secretary and deputy secretaries and the CAC. Although the composition of the Central Committee has never been announced publicly, various sources report that 30 to 40 persons make up its membership. Aside from the secretary and deputy secretaries, they probably include heads of the functional sections under COSVN, regional secretaries, and the top military officers. In addition to full members of the Central Committee, there are a number of alternate or candidate members.

11. An isolated Central Committee would be useless. There has to be a method of control. Apart from the actual dispatch of investigators, supervisors, and trouble-shooters, the VC system seems to rely primarily on a constant flow of directives down the chain of command matched by an equally constant flow of situation reports up the chain of command. The cardinal principle in the VC managerial system is the "steering" concept. The directives generally are broad enough to allow their recipients considerable leeway for local conditions. The principle is that senior echelons guide or steer lower echelons until the final echelon has the action. This principle is in effect from Hanoi to the smallest liberated hamlet.

12. Hanoi exercises its control principally by the placement of its own cadres, including Lao Dong Politburo members, in command positions in SVN and the use of directives and resolutions. In the military field, particularly north of Nam Bo, NVN also appears to exercise considerable direct tactical control. In the political sphere, the normal procedure at the highest level is for the Lao Dong Politburo to formulate the strategic policy and guidelines, usually after taking into consideration representative views and recommendations of COSVN. If fundamental enough, then this policy will be placed before the NVN Central Congress resulting in its becoming a Resolution and being given a number, such as Resolution 12. In other cases, the policy is sent South as a Politburo Resolution. In theory there is a difference, but in fact the end result is the same since the Central Congress acts largely as a rubber stamp. Often the decision hinges on whether the subject matter has international implications (such as a statement on the Sino-Soviet rift) or is devoted solely to the war in SVN. In the former case, a Central Congress Resolution is the rule, while in the latter it is not.

13. These broad policy statements either may be carried physically to COSVN or they may be sent electrically. Both methods have been used. In any event, once they reach COSVN, the COSVN Central Executive Committee will meet to discuss the policy. They are free to make changes, particularly those that reflect an appreciation of local conditions under which the policy is to be implemented. Although not universally followed, COSVN also may issue its own number to the policy. In addition, as the policy filters down the chain of command, other echelons also may utilize a different numbering system, thereby further disguising and confusing the issue.

14. Following the high-level COSVN discussion of the policy, it is then presented to the other COSVN personnel. This is sometimes in writing, but apparently more often it is by briefing. At this time, or sometimes at the next stage, leading cadres are called in from the next Communist organizational echelon, the Military Regions (MR) and Sub-regions (SR), for briefings and discussions on the policy. This pattern basically is repeated at each level. For example, the Region Party Committee interprets the broad COSVN policy decisions in terms of regional differences or special requirements, passing a somewhat modified or mission-type directive to provinces for action. The Province Committee formulates specific directives for implementing COSVN policies. The District Committee translates these directives into specific actions; thus, it is the indispensable link between COSVN, the Region and Province Committees, and the villages. The Village Committee executes orders received from the District Committee, and exercises final authority over use of village guerrillas.

15. Although at the lower levels there may be more specificity concerning what is to be done locally, there also is a higher degree of generalization and propaganda concerning the overall strategy and its rationale. Indeed, at the lowest levels, only the barest glimmer of the original statement remains. Unfortunately, it is from these lower levels that most of the information is obtained on these policies.

16. In addition to the high-level resolutions and directives, each echelon and element of the VC apparatus issues and receives numerous other orders, directives, reports, and the like from higher levels and from lateral sections of the infrastructure. This is particularly true when speaking of the Party's functional sections. For example, the Region Party Committee might discuss a COSVN resolution, but a facet of it might be the responsibility of the Military Intelligence (MI)

Section of the Military Staff of the Military Affairs Committee. And, to implement this facet, the MI Section may need to coordinate with the Party's Security and the Military Proselyting Sections, both of which deal with penetration agents. A second example, the Party's Finance and Economy Section must be firmly coordinated, almost daily, with both the local Party Secretary and the Forward Supply Council; it also must maintain contact and account for its actions with the next higher echelon Finance and Economy Section, while supervising the activities of the next lower echelon section simultaneously.

17. All this criss-crossing of papers places a great load on the commo-liaison system. In addition, such heavy reliance on bureaucratic decision-making slows reaction time and makes the commo-liaison an all-important, yet vulnerable, link in the overall operation. COSVN uses three basic means to communicate: couriers, land lines, and radios. Land lines are almost never used outside secure base areas (and even then tend to be buried or otherwise camouflaged). Radios are used primarily as a means of coordinating wide-spread military operations, although there are indications COSVN would like to expand the use of radios, especially in the MI area. For the vast bulk of the paper flow, couriers are used and these couriers often are required to pass through hostile territory. The larger the flow and the more reliance placed upon it, the more vulnerable the VC apparatus will be.

IV. CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (CAC)

18. Meetings of the Central Committee are supposed to be held at least once every six months. In the interim, the daily business of the Party is conducted by the CAC. Ten men or so reportedly comprise this committee. As the highest ranking leaders of COSVN, and many of them concurrently members of Hanoi's Central Committee, they constitute the highest Communist leadership in SVN. Although the CAC members must follow the overall guidelines established by the Lao Dong Party and the PRP Central Committee, they enjoy considerable operational independence in the day-to-day execution of policy. Their authority is exercised not only by means of the broad Resolutions and directives issued in their name, but through their supervisory roles as well. Each top leader usually functions either as the actual head of a functional section or agency, or he is assigned a sort of general supervisory role over one or more areas, such as finance, proselyting, or military. At this level, personalities probably play an important part and the actual position an individual occupies may not reflect his true power or role.

19. Though theoretically not paramount, the actual leadership of the CAC apparently is vested in the Secretariat. At present, the three members of the Secretariat appear to be Pham Thien Hung (aka Pham Hung, Cao Dang Chiem*, Bay Hong), Nguyen Van Cuc (aka Muoi Cuc, Muoi Ut), and Nguyen Van Dang (aka Hai Van, Pham Xuan Thai, Hai Ram).

A. Muoi Cuc

20. From 1962 to 1964, the chief member of COSVN and Secretary of the PRP apparently was Muoi Cuc. Like so many other NVN and VC leaders, Cuc's revolutionary career extends far into the past and is interwoven with that of other leaders. About 1935 or 1936, Cuc was arrested and imprisoned on Con Son Island. Taking advantage of the general confusion prevailing among the Japanese authorities just after the end of World War II, Cuc and several other high-level prisoners escaped. They located a large Japanese boat, repaired it on their own and successfully navigated to Soc Trang, a distance of some 75 miles. The escapees included the future secretary of the Lao Dong Party, Le Duan; and the entire Secretariat of COSVN in its earlier stages, Cuc (secretary), Hai Van (first deputy), and Vo Chi Cong (third deputy who has since returned to NVN for medical reasons).

21. Cuc's childhood consisted of his being orphaned, raised by an uncle in Tonkin, and later sent to Saigon. By 1956, he was reported to be the deputy secretary of the Nam Bo Regional Committee and Party secretary of the Saigon-Cholon area. During the period from 1957-1959, he operated out of Phnom Penh, Cambodia where he contracted lung trouble, forcing him to give up smoking. He was among those allegedly elected to the Lao Dong Central Committee in 1960 and, according to one source, secretly elevated to the Lao Dong Politburo in February 1967. Personally, Cuc appears to be a studious, quiet, and serious sort. He is well read, able to read French and some Chinese. His COSVN office is full of books. His preferences run to Party literature (which he also writes), philosophy, works on foreign lands, and novels. He is considered to be affable, warm in his relations with his colleagues, and receptive to their ideas and problems. Le Thi Rieng, a leading PRP cadre arrested in 1967, has described him as an imaginative leader, though not quite as sharp as his friend, Le Duan. His wife, Ngo Tui Hue, is a member of the NVN

*The name "Cao Dang Chiem" apparently also is used by one of the members of COSVN Security Section. To further confuse the situation, the same name also appears to be used by a NFLSV cadre operating in IV Corps.

National Assembly.

22. During 1964, the evidence indicates Senior General (Sen. Gen.) Nguyen Chi Thanh arrived from Hanoi to assume command of COSVN. This change probably was not meant to reflect on Cuc, but rather on the tremendous increase in the numbers of NVN military being infiltrated at this time. Thanh possessed unusually strong credentials for the job. He was considered second only to Sen. Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, and they were the only two holding this rank. He was a member of both the NVN Defense Council and the Secretariat. Cuc probably stepped down to the position of first deputy secretary of the Party. Thanh appears to have concentrated more on the military issues, and Cuc may have possessed considerable latitude on the civilian side. When Thanh died in late June or early July 1967, possibly from a B-52 raid, Cuc probably resumed charge of COSVN. But recent reports indicate that Cuc soon stepped down again (about September 1967) when Pham Hung, first deputy Premier of NVN, arrived in the South to head COSVN.

B. Pham Hung

23. If Sen. Gen. Thanh could be described as Giap's right-hand man, Pham Hung certainly could be considered the protege of NVN Prime Minister Pham Van Dong who has been described as the protector and benefactor of Hung. Apparently born in SVN in 1912 (Long Ho District, Vinh Long Province), Hung went to school in My Tho. In 1920, he joined the Revolutionary Youth Group and in 1930, the Communist Party. In 1932, he was arrested and sentenced todeath in My Tho for complicity in a "Secret Society" and for his role in assassination plots. The sentence was commuted to life and he was sent to Con Son Island where he remained until September 1945. His initial assignment on his return seems to have been as commander of a detachment of the Viet Minh 18th Division at Sadec. He quickly moved to the civilian side and by 1947 was the deputy chief of Security for Eastern, and then all of the Nam Bo Inter-region (including Saigon-Cholon).

24. From 1949 to 1951, Hung reportedly was in NVN attending the assembly that established the Lao Dong Party and replaced the Nam Bo Regional Committee with COSVN. Hung was elected to the Central Committee and appointed to the Southern Affairs Bureau. It was at this juncture that he began his association with Le Duan, then head of the Southern Bureau. From 1950 to 1952, he appears to have been in charge of Security for SVN. In 1952 he married Mai Khanh, chief of the Women's Association of

Can Tho Province. And from 1952 to 1954, he assumed the position of Secretary and Commander of the Eastern Nam Bo Region. In 1954, after the Geneva Accords, Hung was given the rank of Colonel (Col.) and named to head the military mission to the International Control Commission (ICC) in Saigon. Actually, this last appointment appears to have been a cover to allow him to travel in the Saigon area so that he could direct clandestine operations against the Government of Vietnam (GVN). As of 1955, his true position appears to have been NVN Minister in charge of SVN affairs.

25. In 1956 he apparently returned to NVN where he served as a minister, ostensibly without portfolio. In 1957 he was elected to the Lao Dong Central Executive Committee and a year later promoted to Deputy Premier. In 1958, the NVN press identified him as Chairman of the Drought Prevention Commission and in July 1959 as Chairman of the National Reunification Board. During this period (1957-1960) he served on a number of top-level delegations to foreign countries. In 1960, he was appointed chairman of the Agricultural Bureau and elected to the Party Secretariat. In 1963, he transferred chairmanship to the Trade Bureau. In July 1964, he was reelected Deputy Premier after which little was heard of him until he assumed control of COSVN.

26. It has been said of Hung that while he assumes the correct or popular role in public, he actually is authoritarian and presumptuous. He also has been accused of possessing a surly facial expression and acting arrogantly. On the other hand, he has been described as an able administrator and an exceptional planner. His record would indicate that he is more of a political animal than his predecessor, Sen. Gen. Thanh. What is more, unlike Thanh, Hung apparently has placed a powerful military commander between himself and the SVNLA in the person of Lieutenant General (Lt. Gen.) Hoang Van Thai. Where this leaves Nuoi Cuc, the politician, is not clear although he continues to be first deputy and politically oriented. Cuc is said by one source to have supervisory responsibility for the Propaganda, Culture and Indoctrination Section.

C. Hai Van

27. The third member of the Secretariat, Hai Van (aka Nguyen Van Dang, Pham Xuan Thai, Hai Ram), has been identified as a COSVN deputy secretary since its inception. He was second deputy until Cuc moved down to second deputy and the third slot was vacated by Vo Toan (aka Vo Chi Cong, Nam Cong). Vo Chi Cong

reportedly specialized in proselyting activities and also acted as Party secretary of VC MR-5 until August 1966 when he is believed to have returned to Hanoi for medical treatment. Not much is known about Hai Van, despite the belief that he holds the overt position of chairman of the NFLSV's Liberation Federation of Trade Unions Association under the pseudonym of Pham Xuan Thai. About 52 years old, he apparently was born in Vinh Long Province. He apparently remained in SVN at the time of the 1954 regrouping. Party organization, security, and propaganda are said to be under his general supervision. He also has been reported to be a member of the Lao Dong Central Committee as well as an overt member of the NFLSV Presidium.

D. Others

28. Eight other names have been associated with the COSVN CAC. Three of them have at one time or another been considered to be in charge of the military side of the show. They are Major General (Maj. Gen.) Tran Phi (aka Hai Hau, Tran Luong, Tran Nam Trung (overt name), Tan Phi), Lt. Gen. Tran Van Tra, and Lt. Gen. Hoang Van Thai. Tran Phi is known to others mostly by the names Hai Hau and Tran Luong. Since both he and Tran Van Tra have used the alias Tran Nam Trung (which apparently goes along with the position of head of Front Military Affairs Committee), and since their assignments often placed them simultaneously in the same geographical area, much of their earlier activities were attributed to a single individual.

29. Hai Hau. It now would appear that Hai Hau was born Tran Phi about 1910 in Quang Ngai Province. His revolutionary career began about 1930 at which time he was arrested and detained at Ban Me Thout, Lao Bao, and Lao Xa in Hanoi. In 1944, he was sent to the Ba To prison in Quang Ngai where he gained his freedom in the Ba Tu uprising of February 1945. In August 1945 he was deputy secretary of the Viet Minh Inter-Region V Committee. Sometime during 1950-1954 he received military training in Communist China. During the period 1946-1954, his primary responsibility was Party dealings with the Montagnards. In 1954 he reportedly regrouped to NVN. His wife and six children still live in Hanoi.

30. Hau returned to SVN by 1961 and reportedly was a member of the first NFLSV Central Committee (under the name of Tran Nam Trung and as the representative of the SVNLA) and also of the first COSVN CAC. From this period to 1967, Liberation

Radio and similar sources placed him in the positions of deputy chairman of the NFLSV Presidium and head of the NFLSV Military Affairs Committee. Returnee Lt. Col. [redacted] believed Hai Hau had been both Commanding Officer (CO) and Political Officer (PO) of the SVNLA from 1961 to 1963, but was replaced by Nguyen Chi Thanh in 1964. At this point, Hau appears to have dropped out of the military picture, although he continued as a member of the CAC. Some sources claim that financial and economic affairs have since become his major area of interest. As Tran Nam Trung, Hai Hau meets with foreigners; his name is used by Liberation Radio; and his photograph is well circulated (one is on the dust cover of Douglas Pike's book on the VC). This might suggest that he may be more of a front man than a nuts-and-bolts military man. However, a rallier, [redacted] has stated that Hau [redacted] was supervisor of both the military proselyting section and the Propaganda, Culture, and Indoctrination Section of COSVN. b1 b3 (S)

31. Tran Van Tra. Such is not the case of either Tra or Hoang Van Thai, who may be in competition for the title of first soldier of the SVNLA. Lt. Gen. Tra (aka Tu Chi, Nguyen Van Tra, Le Van Thanh, Tran Trung Lap, Tran Nam Trung) is believed to have been born around 1918 at Bung Tich, Quang Ngai Province. He attended an industrial school in Hue from 1936-1939, during which period he joined the Republican Youth Movement. Arrested by the French colonial authorities in 1939, he was sentenced to six months imprisonment and a period of residence under surveillance in Hue. In 1941, he left Hue and made his way to Saigon where he adopted the name Le Van Thanh. He was arrested again in 1944 but was freed by the 1945 revolution. As Tran Van Tra he began to take part in the activities of the Viet Minh. According to [redacted] he and To Ky (current status not known, but once was PO of VC MR-3) organized the 14 "Chi Doi" (Viet Minh for Division), and he was the CO. They both reportedly disliked Le Duan. Nonetheless, he became a member of the Current Affairs Commission of the Viet Minh's Committee for SVN. b1 b3 (S)

32. By August 1946 Tra was commanding Viet Minh Region 8 (in 1946 Nam Bo consisted of Regions 7 to 9, and the Inter-regions were not established until March 1948). He possibly continued in this command until 1950, although he also had other assignments during this period and record of these is sometimes conflicting. He was reported to have replaced the head of Region 9 and to have taken over the Saigon-Cholon-Special Region. He relinquished the latter post in June 1950 to become

to become CO of Region 7. Tra was accused of forcing out the CO of Region 7 (and falsely, of murdering him - he later turned up alive). By mid-1951, Tra was deputy to the CO of Inter-Region VI (Nam Bo), Nguyen Binh. Binh was forced from his post in August 1951 for suspected Titoist tendencies, and in November was killed by French troops in a situation believed to have been set up by his colleagues. In the period 1948-1951, Tra seems to have successively headed the military commands of all the regions of Nam Bo. From the multiplicity of his assignments, and the fate of Nguyen Binh, and a report that he was not known as a strong military strategist, it has been speculated that Tra served as either a political troubleshooter or a 'hatchet man'.

33. Tra served for a short period as Binh's successor, but later in 1951 when Inter-Region VI was reorganized into two Sub-Inter-Regions (Eastern and Western Nam Bo), he assumed command of Eastern Nam Bo, remaining in that post until the mid-1954 cease fire. By February 1955, Tra was in Hanoi and in September radio Hanoi identified him as deputy chief of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) General Staff. In 1959 he was promoted to Maj. Gen. and in 1960 names as alternate member of the Lao Dong Central Committee, and he possibly replaced Hoang Van Thai in 1960 as head of the Thai Meo Region headquarters at Dien Bien Phu (probably supporting Pathet Lao Operations).

34. Conflicting reports from 1960 to 1963 place Tra in NVN and SVN. Returnee [ ] reported that about the time Hai Hau relinquished his command of the SVNLA (1961-1963), his deputy also left the scene. The deputy was Lt. Gen. Tran Van Quang (aka Bay Tien), currently Party Committee secretary of VC Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region. Another returnee, [ ] stated Quang returned to NVN in June 1964 and that both he and Tra used the name Tran Nam Trung when signing documents. Such a change in command made a certain amount of sense. The increase in the NVA presence was being felt, Son. Gen. Nguyen Chi Thanh took over command from both Muoi Cuc (former General Secretary) and Hai Hau (head of the Military Affairs Committee /MAC/). In addition, with the increase in Communist Main Force (MF) units, there was a corresponding increase in the number of deputy commanders of the SVNLA, Tra being the senior deputy. The others, according to [ ] were: Maj. Gen. Le Trong Tan (aka Ba Lam, Ba Long, Nguyen Trung Tan, Ha Ke Tan, Thanh Song, Tran Van Hai, Phu Chu, Chinh Nam); Nguyen Huu Xuyen (aka Tam Den Den, Tam Kien Quoc); Maj. Gen. Hoang Duc Anh (aka Sau Nam, Le Duc Anh); Nguyen Thi Dinh (aka Ba Dinh, Ba Han, Bich Tri Van, Ba Tan, Bay Thanh); and the assistant PO, Maj. Gen. Tran Do (aka Chin Vinh, Truong Son, Tran Quoc Vinh).

b1 b3 (S)

b1 b3 (S)

b1 b3 (S)

35. Tra appears to have continued as undisputed senior deputy until Pham Hung's arrival about September 1967. According to [redacted] Hung in effect replaced Tra by giving the command of the SVNLA to Thai. Strictly speaking, Tra was not demoted, however. Nguyen Chi Thanh had held this command himself and with his death it passed from Muoi Cuc to Hung who vested it in Thai. If this was, in fact, what happened (there are indications that Hung retained direct command), then Tra continues as senior deputy, but subordinate to Thai nonetheless. If not, then it is questionable which is the more senior. [redacted] had heard that Tra, who was in direct command of the Tet and May-June Offensives against Saigon, had been criticized for their ineffectiveness. [redacted] who was captured in [redacted] believed Pham Hung and Muoi Cuc were the secretary and deputy secretary of the MAC, while Thai was CC of the SVNLA Headquarters (Hqs.) and Tra was senior deputy or Executive Officer of the Hqs. (S)

36. Hoang Van Thai. Thai (aka Muoi Khang, Hoang Van Khang, Ngo Quoc Binh, Hoang Xuan Thai) is believed to have been born about 1906 in Thai Binh Province, NVN, and orginally to have been a teacher by profession. Thai reportedly joined the Party in the 1930's and became a close friend and associate of Sen. Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap with whom he shared a Chinese exile in 1939. Thai who is believed to have undergone training in the USSR at some time may have re-entered Vietnam in 1941 or 1943, since a NVN source stated he returned with Ho Chi Minh when World War II broke out.

37. In 1945 with the end of the war, Giap set out to build a "new model army" with Thai's help. In 1946 Thai was promoted to Chief of Staff, second only to Giap. In 1952, according to [redacted] sources, Thai rather than Giap was directing military operations in NVN. However, by 11 October 1954 when Giap made his ceremonial entry into Hanoi, Col. Gen. (Three Stars) Van Tien Dung was publicly identified as the Chief of Staff and Thai as Dung's deputy. Dung apparently had covered himself with glory, particularly at Dien Bien Phu, and was also intensely loyal to Giap. First identified as Chief of the Military Training Department in May 1958, Thai was named a member of the newly established National Scientific Research Board the following December. He was named chairman of the Central Physical Culture and Sports Committee in May 1959 and promoted to Maj. Gen. the following September. While it has been reported that Thai acquired expensive tastes, he also is reported to be serious and correct in dealings with others. He also is supposed to be a proponent of guerrilla warfare in the spirit of Nguyen Chi Thanh.

b1 b3 (S) [redacted] noted that Thai's position previous to his appointment to COSVN was as head of VC MR-5 (essentially an [illegible] position) where he replaced Maj. Gen. Nguyen Don. When Thai assumed this command is not known definitely, although it appears to have been sometime between October 1966 and April 1967.

38. Tran Do. A good deal less is known about the remaining identified members of the CAC: Tran Do, Ba Buong, Sau Dan, Mai Xe Ngua, and Tran Bach Dang. The most famous, due to the apparently premature notices of death during the Tet Offensive, is Maj. Gen. Tran Do (aka Chin Vinh, Truong Son, and Tran Quoc Vinh). The name "Tran Quoc Vinh" has been used overtly in referring to Tran Do since he has been in SVN. GVN authorities discovered an enemy body which they thought matched Tran Do's description, but several sources since have sworn they saw Tran Do alive in COSVN after the discovery. From 1945-1950, his career was that of Chief of Staff, CO or PO of a succession of Viet Minh battalions, regiments, and one division, the 312th. In 1958 he was reported to be the head of the NVN Right Bank MR, and in 1960 he was elected as an alternate member to the Central Executive Committee of the Lao Dong Party. In February 1965, he infiltrated into SVN, joined the CAC, and became the Deputy Political Officer (DPO) of the SVNLA, Sen. Gen. Nguyen Chi Thanh retaining the post of PO for himself. Tran Do probably is still the DPO. There is rare unanimity among such sources as [redacted] b1 b3 (S) and [redacted] on Tran Do being the DPO.

b1 b3 (S) 39. Kiet, Xe, Buong, and Dang. Le (or Nguyen) Van Kiet (aka Sau Van, Chin Dung, Phang Trong Dan, Sau Dan) was secretary of VC MR-4 prior to the late 1967 reorganization of the Saigon-Cholon area into SR's. There were reports he also commanded one of the military fronts during the Tet attack against Saigon. A finance and economy expert, Nguyen Van Xe (aka Hai Xe Ngua, So Le Van, Chu Tich Xe Ngua), reportedly returned to NVN for medical treatment in 1967. According to [redacted] b1 b3 (S) Hai Xe Ngua translates as "Two Horse-carts" and Chu Tich Xe Ngua comes out "Chairman of the Horse-carts," which indicates a possible sense of humor. Nguyen Van Buong (aka Ba Be and Ba Buong) reportedly was MR-3 Party secretary from 1965 to 1966, and now may be supervising both the Security and Organization Sections of COSVN. Buong reportedly was one of the prisoners who escaped from Con Son Island in the famed boat in 1945. The last member of the COSVN inner sanctum is Tran Bach Dang (aka Tu Meo, Tu Anh, Nam Quang). He presumably is still a CAC member. His last reported position is as secretary to the CAC of VC SR-6 (Saigon); however, this position is not incompatible with Dang also still being a member of the CAC of COSVN.

V. THE "CIVILIAN" SECTIONS

40. There are numerous "civilian" functional sections. Each of these is a specialized office which fulfills a dual role. First, each section is responsible for advising the CAC and for developing Party policies within its own area of competence. Second, each section oversees the execution of specific policies by lower levels of the VC infrastructure. The main functional sections are as follows:

A. Organization Section

41. The Organization Section is the office with primary responsibility for all affairs pertaining to civilian political cadres. It handles problems of Party recruitment and development, and the assignment of personnel at higher levels of the PRP. It has the additional responsibility of maintaining Party discipline. According to returnee [ ] CAC member Hai Van is chief of this section, and Le Tu Nhien his deputy. According to another returnee, [ ] at the COSVN Base), the chief and deputy since 1961 had been Hai Mai and Ba Thanh, and the PO is Ba Nhan. However, [ ] also has mentioned Ba Buong (aka Nguyen Van Buong and Ba Bo) as "supervisor" of the Organization Section. Ba Buong, a COSVN CAC member, also has been reported to be the "supervisor" of the COSVN Security Section and the Rear Services Section.* The chief and deputy chief, according to a 1966 collated study [ ], was Sen. Col. Hiep and Maj. Muoi Tai. The section appears to consist of six sub-sections:

a) The Correspondence Sub-section reportedly was headed by Nguyen Van Nhan, according to [ ] (as [ ]). This sub-section is responsible for all incoming and outgoing correspondence, including requests for NVN civilian political cadres. It also censors private correspondence handled by the VC postal system.

*As mentioned earlier, some of the confusion concerning who actually heads a section stems from the ambiguity between the terms "chief" and "supervisor." The chief of a section almost always refers to the individual who is responsible on a day-to-day basis. The supervisor, especially as used by [ ] is a higher ranking cadre who has general responsibility over the section as well as other duties in the Communist hierarchy.

b) The Personal Affairs Sub-section, headed by Nguyen Van An (according to [redacted] b1 b3 (S) is responsible for the food supply, pay and uniforms and clothing for all personnel in the Organization Section. Members of this sub-section cultivated all of the food required by the Organization Section.

c) The Planning and Policies Sub-section, according to [redacted] was directly under the control of the chief of the Organization Section. Its function was to draft policies concerning civilian political cadres (assignments, training, promotions, citations) and to study GVN policies concerning land development and pacification and determine counter measures to thwart these GVN policies.

d) The Movement Sub-section, allegedly headed by Hai Thua, conducts investigations of cadre activities at the region and province levels to determine problem areas and to find solutions. According to [redacted] the major problem areas have been defined as allied sweep operations, defoliation, and loss of cadres.

e) The Cadre Administration Sub-section, reportedly under Ba Nghi, is responsible for maintaining statistical records of cadre strength throughout SVN; assignment, training, and indoctrination of cadres; promotions, awards, and disciplinary actions. According to [redacted] this sub-section did not control the specific assignments given to cadres after they had been initially assigned either to a functional agency or to a region, nor were they responsible for assignment of military cadres. The sub-section also maintains personnel records on all SVN cadres who leave for NVN, and prepares requests for their return.

f) The Party Construction Sub-section, headed by Hai Que, is responsible for the management of the PRP. It directs the execution of Party policies and monitors and evaluates the activities of Party chapters. It keeps records in the utilization of Party cadres, their attitudes and motivations. According to [redacted] as of October 1966, approximately 40 percent of all civilian political cadres in SVN were Party members. Total membership was estimated at 1,000,000 and some villages contained as many as five chapters with an average membership of 25 to 30. b1 b3 (S)

9. Propaganda, Culture, and Indoctrination Section

42. Lt. Col. [redacted] thought that Hai Van ran this section, as well as the Organization Section. [redacted] thought the section was under CAC member Tran Bach Dang (aka Nam Quang), which agrees with [redacted] (both referring to time period of 1966). The chief of this section since 1961, according to [redacted] is Hai Tau. [redacted] also lists a "supervisor" in charge of the Propaganda, Culture, and Indoctrination Section. In this case, [redacted] claims that CAC member Tran Luong is supervisor of the section, as well as being supervisor of the Military Proselyting Section. Although [redacted] is not sure which individual holds what position, the assistant chief and IO are Tran Hau and To Lam. In October 1968, To Lam was reported as the editor of Tien Phong (Vanguard, the Party's theoretical journal). This section serves as the psychological warfare headquarters and is charged with monitoring the propaganda activities of subordinate levels while producing a great deal of propaganda on its own in the form of Party and Front publications. In addition, this section is responsible for ensuring that Party cadres are properly motivated, and also for supervising whatever school systems may exist in liberated areas. Included in this section's purview are the fields of the arts, press, radio, and cultural dissemination both in SVN and abroad. This section also controls such front groups as the Cultural Association, the Teachers' Association, and the Newsmen's Associations.

43. An unusually large number of sub-sections have been identified, many with only a vague idea of what their functions are. For the sake of organizational simplicity, these sub-sections could be divided into four broad categories. The first would be those sub-sections which are concerned with the person-to-person approach to influencing people. The second would be those concerned with propagandizing through communications media, and on an international as well as a domestic level. The third category would be the Party's own setup for educating their higher level cadres in Party theory. And the last would be the usual support sub-sections common to any large endeavour. The specific sub-sections then would be:

(1) (a) The Propaganda or People/Culture Sub-section (B.7). B.7, the chief sub-section in the "person-to-person" category reportedly plans propaganda campaigns around cultural improvement programs. It specializes in indirect, subtle forms of propaganda. In 1966, its chief was Tu Ou, and its deputy was Chu Tam Map (these and most other names

associated with the sub-sections are taken from

b3

b) The Education Sub-section (B.18). B.18 is also involved on the person-to-person level and provides administrative and technical support for the VC school system. The support includes obtaining textbooks, teachers, and school rooms. The goal, not always realized, is to set up a school system in all VC-controlled areas. The main emphasis is on school children, but adult literacy is not ignored. Teachers are urged to make classroom problems revelent to the Revolution. For example, math problems might entail dividing the number of punji stakes produced by the number of Liberation Youth Association members making the stakes. In 1966, the chief and deputy of B.18 were Nam Dieu and Huynh Dan (or Dan) Thang (aka Nam Giai). Other members were Liet, Thanh, Hieu, Miss Lam, Miss Cui, Miss Hue, Miss Hang, and Miss Dung.

c) The Entertainment Sub-section (B.5) definitely is involved in person-to-person propaganda-ing. It reportedly plans the content of, produces, and presents entertainment to both military units and civilians. In 1966 the chief was Bui Kinh Luong. Other members were Tuan Khanh (chief musician), Pham Anh Tuan (musician), Hong Anh and Linh Thu (actresses), and Luong, Bac, Diep, and Dung (all actors). Phan Lac Tuyen, Giang Nam, Lan, Le, and Anh (a NVN comedy actress). There also were reports of a Montaguard Entertainment Sub-section (B.23). There also may be a Motion Picture Sub-section that travels from place to place with the entertainers, forming a mobile psywar component. Finally there are reports of Painting Subsection (B.20) under Huynh Phuong Dan. Other members mentioned were Tan Song Chau and Trang Phong.

d) The Liberation Radio Broadcast Station (B.6): the clandestine station serving as the voice of the Front is the most well-known sub-section concerned with the mass media. In 1966 its chief and deputy were unknown, but the following members were identified: Phuoc Rau (announcer and reportedly the son of Nguyen Huu Tho, NFLSV chairman), Hanh (assistant announcer), Chin Nam (editorial announcer), Tuyet Anh (Chinese announcer), Ba Tai, Muoi, and Tan Tong. The powerhouse for the station was itself a sub-section (B.16). Its chief and deputy were Ba Nhi and Tam Tong. Two other members were Hoa and Dung.

e) The Liberation Press Agency (B.6) disseminates information with emphasis on VC victories, for national and international consumption, as well as for use at the Paris peace talks. In 1966, the chief of B.6 was Thanh Nho. Other members were: Tam Rau (in charge of editorials), Ba Do (in charge of information), Truc and Mien Gan (typists), Miss Suong (mimeographer), Cong (editor), Tam Chi (steno), and Nghia (printer).

f) The Foreign Relations Sub-section (B.13) is responsible for propaganda designed to influence foreign opinion.* It handles virtually all of the international propaganda in the name of the NFLSV. It also may be responsible for the content of The Fighting South which is published in English and French. In 1966 the chief was Chin An. He had three deputies: Truc Tung, Le Van Thu, and Ba Binh. Ba Thu was the English teacher. Another member, Chau, has been reported to be a son of the NFLSV chairman, Nguyen Huu Tho. Other members mentioned were Tan, Hai, Sau, Thuong, and Me.

g) The Newspaper Sub-section, according to the SMA Newsletter, 11, is responsible for gathering news items pertaining to local, national, and international Communist affairs and editing them as required to conform to VC policies. The sub-section publishes bulletins and small newspapers for public consumption. This may be the element that is responsible for the following three Vietnamese language newspapers Tien Phong (Vanguard, the Party's theorectical journal), Co Giai Phong (Liberation Flag), and Van Nghe Giai Phong (Liberation Arts and Culture). This also may be the sub-section referred to elsewhere as the Publications Office (B.22). If it is, then the chief in 1966 was believed to be Sau Hai (or Hai Thai). Other members were Dong, Nhao, Khoi, Nguyet, and Duong.

h) The Editorial Office (B.21) and The Giai Phong Film Workshop (B.15) may be closely related to publications, although little is known about them. In 1966 the chief of

*This sub-section should not be confused with Foreign Relations Committee of the NFLSV which is an overt body. The NFLSV Committee is headed by Tran Buu Kiem, currently co-head of the NFLSV delegation at the Paris peace talks, presumably the Front body supervises the NFLSV's overseas representatives.

B.21 was Thanh Nho. Other members were Ngoc Anh, Tat Tan, and Muoi Quan. The chief and deputy of B.15 were Hien Lien and Long Pha. Other members included two cameramen, Hong Son and Pham Khac; and Bu (aka Tran Thanh), a photographer.

i) The Indoctrination and Training Sub-section probably is responsible for training Party cadres in the arts of propaganda and Communist theory, although this is not confirmed. What is fairly certain is that the Propaganda Section is responsible for two training schools. Little is known about one - the Trang Tan School (B.24). The other is quite well-known and goes by Ho Chi Minh's real name - the Nguyen Ai Quoc Political Theorizing School (located in September 1963 at XT 500 680). According to [redacted] the director was Nam Trieu, the deputy was Thanh Nam, and the secretary was Tu Xuat. It is, of course, possible that this school is involved in producing the Party's theoretical journal, Tien Phong (Vanguard). According to [redacted] to attend the Nguyen Ai Quoc School, the trainee must be equal to a member of a Provincial Party Committee or at least a Regimental Commander. The courses lasted 18 months.

b3 b1 b3 (S)

j) The Administrative Sub-section (B.4) probably is first among the support elements. This element probably keeps the records of the personnel, procures and issues supplies, and provides other similar services. The chief and deputy, as of 1966, were Doan Chi Cao (aka Nam Phi, Tu Nam) and Nam Canh. Also assigned to this sub-section were: Tu Xuat (clerk), Hai and Dat (finance), Misses Xuan and Mai (treasurers), Miss Lan (typist), Tam Thi (radio), Du, Hoang, and Hue (liaison), Sau Nho (Party Chapter secretary), and two others, Sau Chau and Mai Thin.

k) The Tran Phu Printing House (B.8) probably handles most of the job orders for leaflets, bulletins, journals and books. In 1966 its chief and deputy were Nam Nam and Nguyen Khac Tu, respectively. There were two zincographers, Ngan and Huy; two bookbinders, Miss Truc Chi and Viet; and a stenographer, Loi. Also assigned to B.8 were Dung, Phuong Nam, and Tu Rau. This sub-section probably includes a printshop element and a photo-offset printing element.

l) The Medical Sub-section (B.13) was directed by Sau Tung and his deputy, Duong Nhon Quy. Its staff in-

cluded three medics; Son, Hung, and Bang, and one other member, Chin Hue. The Radio Communications Sub-section (B.10) was directed by Sau Nghia and his deputy, Chin Chieu. Other members of B.10 were Thieu, De, Phia, Hoang, Huong, Van, Loi, Tho, and Ba Do, an editor. The Production Sub-section (B.11) was led by Tu Lap and his deputy, Bay Ha. Members of B.11 were Buoi, Can, Tong, Be, Sum, and Cu. The Defense or Security Platoon (B.12 or B.14) was under Nam Dua and his deputy, Muoi Quan.

m) A Rear Services Sub-section (B.9) with at least six sub-divisions of its own has been identified in addition to the above support units. As of 1966 the chief and two deputies of B.9 were Muoi Nga, Bay Cong, and Hai No. The Administrative Branch included Muoi Nga again, as well as Bay Cu; another deputy was Tri; two members were Cuc and Miss Sau Chau. There were land and river supply transportation teams. The members of the waterway team were: Sau Sang Hung (chief), Phung (deputy), Tong, Thanh, and Thu. The land team included: Hai Truong (chief), Hai Chau (aka Hai Den) (deputy), Mui (or Mai), Chat, and Be (aka Thanh). There was an Equipment Team consisting of Tinh (chief), Quan (deputy), Miss Nga, Miss Phung, and Viet. The head and deputy of the Rice Mill were Huynh Van Lanh (aka Nam Den) and Buoi. Also assigned to the mill: Ngoc, Minh, Dan, Son, Hai, and Tan. The final element of B.9 was the Warehouse Team of which only one member's name is known, Nam Thang.

C. Finance and Economy Section

44. The Finance and Economy Section is responsible for the overall finances and budgeting of COSVN, and for the guidance and supervision of financial activities of the lower echelons. In 1966, according to [redacted] the section consisted of from 20 to 30 members. Among the section's duties, according to [redacted] was the preparation of the annual budget, including prediction of income and support of those areas expected to operate at a deficit. The section also establishes tax quotas for each MR, and details to subordinate echelons those tax collection procedures that have had the most success and those that have failed. It also prescribes the accounting procedures that will be used at all echelons within the Party structure down through District level, and establishes rules and regulations governing expenditures of funds. [redacted] thought that every

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expenditure of each organization of the Front had to be reported to the section. In addition, each organization (functional and regional only) had to submit a budget request to the section every six months. [ ] section (Organization) usually received only 70 to 80 percent of its requested budget. He believed the ones that always received 100 percent were the Military, Military Proselyting, Civil Health, and Foreign Affairs (as of 1966). b1 b3 (S)

45. In order to perform these tasks, the Finance and Economy Section is reportedly dependent on experienced and extremely well-trained, competent cadres. Lt. Col. [ ] believed the chief of the section was CAC member Hai Xe Ngua (or "Two Horse-carts"). [ ] thought Hai Xe Ngua was the section's "supervisor", as well as being "supervisor" of Rear Services. But [ ] felt that the "chief" had been Chin Phuoc since 1966 and that his assistant was Sau Lau who also was PO. [ ] listed Maj. Tu Tranh as chief, and Senior Captain (Sen. Capt.) Muoi Thiem as deputy, and Tu Tan Long as head of budgeting and financial affairs. b1 b3 (S) b3

46. There are at least eight or nine identified sub-sections. [ ] and the SRA Newsletter II agree on seven; while the former lists a Medical Sub-section as eighth where the latter lists a School Sub-section as the eighth. The major sub-sections are: b1 b3 (S)

a) The Administrative Sub-section which presumably handles managerial, secretarial, and minor supply problems. Most COSVN sections have such a sub-section.

b) The Finance and Statistics Sub-section probably is the accounting office and may, therefore, play the most important part in the budgeting process. It also probably is safe to assume that this sub-section plays a key role in levying requirements and checking on subordinate elements both within COSVN and at the regional level.

c) The Currency Sub-section is responsible for foreign currency transactions, including acquisition and distribution. Judging from a number of captured messages referring to U.S. dollars, as well as the actual capturing of American dollars in VC caches, this sub-section must be heavily involved in black market activities, especially in the Saigon area. The VC, however, have their problems in getting near the going rate of piastres for dollars. Several documents

have complained of "gouging" tactics being used against the VC.

d) The Trade or Commerce Sub-section generally is responsible for overseeing commercial activities in its geographic area. It selects sites for tax collection points and regulates the flow of goods through VC-controlled areas. At lower echelons, this sub-section has been known to manage trading agencies which act more or less as middle-men in selected trade activities.

e) The Transportation Sub-section is claimed by both [redacted] and SRA Newsletter II to be responsible for the movement of goods. It supposedly plans the routes, and schedules the time for moves. According to the Newsletter, porters who are used to move the goods usually are supplied by other agencies, especially the Forward Supply Council and the Liberation Youth Association. Actually, this sub-section's existence is somewhat in doubt, at least with the functions enumerated. Current indications are that the movement of goods is the function of Rear Services (for the long haul) and the Forward Supply Council (to meet more immediate needs).

f) The Production Sub-section, a common element in most VC agencies, is to produce food and materials for the immediate use of the section.

g) The Finance and Economy School Sub-section and the Medical Sub-section. The former is listed in SRA Newsletter II, while [redacted] cites the latter. Actually, both would quite logically be found at the COSVN level especially since: (1) the distances between COSVN Sections would indicate the need for a small medical facility, and (2) the special skills required for Finance and Economy cadres would make the presence of a special school almost inevitable, as other less-specialized sections generally have been found to have schools.

D. Forward Supply Council

47. The Forward Supply Council is a special organization maintained until recently at all levels within the Infrastructure. It was designed to aid frontline troops during the Liberation Army campaigns. The COSVN Council is said to be composed of the chief of the Finance and Economy Section, a deputy who is also

chief of the Rear Services Staff of the SVNLA, and cadres from Region-level Rear Services. It could issue directives to both the civil and military sides of the VC structure. According to one study, [ ] under the original arrangement, the Finance and Economy Section was to collect taxes and draft financial plans. The Rear Services was responsible for the procurement, storage, and issue of food and supplies. The Forward Supply Council was responsible for providing civilian labor to military units and for transporting supplies to the frontline military units that could not re-supply themselves from the Rear Services. b3

48. The Forward Supply Councils encountered problems, principally the overlapping functions between it and Rear Services. In late 1967, COSVN issued a directive ordering that the councils be deactivated and its components merged into other organizations as follows: mobilization of material resources to Finance and Economy; civilian labor procurement to the district units; and administration of the Assault Youth units to the Rear Services and Assault Youth command. The decision to deactivate the council below region level was left to the individual provinces, and some continued to operate. The strain created by the Tet Offensive on supply sources caused COSVN to reactivate the councils at all levels around mid-1968.

49. The organization of the Forward Supply Council at the COSVN level is not known, though it may be similar to that found at lower levels. According to [ ] Spot Report [ ] 6 January 1969, at the lower levels each council is supposed to have two elements: the council itself composed of a chairman plus deputies and members; and a Standing Committee with three to five cadres. The council is responsible for mobilizing the manpower and material resources while the Standing Committee is to carry out specific functions based on the general duties of the council. Sub-sections of the council include (a) civilian labor and Assault Youth; (b) provision procurement and storage; (c) civil health; and (d) organization and planning. b1 b3 (S)

K. Security Section

50. The COSVN Security Section, although subordinate to the COSVN hierarchy, ultimately is responsible to the NVN Ministry of Public Security in Hanoi, which supplies the section with many of its members, especially in leadership positions. According to [ ] July 1967, the majority of the section's own cadres are trained in NVN, and their selection is controlled

b1 b3 (S)

by the Ministry in Hanoi. In addition, from province upward Security reports directly to Hanoi as well as to the Party Committee at their echelon, and the Security Section at the next higher echelon. In recent years, the COSVN Security Section has grown considerably; an interrogee stated it had 150 members in late 1962, of whom 70 were office personnel. By 1964, it had increased to 250, and in 1965 it reached 481, with a planned strength of 602.

51. The Security Section is responsible for Party internal security and counter-intelligence, physical security of the COSVN area and for visitors to COSVN, for maintaining public order through criminal prosecution, and for clandestine reconnaissance and intelligence missions. The section also maintains a school for personnel training, and a detention camp. Its functions resemble those of the Soviet KGB and the Ministry of Public Security of Communist China. Security case officers from the COSVN level downward are tasked with penetrating Allied security and intelligence organizations and SVN political parties and religious sects. Armed reconnaissance groups assassinate or kidnap GVN officials, especially police and intelligence personnel. Security personnel also are responsible for compiling black lists of GVN officials marked for execution in the event of a VC victory. This section's cover number was C.298, but recently may have been changed to M.40 (which also may refer to COSVN in general).

52. According to Lt. Col. [ ] the chief and deputy chief of the Security Section were Hai Van and Sau Hoang (aka Cao Dang Chiem, Cao Dong Chiem).* [ ] has reported a "Colonel Thai" as chief of this section; this almost certainly is Pham Xuan Thai, one of the aka's for Hai Van. [ ], an intellectual [ ] also stated that Hai Van and Sau Hoang headed the section. A [ ] who served in the B.3 sub-section of the COSVN Security Section from [ ] to [ ] also listed Hai Van and Sau Hoang as chief and deputy chief. The 1966 collation [ ] listed Sau Hoang as chief and Le Van Son (aka Muoi Cong) and Ba Chung as deputies. Finally, according to [ ], the section's

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*As noted in the footnote to paragraph 19, this "Cao Dang Chiem" should not be confused with Pham Hung, head of COSVN, who also uses the same aka.

supervisor was Ba Buoug: Buong is a COSVN CAC member and also has been reported by [redacted] to be supervisor of the Organization Section. b1 b3 (S)

53. [redacted] listed several other members of the COSVN Security Section, most of whom appear in the discussion of the sub-sections. Some, however, he failed to associate with any sub-section. The principal member of this group is Hai An (aka Hoang), a member of the Security Committee, a former Lt. Col., and CO of the Secret Police in NVN. Another Committee member he mentioned is Tu Trong (aka Tai). [redacted] also listed a Tan Nam as head of the Secret Police Service of the COSVN Security Section. The following were listed simply as cadres: Quoc Vu Khanh, Lam (aka Hong Ha), Bui Khung, and Hon (aka Quoc Hung). b1 b3 (S)

54. According to [redacted] the COSVN Security Section was believed to have ten major sub-sections (code named B.1 through B.10). The ten sub-sections are: b1 b3 (S)

a) The Administrative Sub-section (B.1). B.1 is divided into twelve elements. Five of these elements have been identified as correspondence, management, food supply, operations, and finance. The sub-section's strength dropped from 96 to 63 between 1965 and 1966.

b) The Internal Security or Political Protection Sub-section (B.2). According to [redacted] B.2 is divided into three major parts: an office staff (with 32 men), an armed reconnaissance component (consisting of units 15, 17, 19, and 21, totally 46 men), and a component entitled "Permanent Section (" (with 87 men). In early 1966, its total complement was 165, almost double the number it had a year earlier. According to SEA Newsletter II, this sub-section performs counter-intelligence (CI) functions and has two subordinate elements. The first is the Reconnaissance Element which is responsible for countering Allied sweeps into VC areas, primarily by developing and disseminating intelligence on the raiding forces so other VC units can counter the sweep. The other is a Judicial Element (People's Courts), which administers courts in VC areas. The chief of B.2, according to [redacted], is Sau Anh. b1 b3 (S)

c) The "Research" Sub-section (B.3). According to [redacted] B.3's staff grew from 4 to 17 men between b1 b3 (S)

1965 and 1966. It maintains extensive files on counter-revolutionaries, including foreign newsmen - Chinese, Cambodian, French, Japanese, and English. More current intelligence indicates that this section, while still often called Research, is actually the Espionage and Intelligence Section, and it is also supposed to be involved in black propaganda, especially misleading documents. Since COSVN Security Section case officers operate in both Cambodia and SVN, there may be a foreign and domestic breakdown. There also probably is a city breakdown, especially since much of the espionage component's activities appear to be centered around Saigon.

Before being sent to Bien Hoa, [ ] was associated with B.3. from [ ] and is still undergoing (he was [ ] interrogation). [ ] maintained that B.3's chief was Tam Toan. [ ] assignment was to study the activities of [ ] by [ ] their [ ] He said other cadres assigned to B.3 were Hai (aka Anh Son) in charge of studying the enemy situation; Viet Hong (similar duties); Kinh Chau (in charge of code numbering); Kiem Lap (similar duties). [ ] assignment in Bien Hoa appears to have been [ ]

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b3 (S)

d) The Guard Sub-section (B.4). B.4 appears to have numbered about 30 men whose duties included the protection of foreign visitors. This unit also has been referred to as a Public Order unit. According to [ ], the chief of B.4 is Nam Tra and one of the cadres is named Le Chat.

b1
b3 (S)

e) The Production Sub-section (B.5). B.5 is the production component common to most VC agencies. Charged largely with growing rice and raising cattle, this sub-section is omitted from distribution of Security Section circulars and from the pay rosters.

f) The Internal Security and Intelligence School (B.6). In early 1965, B.6's staff was top heavy with a strength of 87. Like other components, it came under intense pressure to reduce its administrative personnel in 1965. By 1966, only 24 staff members remained. This

school does not have regular semesters. Classes start at irregular intervals with as many as four going on at the same time. [redacted] mentioned two Security Section instructors who probably were assigned to this school; Toan Thang and Sau Hoc (aka Doc). He also named the chief of B.6, Hai Binh, but did not refer to him as associated with instructing. b1 b3 (S)

g) The "Organic Mobile Unit" (B.7). Sub-section B.7 may be the "organic mobile unit" occasionally appearing in documents. In 1965, its strength was 102 with a planned complement of 204. This unit also has been referred to as the Border Defense Public Security Unit and presumably would be responsible for border surveillance at COSVN. [redacted] mentioned several cadres of Region C (meaning Cambodia), which may be a possible additional sub-section, but also may refer to B.7 (or less likely, B.3). The chief is Tu Thang who, according to [redacted] also is a Security Committee member. Two cadres [redacted] listed are Muoi Thanh and Ba Kha. While [redacted] called him "Officer Chief of Security," Chin Nghia is probably also connected with the Region C group. b1 b3 (S)

h) Commo-Liaison Sub-section (B.8). B.8 had a staff of 35 in 1966. In 1965, the sub-section reportedly made 164 routine trips, performed 83 unexpected escorts of visitors, transmitted direct and express correspondence, and guided recruits. Permanent commo-liaison corridors appear to have been set up with MR-1 through 4 and with districts and provinces in the area of War Zone C. A document of early 1966 suggests the COSVN-Saigon corridor is one of the most heavily traveled.

i) The Logistical Sub-section (B.9) maintains an armory and food depots, and has a distribution unit equipped with pack bicycles. The sub-section's last known strength was 39 people. The armory's stock of weapons includes silencer pistols and explosives. Besides the COSVN Section, its customers include the regions, and Tay Ninh and Binh Long Province Security Sections. The chief of B.9, according to [redacted] is Chin Cat. b1 b3 (S)

j) The Interrogation and Detention Sub-section (B.10). B.10's last known strength (April 1968) was 35 men with plans to add 15 more. The sub-section is organized to include a leadership committee, an interrogation and indoc-

trination element, a jail administration component, and a guard unit. Reportedly, the number of detainees rarely exceeds 20. They are of two types: VC personnel from COSVN agencies suspected of harboring anti-revolutionary sentiments, and various military and civilian Allied officials, including important Vietnamese.

55. Available information is unclear regarding the organizational subordination of some elements of the COSVN Security Section. A signal component almost certainly is present, because of the large amount of radio equipment mentioned in Security Section documents. Some of the radio operators seem to have been trained in NVN. It also seems likely that the Security Section has its own cryptographers, because lower echelons have been identified as having them. b1 b3 (S) [redacted] mentioned the names of several radio operators: Tho Minh (in charge of radio communications), Sau Hai (chief of the Secret Code Cell), Ten Leo, Ten Thuy, Ten Trieu, and Bay Thanh (all cadres of the Secret Code Cell). A "Guerrilla Unit," code-named "Village 5," also has been mentioned as part of the Security Section. Apparently the unit is not a permanent formation, but seems to take shape only when Allied sweep operations threaten War Zone C. A report of May 1966 listed its armament as four machine guns, 14 submachine guns, and 114 rifles.

F. Military Proselyting Section

56. The Military Proselyting Section draws up and disseminates instructions concerning the proselyting of enemy soldiers and civil servants. Its goal is to motivate these personnel to desert to the VC, or remain at their posts as fifth columnists or undercover agents. [redacted] noted that this section is a civil agency of COSVN, although up through 1964 it had been one of the four sub-sections of the SVNLA Headquarters. There still is a small military proselyting section (most often referred to as the Enemy Proselyting Section or Branch) under the Political Staff of the SVNLA Headquarters. b1 b3 (S)

57. Supervision of enemy proselyting activities by lower echelons appears to be the section's principal function. In performing its task, the section prepares propaganda materials to be used by lower echelons, forwards instructions on policy and techniques, and maintains special advisory teams at lower echelons. Whether the COSVN Section conducts penetration operations or whether all such activities are transferred to

Military Intelligence or Security is not clear. At lower echelons, it is known that military proselyting often has provided undercover agents for Military Intelligence and possibly Security, and that they run innumerable low level penetrations themselves. However, at this level the sections seem more oriented toward recruiting fifth columnists to be used to sabotage equipment or help overthrow isolated outposts at the crucial moment when they come under VC attack. Such fifth columnists can be transferred to more sensitive posts in the GVN and thereby become a distinct intelligence asset.

58. Military proselyting elements also are responsible for running prisoner of war (POW) facilities, as distinct from Security Section detention and reform camps which are oriented toward incarceration of criminals, spies, "wicked elements," and counter-revolutionaries. In these camps, the Military Proselyting Sections are responsible not only for maintenance, but for interrogation and thought reform, and determining what prisoners should be released, retained, or punished. Some evidence suggests the COSVN Section may operate camps for high level SVN and foreign prisoners.

59. Lt. Col. [redacted] and [redacted] are in rare b1 b3 agreement on the name of the chief of this section - Tran Van Du (aka Bay Du), a CAC member. Bay Du is believed to have been born around 1927 and to have come from Ben Tre Province where his wife (Le Thi Tuyet) was a village level cadre. His name has been associated with the Military Proselyting Section since COSVN was organized. There are reports that he may have been replaced by Nguyen Van Thoi (aka Nam Thoi) to free him for service on the SR-1 Committee. There also was equal agreement over the name of the former deputy. [redacted] listed Ba Cung (aka Ba Xe) as of 1966. [redacted] listed Tran Van Thanh (aka Ba Cung), but said he had been relieved by a person unkown to [redacted] [redacted] did not know who the deputy was, but did state that the overall supervisor was CAC member Maj. Gen. Hai Hau and/or Tran Luong. b1 b3 (S)

60. According to SRA Newsletter II and [redacted] there b3 were seven sub-sections in the Military Proselyting Section, and apparently an eighth has been added recently:

a) The Administrative Sub-section provides both administrative and logistical support. The sub-section consists of eight elements; Secretarial, Finance, Liaison, Transportation, Mess, Cadre Protection, Medical and Security.

In 1966, according to [redacted] the chief was Lt. Nam (or Lam) Quang. There were two deputies, Ha Tho and Hoang Vinh Sung. Lt. Tho was in charge of the secretariat. Hong was responsible for records. Hai was in charge of transportation and security, and Bay Co was his assistant. Cu Can Ky was responsible for production. b3

b) The Training Sub-section, headed by Capt. Ba Hung, provided training aids and other instructional services for the section. It consisted of two elements: School and Documents.

c) The Propaganda Sub-section consisted of five elements: Photo, Press, Information, Leaflet, and Book. According to [redacted] the chief was Maj. Muoi Tai (aka Tu Kien) and the deputy was Khiet. Tho was responsible for leaflets and Trong for newspapers. According to [redacted] b3 b1,b3(S)

the chief of the Propaganda Sub-section is Tu Hao. Tu Hao reportedly studied English as a student in Hanoi during the French Resistance period. Apparently around the beginning of 1966 a new "combined proselyting plan" was initiated which placed greater emphasis on proselytizing U.S. troops, especially Negroes. Tu Hao was charged with preparing the line to be used in leaflets directed against U.S. troops as part of this plan. b3

d) The Fifth Column or Penetrations Sub-section supervises the recruiting of in-place agents and sympathizers within the ranks of the GVN and ARVN. It is believed that there are three subordinate elements: Urban, Rural, and Enemy Installations. In 1966, the chief and deputy were Sau Vu and Tu Viet. In addition, there may be more specialized elements operating either under this sub-section or, more likely, in close coordination with it. One of these is the Military Officers' Proselyting Sub-section, and another is the Capital Military Proselyting Section (both of these are discussed below).

e) The POW Sub-section has been known to include such functional elements as camp security guards, camp administration, an interrogation and indoctrination element, and a production element. This sub-section is responsible for determining which POW's should be released,

retained, or punished. The total POW population is usually spread over several smaller camps. In the case of high level or foreign POW's, the number of POW's is restricted to a low of ten or less. And it would be safe to assume that only the most important prisoners are the concern of COSVN. In 1966, its chief and deputy were Capt. Chuong and Tu Quy.

f) The Organization Sub-section is responsible for maintaining the personnel records of Party members serving in the section. It constitutes the Party's version of the Administration Sub-section. In 1966, its chief was Ba Hung.

g) The Research or Management Sub-section is supposed to analyze performance and plan operations for the section. The three elements of this sub-section are: Reports and Analysis, Enemy Installations, and Directive Writing. In 1966, its chief was Bay Kiem.

h) The Military Officer Proselyting Sub-section. This sub-section was established in late 1965 and was tasked with recruiting selected GVN military personnel. Bay Nghia, a senior PRP cadre, was detailed from VC MR-2 to head the sub-section. He was supposed to report directly to Tran Van Du (aka Bay Du), Chief of the COSVN Military Proselyting Section. About four months after the sub-section's formation, another cadre, Ba Ke, was assigned to assist Bay Nghia. According to [ ] who was a [ ] of the [ ] until early [ ] the sub-section was ineffective, primarily because experienced cadres were not available to conduct high level proselyting operations. By late 1967, the situation had deteriorated to the point that Bay Nghia issued orders that the sub-section was to concentrate on general propaganda activities, if it could not implement an effective officer proselyting program. b1 b3 (S)

i) The Capital Military Proselyting Sub-section (CMPS). The CMPS is a new sub-section of COSVN's Military Proselyting Section. The creation and operation of the CMPS offers considerable insight into the modus operandi and vulnerabilities of COSVN forward elements operating in the Saigon area (most particularly those operating out of Military Proselyting, Security, and Military Intelligence). Information on the CMPS was provided by [ ] b1 b3 (S)

[redacted] had been at the time of his capture [redacted] for Ben Tre Province when in November 1967, Bay Du contacted him regarding recruiting cadres for operation in Saigon. [redacted] said Bay Du at the time was deputy chief of the COSVN Military Proselyting Section. It was not until a meeting held in Long An Province in March 1968, that [redacted] learned the cadres he had recruited (all from Ben Tre) were to be part of the new CMPS. b1 b3 (S)

61. A review of the formation and operation of the CMPS affords considerable insight to the mechanics of COSVN's modus operandi; and its ad hoc nature. At the time of the March 1968 meeting, the May Offensive was imminent so the organization of Armed Propaganda Teams (APT's) was paramount. It is interesting to see how COSVN went about setting up these APT's. Bay Du gave [redacted] a letter of introduction to take to the deputy chief (Tu Quy) of SR-3's Military Proselyting Section at Long Phung Village, Can Giuoc District, Long An Province. It was Tu Quy who arranged for equipping APT and coordinating its activities with SR-3's military forces. [redacted] was dispatched to Saigon ahead of time, but the APT failed to link up with him. b1 b3 (S)

62. During early August 1968, [redacted] and the seven remaining members of the APT were escorted to the Ba Thu Base in Cambodia [redacted] lost control of the APT at this time because the members were dispersed to other elements of the COSVN Section. Bay Du did not attend the reorganizational meeting because he was no longer the chief of the CMPS. As reorganized, the CMPS consisted of six key cadres: b1 b3 (S)

Chief: Tu Kien (aka L10, a member of the COSVN Section)
Deputy: Ut Hao (aka N30)
Deputy: Hai Be
Member: Sau Cong
Member: Nam Hau
Member: Tu Minh

63. Ut Hao, Sau Cong, and Tu Minh were assigned particular GVN and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) installations which were highly desirable targets for penetration. Ut Hao was assigned the ARVN Joint General Staff (JGS) and Capital Military District (CMD) Compounds. Besides the personnel of these compounds, he was also to recruit civilians who lived in the areas

surrounding the compounds. All of these personnel were to be utilized to recruit additional sympathizers, to provide information concerning the installations and, if opportune, to smuggle in explosives for sabotage purposes. In addition, the civilians could be organized into propaganda teams to spread leaflets in the areas around the compounds. Sau Cong was assigned Independence Palace, the National Police Directorate and the Saigon Radio Station. Tu Minh's targets were not known. Nam Hau and Hai Be continued to perform their previous assignments, the former as Tu Kien's assistant, and the latter as leafleteer. Each member was to make periodic progress reports to Tu Kien who, in turn, was directly responsible to Bay Du at COSVN. With the exception of those personnel operating under each of the cadres, this comprised the CMPS's entire organizational system.

64. Ut Hao set up his base of operations at Tu Kien's base in My Thanh Village, Cay Lai District, My Tho Province. From this location, Ut Hao communicated with his personnel in Saigon by comms-liaison runner and also personally. His organization consisted of five cadres, eight sympathizers, and seven comms-liaison runners. Two of the cadres had not begun operations; Tu Tien and Hai Tot. The other three had; Sau Trung (aka Tuan), Tu Phuoc, and Tam Duc.

65. Sau Trung concentrated on the JGS Compound and had successfully recruited three ARVN soldiers, known to [ ] as 1002, 1003, and 1004; one of whom worked in the JGS. Tu Phuoc concentrated on the CMD Compound. He recruited three sympathizers: Loc, Thinh, and an ARVN Lt.Thanh. The latter worked in the CMD Compound. [ ] accidently discovered a letter written by Thinh to an ARVN Major requesting a different "intelligence assignment," so [ ] ordered Phuoc to break contact with Thinh and Loc. Tam Duc also had recruited three sympathizers: Khiet or Thiet, a National Policeman named Be, and Hai Sang. None of these personnel were effectively exploited by Duc. b1 b3 (S)

66. [ ] communicated with Sau Trung through a letter drop at the home of Hai Truong, a sympathizer whom he had known from the Ben Tre days. This was where he met with Tu Kien, the deputy chief of the CMPS. To establish contact with all of these agents, [ ] utilized the comms-liaison runners originally recruited in Ben Tre, including Tu Moi, Muoi Chanh, Ba Ut, Thu (aka Hong), Huynh Le, Tu Tien, and Hai Hoa. One additional runner, Ba Ro, was recruited by Tu Phuoc. There was no system employed in the use of the runners; they were used as needed. b1 b3 (S)

To avoid being conspicuous, [ ] did not send these couriers to the base very often. Two more cadres were assigned to [ ] by Tu Kien in late January 1969. He was enroute to Hoc Mong District to make the initial contact with them when he was apprehended at a control station for possession of a false ID card. b1 b3 (S)

67. [ ] made some interesting admissions to the authorities. As a result of the August 1968 meetings at Ba Thu, Cambodia, he clearly recognized that the use of APT s during the May Offensive had been a failure. He also recognized that the General Uprising in the cities could come only as a result of vigorous and continuous proselyting. However, his morale was quite low as he had experienced many difficulties. Chief among these was the antipathy towards the VC shown by the people of Saigon. It simply was not possible to recruit them readily. Most of his associates were people he had recruited or known in Ben Tre. The population control exercised by the GVN through checkpoints and public security forces was particularly difficult to outmaneuver. The checkpoints proved to be a constant limiting factor on his mobility. He had lived in constant fear of being apprehended and was convinced that he eventually would be captured while traveling. False identification cards (ID cards) were expensive and difficult to procure. (This is corroborated by a [ ] who also experienced a great deal of difficulty procuring ID cards, despite the fact that COSVN is supposed to be able to forge them.) b1 b3 (S)

68. Because [ ] and most of [ ] personnel were from the countryside, they had difficulties adjusting to the city and finding their way around. They feared they would be recognized as strangers and be turned in to the authorities. Because of the strong population control and the likelihood that [ ] personnel would be apprehended, his organization had to operate under a compartmentalized system, thereby lessening his control over [ ] cadres' activities. Furthermore, [ ] experience with Trinh and Loc made him very apprehensive of the possibility that [ ] organization would be or had been penetrated. Although he anticipated that it would take a long time to establish his organization, he felt that the results of his efforts from September 1968 to January 1969 were very meager. b1 b3 (S)

C. Civilian Proselyting Section

69. One of the principal functions of all levels within the infrastructure is the recruiting of personnel. COSVN has

different sections devoted exclusively to the function of proselyting. Although each is often listed as a separate entity, it is possible that all sections except Military Proselyting are grouped into an overall Civilian Proselyting Section (sometimes referred to as Front Section, especially in older documents). According to [redacted], there was such a section headquartered in Tan Lap Village, Tay Ninh Province with a total personnel strength of 20 to 25 persons. [redacted] maintained that the section was composed of three major sub-sections --Farmers, Women, and Youth-- which prior to 1966 had been separate sections. [redacted] stated that the function of the Civilian Proselyting Section was to send cadres into the villages to establish Liberation Farmer's, Liberation Women's, and Liberation Youth's Associations. As soon as the organizations were established, the section cadres withdrew, relinquishing their leadership function to the local people. b1 b3 (S)

70. The collated study, [redacted] listed former Under-Secretary Vo Chi Cong as the Chief of the Civilian Proselyting Section in 1966. This was logical since at the time Cong was the overt PRP representative to the NFLSV, a function now performed by Tran Luong under his overt name of "Tran Nam Trung." Indeed, one source has reported that this section is now headed by "Tran Nam Trung." Lt. Col. [redacted] believed that the "Front Section" was under Rau Kem. [redacted] did not know who headed the section. He believed that the chief of the Farmer's Proselyting Sub-section was Nguyen Huu The (aka Tu Gia), who also is a member of the NFLSV Presidium. [redacted] also estimated that the total membership of the Liberation Farmer's Association in 1966 was 22,000 to 25,000. At the time, the Women's Sub-section was headed by Mrs. Nguyen Thi Gieng.* Other important leaders were Mrs. Ma Thi Cu and Mrs. Nguyen Thi Lu. Total membership in the Liberation Women's Association (LWA) in 1966 was estimated at 40,00 to 50,000. Nguyen Thi Dinh, an NFLSV Presidium member and DCO of the SVNLA, currently heads the LWA. [redacted] believed the Youth Proselyting Sub-section was headed by Nam Quang (who he thought was also chief of the Propaganda, Culture, and Indoctrination Section). He directed the activities of both the Liberation Youth's Association (LYA) and the Liberation Student's Association (LSA). Total estimated membership of these two groups in 1966 was 60,000 to 70,000. At the present b1 b3 (S)

*This almost certainly is Le Thi Rieng, a leading PRP cadre arrested in May 1967 and subsequently killed, apparently inadvertently, by the VC during the 1968 Tet Offensive.

time. Tran Bach Dang, a COSVN CAC member and also a member of the NFLSV Presidium, is LYA Chairman; while Tran Van Kiem, a member of the NFLSV Presidium and currently in Paris heads the LSA.

71. [redacted] mentioned that the People's Revolutionary Youth Group (PRYG) membership in 1966 was estimated at 25,000 to 30,000. [redacted] quite correctly noted that the PRYG chapters came directly under the supervision of the local party chapter. He might have added that PRYG chapters in the SYNLA came under the unit's Party chapter. The PRYG, therefore, was not part of the Civilian Proselyting Section's responsibility. But there was a close tie-in because PRYG members at the local level were responsible for much of the active leadership of the Liberation Youth or Student Association chapters and cells.

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72. There have been reports of a Chinese, a Workers, a Religious, an Intellectual, and a Montagnard Proselyting Sub-section. From time to time, cadres of such sub-sections at lower echelons have been captured or firmly identified; especially at the Saigon-Cholon echelon. In addition, NFLSV organizations are known to exist for these and other segments of society in South Vietnam, and the usual practice is to assign the responsibility for proselyting in a given segment of the population may be assigned to a member of the Civilian Proselyting Section, a separate sub-section may be created to perform this function, or the responsibility may be given to a closely affiliated section (e.g., the Newsmen Association appears to come under the Propaganda, Culture, and Indoctrination Section). An overlap of personnel undoubtedly exists between all of these proselyting sub-sections, and the NFLSV Committee (discussed later). The actual Liberation Associations technically are a part of the NFLSV structure, while the organizing cadres work out of the proselyting sub-sections. Often the same individual works both sides of the house, sometimes operating under the thin cover of pseudonyms.

E. Civil Health Section

73. The Civil Health Section provides medical care to the personnel of COSVN and provides guidance and supervision for subordinate civil health sections, hospitals and dispensaries at lower echelons. It also has some responsibility for the supply of medical equipment and drugs to lower echelons, and for processing of bulk pharmaceuticals into useable drugs. A facility is maintained for training medical technicians, first-aid personnel and pharmacists. In addition, the section

including a program of continuing medical education by distributing training bulletins on medical techniques to interested physicians. The supervisory responsibility also appears to include the use of inspection teams. A plan captured in 1968 proposed the dispatch of an inspection team to undertake a thorough survey of village medical facilities to determine the progress being made in improving public health systems. Other aims of this inspection mission included acquisition of first-hand knowledge of local medical facilities and the selection of pilot villages where measures would be instituted for improved leadership.

74. According to [redacted] Civil Health doctor, personnel working in the Civil Health Sections in SVN were classified into four categories. [redacted] expertise is the product of experience. He received his medical training in [redacted] SVN. On graduation he infiltrated in SVN, eventually becoming the chief of the [redacted] Civil Health Section. [redacted] rallied on 5 May 1968. He reported that the four categories were: (a) doctors and highly trained druggists; (b) medical practitioners and intermediate druggists; (c) nurses and druggist assistants; and (d) first aid personnel and midwife assistants. The COSVN Section had to furnish intermediate and high-level doctors and druggists for the Regional Civil Health Sections who, in turn, had to provide similar personnel to the Provincial Sections. The provinces had to provide the districts with medical practitioners, nurses, and druggist assistants. The districts supplied nurses, midwives, midwife assistants, and first aid personnel for the villages.

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75. [redacted] believed that as of May 1968, there was an adequate number of doctors and qualified druggists, but there was a shortage of medical practitioners, intermediate druggists, nurses, midwives and their assistants, and first aid personnel. In May 1968, Provincial Civil Health Sections usually had three or more doctors, depending on the size and importance of the province, and one or two mobile surgical teams. Each team was composed of one surgeon, one or two medical practitioners, and two or three nurses. The District Civil Health Section usually had one or two medical practitioners. Village Sections were staffed with no more than two nurses and two midwife assistants, and three to five first aid personnel. Some Village Sections were operating with only a third of the required staff, due to desertions and losses, and inability to effectively recruit in GVN areas.

76. [redacted] stated the chief of the COSVN Civil Health Section was Nguyen Van Thu (aka Ba Thu, Nguyen Van Chi). Early in 1967, Ba Thu returned to Hanoi because of tuberculosis and Dr. Muoi Nang, the section's DO, took over as acting chief. An earlier source, [redacted] also reported Nang as chief in August 1967. According to [redacted] the chief was Phung Van Cung; but the section actually was managed by Ho Thu, a pharmacist and member of the CAC.* In 1966, the chief and deputy, according to [redacted] were Dr. Nguyen Van Vy and Hon (aka Hoang). b1 b3 (S)

77. The SRA Newsletter II listed eight sub-sections, the first four of which correspond roughly with the six sub-sections listed by [redacted] The sub-sections were: b1 b3 (S)

a) The Administration Sub-section (B.1) is called the "Civil Health Headquarters" by [redacted] According to the SRA Newsletter, it keeps medical records and charts, maintains supply levels, and assures an adequate level of medical personnel. b1 b3 (S)

b) The Hospital (B.2), according to [redacted] is responsible for treatment and convalescence of civilian cadres of provincial Party Committee rank and above. [redacted] described COSVN's surgical facilities as primitive. He stated the operating room was set in a trench four meters deep, six meters long, and three meters wide. It was covered with parachute cloth. A bicycle lamp was used for illumination which was powered by turning a bicycle wheel. b1 b3 (S)

c) The Dispensary (B.3), according to [redacted] is provided for civilian cadres and personnel, regardless of branch. The SRA Newsletter lists a Hospital and Dispensary Sub-section which at least in name would combine the activities of [redacted] B.2 and B.3. The Newsletter states that the sub-section is responsible for physical and technical support such as obtaining proper sites, building shelters, issuing supplies, and performing routine hospital duties. b1 b3 (S)

*Phung Van Cung is head of the presumably overt NFLSV Public Health Commission; this probably is the basis for [redacted] contention. It should be noted, however, that the NFLSV position and chief of the COSVN Civil Health Section may be identical. b1 b3 (S)

d) The Bacteriological Institute (B.4), according to [redacted] cultivated bacteria to make vaccines for use by subordinate echelons against such diseases as cholera, typhoid, and smallpox. b1 b3 (S)

e) The Pharmaceutical Factory (B.5 or B.29), according to [redacted] produced medicines for B.2 and B.3. The Newsletter also listed this sub-section, stating its functions to be obtaining drugs and medical supplies through production or via the black market, for distribution by the Pharmaceutical Sub-section. According to [redacted] the raw material for the preparation of Western medicines came from Hanoi. The COSVN factory also produced Oriental medicines. Apparently, some pharmaceuticals are sent to lower echelons while others are not. [redacted] mentioned leucorrhea and cataplasm which were reserved for B.2 and B.3 until 1966, at which time COSVN began to supply them to regions and provinces. b1 b3 (S)

Regional Health Sections produced nearly the same medicines as COSVN. Even provincial Civil Health Sections make pharmaceuticals, particularly those near enough to the border to set up their facilities in Cambodia. At the district and village level, GVN products frequently are purchased. [redacted] stated the VC were able to purchase medicines through the use of prescriptions issued by GVN doctors. They also gave written instructions specifying type and quantity of medicines to sympathizers to buy for them. They also organized groups of regular purchasers with connections with drug stores and hospitals. GVN-recognized nurses often were used to do this. They easily could buy any quantity of medicine, and receive a good profit in the bargain. b1 b3 (S)

[redacted] was not clear in his delineation of duties between B.4 and B.5. For instance, he stated B.5 produced a "secret" medicine called "subtillis" made from bacteria cultivated from meat and eggs and used to combat several strains of bacterial infection. It would seem that this medicine would more likely be produced by B.4. This medicine, incidentally, had been provided to the regions and provinces since 1965. [redacted] also stated that neither NVN nor the VC had been able to produce penicillin. b1 b3 (S)

f) The Cadre's Formation and Advanced School (B.25) was the name given by [redacted] to what the Newsletter des-

cribed as the Medical Education Sub-section. The Newsletter described its functions as providing printed information and oral lectures to midwives, technicians, and nurses and in general supporting the Military and Civil Health Sub-sections. [redacted] had more detailed information. From 1964 to 1966, it trained nurses to become medical practitioners. In that period the school conducted three courses for 100 students. Since 1967, the medical practitioner training had been entrusted to Regional Civil Health Sections. MR-1, 2, and 3 had conducted seven courses for 350 students selected from experienced nurses. Training lasted from six months to a yerr. Further down the line, midwife assistants were selected by provincial sections to attend the midwives and nurses courses which lasted from two to three months. District Civil Health Sections trained for one to two months. Since terminating the medical practitioner courses, COSVN began training medical technicians to become doctors. Two courses had been held. The 1966-1967 session trained 22 doctors, and a September 1967 to September 1968 course provided 27 more.

g) The Drug Preparation and Storage Unit was the final sub-section mentioned by [redacted]. It did not correspond to any mentioned in the SRA Newsletter. This unit's functions were storing medicines and medical instruments supplied by Communist countries for distribution to regional and provincial dispensaries.

78. The following four sub-sections were mentioned in the SRA Newsletter, but not by [redacted]. In the case of the last two, their functions are such that they probably do exist, and probably were of no interest to [redacted]. The existence of the first two (Military Health and Civil Health) is more problematical. However, since their functions also are less medical than sanitary, they also may have escaped the attention of [redacted] The four sub-sections are:

h) The Military Health Sub-section insures that hygiene and sanitation programs are initiated and followed within the armed forces.

i) The Civil Health Sub-section specialized in preventative medicine and sanitation programs in VC-controlled

areas.

j) The Printing Sub-section produces printed material on medical topics for use by the populace under VC control, as well as by members of VC military and civilian agencies.

k) The Protection Sub-section provides physical security for the Medical Section.

VI. THE "MILITARY" SECTIONS

79. The COSVN Military Affairs Committee (MAC) originally was a special committee of the Party which met on a regular basis (said to be monthly) to resolve major problems of military police, distinct from operational details. About 1965, as the tempo of military operations increased, a separate military headquarters was required and the SVNLA Headquarters (Hqs.) was established as a working organization. The MAC continues to exist in name, but is virtually synonymous with the SVNLA Hqs. Technically speaking, the MAC handles Party affairs, while the Hqs. handles the military. The Hqs. exercises command of the Main Forces (MF), Local Forces (LF), and guerrilla units. It is the central command organization through which the military policy of the SVNLA is executed. It is subordinate to the CAC of COSVN, but can also communicate directly with the NVA command in Hanoi.

80. Returnee Lt. Col. [redacted] provided a list of the commanders of the SVNLA Hqs. from 1961 to 1968. While the individuals he cited may not have held these exact positions (for biographic sketches and further explanations, see the CAC section of this paper), they probably occupied positions quite close to those he named: b1 b3 (S)

1961-1963

CO & PO — Maj. Gen. Tran Phi (nka Hai Hau, Tran Luong, Tran Nam Trung, Tan Phi)

Executive Officer (XO) — Lt. Gen. Tran Van Quang (aka Bay Tien)

1964-1965

CO & PO	Sen. Gen. Nguyen Chi Thanh (aka Sau Di)
XO	Lt. Gen. Tran Van Tra (aka Tu Chi, Tran Nam Trung, Le Van Thanh, Tran Trung Lap)
XO	Maj. Gen. Le Trong Tan (aka Ba Lam, Ba Long, Nguyen Trung Tan, Ha Ke Tan, Thanh Song, Tran Van Hai, Phu Chu, Chinh Nam)
XO	Nguyen Huu Xuyen (aka Tam Don Den, Tam Kien Quoc)
XO	Maj. Gen. Hoang Duc Anh (aka Sau Nam, Le Duc Anh)
XO	Lt. Col. Nguyen Thi Dinh (aka Ba Dinh, Ba Han, Bich Tri Van, Ba Tan, Bay Thanh)
DPO	Maj. Gen. Tran Do (aka Chin Vinh, Truong Son, Tran Quoc Vinh)

September 1967 to 1968

CO & PO	Pham Thien Hung (aka Pham Hung, Bay Hong)
XO	Lt. Gen. Hoang Van Thai (aka Muoi Khang, Hoang Van Khang, Ngo Quoc Binh, Hoang Xuan Thai)
XO	Lt. Gen. Tran Van Tra
XO	Lt. Gen. Le Trong Tan
XO	Nguyen Huu Xuyen
XO	Maj. Gen. Hoang Duc Anh
XO	Lt. Col. Nguyen Thi Dinh
DPO	Maj. Gen. Tran Do

[redacted] who was [redacted] had a slightly different way of looking at the leadership of the SVNLA Hqs. He separated the membership of

the MAC from that of the Hqs. The secretary and under-secretary of the MAC were Pham Hung and Muoi Cuc; and the members were Hoang Van Thai, Tran Van Tra, Tran Do, and Le Trong Tan. The head of the Hqs. was Lt. Gen. Hoang Van Thai. His deputies were Lt. Gen. Tran Van Tra, Maj. Gen. Le Trong Tan, Nguyen Huu Xuyen, and the ever present female representative, Nguyen Thi Dinh. The PO was Pham Hung, with two deputies, Tran Do and Muoi Cuc.

82. Most of these military leaders were discussed earlier in the section on the CAC. Some will be discussed in the section that follows on the operation of the Staff Departments. The remaining deputies who are not covered in either place are: Maj. Gen. Le Trong Tan, Nguyen Huu Xuyen, and Lt. Col. Nguyen Thi Dinh.

83. Le Trong Tan. According to [redacted] sources, Le Trong Tan (aka Ba Lam, Ba Long, Nguyen Trung Tan, Ha Ke Tan, Thanh Song, Tran Van Hai, Phu Chu, Chinh Nam) was director of the Hon Gai (north of Hai Phong city in NVN) police under the Japanese occupation. At the end of 1947, he appeared as the CO of the Viet Minh 97th Regiment and of Region XIV with the rank of Lt. Col. During the period 1948-1949, he was DCO of the Tonkin Inter-region X. From 1950-1951, he was CO and PO of the 209th Song Le--"Claire River"--Regiment (Regt.), which was the basic unit of the future 312th Division. He commanded this unit from its formation and became a Brigadier General (Brig. Gen.) in 1952. From 1957 to 1960 he was commandant of the NVA Ground Forces Officers School at Son Tay. In 1960 he was promoted to Maj. Gen. and attended a Communist Chinese War College. In 1961 he became a deputy chief of the NVA General Staff. b1 b3 (S)

84. [redacted] alleges that Tan became a deputy chief of the SVNLA in 1964-1965. In 1966 he was reported to have the additional duty of chief of the Combat Operations Staff (B.1). He is now believed to be acting as commandant of the VC Ground Forces School. He is a member of the Central Committee, and has written numerous articles on military subjects, one of which was on the subject of strengthening on-the-job training of officers. These articles appear regularly in Hanoi newspapers. Training, rather than combat or staff work, would appear to be his current speciality. He has been described as very nervous and he seldom speaks. Tan reportedly dresses in khaki uniforms. b1 b3 (S)

85. Nguyen Huu Xuyen. Not much is known about Nguyen Huu Xuyen (aka Tam Den Den, Tam Kien Quoc) [redacted] mentioned a b1 b3 (S)

Col. Xuyen as deputy SVNLA commander and stated that formerly he had been CO of VC MR-1, but that he was sent to NVN in June 1964 because he thought it unnecessary to use regular troops for battles. [redacted] heard he had returned to SVN in October 1965. [redacted] mentioned a deputy CO named Tam Venh Venh or Tam Xuyen in charge of Rear Services. This probably was Xuyen since his most used aka is Tam Don Den, the "Venh" being mistakenly substituted for "Dan." From such lackluster early reports, it might be concluded that Xuyen's star is on the wane. But according to more recent reporting [redacted] 21 April 1969), as far as direct command of the forces earmarked for use against Saigon, the role envisaged for Xuyen is second only to that of Tran Van Tra.

b1 b3 (S)

b3

86. Nguyen Thi Dinh. Nguyen Thi Dinh (aka Ba Dinh, Ba Han, Bich Tri Van, Ba Tan, Bay Thanh) is the only SVNLA DCO whose position also is overt. Although there is considerable conflict in detail, in general terms her background is fairly well established. She apparently was born in 1920, either in Nam Dinh Province (NVN) or Ben Tre Province (SVN). In either event, she spent her early years in Ben Tre. In 1937, she and her husband Bich joined the Ben Tre Popular Front stationed at Ba Tri. They were arrested in 1939. He was sent to Con Son Island and died, possibly as early as 1940. She was sentenced to forced residence until 1943, when she was allowed to leave.

87. She immediately rejoined the Resistance and next was heard of as participating in the August 1945 uprising in Ben Tre Province. In 1946 she and other cadres were in Hanoi to receive weapons and training for stepping up the guerrilla war. By 1954 she was reported to be Chairman of the Liberation Women's Association (LWA) in Saigon-Gia Dinh. Other reports describe her as Secretary General of the entire LWA. On 8 March 1965, at the alleged first convention of the LWA, she was elected its Chairman, a position she still holds according to overt reports. In 1960 she was appointed deputy secretary of Ben Tre Province. Other sources, including [redacted] designate her as Province Party secretary. In 1961 she was elected to the Executive Committee of the Nam Bo NFLSV and presently she is an overt member of the NFLSV Presidium. In May 1965, she was appointed DCO of the SVNLA, although according to [redacted] she assumed this position in 1963. As SVNLA DCO, Dinh appears to specialize in guerrilla affairs.

b1 b3 (S)

88. Another source stated that Dinh was a cadre for Ben Tre from 1950 to 1960, and for MR-2 from 1960 to 1963, and that

She married twice. According to this source, Dinh had four children by her first husband (she is supposed to have had one), and that he was reportedly killed in 1962. This source also stated that she was a Lt. Gen., whereas [redacted] reported she was a Lt. Col. She was last reported to have taken personal command over MR-2 sometime during the summer of 1968, but this is unconfirmed. b1 b3 (S)

90. Most sources do agree on her personal description. She has been described as stout or fat, frank, talkative, outgoing, and folksy. She prefers field trips to office work, and does not wear make-up or jewelry. She does not smoke and drinks little. Her military abilities reportedly are not very great, and there exists a feeling that she may be more of a figurehead to inspire female recruits than an actual military activist.

VII. THE STAFF DEPARTMENTS

90. Three staff departments are included in the SVNLA Hqs: Military, Political, and Rear Services. According to [redacted] when COSVN was reactivated in 1961, these divisions were designated as sections (ban). They later were changed to offices (phong). By 1964 they had been up-graded to departments (cuc). Under the present military structure, the term cuc is used in the south only at COSVN and in MR-5; all other MR's use the term phong for the corresponding sections of their staffs. b1 b3 (S)

A. The Military Staff Department

91. The Military Staff Department is the equivalent of the American G-1, G-2, and G-3 Staffs. It is responsible, according to [redacted] for troop replacement, including infiltration and assignment of recruits. It prepares the annual training program for main, local, and guerrilla force troops. Further, this department provides guidance to the Rear Services on weapons and material distribution priorities. It collects intelligence and advises the SVNLA Hqs. on strategy, operations, and tactics; and it also trains military cadres and specialists. b1 b3 (S)

92. There is remarkable agreement among the major sources on the chiefs and deputy chiefs of the Military Staff Department. [redacted] all agree the chief of staff is Hoang Duc Anh (aka Sau Nam). There was some difference of opinion with regard to his rank, ranging from [redacted] Maj. Gen. to [redacted] Col. Sau Nam b1 b3 (S)

believed to be a member of the Central Committee. [redacted] formerly to have been an assistant chief of staff on the NVA General Staff. Major [redacted] on 6 January 1969 described Sau Nam as easy going, an excellent staff worker, a regroupee, and former chief of the Military Forces Department of the NVA General Staff. Sau Nam also was reported to be CO of a Vanguard or Forward Hqs. operating during the 1968 General Offensive which had control over units in MR-1 and 2. b1 b3 (S)

93. Col. Tran Vinh Xu (aka Tran Minh Ho, Ba Dinh) consistently has been reported as a deputy chief of staff. [redacted] listed him, but [redacted] thought he had been replaced in June 1965 by Lt. Col. Ba Tran. According to [redacted] Xu left his post to become military commander of VC MR-4 in June 1965. Indications are Xu currently holds the position of MR-1 CO, and may still be a deputy chief of staff at COSVN. b1 b3 (S)

94. The man who [redacted] said replaced Xu was Lt. Col. Ba Tran, who formerly had been deputy chief of the MI Staff (B.2). The major source on B.2 at this time [redacted] corroborates that Ba Tran made this change, differing only in that [redacted] believed Tran had been chief, not deputy chief of B.2. [redacted] listed Ba Tran as deputy chief of staff and concurrently chief of B.2. [redacted] listed Ba Tran as a deputy chief of staff, and a Lt. Col. Tu Binh as deputy chief of the MI Staff. [redacted] lists Col. Tu Binh as deputy chief of staff, concurrently chief of the MI Staff, and a former deputy chief of the MI Department of the NVA General Staff. There are reports that Ba Tran and Tu Binh are the same person, but this evidence is not conclusive. The biographic record of Ba Tran (aka Tu Binh) suggests that he was born around 1927 in SVN. During the French resistance, he reportedly was a MI chief in a province in Eastern Nam Bo. He regrouped to NVN where he served in the NVA MI Staff, and then returned to SVN "sometime in early 1960." Presumably he served on the COSVN MI Staff, "either as chief or deputy until 1965 when he was made assistant chief of the Military Staff Department. He may have reached the rank of Brigadier General. One source has described him as big and robust; a man of few words, with a weakness for cigarettes. [redacted] b1 b3 (S)

95. Another deputy listed by [redacted] is Col. Hai (or Nguyen) Nghiem. [redacted] noted that Nghiem formerly had been a deputy in the Combat Operations Staff (B.1); [redacted] thought Nghiem's position was that of chief of B.1, rather than [redacted] b1 b3 (S)

deputy chief of staff. [redacted] described him as about 50 years of age, heavy set, wore glasses, and was very handsome-looking part French. He was very good-natured, extroverted, and well educated (speaking French, German, and English), and was fond of European music.

96. [redacted] added a final candidate for an assistant chief of staff not mentioned by the others, Sen Col. Hoang Cam (aka Nam Thach); who [redacted] believed was concurrently CO of the 5th Front (in SR-5). Cam reportedly was born in Hung Yen, NVN, around 1927. He also was reported at one time to have been the CO of the 9th VC Division.

97. According to [redacted] the Military Staff Department of COSVN was located, as of October 1967, within a twenty square kilometer area bounded by map coordinates XT 4883, XT 4888, XT 5283, and XT 5288; map sheet 6232 II. Chuoc's Battlefield Preparation Section was located (map coordinate XT 4968, map sheet 623 II) just north of the intersection of Ba Chiem and Dong streams.

98. Combat Operations Staff (B.1). This staff, according to [redacted] was supposed to keep the Hqs. posted on the friendly and enemy situation, draw up operation plans for subordinate units, provide operational support to these units, and deliver orders to units directly subordinate to COSVN and to the MR's and SR's. In addition, this staff was supposed to analyze and draw lessons from past battle experiences.

99. [redacted] listed Col. Nghiem as the chief of the Combat Operations Staff. [redacted] listed Lt. Col. Vu Ba as a deputy. [redacted] listed Lt. Col. Van as deputy, as well as five assistants: Lt. Col. Thanh and Sen. Capts. Tuoc, Kohn, Minh, and Xam. [redacted] allotted the chief's role to Lt. Col. Ho Tam, a regroupee and former member of the Training Staff of the NVA General Staff. His assistant chiefs were Lt. Col. Vu Ba, Maj. Mai Thanh, and Maj. Hai Bang. All were regroupees. Mai Thanh was in bad health; he had been a member of the Combat Operations Department of the NVA General Staff.

100. [redacted] maintains that there were ten subordinate sections of the Combat Operations Staff:

a) The General Combat Situation Staff (A.1), whose chief was Maj. Chin Do; age 40 years, heavy build, quiet, and well educated. He spoke French, Russian, and some German, and reportedly spent seven years studying in a

Command and Staff School in Russia. This section received information such as casualty reports (enemy and friendly) and victory reports from independent units and those of the MR's and SR's. The MI Staff also was used as an information input, primarily for verification. All of the information was checked and passed up to this staff by means of immediate, weekly, monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, and annual reports. This section also evaluated strengths and weaknesses of friendly units and forcast future enemy moves.

b) The Planning Section (A.2) under Lt. Col. Yu Ba, concurrently assistant chief of the staff. After receiving both the objectives from the Military Staff Department and the battlefield situation report from the General Combat Situation Section, this second section would plan the general timing, duration, and areas of operations for the main force units directly subordinate to COSVN. The Planning Section dealt in the higher level aspects of operations. This section also maintained some control over MR and SR units.

c) The Main Force Section (A.3) was led by Maj. Ho Xuan (aka Vum Xuan), of whom [redacted] described as 42 years of age and a regroupee from Thua Thien Province. This section advised the Military Staff Department on the personnel and materiel strengths, missions, and general activities of the divisions and independent regiments directly subordinate to COSVN. One group of cadres kept track of each Main Force Unit. b1 b2 (S)

d) The Local Battlefield Section (A.4) was under the direction of Maj. Bay Thanh, 40 years old, half-Chinese, and a regroupee. This section was similar to and complimented the Main Force Section in that it had the same mission, but covered area forces. This section informed the Military Staff Department on strengths and activities of Main Force, Local Force, and guerrilla forces in the MR's, SR's, and independent provinces in all of SVN.

e) The Campaign Section (A.5) was headed by Maj. Hai Bang, concurrently assistant chief of the staff. This section studied large American sweep operations to learn how to escape with the least damage to VC forces. The section proposed ways to neutralize sweep operations with counter-sweep operations or by avoiding contact. The primary emphasis had been on a study of the Junction City

Operation.

f) The Tactical Research Section (A.6) was under Maj. Ba Tran, 40 years old, with three years of college in Hanoi and a regroupee from Binh Duong Province. This section collected battlefield information about United States (U.S.) tactics and VC responses in an attempt to determine what responses were most effective. The results were disseminated to field units and training cadres. This section primarily studied U.S. tactics because it was felt the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) used the same tactics.

g) The Combat Control Envoy Section (A.7) consisted of about ten cadres and 20 to 30 guard personnel. The chief was Sen. Capt. Tam Thun, a 40 year old regroupee from Ben Tre Province. The cadres of this section carried special messages from the Military Staff Department to battle units. Generally they were used when some form of explanation was required with the messages, such as the reason why some very important request was turned down. These cadres were to reinforce the order and lift the morale of recipients of orders and messages. This section, according to [redacted] was not used very often. b1 b3 (S)

h) The Battlefield Preparation Section (A.8) was headed by Maj. Tu Hiep, 42 year old regroupee originally from Ben Tre Province. In this section there were 13 cadres, 15 security guards, 3 draftsmen, 2 cooks, and one medic, totalling 34 persons. The cadres were: [redacted] current information on the operation and organization of the COSVN Military Staff Department); Sen. Capts. Xuan, Cau Cuong, Hai Phan, Tu Dung, Kien, Bay Dai, and Vu Coi; and Capt. Hai Phoc. This was a relatively long-range planning section. It sent out cadres to reconnoiter terrain and enemy installations in large areas. For example, [redacted] reconnoitered the U.S. installations in Long Binh-Bien Hoa area. This section covered VC MR-6, MR-10, parts of Binh Duong, and Bien Hoa Provinces, as well as Long Khanh, Ba Ria, and Tay Ninh Provinces. After the reconnaissance, the cadres recommended the type and size of unit and tactics that could best be utilized against the target. The Combat Operations Staff reviewed their recommendations, and prepared tentative plans for the Military Staff Department. If the Military Staff Department and Hqs. approved the plan, it was sent to the MF units in the area which then ran their own reconnaissance b1 b3 (S)

preparatory to executing the mission. This section drew up plans only for units directly subordinate to COSVN; the MR's and SR's planned their own targets.

i) A.9 was the Administrative Section. It had two main functions. First, it took care of the paperwork and typing for the Combat Operations Staff. Second, it supplied food and clothing to the other sections of the staff.

j) A.10 was the Map Section which maintained the combat situation map for the Combat Operations Section. It also made map overlays and enlargements, and printed maps in three scales; 1:25,000, 1:50,000, and 1:100,000.

101. Military Intelligence (B.2). B.2 is the equivalent of the U.S. G-2, but actually it is more than that. VC MI has its own penetration agent nets, armed reconnaissance units, base areas, comms-liaison, radio and crypto personnel, and analytical personnel. It is responsible for coordinating the activities of the "People's Military Intelligence Nets." In addition, when the situation warrants it, MI probably also processes intelligence gathered through Military Proselyting agent operations, as well as from the activities of Special Action Units. Finally, there are very firm indications that since the May-June offensive, the old B.2 MI office assumed a strategic counterpart designated B.22. (See [ ] b3 3 April 1969). While it is not clear as yet, B.22 appears to be a conglomerate of NVN Intelligence Service Cuc Nghien Cuu (CNC) espionage nets (at least in the Saigon theater of operations), the more strategic of B.2's espionage nets, and any support or miscellaneous personnel and facilities that seemed particularly suited to strategic, rather than tactical, collection activity.

102. The capture of documentation on B.22 and several of its agents since December 1968 has revealed considerable information about the operations of the new organization. But for an overall description of the operation of MI at the COSVN level, it is necessary to refer to the now dated information supplied by Sen. Capt [ ] In May 1964 [ ] b1 b3 (S)
was assigned to the [ ] where he remained [ ] a Reconnaissance/
Sapper training cell of the then newly-activated Special Action Force.

103. According to [redacted] B.2 had the responsibility of collecting and following up daily and hourly activities on the military situation, tactically and strategically. It was supposed to anticipate enemy combat plans and provide guidance to the Military Staff Department in the preparation of their plans. In consideration of B.2's important operation, the Department reserved all priority facilities for B.2, such as supply and engineering developments. The chief, Anh Tu (cover name), was assigned in April 1965 to replace Ba Tran who was reassigned as an assistant to the Department. Tu's assistant was Hai Nguyen.*

104. The MI component of the Military Staff Department has several operational elements:

a) A.1, the Enemy Situation Study Section. Its chief and assistant were Maj. Hung and Sen. Capt. Thanh respectively. The cadres were Sen. Capts. Thong, Tai, Dung, and Thao; Capts. Son (aka Son Vang), and Long (aka Hung); and Sen. Lt. Tho, as well as others unknown to [redacted] The section consisted of several cells responsible for the political situation, military situation, cultural-social-economic situation, "recapitulation," and translation. This section was supposed to study all information received on military, political, economic, and cultural activities, keeping COSVN abreast of the situation of the GVN and the latter's policies, along with suggested countermeasures. It was also responsible for studying and commenting on intelligence received from subordinate units, and disseminating this intelligence to subordinate units. The intelligence was supplied by the regional level MI; MI tactical, campaign, and technical (radio intercept) reconnaissance elements; and espionage agents.

b) A.2 was the Reconnaissance Section. The chief and assistant were Maj. Son and Sen. Capt. Mieng. The training cadres were Sen. Capt Hai (aka Hai Ham); Capts. Son and Dong (alias Thi), and Trong [redacted]; and Sen. Lt. Tu Kieng. The battlefield study cadres were Sen. Capt. Bich and Capts. Luan, Ngu, and Van; and Sen. Lt. Thanh. The "Major Reading Cadre" was Sen. Lt. An. The subordinate

*For a discussion of whether Ba Tran and Tu Binh are the same individual, refer to paragraph 94 above.

elements were the Training Teams, the Battlefield Study Team, and the Map Team. This section was responsible for controlling the reconnaissance activities of the C.252 Combat Reconnaissance Battalion and of Main Force Regiments, for studying prospective campaign battlefields. A.2 also prepared training materials and followed up on reconnaissance training activities.

c) A.3 was the Espionage Section. This section had no chief because it was directly under the control of the chief of B.2, An Tu. Capt. Tam was responsible for espionage activities in Saigon and other cities. Sen. Capt. Kien was responsible for suburban and contested areas. b1 b3 (S) [redacted] knew of two other cadres; Hoa (a northerner), and Vinh (from central VN). A.3 was supposed to administer and guide all espionage agents and their rear base areas, and also to process and revise the intelligence furnished by these agents. It was this section that most directly involved in the establishment of B.22.

d) The Crypto Section was A.4. The chief and deputy were Capts. Thuan and Phung. This section was a company-size unit, but instead of having the organization of a company, it consisted of 7 or 8 cells. Each cell was responsible for ciphering and deciphering messages passed between B.2 and other agencies, battlefields, or MR's.

e) A.5 is the Administration Section under Capt. Sau and his deputy, Lt. Thanh. It consisted of about 30 men divided into three squads. The Communication Squad (A.12) maintained liaison between B.2 and its various divisional, tactical, and strategic teams. The Correspondence Squad (A.9) was responsible for internal liaison. The Transportation and Troop Feeding Squad (A.10) appears to have been responsible for food production and messing. This section was responsible for routine personnel administration of B.2, procurement and issue of facilities and equipment, and maintenance of communication lines between B.2 and its subordinate sections.

f) A.6, the Political Section, was under Sen. Capt. Nam Son (aka Son Den); and Sen. Lts. Tran Le, Tac, and Huy. There were four sub-sections: Organization, Cadre, Propaganda and Training, and Security. A.6 was responsible for maintaining the records of all MI cadres, including those assigned to MR's. A.6 also was responsible for the place-

ment and reassignment of MI cadres, for their awards and promotions, and for their Party records.

g) The People's Intelligence Section's (A.7) chief was Sen. Capt. Huynh Long, and Lt. Tam was deputy chief. This section was charged with organizing and controlling people's nets in liberated, contested, and suburban areas. It also received information from those nets for study, evaluation, and processing and dissemination.

h) The A.8 Technical Section forged various types of documents for use by agents. It also compiled and analyzed captured documents for possible use. The chief was Sen. Lt. Truong. There were two platoon leaders, Hung and Hoang Anh. There were three sub-sections: documentation and photo reproduction; document and photo compilation; and document and photo forgery.

i) The Signal and Radio Communication Section (A.13) actually was a Signal Company, but it was not organized like a military unit. It had a strength of about 100 and included a Receiving Sub-section, a Transmitting Sub-section, and a Radio-and-Equipment Repairs Sub-section. A.13 transmitted messages between B.2 and the MI sections of the MR's and the campaign and tactical reconnaissance teams.

j) The Technical Reconnaissance Section (A.29) actually was a cryptanalysis battalion and organized like a combat unit of three companies. The chief was Sen. Capt. Duy Tien. The three companies were supposed to monitor all GVN or ARVN transmitting stations and decipher all coded messages. It was generally held that the personnel of A.29 received special treatment because their intelligence had proven to be highly valuable and accurate, particularly in their monitoring of ARVN communications. For example, this section monitored ARVN fire mission requests and troop maneuver (both withdrawal and attack) movement traffic. In April 1965 when [redacted] he heard that there were plans to set up another Technical Reconnaissance Battalion, code named A.28, equivalent to A.29. He also heard that Sen. Capt. Ba was appointed PO of this unit. More current information on the Technical Reconnaissance Section was provided by [redacted] b1 b3 (S)

[redacted]

[redacted] He maintained that the Technical Reconnaissance Section provided the bulk of MI information. According to [redacted], the section was composed of approximately 400 men who monitored all Allied radio nets on a 24-hour basis. As a radio message was intercepted, it was written down and immediately passed to a man known as a decoder. The decoders were guarded constantly by a three to four man group which always moved with the decoders. [redacted] maintains that the chief of this section, [redacted] that code books used by the decoders contained basic Allied code terms obtained from NVN, the USSR, and Communist CHina. [redacted] had heard that Col. Tam Si had been trained in France. The section also obtained code information through paid informers within the Allied community. Once the decoder received the message from the interceptor personnel, he decoded it, and sent it to the MI Staff commander who would then disseminate it on a need-to-know basis. b1 b3 (S)

k) Campaign Intelligence Teams, according to [redacted] also fell under B.2's purview. There were four teams with each being a battalion-sized unit. The teams and their chiefs and deputies were: (1) A.16 under Capt. Nguyen and Sen. Lt. Sau Thi; (2) A.20 under Sen. Capt. Sau Tri and Sen. Lt. Bay; (3) A.22 under Capt. Dang and Capt. Bay Hieu; (4) A.30 under Sen. Capt. Nam Tra and Sen. Lt. Nam Chinh, as well as Capt. Giau, the PO. Their general mission was to study the battlefield for prospective campaigns and follow developments as they occurred. However, they also ran agent nets, especially near ARVN and U.S. base camps and installations. [redacted] heard that once the team concerned had organized the net, it transferred its operational control to the Espionage Section (A.3), but still acted as a liaison and support unit. Actually, current information indicates these teams may have been the Forward Command Elements of A.3 (Espionage Section), especially since the Sau Tri who [redacted] commanded A.20 may be the Sau Tri who now is considered to be the deputy CO of B.22. b1 b3 (S)

According to [redacted] A.16 operated near the SVN-Cambodian border (Bacham and Tapang Robon - map coordinates XT 015 445). It was responsible for maintaining contact with various espionage units which were operating on Cambo- b1 b3 (S)

Bien territory and with various NVN CNC teams. Part of A.16's mission was receiving and transmitting agents and supplies. A.20 operated in the Loc Thuan (Doc Thuan) and Cu Chi areas (map coordinates XT 620125). A.22 operated in the Phu Hoa Dong, Ben Co, and Phu An areas (map coordinates XT 700335 and XT 740330). A.30 possibly was operating in the areas northeast of Vung Tau. [redacted] had heard A.30 had been a NVN CNC Strategic Intelligence team reporting to Hanoi until September or October 1964 when it was subordinated to B.2. A.30 had its rear base in the Vung Tau area and was the largest of the four campaign teams. A.30 reportedly possessed a company-size combat reconnaissance element, a radio element, a crypto element, and a cryptanalysis element. b1 b3 (S)

l) "Tactical Intelligence Teams," according to [redacted] included: (1) A.14 under Sen. Lt. Hoang Thao and Lt. Thinh; (2) A.15 under Sen. Lt. Hung (aka Tan); and (3) A.32 under Sen. Lt. Man. Each team had from 30 to 40 men and consisted of two elements, one for reconnaissance and the other for combat and security. Team leaders had the rank of company commander. They were to collect information on ARVN activities and submit daily reports to B.2. Tactical teams also were responsible for espionage nets, whether organized by the team or assigned by B.2 for watching specific ARVN units or positions. A.14 operated in Ba Den mountain area (Tay Ninh Province), A.15 near the Binh Duong Province capital, and A.32 in Bien Hoa. b1 b3 (S)

m) C.252 Combat Reconnaissance Battalion. This unit had been led by Maj. Sau Duyen until his death during the battle of Binh Gia. The deputy, concurrently XO, was Sen. Capt. Nam Thanh. [redacted] heard the names of two of the company commanders, Sen. Lt. Long and Sung. The battalion consisted of about 400 men armed with light weapons. There were three companies with rumors of a fourth in the making; among the company commanders were Sen. Lts. Long and Sung. C.252 was responsible for preparing the battlefield for COSVN (in compliance with plans issued by the Military Staff Department) by tracing the courses of action prescribed for long-range campaigns. They were to survey terrain conditions, defense obstacles, and coordinate with MR and Main Force Regimental MI and reconnaissance units. In case a terrain survey was extremely important, it would be conducted by the CO of C.252, such as the Binh Gia battle. C.252 usually operated in units of platoon and company strength. b1 b3 (S)

They were trained in stealthy infiltration, handling unusual weapons, close combat techniques, observational techniques, map drawing, and field survey techniques.

105. Describing the communications undertaken by B.2, [redacted] noted an upward and downward vertical channel and a horizontal channel. Upward was the NVA MI; downwards included the six MR's, four campaign and three tactical intelligence teams; espionage elements, MI sections of divisions and regiments subordinate to COSVN and the C.252 Combat Intelligence Battalion. B.2 maintained horizontal communications with the Combat Operations Staff (B.1), the Cryptographic Staff (B.6), and the NVN CNC Strategic Intelligence Teams, and the Security and Military Proselyting Sections of COSVN. B.2 received and transmitted intelligence through the Radio Signal Section (A.13) after it was deciphered/ciphered by the Crypto Section (A.4). All messages passed by the Radio Signal Staff (B.3) also had to go through B.6, the Cryptographic Staff. b1 b3 (S)

106. [redacted] reported that quarterly reports were submitted to the NVN General Staff, but he did not know how they were transmitted. Most messages concerned reports on organization and activities, request for support, or the transmittal of directives. Contact with subordinate elements was daily, but [redacted] did not know how contact was made. Contacts with the Combat Operations Staff (B.1) were made many times daily by various means, including telephone and messenger. These contacts covered information received from NVN, the battlefield situation throughout SVN, and information coming from the MR's and COSVN's Main Force units. During combat operations, every piece of information had to go through the Forward Command Post. In this instance, B.2 directed its subordinates to send their information to the Command Post which then would be responsible for relaying the information back to B.2. b1 b3 (S)

107. At the time of his interrogation [redacted] stated that it [redacted] normal for B.2 to be informed ten to fifteen days in advance of important ARVN operations. He was told that in some cases, the information was received as soon as the operation planning was completed. The NVA MI provided the most accurate information on ARVN strategy and deployment, large-scale operations, B-52 bombings, and GVN policies. AT 0500 hours each day, the NVA MI sent a message to B.1 and B.2 on the deployment of ARVN units, regimental size or larger. Espionage elements often provided accurate information on ARVN operations, as well as on major policies of the GVN. Cryptanalysis units collected very b1 b3 (S)

accurate information on planned artillery and aerial attacks by monitoring messages requesting such support as they were relayed from sector to division to corps and JGS. Cryptanalysis also proved effective in determining both advances and retreat of ARVN units during operations. They had more trouble with U.S. messages because the majority of cryptographers had a very poor command of English.

108. The Formation and Functions of B.22 (Strategic Intelligence Office). According to one of several captured documents in June 1968 a "section" (possibly all or part of A.3) was separated from B.2 and combined with C.2, (probably a cover for NVN CNC units) to become B.22 (aka Doi 22, H.22). The C.2 is probably an abbreviation for Cuc 2, a term which has been used by MI personnel to refer to the CNC and its operating elements. B.22 was dubbed the Strategic Intelligence Office (also referred to as Bureau Department and Staff). It was to serve not only the SVNLA, but the leadership of the "Central level" and the "Central Military Party Committee" (probably here referring to Hanoi), as well. Besides military intelligence, it was charged with covering the political, economic, and diplomatic fields as well.

109. Just exactly what this split did to the organization of the two parts is not clear (See [redacted] b3 [redacted] b3 [redacted] and [redacted]. Judging from the interrogations of the chiefs of three intelligence collection detachments, most of the reorganization consisted of doubling numbers. Apparently B.2 retained all its old sections, while B.22 duplicated five of them, doubling their code numbers in the process. The new sections appear to be A.33, A.55, A.77, A.88, and A.99. A.33 corresponds to B.2's A.3, or the Espionage Section. According to [redacted] b1 b3 b7 b3 (S) [redacted] this section included three former NVN CNC cadres; Son, Capt. Tu Kien, and Capts. Ba Tam and Ba Thu, plus one SVN MI cadre, Tran Thang. The former [redacted] stated that this section's code number was A.3 and it was called the Operations Section and was headed by Ba Tam and his deputy, Tu Kien. Actually, the section could be called either since its function was espionage operations. It probably was numbered A.33 since all other numbers were doubled; and since there are indications B.2 still has responsibility for some espionage detachments, certainly for those engaged in tactical intelligence collection.

110. [redacted] (of A.42) referred to A.55 as the Rear Services Section, while Ba Minh (of A.20) referred to it as the Administration and Rear Services Section. Actually, from [redacted] description of B.2's Administration Section (A.5), both rear services and administration functions would be appropriately combined.

111. Both [redacted] and [redacted] referred to A.77 as the Political Section. [redacted] thought its chief was Cao Van. According to [redacted] A.7 was the People's Intelligence Section and A.6 was the Political Section (under Sen. Capt. Nam Son). Both [redacted] and [redacted] also agreed that A.88 was the Technical Section. [redacted] said it was headed by Thu and Duc. A.88 would correspond nicely with [redacted] A.8 Technical Section in charge of document compilation, reproduction and forgery.

112. Both [redacted] and [redacted] referred to A.99 as the Signal Section. [redacted] listed its heads as Duc A and Duc B. [redacted] called A.9 the Correspondence Section and A.13 the Signal Section. He listed the chief of A.13 as Sen. Lt. Duc. A.99 might be related to either. The functional responsibility for A.9 was for internal liaison within B.2. Both [redacted] and [redacted] mentioned that B.2's Comms-liaison Section (A.12) continued to function under B.2, but that it closely supported B.22.

113. When it comes to listing the Intelligence Detachments (called "cum") of B.22, there is less agreement among the sources and the picture becomes more confusing. [redacted] thought the A.3 (probably should be A.33) Operations Section oversaw the operations of the detachments under B.22. The only detachments he knew of were [redacted] A.42 and two others; A.24 (chief, Nam Van), and A.30 (chief, Ha). [redacted] thought the Operations Section under B.2 was A.54, headed by Tu Sac and his PO, Bay Anh. The only element he knew of that was subordinate to A.54 was A.34.

114. Another source, [redacted] has been in charge [redacted] for A.54 before him [redacted]. He knew nothing of B.22, indicating only that COSVN had ordered the amalgamation of two former MR-1 MI units and another, numbered A.38, in July 1968. The former MR-1 units were renumbered A.34 and A.44. The new organization was called A.54. Another unit was added later, A.40. A.54 operated closely with SR-1 and the 9th Division, and may have corresponded to a Campaign Intelligence Unit. It did, however, have espionage nets [redacted] listed A.54's chief, deputy, and PO as Tu Sac, Ba Song, and Bay Anh respectively. The chiefs and

location of the others were: A.34, Tu Trung and Ut Thanh; A.38, Muoi So and Ly Van Ri; A.40, Muoi Rau; A.44, Chin Tan; and two cadres, Tu Lan and Rang.

115. According to the former chief of [redacted] prior to the B.22 reorganization, there were several NVN CNC units operating in SVN, including B.44 in Central SVN and B.48, B.49, B.50, and B.52 in the Saigon area. B.44 was led by Maj. Nam Den (aka Xuan); B.48 by Maj. Hung and Sen. Capt. Mai Thang; B.49 by Maj. Nguyen Thanh Tung (aka Huynh Kim Trong, Muoi Tung, Muoi Co, Phung Co); and B.52 by Maj. Phan. [redacted] was an [redacted] for B.49. He identified the following cadres: Maj. Nam Tam (PO); Maj. Trung Tieu (Chief of Research); Sen. Capt. Doanh (Chief of Training); and the following Sen. Capts. [redacted] Ba Can, Tam Nam (aka Nam Sach), Ba Lieu, and Ut Dong. b1 b3 (S)

116. In late 1968, those CNC units operating in the Saigon area were slated to be merged into the newly formed B.22. In August 1968, a conference of B.49 was held in the Ba Thu-Ta Noi area of Cambodia. [redacted] presided. [redacted] indicated the CNC espionage organization might possibly be merged with the COSVN MI Espionage Section. The process of merging B.48 with B.49 began in October 1968, and the four resulting agent nets (or cums) were to be numbered A.68, A.69, A.70, and A.71. The command section was designated A.72 under Maj. Muoi Tung, the former chief of B.49. The former head of B.48, Maj. Hung, was ordered back to B.22. By December 1968, the merger was completed with some assets and agents and one agent net chief of [redacted] b1 b3 (S)

B.48 merged with B.49. The [ ] were Ba Can (A.68), Nam Sach (A.69), Hai Thang (A.70), and Ut Dong (A.71). b1 b3 (S)

117. [ ] maintained that the chief of B.22 was the colonel who presided over the conference, Tu Hiep. The deputy was Col. Sau Tri, and the PO was Col. Tran Van My (aka Tam My). [ ] agreed with this lineup, except that he lowered everyone's rank one grade. In this, [ ] has been consistent and probably in error. [ ] also noted Sau Tri had been former chief of A.3, and that Tam My was former PO for B.2. [ ] only knew that Sau Tri was the deputy, but he added that the command staff of old B.2 was: Tu Binh (chief); Nam Nam (deputy); Son Map (deputy); and Chin Loc (political officer). b1 b3 (S)

118. It should be noted by way of conclusion that documentation on the creation of B.22 and the merger of B.48 and B.49 indicates that these reorganizations were implemented as part of a general trend toward upgrading strategic capabilities. The documents and interrogations reveal that the communications breakdown during the first two offensives led to the assignment of radio and crypto men and equipment to enable agents to maintain contact when regular liaison links become blocked. The documentation also reveals an increased concern with strategic reporting. According to the captured documents summarized in [ ] 11 April 1969, this concern with strategic reporting has reached the point where both Security and MI are re-evaluating their agents' strategic potential and are attempting to guard the better agents from premature exposure. Such exposure apparently occurred during the initial stages of the General Offensive. Now, with the cold reality of the situation sinking in and an eye cocked toward the Paris talks, the VC appear to be digging in their agents for the long haul. b3

119. The Signal Staff (B.3). The next subordinate element of the Military Staff Department is B.3, the Signal Staff. [ ] agree that the chief of B.3 is Col. Tran Nam. The deputy chief, according to [ ] is Maj. Oanh. According to [ ] the functions of the Signal Staff include drafting the annual plan for the establishment of signal units, telephone and radio communications, and couriers for Regional and Main Force units. It also is responsible for training cadres and organizing communications between COSVN and the Regional and Main Force units. This staff also is supposed to change communication codes every three months and organize an emergency communications system. Other functions are planning for radio requirements and checking the daily communication procedures of the different radio-telephone stations. b1 b3 (S)

120. According to CICV Report ST 69-01, 10 March 1969, B.3 has a reported strength of 565 personnel including two combat support element, recent documentation places the 44th subordinate to B.3. The battalion consists of three companies; one each for radio, telephone, and courier communications. Each company numbers about 85, for a total strength of 265. The remaining elements appear to be two signal companies of 75 men each, a signal liaison element of 25 persons, and an administrative element.

121. The Military Personnel (or Armed Force) Staff (B.4). According to [redacted] the chief of this staff is Col. Duc, and the administrative staff chief is Maj. Minh. [redacted] listed Duc as the chief, and a Maj. Hoat as the deputy chief. Again, according to [redacted], the functions of B.4 consisted of drawing up plans for writing Army regulations, inspecting lower echelons to insure compliance with regulations, keeping records of platoon leaders and their assistants in all of the units subordinate to COSVN Hqs, except cadres in the MR's. B.4 also was responsible for drawing up an annual manning plan based on COSVN requirements for the reception and assignment of recruits from NVN and the MR's. Depending on the situation, these strength requirements were changed quarterly. Additional duties, according to [redacted] were to inventory weapons caches, make arrangements with the Ordnance Branch to maintain weapons, and to provide weapons, ammunition, and signal equipment to the MR's and other units. b1 b3 (S)

122. The Engineer Staff (B.5). According to [redacted] the Engineer Staff is headed by Col. Ung Rang. [redacted] thought its chief was Maj. Bui Tue. [redacted] listed the chief as Maj. Nhan and the PO as Maj. Ky. According to [redacted] the functions of B.5 were to draw up plans for training activities for all engineer units under COSVN, to prepare specialized research for the Engineer Branch for all campaign activities, and to study combat engineer techniques. These techniques included employment of mines to support attacks, construction of air raid shelters, and methods of sabotaging bridges. b1 b3 (S)

123. Formerly considered combat support elements, according to CICV ST 69-01, the individual engineer companies subordinate to B.5 now fall under the definition of administrative service. The staff consists of a 55 man Headquarters Section, four engineer companies, and an engineer school. The strength of the remainder is estimated to be 70 for C.23, 60 for C.24, 55 for C.25, 65 for C.26, and 45 for H.18 the school. The total strength is set at 350 persons.

124. The Military Training Staff (B.6). [redacted] thought the chief of B.6 was Lt. Col. Tam, and the deputy was Maj. Cang. [redacted] believed its chief was Lt. Col. Bang. This staff is supposed to organize and guide discussions on past experiences, record those of tactical value, and disseminate these to lower echelons. B.6 also draws up the infantry training program for COSVN units and gives training guidance to the cadres of training schools at the platoon and company level of main force units. According to CICV ST 69-01, B.6 includes in its staff the 76th and 80.A Training Regiments with 850 personnel between them. b1 b3 (S)

125. The Political Staff (B.7). Little is known about the Political Staff. It is listed in the CICV Study ST 69-01. Lt. [redacted] however, called it B.9 and listed its chief as Lt. Col. Bay Phat, the deputy chief Sen. Capt. Thuan, and the chief of organization as Sr. Capt. Lan. b1 b3 (S)

126. The Cryptographic Staff (B.8). Both [redacted] and [redacted] agree its chief is a Maj. Hong or Hoang. [redacted] listed its functions as compiling codes, training and assigning crypto personnel to the MR's and other units directly subordinate to COSVN. B.8 also is charged with investigating and prescribing rules of security in communications procedures, decoding and recording all messages received and sent by COSVN, and uniformly organizing all crypto units employed in combined military operations. b1 b3 (S)

127. The Adjutant Staff (B.9). CICV Study ST 69-01 lists B.9 as the Adjutant Staff. Neither [redacted] mentioned an Adjutant Staff, although [redacted] dated 18 June 1966 did, stating in addition that its chief was Tu Do. [redacted] thought B.9 was the Political Staff. b1 b3 (S)

128. The Message Center (B.10). CICV Study ST 69-01 lists B.10 as the Message Center. [redacted] mentioned an Administration and Message Center as B.7. [redacted] listed its chief as Capt. Tam Phuong and the following minor members: Thi Phuong (typist) Thi Lan and Thi Ry (supply), Hung and Tho (security). [redacted] listed an unnumbered Administrative Branch that logically would have followed as B.10. Its chief was listed as Capt. Khon. Sen. Lt. Phuong was listed as in charge of administration. Sen. Sgt. Tuan for supply. b3 (S)

129. The Chemical Staff (B.12). Although listed in the CICV study, neither [redacted] or [redacted] mentioned a Chemical Staff. [redacted] did, however, stating its deputy chief was Maj. Dung b1 b3 (S)

and five years of college, had studied chemistry in Bulgaria and was formerly a member of the NVA Chemical Staff of the General Staff.

130. The Military Postal Service (B.14) (B.14 is the new Military Postal Service (aka Office of Postal Service and Communications) which is responsible for the maintenance of courier service and other communications. This responsibility originally belonged to the Postal Transportation and Communications Section of COSVN's CAC, but on 25 August 1966, COSVN issued a directive transferring the section to military control and changing the name to Military Postal Service. However, the directive never has been fully carried out throughout SVN, and many echelons still retain the system as a civil function.

131. The courier system not only handles written communications and mail, but also moves cadres and furnishes guides for visitors to the COSVN area. Although it operates directly only in the COSVN area, it also supervises the system throughout SVN. No limitation is placed on the number of private letters that can be sent through the system and no stamps are required. The Party District Committee where the addressee is located is responsible for final delivery of letters to the addressee. All letters are censored by the Correspondence Sub-section of COSVN's Organization Section.

132. The primary mission of the COSVN Postal Service is to control the infiltration of personnel and goods to intermediate stations within its own area of responsibility. At the intermediate stations, the infiltrators and goods are turned over to MR or province comms-liaison systems. This transfer may take place at an infiltration staging area, such as the one located at Ba Thu in the Parrot's Beak of Cambodia which is used extensively for the infiltration of people and goods into MR-2 and MR-3.

133. According to CICV Newsletter No. 4, 5 June 1965, the COSVN office is divided into three subordinate elements; a Military Staff Department, a Political Section, and an Administrative Committee. The Military Staff Department appears to be in charge of the movement of men and materiel. It also is responsible for the Binh Long Corridor Section which maintains infiltration routes leading from Cambodia to VC Binh Long Province in MR-10. The Political Section reportedly has the responsibility of supervising Party activities. The Administrative Committee acts as both a clerical and personnel office. There is no information available on the current leadership. Back

In 1968, under the old Commo-liaison Section, the chief was reported to be Ba Cao, and his deputy, Ngo Van Chuyen (aka Muoi Chuyen).

134. Others, [redacted] all list a Militia Staff, [redacted] cites it as B.10. The CICV Study ST 69-01 and [redacted] omit it. [redacted] listed the chief as Maj. Nguyen and the deputy in charge of operations as Sr. Capt. Chuoc. [redacted] thought the chief was Col. Hien. [redacted] listed the chief as Col. Tu Hien, and its mission as one of drawing up developmental plans for guerrilla forces and making quarterly inspections of these forces. On the one hand, this staff was to gather experiences and disseminate reports on guerrilla activities. On the other hand, the staff was to coordinate with mass organizations such as the Youth's, Farmer's, and Women's Associations to seek support for the guerrillas.

135. Both [redacted] listed an Artillery Staff under the Military Staff Department. [redacted] (a former [redacted] of the 58th Independent Recon Platoon of the Artillery Hqs. and/or U69) maintained there was a separate artillery command directly subordinate to the SVNLA Hqs. which [redacted] called U69. [redacted] on the other hand, noted that in NVN the Artillery Branch was large and rated a command separate from the General Staff, but that in SVN it was still subordinate to the Military Staff Department. [redacted] stated that this staff's mission was to plan the establishment of artillery forces in SVN, supervise those units directly subordinate to COSVN, prepare tactical guides, and provide equipment and other facilities for the COSVN Artillery Branch.

136. [redacted] allegation that the Artillery Hqs. is separate from the Military Staff Department is bound up in his description of that Hqs.' CO, Sr. Col. Nguyen Minh Khanh (aka Hoang Minh Khanh, Tran Soan Dau, and Tu or 4th Khanh). According to [redacted] Tu Khahn [redacted] listed Tu Khanh as the head of the Artillery Staff) had been DCO of the SVN Artillery Command during the Resistance. He regrouped toNVN and became DPO of the NVA Artillery Command Hqs. In 1963 he returned to SVN to establish another SVN Artillery Command called U69. In 1965, Col. Ba Bich, CO of the NVA Artillery Hqs., came south as Khanh's deputy in charge of the actual military operations, leaving political affairs to Khanh. When the NVA Artillery Hqs. was divided to form a new Missile Command in November 1968, Bich was recalled to take over the new Missile Command. Khanh then resumed command of U69 until 1967, when

newly-infiltrated Sen. Col. Ba Vu [ ] listed two [illegible] Lt. Cols. Phuc and Bui Khac Vu) took over and Khanh again resumed his duties as PO. [ ] stated that Tu Khanh had suffered from trachoma since Resistance days. His condition is serious and he suffers occasional near-blindness. He is thoroughly disliked and a known lecher with the nickname Vua Gu "King Flirt" and Vua Ai Tinh "King of Love." According to [ ] he is considered unknowledgeable in artillery, bull-headed, a perfectionist when it comes to his own comfort, and not especially dedicated to duty. b1 b3 (S)

137. [ ] and [ ] also listed a Sapper Staff, but gave no 'B' number. The existence of this organization as a part of the Military Staff is not confirmed. With the increased emphasis on sappers, it may exist as a separate command, like the artillery command. [ ] believed the Sapper Section was under Sen. Capt. Mai. [ ] thought its commander was Lt. Col. Tu Cang, and that its functions were to draft plans establishing and organizing sapper units, provide training programs and aides, conduct research on sapper objectives, and evaluate past experiences. b1 b3 (S)

B. The Political Staff Department

138. Despite, or perhaps because of, the relative importance of this department, little is known about its operations. [ ] provided some information on this department's overall mission. It is responsible for developing Party membership within the military, monitoring troop morale, and suggesting methods for eliminating morale problems. It is charged also with preparing and guiding programs for political indoctrination and disseminating current events information by radio and paper. Further, the Political Department drafts COSVN resolutions and sends them to MR Party Committees and independent unit Party Committees. This department also gives guidance on maintenance of security for the MR's and independent units, and it maintains records on cadres from battalion level on up, especially the regimental level. b1 b3 (S)

139. There is little agreement on who heads this department. [ ] and [ ] list Maj. Gen. Tran Do. Lending credence to these assertions is the well-confirmed fact that Do is a deputy PO of the SVNLA, and at lower levels, the chief of the Political Staff; consistently also is a deputy PO [ ] lists Sen. Col. Le Chau (aka Le Chau) which agrees with [ ] b1 b3 (S) b3

[redacted] lists Ba Thang (who he says may have been replaced by Sau Khan); [redacted] lists Ba Thang as a deputy chief. Both [redacted] and [redacted] list Col. Tam Tran as a deputy. Both the [redacted] and [redacted] list Sen. Col. Hai Tuong (aka Hai Chau) as a deputy. [redacted] lists a Sen. Col. Nam Tan (aka Nam Thanh) as a deputy. [redacted] listed still two more deputies: Col. Ba Luu and Tran Quoc Hung (aka Nam Thai). Finally, to further confuse the issue, [redacted] a VC rallier from [redacted] lists Ba Hung as chief and Bay Phuong as deputy chief. b1 b3 (S)

140. Although there is not much agreement on who heads the subordinate staffs of the department, there is general agreement on the existence of the first six of its component staffs:

a) The Propaganda and Training Staff (B.1). [redacted] alleges that the functions of this staff include monitoring troop morale and preparing papers on problem areas, compiling training and indoctrination documents, and disseminating information through newspapers and radio. This staff also is responsible for guiding psywar, entertainment, and movie groups. [redacted] believed its chief was one of the deputy departments heads, Sen. Col. Hai Tuong. [redacted] listed Lt. Col. Le Dinh Le (chief) and Lt. Col. Nguyen Huu Minh (deputy). [redacted] listed Lt. Col. Sau Khiet (chief) and Capt. Ba Huong (deputy). [redacted] gave the following breakdown: chief, Lt. Col. Chuc (or Truc); deputy, Maj. Minh; press, Sen. Capt. Thuong; information, Capt. Nguyen Van Hich; documents, Capt. Tau; recreation, Capt. Ta; and photography, Sen. Lt. Hy. b1 b3 (S)

b) The Enemy Proselyting Staff (B.2). Neither [redacted] nor [redacted] mentioned it, but the existence of a Military Proselyting Staff is fairly firm. [redacted] listed its chief as Sen. Capt. Binh. Not much is known about its operation at the COSVN level, although several of its directives on treatment of prisoners of war are available. It appears to be the military version of the Military Proselyting Section. As such, its responsibilities probably are chiefly directed at indoctrination of VC troops in an attempt to convince them of the advantages of capturing prisoners and treating them well, and at organizing military interrogation and detention facilities. It also would be responsible for activities aimed at encouraging the enemy to desert or surrender, usually a matter of using bull horns, leaflets, and the like. b1 b3 (S)

c) The Organization Staff (B.3). According to [redacted] this staff had to keep track of the overall number of Party members in the military. This staff also prepared plans in the development of the Party and prepared training programs and documents. It also is responsible for monitoring the morale of Party members in the military. [redacted] said that the staff supervised the H.25 Agency, a Transient Facility for military officers awaiting re-assignment. [redacted] believed the chief was Col. Lan. [redacted] said the chief was Lt. Col. Ba Lan (aka Ba Luu). While this would indicate they agreed, [redacted] listed a Col. Ba Lau as head of the Cadre Staff. [redacted] listed Maj. Ba Lam as chief of the Organization Staff; Ba Lam may be identical with Ba Lan, although the ranks involved are not consistent since [redacted] rallied long before [redacted] b1 b3 (S)

d) The Cadre Staff (B.4 or B.7). [redacted] thought the chief of the Cadre Staff was Lt. Col. My, and [redacted] thought it was Col. Ba Trang. [redacted] listed Bay Thuong as chief and Nam Duc as deputy; a 1968 captured document confirmed that Bay Thuong was connected with the Political Staff Department. [redacted] described the functions of this staff. It was supposed to keep abreast of the development of cadres from platoon up to COSVN, prepare plans for the assignment of cadres from regiment upward, and maintain records on military cadres from battalion upward. In addition, this staff received and reassigned NVA cadres. It also was responsible for training schools for cadres company level and up, and for formulating policy on promotions and discipline of cadres, and aiding their families. b1 b3 (S)

The Security Staff (either B.4 or B.5). [redacted] and [redacted] all agree that the chief of this staff is Col. or Lt. Col. Thai (aka Ba Thai, Nam Tai, Tran Quoc Hung, Quoc Hung), a former assistant chief of the Security Department in NVN. [redacted] listed the deputy as Lt. Col. Nguyen Van Sen, and [redacted] as Sen, Capt Mai Thang. This staff, according to [redacted] was responsible for formulating plans for the organization of security systems in troop units throughout COSVN, and for the maintenance of the SVNLA Hqs. security system. This staff also keeps records of and investigates personnel suspected of being enemy agents, and drafts plans for security preservation during military operations. b1 b3 (S)

f) The Administrative Staff. Little is known about the Administrative Staff. [redacted] listed a Maj. Tu Van as its chief. [redacted] listed Sen. Capt. Khoe as its chief with the following subordinates; Sang (Security), Hoang (Food Supply), Hieu (Liaison), Lt. Hoi (Supply), Chien (Medical), Lap (Printing), and Tuy (Secretariat). b1 (S) b3 b3

141. In addition to the six staffs above, the [redacted] also listed an Intermediate Political School Staff under Sen. Capt. Viet Hung. [redacted] listed an Entertainment Staff under Capt. Xuan Hong and his PO, Sen. Capt. Bay Hien; and [redacted] listed a Militia Political-Mission Staff under Lt. Col. Do Khanh Van which specialized in ministering to guerrilla forces. b3 b1 (S) b3

142. The existence as separate entities of the three staffs above cannot be considered especially firm, although they may well exist as subsidiaries of other staffs. [redacted] for instance, also mentioned an Intermediate School of Political and Military Affairs (cover number 86/R) which might be the one referred to in paragraph 141 above. But [redacted] listed it under Schools, rather than the Political Staff Department. He had heard that the school was built in late 1961 and specialized in advanced training in political and military affairs for cadres of company level and up. [redacted] in [redacted]. He stated the students came from various locales, and that the school gave two five-to-six month courses yearly. Its organization consisted of a seven man Party Committee and a three man Board of Directors. There were three agencies subordinate to the Board: Military Training (11 persons), Political (12 persons), and Rear Services (25 persons). The director was Lt. Col. Phi Hung; the PO was Lt. Col. Thanh, and his assistant was Sen. Capt. Minh. Three tactical instructors were Sen. Lts. Bien, Ha, and Minh. The political trainers formed one company and the military trainees formed two. These companies ranged from about 80 to 90 persons each. [redacted] knew of four other schools: Signal Training, Engineer Training, Reconnaissance Training, and the Nguyen ai Quoc Political Reasoning School (referred to under the Propaganda Section of the COSVN CAC). (S)

C. The Rear Services Staff Department

143. The Rear Services Staff Department is the equivalent of the American G-4 Staff. It is responsible for providing logistical support to the armed forces. According to [redacted] b1 b3 (S)

this staff ultimately is responsible for insuring the adequacy of materiel support based on the requirements of the Military Staff Department. Among its functions are supervising ordnance repair and production facilities, supplying and controlling expenditures of Main Force units of COSVN, and training cadres for the Quartermaster Branch. This staff also transports, distributes, and maintains all types of ordnance and military equipment infiltrated from NVN, and it manages a system of caches in COSVN's operational areas. Finally, it is this staff which manages hospitals and provides care for soldiers of COSVN's Main Force units.

144. As was noted in CICV Study ST 69-01, the Rear Services consists of the Headquarters Staff and subordinate Rear Services Groups. These groups are responsible for providing all logistical support to the Main Force, combat support, and administrative service units throughout the area directly controlled by the SVNLA. The composite strength of the overall staff element, not including the groups, is about 1,000. According to the CICV Study, there has been much documentation indicating an increase in the strength of the groups during the past year. There is a great deal of overlapping control between elements of the groups and the Rear Services Staffs of the SR's; many of the operations of the groups cut across SR boundaries.

145. Most sources appear to be referring to the same individual as chief of Rear Services. [redacted] listed Sen. Col. Tu Hoa; [redacted] listed Sen. Col. Nam Hoa; and [redacted] listed Sen. Col. Nam Thi. [redacted] listed Col. Ba Ngoan as PO and Lt. Col. Nhan as DPO. [redacted] listed two DCO's: Cols. Sau Ngap and Phung. [redacted] listed Nam Quoc Dang (aka Nam Thuoc) as a DCO; [redacted] also listed Hai Vo as another DCO. b1 b3 (S)

146. According to CICV ST 69-01, there are nine sub-divisions of the staff element, and a school, security guard, and an induction station. The nine sub-divisions are:

a) The Plans Staff (B.1). [redacted] believed B.1 was headed by Col. Sau Ngap. [redacted] described its functions as one of advising other staffs on making out their plans in coordination with the general plan of the department. b1 b3 (S)

b) B.2 is The Political Staff (B.2) which presumably handled Party affairs for the staff.

c) The Quartermaster Staff was B.[redacted] thought its chief was Sen. Col. Hai Chanh. [redacted] maintains this b1 b3 (S)

staff dealt only with units directly subordinate to COSVN. It was supposed to draft plans for, and organize the collection and purchase of, foodstuffs for these units. It also organized the transportation system, the network of caches and warehouses, and the deployment of the quartermaster network for operational purposes.

d) B.4 is the Ordnance Staff which, according to [redacted] was responsible for drawing up plans for the transportation and distribution of weapons and ammunition to the units of COSVN and the MR's. This staff supervised the workshops that produced weapons in accordance with the Military Staff Department requirements, and arranged for the issuing of the weapons to all subordinate units of COSVN. The staff provided technical guidance on the invention of new weapons and notified the MR's about the invention of new weapons. The staff also advised the MR's on transportation, maintenance, and replacement of weapons, and constructed caches and transported equipment during military operations. b1 b3 (S)

e) The Medical Staff was B.5. [redacted] believed the chief of this staff was Dr. Hue, a Major. This staff was responsible for training medical cadres, planning the organization of the military medical staff and setting up medical stations during military campaigns. This staff also prepared medicines and instructed the MR's on how to do the same. Finally, this staff was responsible for treating the wounded and sick soldiers of COSVN's military units. b1 b3 (S)

f) B.6 was the Financial Affairs Staff. [redacted] thought this staff was directed by Maj. Ba Nonn and his assistant, Sen. Capt. Ban. [redacted] maintained this staff provided funds only to units directly subordinate to COSVN. It received these funds from the COSVN Finance and Economy Section. It was supposed to account for or settle all its expenditures with the COSVN Section. b1 b3 (S)

g) Supply, Transportation, and Secretary Staffs. The Supply Staff (B.8), according to [redacted] receives the purchase applications of the departments of COSVN, and organizes these purchases in accordance with the requirements of COSVN. It supplies COSVN units with such items as office supplies, medical instruments, and signal equip- b1 b3 (S)

ment. [redacted] also alleges that it is this staff that deals with transporting goods from legal areas to the Secret zones. This would more likely be the function of B.9, the Transportation Staff. b1 b3 (S)

147. Rear Services Groups. The Rear Services Staff Department, according to CICV ST 69-01, consists of seven Rear Services Groups (RSG) plus one special Transportation Group. The RSG's are numbered 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, and 100, and the Transportation Group is number 70. Very little is known about Transportation Group 70. There is one report that Cao Phong is the group's CO. The CICV Study noted that the documented strength of RSG 81 was 2,226, but that only about 70 percent of these were available for duty during the fall of 1968. This group operates in the War Zone D and SR-6 areas. According to [redacted] Muoi Thiem is CO of RSG 81; however, a captured VC document dated April 1969 listed Nguyen My as head of the Party Committee and Command Committee of RSG 81. b1 b3 (S)

148. The total strength of RSG 82 is reported to be 1,816. This group operates in War Zone C and in Tay Ninh Province. [redacted] stated that Muoi Bi was CO of RSG 82; however, two POW's and a captured document list Muoi Bi as CO of RSG 83. [redacted] in RSG 82 who [redacted] in September 1967, held that the CO and PO of RSG 82 was Maj. Nguyen Huu Tan; that the DCO was Ba Van; and that the two DPO were Chi Trung and Ly. [redacted] b1 b3 (S)

149. The estimated strength of RSG 83 is 885. Muoi Bi has been identified as the CO of this group by two POW's from RSG 83 and from a captured document. One of the POW's listed a Ba Son as DCO in 1966, while both of the POW's and a 1 August 1966 document listed Doan Sau as the group's PO. Conflicting reports exist concerning the CO of RSG 84; an April 1966 captured VC document listed Le Minh Thinh in this position, while a December 1966 document had Nguyen Van Hue as CO. RSG 85 was activated in February 1965 and its current estimated strength is 400. It operates primarily within Binh Long Province and northern SR-1 and SR-5. RSG 85 is basically a trucking unit. At one time, it was thought that RSG 85's transportation mission had been assumed by Transportation 70, but it now appears that they operate in adjacent areas, with Group 70 operating along the Cambodian border. According to one field study, as of the beginning of 1968, the CO, XO, and PO of RSG 85 were Vo Van Chanh, Luu Van Luong, and Nguyen Kim respectively.

150. The mission of RSG 86 is one of logistical support

two COSVN combat elements operating in Phuoc Long and Binh Long Provinces, including elements of the 7th and possibly the 1st NVA Infantry Divisions. This unit has an estimated strength of 2,450. A possible additional transportation group operating in the same area as RSG 85 was formed from the D.4 Transportation Battalion, formerly attached to RSG 86. The unit growing out of the amalgamation of D.4 with other smaller units is Transportation Group 70. Its area of operation extends from the Cambodia/Binh Long-Phuoc Long border south at least as far as Route 13. The personnel strength has been documented at 302. According to one report, RSG 86 is commanded by Tran Van Trung, however, a [redacted] earlier from [redacted] stated that a Lt. Col. Dang headed the group. b1 b3 b5

151. Although RSG 100 is subordinate to COSVN, this administrative service organization of 600 personnel was formed from a nucleus of elements of the Rear Services Staff of SR-2. Its primary operating area is SR-2, which serves from base areas in Cambodia and Tay Ninh. Its major depots and transportation lines are also located in SR-2. This SR provides the easiest access into the capital from base areas in Cambodia and therein lies its importance as a key communications link. One of the most extensive logistical bases in the III Corps Tactical Zone area is Ba Thu village which is located in Cambodia just across the border from SR-2.

152. The brief but checkered existence of the Forward Supply Council took another turn in the latter half of 1963, when it was officially reactivated from COSVN down to the village level. This reestablishment necessitated a transfer of personnel to it from the Finance Economy Section and the Rear Services Section. The latter probably provided military personnel with experience in two specific areas of activity of the Forward Supply Council: manpower (civilian labor and Assault Youth) and food provisions. Some of the personnel transferred at this time may have originally been members of the Forward Supply Council, for one document mentions that certain members of COSVN Rear Services Group 81 were to resume their former functions. The top echelon of the Forward Supply Council at the COSVN level is the permanent section consisting of a chief, who is a member of the Party Current Affairs Committee, and two deputies, one of whom is a high-level Rear Services official. Possibly one or both of the members in charge of manpower and provisions may also have a concurrent Rear Services function. Coordination between the Forward Supply Council and the Rear Services probably takes place through members of the permanent section who were

formerly, or still are, attached to the Rear Services organization. This coordination is vitally needed for the Forward Supply Council to fulfill its primary role of supporting the battlefield operations with supplies and the civilian laborers to move them.

VIII. THE "FRONT"

153. In the preceding section, the subject was COSVN's Party Committee with its functional sections. Each echelon below COSVN has a similar, if less elaborate, Party organization. No matter what the level, the decision-making power rests with the Party organization. But, wherever the Party meets directly with the uncommitted masses, it prefers to operate through Front groups whose connections with the Party are either wholly camouflaged or made to look less dictatorial than they really are. VC infiltration of an otherwise nationalist Buddhist Student Group would be an example of total camouflage. The NFLSV, the first among the Front groups, would be an example where only the extent of Party control is disguised.

154. There are at least four reasons why the Party prefers to operate through the NFLSV. First, for international appearances the NFLSV is used to mask NVN and Communist direction of the insurgency. This tactic is used to gain sympathy from foreigners for an alleged internal movement for liberation from an oppressive "puppet" government. The NFLSV handles foreign affairs. Not being openly connected with the Party, its international appeal is more widespread. Thus, while part of the Front's task is traditional diplomatic representation (especially in other Communist states), it has the additional task of drumming up international support such as liaison with international trade unions or U.S. student protest movements.

155. Second, the Front also is used to mask Party control of the insurgency at home. Everything is conducted in the name of the Front, rather than the Party. Tax receipts, execution judgments, and other documents meant for public consumption are invariably signed and sealed in the name of the Front. This charade even includes the actions of the SVNLA. As mentioned above, the SVNLA is called the People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) when acting publicly. Thus, Liberation Radio broadcasts PLAF announcements in its own name, as well as those of the alleged PLAF sub-divisions. These latter generally may or may not correspond to an actual VC military command. For instance, when the VC released three U.S. prisoners in December 1968, in

widely publicized rendezvous with U.S. military representatives in Tay Ninh Province, the prisoners were released in the name of the "People's Liberation Armed Forces Command, Eastern Nam Bo."

156. Third, the Front represents an attempt to mask the real leadership of NVN and the PRP. Although the facade has long since worn away, the Communists continue to utilize the Front. What is done publicly is done by a Front leader. This also allows the Party to utilize "notables," a term often used by the VC to denote individuals of public renown. For example, while the Communist Party is avowedly athiestic, it is still able to enlist the services of such Buddhist and Catholic representatives as Thich Thien Hao and Joseph Mario Ho Hue De respectively. There also are Hoa Hao and Cao Dai members among the NFLSV leadership.

157. The use of notables naturally leads to a fourth reason for the Front; its capacity for allowing the VC to appeal to a broader mass of people than would be the case if they relied on Party members and well-known sympathizers alone. Recruitment of non-Party members is principally accomplished through such mass organizations as the Farmer's, Women's, and Youth's Liberation Associations. While it is the Party's proselytizers that direct the establishment of the mass organizations and supervise or directly engage in recruiting, this is done in the name of the Front. Thus, while the Liberation Youth Association is a Front group, its direction comes from the Youth Section of the local Party Committee's Civilian proselyting apparatus. It might be worth noting that at these lower echelons, the Party will also use non-members to staff its functional sections. In fact, this is one of the more common ways the Party gains new members.

158. According to a former senior Party military cadre who had spent from [redacted] at COSVN, the top NFLSV personalities were satisfied with their roles. He also claimed that

63

In theory, the PRP is only one component of the NFLSV. As such, it is overt and since 1966, Tran Nam Trung (aka Tran Luong) has served as the overt PRP representative to the Front. (Vo Chi Cong held this "distinction" until 1966.) Denigrating the PRP's effort to disguise its control, Tran Nam Trung also is the overt chairman of the NFLSV's Military Affairs Committee.

the special treatment given to the Front leaders did not unduly antagonize realistic Party cadres. The outstanding characteristic of these Front personalities is that they are representative of large segments of the population and, therefore, valuable to the Party. This representative factor outweighs all others, including executive ability which can be supplied by more anonymous Party cadres serving in the NFLSV mass organizations. In the same vein, this source felt acceptance of a man like Nguyen Huu Tho into the Party would be foolish. The news could not help but leak out and erode Tho's Front image. [redacted] however, claims that Tho in fact is a PRP member, and [redacted] stated that Tho was a member of the COSVN Civilian Proselyting Section--a position which roughly would coincide with most valuable on-the-ground aspect of the Front.

b1
b3
(S)

159. To handle the affairs of the Front, the Party attempts to create a Front Committee to correspond to the Party Committee at every echelon from COSVN down to the village. Thus, there is an NFLSV Central Committee that corresponds to the COSVN Central Committee, and a Presidium that corresponds to the COSVN CAC. This Presidium appears to have an additional off-shoot called the Secretariat which may be the Party's principal organ of control.* The sub-divisions of the Central NFLSV Committee that have been identified are: the Military Affairs Committee, the Information, Culture and Education Committee, the External Relations Committee, the Economic Affairs Committee, the Commission for Public Health, and the Korean Relations Committee. The NFLSV's regional sub-divisions, corresponding very roughly to the VC MR's, are the Central Committee of Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh, Eastern Nam Bo, Western Nam Bo, Central Trung Bo, and Tri-Thien-Hue. The province, district, and village committees follow in line. The principal leaders and NFLSV-associated organizations are listed at Attachment B.

160. The Party's control over the NFLSV apparently has become so transparently obvious that even the PRP felt it necessary by the time of the 1968 Tet Offensive to create another

*It is likely that Tran Nam Trung (aka Tran Luong), the official PRP representative to the NFLSV and a PRP Central Committee member, and Pham Xuan Thai, a PRP Deputy Secretary and member of the Front Presidium, perform the function of insuring that Party control is maintained.

nationwide Front group in conjunction with their initial Tet 1968 Offensive. Called the Vietnam Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces, this group was created not only to broaden the base of popular support, especially in urban areas, beyond that of the NFLSV, but also apparently to provide a negotiating element possibly more acceptable to the U.S. and the GVN. The Alliance relies almost totally on the Liberation Radio for its official pronouncements. Moreover, the Alliance and NFLSV issue joint communiques. Finally, Trinh Dinh Thao, Chairman of the Alliance, was once a law partner of NFLSV Chairman, Nguyen Huu Tho. The movement to form alliances in various urban areas has been very weak to date. There are chapters in Saigon, Hue and Danang.

161. At the lower levels, the Communists have created People's Revolutionary Councils and People's Liberation Committees. This effort constitutes an attempt on the part of the VC to establish their long-promised legitimate government. As such, the councils more or less are powerless. The committees, however, do exercise some control. Thus, it is not surprising that the various sub-divisions of the Committee, such as Security, or Finance and Economy, still generally are directed by individuals who already head these sections within the Party Committee structure.

IX. COSVN'S RELATIONS WITH ITS SUBORDINATE ECHELONS

162. Historically, Vietnam has been divided into three parts: North, Central, and South. The Viet Minh began their operations with fourteen regions that they reduced to six inter-zones in March 1945. Inter-zones 1, 2, and 3 formed North Vietnam (Bac Bo); 4 and 5, Central Vietnam (Trung Bo); and 6 was South Vietnam (Nam Bo). The division between NVN and SVN provided by the Geneva Accords of 1954 ran roughly along the 17th parallel which split off the two southernmost provinces (Quang Tri and Thua Thien) of NVN's inter-zone 4, leaving them in SVN. Also remaining in SVN were inter-zones 5 and 6; i.e., the southern half of Trung Bo and all of Nam Bo. When the NFLSV was proclaimed on 20 December 1960, six sub-divisions of Nam Bo and Trung Bo were established: South Trung Bo, Western Highlands Autonomous Region, Eastern Nam Bo, Central Nam Bo, Western Nam Bo, and the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Special Zone. Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces were placed under the jurisdiction of Southern Trung Bo.

163. Officially in 1961, COSVN was formed from an amalgamation of the Nam Bo and Trung Bo Committees. Initially, a lack of staffing at the regional level left the inter-zone the primary level of planning and coordination. COSVN probably did exercise nominal control over the Trung Bo area, but with the inter-zone 5 committee still remaining largely independent. As for the Western Highlands Autonomous Region, the VC Vontguard policies were largely unsuccessful, and it appears probable that the entire region initially remained subordinate to inter-zone 5 and now is subsumed in the B-3 Front area.

164. With the passage of time, the effectiveness of the regional level increased. This was due in large measure to the difficulties in coordination caused by extremely poor transportation and communications. In May 1963, the inter-zone echelon was completely eliminated. Inter-zone 5 was divided into two regions, MR-6 in the south and MR-5 in the north. The sub-divisions of the Nam Bo inter-zone remained unchanged, but were assigned numbers as follows: MR-1, Eastern Nam Bo; MR-2, Central Nam Bo; MR-3, Western Nam Bo; and MR-4, Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh Special Zone. At this time, MR-6 came fully under the control of COSVN, but the remaining portions of former inter-zone 5 continued to exercise a great deal of autonomy. In 1964, probably due to the enormous distances involved, MR-5 created two SR's. The southern SR covered VC provinces Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, and Daklak. The northern SR included Quang Tri and Thua Thien.

165. In mid-1965, the U.S. entered the war and Hanoi began infiltrating integral NVA units. This change led to an upgrading of the military committee system and an increase in Hanoi's direct control of MR-5. By the spring of 1966, these new stresses led to a major reorganization of VC administration throughout SVN, including the formation of MR-10 and the Tri-Thien-Hue Region (TTH-MR), the Western Highlands Front Command (B-3 Front), and the consolidation of districts and provinces in MR-1.

166. In April 1966, recommendations were made by the MR-5 Party Committee to Hanoi that the MR be divided into three sub-divisions. In June of that year a formal sub-division was made, creating the TTH-MR and the B-3 Front, leaving as MR-5 the remaining provinces along the coast. It appears the Western Highlands did not have a Party Committee as did the TTH-MR, and for this reason was a Front Command with MR-5's Party Committee remaining responsible for the political side of the war in VC provinces Kontum and Gia Lai. Daklak Province of the southern

SR falls under the B.3 Front militarily and the MR politically. To the north, it was simply a case of elevating the northern SR to full MR status. According to [redacted] this MR also controls the central part of the Laotian panhandle and has occasionally been referred to as the Tri-Thien-Central Laos MR. There are also indications a connection may exist between this MR and the NVN province of Quang Binh, resulting in the name Binh-Tri-Thien MR. Military control of these areas is almost completely in the hands of NVA Front Commands. However, they are still considered to be nominally subordinate to COSVN, if only to maintain the facade of the NFLSV being the guiding hand of the insurgency. b1 b3 (S)

167. If the net effect of these changes in the North was one of lessening COSVN's influence, the opposite is probably true in the South. COSVN had already inherited MR-6 which, prior to 1963 had been part of inter-zone 5. In October 1964, shortly after the formation of the B.3 Front, MR-10 was established by merging one MR-6 province, Quang Duc, with two MR-1 provinces, Phuoc Long and Binh Long. According to a captured diary, the establishment of base areas, control of the southern end of the infiltration route, ethnic minority problems, and land development for the large plantations in the three provinces were the principal problems to be solved by the new MR.

168. The reorganization of the remainder of MR-1 appears to have occurred in response to Allied operations. The attrition of VC cadres made the consolidation of existing structures necessary. Tay Ninh was the only province not affected. Binh Duong and most of Phuoc Thanh provinces were merged to form Thu Dau Mot Province. Long Khanh, Bien Hoa, and Ba Ria were merged into Ba Bien Province. The Rung Sat, a heavily forested swamp lying astride the river mouths leading to Saigon, was also reorganized in the spring of 1966. Before it had formed two districts under Bien Hoa Province, now it became a special zone numbered T-10 with the mission of constructing a strong base area and interdicting the water lines of communication to Saigon. This eliminated the need to staff two District Committees whose political responsibilities encompassed a sparsely populated swamp. There was little reason to alter the VC organizational structures in MR-2 and 3 in the Delta, south of Saigon. This area was still firmly controlled by COSVN.

169. By November 1967, COSVN had ordered a major reorganization of all areas contiguous to Saigon to facilitate the planned general offensive against Saigon in January-March 1968.

The territory of former MR-1 (minus Tay Ninh, Ba Bien, and U-1 Provinces), MR-4 and MR-2's Long An Province were divided into six SR's. SR-1 through 5 formed wedges around Saigon-Cholon, which became SR-6. For the first time, the traditional Nam Bo divisions were ignored and established provinces dissolved to create entirely new entities. If anything, this reorganization resulted in COSVN taking even firmer control of this area, one in which COSVN had always shown special interest.

170. The boundaries of the old MR-4 enclosed an area too limited for the concealment of VC forces during Allied operations in the area. This situation became especially critical after the VC decided to move from guerrilla warfare into a new phase of conventional warfare which meant not only larger military units, but Rear Support bases as well. The new SR arrangement gave each SR a common border with the city and a large rural hinterland for base areas. The breakup of MR-1 and MR-4 also enabled the VC to place relatively high-level personnel from these organizations into the SR's, thus improving the quality of leadership farther down the line. This was also achieved by the direct placement of COSVN personnel down on the SR level on a temporary basis.

171. At this time there were indications the VC also planned to turn Tay Ninh, Ba Bien, and U-1 Provinces into SR's, but never did so. There were also indications that an MR-4 type organization was performing some sort of intermediate headquarters function between COSVN and the SR's, although it now appears that this experiment has been dropped. The overall effect remained, however, one of a COSVN-directed attack against Saigon on several fronts, the coordination of which was the responsibility of Lt. Gen. Tran Van Tra. Despite the close control exercised by COSVN, according to [redacted] the VC command believed the Tet Offensive was marked by a lack of coordination between the military and political forces, a lack of central control over military forces under the SR's, and an inability of the SR's to provide reinforcements. (S) b1 b3

172. In March 1968, COSVN apparently assumed direct command over all military forces in the SR's by turning the military headquarters of each SR, except SR-6, into a Front responsible only to the SVNLA Hqs. As a result, the SR Party Committees no longer exercised command over their own military forces, a departure from normal Party practice. Rather than create a Front for Saigon, SR-6's sapper units and area of responsibility

were divided between the outside SR's. This was probably due to the lack of coordination that occurred between the outside units infiltrating Saigon and their SR-6 supporters during the Tet Offensive. The May-June Offensive proved to be just as ineffective, despite the further reorganization, but it remained evident that with regard to operations for the Saigon area, COSVN intended to assume direct control to the point of placing its own cadres in roles of direct command.

173. COSVN was similarly tightening its grip over the Delta. As outlined in CICV Newsletters No. 5 and 7, 27 July 1968 and 14 October 1968, the COSVN was troubled by decreasing cadre strength and loss of population control in the Delta. On 6 April 1968, there was a meeting between COSVN representatives and high-level cadres from the Delta. Attending were: Dong Van Hieu, a COSVN representative; Mrs. Nguyen Thi Dinh, deputy CO of Hqs. SVNLA; Nguyen Tri Hung, MR-2 representative; and Tran Van Lap, MR-3 representative. One major topic discussed at this meeting was a plan to reorganize the political boundaries of MR-2 and 3. These changes consisted of shifting districts about to accommodate for the change in emphasis resulting from Long An Province being divided into SR-2 and 3. Where, for instance, Tan An city had formerly been a focus of VC efforts in Long An Province, it was now suffering neglect due to the concentration on the Saigon area. Therefore, the district containing Tan An was shifted to My Tho Province. Then, to relieve My Tho Province from the responsibility of administering three large cities - My Tho, Tan An, and Go Cong - a new Go Cong Province was split off eastern My Tho. Further south, MR-2's Ha Tien District was transferred to MR-3, giving MR-3 complete control of supply routes passing through Ha Tien on the way to MR-3. The COSVN representatives also discussed closer coordination of military operations. Mrs. Nguyen Thi Dinh reportedly took personal command of MR-2; with the former deputy CO of the SVNLA, Maj. Gen. Dong Van Cong taking over command of MR-3. In addition, COSVN ordered 90 percent of all Delta village and district forces to be formed into battalions directly subordinate to COSVN.

174. Further reorganization of the Saigon area followed in the path of the May-June Offensive. As mentioned previously, there are indications COSVN's original SR plan envisaged turning Tay Ninh, Ba Bien, and U-1 Provinces into SR-'3, but the plan was never carried through. There also appeared to have been

[illegible] and unsuccessful attempts to set up a new version of MR-4; at the same time, a new MR-7 was created, apparently successfully. Captured documents indicated that between late May and early June 1968, COSVN formed these two MR's (designated T-4 and T-7) with T-4 controlling the territory west and north of Saigon (SR-1, 2, 3, and 5) and MR-7 controlling the territory to the northeast, east, and southeast (SR-6, 9, and 4 including the Rung Sat Special Region). SR-6 was the U-1 Province, and SR-9 was Ba Bien Province (aka Ba Long Province). A general lack of further commentary indicates the MR-4 portion of the reorganization never got off the ground. The existence of MR-7, however, is relatively firm.

175. In fact, a great deal of the reorganizational activity undertaken by COSVN in the Saigon area during this period assumed a sort of trial-and-error, Alice-in-Wonderland quality. Take for example U-1: according to [redacted] and of the [redacted] of U-1, he had learned in December 1967 that MR-1 had been dissolved and U-1 had been redesignated SR-8, reporting directly to COSVN. The U-1 Party Committee* complained that it could not function as an SR with territory including only one district and the province capital of Bien city and an inadequate infrastructure. COSVN apparently agreed because after May, U-1 continued under the old designation. There are indications that U-1 eventually fell under the control of T-7, and T-7 began to function sometime around or after the May-June Offensive. b1 b3 (S)

176. Apparently T-7's creation was designed to enable COSVN to more effectively control this side of the Saigon area of operations by dealing with one rather than several headquarters. It may also be of some significance that during the February 1969 offensive, the incidence of heaviest action shifted from the T-4 to the T-7 theater of operations. The command pattern of that latter offensive was familiar. In the estimation of Lt. Col. [redacted] the Bien Hoa Front was led by Gen. Song Hao, formerly with the Political Department of the NVA General Staff**. Under his command were combined b1 b3 (S)

*In 1955, MR-1's provinces were given "U" numbers. In late 1964, the capital city of Bien Hoa Province was separated from U-3 Province and assigned the code U-1. Except for U-1, the U Series was dropped when the MR's were superceded by the SR's.

**There has been no corroboration that Gen. Song Hao is in SVN, and [redacted] allegation therefore appears doubtful. b1 b3 (S)

independent COSVN maneuver elements and MR-7 forces."

177. This disposition of forces also reveals another interesting pattern. There were three offensives during which the VC made a major effort in the Saigon area - Tet, May-June 1968, and February 1969. In the first, SR-1 and 2 supposedly had the crucial role. In the second, SR-4 and 5 had the principal roles. In the third, what would have been SR-4, 8, and 9 played the major role. As far as local force units were concerned, this arrangement allowed them to share the honors and the losses, as the thrust of the attacks moved from east of Saigon to the coast, to even further west. Apparently SR-3 was experiencing too many internal difficulties to be of much aid.

178. A larger pattern also seems to be forming. As NVN assumes more and more responsibility in the Trung Bo area, COSVN is able to concentrate its personnel on the problems of the Nam Bo area. It also would appear that with the new emphasis on urban areas, harrassment of the Saigon area has become the principal concern of COSVN. Possibly never before have so many COSVN level cadres appeared in the front areas of Saigon, increasing the chance of their being captured or being able to defect. COSVN's Military Intelligence cadres are particularly vulnerable in this respect.

ATTACHMENT A: COSVN LEADERSHIP

COSVN

Secretariat

Pham Thien Hung

Muoi Cuc Hai Van

Additional Current Affairs Committee Members

Hoang Van Thai, Hai Hau, Tran Van Tra,
Tran Do, Ba Buong, Sau Van, Hai Xe Ngua, Tran Bach Dang

Additional Central Committee Members

Le Trong Tan, Nguyen Thi Dinh, Hoang Duc Anh, Tran Van Du, Tam Than, Cao Dang Chiem (Sau Hoang), Le Tu Nhien,* Nguyen Van Don, *Le Minh Chau, Le Man, Muoi Hung

Additional Leaders at COSVN

Tran Trong Tan, To Lam, Hong Viet, Chinh Ngu, Nguyen Huu The, Muoi Khanh, Cuu Long, Quoc Tuan, Sau Ut, Tam Tu

*possible, position unconfirmed

ATTACHMENT A:

COSVN Functional Sections

Current Affairs Committee*

Organization Section
- Ch: Hai Van or Hai Mai
- D/Ch: Le Tu Nhien or Ba Thanh
- PO: Ba Nhan

Propaganda/Culture/Indoctrination Section
- Ch: Hai Van, Nam Quang or Hai Hau
- D/Ch: Tam Rau or To Lam
- PO: To Lam or Tam Rau

Finance-Economy Section
- Ch: Hai Xo Ngua, Chin Phuoc or Muoi Thiem
- D/Ch & PO: Sau Lau or Muoi Thiem

Forward Supply Council
- Ch: Hai Xe Ngua, Chin Phuoc or Tu Tranh
- D/Ch: Nam Hon

Security Section
- Ch: Hai Van, Sau Hoang, Ba Buong or Ba Nam
- D/Ch: Sau Hoang, Muoi Phan, Le Van Son or Ba Chung

Civil Health Section
- Ch: Phung Van Cung or Nguyen Van Vy
- D/Ch: Ho Thu or Hoa (Hoang)

Civilian Proselyting Section
- Ch: Tau Kem
- D/Ch: Nguyen Huu The (Farmers)
- D/Ch: Nguyen Thi Gieng (Women)
- D/Ch: Nam Quang (Youth)

Military Proselyting Section
- Ch: Tran Van Du or Nguyen Van Thoi
- D/Ch: Ba Cung (formerly)

Military Affairs (see attached)

*Organization Section reportedly under "supervision" of Ba Buong. Security Section reportedly under "supervision" of Hai Van and/or Tran Luong. Propaganda/Culture/Indoctrination and Military Proselyting Section reportedly under "supervision" of Hai Hau.

ATTACHMENT A:

MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (HQS. SVNLA)

CO & PO: Pham Thien Hung
XO: Hoang Van Thai
XO: Tran Van Tra
XO: Tran Do
XO: Le Trong Tan
XO: Nguyen Hau Xuyen
XO: Hoang Duc Anh
XO: Nguyen Thi Dinh (Not to be confused with Nguyen Thi Binh, presently deputy chief of NFLSV delegation to Paris talks.)

Military Staff

COS: Hoang Duc Anh
DCOS: Hai Nghiem, Tran Dinh Xu, Hoang Cam or Tu Binh

(see attached sub-sections)

Political Staff

COS: Tran Do, Ba Thang, Le Chau, or Ba Hung
DCOS: Ba Thang, Bay Phuong, Tam Tran, Hai Tuong, Nam Tan, Ba Luu or Tran Quoc Hung

(see attached sub-sections)

Rear Services Staff

COS: Nam Hon, Tu Hoa or Nam Thi
DCOS: Nam Quoc Dang, Hai Vo, Sau Ngap, or Col. Phung
PO: Ba Ngoan
DPO: LTC. Nhan

(see attached sub-sections)

ATTACHMENT A:

MILITARY STAFF

Combat Operations (B.1)

COS: Hai Nghiem or Ho Tam
DCOS: Vu Ba or Vo

Military Intelligence (B.2)

COS: Anh Tu
DCOS: Hai Nguyen

Personnel Staff (B.3)

COS: Tuu Nam
DCOS: Maj. Canh

Personnel Staff(B.4)

COS: Col. Duc
DCOS: Maj. Minh or Maj. Hoat

Engineering Staff (B.5)

COS: Ung Rang, Buf Tue, or Maj. Nhan

Sapper Staffs

COS: Tu Cang or Capt. Mai

Training Staff (B.6)

COS: Col. Bang or Lt. Col. Tam
DCOS: Maj. Cang

Political Staff (B.7)

COS: Bay Phat
DCOS: Capt. Thuan

Cryptographic Staff (B.8)

COS: Maj Hong (or Hoang)

Adjutant Staff (B.9)

COS: Tu Do

Message Center (B.10)

COS: Tam Phuong

Chemical Staff (B.12)

DCOS: Maj. Dung

Militia Staffs

COS: Tu Hien or Maj. Nguyen

Artillery Staffs

COS: Ba Vu
DCOS: Bui Khac Vu or Lt. Col. Phuc
PO: Tu Khanh

Military Postal Service (B.14

COS: Ba Cao
DCOS: Ngo Van Chuyen

Strategic Intelligence Office (B.22)

COS: Tu Hiep
DCOS: San Tri
PO: Tran Van My

* Possibly separate commands.

ATTACHMENT A:

POLITICAL STAFF

Propaganda & Training Staff (B.1)

COS: Le Dinh Le, Hai Tuong or Sau Khiet

DCOS: Nguyen Huu Minh or Ba Huong

Organization Staff (B.3)

COS: Ba Lan or Ba Luu

Security Staff (B.4 or B.5)

COS: Tran Quoc Hung

DCOS: Nguyen Van Sen or Hai Thang

Enemy Proselyting Staff (B.2)

COS: Capt. Dinh

Cadre staff (B.4 or B.7)

COS: Lt. Col. My, Ba Trong or Bay Thuong

DCOS: Nam Duc

Administrative Staff

COS: Maj. Tu Van, Capt. Khoa

ATTACHMENT A:

REAR SERVICES STAFF

Plans Staff (B.1)
COS: Sau Ngap

Political Staff (B.2)

Quartermaster Staff (B.3)
COS: Hai Chanh

Ordnance Staff (B.4)

Medical Staff (B.5)
COS: Dr. Hue

Financial Affairs Staff (B.6)
COS: Ba Hoan
DCOS: Capt. Ban

Secretary Staff (B.7)

Supply Staff (B.8)

Transportation Staff (B.9)

Rear Services Groups
81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 100

ATTACHMENT B: NFLSV LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION

I. Internal Organization

a. Central Committee Presidium:

Chairman — Nguyen Huu Tho

Vice Chairman — Y Binh Aleo
Phung Van Cung
Huynh Tan Phat (DP)
Tran Nam Trung (Tran Luong) (PRP)

Members — Nguyen Thi Dinh, possible vice chairman (once reported)
Thich Thien Hao
Tran Bach Dang (PRP)
Tran Buu Kiem
Pham Xuan Thai (Nguyen Van Dang) (PRP)
Nguyen Huu Tho
Nguyen Van Ngoi (reported as CC member only, in 1968)
Dang Tran Thi (not noted since November 1967)

b. Additional Central Committee Members

Tran Van An
Ho Hue Be (aka Joseph Marie)
Nguyen Thi Binh
Rochom Briu
Ma Thi Chu (Mrs.)
(Mme. Nguyen Van Hieu)
Nguyen Ngoc Thuong (RSP)
Nguyen Van Hieu (RSP)
Vo (Vi) Nhu Le
Nguyen Van Ngoi (?)
Ho Thu
Huong Hich Son
Huynh Van Tam (Chin Nam?) (PRP)
Le Van Tha (RSP)
Le Quang Chanh
Ho Thu
Nguyen Van Tien
Ung Ngoc Ky (Vuong Ngoc Cung) (DP)
Dang Quang Minh
Tran Hoai Nam
Nguyen Van Tu (T1)
Ho Xuan Son (DP)

c. Secretariat:

Secretary General — Huynh Tan Phat (DP)

Assistant Secretaries — Le Van Huan
Ho Thu

ATTACHMENT B: (continued)

Members — Ung Ngoc Ky (Vuong Ngoc Cung) (DP)
Ho Xuan Son (DP)

d. Other Functional Departments

1) Foreign Affairs Commission:
Tran Buu Kiem, Chief

2) Communications, Postal and Transportation Branch

3) Organization Committee:
Ung Ngoc Tuyen, Chief

4) Public Health (or Civilian Medical) Committee:
Dr. Nguyen Van Chi, Chief

5) Military Affairs Committee:
Tran Nam Trung, Chief

6) Korean Relations Committee

e. Regional Organization

1) Western Nam Bo:
Duong Van Minh, Chairman

2) Central Nam Bo:
Nguyen Trong Xuat, Chairman

3) Eastern Nam Bo:
Nguyen Than Long

4) Southern Trung Bo

5) Saigon/Gia Dinh:
Huynh Tan Phat, Chairman

6) Central Trung Bo

7) Tri-Thien

8) Southwest Highlands MR

ATTACHMENT B: (continued)

2. Component Parties

a. People's Revolutionary Party

1) Tran Nam Trung - Representative to NLFSV

b. Democratic Party

1) Ngo Ngoc Sang, Chairman (not reported in recent years)

2) Ho Xuan Son, Vice Chairman

3) Huynh Tan Phat, Secretary General

c. Radical Socialist Party

1) Nguyen Van Hieu, Secretary General

2) Nguyen Khoc Thuong, Deputy Secretary General

3) Le Van Tha - Representative to NLFSV

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

INDEX

NAME	PAGE
Aleo, Y Binh	Att. B-1
An (Sen. Lt.)	52
An, Chin	19
An, Hai	26
An, Nguyen Van	16
An, Tran Van	Att. B-1
Anh	18
Anh, Bay	59
Anh, Hoang (Plt. Ldr)	54
Anh, Hoang Duc (Maj. Gen)	12, 43, 46, Att. A-1, Att. A-3
Anh, Hong	18
Anh, Le Duc	12,43
Anh, Ngoc	29
Anh, Tu	14
Anh, Tuyet	18
Ba (Sen. Capt.)	54
Ba, Vu (Lt. Col.)	48, 49, Att. A-4
Bac	18
Ban, (Sen. Capt.)	71, Att. A-6
Bang	21
Bang, (Lt. Col.)	63, Att. A-4
Bang, Hai (Maj.)	48, 49
Bay, (Sen. Lt.)	55
Be	21, 34
Be, Ba	14, 15
Be, Hai	33, 34
Be, Ho Hue (Joseph Marie)	75, Att. B-1
Bi, Muoi	72
Bich (Sen. Capt.)	52
Bich, Ba (Col.)	65
Bien, (Sen. Lt.)	69
Binh, (Sen. Capt.)	67, Att. A-5
Binh, Ba	19, 45
Binh, Hai	28
Binh, Ngo Quoc	13, 43
Binh, Nguyen	12
Binh, Nguyen Thi	Att. A-3, Att. B-1
Binh, Tu (Lt. Col)	47, 52, 61, Att. A-3
Brin, Rochon	Att. B-1
Bu	20
Bung, Muoi	Att. A-1
Buoi	11
Buong, Ba	14, 15, 25, Att. A-1, Att. A-2
Buong, Nguyen Van	14, 15

INDEX (continued)

Cam, Hoang (Sen. Col.) 48, Att. A-3
Can 21
Cang, (Maj.) 63, Att. A-4
Cang, Tu (Lt. Col.) 66, Att. A-4
Canh, Nam 20
Cao, Doan Chi 20
Cat, Chin 28
Chanh, Le Quang Att. B-1
Chanh, Hai (Sen. Col.) 70, Att. A-6
Chanh, Muoi 34
Chanh, Vo Van 72
Chat 21
Chat, Le 27
Chau 19
Chau, Hai 21, 67
Chau, Kinh 27
Chau, Le (Sen. Col.) 66, Att. A-3
Chau, Le Minh Att. A-1
Chau, Sau 20, 21
Chau, Tan Song 18
Chi, Nguyen Van 39, Att. B-2
Chi, Tam 19
Chi, Truc (Miss) 18, 20
Chi, Tu 11, 43
Chiem, Cao Dang 7, 25, Att. A-1
Chiem, Cao Dong 25
Chien 69
Chieu, Chin 21
Chinh, Nam (Sen. Lt.) 55
Chu, Ma Thi Att. B-1
Chu, Thu 12, 43, 44
Chuc (Lt. Col.) 67
Chung, Ba 25, Att. A-2
Chuoc, (Sen. Capt.) 65
Chuoc, Chin 47
Chuong 12
Chuyen, Muoi 65
Chuyen, Ngo Van 65, Att. A-4
Co, Bay 31
Co, Muoi (Maj.) 60
Co, Thiec (Maj.) 60
Coi, To (Sen. Capt.) 50

INDEX (continued)

Cong, [illegible] 19
Cong, Bay 21
Cong, Dong Van (Maj. Gen.) 81
Cong, Muoi 25
Cong, Nam 9
Cong, [illegible] 33, 34
Cong, Vo Chi 7, 9, 36, 75
Cu [illegible] 21
Cu, Bay 21
Cu, Ma Thi 36
Cuc [illegible] 7, 21
Cuc, Muoi 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 44, Att. A-1
Cuc, Nguyen Van 7
Cung, Ba 30, Att. A-2
Cung, Phung Van 39, Att. A-2, Att. B-1
Cung, Vuong Ngoc Att. B-1
Cuong, Cau (Sen. Capt.) 50
Dai, Bay (Sen. Capt.) 50
Dan [illegible] 21
Dan, Phang Trong 14
Dan, Sau 14
Dang [illegible] 20
Dang (Capt.) 55
Dang, (Lt. Col.) 73
Dang, Nam Quoc 70, Att. A-3
Dang, Nguyen Van 7, 9
Dang, Tran Bach 14, 17, 37, Att. A-1, Att. B-1
Dat [illegible] 20
Dau, Tran Soan (Sen. Col.) 65
De [illegible] 21
Den, Hai 21
Den, Nam 21
Den, Nam (Maj.) 60
Den, Son (Sen. Capt.) 53
Den, Tam Den 12, 42, 44, 45
Di, Sau 43
Diep [illegible] 18
Dieu, Nam 18
Dinh, Ba 12, 43, 47
Dinh, Nguyen Thi (Lt. Col.) 12, 36, 43, 44, 45, 46, 81, Att. A-1, A-3, Att. B-1
Do, Ba 18, 21

INDEX (continued)

Do, Chin (Maj.)	48
Do, Tran (Maj. Gen.)	12, 14, 43, 44, 66, Att. A-1, A-3
Do, Tu	63, Att. A-4
Doanh (Sen. Capt.)	60
Doo	28
Don, Huynh Phuong	18
Don, Nguyen (Maj. Gen.)	14, Att. A-1
Dong	19
Dong, (Capt.)	52
Dong, Pham Van	8
Dong, Ut (Sen. Capt.)	60, 61
Du	20
Du, Bay	30, 32, 33
Du, Tran Van	30, 32, Att. A-1, A-2
Dua, Nam	21
Duan, Le	7, 11
Duc (Col.)	59, 62, Att. A-4
Duc, Nam	68, Att. A-5
Duc, Tam	34
Dung	18
Dung, (Maj.)	63, Att. A-4
Dung, Chin	14
Dung, (Miss)	18
Dung, Tu (Sen. Capt)	50, 52
Dung, Van Tien	13
Duong	19
Duyen, Sau (Maj.)	56
Gia, Nam	18
Gia, Tu	36
Giap, Vo Nguyen	8, 13
Giau (Capt.)	55
Giang, Nguyen Thi	36, Att. A-2
Gna, (Miss)	19
Ha (Sen. Lt.)	69
Ha, Bay	21
Ha, Hong	26
Hai	19, 20, 21, 27, 31
Hai (Sen. Capt.)	52
Hai, Sau	19, 29
Hai, Tran Van	12, 43, 44
Ham, Hai (Sen. Capt.)	52
Han, Ba	12, 43, 45

INDEX (continued)

Hang, (Miss)	18
Hanh	18
Hao, Thich Thien	76, Att. B-1
Hao, Tu	31
Hau, Hai	10, 11, 12, 30, 42, Att. A-1, A-2
Hau, Nam	34
Hay, Tran Dinh	47
Hong, Xuan (Capt.)	69
Hich, Nguyen Van (Capt.)	67
Hien, Bay (Sen. Capt.)	69
Hien, Tu	Att. A-4
Hiep, Tu (Col.)	15, 60, 61, 65, Att. A-4
Hiep, Tu (Maj.)	50
Hieu	18, 69
Hieu, Bay (Capt.)	53
Hieu, Dong Van	81
Hieu, Nguyen Van	Att. B-1, B-3
Hieu, Hue. Nguyen Van	Att. B-1
Hoa	118, 26, 39, 53, Att. A-2
Hoa, Hai	34
Hoa, Nam (Sen. Col.)	70, Att. A-2, A-3
Hoa, Sau	58
Hoa, Tu (Sen. Col.)	70, Att. A-3
Hoa, Ut	33, 34
Hoan, Ba (Maj.)	71, Att. A-6
Hoang	20,21,26,39,63, Att. A-2, A-4
Hoang, Sau	25, Att. A-1, A-2
Hoat, (Maj.)	62, Att. A-4
Hoc, Sau	28
Hoi, (Lt.)	69
Hong	31, 34, 63, Att. A-1
Hong, Bay	7, 45
Hong, Viet	27
Huan, Le Van	Att. B-1
Hue	20
Hue, Dr. (Maj.)	71, Att. A-6
Hue, (Miss)	18
Hue, Chia	21
Hue, Ngo Thi	7
Hue, Nguyen Van	72
Hung	21, 63
Hung (Capt.)	52
Hung, (Maj.)	52, 60
Hung, Ba	31, 32, 67, Att. A-3
Hung, Nguyen Tri	81
Hung, Pham	43, 44

I N D E X (continued)

Hung, Pham Thien 7, 8, 9, 13, 25, 43, Att. A-1, A-3
Hung, Phi (Lt. Col.) 69
Hung, Quoc 20, 68
Hung, Sau Sang 21
Hung, Tran Quoc (Lt. Col.) 67, 68, Att. A-2, A-5
Hung, Viet (Sen. Capt.) 69
Huong 21
Huong, Ba (Capt.) 67, Att. A-5
Huy 20
Huy, (Sen. Lt.) 55
Hy, (Sen. Lt.) 67
Ke, Ba 32
Kem, Rau 36, Att. A-2
Kha, Ba 28
Khac, Pham 20
Khan, Sau 67
Khang, Hoang Van 13, 43
Khang, Muoi 13, 43, Att. A-1
Khanh, Hoang Minh (Sen. Col.) 65, 66
Khanh, Mai 6
Khanh, Nguyen Minh (Sen. Col.) 65
Khanh, Quoc Vu 26
Khanh, Tu (or 4th) 65, 66, Att. A-4
Khanh, Tuan 18
Khiet 31, 34
Khiet, Sau (Lt. Col.) 67, Att. A-5
Khoe, (Capt.) 63, 69, Att. A-5
Khoi 19
Khung, Bui 26
Kiem, (Sen. Capt.) 50
Kiem, Bay 32
Kiem, Tran Buu 19, 37, Att. B-1, B-2
Kien, Tu (Sen. Capt.) 31, 33, 34, 35, 53, 59
Kieng, Tu (Sen. Lt.) 52
Kim, Nguyen 72
Koha (Sen. Capt.) 48
Ky (Maj.) 62
Ky, Cu Can 31
Ky, To 11
Ky, Ung Ngoc Att. B-1, B-2

b1, b3 (S)
b1, b3 (S)
b1, b3 (S)

I N D E X (continued)

Lam	26
Lam (Miss)	18
Lam, Ba	32, 43, 44, 68
Lam, To	17, Att. A-1, A-2
Lam, Tu	60
Lan	18, 20
Lan (Sen. Capt.)	63
Lan, Ba (Lt. Col.)	68, Att. A-5
Lan, Thi	63
Lang, Bui Kinh	18
Lanh, Huynh Van	21
Lap	21, 69
Lap, Kiem	26
Lap, Tran Trung	11, 43
Lap, Tran Van	61
Lau, Sau	22, Att. A-2
Le	18
Le, Huynh	34
Le, Le Dinh (Lt. Col.)	67, Att. A-5
Le, Tran (Sen. Lt.)	58
Le, Vo (Vi) Nhu	Att. B-1
Leo, Tan	29
Lien, Hien	20
Liet	18
Lieu, Ba (Sen. Capt.)	60
Loc	34, 35
Loc, Chin	61
Loi	20, 21
Long (Capt.)	52
Long (Sen. Lt.)	56
Long, Ba	12, 43, 44
Long, Cuu	Att. A-1
Long, Huynh (Sen. Capt.)	54
Long, Nguyen Than	Att. B-2
Long, Tu Tan	22
Lu, Nguyen Thi	38
Luan (Capt.)	52
Luong	18
Luong, Luu Van	72
Luong, Tran	10, 11, 17, 30, 36, 42, 75, 78, Att. A-2, Att. B-1
Luu, Ba (Lt. Col.)	67, 68, Att. A-3, A-5
Ly	72
[redacted]	
Mai (Mien)	20
Mai (Sen. Capt.)	66, Att. A-4
Mai, Hai	15, Att. A-2

INDEX (continued)

Man (Sen. Lt.)	56
Man, Le	Att. A-1
Map, Chu Tam	17
Map, Son	61
Mo	19
Moo, Tu	14
Mong (Sen. Capt.)	52
Minh,	21
Minh (Maj.)	67, Att. A-4
Minh (Sen. Capt.)	48, 69
Minh (Sen. Lt.)	69
b1 b3(5) [redacted]	
Minh, Dang Quang	Att. B-1
Minh, Duong Van	Att. B-2
Minh, Nguyen Huu (Lt. Col.)	67, Att. A-5
Minh, The	29
Minh, Tu	33, 34
Moi, Tu	34
Mui (or Mai)	21
Muoi	16
My (Lt. Col.)	68, Att. A-5
My, Nguyen	72
My, Tam	61
My, Tran Van (Col.)	61, Att. A-4
Nam, Ba	Att. A-2
Nam, Chin	18, Att. B-1
Nam, Chinh	12, 43, 44
Nam, Giang	18
b1 b3(5) [redacted]	
Nam, Nam	20, 61
Nam, Phuong	20
Nam, Sau	12, 43, 46, 47
Nam, Ta	20
Nam, Tam	28, 61, Att. A-4
Nam, Tam (Sen. Capt.)	60
Nam, Thanh	20
Nam, Tran Hoai	Att. B-1
Nang, Muoi (Dr.)	38
Nga, (Miss)	21
Nga, Huoi	21
Ngan	20
Ngap, Sau (Col.)	70, Att. A-6
Nghi, Ba	16
Nghia	19
Nghia, Bay	32
Nghia, Chin	28
Nghia, Sau	21
b1 b3(5) [redacted]	
b1 b3(6) [redacted]	

INDEX (continued)

Ngaiem, Hai (or Nguyen) (Col.)	47, 48, Att. A-3, A-4
Ngoan, Ba (Col.)	70, Att. A-3
Ngoc	21
Ngoi, Nguyen Van	Att. B-1
Ngu, (Capt.) (Chinh)	62, Att. A-1
Ngua, Chu Tich Xe	14
Ngun, Hai Xe	14, 22, Att. A-1, A-2
Nguyen, (Capt.)	55
Nguyen, (Maj.)	65, Att. A-4
Nguyen, Hai	53, Att. A-4
Nguyet	19
Nhan (Lt. Col.)	70, Att. A-3
Nhan, (Maj.)	62, Att. A-4
Nhan, Ba	15, Att. A-2
Nhan, Nguyen Van	15
Nhao	19
Nhi, Ba	16
Nhien, Le Tu	15, Att. A-1, A-2
Nho, Sau	20
Nho, Thanh	19, 20
No, Hai	21
Oanh, (Maj.)	61, Att. A-4
Om, Tu	17
Pha, Xong	20
Phan, (Maj.)	60
Phan, Hai (Sen. Capt.)	50
Phan, Muoi	Att. A-2
Phat, Bay (Lt. Col.)	63, Att. A-4
Phat, Huynh Tan	Att. B-1, B-2, B-3
Phi, Nam	20
Phi, Tan	10, 42
Phi, Tran (Maj. Gen.)	10, 42
Phin	21
Phoc, Hai (Capt.)	50
Phuc (Lt. Col.)	66, Att. A-4
Phuc (Plt. Ldr.)	54
Phung	21
Phung (Capt.)	53
Phung (Col.)	70, Att. A-3
Phuoc, Chin	22, Att. A-2
Phuoc, Tu	34

INDEX (continued)

Phuong (Sen. Lt.) 63
Phuong, Bay 67, Att. A-3
Phuong, Ta's 63, Att. A-4
Phuong, Tai 63
Phuong, Trang 18

Quan 21
Quan, Muoi 20, 21
Quang, Lam 31
Quang, Nam 14, 17, 31, 36, Att. A-2
Quang, Tran Van 42
Quang, Tran Van (Lt. Gen.) 12
Que, Hai 13
Quoc, Tam Kien 12, 43, 44
Quy, Duong Nhon 20
Quy, Tu 32, 33

Ram, Hai 7, 9
Rang 60
Rang, Ung (Col.) 62, Att. A-4
Rau, Muoi 60
Rau, Phuoc 18
Rau, Tam 17, 18, Att. A-2
Rau, Tu 20
Ri, Ly Van 60
Rieng, Le Thi 36
Ro, Ba 34
Ry, Thi 63

Sac, Tu 59
Sach, Nam (Sen. Capt.) 60, 61
Sang 69
Sang (Sen. Lt.) 56
Sang, Hai 34
Sang, Ngo Ngoc Att. B-3
Sau 19
Sau (Capt.) 53
Sau, Doan 72
Sen, Hong 20
Sen, Nguyen Van (Lt. Col.) 68, Att. A-5

So, Muoi 60
Son 21
Son (Capt.) 52
Son (Maj.) 52
Son, Anh 27

INDEX (continued)

Son, Ba 72
Son, Ho Xuan Att. B-1, B-2, B-3
Son, Hoang Bich Att. B-1
Son, Le Van 25, Att. A-2
Son, Man (Sen. Capt.) 53, 59
Son, Truong 12, 14, 43
Song (Capt.) 52
Song, Ba 59
Song, Thanh 12, 43, 44
Sum 21
Sung (Sen. Lt.) 56
Sung, Hoang Vinh 31
Suong, (Miss) 19
Ta (Capt.) 67
Tac (Sen. Lt.) 53
Tai 24
Tai (Sen. Capt.) 52
Tai, Ha 8
Tai, Muoi 15, 31
Tai, Nam (Lt. Col.) 66
Tam 21
Tam (Capt.) 53
Tam (Lt.) 54
Tam, (Lt. Col.) 63, Att. A-4
Tam, Ba (Capt.) 58
Tam, Chin 60
Tam, Ho (Lt. Col.) 48, Att. A-4
Tam, Nam (Maj.) 60
Tan 19
Tan (Capt.) 67
Tan (Sen. Lt.) 56
Tan, Ha 12, 43, 45
Tan, Ha Ke 10, 43, 44
Tan, Le Trong (Lt. Gen.) 12, Att. A-1
Tan, Le Trong (Maj. Gen.) 43, 44, Att. A-3
Tan, Nam (Sen. Col.) 67, Att. A-3
Tan, Nguyen Huu (Maj.) 72
Tan, Nguyen Trung 12, 43, 44
Tan, Tran Trong Att. A-1
Tau, Hai 17
Thai, Le Van 10, Att. B-3
Thach, Nam 48

INDEX (continued)

Thai, Ba (Lt. Col.) 68
Thai, Hai 19
Thai, Hoang Van (Lt. Gen.) 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 43, 44, Att. A-1, A-3
Thai, Hoang Xuan 12, 13, 43
Thai, Nam 67
Thai, Pham Xuan 7, 9, 10, 25, 70, Att. B-1
Thai, Tam Att. A-1
Thang, Ba 67, Att. A-3
Thang, Hai (Sen. Capt.) 60, 61, 68, Att. A-5
Thang, Huynh Dan (or Dac) 18
Thang, Nam 21
Thang, Toan 28
Thang, Tran 58
Thang, Tu 28
Thanh 21
Thanh (Lt.) 18, 34, 53
Thanh, (Lt. Col.) 48, 69
Thanh (Sen. Capt.) 52
Thanh (Sen. Lt.) 52
Thanh, Ba 15, Att. A-2
Thanh, Bay (Maj.) 12, 29, 43, 45, 49
Thanh, Le Van 11, 43
Thanh, Mai (Maj.) 48
Thanh, Muoi 28
Thanh, Nam (Sen. Capt.) 56
Thanh, Nam (Sen. Col.) 67
Thanh, Nguyen Chi (Sen. Gen.) 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 43
Thanh, Tran 20
Thanh, Tran Van 30
Thanh, Ut 60
Thao (Sen. Capt.) 52
Thao, Hoang (Sen. Lt.) 56
Thao, Trinh Dinh 77
The, Ba 31
The, Nguyen Huu 36, Att. A-1, A-2, Att. B-1
Thi (Capt.) 52
Thi, Dang Tran Att. B-1
Thi, Nam (Sen. Col.) 70, Att. A-3
Thi, Sau (Sen. Lt.) 55
Thi, Tam 20
Thieu, Muoi 22, 72, Att. A-2
Thiet 34
Thieu 21
Thin, Hai 20
Thinh (Lt.) 34, 35, 50
Thinh, Le Minh 72
Tho 21, 63
Tho (Sen. Lt.) 52

INDEX (continued)

Tho, Nguyen Huu 18, 19, 76, 77, Att. B-1
Thoi, Nam 30
Thoi, Nguyen Van 30, Att. A-2
Thu 21, 34, 59
Thu, Ba 19, 39
Thu, Ba (Capt.) 53
Thu, Ho 39, Att. B-1
Thu, Linh 18
Thu, Nguyen Van 39
Thua, Tam (Sen. Capt.) 20
Thuan 53, Att. A-4
Thuan (Sen. Capt.) 63
Thuoc, Nam 70
Thuong 19
Thuong (Sen. Capt.) 52, 67
Thuong, Bay 68, Att. A-5
Thuong, Nguyen Ngoc Att. B-1, B-3
Thuy, Ten 29
Tien, Bay 12, 42
Tien, Duy (Sen. Capt.) 54
Tien, Trung (Maj.) 60
Tien, Tu 34
Tinh 21
Tinh, Vua Ai 66
Toan, Tam 27
Toan, Vo Tam 9
[redacted]
Tong 21
Tong, Tam 18
Tong, Tan 13
Tot, Ma-i 34
[redacted]
Tra, Nam (Sen. Capt.) 27, 55
Tra, Nguyen Van 11
Tra, Tran Van (Lt. Gen.) 10, 11, 12, 13, 43, 44, 45, 80, Att. A-1, A-3
Tran, Ba (Col.) 47, 50, 52
Tran, Tam (Col.) 67, Att. A-3
Trang, Ba (Col.) 68, Att. A-5
Trang, Tu 7, Att. A-2
Tri 21
Tri, Sau (Col.) 61, Att. A-4
Tri, Sau (Sen. Capt.) 55
Trien, Ten 29
Trong 31
Trong, Huynh Kim (Maj.) 80
[redacted]
Trong, Tu 26

I N D E X (continued)

b1 b3 (S) [redacted]
Truc 19
Truc (Lt. Col) 67
Trung, Chi 72
Trung, Sau 34
Trung, Tran Nam 10, 11, 12, 36, 42, 43, 75, 76, Att. B-1, B-2, B-3
Trung, Tran Van 73
Trung, Tu 60
Truong (Sen. Lt.) 54
Truong, Hai 21, 34
Tu, An 53
Tu, Anh 52, Att. A-4
Tu, Nguyen Khac 20
Tu, Nguyen Van (Ti) Att. B-1
Tu, Tam Att. A-1
Tuan 34
Tuan (Sen. Sgt.) 63
Tuan, Pham Anh 18
Tuan, Quoc Att. A-1
Tue, Bui (Maj.) 62, Att. A-4
Tung, Muoi (Maj.) 60
Tung, Nguyen Thanh (Maj.) 60
Tung, Sau 20
Tung, Truc 19
Tuoc (Capt.) 48
Tuong, Hai (Sen. Col.) 67, Att. A-3, A-5
Tuy 69
Tuyen, Pham Lac 18
Tuyen, Ung Ngoc Att. B-2
Tuyet, Le Thi 30
Ut, Ba 34
Ut, Muoi 7
Ut, Sau Att. A-1
Van 21, Att. A-4
Van (Capt.) 52
Van, Ba 72
Van, Dich Tri 12, 43, 45
Van, Cao 59
Van, Dat 20
Van, Do Khanh (Lt. Col.) 48, 69
Van, Hai 7, 9, 10, 13, 17, 25, Att. A-1, A-2
Van, Nam 59
b1 b3 (S) [redacted]
Van, Sau 14, Att. A-1
Van, So Le 14

INDEX (continued)

Van, Tu (Maj.)	69, Att. A-5
Vang, Son (Capt.)	52
Venh, Tam Venh	45
Viet	20, 21
b1 b3 (S) [ ]	[ ]
Vinh	53
Vinh, Chin	12, 14, 43
b1 b3 (S) [ ]	[ ]
Vinh, Tran Quoc	12, 14, 43
Vo, Hai	70, Att. A-3
Vu, Ba (Sen. Col.)	66, Att. A-4
Vu, Bui.Khac (Lt. Col.)	66, Att. A-4
Vy, Nguyen Van (Dr.)	39, Att. A-2
Xam, (Sen. Capt.)	48
Xe, Ba	30
Xe, Nguyen Van	14
Xu, Tran Dinh (Col.)	47, Att. A-3
Xuan	60
Xuan (Sen. Capt.)	50
Xuan (Miss)	20
Xuan, Ho (Maj.)	49
Xuan, Nam	49
Xuat, Nguyen Trong	Att. B-2
Xuat, Tu	20
Xuyen, Nguyen Huu	12, 43, 44, 45, Att. A-3
Xuyen, Tam	45

SAFETY - JUNE REPORT

1. General - Pilot Meetings.

1. Beechcraft - 17 June. R-985 engine problems were reviewed. Proper starting procedures and general operating procedures were discussed. The importance of precise legible maintenance write ups was emphasized.

2. C-46, C-47 - 30 June. Pilots were requested to take a more critical view of unusual cargo loads, and to request a check of cabin loads which appear heavy or may have effect on C.G. limits.

Operational Hazard Reports were discussed. The importance of checking NOTAMS daily before each flight was emphasized. Three ORR's were received this month in which pilots violated closed portion of a runway (2), and landed against traffic when USAF Combat Control Team was directing air traffic (1). Both items were listed on the NOTAM board.

Other Meetings.

Tan Son Nhut Integrated Base Safety Council Meeting - 30 June. MSAFE attended the first meeting following invitation by the Base Safety Director. Agenda items were mainly of military interest, except for the OHR revies, and vehicular traffic hazard reports. There are an average of two air traffic pattern OHR's per week. AAM is apparently receiving more than proportionate share of these.

Accident and Incident Investigations.

1. Status of Accident Investigations. Accident reports on Beech 10-2, N137L, and 204B, N1304X have been reviewed by the Local Board and sent to Taipei. Investigation of VTB, N3728G has been completed, and review is pending. This will complete the back log created by the rash of accidents during the first calendar quarter of 1969.

2. Incident Reports. Investigation of incidents involving C-46, B910 of 12 June, and C-47, 16083 of 23 June has been completed. Estimate B910 report in Company mail on 3 July, and 083 report on 5 July.

2. Safety Suggestions

Safety comments and Pilots reports.

01 June - Captain pointed out excessive high speed traffic through AAM ramp entry gate at Danang, suggests traffic humps be installed in AAM roadway such as the ones at Saigon. A/SZ Danang indicates USAF may install the humps. Still in process.

04 June - Capt McCauley was lost twice under radar control because of no transponder. Processed to DSAFE on 7 June.

11 June - Captain McCauley again lost twice on radar on IFR. Processed to DSAFE 17 June

17 June Captain Seale incurred serious sunburn, fatigue, and nausea due to exposure in the PC6 cockpit. Captain Wiehrdt reported same problem verbally to MSAFE. Processed to DSAFE 24 June.

19 June Captain McCauley reported more R-985 problems. Processed to DSAFE 24 June. (This is the worst safety of flight item we have at this time. Impeller seals are highly suspect)

27 June Captain D.E. Morris was cleared by VN tower operator to taxi across 25L at VO1 immediately. He was not in position to observe the runway, and applied surge of power to cross, at which time he saw an F-4 on landing roll. Braked heavily to avoid collision. This report is being processed locally.

27 June Captain Vikre lost on radar approach to TSN, due no transponder, and ADF's ineffective due to thunderstorms. This situation will now pertain at Saigon during the Southwest monsoon, a serious safety of flight situation. Processed to DSAFE 1 July.

3. Follow-up Action

Safety comment form, 1 June has been returned to A/SZDAD for report on status of installation of traffic humps.

4. Minor Incident/Inflight Irregularity (SAFE 9)

DATE	A/C TYPE/NO.	LOCATION	REMARKS
05	VTB/N91295	V-01	Engine unwound to 30% in cruise at 7500' PIC feathered and executed single engine landing at V-01. Improper rigging of link between fuel by - pass and shut-off valves resulted in loss of fuel pressure.
06	Helio/B367	Tan An	On touchdown at V-247, left brake had no effect, A/C veered 4' off right side of runway, no damage. Probable faulty seals in brake assembly, previous corrective actions included new linings, master cylinder and system bleeding.

5. Accident Reports (SAFE 4)

05	VTB/N9838Z	Unk	Bullet damage reported in paragraph 4.
05	C-47/B817	V-03	Left hand fuselage skin below cargo door damaged by customer truck. Loading crew provided no guidance to backing truck.
06	C-46/N67985	V-01	Ramp crew towing A/C with bottom cowlings hanging down. Right hand oil cooler air scoop damaged by striking tire. Employee received reprimand.

10	PC6/N12450	Unk	Right hand rear panel forward of tail wheel attach found buckled and warped on preflight. Probably caused by fast taxi turn on rough surface.
12	C-46/B910	V-19	Left hand wing tip damaged by striking tree on approach. Still under investigation
17	10-2/N9573Z	V-17	Cowling removed, lying under left wing. USA, U-1A #8-1718 blew cowling into left rudder, tearing 6 x 10" hole in fabric. No structural damage.
17	10-2/N5269V	V-17	Smoke emitted from right hand scoop and cowling on start. Motoring did not start engine or reduce smoke. Mechanic used hand extinguisher. Hot box duct was burned and paint blistered on scoop. Fuel inlet fitting to carburetor found loose. Further investigation by MTS requested.
19	PC6/N394R	Unk	Probable rock damage to leading edge and bottom of horizontal stabilizer, discovered during No.2 Service.

S/R.E. Noah

COMMUNISTS RENEW FIGHTING IN LAOS

Communist forces have launched a series of ground attacks against government positions near the Plaine des Jarres in north Laos.

The action was highlighted by a sharp attack on 24 June against the neutralist headquarters at Muong Soui. At least two battalions of North Vietnamese troops supported by tanks overran a number of the base's outlying defense positions and inflicted light casualties on government defenders. The airstrip, however, remained in government hands.

One North Vietnamese prisoner claims that his unit moved into Laos from North Vietnam in early June with the specific purpose of attacking Muong Soui. The ability of the North Vietnamese to move their forces rapidly into position around Muong Soui demonstrates the vulnerability of the neutralist headquarters to enemy forces situated directly east on the Plaine. It also is fresh evidence that the North Vietnamese can deploy troops into Xieng Khouang Province with little warning or chance of detection.

In apparently related moves, the Communists drove government troops from Phou Soung, a recently won position north of the Plaine, and hit government guerrilla outposts on the southern rim. These actions are almost certainly in response to General Vang Pao's recent effort to re-establish a government presence on the Plaine.

The attack against Muong Soui is the first major action against that position in five years. It may have been intended as a commensurate response to the government's occupation for six weeks this spring of the once inviolate Communist base of Xieng Khouangville. The attack may also have been launched for political reasons. In recent weeks the Communists have made a concerted effort to portray Communist "patriotic neutralist" elements as the "true representatives" of the neutralist faction. Such pretensions presumably would be furthered by the capture of the neutralist headquarters at Muong Soui. (~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~)

* * *

NND 941536 --- 3823

Thailand: Insurgents Improve Positions in Widely Separated Areas



95402 6-69 CIA

NND 941536 --- 3 E 2 y

COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS ACTIVE IN THAILAND

Communist insurgents continue to make headway in the north while they try to improve their assets in the northeast.

In the north and north-central provinces, the Communists are consolidating their control over tribal areas. Village propaganda meetings and sightings of larger insurgent bands attest to the insurgents' growing strength in Nan and Chiang Rai provinces. Village reports also indicate the guerrillas are strengthening their organization in Tak.

The guerrillas continue to harass government security forces, but incidents have become less frequent because several army units have been pulled out of the area for security duty in adjacent lowlands. Bangkok has assigned a new military commander to the north who has a reputation for being aggressive. Nevertheless, the leadership still appears to be divided on the best course to follow in combatting the tribal insurgency.

In the northeast, the guerrillas are apparently carrying out plans drawn up last December to pare down and improve their organization. An increased number of sightings of insurgents in Udon Thani and Kalasin provinces indicate the guerrillas may be establishing footholds in neighboring areas that are relatively free of government security forces. They are reported to have established new political and military training facilities in Kalasin. Bangkok has been particularly concerned over the spread of insurgent activity in southern Ubon Province, an area that is especially vulnerable because of the proximity of Laos-based Communist forces.

The guerrillas also continue to avoid armed encounters with superior security forces, although periodic Thai Army operations have resulted in some small unit clashes.

There are some indications that the Communists intend to increase their military assets in the northeast. A senior Communist defector has stated that several hundred insurgents were scheduled to return earlier this year from extended training in North Vietnam and Laos. There have also been reports that the insurgents have acquired a few mortars and rocket launchers, but there has been no indication of their use. ~~(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)~~

NND 941536 --- 3825.

LITTLE PROGRESS MADE AT DEFENSE TALKS IN CANBERRA

The five-power Commonwealth defense talks held in Canberra on 19 and 20 June were strongly influenced by uncertainties in the key Malaysia-Singapore relationship, which were generated by communal violence in Malaysia last month.

The attitude of Australia and New Zealand during the talks reflected concern that their military presence might entangle them in Malaysia's internal problems and in frictions between Malaysia and Singapore in the event of a serious deterioration in Malaysia's internal security situation. They did, however, reaffirm their commitment to keep forces in the Malaysia-Singapore area after the British withdraw in 1971.

Australian Prime Minister Gorton bluntly reiterated that his country's presence would be directed solely against external aggression. He also said he anticipated that assistance from outside powers would be required should a major external threat develop. Canberra's interest in carefully limiting its commitment was also reflected in the rejection by External Affairs Minister Freeth of a formal agreement to replace the Anglo-Malaysian Defense Agreement that expires in 1971. Australia prefers a general understanding rather than specific treaty obligations.

The five-power meeting also revealed differences over the command structure of Commonwealth forces committed to the Malaysia-Singapore area. While Kuala Lumpur and Singapore favor an integrated command structure, Canberra and Wellington emphasized that they intend to retain direct control of their military units. They did agree, however, to establish a joint services advisory working group, in addition to existing air, ground, and naval advisory groups, to implement plans and policies.

Although planning will go forward at the working-group level, the differences that surfaced at Canberra strongly suggest that progress toward governmental-level understandings and agreements will be slow and limited. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

* * *

NND 941536 --- 382

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
JULY 1969

I. GENERAL

1. While flying recovered slightly, the month of July was marred by three accidents.

2. There is every indication that flying will stabilize around 6000-6500 revenue hours. There is at the present time a decrease in all activities in Vietnam which indirectly effects Air America. The V.C. apparently is preparing for another offensive. Unfortunately, the decreased level of terrorist and combat activities I believe, are resulting in people being lulled into over confidence and false security which could result in disaster.

3. The Department Heads are continually looking for areas of cost reduction and avoidance. Unfortunately, this centers around personnel and as a result there is continual need for staff reductions. This is being accomplished in a systematic manner, and will continue on a monthly basis as long as the flying hours continue to decrease.

II. FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT

1. The major accomplishment during the month was the completion of the West Ramp - four years, three months, and three contractors after starting.

2. Other minor projects at SGN, NHA and DAD continue to improve and upgrade the facilities at each station.

III. FLYING

1. The biggest highlight of the month was a general Pilots' meeting conducted by the VPFO and the DFD. The VPFO spoke on what he expects of the pilots and what the pilots can expect of the VPFO. He also spoke of some of the conditions being negotiated for in the new contracts. During the meeting the change in atmosphere was almost visible. It was like a person being lost suddenly finding his way. The consideration for financial and material increase partly affected the change in morale but not nearly so much as the VPFO's assurance of his support of the pilots.

2. The support of the VPFO was brought to test within a week. We have been suffering a great magnetude of R-985 engine failure. This problem was presented to Mr. Walker who took firm and positive action. An investigation team headed by the VPTS arrived at Saigon. Their work was commendable. Corrective action began to eliminate the problem area. The R-985's are humming like sewing machines. The most significant factor of all this is the marked improvement in pilot morale because they feel that management is in consort with them. Matter of fact if the VPFO said "frog" we would have pilots hopping all over the place.

3. There are no other significant problems. Our privilege of being able to shop in the commissary has denied us the right to eat in US Gov't field ration dining rooms throughout the country. This started out to be a big problem but it has almost resolved itself.

IV. OPERATIONS

1. Total revenue block time for July was 6397 + 43 for June. Our Flight Time Forecast for the month was more realistic than previous months. The revenue forecast was 6560 hours. It is predicted the revenue flying picture for the next 3 months will be in the vicinity of 6500 hours.

2. Phase one of our cost reduction program was accomplished by reducing our TCN force by 3 people. CM/NHA Paulding resigned and a study is being made on the possibility of releasing this slot. Two FIC American personnel were released and a study is underway on the feasibility of eliminating one or both of these slots.

3. There were 19 controllable and 48 non-controllable delays during the month with a total of 928 Saigon departures.

4. We are considering ways to reduce GTD costs. A review of the GTD operation reveals that numerous trips are being made by the microbuses instead of the less expensive utilization of our motorbikes and scheduled bus services. A report is being submitted to the Base Manager for his approval on eliminating certain departmental requirements for microbus services.

FIC and the Emergency Equipment Room are in good order.

Flight Time Report (See Attachment A)
Aircraft Incidents Report (See Attachment B)

5. Communications - Post and Telecommunications approved Air America's request to establish a direct full duplex UHF radioteletype circuit between our Tan Son Nhut Base and the Post Office. Preliminary discussions were held with the appropriate Service Chiefs at the Post Office concerning installation of the equipment. They were most helpful and no problems are foreseen. There is adequate space for our equipment within the overseas communications center and our antennas can be readily erected on the roof of the building.

6. However, since the equipment has not yet arrived from Bangkok, and since it will take approximately three to four weeks to receive frequency allocation ffom USMACV J634, it was decided to postpone further talks with Posts and Telecommunications until we receive both the equipment and the frequency assignment. Then, too, it will take a few more weeks to order and receive crystals if the already installed frequencies cannot be used by Air America in SVN.

7. A letter to this effect was sent to MACV J634 requesting frequency allocation. MACV was given copies of Air America's original request and Posts and Telecommunications subsequent letter of approval as background information and justification for our frequency assignment request. They have promised to handle the matter as quickly as possible.

8. Apropos of frequency assignments MACV has informally advised us that Air America has been allocated five additional HF frequencies although no official notification has been received from CINCPAC or DCD.

9. AMTRACO has not received as yet any correspondence from General Electric regarding our ramp control network equipment.

10. The BKK-HKG leased radioteletype circuit was terminated effective 2400Z July 31. Temporarily all traffic for that station will be relayed via the SGN-BKK CW circuit until the UTH-VTE radioteletype circuit is established. As soon as that has been accomplished UTH will protect BKK traffic under normal circuit conditions.

V. TRAFFIC/AAM

1. Although the SRTM position was transferred to Danang [redacted] it was requested by the BM to leave the administrative responsibility at Saigon. Accordingly TM/SGN has remained with this additional duty during the reporting month.

2. [redacted] was unable to depart until 4 July due to visa/ticket problems and is scheduled for return to duty on 3 August. During his absence [redacted] was assigned additional duties as ATM and performed very well.

3. [redacted] was sent to Cantho for two days to indoctrinate the Traffic personnel on proper paperwork procedures for shipment of company cargo. He indoctrinated them on AWB preparation, manifesting, types of cargo shipment authorized on passenger aircraft and record maintenance. An improvement in documentation has been noted.

All personnel records were screened and records of personnel having been terminated or resigned for over one year were forwarded to personnel.

	June	July
Passengers departure SGN (All contracts)	5375	6021
" arrival SGN (All contracts)	6137	6622
Outbound cargo - SGN	72742	72793
Inbound cargo - SGN	90017	89632

4. TRAFFIC/USAID

	Cargo (including AF Caribou A/C)	
Outbound (lbs) SGN	1,092,917	2,841,844
Inbound (lbs) SGN	86,747	586,425

VI. HOSTEL OCCUPANCY

1. During the month of July, 64 beds out of 186 were occupied for a 34.4% occupancy rate. Also, there were no Non-Avail. Slips issued during the month.

VII. SAFETY

1. Pilot Meetings - Beechcraft - 21 July. Mr. Wueste and Mr. Chambers were present to review the investigation of R-985 problems and requested assistance from the pilots in accurately reporting observed abnormalities. Mr. Wueste is desirous of improving communications between the stations and MMB, and further stated he desired direct messages from the operations side to avoid delays in investigation of problems. It was found that exhaust valve guides were being reamed to zero clearance due to an undersize reamer at MMB. Correction of this problem seems to have solved the incidence of backfiring.

2. There was also a discussion of weight and balance, limitation on cargo aft of rear seats in the C-45, and the requirement for WB Form in the 10-2 with fuel in rear tanks or with load in rear cabin.

Accident Investigations - Three accidents occurred during the month and are presently under investigation:

1. VTB, N3674G gear up touch-and-go at Nha Trang on 8 July

2. Serious injury to VN National who ran into tail rotor of 204B, N1306X at Mo Duc on 23 July.

3. 10-2, N9521Z landing accident at Vung Tau resulting in serious injuries to five persons, and substantial damage to Army Ov-1C and 21Z.

VIII. PERSONNEL

1. Apart from routine activities our efforts this month have been concentrated on expediting [redacted] participation at the Line Maintenance School in Tainan. We played host to a group of visitors from the Ministry of Labor Department of Vocational Training who appeared impressed by our facilities and with our local training efforts. The Director of Vocational Training, [redacted] assured us that the Ministry of Labor is doing all possible to secure Ministry of Defense approval for our candidates to obtain their exit documents, and we feel reasonably optimistic that this approval will be forthcoming shortly.

2. We are experiencing some difficulty in obtaining Work Permit renewals for our Third Country National (TCN) personnel in country, and Work Permits and Entry Visas for TCN personnel awaiting transfer to Vietnam. The Ministry of Labor is taking a long hard look at all work Permit applications in view of the large number of TCNs illegally living and working within the country, and because so many Vietnamese are now unemployed (or will be soon) due to U.S. Government contract cutbacks.

3. APH was interviewed, selected and is now participating in a two hour biweekly seminar for Vietnamese executive level personnel. The seminar, entitled Successful Management Action, is sponsored by USAID, and will run for about 12 weeks.

4. One new addition was made to the Department's staff [redacted] who will work in the Passport and Visa Section.

5. Personnel Strength (See Attachment C)

IX. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. It would appear that our flying hours are going to stabilize around the 6500 per month figure. June was 6408 and this month was 6574. The personnel reductions are based on a 6500 figure and our strength is getting down to the level where our manpower will be much better aligned to the workload. The 204B and PC6C have always been the highest two programs for flying hours and still are, but these two programs were each down about 100 hours for July versus June. The C-47, VTB and C45/10-2 each picked up near equal amounts. The fourth and last H395 was put into temporary storage during the month.

2. VPTS, Mr. Hueste visited with us for about 5 days. This is about the appropriate length of time for a good close look at our operation. So many visitors buzz through on a two or three day "firemans tour" and rarely have the time to observe/discuss local problems or plans. VPTS visited DaNang (HCN), Nha Trang and Can Tho stations with sufficient time to sit down and conduct good meaningful discussions with the concerned supervisors. This is a worthy morale booster, to the sub-bases in particular because they realize their problems and projects are of honest interest to higher management in Tainan. VPTS visit was quite beneficial to all of us and a much better understanding from everyone concerned is obvious.

3. Another relocation of several (some 10) offices and shop functions is to be implemented in the near future. Reason is funding for addition facilities is quite unlikely under the new contract coming up and the pilots need a locker room(?) and a decent toilet facility. In addition Communications Center is in dire need of more space for sure, as is the Emergency Equipment Room. With the Accounting Offices planned into the RMD shops 2nd floor offices and Security Dept planned for occupying the present Airborne Electronics Shop area in the RMD hangar (west side), this would then vacate some 75% of the ground floor of the Operations Building for Flying Dept to expand. It would seem that a more economical approach would be to erect a TALCO Building of 26' x 100' along the north side of the Operations Building which could house all the Flying Dept. requirements. The majority of such a TALCO Building is now in storage at our CMD area.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
M. HULSE

M. Hulse
Base Manager

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT

JULY 1969.

ontract 4101 -

A/C No.	Revenue Block Time	Revenue Flight Time	Non-Revenue Block Time	Non-Revenue Flight Time
N67984	45+57	38+12	31+53	26+14
N67985	165+45	139+39	6+42	5+51
B910	124+21	104+26	5+47	4+22
B928	100+53	82+10	2+33	1+36
B138	111+01	90+19		
B146	45+51	36+14	1+03	0+41
6147	157+09	133+11	0+33	0+30
8084	133+08	115+24		
5559	137+30	126+30	1+40	1+14
5994	153+20	130+28	6+00	4+21
B817	31+00	27+27	0+40	0+20
B829	61+15	48+00	2+51	2+20
6083	137+29	118+04		
N539I	5+57	5+08	2+03	1+03
N544I	6+39	4+56	2+10	1+20
N9518Z	85+33	73+43	5+33	4+27
N6154U	99+30	84+49	1+54	1+43
N9956Z	86+53	76+06	2+44	1+48
N7770B	116+05	98+59		
N9577Z	98+26	82+14	1+37	1+02
N9838Z	12+00	10+02	11+36	10+08
N3728G	66+52	58+17		
N9664C	13+48	11+51	4+29	3+19
N3674G	24+51	20+45		
N7695C	9+44	8+02	1+05	0+58
N91295	19+23	17+04	1+30	1+15
N9521Z	96+20	82+07	3+24	2+37
N9573Z	56+10	43+29	7+44	5+19
N5269V	61+25	52+21	2+04	1+40
N77I	139+14	122+24	30+52	26+33
N7950C	65+29	51+25		
N51259	59+19	50+21	2+58	2+10
N2142	19+08	15+39	3+29	2+29
N9073Z	92+51	77+18	3+30	3+13
N9871Z	5+40	4+31	0+48	0+30
N9898Z	7+20	6+19	4+08	2+03
N358F	144+43	129+00	8+34	5+26
N285L	85+53	72+04	3+06	2+21
N391R	115+56	101+51	1+29	0+50
N394R	191+00	161+10	2+23	1+35
N9444	170+48	147+17	2+00	1+43
N198X	100+15	72+37	0+52	0+45
N153L	130+55	113+19	3+18	2+33
N180K	58+09	47+50		

ATTACHMENT "A"

N12450	115+42	97+59	2+04	1+18
N748N	8+45	7+14	0+48	0+27
N152L	79+28	69+12	2+52	2+15
N184L	46+49	38+56	1+05	0+33
N185K	32+52	27+52	4+26	3+17
N192X	26+13	23+05	1+10	0+50
N393R	104+43	85+07	3+40	2+42
N194X	6+57	5+52	0+48	0+38
N1303X	96+42	96+42	12+05	12+05
N1304X	130+46	130+46	7+32	7+32
N1305X	149+35	149+35	2+15	2+15
N1306X	223+29	223+29	4+30	4+30
N1307X	199+36	199+36	2+15	2+15
N8512F	19+10	19+10	1+15	1+15
N8513F	1+15	1+15	2+45	2+45
N8514F	2+25	2+25	11+00	11+00
N8535F	12+32	12+32	0+30	0+30
B867			4+16	3+45
N6622C	5+58	4+53		
Sub-total	4914+22	4288+45	240+02	196+12

2. Contract 4102

5994	6+17	5+25
N539Y	3+22	3+22
N544Y	9+54	7+56
N6154U	12+19	10+22
N9956Z	26+59	22+29
N7770B	6+28	5+30
N9838Z	19+07	15+23
N3728G	10+22	9+59
N9664C	8+09	7+09
N3674G	50+00	42+38
N7695C	81+37	67+44
N91295	50+24	43+11
N21412	2+40	1+45
N358F	6+08	5+35
N285L	3+58	3+28
N391R	2+32	2+08
N394R	6+59	5+35
N9444	5+33	4+39
N198X	95+32	90+10
N153L	6+15	5+13
N180K	52+22	47+37
N748N	86+55	76+42
N152L	27+41	24+20
N184L	63+34	53+51
N185K	68+29	56+56
N192X	50+22	46+00
N393R	50+00	40+29
N194X	77+03	67+59
N1303X	30+53	30+53
N1304X	17+56	17+56
N8512F	14+35	14+35
N8513F	103+58	103+58
	44+25	44+25

Contract 4102	Sub-total	1140+07	1020+41
3. Contract 4103			
	M67984	1+26	0+50
	B910	2+16	1+47
	B928	1+49	0+47
	B829	2+23	1+36
	M539Y	4+32	3+38
	M544Y	5+20	4+31
	M9521Z	12+20	8+56
	M9573Z	25+51	18+08
	M5269V	5+47	4+09
	M77Y	2+50	2+06
	M7950C	22+38	16+06
	M51259	1+18	0+55
	M21412	4+01	2+51
	M9073Z	1+19	0+55
	M394R	2+32	2+02
	M153L	1+05	0+59
	M12450	8+40	7+09
	M152L	1+09	0+55
	M192X	2+06	1+47
	M1305X	5+54	5+54
	M1307X	5+18	5+18
	M8512F	4+43	4+43
	M8513F	8+30	8+30
	Sub-total	133+47	104+30
4. Contract 0005			
	M6622C	97+55	86+53
	B829	4+38	3+30
	M9898Z	6+45	5+51
	M285L	2+44	2+18
	M9573Z	13+06	11+56
	M51259	4+24	3+49
	M8514F	2+31	2+31
	Sub-total	132+03	116+48
5. Contract 0069			
	M9664C	57+38	50+04
	M3728G	7+00	6+06
	M9518Z	8+39	7+34
	M7636Z	3+46	3+33
	Sub-total	77+03	67+17

Total Revenue Block Time	6397+22
" " Flight Time	5598+01
" Non-Revenue Block Time	240+02
" " " Flight Time	196+12
GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	6637+24
" " FLIGHT TIME	5794+13

FLIGHT TIME BY TYPE OF AIRCRAFT

Type of A/C	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block time	Flight time	Block time	Flight time
C-46	599+19	494+24	46+55	38+03
C-47	724+53	629+02	6+07	4+45
Bailed C-47	99+16	80+33	6+40	4+41
DHC-4	36+44	29+31	2+03	1+03
VTB	975+33	833+34	31+08	24+45
10-2 (Beech)	696+23	580+11	48+32	39+34
C-45	113+55	94+57	7+47	6+12
Porter	2041+47	1746+17	42+27	29+16
204B	1109+32	1109+32	44+07	44+07
Helio			4+16	3+46
TOTAL	6397+22	5598+01	240+02	196+12

Original Signed By
L. G. PARRISH

L.G. Parrish

cc: BH/SGN via ABM/SGN
MFD/SGN
AABM/SGN
TM/SGN
File.

S A I G O N B A S E

JULY - 1969

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted]												TOTAL	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	49	166	174	13	169	1	22	6	581#	15**	3	2	1*		1001	201
TEMPORARY																
FTC																
PRE-PROCESSED									9						9	
TOTAL	49	166	174	13	169	1	22	6	590#	15**	3	2	1*		1010	201

(*) : 1 Swiss
(**) : 1 French
(#) : 4 French

GROUND PNL : 1010
FLIGHT PNL : 201
TOTAL : 1211

ATTACHMENT "C"

DA NANG - SUB-BASE

JULY 1969

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted]						TOTAL	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	4		14		23		89	130
TEMPORARY								
FTC								
PRE-PROCESSED							8	8
TOTAL	4		14		23		97	138

GROUND PNL : 138

FLIGHT PNL : 0

TOTAL : 138

NHA-TRANG SUB-BASE

JULY 1969

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted]				TOTAL	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	6		17		29		67		119	
TEMPORARY										
FTC										
PRE-PROCESSED							3		3	
TOTAL	6		17		29		70		122	

GROUND PNL : 122

FLIGHT PNL : 0

TOTAL : 122

CAN THO SUB-BASE
JULY 1969

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted]						TOTAL	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	1				10		4	15
TEMPORARY								
FTC								
PRE-PROCESSED								
TOTAL	1				10		4	15

GROUND PNL : 15

FLIGHT PNL : 0

TOTAL : 15

11777

11777

~~Top Secret~~

[redacted]

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

Anomalies in Soviet Shipping to North Vietnam During the First Half of 1969

~~Top Secret~~

Copy No.

ER IM 69-93

July 1969

~~TOP SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
July 1969

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Anomalies in Soviet Shipping to North Vietnam During the First Half of 1969

Summary

Recent anomalies in Soviet shipping to North Vietnam suggest that the USSR has expanded the categories of military-related cargo that it is willing to ship to North Vietnam by sea since the bombing halt. Soviet ships during the first half of 1969 delivered the first seaborne consignments to North Vietnam of Soviet Chief Engineering Directorate (GIU) cargo and and ammunition, a large number of

and the first shiploads of vehicles to North Vietnam from the Soviet Far East. In contrast to previous practice, Soviet ships en route to Haiphong have stopped at intermediate ports to discharge military cargo without advance notice Even though deliveries of military-related cargoes have become more frequent, there is no conclusive evidence of any seaborne deliveries to North Vietnam of combat arms or ammunition.

The GIU cargoes were shipped under contracts dealing with both aviation equipment and land armaments. Shipments by the GIU to other countries in these categories have included both combat materiel and military-related items. Soviet delivered in the past to North Vietnam (by rail) and to Cuba were models designed for training or target competition. shipped by the USSR to the Middle East and Cuba have

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and was coordinated with the Office of Strategic Research.

~~TOP SECRET~~

ranged from trucks to combat aircraft. The quantities involved in these suspicious shipments to North Vietnam were small. Even if every suspicious item were combat materiel, total deliveries of such cargo would be negligible compared with the amount of military aid which North Vietnam receives from the USSR.

The deliveries of vehicles from the Soviet Far East may have been diversions from rail shipment across China as a result of Chinese harassment. The presence of five 100-mm antiaircraft guns in the railyard near the wharves in Haiphong on 10 May 1969 suggests a diversion of combat materiel from rail to sea, but the mode of arrival of these guns in Haiphong has not been determined. Similar guns have been used in the Haiphong area for some time.

If Soviet shipments across China are being delayed or harassed, as some reports indicate, the USSR is likely to switch more military-related cargoes, and possibly some combat materiel, to sea shipment. Soviet authorities probably could conceal some shipments of combat materiel for a time, if they wished to do so. Repeated shipments by sea of large quantities of combat materiel, however, probably would be detected.

Chief Engineering Directorate Cargo

1. During 1969 the first seaborne shipments of cargo by the USSR's Chief Engineering Directorate (GIU) to North Vietnam were detected. The first shipment arrived in Haiphong from the Black Sea on 15 April aboard the Soviet large-hatch ship *Partizanskaya Iskra*.* This 39-ton cargo, which has not been identified,

2. The GIU is frequently involved in shipments of combat materiel and military support equipment such as trucks and radar to other countries, both by rail and by sea. It has also been involved in at least one rail shipment to North Vietnam. In 1966 a large-hatch ship, which eventually called at

* *A dry cargo ship with at least one hatch 50 feet or more in length. This oversize hatch facilitates the handling of large items of cargo. Nearly all of the general cargo shipped to North Vietnam from the Black Sea is carried by ships of this type.*

North Vietnam, delivered GIU cargo to an intermediate port, Djakarta.* In another instance, 3 tons of GIU cargo were shipped from North Vietnam to the USSR by sea. However, the GIU had never been previously identified, as the shipper of seaborne cargo *to* North Vietnam.

3. The voyage of the *Partizanskaya Iskra* was noteworthy in other respects. The ship passed the Bosporus on 24 February declaring from Ilichevsk (near Odessa) to Singapore. Before calling at Singapore it called at Djakarta and Surabaya without advance notice, probably to discharge military cargo. Previous calls at intermediate ports by ships suspected of delivering military cargo had always been forecast Moreover, 2,200 of 7,000 tons of cargo on board the *Partizanskaya Iskra* for Haiphong were unidentified.

4. The second detected seaborne shipment of GIU cargo to North Vietnam is aboard the *Partizanskaya Slava*, which should arrive in Haiphong in early July.

Much of the other cargo for Haiphong on the *Partizanskaya Slava* has been identified and consists of a variety of general cargo, including 100 motorcycles weighing 45 tons consigned to the

---

* *The* Baymak, *which declared from Nikolayev to Djakarta, delivered aviation material to Djakarta. Later it called at Haiphong.*

There were also
of 8 x 12 x 20 feet on the deck of the *Bratslav*; their contents have not been identified. The *Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya*, was supposed to deliver
weighing 130 kg to Singapore with transshipment to be made to Djakarta. However, the ship is reported to have discharged in Haiphong.

8. The first and only seaborne shipment of to North Vietnam is aboard the *Berezovka*, which is scheduled to arrive in Haiphong about 1 July.

9. The munitions on these ships probably are what they purported to be

Kaznoeksport (meaning "various exports"), which is subordinate to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade and has dealt in the past with the export of tobacco products, building materials, mica, hides, hardware, insulators, firefighting equipment, leather goods, crockery, domestic electrical appliances, sewing machines, clothing, knitted goods, sports goods, sporting guns, *matches, toys, musical instruments, and so on.*

One delivery of ammunition and firing pins was consigned to North Vietnam's quasi-military "Central Committee for Sports and Gymnastics." No deliveries of were observed between September 1967 and early 1969.

10. Soviet shipments by sea of and ammunition to other destinations are not unusual. There have been 13 such deliveries to Cuba since the beginning of 1967.* Most of these were and, where identified, turned out to be of 5.6 mm caliber. Most of the shipments were small. There is no evidence that any of them included combat weapons or ammunition.

Technical Cargo

11. Several of the Soviet arrivals in Haiphong during the first half of 1969 delivered

to Cuba and the UAR. The *Nizhneudinsk*, a 2 January arrival, carried nearly a full load of flour, some caustic soda, and 1 ton of

12. The *Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya* and the *Bratslav*, both discussed previously in connection with consignments of also delivered to Haiphong. The *Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya* is reported to have unloaded at Haiphong.

13. On 1 April 1969 the *Ignatiy Sergeyev* declared at the Bosporus for Haiphong from Nikolayev, the port of origin for many previous arms shipments.

* *There were deliveries by Soviet ships to Cuba prior to 1967. References to or ammunition have not been made in connection with voyages of non-Soviet ships to Cuba.*

This was only the second ship to declare for Haiphong from this port. Ten tons of

included in its cargo for North Vietnam. were The ship made an unscheduled stop in Sihanoukville, Cambodia, on its way to Haiphong and probably offloaded military equipment under an aid agreement with Cambodia. A vehicle resembling a compressor-oxidizer truck, which is used with missile systems, was photographed on the deck of the *Ignatiy Sergeyev* when it passed the Bosporus. When the ship was photographed again, seven days after its arrival at Zero Buoy in Haiphong, this vehicle was no longer on deck. Therefore, it had been unloaded at Sihanoukville (unlikely because the Cambodians have no missiles) or lightered off at Haiphong. The nature of the cargoes shipped to North Vietnam has not been determined, but there is a strong suspicion that they are at least military-related.

Suspicious Voyages in the Past

14. Six of the 10 ships discussed above have made suspicious voyages to North Vietnam in the past (three of the remaining four ships were on their first voyage to North Vietnam). The *Partizanskaya Iskra* delivered a cargo to North Vietnam in August 1967 that included 26 crates identified as resembling Styx missile crates, but no Styx missiles have ever been observed in North Vietnam. The nature of this suspicious cargo, however, has not been determined. The *Belgorod Dnestrovskiy* carried cargo to North Vietnam in February 1966 and February 1968. Moreover, it berthed at Haiphong five days before four 29-foot mansard-roof crates, similar to those used to transport military equipment, were photographed near the Haiphong wharves. In September 1968 it delivered 7,900 tons of cargo to Haiphong, 7,700 tons of which have not been identified.

15. The *Bratislav* arrived in Haiphong on with 3,500 tons out of 4,200 tons of its cargo unidentified, including 12 boxes of unspecified cargo shipped by Aviaeksport. In October 1968 it delivered 8,100 tons; 7,200 tons were unidentified. The *Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya* carried equipment to North Vietnam in

May 1968. The *Nizhneudinsk* early in 1968 delivered three "assemblies," and "field kitchens" weighing a total of 37 tons and shipped by Prommasheksport, which handles both commercial and military-related goods. The *Berezovka* delivered to Haiphong in July 1968. In January 1969 it offloaded 6,500 tons of cargo in Haiphong, 6,100 tons of which were unidentified.

Motor Vehicle Shipments from the Soviet Far East

16. In January 1969 the Soviet large-hatch ship *Vitim* delivered a shipload of vehicles to North Vietnam from Vladivostok.* This was the first full shipload of vehicles carried to North Vietnam from the USSR since February 1966 and the first shipload from Soviet Pacific ports. In April and May 1969, there were three similar voyages, each with substantial cargoes of vehicles. The *Orekhov*, a 16 April arrival, delivered 1,065 tons of vehicles, including 218 trucks and 9 ambulances, from Vladivostok. The deck cargo consisted of 44 ZIL-157 trucks, 6 GAZ-66 trucks, and 16 dump trucks. The *Vysokogorsk*, on its first voyage to Haiphong, arrived on 26 April with 1,029 tons of cargo loaded at Nakhodka, including 111 ZIL-157 trucks, 32 ZIL-MMZ-555 trucks, 2 GAZ-66 trucks, and 64 TAG-53A trucks. On deck were 44 trucks and 6 double-decker buses. The *Vysokogorsk* again arrived in Haiphong on 20 May, this time from Vladivostok, carrying at least 553 tons of trucks, 8 trailers, 2 buses, 7 unspecified vehicles, and small amounts of transformers, vodka, flour, and cheese. All three voyages were accorded priority handling in Haiphong. Each ship was unloaded in less than four days.

* *The* Vitim *was only the fourth large-hatch ship to sail to North Vietnam from the Soviet Far East. The first voyage was made by the* Ostrogozhsk, *a July 1966 arrival, which delivered 977 tons of cargo loaded at Sovetskaya Gavan and Vladivostok, none of which has been identified. The* Omsk, *a September 1967 arrival, delivered four 47-ton "heavyweights" which had been loaded in Vladivostok and which were never identified. The* Votkinsk, *a January 1968 arrival, delivered only 216 tons of cargo, including "field kitchens."*

17. The vehicles delivered from the Soviet Far East may originally have been intended for rail shipment through China, only to be diverted because of Chinese harassment. According to a Soviet radio broadcast of 27 April 1969 the Chinese at the end of 1968 delayed a Soviet freight train loaded with motor vehicles for North Vietnam at the Sino-Soviet border for three months. A Soviet official in Peking reported in late May that the Chinese continually harassed and delayed Soviet rail shipments to North Vietnam and that this harassment had continued up to late May 1969. He stated that there had been no noticeable increase in harassment, however, as a result of the initial Ussuri River incident. A Haiphong port official claimed in March or early April that Soviet supplies were being stopped by the Chinese, but that henceforth these supplies would come by ship. However, [redacted] that Soviet rail shipments across China are continuing.

Antiaircraft Guns in Haiphong

18. Photography of Haiphong on 10 May 1969 showed antiaircraft guns (probably 100 mm) on flatcars in the main railyard four-fifths of a mile south of the main wharf area. Antiaircraft guns of this size have been emplaced in the Haiphong area for some time. Goods on other cars in the yard appeared to have arrived by sea, but it has not been determined how the guns arrived or whether they were incoming or outgoing cargo. If they were delivered by sea, the most likely vessels to have carried them were the *Partizanskaya Iskra* and the *Bratslav* (discussed previously) and the *Pavlovsk*, which arrived on 27 April 1969. Each ship offloaded cargo immediately preceding or during the time the antiaircraft guns were photographed. The *Pavlovsk* was the first large-hatch ship to sail directly to Haiphong from the Black Sea since August 1968. Of its 6,700 tons of cargo carried for North Vietnam, 5,700 tons has not been identified.

19. The *Pavlovsk* also was one of the first large-hatch ships to depart from a Black Sea port subsequent to the outbreak of the Ussuri River hostilities. It left the Black Sea approximately on 15 March -- 13 days after the initial Ussuri River incident, about enough time for the USSR to begin rerouting rail shipments destined for Vietnam.

However, no direct evidence connects any of these vessels with the delivery of antiaircraft guns to North Vietnam.

Conclusions

20. The various anomalies noted in the past six months suggest an expansion in the categories of military-related cargoes the USSR has been willing to ship by sea to North Vietnam since the bombing halt, but they do not constitute conclusive evidence of seaborne shipments of combat arms and ammunition. In any event, the volumes involved are small. Even if every unidentified and suspicious item were combat arms or ammunition, total deliveries of such cargo would be negligible compared to the entire amount of military aid which North Vietnam receives from the USSR.

21. This apparent change in Soviet policy may represent a diversion of cargoes from rail shipment across China because of the threat of Chinese harassment. If the Chinese continue to delay and harass Soviet rail shipments, as some sources report, the USSR may ship more military-related cargoes, and possibly some combat materiel, by sea to North Vietnam. The USSR could conceal shipments of combat materiel for a time if it wished to do so.

Combat materiel delivered to North Vietnam by sea, however, presumably would be shipped together with commercial cargoes.

22. Detection of such cargoes would be difficult. Security at Soviet loading ports is excellent;

and photography of Haiphong has been sharply reduced since the bombing halt. Even though the advantages of concealment appear to be with the USSR, repeated sea shipments to North Vietnam of large quantities of combat materiel probably would be detected.

MEMORANDUM

TO : BM/SGN

DATE: 03 July, 1969

FROM : A/SZDAD

REF. No. SZDAD/69/069

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for June, 1969

GENERAL

During the month there was one occasion in which the DaNang Air Base received hostile fire from enemy rockets. On the night of 6 June at least nineteen 122mm and 140mm rockets impacted within the confines of the air base causing minor damage to military installations. Five U.S. military fatalities were rumored but not officially confirmed as a result of this attack. Several satchel charges were exploded in the City of DaNang but no casualties were reported. Company personnel and property were not directly affected by these actions.

The DaNang city curfew was extended one hour and is now in effect from 2100 to 0600 hours daily. The air base curfew remains from 1900 to 0600 hours for indigenous employees. No serious curfew incidents were reported during the month with the exception of a short term detention of one Filipino employee by Vietnamese authorities. This type of problem results from police insistence that Third Country National personnel should have their passport in their possession at all times. Such a requirement is completely untenable since employee passports are usually held by the Saigon Passport and Visa section for visa and extention of stay processing. Individual letters of identification have so far sufficed to remedy the problem but employees are still subject to minor harassment.

The number of Southern Air Transport flights declined from the previous month for a total of six. No problems were encountered in the ground handling of these flights, but the possibility of utilizing a local ground handling service is being investigated. Authorization from VNAF security to permit two Vietnamese utility personnel to remain on the air base overnight to assist in the handling of the SAT round trip flights scheduled to arrive during the curfew has been requested, but no reply has been received to date. Seven such flights are already scheduled into DaNang during July.

A Per Diem rate survey was conducted during June, the results of which indicate that the DaNang rates should be raised significantly, especially for Third Country National personnel who may not utilize U.S. Government messes. Use of these messes by American civilian personnel was nearly curtailed as the result of a MACV directive which was to be effective 1 July. This directive stipulates that civilian personnel must have Field Ration Mess privileges authorized on their MACV privilege cards, but the effective date was extended to 15 July. No company personnel presently have such an authorization, and since most crew members utilize one of these messes located close to the Old Hostel, serious problems may result if a solution is not reached by the above suspense date.

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for June, 1969

LEGAL

The lease on the Station Manager's residence [redacted] was renewed for another year. Although the lessor had requested an increase in the lease price, a supplemental agreement was negotiated whereby the painting clause in the lease contract was deleted but the rent remained constant. This agreement also provides for two subsequent one year renewals at a twelve percent increase in annual rent.

The possibility of letting the lease on the New Hostel [redacted] expire is under consideration. This hostel has a very low occupancy factor but alternatives to relinquishing this building must still be determined. The rent on this property is pre-paid thru 09 August 1969.

A proposal was received from Barclay & Co., a private concessionaire, concerning the assumption of the station snack-bar operation. Certain problem areas will have to be resolved, primarily those of electric power supply and an account with the NSA commissary, but a first class type of operation, with a complete redecorating of the snack bar interior is proposed if an agreement can be reached. The service presently provided by the USAF NCO Club can only be considered less than satisfactory.

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

No significant problems were encountered in this area during the month.

FACILITIES

Construction of the Nose Hangar Lean-to is progressing at a fairly rapid rate. The project is nearly fifty percent complete and the contractor estimates it should be ready for final acceptance by the end of July.

The station continues to be plagued with electric power failures. A fourth 100 KVA generator was installed by USAF, but it seems to be no more reliable than the previous three. The problem is very intermittant and rarely occurs when service personnel arrive. Fuel contamination is suspected but unconfirmed.

A series of unseasonal rain showers have pointed out the strong need for paving the unsurfaced areas of the station facility, particularly that portion between the Operations/Administration building and the Supply warehouse. This area was previously at least graded fairly smooth, but with the lack of drainage, and the heavy vehicular traffic experienced, rather large pools of water and mud have been created which frustrate any efforts to keep the interiors of the adjacent buildings clean.

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for June, 1969

FISCAL

The station time clock was shipped to Japan for conversion to sixty cycle operation. Implementation of a timekeeping system based on this piece of equipment must be deferred until it is received.

[redacted] payroll for the month totaled: [redacted]

Petty Cash expenditures for the month totaled: 78,529$VN

OPERATIONS

Total revenue flight time declined slightly from the previous month, although 4395 and 0005 contract flying increased. Revenue losses were 8+00 hours as compared to 5+30 hours during May.

The following is a breakdown of flight time generated by this station during June:

AID/VN-41	786+11
4395	335+14
0005	9+59
Non-revenue	7+12
Total	1,138+36

Revenue losses for the month are broken down as follows:

Maintenance	2+00
Customer Cancellations	6+00
Weather	Nil
Other	Nil
Total	8+00

COMMUNICATIONS

The Motorola remote VHF/UHF was only out of service twice during the month. Although several actual communication difficulties were reported, these problems have been attributed more to weather phenomena, terrain and other radio interference than equipment discrepancies.

Incoming and outgoing messages totaled 2114 and 1399 respectively.

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for June, 1969

TRAFFIC

[redacted] resigned as Traffic Manager and was replaced by [redacted]. This changeover of personnel was accomplished smoothly and with a minimum loss of continuity.

Passenger and cargo statistics for the month are as follows:

	Passengers In	Passengers Out	Cargo In	Cargo Out
AID/VN-41	2,851	2,896	191,833	281,285
4395	618	635	1,800	39,084
0005	7	7	Nil	Nil
Perry	59	59	Nil	Nil
AAM	107	107	20,270	14,699
Total	3,642	3,704	213,903	335,068

16 Continental Air Services flights were handled by this department during the month.

SECURITY

No information has been received from the VN-41 customer regarding the upgrading of two ground services utility slots to Guard positions. It was originally requested that their support for this recommendation be communicated directly to Saigon. The status of this proposal will be confirmed when the VN-41 Air Operations Officer returns from leave.

Additional high intensity lights are being installed to illuminate potential pilferage areas within the facility. This lighting, when complete, should aid the airport security guards in maintaining surveillance over the entire compound.

PERSONNEL

The processing of employee extention of stay and visa applications continues to be a time consuming procedure, but the Saigon Passport and Visa section has been able to support the most urgent requirements on a timely basis.

The personnel breakdown for DaNang Station during June was as follows:

		[redacted]		
Permanent	5	31	14	105
Pre-Process	0	0	0	12
Temporary	0	0	0	0
Daily Hire	0	0	0	0
Total (167)	5	31	14	117

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for June, 1969

TECHNICAL SERVICES

RMD handled at total of 616 arriving and 617 departing flights, of which seven of the latter were delayed due to maintenance. There were two engine changes and no propeller changes during the month. A total of nine heavy services performed, including two 2048 number 2 services which were supported by personnel TCS from Saigon. In the future, only number 1 services on PC-6 and VIB aircraft will be performed at DaNang.

RGMD expended at total of 1360 manhours, of which 262 were utilized in hostel maintenance and painting.

The substantial credit expected on the May NSA invoice was not received, but coordination was effected with the concerned offices to delay payment pending the receipt of credit on the June invoice. Overall, NSA has been very cognisant of this problem and appears to be making a serious effort to resolve their internal accounting problems.

Original Signed by
WINSTON C. CAMBRE
Winston C. Cambre

cc: file

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
AUGUST 1969

I. GENERAL

1. The overall activities during the past month were routine with the flying decreased slightly as forecasted. The forecast was within .2% of actual. Enemy activities have increased considerable and Saigon continued to receive rockets and terrorist activities which make living a little uncomfortable.

2. The Saigon Retail Price Index remained rather stable from August 1968 to April 1969, but is now 12% above the April level. The rate of increase has declined. The index for all items rose 7% in May, 4% in June and only 1% in July. The July increase was almost entirely attributable to the impact of the increased per equation tax.

II. FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT

1. SFD Phil Doyle was transferred to Udorn leaving SGM the responsibilities of Facilities Development. There are two major projects underway. (1) The revetment fence along the northwest side of the area. (2) The water system. Both of these projects are approximately 90% completed. The new antenna masts and accessories are scheduled for arrival during September so we will start the final phase of relocating the transmitters toward the end of the month.

III. OPERATIONS

1. Total revenue block time for August was 6128 + 34 compared to 6397 + 22 for July. Our revenue forecast for the month was nearly perfect as we predicted 6135 revenue hours. The Caribous flew 169 + 07 revenue hours which was a substantial increase over previous months.

2. One other TCN was transferred giving a total of 4 less TCN's and 3 Americans since we initiated our cost reduction program. PM/SGN has been advised to hire locals to fill the slots of TCNs. OM Macfarlane is cross-trained to cover OM and FIC shifts.

3. There were 18 controllable and 46 uncontrollable delays with a total of 907 Saigon departures. These figures are practically the same as the previous months.

FIC, GTD and the Emergency Equipment Room are in good order. Customer relations have remained good.

Flight Time Report (See attachment A)

Aircraft Incidents Report (See Attachment B)

F

IV. TRAFFIC/AAM

1. The SRTM position reportedly has again been transferred to Saigon. Although no written direction from management has been received I have continued to perform the functions during the reporting month.

A "Vector Control" program was instigated with a score of 5 KIA rodents for the month. This will be a continuous program with traps set during aircraft HONs.

2. The new Contract of Carriage forms were placed in use. Several problem areas have been noted and this will be discussed in a separate letter.

As mentioned in my SRTM/SVN/M/69/135 dated 20 August there have been some differences of opinion on baggage to be carried on our aircraft. We are attempting to conform to basic safety guidelines and still satisfy the Customer using the criteria outlined in BM memo BMSGN/69/285.

3. We have secured adequate storage in the Customer Warehouse and the covered area outside the warehouse for Company cargo. Although somewhat removed from our work area it has proven to be sufficient for our needs.

4. Checking of Beech seats by numbers with drawings indicated an error in seat numbers. We have received an engineering evaluation and have started to have the seats configured correctly.

			July	August	
Passengers departure	SGN	(All contracts)	6021	6153	5, 857
" arrival	SGN	(" ")	6622	6731	5, 980
Outbound cargo	SGN		72793	69543	90,217
Inbound cargo	SGN		89632	88103	90, 207

5. TRAFFIC/USAID

		Cargo (including AF Caribou A/C)		
		July	August	
Outbound (lbs)	SGN	2,841,844	1,626,899	1, 369, 252 lb
Inbound (lbs)	SGN	586,425	540,886	519, 783

V. HOSTEL OCCUPANCY

1. During the month of August 1969, 3 beds out of 186 were utilized for a 1.6% occupancy rate. Also, there were no Non-Availability slips issued during the month.

VI. FLYING

1. The gravest problem confronting the Flying Department in many respects is lack of utilisation of the VTB yet the schedule requires many hours of standby by the crews. This problem has been prevelant for some time. I do not think it will be with us too much longer as we will have no VTB crews to worry about. This standby problem is becoming so serious that, to date, four Captains have voiced a strong indication of resigning, and five Captains have vehemently requested transfer out of the VTB program. Such actions seem natural enough considering for every four hours of duty time, a VTB Captain receives only one hour for pay purposes.

To counteract these inequities:

- We have forwarded studies to the BM for discussion with the customer,
- We forwarded a study to the DFD for salary consideration regarding standby time,
- We have cross-trained personnel into the VTB but so far we have been unsuccessful in cross-training any personnel out, as every PIC trained-in are being utilized standing-by.

2. So far no assistance from the customer appears to be forthcoming, the DFD has not had time to act upon salary adjustment, and our cross-training program has reached a stand still, as far as getting volunteers to train into the program, and from an economical view point.

3. Morale in other programs is naturally very good. The flying time is up in all other programs and there were no accidents for the month.

VII. SAFETY

1. Pilot Meetings - VTB - 7 August

a. Recent aircraft troubles, Saigon and out-station maintenance, maintenance write-ups, and wind, weather, and airfield hazards were discussed.

b. Technical and printing errors in the new VTB Flight Manual were brought to the pilots' attention.

C-46 - 11 August. Following items affecting flight safety were discussed:

a. Use of non-standard cockpit signals. This practise will be discontinued and flight crews will be spot checked for compliance.

b. It has been observed that many pilots are failing to use checklists installed in aircraft. Disciplinary action will be taken against further infractions of this rule.

c. Taxiing with hands hanging out of windows and not holding yoke was discussed.

d. Removal of landing gear pins. After #2 has been started and the hydraulic pressure is up, the PIC will signal for removal of the gear pins prior to starting #1.

Beechcraft - 26 August. Following safety items were discussed:

a. Caution about vehicular traffic on the new road which crosses the AAM taxiway.

b. Pilots were informed to check for proper installation of forward and rearward facing seats. Seat failures in a recent accident may possibly have resulted from improper installations.

c. Recently, a passenger in the copilot seat of a VTB grasped the control wheel during landing. Pilots were warned to thoroughly brief any passenger occupying this seat.

d. A recent accident at another station revealed that some passengers aboard did not have seat belts available. Pilots were warned to assure that every occupant has available, and wears a seat belt. Exceptions should be made only in grave emergencies.

e. Pilots were cautioned to check for accumulation of mud in wheel wells after operating on muddy surfaces. Excess mud in wheel wells can result in a gear-up landing.

204B - 30 August

a. N1307X FCU malfunction of 27 August was reviewed. Pilots were advised of residual high EGT during emergency, and necessity for slow application of power after switching to manual fuel control. This emergency occurred at 1800' and approximately 500' was lost in entering autorotation, diagnosis of problem, and effecting manual control to recover.

b. Pilots were reminded of necessity for complete, accurate write-ups whenever a malfunction occurs. This will enable MMB to diagnose malfunctions which in the past may have gone undetected.

2. Accident Investigations

a. Investigation of Beech 10-2, N9521Z accident at V-05, Vung Tau on 26 July 1969 has been completed except for the report of analysis on landing gear and brake components. Anticipate completion of Local Board of Review prior to 15 September.

b. Local Board of Review for VTB, N3674G accident was completed on 14 August and submitted to the Head Office.

c. Traffic utilityman [redacted] suffered the loss of a finger as a result of being caught in a lowering forklift boom at Danang on 29 August. Employee Accident Form PD-137R5 will be submitted.

VIII.
PERSONNEL

1. As was the case in July, activities were largely routine with the exception of the work done on the Vietnamese Line Maintenance Training Program and on Work Permits. Ministry of National Defense approval to leave the country has been granted to 22 of the primary Trainee candidates and to all 10 alternates. What remains is Directorate of Civil Aviation and Ministry of Education program sanction and approval. The Ministry of Labor advises that these approvals will be forthcoming shortly, and also that the candidates' passport and exit permit applications will be expeditiously handled.

2. Work Permit approvals continue to be a problem. The new application procedures are not moving along smoothly at all. Unfamiliarity with this new system together with the large amount of paperwork necessary for each application has resulted in confusion and mishandling at all stages in the procedure. We have our hands full with this further compounded by the government's attitude toward TCNs.

3. [redacted] recommended and instituted a follow-up procedure which, assuming cooperation from the application handling personnel, will enable us to maintain better control over the Work Permit applications. Heretofore we had depended on USAID for this control, but with little positive result. Hopefully with our direct control throughout all stages of the procedure we will be able to enjoy success.

4. Personnel Strength (See Attachment C)

IX. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. August was a quiet month without any major crisis or serious incidents. Our cost reduction program continued with emphasis on personnel reductions. The goal we set for ourselves was $90,000 a month reduction by 31 October 1969, and to date we have finalized plans for slightly over $70,000 monthly, but our "goal" is a long way off. The manpower is approaching the balance point in respect to our current overall workload. RMD and GMD have shown the best results in tightening of the purse strings as related to cost (personnel) cuts. Da Nang and Nha Trang Technical Services Depts have also done very well in reductions of personnel.

2. The flying hours for August was about 6,327 total, which is the range we are trimming our manpower for. This was near the figures for June and July. One of our competitors (CASI) is supposedly pulling up stakes at the end of October and we are hopeful that some contract arrangements can be put together, so as to enable us to acquire most of their current flying contracts. At this point our chances are probably 50-50.

3. Our revetment (perimeter) wall along the northwest edge of our ramp is nearing completion. This wall is made of pre-cast reinforced panels that insert between poured columns. The wall extends from the USAID warehouse along N.W. ramp to the west end of the RMD ground equipment parking area near the Utilities Building. Ramp lights are being mounted on poles on top of every fourth column, as part of the perimeter lighting A.R. project.

4. The newly concreted west ramp is now being fully occupied with aircraft. China Air Lines was assigned four parking spots (2 - C46 & 2 - C123), this permits us to park 2 - DHC/4 and 6 C46/C47 aircraft. This has really helped to relieve most of the conjestion from the area in front of the USAID warehouse. Now if we can obtain funding for lighting, and electrical (power) system and some other utilities, the west ramp would be very good.

5. The RMD Ramp Crew was issued some "AAM SGN made" day-glo vests to identify themselves to flight crews and other associated functions. These vests are worn over their white uniforms. The orange (day-glo) and white color contrast gives them a very professional appearance as well as improving overall ramp safety.

X. FISCAL

1. Contract Billing

	Flying Services		Others	
VN-41/CORDS	US$797,109.35	VN$1,052,879.00	US$6,321.43	VN$25,150
VN-41/EMB	174,429.16		6,420.87	
VN-41/RDC	24,876.03		231.05	
4395 (Sub. Cont.)	96,877.13			
00005	25,826.82		45.16	
00069	20,919.79			
Others			1,092.26	
Credit Note to VN-41			(44.85)	

2. Total flying hours including CAL Sub-Contractor

Revenue Block time:	6,405+33
Flight Time:	5,542+33
Hazard Time:	4,408+42
Total log sheets processed:	1,617
Passengers:	41,993
Cargo:	3,073,754 lbs
Non-revenue block time	279+32
Flight Time	229+14

3. Payroll and Timekeeping

		Amount	No. of Person
[redacted] payroll	[redacted]		776
TCN Piastres Allowance	VN$	2,658,015.00	477
American Piastres Allowance	VN$	1,036,590.00	175
[redacted] Payroll	US$	78,244.57	202
[redacted] Payroll	US$	7,776.97	30

DSL: 76,449 hrs.
Number of persons filling DTR: 368

4. Total disbursements: VN$18,035,008.00
MPC 151.45

Free market rate: VN$ 220 to US$ 1.00

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
E. J. THEISEN
ABM-SCN

E.J. Theisen

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT
AUGUST 1969.

1. Contract 4101 -

A/C No.	Revenue Block time	Revenue Flight Time	Non-Revenue Block Time	Non-Revenue Flight Time
N67984	30+32	25+37	28+41	25+08
N67985	162+36	134+11		
B910	122+23	102+14	1+40	0+59
B928	66+03	54+53	22+43	19+57
B138	125+02	103+37	2+10	2+00
B146	40+43	31+57	3+06	2+41
6147	119+13	104+01	4+09	3+23
8084	127+20	109+17		
5559	159+09	144+31		
5994	88+26	74+17		
B817	42+15	36+02	4+53	3+31
B829	78+08	59+18	12+09	10+19
6083	113+12	94+31		
N539Y	52+50	43+49	23+48	21+38
N544Y			4+02	3+04
N9518Z	83+28	71+47	3+21	2+02
N6154U	40+37	34+41	5+40	2+47
N9956Z	31+15	26+34	1+26	0+51
N7770B	95+45	82+30	3+43	2+57
N9577Z	70+43	60+55	2+58	2+24
N9838Z	24+51	21+19	1+50	1+26
N3728G	64+12	55+38	0+49	0+23
N9664C	9+30	7+29	3+33	2+06
N3674G	20+11	18+33		
N7695C	76+02	65+37	1+46	0+51
N5454V	19+06	14+45	1+14	0+55
N6622C	15+33	11+14		
N9573Z	97+39	82+57	5+06	4+25
N5269V	117+34	100+02		
N77I	116+14	97+14	4+27	3+33
N7950C	81+30	66+41		
N51259	14+21	11+34	21+44	19+04
N21412	37+19	30+08	3+15	2+30
N9073Z	3+44	2+55	11+36	8+05
N9871Z	4+28	4+00	1+30	1+00
N9898Z			5+20	4+28
N358F	130+40	111+43	2+22	1+24
N285L	189+02	154+52	3+49	3+20
N391R	146+54	120+09	3+27	1+50
N394R	159+45	132+58	5+46	4+55
N9444	133+32	115+49	4+45	3+20
N198X	152+59	126+39	7+20	5+52
N153L	142+52	128+08	5+11	4+05
N180K	115+34	102+00	0+42	0+25

N12450	44+02	39+04		
N748N	10+46	9+27		
N152L	6+27	5+47		
N184L	23+56	19+56		
N185K	37+42	32+05		
N192X	99+49	86+43		
N393R	32+56	29+21		
N194X	30+04	27+26		
N1303X	159+08	159+08	1+45	1+45
N1304X	106+32	106+32	3+35	3+35
N1305X	135+23	135+23	7 +15	7+15
N1306X	101+34	101+34	3+40	3+40
N1307X	193+09	193+09	2+25	2+25
N8512F	24+14	24+14		
N8513F	8+18	8+18		
N8535F	34+22	34+22		
Sub-total	4571+34	3989+35	238+41	196+18

2. Contract 4102

5994	17+26	15+03		
5559	6+17	5+47		
N539Y	3+20	2+06		
N544X	31+03	25+33		
N36740	77+11	65+11		
N7695C	15+09	13+02		
N91295	64+11	55+28	3+22	2+31
N7770B	2+11	2+00		
N3728G	4+05	3+19		
N748N	76 +37	68+52	5+55	4+58
N152L	128+11	113+01	9+47	8+02
N184L	72+23	58+28	5+45	4+14
N185K	56+57	50+15		
N192X	20+32	17+24	2+14	1+19
N393R	46+18	41+13	2+19	1+35
N194X	85+40	71+27	2+07	1+35
N9073Z	1+00	0+44		
N285L	1+13	0+43		
N391R	2+25	1+55		
N394R	3+03	2+32		
N198X	11+21	10+24		
N180K	9 +35	8+46		
N12450	97+11	87+15	6+10	5+35
N8513F	22+19	22+19	2+30	2+30
N8512F	12+32	12+32	4+27	4+27

N8514F	82+42	82+42	1+00	1+00
N8535F	55+32	55+32	3+35	3+35
N1303X	21+22	21+22		
N1304X	3+14	3+14		
N1305X	1+58	1+58		
N1307X	2+33	2+33		
Sub-total	1035+31	922+40	49+11	41+21

3. Contract 4103

N67985	3+40	1+40
B910	18+16	15+05
B928	43+44	37+28
B138	21+23	16+47
B146	15+14	13+13
5994	6+51	5+25
B829	6+19	4+55
6083	7+07	6+03
N539Y	55+16	46+07
N544X	26+38	22+19
N9577Z	3+06	2+35
N5454V	14+34	10+22
N6622C	5+25	3+32
N9573Z	11+02	6+48
N5269V	8+47	7+08
N77X	2+40	1+36
N7950C	14+06	10+00
N51259	6+35	5+18
N21412	7+17	4+49
N9898Z	1+11	0+50
N358F	3+30	3+10
N285L	4+35	3+19
N153L	1+32	1+10
N180K	0+58	0+50
N1306X	24+56	24+56
N1307X	5+07	5+07
N8512F	17+39	17+39
N8513F	32+31	32+31
N8535F	16+10	16+10
Sub-total	386+09	326+45

4. Contract 0005 -

N6622C	27+55	23+38	1+49	1+05
N5454V	3+40	3+26		
N9573Z	10+58	10+13		
N51259	4+45	3+54		
Sub-total	47+18	41+11	1+49	1+05

5. Contract 0069 -

N9664C	46+54	41+15	3+03	2+05
N9518Z	16+32	14+32		
N3728G	7+25	6+31		
N7770B	4+20	4+02		
N91295	2+34	2+13		
N9838Z	10+17	9+10		
Sub-total	88+02	77+43	3+03	2+05

Total Revenue Block Time	6128+34
Total Revenue Flight Time	5357+54
Total Non-Revenue Block Time	292+44
Total Non-Revenue Flight Time	240+49
GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	6421+09
" " FLIGHT TIME	5598+43

Flight Time by Type of Aircraft

Type of A/C	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block time	Flight Time	Block time	Flight Time
C-46	649+36	536+42	58+20	50+45
C-47	126+42	100+15	17+02	13+50
Bailed C-47	645+01	558+55	4+09	3+23
DHC-4	169+07	139+54	27+50	24+42
VTB	770+29	664+21	31+31	20+23
10-2 (Beech)	617+00	505+12	37+35	31+32
C-45	10+23	8+28	18+26	13+33
Porter	2079+08	1782+51	67+39	52+29
204B	1061+15	1061+15	30+12	30+12
TOTAL	6128+34	5357+54	292+44	240+49

Original Signed By
L.G. PARRISH
L.G. Parrish

ATTACHMENT "A"

- FLIGHT INFORMATION CENTER -

- S A I G O N -

MONTHLY ACTIVITY REPORT

1-31 AUGUST 1969.

PART I

- AIRCRAFT INCIDENTS -

Date	A/C No., Type & Contract	Place	Description
11 Aug.	N1307X 204-B 4301	Between V-246 & BT3210	While moving sling loads between V246 & BT3210 acft received one hit thru the belly striking a main spar. No personnel injuries.
17 Aug.	N1305X 204-B 4101	XS 6744	Acft sustained three hits in rotor blade tip, while circling village at customer direction. No personnel injuries.
17 Aug.	N8535P 204-B 4102	Soccer Field at V-23	While on ground, one round of unknown caliber rocket fire impacted on S.E. portion of field. No acft damage or personnel injuries occurred.
18 Aug.	N1303X 204-B 4101	BT 3108	After touchdown at IZ, 03X received sniper fire, which impacted in front of acft. No acft damage or personnel injuries occurred.
27 Aug.	N539Y DH2-4 4203	Landing V-20	The left inboard main tire rec'd one round of groundfire while landing at V20. Damage repair completed at V17. No personnel injuries involved.
28 Aug.	N1305X 204-B 4301	NE of V-149	Acft was flying below weather when PIC observed four flashes from ground fire being directed at 05X. PIC applied max power and executed immediate climbout. Acft continued mission without further incident. No acft damage or personnel injuries involved.

PART II
- SITUATION SUMMARY -

Few major attacks occurred during August, however many scattered and separate incidents took place. DANANG AB received a 14CMM rocket attack. CAM RANH BAY received both rocket and sapper attacks including attacks on the 6th Convalescent Hospital with plastic charges. Many base camps and fire support bases in III Corp received scattered rocket and mortar attacks. In SAIGON a USAF Language School in front of the Dong-Khanh Hotel was sabatoged with a sixty pound plastic charge, killing eight and wounding sixty-two. During this period SAIGON received rockets in the dock area and terrorist remained active with several grenade incidents reported. Significant enemy buildup occurred in parts of IV Corp with several major population centers including CAN-THO, receiving rocket and mortar attacks. For the present time enemy activity is expected to remain at a moderate level. Emphasis is expected to remain on small unit action. Attacks by fire, sapper actions, and ground probes against small unit installations is expected to continue.

E. J. WILSON
OSF/SGN

Distribution:

VPFO/TPE (2)
BP/SGN (3)
SOK/SGN (1)
FIC/File.(1)

ATTACHMENT "B"

S A I G O N B A S E

31 August 1969

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted]												TOTAL	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	44	154	150	13	167		16	5	569#	15**	3	2	1*	952	187
TEMPORARY															
FTC															
PRE-PROCESSED	1								3					4	
TOTAL	45	154	150	13	167		16	5	572#	15**	3	2	1*	956	187

\# : 4 French
** : 1 French
* : 1 Swiss

GROUND PNL : 956
FLIGHT PNL : 187
TOTAL : 1143

ATTACHMENT "C"

DANANG PUB-B AUS

31 August 1969

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted] GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	TOTAL GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	4		14		22		93		133	
TEMPORARY										
FTC										
TOTAL PRE-PROCESSED	4		14		22		93		133	
TOTAL										

GROUND PNL : 133

FLIGHT PNL : 0

TOTAL : 133

NHA TRANG SUB-BASE

31 August 1969

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted] GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	TOTAL GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	5		15		25		65		110	
TEMPORARY										
FTC										
PRE-PROCESSED										
TOTAL	5		15		25		65		110	

GROUND PNL : 110

FLIGHT PNL : 0

TOTAL : 110

CAN THO SUB-BASE

31 August 1969

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted]				TOTAL	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	1		10	4	15	
TEMPORARY						
FTC						
PRE-PROCESSED						
TOTAL	1		10	4	15	

GROUND PNL : 15

FLIGHT PNL : 0

TOTAL : 15

MEMORANDUM

TO : BM/SGN

DATE: 04 August 1969

FROM : A/SZDAD

REF. No. SZDAD/69/084

SUBJECT : DANANG Station Monthly Report for July 1969

GENERAL

No incidents involving hostile activity against the DaNang Air Base were reported during the month, but rumors persist that large scale rocket and perhaps ground attacks could be forthcoming at anytime. A few, relatively close, B-52 raids did shake the buildings and windows substantially but no damage resulted.

The DaNang City and Air Base curfews remain unchanged, being 2100 to 0600 hours and 1900 to 0600 hours respectively. The base curfew is still applicable to indigenous personnel only, and no curfew incidents involving personnel downtown were reported. Two [redacted]mployees were arrested and detained for a short period of time by the Vietnamese Police for an alleged House Record discrepancy.

The number of Southern Air Transport flights increased tremendously over the previous month for a total of 26. A similar number of such flights is expected in August. Traffic has had to resort to utilizing TCN personnel to assist in handling these flights and RMD will most likely lose the services of one crew chief a good part of the time during the last half of August if the present scheduling of these flights continues. Authorisation has been received from VNAF security to permit three Traffic utility personnel to remain on the base overnight when required.

American personnel were barred from using the MACV Field Ration Mess located near the main company hostel for two days, but customer co-signed travel orders, specifying that crew members were on bonifide TCS status has resolved the problem to date. Permanently assigned American personnel have the option of electing either Field Ration Mess or Commissary Privileges but are not entitled to both.

LEGAL

Due to the difficulty in selecting a suitable alternative to relinquishing the company hostel [redacted] in the time available, it was decided to rent these premises for another six months, the duration of the present lease renewal. In the interim, it will be possible to more precisely determine what the expected flight crew RON requirements will be.

No further information has been received from Barclay & Company regarding their proposal to assume the operation of the DaNang Terminal Snack-Bar. It is planned, however, to draw up a preliminary agreement for approval the next time their representative visits this office. From comments made

..... Cont'd.

by representatives of the Base NCO Club, little or no improvement can be expected from that quarter. They seem to be of the opinion that the Snack-Bar operation is insignificant compared to their other commitments and would just as soon be rid of the responsibility for running it.

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

The VN-41 Air Operations Officer has indicated that he will make an official complaint if the handling of SAT flights in any way interferes with the Air America Traffic operation. Two of the three personnel from Traffic, who presently meet these flights, are technically Ground Services personnel, and although it is not always possible for them to work a full eight hours at Air America and also meet SAT flights at nine o'clock at night and five o'clock in the morning, the basic Traffic responsibility has not been affected.

VN-41 has also shown some interest in modifying the station passenger terminal in order to obtain a layout similar to that at Nha-Trang, i.e., a completely enclosed, air conditioned waiting room. Such a project would require the removal of half of two walls which provide the main support for the roof of the building in addition to the air conditioning. The modifications could be done, but it would be quite expensive and would most likely require customer funding.

FACILITIES

The nose hangar Lean-to was eighty five percent complete at the end of the month and should be ready for final acceptance by mid August. One steel angle will have to be removed temporarily from the Nose Hangar to permit the attachment of the siding required for the east end of Lean-to since the materials received from Nha-Trang were short a few items.

Work was started on the Danang Station Electric Power Distribution Project. A rather major modification was made whereby using existing underground power cable it will be possible to eliminate all overhead power lines. Not only will this method contribute to the better appearance of the area, it should also require fewer manhours to accomplish. The installation of the 100 KVA transformer by S.I.P.E.A. should be completed in early August.

Since the station paving project has been deferred for an indefinite period, consideration is being given to the possibility of obtaining sufficient gravel, in exchange for the cement presently on hand, to cover the highly travelled areas and planting grass in the remaining

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for July (Cont'd)

portions. This plan would not provide for any needed drainage but it would reduce the amount of dust and mud now experienced.

FISCAL

The station time clock was received, converted to 60 cycle operation. A time card system was initiated on 1 August as a trial basis to determine what problem areas might arise. Several generator shutdowns have made it necessary to adjust the clock frequently, but by 16 August it should be possible to start keeping employee time and attendance records with time cards rather than attendance rosters.

[redacted] payroll for the month totaled: [redacted]

Petty Cash expenditures for the month totaled: 27,307$VN

OPERATIONS

Total revenue flying declined nearly 100 hours as compared to the previous month. Although AID flying increase slightly, Embassy requirements were reduced approximately 30 percent. Revenue losses were 45+30 hours as compared to 8+00 hours during June.

The following is a breakdown of flight time generated by this station during July:

VN-41/AID	811+11
VN-41/Embassy	230+59
0005	Nil
Non-revenue	6+04
Total	1048+14

Revenue losses for the month are broken down as follows:

Maintenance	Nil
Weather	42+00
Customer cancellations	3+30
Other	Nil
Total	45+30

COMMUNICATIONS

After some serious problems at the beginning of the month, the Motorola Remote VHF/UHF has remained in operation continuously. Both SCC and Ground Radio personnel agree that the system is now working satisfactorily.

Incoming and outgoing messages totaled 2257 and 1610 respectively.

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for July (Cont'd)

TRAFFIC

With the exception of the numerous SAT flights scheduled into Danang, workload remained fairly constant. As a result of close coordination with both customers, a set of procedures regarding passenger processing, baggage limitations, and manifest close-out times were formulated which have greatly reduced many of the minor problems previously encountered. An electric Marketeer was received from Saigon which has significantly increased the efficiency of the station's baggage handling system.

Passenger and cargo statistics for the month are as follows:

	Passengers In	Passengers Out	Cargo In	Cargo Out
VN-41/AID	2,821	2,856	202,504	319,118
Embassy	508	537	6,683	6,056
0005	37	37	Nil	Nil
0069	7	8	Nil	Nil
Ferry	38	38	Nil	Nil
AAM	100	129	10,933	20,207
Total	3,511	3,605	220,120	345,381

6 Continental Air Services flights were handled by this department during July.

SECURITY

A Blick Time Clock was received during the month and the eleven key stations associated with this system were installed at various locations around the facility. Night surveillance of the area can now be closely monitored since a permanent record tape is printed when the security guard punches in at a given station. This system may prove sufficiently effective to eliminate any requirement for separate CONS warehouse security personnel.

PERSONNEL

A significant reduction in personnel, both TCN and indigenous, was accomplished during July. Total personnel strength declined from 167 to 142. The individual separations were handled smoothly and with a minimum of ill will.

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for July (Cont'd)

The personnel breakdown for Danang station at close of business, 31 July, was as follows:

[redacted]

Permanent	5	15	24	88
Pre-Process	0	0	0	10
Temporary	0	0	0	0
Daily-Hire	0	0	0	0
TOTAL (142)	5	15	24	98

TECHNICAL SERVICES

RMD handled a total of 670 arriving and 669 departing flights, of which seven of the latter were delayed due to maintenance. A total of three out station recoveries were performed including one C-47 cylinder change at Cha-Lai. No engine or propeller changes were required during the month. Heavy services totaled eight, all but two of which were performed on 2048 aircraft.

RMD expended a total of 1469 manhours, of which 105 were utilized in hostel maintenance.

Although the expected credit from MSA was not received on the June invoice, positive assurances were given that substantial portion of it would be included in July. In order to minimize these problems in the future, the company operated GMC truck will be utilized to make all pick-ups from MSA since most requests for credit result from over-shipments and billings for items not received.

PEMD accomplished the re-painting of the three station Mitsubishi Jeeps and one micro-bus. All company operated vehicles are now painted blue.

Original Signed by
WINSTON C. CAMBRE
Winston C. Cambre

cc: file

MONTHLY REPORT
NHA - TRANC
JULY 1969

GENERAL

July was an active month which saw the completion of two major projects. The nose hanger Lean/To and the Scooter Shed were completed and the ARs closed. Both projects were finished well within the allocated funds. The remaining open AR for power and light distribution will be completed in August.

There has been considerable military activity in the hills surrounding NHA, all being visable from the airport but, little activity in town.

Hostel II contract for 1969/70 was completed and conformed with no increase in rent.

A good month.

TRAFFIC

A. GENERAL

Station Traffic activities have increased over the previous month. Aircraft arrivals/departures,cargo and passenger handeling were much higher than June but, still remain considerably lower than the same month in 1968.

The position of Traffic Manager has removed from the 4101 contract. This was in accordance with a letter submitted to BM/SGN.

In line with the cost reduction program, TM is to be cross-trained with OM duties with the shorter flying time and hours, it is felt that one American personnel can handle these positions at NHA. This requires, of course, greater operations support from SGN Operations, POD, and Managment at NHA and SGN are cooperating in this venture which can mean considerable savings to the company.

STATISTICS

PASSENGERS	JULY	LAST Mo.	1968
Departing	3919	3402	5076
Arriving	7765	3264	
CARGO			
1.GROUND SERVICES(Lbs)			
Departing	508,938	396,646	977,133
Arriving	258,261	240,360	325,999
Total ..	867,199	637,006	1,303,132
2.COMPANY CARGO(Lbs)			
Departing	15,959	11,256	18,028
Arriving	10,861	11,624	8,028
Total . .	26,820	22,880	26,056
3.GRAND TOTAL(Lbs)(1+2)			
Departing	524,897	407,902	995,161
		251,984	333,027

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

No major problems in this area this month. The one remaining sore spot thereby two of AAH personnel are physicallt working in the Cords/Usaid area is being worked on. Paperwork to change these to the Cords/Usaid payroll has been submitted.

OPERATIONS

A. COMMUNICATIONS

The Motorola VHF has performed well during this period with only minor outages. We are experiencing an inordinate amount of interference on the HF. Several local stations cut in making flight watch very difficult.

B. GROUND TRANSPORTATION

One driver was excessed leaving four regular drivers. This requires paying a limited amount of overtime each week, but is on the whole, a savings to the company.

C. FLIGHT FREQUENCY (See attached)

D. ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE COMPARISON

	July	Last No.	1968
Arrivals	641	531	645
Departures	641	533	660
Ron	287	275	364

E. DELAYS

Percentage on time	97	98	

SECURITY

The SZ Jeep was stolen on the morning of July 8 and recovered by SZ from a downtown repair yard early on July 9.

Five security personnel were released as surplus to the needs of this station.

PERSONNEL (See attached)

FISCAL : No problems.

LEGAL : No problems.

TECHNICAL SERVICES

	JULY	LAST No.	1968
1. Transient overnight	354	256	281
2. Overnight services	287	275	364
3. Engine changes	3	1	4
4. Propeller	2	1	0
5. [illegible] services	0	3	4
6. Delays maint /mech.	0	1	5
	6	9	12

		JULY	LAST Mo.	1968
8.	Intermediate services	0	1	0
9.	ACP	12	23	48
10.	Outline recoveries	3	3	3
11.	Accident reports (CA/C)	1	2	2
12.	Accident reports(PEL)	0	0	0

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

Dan Lawson

DAN LAWSON
SZ-ETA

VIETNAM

INTRODUCTION

Vietnamese communist attention to President Nixon's Asian tour includes attacks at the Paris talks on 31 July by both the PRG and DRV delegates. But only PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh acknowledged--and deprecated--the President's statement in Saigon that it is time for the communists to respond to allied initiatives. Xuan Thuy claimed that by talking about "problems after the Vietnam war," President Nixon is trying to make people believe that peace will come soon. President Thieu's 11 July proposal for elections in which the NFLSV would participate was again attacked at the session on the 31st. And propagandists as well as the communist delegates castigate Ambassadors Lam and Lodge for repeating their "unreasonable demands" for mutual troop withdrawal and "so-called" free elections and for refusing to accept the NFLSV 10-point proposal.

VNA on 4 August reports that the three American prisoners of war, whose pending release had been announced on 3 July, had been handed over to U.S. representatives of a peace organization. VNA reports that Mme. Bui Thi Cam, identified as a member of the Secretariat of the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with the American people, said captured U.S. personnel "are treated in accordance with the humanitarian policy" of the DRV.

Attention to the situation in the North includes propaganda commemorating the fifth anniversary of the Tonkin Gulf incident (2 August) and the coincident 14th anniversary of DRV Navy Day (5 August). Hanoi also marks the 22d anniversary of "war invalids day" (27 July) with "instructions" from Premier Pham Van Dong on observance of the anniversary and a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial claiming good results in implementing the policy toward war dead and disabled and their families.

Hanoi makes more claims to have downed U.S. planes, with the alleged downing of an unmanned reconnaissance plane over Nam Ha Province on the 6th bringing the total to 3,313.

The lull in the fighting in the South is reflected in a paucity of battle reports. But a VNA item on 1 August claims that during July the PLAF and the people in the South "continued their unremitting and powerful attacks on the enemy in all battlefields." Hanoi on 29 and 31 July broadcasts a review of the military situation by "Quyet Thang" (Determined to Win) which reportedly is also published in the July issue of the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine.

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Date
26 SEP 1997

Attention to political developments in the South includes the 2 August LPA report of a PRG communique, dated 24 July, on an "ordinary session" of the Council of Ministers on the 22d and 23d which heard a report on the Paris talks from Tran Buu Kiem. Reports of additional provincial revolutionary committees are broadcast, but there are still contradictory propaganda claims as to the total number. The recent arrest of many GVN personnel suspected of being a part of a communist espionage ring is treated as further evidence of a policy of terror and repression by a government which, propagandists claim, is rent with rivalry and disunity.

PARIS TALKS

THIEU PROPOSAL

At the 28th session of the Paris talks on 31 July, Mme. Binh once again voiced the PRG's rejection of President Thieu's election proposal; and this time she called the "rejection" a serious one "stemming from the responsibility of defending the real right to self-determination of the South Vietnam people." DRV delegate Xuan Thuy expressed his "full agreement" with Mme. Binh's analysis of the question of the Vietnamese people's right of self-determination. Both delegates said the election proposal is aimed at consolidating and maintaining the GVN, and Mme. Binh repeated the charge that proposed elections would be "fraudulent and void" like those held by the Diem regime and, more recently, by the Thieu-Ky government. She also claimed again that the Thieu proposals require that the South Vietnamese "people" lay down their arms while the GVN uses its army and police to "control" the elections. She made no reference to Thieu's provision for an electoral commission, although this had previously been acknowledged and denounced.

The VNA account of the session says GVN delegate Pham Dang Lam "again rehashed the shopworn allegations about the so-called proposal for free elections" made by President Thieu, a proposal which "has been laid bare and flatly rejected" by the PRG and DRV. It notes that Ambassador Lodge also "repeated his old arguments aimed at dolling up" Thieu's proposal and that he "responded negatively to the logical and reasonable" 10-point proposal of the NFLSV and "tried to dodge the demand" for an unconditional troop withdrawal.

A 2 August Liberation Radio commentary claims, inaccurately, that the allied ambassadors at the 28th session said "the last concessions" had been offered. Mme. Binh in her presentation noted the President's remarks in Saigon that the allied side has gone far enough to open negotiations leading to peace and that now it is the other side's turn to respond. She went on to denounce the United States for continuing and intensifying the war, adhering to its "position of a colonialist aggressor," opposing the legitimate demands of the Vietnamese people, and "unceasingly" obstructing the Paris talks.

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Xuan Thuy did not acknowledge the President's remarks on a settlement, but VNA notes that he said the trip to Saigon was clearly "of no use for the settlement of the South Vietnam problem." VNA says Thuy "analyzed Nixon's latest deceitful allegations about peace," which by dealing with questions that would arise after the Vietnam war "were designed to make believe that peace would come soon." Thuy charged that this was "only a crafty move to appease Americans and world public opinion."

U.S. "OBSTRUCTIONISM" Both the PRG and DRV delegates again pointed to communist "goodwill" and claimed that it is the United States which is obstructing progress at the talks, and this charge is repeated in the Liberation Radio commentary on the 2d. Mme. Binh stressed those sections of the NFLSV's 10-point solution and its call for a provisional coalition government as representing the correct basis on which the people can express their political self-determination. Xuan Thuy hailed the "good will" of the NFLSV and PRG, which had proposed the formation of a provisional coalition government that will "organize and control the free general elections to elect an official coalition government." He declared that this is the "most correct, reasonable and appropriate measure to settle the problem." Mme. Binh, in a defensive aside, denied as "mere invention and distortion" the view that the proposed coalition government would be the government of a single group or political force.

Both the VNA and LPA accounts note Mme. Binh's remark that if the United States really wants to settle the war, it must, on the basis of the 10 points, "hold direct talks" with the PRG, "the genuine and competent representative of the South Vietnamese people."*

In charging U.S. obstruction of the talks, Xuan Thuy stressed that the DRV had come to Paris "with good will and a serious attitude to find, together with the other parties, a peaceful solution to the Vietnam problem." In an apparent response to Ambassador Lodge's charge at the last session, on 24 July, that the other side was unwilling to negotiate on the basis of the proposals before the conference and had in fact rejected them flatly, Thuy said "we have carefully studied and analyzed all the proposals put forth by the representatives of the United States and the Saigon administration." Thuy continued, according to VNA, that "not only refuting these proposals," the DRV Government had

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* This demand for direct U.S. talks is recurrent. It is contained in Article 1 of the PRG's 10 June program and was last raised by both Mme. Binh and DRV delegate Ha Van Lau at the 12 June Paris session. It was also made in a 16 July LPA release of a "war crimes" communique, and by Mme. Binh in an unpublicized interview which appeared in the NEW YORK TIMES on 20 July.

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Thai Insurgents May Open New Area of Operations

Communist insurgents may be planning to set up a new area of operations in northeast Thailand. A recent compilation of reports indicates that since early this year perhaps as many as 200 North Vietnamese - trained cadre have been infiltrated across the Laotian border into southern Ubon Province.

The capture of some modern weapons, the recent attack on the Ubon Air Base, and reports by low-level village informants of Communist proselytizing could be harbingers of a substantial insurgent effort in southern Ubon. Such an effort would be facilitated by Ubon's proximity to Communist bases in Laos and by the familial and other ties of many people on the Thai side of the border to Lao Communists.

There is no evidence to indicate what the Communists expect to achieve if they do establish a new area of operations. They may hope that southern Ubon can be developed into a firm toehold for further expansion in the strategic northeast region. They have been trying for several years to build a viable organization in other northeast areas but have not made much progress.

One reason for the Communists' difficulties has been the activity of the Thai Army, which has pressed them hard, particularly in the northeast. There is some evidence, however, that the army now wants to cut back its effort in this area. The army's chief of staff reportedly has seized on the deteriorating situation in Laos as an excuse to put into effect contingency plans calling for the partial withdrawal of army units engaged in the counterinsurgency effort. If such a withdrawal takes place, it would give the insurgents a respite from government pressure.

The government, meanwhile, has once again restructured its counterinsurgency apparatus. A Communist Suppression and Prevention Command has been established under the direct control of Deputy Prime Minister Praphat. Aside from further strengthening Praphat's voice in Thai affairs and ostensibly "regularizing" the counterinsurgency effort, it is not yet clear what this new setup will accomplish. (~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~)

Communists Setting Up New Insurgency Area in Thailand



NND 941536 --- 362

Chinese Communists Expand Hydrofoil Patrol Boat Program

The Chinese Communists have designed, developed and are producing two types of hydrofoil patrol craft. In addition they may be refitting some of their old Soviet-designed P-6 motor torpedo boats with hydrofoils.

The hydrofoils are designed to lift the bow of the patrol boat out of the water, giving higher speeds and greater stability.

The Chinese began work on hydrofoils for military craft at least as early as 1964 when the first type--designated the Hu-chuan class--was initially identified. This boat probably went into serial production in 1965. The Chinese are turning out about 20-25 per year at the Hu-tung shipyard in Shanghai. Thus far about 65 Hu-chuans have been deployed to all three fleet areas. The Chinese have also exported six of these boats to Albania and reportedly have agreed to deliver 24 more. Three have been given to North Vietnam.

Another new hydrofoil motor gunboat, the Shan-tung class, first appeared in December 1966. Only two units have been seen so far, but it is possible that this class is now in production. Unlike the Hu-Chuan, which is a torpedo boat, the Shan-tung carries only light armament and no torpedo tubes.

There are indications the Chinese may install hydrofoils on some of their old Soviet-designed P-6s. One P-6 has been seen with hydrofoils installed, probably as a test model. If the test is successful, additional P-6s and other motor gunboats may be similarly equipped. (~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~)

Military's Political Role in China Poses Problems

The Army Day rally on 1 August shed little new light on problems currently besetting Peking, but there are indications that the army's performance on the domestic front remains a source of concern at the highest level. The appearance in Peking during the celebrations of high military leaders from some of China's most troubled provinces also suggests that the central authorities are still trying to untangle local political disputes in which the army plays a key role.

The authoritative joint editorial marking the occasion attempted to balance the military's continued heavy involvement in

NND 941536 --- 3828

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
SEPTEMBER 1969

I. GENERAL

1. We logged 6346 block hours in September which represents 75 hours less than the month of August, however revenue time went up six hours. On the other hand, customer passenger handling declined 18.3% and cargo handling declined 11.8%.

2. Ennemy activity in Saigon has been on a steady decline and appears to have reached the level which existed prior to the nefarious 1968 TET offensive. Two rockets impacted in outlying districts causing negligible damage. There were three terrorist incidents involving plastic charges resulting in eight Vietnamese killed.

3. We were approached separately by RMK and the Postal Division of MACV concerning the possibility of providing airlift service. Both agencies are conferring with USAID to determine the feasibility of an agreement for AAM to provide this service under the new USAID contract. (It appears at this moment RMK's current airlift contractor will stay in business with RMK for at least one more year.)

II. FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT

1. We are happy to announce that the much-needed RMD toilet and aircrew shower facility is completed and in full use. The TSN common use water distribution system has been completed and AAM, AVN, PanAm and Air France are receiving adequate supply of water with good pressure. Initial USAF tests indicate this water is potable. The Electric Power Distribution System at Danang with commercial power input, is completed. Also the Hangar Lean-To at Danang is completed. (Attached hereto is a pictorial display of a number of current facilities developments).

III. GENERAL AFFAIRS

1. Exemption of taxes on airfield meal and transportation allowances was granted by GVN as of Sept. 1, 69. As a result of this exemption, Vietnamese employees monthly pay was increased from a modest amount VN$20 to a substantial VN$700 depending on the employees' pay and family status.

2. The company is requested to forward to GVN Customs in SGN, TSN and DAD schedule of its international (maintenance) flight 48 hours prior to departure or arrival. Apparently, this measure was taken after 360kgs of opium was found mixing up with company cargo originated from VTE aboard a Royal Air Laos regular flight. The unofficial opinion of the Customs officials is that organized smuggling on this scale cannot operate without cooperation between smugglers, airport customs and airlines employees.

3. Letter of renewal of lease for Phu Kiet Office was acknowledged and accepted by land-owner. The next step is to negotiate the incorporation of a right of renewal clause into the lease as suggested by LGA-TPE.

IV. OPERATIONS

1. Total revenue block time for September was 6134+45 compared to 6128+34 for August. Our revenue forecast for the month was 6120 hours. The revenue time for Porters was 382 hours less than the previous month; this is because the customers were behind on their quarterly minimums for Volpars + Beechs and these aircraft were used for flights normally flown by Porters. We can expect our flight time forecasts to be less accurate in the coming months since we will be operating under new contracts with many schedule changes.

NHA/OM resigned, the SZ and TM are taking over the OM duties; therefore an OM replacement is not planned for the station and the position has been eliminated. To date we have reduced our working force by 4 Americans, 5 TCNs and 3 locals. Plans for reducing additional personnel are underway.

2. An extensive study has been made of the GTD operation. Realighment has already begun and reductions are planned. New procedures have been implemented with more to follow. Due to the scope involved it is anticipated that the majority of changes will not be effected until the latter part of the coming month.

3. We expect to reduce our spare aircraft fleet by sending 3 C-45s to Tainan this month and we will possibly deposition one Helio to Viehtiane.

There were 21 controllable and 38 non-controllable delays for the months out of a total 913 Saigon departure.

4. Flight time report (See attachment A)
Aircraft Incidents report (See attachment B)

V. TRAFFIC/AAM

1. A letter suggesting changes to the Contract of Carriage Form was forwarded to DTD on 6 Sept. 69. Implementation of the changes would save considerable storage space and allow for a more streamlined operation.

2. [redacted] was transferred to SAT as TM, after a week's orientation at Tachikawa prior to physical movement. General overseeing and assistance to him will be rendered by this office as discussed with DTD.

3. Terminal painting is still not started due to lack of customer provided paint. Discussions with the CORDS representative indicate paint will arrive during second week of October.

4. Many of the same problems remain regarding procedures, logistics and movement of International Company cargo. Daily efforts are made to resolve long range and daily problems and it is felt that thru the operation of the customer and other Air America sections that progress is being made.

5. The Water Supply seems to be adequate now however, we will watch the pressure and flow for another month before a good evaluation can be made

	August	September
Passengers departure SGN (All contracts)	6153	5,837
" arrival SGN (All contracts)	6731	5,980
Outbound cargo SGN	69543	94,217
Inbound cargo SGN	88103	90,205

6. TRAFFIC/USAID

	Cargo (including Af Caribou A/C)	
	August	September
outbound (lbs) SGN	1,626,899	1,369,868 lbs
Inbound (lbs) SGN	540,886	519,743 lbs

VI. HOSTEL OCCUPANCY

1. During the month of September, 1969,44 beds out 120 beds were utilized for a 40% occupancy rate.

VII. SAFETY

1. Pilot Meetings - 204B - 22 Sept. The following items affecting flight safety were discussed:

a. Pilots were reminded of the necessity for assuring there is a seat belt for each passenger aboard.

b. The FAA regulation regarding drinking prior to flight were reviewed. (Twelve hours from "bottle to throttle.")

c. Pilots were warned to observe the utmost caution in the vicinity of air strikes and military airfields because of the recent rash of mid-air collisions.

d. Pilots were reminded of the proper procedure for checking autorotational RPM.

e. Pilots were cautioned about accepting aircraft with obvious FCU discrepancies such as: (1) More than 1% RPM surge, or (2) a drop in NII with booster pumps turned off.

2. Accident Investigation - 1) Local Board of Review for N9521Z is scheduled for 10 October. 2) Estimate N7770B Review Board on 14 October. 3) Estimate N1306 Review Board on 20 October.

VIII. PERSONNEL

1. Activities were largely routine with, again as last month, the exceptions of the time spent on Work Permit applications and on the Vietnamese Line Maintenance Training Program. Progress has been slow in both areas due to the everchanging procedures, forms, requirements, etc. However, we plug along with undiminished faith that there are indeed silver linings.

2. Some progress has been made toward obtaining Gia Dinh Labor Service approval of our Rules of Employment. We have met with the Labor Service Personnel several times in the past few weeks and have ironed out most of their points of contention. A few points yet remain which we hope will soon be resolved.

3. By directive of the Ministry of Labor (MOL), all foreign workers in Vietnam must have in their possession, by 15 October 1969, a Workers' Card (at VN$1000 per copy). So, during the last week of September we compiled and submitted to MOL applications for all of our expatriates (to which we attached a check for VN$ 619,000). For our efforts and expense we were rewarded with blank Worker's Card forms which we must complete and return to MOL for their validation stamp. A businessman's dream becomes a government reality.

4. See Personnel Strength Attachment C.

IX. FISCAL

1. Contract Billing

	Flying Services		Others	
	US$	VN$	US$	VN$
4101	769,297.52	13,607,414	48,222.86	226,545
4102	171,395.31	3,044,309	4,371.72	-
4103	65,359.37	990,122	2,100.15	-
4395	82,055.94	-	-	-
0005	7,949.50	-	-	-
0069	20,798.89	-	1,094.24	-

Total: US$1,172,645.50 VN$17,868,390

2. Total flying hours including CAL Sub-Contractor

Revenue:
- Block time: 6,446:32
  Flight Time: 5,586:05
  Hazardous Time: 4,609:49

Non-Revenue:
- Block time: 203:33
  Flight time: 164:17
  Total AFL's processed: 1634
  Passengers: 38,604
  Cargo: 3,819,494 lbs.

3. Payroll and Timekeeping

[redacted]	Amount	No. of Person
	[redacted]	743
TCN piastre allowance	2,484,150.-	436
American piastre allowance	990,296	169
Chinese payroll	US$ 70,961.39.-	177
Thai payroll	6,060,28.-	20

DSL: 70,370 hrs.
Number of persons filling DTR: 335

4. Total disbursements

VN$ 19,470,848.00
Free Market Rate: VN$ 226 to US$1.00

X. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1.September started off about as bad as it could possibly be, Volpar N7770B incurred substantial damage when the nose gear collapsed during a post service engine run up by RMD. We were lucky in that no one was seriously hurt, but the two props contacted the ground and more or less disintegrated. Both engines were badly damaged from sudden stoppage and the fuselage nose section buckeled inside with shrapnel damage outside. About seven days of hard work, totaling some $60,000.00 US is estimated for this accident. The investigation has been completed at Saigon and various actions are underway (at SGN and TMN) to prevent recurrence.

2. The new RMD toilets have finally been completed and opened for use during the last part of the month. Of course it seems smaller than we would like and it is not equivalent to the Hongkong Hilton but it is a big improvement for which most all of us appreciate.

3. A reshuffle of the various RMD Shop functions is underway to provide a more direct access for 204B work, a better working arrangement for the Sheetmetal Shop, a relocation of the Tire Shop and expansion of the Paint Shop (to accommodate the new spray booth).

4. A new hard fresh review of the supply handling, arrangement and procedures is being made by the new Superintendent of Supply Mr. A.C. Anderson. He has brought up some fine ideas that should be a big improvement to the overall effort.

5. Our total flying hours for the month again was quite stable, with only a drop of some 40 hours from the previous month.

XI. FLYING

1. Speculation and anticipation ran high on the outcome of the new contract. The proposed pay increase has been somewhat over shadowed by the impending resolvement of the standby time. The star of this particular show is the VTB program. Numerous studies have been presented in regards to this, the latest of which was hand carried to Taipei by the Base Manager to be considered in the contract negotiation.

2. The Base Manager's efforts proved fruitful. On his return his briefing included the well sought for answers. In essence there will be no airport standby for customer requirements. If an aircraft is not scheduled there will be not requirement for a crew to standby just in case something does come up during the day. We will continue to schedule airport standby for Company requirements in order to meet the published schedule. Emergency requirements ordered by the customer will be excepted. Education of the customer is now in order.

3. The ATC (Air Traffic Control) working group of JAOG (Joint Air Operation Group) is to submit their recommendations to JAOG on 6 Oct 1969. The point proffered is to insure closer control of aircraft at uncontrolled airstrips in RVN. Use of common frequencies, education of various publications and directives, emphasis on courtesy and realignment or updating

of equipment were the main considerations. Note the consideration "realignment or updating of equipment". This is a recommendation that Air America, Inc. be directed to equip their aircraft with an FM radio as this is common to all military aircraft, controllers, portable towers and other military agencies. All recommendations are to enhance safety.

E.J. Theisen

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT
SEPTEMBER 1969.

1. Contract 4101 -

A/C No.	Revenue Block time	Revenue Flight time	Non-Revenue Block Time	Non-Revenue Flight Time
N67984	73+52	59+25		
N67985	139+20	114+18		
B910	121+14	99+17	1+05	0+50
B928	117 +20	92+57		
B138	133+58	108+59	0+38	0+00
B146	64+58	53+16	2+05	1+13
6147	156+23	129+34		
8084	119+16	102+56		
5559	162+30	145+26		
5994	119+38	99+31		
B817	99+22	87+57	2+48	2+25
B829	55+09	44+23	11+49	11+02
6083	105+03	91+32		
N539Y	48+26	42+12	2+57	2+08
N544Y	28+14	24+20	20+02	17+46
N9518Z	108+48	94+59	1+09	0+37
N6154U	39+40	33+28	9+55	6+57
N9956Z	60+04	52+35		
N7770B	1+20	1+05		
N9577Z	89+33	77+55	1+28	0+56
N9838Z	34+34	27+08	0+49	0+30
N3728G	67+15	58+38	20+43	17+53
N9664C	8+14	7+25	7+28	4+51
N3674G	57+05	46+48		
N7695C	36+43	31+11		
N91295	12+48	10+59		
N6622C	10+48	8+27		
N5454V	97+35	75+49	1+41	1+17
N9573Z	129+08	109+59		
N5269V	107+31	91+22	1+56	1+12
N77Y	72+37	61+00	1+39	1+08
N7950C	137+56	110+32		
N51259	105+45	91+03		
N21412	63+52	51+48	0+52	0+33
N9073Z	69+51	60+39	2+00	1+40
N9871Z	26+50	21+31	12+33	10+15
N9898Z	19+24	14+41	9+05	6+52
N285L	98+03	83+28	8+12	6+35
N391R	145+58	128+07	5+01	3+17
N394R	118+44	105+45	6+10	4+22
N9444	125+23	111+10	0+37	0+24
N198Y	93+44	83+36	4+19	3+25
N153L	112+28	93+54	5+11	3+52
N180K	47+48	44+02		
N12450	83+33	72+01	0+50	0+30

N748N	35+51	28+43		
N152L	62+26	50+49		
N184L	68+13	59+21		
N185K	21+06	16+52		
N192X	18+21	16+12		
N393R	15+13	13+07		
N194X	87+52	75+58		
N1303X	126+55	126+55	1+15	1+15
N1304X	65+50	65+50	10+42	10+42
N1305X	108+47	108+47	7+30	7+30
N1306X	145+29	145+29	4+52	4+52
N1307X	146+25	146+25	2+15	2+15
N8512F	86+26	86+26		
N8514F	2+57	2+57		
N8535F	128+25	128+25	0+45	0+29
B839	7+20	7+08		
Sub-total	4855+22	4236+32	170+21	139+33

2. Contract 4102

B146	10+18	9+23		
B817	4+09	3+55		
N539Y	23+04	18+57		
N544Y	14+21	11+29	7+36	5+31
N3674G	4+39	3+44	0+40	0+15
N7695C	47+18	41+19	4+12	2+14
N9129S	87+50	75+58		
N9518Z	4+18	3+28		
N6154U	34+15	29+26		
N9956Z	3+26	3+03		
N9577Z	7+43	6+26		
N3728G	9+37	8+34		
N9664C	17+36	15+08	6+40	5+20
N748N	82+00	71+08	1+58	1+26
N152L	62+19	57+03	3+15	2+07
N184L	46+49	37+56	2+47	1+20
N185K	91+31	70+36	1+52	1+26
N192X	70+57	63+03	2+37	1+33
N393R	81+55	71+02	0+56	0+30
N194X	14+44	11+30		
N358F	5+51	5+40		
N285L	8+46	6+38		
N9444	9+19	8+12		
N153L	8+45	6+16		
N180K	34+42	32+09		
N12450	42+10	37+39		

N5269V	2+30	1+52		
N51259	14+23	11+30		
N21412	5+13	3+55		
N9871Z	7+48	7+13		
N8514F	111+01	111+01	2+07	2+07
N8512F	1+50	1+50	3+23	3+23
N8535F	5+25	5+25	2+45	2+45
N1303X	2+15	2+15		
N1304X	16+07	16+07		
N1305X	10+33	10+33		
N1306X	10+33	10+33		
Sub-total	1016+00	891+56	40+48	29+57

3. Contract 4103.

N67984	2+18	1+04
N67985	2+10	1+12
B910	12+23	9+42
B138	0+35	0+00
B146	13+01	11+29
B817	3+11	2+17
B829	1+12	0+55
N539I	7+44	6+20
N544I	10+19	8+29
N9518Z	1+04	0+46
N9577Z	4+34	2+46
N9838Z	5+45	3+41
N3728G	1+50	0+48
N3674G	1+19	0+42
N7695C	4+55	2+44
N91295	4+58	2+49
N5454V	14+02	9+25
N9573Z	7+04	5+50
N5269V	11+23	7+21
N7950C	5+28	3+57
N21412	1+21	0+38
N9073Z	4+18	4+00
N9871Z	2+33	1+47
N9898Z	5+01	3+32

N12450	2+29	1+49
N1303X	12+53	12+53
Sub-total	143+50	106+56

4. Contract 0005.

N6622C	44+29	38+29
N1306X	1+56	1+56
N8512F	0+55	0+55
Sub-total	47+20	41+20

5. Contract 0069.

N9664C	44+33	37+03
N9838Z	17+13	15+22
N3728G	8+26	6+58
N7695C	2+01	1+45
Sub-total	72+13	61+08

Total Revenue Block Time	6134+45
Total Revenue Flight Time	5337+52
Total Non-Revenue Block Time	211+09
Total Non-Revenue Flight Time	169+30
GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	6345+54
" " FLIGHT TIME	5507+22

Flight Time by Type of Aircraft

Type of A/C	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
C-46	691+27	561+02	3+48	2+03
C-47	163+03	139+27	14+37	13+27
Sailed C-47	662+50	568+59		
DHC-4	132+08	111+47	22+59	19+54
VIB	829+24	704+41	54+00	39+44
10-2(Beech)	831+05	682+57	6+08	4+10
C-45	135+45	113+23	23+38	18+47
Porter	1697+01	1463+46	50+25	36+07
204B	984+42	984+42	34+49	34+49
Helio	7+20	7+08	0+45	0+29
TOTAL	6134+45	5337+52	211+09	169+30

L.G.P arrish

ATTACHMENT "A"

FLIGHT INFORMATION CENTER

- S A I G O N -

- MONTHLY ACTIVITY REPORT -
1 - 30 SEPTEMBER 1969

PART I
- AIRCRAFT INCIDENTS -

Date	A/C No., Type & Contract	Place	Description
02 Sept.	8084 C-47 4101	AR 9663	Acft was in a turn enroute to V04 when Capt Greenway and a passenger heard automatic weapons fire directed at the acft. PIC increased the rate of turn and departed the area. No acft damage or personnel injuries involved.
07 Sept.	N539Y DHC-4 4101	BS 7270	Acft was enroute to V23 flying below weather when three rounds of automatic weapons fire impacted in the fuselage. No personnel injuries involved. Acft continued mission without further incident.
16 Sept.	N9956Z VIB 0069	AR 0333	Acft was on final approach at V219 when the PIC heard six rounds of small arms fire pass near his acft. Capt Gustafson notified the twr & landed safely without further incident. No personnel injuries or acft damage involved. Twr launched two military acft to look for sniper, but negative contact was rptd.
22 Sept.	N391R PC-6 4101	UNK - DELTA, RVN	Acft flew most direct route from V17 to V20 (Vinh Long) to V183 (Binh Duc) to V14 (Truc Giang) and back to V17. At no time did pilot notice anything unusual. Bullet hole was discovered by mechanic at V17 during post flight inspection. Bullet entered upper skin of right wing, penetrated 3 stringers and exited at leading edge, tearing a four inch hole in same.

PART II

- SITUATION SUMMARY -

I CORP - With the exception of 6 Sept., enemy initiated activity remained at a low level. On 6 Sept. a total of 16 attacks by fire and ground sappers were reported in the Danang area. Approximately 43 rockets and 270 mortar rounds impacted in the area. The outlook is for activity to remain at a low level throughout the corp with attacks by fire and small unit contact dominating activity.

II CORP- This reporting period saw little significant activity in II Corp. However harassment of the coastal provinces continued. The National Police Training Center in Dalat received 40 rounds of mortar fire on 6 Sept. and on 14 Sept. Ban-Me-Thuot airfield received 11 rounds of mortar fire. It is likely that the present low level of activity will continue. Propaganda, proselyting, and harassment of coastal population centers and remote allied installations will continue.

III CORP - Activity in the Corp has been sporadic with several nights of little activity and several with relatively high levels. This peculiar behavior can possibly be attributed to the death of Ho-Chi-Minh. Bein-Hoa received 18 rounds of rocket fire on 6 Sept. Terrorism in Saigon continued with several incidents reported. In keeping with the enemy's intent to destroy the people's faith in the GVN, terrorism was directed mainly at government officials and PSDF troops. The road between Bien-Hoa and Saigon remains insecure as evidenced by the Sept. 26 midday attack on an ARVN convey. That attack damaged or destroyed 15 out of the 20 vehicles in the convoy. The enemy will likely to continue his present low level of operations as he resupplies, retrains, and makes preparations for his next series of operations.

IV CORP - Activity was scattered throughout the corp and was typified by small unit involvement. The enemy's main efforts are being directed at objectives which will enhance a long term political rather than a military victory. The Chi-Lang ARVN Training Center was attacked on 11 September. Activity is on the rise in the Chau-Doc area with the threat of ground attacks and attacks by fire high. It is probable that the enemy will continue to limit concentration to harassment and attacks by fire in order to keep friendly forces off balance.

E. J. WILSON
OPSP/SGN

ATTACHMENT "B"

S A I G O N B A S E

SEPTEMBER 1969

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted] GRD	FLT	[redacted] GRD	FLT	[redacted] GRD	FLT	[redacted] GRD	FLT	[redacted] GRD	FLT	[redacted] GRD	FLT	[redacted] GRD	FLT	[redacted] GRD	FLT	TOTAL GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	40	150	150	14	155	2	16	5	565#	15**	2		2		1*		922	186
TEMPORARY																		
FTC																		
PRE-PROCESSED	1								4								5	
TOTAL	41	150	150	14	155	2	16	5	569#	15**	2		2		1*		928	186

(**) : [redacted]

(*) :

(#) :

GROUND PNL : 928

FLIGHT PNL : 186

TOTAL : 1114

ATTACHMENT "C"

DA NANG SUB-BASE

SEPTEMBER 69

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted] GRD	FLT	[redacted] GRD	FLT	[redacted] GRD	FLT	[redacted] GRD	FLT	TOTAL GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	5		14		22		81		122	
TEMPORARY										
FTC										
PRE-PROCESSED										
TOTAL	5		14		22		81		122	

GROUND PNL : 122

FLIGHT PNL : 0

TOTAL : 122

CAN THO SUB-BASE

SEPTEMBER 69

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted] GRD	FLT	[redacted] GRD	FLT	[redacted] GRD	FLT	[redacted] GRD	FLT	TOTAL GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	1				10		4		15	
TEMPORARY										
FTC										
PRE-PROCESSED										
TOTAL	1				10		4		15	

GROUND PNL : 15

FLIGHT PNL : 0

TOTAL : 15

NHA TRANG SUB-BASE

SEPTEMBER 1969

CLASSIFICATION	[redacted] GRD	FLT	[redacted] GRD	FLT	[redacted] GRD	FLT	[redacted] GRD	FLT	TOTAL GRD	FLT
PERMANENT	4		14		25		61		104	
TEMPORARY										
FTC										
PRE-PROCESSED							1		1	
TOTAL	4		14		25		62		105	

GROUND PNL : 105

FLIGHT PNL : 0

TOTAL : 105

M O N T H L Y R E P O R T

NHATRANG

SEPTEMBER 1969

GENERAL

September witnessed a further decline in revenue flight activity however, there was an overall increase in cargo and passengers. This results from an increase in C/47 and C/46 utilization with decreased VIP activity. It would appear that we have just about reached the bottom of a graphic curve and should maintain this level or possibly increase our flight time in the coming months. This is a calculated "Guesstimate" based on present and foreseeable requirements of our customers.

Most of the military personnel have moved from downtown Nha-Trang onto the beach. Some units have left Nha-Trang airbase for other areas. All of this has resulted in a light but noticable decline in social activity and hotel availability in the area. Houses are more available but rents have not decreased appreciably as yet.

The cost of commodities on the local market however continue to increase.

TRAFFIC

Station traffic activities declined in arrival and departure of flights but there was an increase in overall passenger and cargo activity. This is reflected in the following statistics.

STATISTICS

Passenger	September	August	1968
Departing	3285	3732	3655
Arriving	3514	2285	1192
TOTAL	6799	6017	4846

CARGO

1. Ground Services (lbs)

Departing	530,278	577,238	1,129,250
Arriving	386,299	244,541	296,373
TOTAL	916,577	843,779	1,425,623

2. Company Cargo (lbs)

Departing	4,658	9,848	12,829
Arriving	5,204	12,487	8,080
TOTAL	9,862	22,334	20,909

. . . 2 . .

3. GRAND TOTAL (Lbs) (1 2)	Sept.	Aug.	1968
Departing	534,936	543,697	1,142,359
Arriving	391,503	289,122	304,143
TOTAL	926,439	794,019	1,446,302

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

Customer relations this month were supprisingly good. A difficult month due to many weather problems went smoothly with cooperation and understanding on the part of everyone.

FACILITIES

Cdr T. Cheely departed this on 23 September. The O function is now being shared by S2/S4A and T/PA. To date the change over has proceeded smoothly. More time and experience in these positions will provide continued improvements. In addition to the Operations Administrative Guide, Operators Manual etc; we have on hand a copy of the NAVAIR Dispatcher & Examination Study Guide which both S2 and T are reading and studying.

A. COMMUNICATIONS

The Motorola unit was out of service for 5 days this month. It appears to be doing well now and continued maintenance experience by our own personnel will provide more reliable service.

B. FLIGHT PROFICIENCY (See attached)

C. ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE CLEARANCE

	Sept.	Aug.	1968
Arrival	542	585	784
Departure	551	566	693
Non	271	178	328

D. DELAYS

Percentage on time	94%	98%	

SECURITY

Problems reported to appropriate parties.

TRAINING (See attached)

FUEL : No problems

LOCAL : No problems

TECHNICAL SERVICES

	Sept.	Aug.	1968
1. Transient overnight	277	307	300
2. Overnight services	271	278	328
3. Engine changes	1	3	5
4. Propeller changes	2	1	1

5. No. I services	0	1	6
6. No. II services	0	0	3
7. Relays maint/Mech	7	3	21
8. Intermediate services	0	0	0
9. ACF	5	10	15
10. Outline reservies	4	2	2
11. Accident reports (A/C)	0	1	0
12. Accident reports (PTL)	0	0	0

C M D

Nha Trang Station electrical distribution was completed this month. The CCC team did an excellent job. It looks good and works well. All circuits were load balanced and emergency power generators were wired with key areas utilizing this limited source.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

Dan Lawson

DAN LAWSON
SE-NHA

MEMORANDUM

TO : BH/SGN

DATE: 05 September 1969

FROM : SZ/DAD

REF. No. SZDAD/69/092

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for August 1969

GENERAL

Hostile activity remained at a relatively low level during the month. There were a few occasions when rockets were launched against the DaNang Air Base, but none of these attacks were large and no damage or casualties were reported. A USMC guard has been positioned at the side entrance to the U.S. Consulate, which is adjacent to the Old Hostel, but this situation may only continue for the duration of a large construction project being performed on the main access road to the Consulate.

The DaNang City and Air Base curfews remain unchanged, and no curfew incidents concerning company personnel were reported.

The anticipated volume of Southern Air Transport flights did not materialize, but sixteen of these flights were handled, a decrease of ten from the previous month. On one occasion, a SAT flight arrived nearly two hours ahead of schedule, at 0440L, and consequently no company personnel were on hand to handle same. The flight departed without undue delay, but MAC personnel were a little disturbed about it. It should be realized that it is impossible to inform the concerned personnel of such early arrivals during the night.

LEGAL

Further progress on the proposal from Barclay and Company to assume the operation of the Terminal Snack-Bar is pending the receipt of a formal agreement from SLC. Should this agreement be acceptable, efforts will then be directed towards obtaining a commissary account from the Naval Support Activity. The VN-41 Air Operations Officer has indicated that CORDS will offer all possible support in this endeavour. It is conceivable but unlikely that the snack bar could be under new management by October.

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

VN-41 has shown strong interest in several facilities improvements, and has indicated that efforts will be made to secure the required funding from Saigon. The main projects under consideration are the renovation of the passenger terminal area (including making more space available to the snack-bar) and paving the unsurfaced areas of the facility. This customer interest in the latter project (action on a pro-forma AR to accomplish same was deferred in July for an indefinite period due to lack of funds) has interrupted efforts to obtain sufficient gravel to cover these areas in exchange for cement presently on hand. Overall relations with AID/VN-41 remain satisfactory.

CS-4 R2

.....Cont'd.

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for August 1969

The permanent Embassy Air Operations Officer has been on temporary assignment to SGN, but continued excellent relations with his replacement have been maintained.

FACILITIES

An Engineer from SGN, with the assistance of RCMD/DAD, prepared a working drawing for the proposed passenger terminal renovation. A cost estimate is now being formulated based on supplying a contractor with all materials obtainable from MSA. It is anticipated that bids for this project will be solicted in September.

The RMD Lean-to project is all but completed. For unknown reasons the contractor has failed to install a stair to the upper storage area which would effectively permit a final settlement.

Only minor in-house work remains on the City Power Project, all underground cables are in place and the company 75 KVA generator (in need of overhaul) has been moved to the new generator pad. S.I.P.E.A. has completed the installation of the 100 KVA transformer so that only two terminal splices and the relocation of the USAF 100 KVA generator are required to make the system operational. Fortunately, the USAF generator's reliability has been quite high during the past few weeks.

FISCAL

With the exception of a few minor difficulties, such as power failures and adjustments, the station timekeeping system based on a time clock is working satisfactorily. The use of attendance rosters for personnel punching time cards has been discontinued.

[redacted] payroll for the month totaled: [redacted]

Petty cash expenditures for the month totaled: 41,945$VN

OPERATIONS

Total revenue flight time increased 8+30 hours as compared to the previous month. Customer requirements seem to have stabilized and little variation is anticipated in the future. Unlike other locations, very few special or VIP flights are operated out of DaNang. Revenue losses were the lowest of any reporting period to date and resulted from a Volpar Fuel Control Unit change.

The following is a breakdown of flight time generated by this station during August:

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for August 1969

VN-41/AID	812+07
VN-41/Embassy	230+52
0005	7+37
Non-Revenue	9+52
Total	1,060+28

Revenue loss for the month was as follows:

Maintenance	1+30
Weather	Nil
Customer Cancellations	Nil
Other	Nil
Total	1+30

In order to more equally balance the flying between the two assigned 204B aircraft, an agreement was reached between AID and Embassy whereby AID would fly the Embassy helicopter on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. AID will now pay half the maintenance ferry cost involved when it is necessary to perform services at Saigon on the Foxtrot Helicopter.

Hostel occupancy factors were 75% and 24.7% for the Old and New hostel respectively.

COMMUNICATIONS

No problems were encountered with Motorola remote VHF/UHF during the month. AESU has commenced preliminary work on transferring the station radio transmitters to their new location in the RMD Lean-to.

Incoming and outgoing messages totaled 1985 and 1527 respectively.

TRAFFIC

Aside from the inauguration of two additional weekly C-46 passenger flights from Saigon, workload has remained fairly constant. A new conditions of Contract form was initiated during the month which requires a few more entries than that used previously, but no real problem in this regard has been experienced. A total of 637 departures were handled during the month.

Passenger and cargo statistics for the month are as follows:

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for August 1969

	Passengers In	Passengers Out	Cargo In	Cargo Out
4101	2,972	3,213	241,754	293,105
4102	486	604	1,477	10,998
C005	9	15	Nil	Nil
C069	8	9	Nil	Nil
AAH	81	116	6,459	29,635
Total	3,556	3,957	249,690	333,738

6 Continental Air Services flights were handled during August.

SECURITY

No problems were encountered in this area during the month; the Blick Time Clock system is working very effectively. No further action will, therefore, be taken to provide seperate guards for the USAID warehouse.

PERSONNEL

Extension of stay approvals are again being delayed, apparently due to a problem concerning work permits for TCN employees. As a result, a few planned leaves have had to be deferred.

The personnel reduction accomplished in July has had no noticeable affect on the overall station operation, and further reductions are being considered for September.

The personnel breakdown at DaNang station at the close of business, 31 August, was as follows:

[redacted]				
Permanent	5	14	22	96
Pre-Process	0	0	0	3
Temporary	0	0	0	0
Daily Hire	0	0	0	0
TOTAL (140)	5	14	22	99

TECHNICAL SERVICES

ABD handled a total of 650 arriving and 652 departing flights during the month. There were a total of five delays of which only one

involved a revenue loss. Two outstation recoveries were necessary but only minor maintenance was required in each case. Seven heavy services were performed, all on 204B aircraft, three of which being number 2 services required maintenance personnel support from Saigon. No engine or propeller changes were required.

MMD expended a total of 1277 manhours of which 136 were utilized in hostel maintenance. The old hostel air conditioners and water pump have been particular problems. Due to four air conditioners being out of service, it was necessary to remove one unit from the new hostel to support the old.

A substantial credit was received on the July MSA invoice, and a further credit for some previous double billings is expected in September. No other problems with MSA account were experienced.

Original Signed by
WINSTON C. CAMBRE
Winston C. Cambre

cc: file

FBIS, DCSOPS, ACSI-CJ; TAG

C767

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

[redacted]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

COUNTRY South Vietnam

REPORT NO. [redacted] 1.3(e)(4)

SUBJECT Lessons Used in the Indoctrination of American Prisoners of War

DATE DISTR. 15 SEPTEMBER 1969

[redacted]

DATE OF INFO. June 1968

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Vietnam, Saigon [redacted]

FIELD REPORT NO. [redacted] 1.3(e)(4)

SOURCE [redacted]

1.3(e)(4)

Summary. A series of four lessons is given American prisoners captured in the area of Front 7. The first, after containing a brief historical review, emphasizes the unjustness of the current American participation in the war. The second develops the theme that the war is causing a split in American society. The third dwells on racial discrimination in the US and links the Negroes' struggle for civil rights to the Viet Cong cause. The last concerns the clemency policy of the Viet Cong toward American prisoners. Directed discussions follow each of the lessons. End Summary.

1. The first indoctrination lesson given American prisoners of war (POW's) in the Front 7 area of Quang Tri proposes to show them that their country's participation in the war is unjust and immoral. It is also designed to help the prisoners understand and sympathize with the Viet Cong insurgency. The lesson begins with the situation following the Geneva Accords

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[redacted] 1.3(e)(4)

5 4 3 2

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NS	AID	OCR	

Approved for Release Date August 1993

of 1954, noting that the latter provided for the withdrawal of the French Army and the holding of free elections leading toward unification. It then states that the French abandoned their responsibility for supervising these elections because of the Algerian war and handed South Vietnam (SVN) over to the Americans in order to repay them for their help during the Indo-China War. The course material goes on to characterize the Diem regime as having been established by the Americans, as having been completely dependent on them, and as having been the cruelest in Vietnamese history. The Thieu-Ky Government is then described as representing the elite only, not the populace; and its support by the US is purported not to be in the latter's national interest.

2. This lesson also claims that SVN has become a virtual colony of the US, that the latter has taken over in all aspects of its life, and that this has not been to the good. Examples of this takeover are seen in the American participation in Diem's overthrow, the continued presence of US troops in the country, the complete dependence of SVN economically on American aid, and the corruption of the manners and morals of Vietnamese women (attributed in large part to the influence of American arts and entertainment). The Americans are also blamed for the spread of venereal disease in the country, the lack of adequate public hospital facilities, the growing gap between the rich and the poor, the violation of traditional customs and manners, and the destruction of temples, pagodas, tombs, villages, and populations.

3. Finally, this lesson contrasts what it contends is the just and winning cause of the Viet Cong (VC) with the unjust and losing one of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) and its American supporters. Comparisons are drawn here with the Americans' victory in their own War of Independence and with the failure of the French to defeat the Vietnamese during 1945-1954. Specifically, the lesson states that the Americans cannot win because the unjustness of their cause has alienated world public opinion, because they lack the support of the majority of the Vietnamese people, and because the American public will be increasingly split as the protracted guerilla warfare of the Viet Cong results in continued attrition of men and money. The Viet Cong, on the other hand, are pictured as having the support of world public opinion because of the justness of their cause, as being able to mobilize the patriotic zeal of the Vietnamese people as a result of the "American aggression," and as being experienced guerrilla warriors.

4. The second lesson aims at showing the POW's that the internal cohesiveness of the US is being ruptured by its government's "absurd determination" to continue the Vietnam War. First it claims that America is facing economic disaster because of the war, that tens of billions of dollars a year must be spent on the Vietnam effort, that unemployment and poverty in America are on the increase, that the dollar is depreciating in value, and that America's overseas markets are being lost to France, West Germany, and Japan. Then the lesson points out what it considers to be the political problems caused by the war, that the split within the Democratic and Republican Parties over the war (anti-war congressmen of both parties are noted here) has compounded the pre-existing split between the two parties (which in turn is cited as the cause of the John F. and Robert Kennedy assassinations) and that the American people have shown their opposition to the war and support of the Vietnamese people in many ways; e.g., bloody demonstrations, burning of draft cards, and self-immolations. The lesson concludes that if you (the POW's) [illegible]

1.3(e)(4)

a Vietnamese, you are going against the conscience and concepts of humanity and justice held by most of your fellow Americans. (Field comment. As presented by the source, this lesson seems ill-organized, building up an anti-war case based upon national self-interest and then switching to a moralistic appeal.)

5. The third lesson concerns racial discrimination in America and is designed to make Negro POW's fully aware of "their condition of slavery" so that they will oppose the US Government. The line is pressed here that racial discrimination is caused by the American Government and not by the American people, who respect all races. It is stated that the government fosters racial discrimination as a means of reducing the collective strength of the people, thus making their exploitation easier. The point is then made that Negroes are also human beings, are intelligent, and can contribute to society and that all people have the right to equal treatment according to the letter of the US Constitution. This is contrasted with the "facts" of segregation and the brutality and economic privation to which the American Negro has been subjected. The situation whereby the Negro becomes a soldier fighting in Vietnam is pictured as being of no benefit to him but only to the large industrial corporations which are growing rich off the war. The civil rights movement is praised as a struggle against genocide, and the assassination of Martin Luther King is presented as a sign that the US Government has embarked upon such a course of extermination. Finally, the Negro struggle in America is likened to the struggle of the Vietnamese "people" against "aggression".

6. The final lesson deals with the application of the VC "clemency policy" towards US POW's. The purpose of this lesson is to convince the prisoner that this policy stems from the humane spirit of the resistance forces. It is stated that the POW himself is not considered an enemy and that it is only the "imperialists" who fall into this category. The prisoners are told that despite the fact that they resisted the VC and committed atrocities against them, they will not be subjected to cruelty. Nevertheless, it is announced that three levels of treatment will be meted out to Americans coming under VC control, depending on whether they are "counter-war," ralliers or those willing to serve as penetration agents; "non-resisters," those who desert on the battlefield or who put up no resistance to being captured; or POW's, those forced to surrender on the battlefield. It is further stated that only weapons, binoculars, radios, compasses, helmets, watches, and fountain pens will be taken from the prisoners and that they will be left with what is considered their personal property; e.g., checks, money orders, contracts, pictures, clothes, shoes, field bags, belts, lighters, combs, and money. Finally, notice is given that the VC will do whatever it can to have delivered POW's letters to their families and to accommodate those Americans wishing not to return home but to remain in the "liberated" area.

7. The following procedures are used in teaching each lesson:

a. The classroom presentation consists of an oral verbatim reading of a previously-prepared standard text. The time required varies from six to eight hours. It is given in intervals of 50 minutes, with a 10 minute break between intervals.

b. The discussion period lasts three or four days, perhaps even longer depending on the receptivity of the

particular group of POW's. The indoctrinator fields the discussion questions and monitors the subsequent discussion which it is hoped will ensue among the POW's. He keeps the discussion keyed to the particular question and observes what part of the class holds a pro-VC view and what part does not. When approximately two-thirds of the class becomes pro-VC, the discussion stops and the text of that particular lesson is re-written for its final presentation in class before proceeding to the next lesson. If two-thirds of the class fail to hold a pro-VC view, the text is re-written again, presented again, and discussed again, or else the particular indoctrinator is replaced by another one from the next higher echelon.

c. The presentation of the revised text requires two to three hours.

8. Field Dissem: STATE, USMACV, USAID, CORDS, 7th Air Force, Dir/JUSPAO (Mr. Nickel only), USARV, NAVFORV, 525 MI GP, 6499 SAG, OSI, CINCPAC PACFLT, PACAF, ARPAC

1 2 3 4 5

1.3(a)(4)

NND 927660-IRS

LAO GOVERNMENT FORCES ARE FACING HEAVIER RESISTANCE

Government forces last week continued to make some slight progress in trying to advance farther north of the Plaine des Jarres. Enemy resistance has stiffened, however, and there are signs that North Vietnam is dispatching reinforcements into north Laos.

General Vang Pao's weary troops have had only limited s c-cess in repeated efforts to se-cure the high ground north of the Plaine, where substantial numbers of North Vietnamese forces are dug in. In the northwest sector of the Plaine and in the key area near the Route 7/71 junction, gov-ernment units have been checked by several small but sharp enemy counterattacks. The government wants to hold this area as long as possible to impede enemy re-inforcements from North Vietnam.

On the more positive side, a small government element has advanced to within five miles of Muong Soui, meeting light enemy resistance. Northeast of Khang Khay, government guerrillas oc-cupied a large, abandoned cave complex believed to be the former Pathet Lao headquarters in north Laos. (~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~)

* * *

NND 941536 --- 3845

Thai Insurgents Seek To Improve Their Position

Communist guerrilla leaders are striving to strengthen their political base in the villages and to improve the caliber of their guerrilla forces. The insurgents' new tactics appear to be better tailored to meet the problems they face, but they are still unable to mount a significant military campaign against the numerically superior government security forces.

In the key northeast region, guerrilla leaders seem to be making some progress in implementing decisions taken last year to overhaul their village support structures and to tighten security procedures. They have tried to establish more effective supply and information networks in the villages and have concentrated on improving their jungle units by more selective recruiting and better training. To improve their standing with the villagers, the guerrillas are buying rather than confiscating food and are generally playing down terrorism.

Although the insurgents continue to avoid armed clashes, their improved organizational practices could pose a new challenge to Bangkok's counterinsurgency programs. One measure of the Communists' progress in the northeast will be their ability to establish themselves in villages that have active government programs, rather than in remote areas relatively free of government influence. Thai security officials, apprehensive over still unconfirmed reports of increased infiltration of men and weapons, have taken some remedial steps. Deputy Prime Minister Praphat, for example, has directed army commanders to operate more forcefully against known Communist base areas.

The Communists appear to be having more success in the north and north-central provinces, where tribal guerrillas in some remote areas are virtually unchallenged. Although the evidence is fragmentary, the insurgents seem to be using the current rainy season to stock up on supplies and win recruits among the tribal population. The transfer of additional guerrilla leaders to the north from the northeast indicates the Communists are trying to solve their shortage of trained and dedicated cadre. This has been a major Communist weakness in the north, as in other parts of the country.

NND 941536 --- 3846

Senior Thai Security officials believe the situation in the north has deteriorated and expect the Communists to try to extend control over the northern border area adjoining Laos during the coming dry season. On the government side the appointment of a new, energetic army commander in the north offers some hope that newly developed programs will be more than window dressing. These programs, which are designed to win the cooperation of the tribespeople while simultaneously protecting the ethnic Thai population in adjacent lowland areas, so far have not been effectively carried out. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)



Preparations for China's National Day Proceeding in Low Key

The regime's preoccupation with pressing internal problems has resulted in a subdued approach to the National Day celebrations on 1 October. Peking has set the mood for the rest of the country by discouraging the hoopla that might be expected to accompany the 20th anniversary of the founding of the republic.

In part, the restrained mood stems from the fact that only a fragile tranquility has been imposed inside China.

Peking probably does not want to jeopardize the newly imposed order by staging major rallies in Peking and provincial capitals, events which by their very nature

NND 941536 --- 345

bring crowds into the streets and tend to raise emotions.

Diplomatic sources report that Peking intends to keep this year's celebrations a "family affair," with few invited foreign guests.

Provincial radiobroadcasts have taken Peking's cue and are urging restraint in celebration planning. A recent Anhwei broadcast, for example, stated that National Day should be observed in a "down-to-earth" manner and that unnecessary expenditures should be avoided.

National Day traditionally has been the occasion for a major leadership turnout. Rumors that Mao is incapacitated have become widespread lately, and he has not appeared in public since 19 May. Mao has been absent for long periods before, however, and has reappeared each time to confound speculation about his health. He has never missed a National Day celebration, and a failure to show up this time would give substance to reports that he is seriously ill. The Chinese, in trying to counter such rumors, have been publicizing recent decisions they say were made by Mao.

Despite the low-key approach to the celebrations, Peking will undoubtedly exploit the occasion for its maximum propaganda value to help promote the commonly heard themes of national unity and preparedness against war. The regime has taken the unusual step of releasing separately 29 National Day slogans, giving particular emphasis to those slogans concerned with war preparations. This probably reflects Peking's growing concern over the possibility of expanded conflicts with the Soviet Union and also serves to dramatize for the population the seriousness of the current war preparations drive and the need to economize and increase production. (SECRET NO FOREIGN ~~DISSEM~~)

* * *

NND 941536 --- 3848

M O N T H L Y R E P O R T

K I A - T R A N G

OCTOBER 1969

****

GENERAL

October 1968 was the month of the greatest revenue block time shown in our statistics.

This month, October 1969 we flew approximately 67% of that month. This results from a 11.5% increase in revenue block time from the month of September this year. This upward trend is most welcome. We look forward to next month.

Other than two mortar attacks on the field in the early part of the month, Kha-Trang remained relatively quiet. More often than not, the military has had the town "[illegible]" to military personnel, and as a result, social activity and incidents between the Vietnamese and military personnel have decreased. I feel certain that this "[illegible]" trend will continue.

TRAFFIC

SCHEDULED

Passenger	October	September	1968
Departing	3922	3265	3545
Arriving	3854	3516	5[illegible]9
TOTAL	7776	6781	11454

CARGO

1. [illegible] (Lbs)

Departing	315,838	530,278	841,351
Arriving	389,404	386,299	410,846
TOTAL	705,242	916,577	1,252,197

2. [illegible] (Lbs)

Departing	7,478	4,658	20,808
Arriving	11,913	5,004	11,271
TOTAL	19,391	9,662	32,079

3. [illegible] (Lbs) (1+2)

Departing	393,216	534,936	862,158
Arriving	313,317	391,403	422,117
TOTAL	706,533	925,339	1,284,275

[illegible] ADMINISTRATIVE

Dennis Wood.

OPERATIONS

A. Personnel arrived from SGN to locate an appropriate place for our new antenna. Relocating the antenna and transmitting units should assist greatly in eliminating the constant interference we are now experiencing.

The monsoon season has arrived and we may expect difficult flight and communication problems this next month. Completion of a shed on the side of our building now allows us to work without the usual two inches of water in the office.

B. FLIGHT STATISTICS CY (See attached)

C. ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE COMPARISON

	October	September	1968
Arrival	527	548	661
Departure	525	551	651
R C H	275	271	338

SECURITY

Problems reported to appropriate parties.

MAINTENANCE (See attached)

MEDICAL : No problems

LEGAL : No problems

TECHNICAL SERVICES

		October	September	1968
1.	Transient overnight	251	277	310
2.	Overnight service	276	271	338
3.	Engine changes	0	1	3
4.	Propeller changes	0	2	1
5.	No 1 services	1	0	6
6.	No II services	0	0	0
7.	Delays Maint/Mech	2	7	24
8.	Intermediate services	0	0	0
9.	A C P	4	5	12
10.	Outline recoveries	3	4	3
11.	Accident report (A/C)	0	0	1
12.	Accident report (P:L)	0	0	0

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

Dan Lawson

DAN LAWSON

SGN-1 MA

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
OCTOBER 1969

I. GENERAL

1. Block and revenue time remained on a par with last month when comparing a 30 day month in September with a 31 day month in October. For Sept. it was 6135 revenue hours and 6346 blocks hours total for SVN vs 6345 revenue hours and 6608 block hours for October.

2. Security conditions remain relatively quiet with only occasional terrorist incidents. There were no concentrated military actions or rocket attacks directed against the Saigon area.

3. We plan to further reduce our spare fleet this month by sending 3 10-2's to Tainan for storage. Beech 10-2 N77Y has been placed in temporary storage at Saigon.

II. GENERAL AFFAIRS

1. Exemption of tax on airfield meal and transportation payment initially granted by GVN to employees working at TSN airport was extended to employees at DAD and NHA Stations.

2. The Government of Vietnam has just decreed a tax (austerity) increase on 1523 imported commodities. As a result of this measure a US dollar's worth of imported commodity will cost from VN$25 to VN520 more; the more luxurious an imported item the higher the tax.

Official statistics which is very conservative by nature, estimate the overall price of imported commodities to rise by 40% and the cost of living 20%

Price of spare parts for automobile, construction materials and office supplies which account for the bulk of company local procurement increase as follows:

Office supplies	+ 100%
Iron bar	+ 100%
Engine parts	+ 160%
Tubes and tyres	+ 103%

III. FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT

1. Among the projects completed this month were: revetment walls

SGN, Antenna masts for Transmitter Building SGN, Nose Hangar Lean-to DNG, Emergency RGMD Water Supply SGN, Power Distribution and Lighting System NHA, and Electrical Power Distribution System DAD.

IV. CUSTOMER RELATIONS

1. Our relations with all customers have never been better. There are no outstanding problem. The rapport between the primary VN-70 customer and this office have improved 100%.

V. FISCAL

1. Budget Matters: Costs are continually being reduced by reduction of work force. A total of 20 persons were either transferred to other bases or surplussed during the month. Particular attention is being given to the payment of overtime to indigenous personnel. Total payments for overtime have been substantially reduced. We believe further reductions are possible in CTD. FCMMR are now being checked 100% against Log Sheets. During the past three monthss we have discovered per diem was being overclaimed by $500.00 to $600.00 per month.

2. Tax problems: We received in writing a ruling from the Tax authorities that the Transportation and Meal Allowance paid to Vietnamese employees are exempt from Vietnamese income tax.

3. Billing Difficulties: No additional problems except as noted under Customer relations.

4. Revisions of exchange rates: There have been many rumors of a devaluation of the piastre. However knowledgeable sources indicated no devaluation will occur for the remainder of 1969.

VI. SECURITY

1. November 1, 1969 will be Vietnamese National Day. This year, the National Day Celebration is very simple in keeping with the Government austerity policy. No parade or demonstration is anticipated.

2. Rumored public disturbances: The majority of Vietnamese people complained about the hike in prices of commodities by the newly decreed austerity taxes imposed on 24 October 1969 by the Vietnamese Government, as the government was compelled to take urgent financial and economic measures to put an end to the inflation threat which could bring about a collapse of the national economy and also cause difficulties in the political and social fields.

VII. MEDICAL

1. Number of visits: 1501

2. Accidents: 51

3. Hospitalization: 2

4. Outcalls: 5

5. Physical Examinations: 36

6. Sick leaves: 312½

VIII. PERSONNEL

1. Work Permit approvals for our Third Country Nationals continue to be a problem. To date we have received only 20. The Ministry of Interior, however, has been kind enough to grant our TCNs temporary Residence Permits valid through 31 January 1970, which presumably will cover them for the period during which their applications for one year work and Residence Permits are under process.

The recent (24 October) imposition of an Austerity Tax on most imported commodities has knocked the value of the piastre to an all-time low (MRH is in possession of some relative VN press articles). The piastre is now being traded on the open market at approximately VN$275 to US$1.

Approval for the Vietnamese Line Maintenance Training Program is pending at the Ministry of Education. At each follow-up call we make we are assured that approval will be forthcoming "any day now".

2. Personnel strength - Saigon Base

Classif.	[redacted]								Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
Permanent	44	143	142	14	154	2	16	5	354	164

	[redacted]					Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	FLT
Permanent	552#	15**	2	2	1*	557	15
Pre-Processed	10					10	

(*) : [redacted]
(**) :
(#) :

Ground PNL: 923
Flight PNL: 179
TOTAL : 1102

Danang Sub-base

Classif.	[redacted]				Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	4	14	21	83	122

Nha Trang Sub-base

Classif.	[redacted] GRD	GRD	GRD	Total GRD
Permanent	4	13	25	61	103

Can Tho Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted] GRD	GRD	GRD	Total GRD
Permanent	1	10	4	15

IX. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. October was a smooth month with no serious incidents or accidents in any department at any station.

2. Several employees have been selected for transfer to Udorn as that station is in dire need of qualified men. We hope to send at least 20 men by mid December. It must look like old home week there with all the men we have sent to Udorn already. Some six Americans have gone there since May of this year, plus over 30 TCNs either sent or under process to go.

X. TRAFFIC/AAM

Nothing of general interest transpired during the month with all areas operating smoothly.

	September	October
Passengers departure SGN (All contracts)	5,837	5,870
" arrival SGN "	5,980	6,492
Outbound cargo SGN	94,217	77,121
Inbound cargo SGN	90,205	97,140

TRAFFIC/USAID

Cargo (including Af Caribou A/C)

	September	October
Outbound (lbs) SGN	1,369,868	1,948,049
Inbound (lbs) SGN	519,743	560,231

XI. OPERATIONS

1. Total revenue block time for October was 6345 + 39 compared to 6134 + 45 for September. Our revenue forecast for the month was 6365 hours. Grand total block time for the month was 668 + 02 with a forecasted figure of 6623 total block hours for the month.

2. We had 20 controllable and 61 non-controllable delays with a total of 916 Saigon departures.

3. Aircraft availability boards and flight watch boards were relocated in FOD allowing for a window on the east wall. Plans are being formulated to make additional improvements to FOD. Three new air conditioners were purchased and installed.

4. We plan to further reduce our spare fleet this month by sending 3 10-2's to Taiwan for storage. Beech 10-2 N77Y has been placed in temporary storage at Saigon.

5. Flight time report (See attachment A)
Aircraft Incidents report (See attachment B)

6. Ground Transportation

Statistics

Aggregate microbuses mileage	:	25359 km or 15849 miles
Microbuses down-time	:	148 hours
Microbus pax-carried	:	3453
Isuzu bus mileage	:	6267 km or 3916 miles
Isuzu bus down-time	:	38 hours 24 Min
Isuzu bus pax-carried	:	10862
Supply vehicles mileage	:	2603 km or 1626 miles
Supply vehicle down-time		113 hrs 24'

Sup by vehicle

XII. FLYING

The month of October was highlighted by one major point of interest: No crew induced accidents during the month. This is a reflection of the pilot's professional ability and to the AMF's close supervision and emphasis on safety. October is the second consecutive accident free month.

With the deletion of the Beechcraft from both the contract and the station a number of on station crew assignments have been realized. Six of the Beechcraft captains have been moved to the Volpar Program.

Flying time was good in all programs except VTB and Beechcraft. The VTB is picking up and conversely the Beechcraft is dropping. Morale of course is directly reflected by the high or low time. The greatest inequity in flying time is projected in American First Officer group. We are still working towards a F/O pool. All the VTB F/O's have received C47 training and should receive their flight checks early in November.

The yearly, 1000 hour per pilot, flying time appears to be well under control. The yearly OBH is being closely monitored as well. The year end should reveal an equal distribution of OBH by program. Any major change in customer requirements should not present too great a problem due our cross training program.

In result of the month bring a rather routine month, it seems that the was that it was a successful one.

XIII. SAFETY

1. Accident investigations

1. Beech 10-2, N9521Z accident report forwarded to TPE on 20 October 69.
2. 204B, N1306X accident report forwarded to TPE on 4 Nov 69
3. VTB, N7770S Review Board will be scheduled for 11 Nov 69.

2. Safety suggestions

1. SAFE 15 - 26 Sep 69. Captain McCauley questions the maximum gross weight of 10,200# for the Special 10-2 aircraft because they do not perform as well and are placarded for seven passengers only. Forwarded to ESAFE 27 Sep 69.

2. SAFE 15 - 14 Oct 69. Capt McCauley recommends the top of one main rotor blade of the 204B's be painted white to aid in being seen by other aircraft. This is being submitted on SAFE 14.

3. TRIP REPORT 22 Oct 69. Capt Rogers pointed out an ambiguous instruction in the Volpar Maintenance manual because of an elevator trim tab problem on 54U. He believes the mechanics get confused about the proper degree of rigging the tab up or down because of the way the manual states the settings. This now in local processing prior to being mailed to TPE.

3. Follow-up Action

Designated runup areas have been prepared and equipped with chocks which fit into pipes to prevent aircraft from moving. This should completely eliminate runup accidents such as the nose wheel collapse on 70B, the death of the man who was blown away on a sheet of plywood by prop blast, and the numerous instances of control surface damage by prop blast.

R. Hulse

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT
OCTOBER 1969.

1. Contract 4101 -

A/C No.	Revenue Block Time	Revenue Flight Time	Non-Revenue Block Time	Non-Revenue Flight Time
N67984	100+02	83+03		
N67985	140+26	111+56	17+46	16+29
B910	104+08	82+51	26+58	23+53
B928	132+29	107+12		
B136	106+57	87+49	21+32	18+55
B146	106+16	84+21	6+27	4+49
6147	116+39	97+47	3+29	3+04
8084	191+02	166+44		
5559	198+05	179+03		
5994	109+02	83+33	1+48	1+23
6083	147+28	128+54	10+45	9+10
B817	107+34	91+46		
B829	54+20	42+43	12+22	10+16
N539Y	77+16	66+05	23+55	21+08
N544Y	20+40	16+13		
N9518Z	66+22	51+51	9+09	5+53
N6154U	100+02	86+18		
N9956Z	12+40	11+16	10+10	8+33
N7770B	56+50	47+36	2+32	1+28
N9577Z	68+15	52+41	1+28	1+07
N9838Z	94+13	80+43	2+04	1+35
N3728Q	47+33	39+44	4+07	2+28
N9664C	5+15	4+42		
N3674Q	50+54	39+22	1+26	0+50
N7695C	18+52	16+16	1+26	0+51
N91295	13+16	8+59	21+07	18+35
N5454V	101+07	87+59		
N6622C	6+38	5+39	0+43	0+21
N9573Z	62+23	53+10		
N5269V	61+58	51+13		
N77Y	37+47	30+39		
N7950C	48+19	39+04		
N51259	7+47	5+56		
N21412	13+15	10+09		
N9073Z	11+51	9+52	11+02	10+19
N9871Z	4+05	3+22	13+28	12+09
N9898Z			10+56	10+08
N285L	126+47	115+48	1+47	1+14
N391R	148+51	126+23	2+02	1+31
N394R	154+33	128+17	3+09	2+15
N9444	162+18	144+18	2+41	1+57
N196X	133+05	116+38		
N153L	171+14	143+32	2+15	1+28
N180K	45+29	41+52		
N12450	12+52	11+43	0+47	0+35

N748N	41+38	34+51	1+02	0+37
N152L	130+05	112+58	0+50	0+30
N184L	131+00	116+25	2+17	1+21
N185K	76+46	64+30	5+32	4+04
N192K	21+00	18+57	0+56	0+26
N393R	55+31	46+12		
N194K	97+36	81+10	5+01	4+11
N1303K	109+01	109+01	1+53	1+53
N1304K	44+32	44+32	1+15	1+15
N1305K	160+46	160+46	2+18	2+15
N1306K	98+34	98+34	1+00	1+00
N1307K	160+24	160+24	4+25	4+25
N8512F	128+18	128+18	2+25	2+25
N8514F	26+15	26+15	1+45	1+45
N8535F	186+44	186+44	3+20	3+20
B875			1+06	0+42
Sub-total	5025+05	4384+39	262+23	222+33

2. Contract 4102 -

N539K	6+16	4+59
N544K	33+54	28+42
N3674G	12+27	11+18
N7695C	55+43	46+38
N91295	18+27	13+46
N9518Z	11+13	9+38
N6154U	8+57	7+11
N9956Z	61+50	53+47
N7770B	00+00	00+00
N9577Z	16+50	14+09
N9838Z	8+30	6+47
N3728Q	7+50	6+41
N748N	123+20	108+37
N152L	7+43	6+19
N184L	4+09	2+34
N185K	51+08	42+41
N192K	42+48	38+15
N393R	120+57	109+40
N194K	31+31	26+59
N285L	6+10	5+26
N391R	44+34	36+43
N394R	20+20	17+24
N196K	7+08	6+18
N180K	66+47	57+51
N12450	67+17	59+06

N8512F	5+37	5+37
N8514F	115+10	115+10
N8535F	7+32	7+32
N1303X	5+52	5+52
N1304X	15+34	15+34
N1305X	14+04	14+04
N1306X	26+05	26+05
N1307X	1+05	1+05
N5269V	4+25	3+27
N51259	3+33	2+36
Sub-total	1034+46	918+31

3. Contract 4103 -

B928	13+45	10+31
B138	2+02	0+55
B146	17+32	14+47
B829	17+14	12+25
6083	2+17	1+55
N539Y	8+13	5+41
N544Y	22+06	17+01
N9518Z	1+57	1+22
N9577Z	14+29	9+04
N9838Z	3+55	2+33
N37280	5+23	2+41
N36740	8+36	5+22
N91295	4+39	2+53
N5454V	0+25	0+18
N95733	4+47	3+51
N5269V	1+19	1+08
N77Y	6+55	4+18
N79500	8+03	5+06
N51259	2+59	2+01
N21412	2+39	2+00
N391R	2+16	2+02
N153L	1+15	1+08
N152L	1+44	1+38
N184L	4+15	3+20
N194X	3+57	3+32
N1307X	9+41	9+41
Sub-total	172+23	127+13

4. Contract 0005-

N6622C	25+41	20+28
N21412	1+41	0+50
N1305X	2+15	2+15
N8512F	2+10	2+10
N8514F	1+45	1+45
Sub-total	33+32	27+28

5. Contract 0069 -

N9664C	69+59	61+27
N3728G	2+47	2+33
N99563	7+07	5+41
Sub-total	79+53	69+41

Total Revenue Block Time	6345+39
Total Revenue Flight Time	5527+32
Total Non-Revenue Block Time	262+23
Total Non-Revenue Flight Time	222+33
GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	6608+02
" " FLIGHT TIME	5750+05

Flight Time by Type of Aircraft

Type of A/C	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
C-46	723+37	583+25	72+43	64+06
C-47	179+08	146+54	12+22	10+16
Bailed C-47	764+33	657+56	16+02	13+37
DHC-4	168+25	138+41	23+55	21+08
VTB	854+51	702+59	53+29	41+20
10-2(Beech)	401+41	329+52	0+43	0+21
C-45	15+56	13+14	35+26	32+36
Porter	2116+04	1833+07	28+19	20+09
204B	1121+24	1121+24	18+18	18+18
Helio			1+06	0+42
TOTAL	6345+39	5527+32	262+23	222+33

Original Signed By
L.I.CC. PARRISH

MEMORANDUM

TO : BH/SGN

DATE: 04 October 1969

FROM : SZ/DAD

REF. No. SZDAD/69/099

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for September 1969

GENERAL

Hostile activity for the month was limited to one significant incident, but in terms of reported casualties and projectiles fired, it was the largest attack in the past five months. This attack occurred in the early morning on 6 September and consisted of an estimated 76 rockets and 43 mortar rounds impacting in the Danang and surrounding area. 21 fatalities and approximately 100 injuries, mainly to Vietnamese civilian personnel, were reported as a result of the attack. One rocket apparently exploded an ARVN ammunition dump and the resulting concussion caused minor damage to some doors and windows in the company hostels. No injures to company personnel were reported.

The Danang City and Air Base curfews remained unchanged; a curfew pass in the form of a letter was obtained for those personnel who might be required to remain on the base after 2100 hours. This pass will be renewed monthly without any anticipated problems.

Southern Air Transport flights were limited to 8 and no problems were encountered in their handling. 8 such flights are already scheduled to transit Danang during October.

The maintenance of company air-conditioners became a serious problem during the month with several unit failures. The station repair capability is satisfactory in most instances, but in several cases, the units require replacement compressor motor assemblies which are unavailable. As a result of this situation it has been necessary to remove all the air-conditioners (4) from the new hostel to support the old hostel and 2 offices at the air base are without air-conditioning.

LEGAL

Negotiations with Barclay & Company concerning their proposal to operate the terminal snack-bar have ceased as a result of a MACV directive which cancelled their operating authority in Vietnam. As an alternative, discussions are being held with a Sergeant Dobbs who apparently was responsible for setting up the snack-bar originally and is now serving another tour at Danang. Through his efforts with the Base NCO Club, an operation far superior to the present may be forthcoming.

..... Cont'd.

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

Two minor problems developed with the Embassy customer concerning the handling of their VIP passengers and cargo on company aircraft. The former was resolved locally by permitting an Embassy representative to pick-up the required conditions of contract from Traffic and escort the VIPs to the aircraft without Traffic assistance. This customer has their own protocol procedures and apparently feels that such passengers are best handled internally. The ultimate responsibility for the correct loading and tie-down of Embassy cargo on company flights is somewhat undefined since the 4395 contract is no longer in effect. This matter has been referred to Flying Contracts for clarification.

The AID customer seems satisfied with the progress made on the design of the passenger terminal renovation project, but funding for the project is still not assured.

FACILITIES

Detailed drawings were prepared by SGN for the passenger terminal renovation project and bids have been received from four local contractors to accomplish the required construction. A reimbursable pro-forma AR has been submitted by SGM/SGN based on the lowest bid.

The Danang City Power Project was completed during the month and payment was made to S.I.P.E.A. for the transformer installation. Although the facility has remained on USAF generator power almost all of the time, very satisfactory voltages are received from the transformer. A technican was sent from SGN to balance the current loads and the slight heating problem in the main distribution lines seems to have been eliminated.

The Nose Hangar Lean-to Project was also completed and final settlement was effected with the contractor.

A re-evaluation of the deferred Paving Project has been requested so that a firm determination can be made as to whether or not the 2500 bags of cement on hand should be retained or exchanged for gravel. The local AID customer supports the project but funding for it is still indefinite. The rainy season is rapidly approaching and it is doubtful that any of this cement will be useable if it is not utilised fairly soon.

FISCAL

[redacted] payroll for the month totaled: [redacted]

Petty cash expenditures for the month totaled: 26,815$VN

OPERATIONS

Total revenue flight time increased 3+55 hours as compared to the previous month. 204B flying was reduced significantly due to a lack of requirements by the Embassy and the substitution of a PC-6 for Quang-Ngai on the part of AID on Sundays. Revenue losses increased significantly primarily as a result of poor weather when Danang was within the influence of tropical storms.

The following is a breakdown of flight time generated by this station during September:

VN-41/AID	876+36
VN-41/Embassy	162+04
0005	9+39
0069	6+12
Non-Revenue	9+19
Total	1,063+50

Revenue loss for the month was as follows:

Maintenance	7+00
Weather	16+00
Customer Cancellations	1+00
Other	0+00
Total	24+00

Hostel occupancy factors were 80.71% and 40.33% for the Old and New hostels respectively. The higher utilization of the New hostel resulted from extended DHC-4 and unscheduled C-47 RONs.

COMMUNICATIONS

The remote VHF/UHF was out of service only once during the month and the problem was repaired within one hour at the [redacted] The transfer of the ground radio transmitters to the RMD Lean-to was commenced, and all the required underground audio cables were installed. Temporary antennas have been erected for interim use until the programmed 80 foot antenna mast is received from SCN and installed.

Incoming and outgoing messages totaled 1853 and 1425 respectively.

TRAFFIC

A planned reduction of 5 Ground Services personnel was deferred at

customer insistence. Although the manning of this department is considered excessive, the AID customer apparently wants to continue to bear the additional expense involved.

Passenger and cargo statistics for the month are as follows:

	Passengers In	Passengers Out	Cargo In	Cargo Out
4101	2,624	3,177	230,044	351,176
4102	495	556	8,401	20,486
0005	11	3	Nil	Nil
0069	0	7	Nil	Nil
AAM	83	120	8,693.5	18,099.1
TOTAL	3,213	3,863	247,138.5	389,761.1

No Continental Air Services flights were handled during September.

SECURITY

A crewmember reported the theft of a flight case from the entrance of the New Hostel while awaiting transportation to the airfield but no conclusive evidence could be found that the hostel security guard was negligent. According to the guard's statement, other crewmembers were in the immediate vicinity of the case when the theft apparently took place.

PERSONNEL

No solution to the work permit problem has been reported and as a consequence, visas, extensions of stay and air base pass processing are still being delayed. PM/SGN indicates that progress in this area is being made but at a very slow rate.

A third major personnel reduction was accomplished during September which brings station manning down to a level not experienced in nearly two years. With only a very few exceptions and those requiring a re-definition of policy, any further reductions can only be sustained with a very noticeable decrease in service or capability.

The personnel breakdown at Danang station at the close of business, 30 September, was as follows:

[redacted]				
Permanent	5	22*	14	85*
Pre-Process	0	0	0	0
Temporary	0	0	0	0
Daily hire	-	0	0	0
TOTAL (126)	5	22	14	85

* Includes two personnel who will be transferred to SGN when Tan-Son-Nhut base passes are obtained.

TECHNICAL SERVICES

RMD handled a total of 620 arriving and 624 departing flights during the month. Maintenance delays remained the same as August for a total of 5. No outstation recoveries were required. Heavy services amounted to two number 1 PC-6 services, three number 1 204B services and two number 2 204B services. One engine change (C47) and no propeller changes were required during the month.

BGMD expended at total of 1435 manhours, of which 323 were utilized in hostel maintenance. In an attempt to reduce air-conditioner problems in the old hostel, heavier guage wire and U.S. switches were installed in addition to replacing the thin plastic windows with plywood sheeting.

MSA transactions were disrupted for a brief period as a result of the substantial damage sustained by their facilities during the rocket attack of 5 September. The only enduring problem was that their September invoice did not include IBM cards which will delay reconciliation of the invoice with company records.

STATISTICS

From previous monthly reports the following data was extracted:

	September 1967	September 1968	September 1969
Flight Time (hours)	1093	1452	1055
Arrivals	719	748	620
Departures	713	737	624
Passengers (outbound)	2451	3499	3863
Personnel	103**	143	127
[redacted]	7	7	5
	18	31	22
	10	13	14
	68	92	86

** Does not include Traffic Ground Services Labor Force.

Although the above figures are not necessarily comparable, they do give some indication of the changes over the years covered.

Original Signed by
WINSTON C. CAMBRE

Winston C. Cambre

cc: file

MEMORANDUM

RECEIVED
18 OCT 1969
BM-SGN

TO : Distribution via AVP JDM

DATE: 7 October 1969

FROM : AA/AVP

REF. NO. AA/AVP-69-105

SUBJECT: Monthly Report

The Monthly Report should periodically be reviewed and evaluated. Some Officers and Directors have indicated that the reports are deviating from the standard format, some reports are to voluminous, some are simply a consolidation of departmental reports and some reports with all the attachments are too repetitious and too much to read.

The Monthly Reports provide quick, general information to Officers and Division Directors to keep them current on activities for which they may or may not be responsible. It is information they should know and use as a guide so they may better administer their respective responsibilities. A report should be concise but complete in itself and should not make references to other reports, memorandums or letters.

The Monthly Report is a consolidation of information of all activities at a Base prepared in one single report, usually based on information submitted by the persons responsible locally for the various activities. The Monthly Report is fundamentally a Base Manager's report and not a grouping of a number of separate individual activities reports submitted to the Base Manager. The report should not contain every tidbit of information, but instead should be limited to only the essentials of the activities of the month including unusual and non-routine items. It should concentrate on substantial matters written concisely and yet clearly without the need of lengthy verbiage to explain a point and without detailed descriptions. The Monthly Report should cover all the points necessary in as few words as possible. Concise statistics are very useful, but the report should not give lengthy detailed statistics; instead it should limit such figures, in totals, to assist in the overall explanation of the narrative where appropriate.

Since the basic purpose of the Monthly Report is to provide information, it should of course, not contain requests for action on any given matter. However, matters requiring actions may certainly be included in the report for informational purposes. The actual request for action on any given matter should be a separate memorandum to those responsible.

Controversial subjects as well as sensitive matters such as expressing opinions about our competitors should not be included in the report (a few of these have been noticed in reports.) The Monthly Reports are circulated through the field head office and matters dealing with salaries, benefits, allowances, bonuses, personnel policy, sensitive subjects of any type, opinions regarding Company policy, etc., are not appropriate for inclusion in the Monthly Report. If there is any doubt about an item being sensitive, controversial or confidential, do not include it in the Monthly Report. All such matters should be handled by separate correspondence with the distribution limited to those concerned and, if appropriate, sent under confidential cover.

Three copies of the Monthly Report (1 original and 2 copies) should be forwarded to AVP under cover of a transmittal memo to reach Taipei not later than the 10th of each month. Do not indicate any distribution, do not use paper with preprinted letter-head notations and do not use paper other than the standard 8½ x 11 plain, white paper. There should be a one and one quarter inch (1¼) margin on the left side of the paper to allow for binding all of each month's reports under one cover.

A standard format for the Monthly Report is attached. However, it may not always provide the desired flexibility to cope with the wide and ever changing variety of non-routine matters which you wish to report. Therefore, please regard the format as a guide rather than a hard and fast standard which is limited solely to the items listed; but, the deviation should only be that which is required.

This is not to introduce more paperwork, but to reduce it where possible and to re-emphasize what is already in effect.

C H Green

C. H. Green

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A/File

Location

Monthly Report

(Month Year)

GENERAL

Under this heading include items which are related to the Base as a whole rather than to one Division's activities.

Information of General interest.

Governmental relations.

Legislation affecting air agreements, business licenses, etc.

Political incidents or situations which might affect the company.

The company's position nationally and locally in the community.

High level public relations and promotion.

ADMINISTRATION

Include items which are related to Administration of the Base as a whole rather than to one activity.

Forecasts

Savings

Accomplishments

Observations

Company activities (Club and other)

PUBLIC RELATIONS

The company position in the community from a public relations point of view.

Situations which may lead to poor public relations and uncomplimentary press reports.

Relationship with press and other news media.

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

Brief statement, about customer relations.

EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

Brief statement, about employee relations.

LEGAL

Legal matters and related subjects.

State of leases, rentals and agreements.

Matters which may eventually become legal in nature.

Contract and agreement processing matters.

Laws and regulations which may affect the company, including those which are under consideration.

FISCAL

Budget matters.

Tax problems and related subjects.

Billing difficulties and related matters.

Insurance.

Revisions to exchange rates.

SECURITY

Company security matters, such as protecting property, etc. (not confidential matters).

Historical or customary dates and particulars of anticipated forthcoming demonstrations.

Rumored public disturbances.

MEDICAL

Number of visits.

Accidents:

(1) aircraft
(2) ground

Hospitalization.

MEDICAL cont.

Out-calls.

Physical Examinations.

Sick leaves.

PERSONNEL

General

Outstanding personnel matters, community labor situation, company labor situation and new or revised labor laws or regulations.

Substantial changes in living costs or per diem rates.

Personnel Strength

Use the present format for reporting personnel as established by memo AA/AVP-68-135, 23 November 1968.

TECHNICAL SERVICES

General

Aircraft Maintenance, fixed wing

Aircraft Maintenance, rotary wing

Shop Section

Planning

Quality Control

Equipment Maintenance

Vehicle Maintenance

Facility Maintenance

Technical Training

Supply

- General
- Material Control
- AGP
- Stores

TECHNICAL SERVICES cont.

POL

Bench Stocks

Uniforms

STATUS OF PROJECTS

TRAFFIC SERVICES

General

Traffic

~~Operations~~

~~Sales~~

OPERATIONS

General

- Flying Operations

Accidents and Incidents

- Flight Operations

~~Flight Information Center~~

Communications

Ground Transportation

~~Traffic Report~~

MONTHLY FLIGHT TIME

CONTRACT NO.

TYPE OF A/C	A/C NO.	FLIGHT TIME	BLOCK TIME
Total			

CONTRACT NO.

TYPE OF A/C	A/C NO.	FLIGHT TIME	BLOCK TIME

Total

Delayed Departures & Cancellations of Flights

A/C NO.	AMOUNT OF DELAY OR CANCELLATION	REASONS

FLIGHT FREQUENCIES

MISCELLANEOUS

STATION REPORTS

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
NOVEMBER 1969

I. GENERAL

1. Total AAM block time for the month was 6238 hours vs 6574 hours in October. The customer failed to meet 204B and Volpar minimums and consequently released 204B N8512F and Ten-Two N9573Z effective 1 December 1969 (73Z flying hours were included in Volpar Minimums). We reduced our Ten-Two fleet by three when we ferried N21412 N51259 and N5454V to Tainan on 17 November 1969. C47 B817 was also ferried to Tainan for storage.

2. Security conditions have remained calm with no unusual incidents to report in the AAM areas of activity with the exception of mortar fire at Gia Nghia on 10 November 69 as C47 15559 was taxiing out. All in all, there were fewer ground-fire incidents reported in November than in any other month over the past two and one-half years.

II. GENERAL AFFAIRS

1. The company presented the Directorate of Civil Aviation with materials required to build a wire fence for DCA housing compound in Dalat [redacted]. The fence proved necessary to the security of DCA employees in Dalat after VC infiltrators slained one employee and wounded another one in August. The major credit of this project should go to SZNHA who helped make the materials available.

2. Efforts have been made to negotiate lease term shorter than the normal one-year period to take advantage of potential decline in rent that may develop as a result of US replacement in Vietnam. A case in point is the lease for our SGN downtown office. The landloard agreed to the six-month lease term and to add to the new lease a clause providing for six 6-month periods renewal after he had been notified in writing of our intention to renew subject lease under old conditions and terms.

3. On 3 Dec., Air Vietnam employees went on strike to demand a 50% salary increase and the removal of some top management staff. The strike was backed by the Confederation general of Labor as opposed to the Confederation general of workers with which Air America union is affiliated. The strike ended on 8 Dec. after the Prime Minister signed an order empowering the Minister of Transport and Communications to requisition all Air Vietnam employees regardless of nationality if necessary and the Board of Administration promised to consider employees' request within 48 hours.

III. FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT

1. The Antenna mast at Danang is scheduled for erection on 11 Dec 69. The power distribution and lighting system at Nha Trang has

been completed. We are having difficulty with the Saigon City Power Company to secure the 200 KVA transformer which we have contracted for. The Utility Tunnel - Phase I SGN has been completed. The Emergency RGMD Water Supply has been completed.

2. Principal projects awaiting TPE approval are: Completion of Concrete Ramp Pavement and Drainage Ditch at Danang, Renovation of Operations Building Saigon, Relocation and Renovation of various AAM Shops and Offices Saigon (including BM office), Improvement of Passenger Lounge Danang and 204B Landing Pads Saigon.

3. RGMD SGN PFAR 69/067 for US$42,470 to "pave terminal parking apron and adjacent PSP ramp (total 15,550 sq. ft.) was submitted on 29 Nov 69.

IV. FISCAL

1. Budget Matters: Total net reduction of work force during the month was 3 persons. Overtime payments to GTD personnel have been reduced by 50% from previous months. During the month we discovered that our record keeping for ARs especially Form F projects was not detailed enough. Payments for material costs were being exceeded by large margin and not all labor costs were being charged to respective ARs. We are in the precess of revising our method of keeping track of AR expenditures to show all costs by type, ie. material, labor, etc.. Persons filling out DTRs were abusing use of J-4 code number. We have worked with MTS and his staff to correct this abuse.

2. Revision of Exchange Rate - Knowledgeable sources still indicate that there will not be any devaluation of the piastre during 1969. They feel these are strong possibility of devaluation occuring during early 1970.

3. Billing procedures - AID/VN-70 customer has now indicated that a separate 1034 payment voucher should be prepared for each end uses, i.e. CORDS, EMB, RDC. This is contrary to instructions given by Miss Voltz in a letter to T/C. We are complying with their wishes.

V. MEDICAL

1. Number of visits: 1610
2. Accidents: 67
3. Hospitalization: 4
4. Outcalls: 4
5. Physical examinations: 27
6. Sick leaves: 202½

VI. PERSONNEL

Although no breakthrough has been made in securing Work Permit [illegible] for our TCNs, we do not feel as though we are facing any contractor treatment in that they are issuing most of the TCNs

special Residence Permits. Those special permits are enabling the TCNs to obtain Exit/Re-entry visas and airfield passes, and should take care of us quite well until the U.S. and Vietnamese governments come to terms over the issuance of the Labor Cards (Sept. Monthly Report refers).

2. The Prime Minister has given his approval to [redacted]rticipation in the Line Maintenance Training Program at Tainan. Hopefully we can have the candidates in place right after the first of the year.

3. The value of the piastre continues to decline (approx. VN$290 to US$1). Several companies are considering P/S revisions but are reluctant to do anything definite until some settling point is reached (or until the remored official devaluation is made).

4. Personnel strength - Saigon Base

Classif.	[redacted]								Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
Permanent	42	143	141	14	146	2	17	4	346	163

	[redacted]					Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	FLT
Permanent	542#	15**	2	2	1*	547	15

Pre-Processed		
	3	3

(*) : 1 Swiss
(**) : 1 French
(#) : 4 French

Ground personnel: 896
Flight Personnel: 178
Total 1074

Danang Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]			Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	3	14	20	82	119

Nha Trang Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]			Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
	4	12	25	61	102

Can Tho Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]		Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
	1	9	2	12

VII. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. A quiet month has passed us without serious incident or major problems. Much effort was put for in reducing the CTC now on the books, we are attempting to come very close to a zero balance by 31 Dec. 69.

2. The general appearance of all stations was at their best - for DRH/TNN visit. This reflects quite favorably on the Supts and Chief Mechanics as little effort was required, because daily housekeeping ground safety habits and ground safety habits and ground equipment maintenance standards are above average and practiced daily.

Considerable improvements were noted in the reduction of manhours on aircraft services, as well as total monthly operating costs in general. More improvements can and will be made in proper accounting of expended manhours on the Daily Time Record (DTR), which reveals utilization (good or bad) of available manpower resources. Everyone is very cost conscious and continued progress toward cost reduction is being made daily.

VIII. TRAFFIC/AAM

1. We were visited by A/DTD and benefited from the general discussions relating to Traffic policy. Mr. Bill Sparks has departed the station and Mr. Boyce is now Chief of Air Operations - TSN.

	October	November
Passengers departure SGN (All contracts)	5,870	6,007
" arrival SGN (" ")	6,492	6,677
Outbound cargo SGN	77,121	81,893
Inbound cargo SGN	97,140	96,146

2. TRAFFIC/USAID

	Cargo (including AF Caribou A/C)	
	October	November
Outbound (lbs) SGN	1,948,049	1,534,916
Inbound (lbs) SGN	560,231	101,577

IX. OPERATIONS

1. ADOFD/A visited SGN the first week of December. He spent a few hours at NHA and DAD. He seemed pleased with the FOD Department and noted there were many improvements since his last visit.

2. There were 27 controllable and 61 non-controllable delays with a total of 936 Saigon departures. Reducing our spare fleet, we and expect an increase in controllable delays. By the middle of December our active spare fleet will consist of N67984, N544Y and N152L.

3. Flight Time Report (See Attachment A)
Aircraft Incidents Report (See Attachment B)

4. Accident Reports

Date	A/C Type/No.	Location	Remarks
13	VTB/N7770B	V-07	Traffic marketeer struck and damaged left flap. (Note - This is second such incident at V-07 in 1969)
15	204B/N8535F	Dai Loc	Indigenous ran into T/R blades, incurred serious injury. T/R blades required replacement. (local review board scheduled 3 Dec.)
16	VTB/N9577Z	V- 225	Right main tire went flat, cut by PSP.
24	PC6/N185K	V-01 AAM ramp	Forklift driven by AAM employee struck and caused minor damage to right wing tip and aileron. 15 manhours required for repair.
26	DHC-4/N539Y	V-01, AAM	Air Vietnam boarding stand blown into nose and tow bar by VNAF C-119 prop blast. Tow bar bent and nose wheel rotated 60°, minor dent in front nose door. A/C required retraction test, no damage to gear found.

5. Communications - Project 6683: Transmitter Building and Antennas, Saigon - Antenna installation is complete. All coaxial cable runs, balun rigging and suspension of transmission lines into the building for the four wide-band antennas have been completed. Tests with DaD, NHA, and BKK produced results of QRK 4/5, QSA 4/5. Minor wiring inside the building is near completion.

Project 6696: 200 KVA Transformer - Installation held up pending delivery of item to Saigon Dien Luc Cong Ty (CEE).

Project 6700: 60' Antenna Mast, Nha Trang (HF Transmitter Relocation) - To commence excavation [redacted] pouring of cement for base #10.

Project 6701: 80' Antenna Mast, Da Nang (HF Transmitter relocation)

Cement base completed and in curing process. Anticipate erection of mast on [redacted] All Antenna hardware at site and will begin installation [redacted] HF transmitter relocation will begin shortly thereafter.

Projects 6708 and 6709: Telephone Cable Distribution System and Base PABX - Complete PABX system received L28. OKI Factory representative to arrive on [redacted] Security Department to obtain necessary gate passes. Plan to commence installation [redacted]

6. Ground Transportation

Aggregate microbuses mileage	:	23794 km or 14871 miles
Microbuses down-time	:	206 hrs
Microbus pax-carried	:	3468
Isuzu bus mileage	:	5941 km or 3713 miles
Isuzu bus down-time	:	168 hrs
Isuzu bus pax-carried	:	10846 pax
Supply vehicles mileage	:	1802 km or 1126 miles
Supply vehicles down-time	:	57 hrs.

7. Monthly Flight Time

Contract No.	Flt Time	Block Time
7001	4,156 + 15	4,712 + 36
7002	839 + 23	935 + 19
7003	241 + 08	291 + 41
C0069	72 + 58	84 + 48
C0005	42 + 13	48 + 53
Total:	5,351 + 57	6,073 + 17
CAL	296 + 42	395 + 50
Grand Total:	5,648 + 39	6,469 + 07

X. FLYING

1. The only real highlight of the month was the visit by the VPFO to discuss the new leave system and the pilots' pay raise. This was the major subject of conversation for several days afterward. Much concern was also in evidence regarding FEPA and what they would or would not do and the effect any action might have on everyone.

Flying time was bettter than expected, although nothing to get excited about. The 2048 program established a new low which was not good for morale. However, the C46/C47s did very well and helped during the overall totals up.

2. It appears that staying within the 1000 hour flight time limit for the year will only require watching a few individuals and should not present a problem unless flying time literally "sky-rockets" beyond all reasons.

In summary, the month could best be described as relatively routine and uneventful.

E.J. Theisen

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT

NOVEMBER 1969.

1. Contract 7001 -

A/C No.	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
N67984	79+10	67+26	2+56	1+56
N67985	114+00	139+33	4+10	3+25
B910	134+54	109+53	7+38	6+27
B928	77+51	64+08	39+08	33+09
B138	94+57	78+01	2+03	1+40
B146	72+36	61+10	29+14	25+19
6147	172+28	150+10		
8084	142+22	124+10	3+22	2+57
5559	160+36	144+03	4+53	3+47
5994	162+29	134+31	8+45	7+01
B817	16+59	14+35		
B829	120+54	99+36	2+45	2+20
6083	168+48	145+43	1+33	1+02
N539Y	78+05	66+06		
N544Y	32+17	25+30	0+38	0+17
N9518Z	70+47	58+19		
N6154U	40+21	33+44	26+32	22+58
N9956Z	35+16	30+06		
N777QB	60+52	52+46	8+20	6+28
N9577Z	29+55	24+13	10+22	8+08
N9838Z	63+58	55+55	2+17	1+47
N3728G	47+19	41+03		
N9664C	1+50	1+27	1+40	1+05
N3674G	63+31	53+54	10+08	8+32
N7695C	97+25	83+05	2+12	1+28
N91295	54+25	43+19		
N6622C	6+13	5+21		
N5454V			12+16	10+19
N9573Z	71+35	61+19		
N5269V	102+48	89+40	1+45	1+21
N7950C	32+07	27+07		
N51259	14+27	11+56		
N21412	11+25	9+01	0+50	0+30
N285L	39+33	36+17	0+47	0+21
N391R	166+15	145+33	1+05	0+47
N394R	132+32	119+43	1+52	1+06
N9444	72+27	64+19	2+18	1+28
N198X	153+09	134+34		
N153L	158+23	137+55	1+50	1+06
N180K	151+04	137+10	1+10	1+00
N12450	18+02	17+03		

			2+43	2+12
M748N	145+41	123+16		
M152L	106+04	90+32	1+26	0+51
M184L	148+30	136+54	0+53	0+32
M185K	24+47	21+51		
M192K	12+46	11+21	5+37	4+35
M393R	103+23	93+29	2+00	1+14
M194K	107+59	91+49	16+58	16+58
M1303K	82+56	82+56	3+22	3+22
M1304K	115+50	115+50	9+40	9+40
M1305K	82+06	82+06	2+25	2+25
M1306K	145+13	145+13	1+45	1+45
M1307K	25+16	25+16		
M8512F	27+21	27+21	1+50	1+50
M8514F	38+51	38+51		
M8535F	112+20	112+20		
Sub-total	4603+08	4098+31	241+08	203+08

2. Contract 7002 -

M138	3+16	2+53
M539Y	9+34	8+45
M544Y	8+46	6+58
M3674G	7+29	5+34
M7695C	7+49	6+31
M91295	18+48	15+01
M95182	5+29	4+34
M6154E	5+37	4+16
M99562	54+07	47+13
M77708	16+53	15+01
M95772	28+36	23+55
M98382	9+20	7+29
M37280	47+14	38+39
M96640	6+49	6+01
M748N	18+07	14+43
M152L	18+58	15+39
M185K	119+31	104+02
M192K	43+45	40+54
M393R	13+24	11+39
M194K	53+03	46+13

N285L	76+39	69+49
N391R	13+57	11+00
N394R	13+13	11+50
N9444	60+07	54+40
N198E	4+42	3+53
N153L	3+59	3+06
N180E	1+44	1+43
N12450	73+33	66+10
N8512F	17+43	17+43
N8514F	46+49	46+49
N8535F	12+07	12+07
N1303X	5+20	5+20
N1304X	10+10	10+10
N1305X	4+15	4+15
N1306X	13+04	13+04
N1307X	80+37	80+37
N7950C	1+34	1+22
Sub-total	936+08	839+38

3. Contract 7003 -

N67984	1+49	1+22
B910	8+47	6+58
B928	29+46	23+54
B136	26+19	22 +20
B146	29+13	23+28
N539I	42+33	36+16
N544I	43+39	
N9518Z	14+02	9+25
N6154U	0+58	0+40
N9956Z	0+59	0+49
N7770B	1+09	0+58
N9577Z	4+35	2+51
N9638Z	4+17	2+37
N3728G	3+54	2+56
N3674G	1+10	0+45
N7695C	4+39	3+24
N91295	12+23	7+45
N9573	6+54	5+00
N7950C	2+53	2+10
N1304X	26+29	26+29
N1305X	14+22	14+22
Sub-total	280+50	231+45

4. Contract 0005 -

N6622C	45+40	39+00
N1304X	1+15	1+15
N1305X	1+00	1+00
N1307X	0+58	0+58
Sub-total	48+53	42+13

5. Contract 0069 -

N9664C	67+32	58+34
N9956Z	3+47	3+13
N9577Z	1+47	1+17
N5269W	11+42	9+54
Sub-total	84+48	72+58

TOTAL REVENUE BLOCK TIME	5953+47
" " FLIGHT TIME	5285+05
TOTAL NON-REVENUE BLOCK TIME	241+08
" " FLIGHT TIME	203+08
GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	6194+55
" " FLIGHT TIME	5488+13

Flight Time by Type of Aircraft

Type of A/C	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
C-46	672+38	601+06	85+09	71+56
C-47	137+53	114+11	2+45	2+20
Sailed C-47	806+43	698+37	18+33	14+47
DEC-4	214+54	180+51	0+38	0+17
VTB	895+02	747+21	61+31	50+26
10-2	307+18	261+50	14+51	12+10
Porter	2055+17	1817+07	21+41	15+12
204B	864+02	864+02	36+00	36+00
	5953+47	5285+05	241+08	203+08

Original Signed By
L. G. PARRISH
L.G.Parrish

FLIGHT INFORMATION CENTER

- S A I G O N -

MONTHLY ACTIVITY REPORT
1-30 NOVEMBER 1969.

PART I

- Incidents -

Date	A/C Type, No.& Contract No.	Place	Description
10 Nov.	15559 C-47 7001	On ground at V-202	Mortar fire commenced as acft was taxiing out and as acft executed T/O. Ten rounds impacted on strip. One C-123 was damaged. The afld radio control vehicle was destroyed. The closest mortar impact from the acft was approximately 150 feet. No personnel injuries or acft damage involved.

Fewer Company fire incidents were reported for the month of November than any other month on record. However, we feel that this is not truly reflective to the tactical situation here. Some pilots have been reluctant to report this information in view of recent criticism involving Company aircraft in ground fire incidents.

PART II

- Situation Summary -

I CORPS : During the reporting period enemy contacts were made in the areas south of the DMZ, west of Tam-Ky [redacted] and in southern I Corps. While additional information is needed to determine the validity of recent POW reports the enemy is reported to be presently engaged in a three phase campaign the ~~third~~ third phase of which will last from February through April 1970. Some slippage of this time frame is expected, however, due to the discovery of several weapons and equipment caches west of An-Hoa [redacted]

II CORPS : For the fourth straight week the enemy has maintained a high level of activity almost all of which has been centered in the western provinces the most significant locations being Bu-Prang and Duc-Lap. The latter is expected to be the enemys' premary objective in the coming weeks.

III CORPS : Enemy activity during the reporting period has been primarily confined to the northern portions of the Corps. Bu-Dop [redacted] remains the most highly threaten area as enemy forces continue operations in the area. Enemy units remain in Central War Zone C engaged in operations designed to tie down allied forces while infiltration is carried out. On 22 November two explosions occured in front of the HongKong BOQ located in Cholon area of Saigon. Explosives captured at the scene consisted of 70 pounds of TNT, 100 pounds of plastic, and 22 blasting caps. Vung-Tau [redacted] is reportedly targeted for rocket attacks at an unspecified time.

IV CORPS : During the reporting period there were no noticeable high points of activity. Five provinces are showing a higher level of activity than the rest of the Corps. Continued penetrations of the U-Minh Forest by GVN forces will probably result in a high level of activity in that area in the coming weeks as the enemy attempts to defend his strongest base area. Reports continue to mention large concentrations of enemy troops along the Cambodia/IV Corps border.

R. N. Begien III
OPSP/SGN

MEMORANDUM

TO : BM/SGN

DATE: 10 November 1969

REF. No. SZDAD/69/111

FROM : SZ/DAD

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for October 1969

GENERAL

No significant incidents of hostile activity were reported during October, but according to Embassy sources, large scale attacks are anticipated prior to the end of the year.

Although the Danang Air Base curfew remains constant, the city curfew was reduced one hour and is now effective from 2200 to 0600 hours daily. Since the RMD late shift is scheduled from 1200 to 2100 hours, there is time for personnel to return home without curfew difficulties.

Nine Southern Air Transport flights transited Danang during the month, but no difficulties were experienced; all were ferry departures.

The station air conditioner situation is still critical; four units failed during the month due to burned out fan motors. One unit, received from Tainan, developed this problem after only three days operation. Local repair capability has made it possible to maintain a full complement of air conditioners in the old hostel and essential offices but nine units are presently inoperative. Two units in the worst condition were shipped to Saigon for repair.

Preliminary discussions were held with the local Customs Authorities regarding inspection of transiting international flights. Arrangements for providing them with advance notification of these flights were made. It was admitted, however, that at the present time, there are insufficient customs personnel available to inspect all flights. The possibility of being authorized to load and off-load cargo on these flights at Danang was mentioned and not rejected, but an official decision on this matter must await future meetings.

LEGAL

The operation of the terminal snack-bar has shown a great deal of improvement under the management of Sergeant Dobbs. If his position becomes definitely permanent, it may prove advantageous to draw up a formal agreement with the Danang NCO club to outline the responsibilities of both parties.

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

An impasse was reached with both local customer representatives concerning the assignment of aircraft numbers to specific flights. Although more efficient aircraft scheduling would accrue from Flight Operations assigning actual tail numbers, the Embassy customer maintains that their agreement with AID assigns two PC-6 and one 204B aircraft for Embassy use and

control. In order to facilitate this control, according to the Embassy, it is necessary that the aircraft be assigned by tail number. Use of any of these aircraft on a non-Embassy flight requires prior permission. It is also claimed by both customers that tail number assignments are necessary to specify which customer is responsible for the payment of maintenance ferry flights.

Problems would be encountered when ferry flights are required or when all Danang Based aircraft might be scheduled at the same time when one or more is not available. Resolution of this situation is pending discussions with the respective customers in Saigon.

FACILITIES

The AID customer has indicated that Saigon is favorably disposed towards providing funds for the Danang Terminal Renovation and Paving Projects. Expedited company approval of these facility improvements has been requested. Due to the fact that the cost estimates for these projects are based largely on contractor bids, significant delays will create problems since both contractors maintain that rising costs will require upward price revisions if contracts are not signed in the near future.

An informal agreement was reached with VNAF Power Production whereby they will continue to supply a generator for station use even though commerical power is available. In turn, commerical power will be supplied to the snack-bar during periods of generator failure.

It has been decided to accomplish the installation of the new transmitter antenna mast through in-house efforts. Verbal approval for erecting the mast has been obtained from the VNAF, and written confirmation is expected in early November. Most of the excavation for the mast footing has been completed. Due to the curing time required for the concrete footing, this installation will not be operational until December.

FISCAL

Minor problems are encountered with the station time clock whenever commerical power is being utilized due to the difference in current frequency (50 Hertz). Although the clock runs slow during these periods, 60 Hertz generator power is available most of the time.

[redacted] payroll for the month totaled: [redacted]

Petty cash expenditures for the month totaled: 20,601$VN

OPERATIONS

Total revenue flight time increased 19+11 as compared to the previous month. Although weather was responsible for a great many flight cancellations with substantial revenue losses, these were offset by a significant increase in overall Embassy requirements and the temporary assignment

of one DHC-4 aircraft. The Embassy customer does forecast increased 204B flying and AID has mentioned there is a very remote possibility of an additional PC-6 being requested for Danang.

The following is a breakdown of flight time generated by this station during October:

VN-41/AID	871+10
VN-41/Embassy	202+32
0005	Nil
0069	Nil
Non-Revenue	13+30
Total	1,087+12

Revenue losses for the month were as follows:

Weather	63+25
Maintenance	17+15
Customer Cancellations	5+30
Total	86+10

Hostel occupancy factors were 86.45% and 31.97% for the Old and New hostels respectively.

COMMUNICATIONS

No problems were encountered during the month with the [redacted] remote VHF/UHF. All ground radio transmitters were transferred to the RMD lean-to. Although some reception difficulties were reported by SGN on HF, the problem was corrected by the middle of the month.

Incoming and outgoing messages totaled 2210 and 1642 respectively.

TRAFFIC

Overall Traffic workload continues to remain fairly constant with no significant deviations from the previous reporting period. No Continental Air Services or USAF aircraft were handled during the month.

Passenger and cargo statistics for the month are as follows:

	Passengers In	Passengers Out	Cargo In	Cargo Out
VN-41/AID	3,072	2,670	330,788	284,120
VN-41/Embassy	505	615	3,987	7,689
0005	0	6	Nil	Nil
AAM	94	106	12,043.3	22,870.3
TOTAL	3,671	3,397	346,818.3	314,679.3

SECURITY

It was learned from the VNAF Security Officer that requests for local personnel to remain on the air base after the established curfew (1900 hours) might be approved if operating circumstances warrant same. Such an approval for a few GTD drivers may be requested to avoid problems with late workshift transportation.

PERSONNEL

Delays in obtaining extensions of stay for third country national personnel may create serious problems in the coming months since many air base passes are expiring. These passes will not be renewed without written evidence that application has been made for an extention of stay which in turn, will not be accepted without a work permit. It is understood that no Danang employee presently has a valid work permit.

The personnel breakdown at Danang station at the close of business, 31 October, was as follows:

	[redacted]			
Permanent	5	21	14	83
Pre-Process	0	0	0	0
Temporary	0	0	0	0
Daily hire	0	0	0	0
TOTAL (123)	5	21	14	83

TECHNICAL SERVICES

RMD handled a total of 640 arriving and 646 departing flights during the month, 20 more of each than experienced in September. Flight delays attributable to maintenance decreased slightly for a total of 4. Four outstation recoveries were necessary, 2 involving DHC-4 aircraft. Two Number 1 services were performed on PC-6 aircraft; the remaining four Number 1 and two Number 2 services were performed on 204B aircraft. No engine or propeller changes were required during the month.

BGMD expended a total of 864 manhours of which 479 were utilized in hostel maintenance and painting the Station Manager's residence. Additional ceiling fans were installed in the rear rooms of the old hostel to provide some additional air circulation in the event of air conditioner failures.

From a visit by MPEMD/THH it was learned that a rebuilt Caterpillar engine will be shipped to Danang to replace the engine installed in the 75 KVA generator. It will not, therefore, be necessary to attempt an overhaul on the present unit.

Routine requisitions from NSA are presently encountering delays due to higher priority customers, but urgent items have been handled by the time consuming but expeditious walk-thru method.

Original Signed by
WINSTON C. CAMBRE

Winston C. Cambre

cc: file

SECRET

Thai Insurgents Look for Fair Weather

Communist guerrillas in several parts of the country appear ready to take bolder action during the approaching dry season. Bangkok has made some moves in anticipation of additional pressures, but foresees no major jump in the Communist threat.

In the north and north-central provinces, the Communists have improved their tribal guerrilla organization in the mountains, presumably in preparation for their seasonal campaign against government security forces. Villages and defectors have been reporting increases in the number and size of these tribal units, some of which appear better armed than in the past. The Communists have improved their support mechanism by shifting some of their Laos-based command and supply units into Thailand. As many as 1,600 guerrillas now may be operating near the Laotian border, an increase of 500 during the past year. They have been virtually unopposed by government security forces, which have been ordered to minimize suppressive operations.

The Communists may also be setting the stage for their first serious effort to move into adjacent lowlands. Sightings of ethnic Thai guerrillas and scattered incidents in these previously quiet areas indicate the Communists are beginning to extend their influence among this part of the population in the north. The effort could run into considerable difficulty, however, because of Communist support for tribal peoples who are looked down on by the ethnic Thais and because of more determined government efforts to ensure security in the lowland areas.

In the northeast, the insurgents have begun to spread out from their traditional operating areas, apparently as part of their year-long effort to broaden village support structures. These incursions, consisting mostly of food- and intelligence-gathering missions, may also be designed to keep security forces off balance, a tactic used in previous years with only limited success. There is no indication, however, that the Communists in this area soon intend to take on government military forces.

In the southern peninsular provinces, Thai insurgents appear to be challenging the government's presence for the first time. They have doubled their strength in the last year to about 400 and recently have made violent attacks on local defense forces and government development projects that have dramatized their presence beyond their actual strength. The government has made desultory efforts to strengthen its security forces and has ordered the national Communist Suppression Operations Directorate to take charge of security efforts in the south. Bangkok will have to do much more, however, to generate the comprehensive counterinsurgency programs necessary to blunt a sustained Communist initiative in the south. (SECRET)

SECRET

NND 941536 --- 3952



NND 941536 --3253

SINGAPORE ATTRACTS COMMUNIST COMMERCIAL INTEREST

Singapore's modern commercial facilities and its position at the crossroads of Asian trade is attracting increasing Communist interest. Particularly for Communist China, it is a significant source of foreign-exchange earnings and provides an important outlet for trade with the free world. Singapore is seeking to retain its role as a middleman and would like to develop new markets in Communist countries for its small and slow-growing exports of manufactures. Trade with these countries, however, continues to account for only about nine percent of Singapore's total trade.

Trade relations with Communist China, Singapore's most important Communist trading partner, have returned to normal following a dispute this summer with the local branch of the Bank of China. Chinese commercial activities have increased significantly since 1967 when Peking transferred a large share of its re-export trade to Singapore following the riots in Hong Kong. Last year Singapore, with earnings of some $124 million, was Peking's largest source of foreign exchange, after Hong Kong. Trade in 1968 totaled $176 million.

North Korea also has found Singapore a main source of its small foreign-exchange earnings. Trade that was minimal before the establishment of a North Korean trade mission in 1967 amounted to $8 million in 1968. North Vietnam's recent efforts to encourage trade with Singapore, however, have not yet met with much success.

Next month Singapore will open a trade office in Moscow, its first in a Communist country. It will be under the auspices of INTRACO, the state trading company that was established last year to provide more control and an improved bargaining position in trade with Communist countries.

Moscow has had a trade office in Singapore since 1966, when the two countries signed their first trade agreement. Trade totaled about $45 million last year, and has consisted very largely of Soviet purchases of Malaysian rubber sold through Singapore. Moscow is increasing its efforts to expand exports to Singapore, however, and reportedly plans to hold a trade fair in Singapore next year. Last year the Soviets formed a joint shipping agency with Singapore, and Moscow has recently initiated regular weekly civil air service to the city-state.

Singapore's trade with Eastern Europe reached about $30 million last year. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria have established local trade offices, and the latter two countries also have concluded trade agreements. A high-level Bulgarian trade delegation visited Singapore last month to open two Bulgarian-owned factories, bringing the total number of such businesses to seven. The Bulgarians also have investigated direct air service between Sofia and Singapore. (~~CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~)

NND 941536 ---3854

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
DECEMBER 1969

I. GENERAL

1. January 70 started with a real bang with heavy gunfire all over the city of Saigon. Fortunately, it was friendly fire although quite frightening to many Saigon residents. I am sorry to report this irresponsible performance was 100% American.

2. Otherwise the year ended quietly without serious incident. In reviewing progress and improvements for 1969, we feel that many noteworthy accomplishments were made. To recap the highlights;

Saigon

(1) We received and installed a 60 Kw and a 30 Kw generator for our initial backup power, when city power fails.

(2) We renovated an old GMD Shop Bldg and made it into a nice Administrative Bldg for all Personnel Dept activities.

(3) We received a link trainer and installed it in the OPS Bldg - tail number of the bird is "007".

(4) We erected revetment walls along the majority of our property perimeter.

(5) We have installed ramp flood lights on almost every ramp and perimeter wall.

(6) We had a new Bldg built for the Fire Brigade Dept, which includes vehicle shelter.

(7) A magnuflux machine was received, made operational and a room constructed for that activity.

(8) The old GMD Warehouse was renovated into a nice Cafeteria Annex facility, serving Vietnamese style food only.

(9) The West Ramp (dust bowl) was finally concrete paved by A&M Enterprises and is being well utilized.

(10) A new large (50,000 Gal) elevated water tower and deep well was constructed by TSN Authorities A&M shared cost interms of advanced water rent. This has nearly resolved all our water supply problems of the past.

(11) Some additional toilet facilities were constructed adjoining the RMD hangar. A welcome relief to the other limited facilities.

(12) The city power transformer was replaced with a company financed 300 KVA unit and hopefully soon a 400 KVA transformer will be available. A big improvement in our previous marginal power supply problems

(13) At years end, we finally installed our new PABX telephone system (100 drop unit). Telephone communications have been tremendously improved by this new system.

Can Tho

(1) We saw the opening of a new station on 10 Jan 69 at Can Tho. Mr. John Carter is the Senior Company Representative there and also the Supervisor of RMD.

(2) The new RMD/Supply Bldg there was completed in May. It houses Supply, RMD and AED Functions.

Nha Trang

(1) A new lean-to was constructed onto the RMD Hangar.

(2) The ramp lighting and rewiring project added considerably to general improvement there.

(3) A new enclosed employees scooter shed was built.

Da Nang

(1) The new aircraft concrete ramp was completed.

(2) A new lean-to was built onto the RMD hangar for use by RMD, PEMD and AED.

(3) Ramp floodlights, blast fence and public address system were installed there.

Two 204B helicopters were transferred to Udorn. We now have seven Bells as does Udorn Base.

3. All the Beech C-45 aircraft were moved to TNN for storage. The Helio H395 aircraft were transferred to VTE, except for two which were put into storage here.

Only three Beech Ten/Two aircraft are left here. Two of these are in storage and the last one is on contract until end Jan 70.

Overall flying hours slowly dropped from Jan through May and then settled around 6200-6400. The rest of the year June thru Dec was in this same range.

4. The year saw considerable progress in development and advancement of our [redacted] employees. Much emphasis was directed towards training. We now have eleven (11) female mechanics in RMD Shops, seven of which are Sheetmetal Mechanics. They were formerly Utilitymaid sweepers.

5. Total block time was 6332 in December 69 as compared with 6238 in November.

6. BMSGN Merrill Hulse departed on 18 Dec 69 for extended leave which will keep him absent from the company for at least five months and very probably for a longer period. Mr. Hulse has been with the company for seventeen years serving as Assistant Supply Mgr., Tachikawa; Station Manager, Seoul, Korea; President's Office; Assistant Base Mgr. Udorn; and Base Manager Saigon 1965-1969. The entire staff at Saigon wishes him the very best in his future endeavors. The undersigned E.J. Theisen, has been designated to function as Base Manager SVN. It became immediately apparent that certain decentralization of authority via delegation to Departments is necessary to prevent an administrative hang-up. A new Base Manual Notice is being printed and will be circulated to all concerned. It should be noted, last year at this time the BM Office was staffed with seven personnel including BM, ABM, and AA/BM. The AA/BM position, has been abolished plus several clerk positions. Our current office staff stands at one Acting BM plus two [redacted] female clerical assistants. Meanwhile, the administrative workload (despite a decline in flying hours) continues to rise due greater sophistication in company and customer management and administrative policies, procedures and requirements.

Acting BM is becoming more and more strapped to his desk (Sundays included) with less & less opportunity to move about within the SVN AAM complex or to maintain an adequate personal rapport with customers and associate company representatives. Decentralization with discrete delegation of authority will help but will not come close to resolving this problem. A proposal to correct this situation is being finalized for forwarding to the Head Office.

The imposition of a stiff Austerity tax (up to 400% on some items) plus strong rumors concerning the devaluation of the piaster has created a highly evolutionary condition within the local economy. I do not think anyone knows the full impact of this development. There are as many opinions as there are experts and we have an abundant supply of both. Actually I doubt if anyone knows exactly where we are now and what direction we are headed. Meanwhile, the "Free Market" rate is running at 350 to 400 to one US Dollar. The situation is reminiscent of the status of the currency on the Chinese mainland in 1944 and 1945.

7. On 17 December 69 Saigon experienced its first rocket attack since 15 August 1969. One 122mm rocket landed six kilometers southwest of Tan Son Nhut. On 19 December four 122mm rockets landed

on Tan Son Nhut causing five US wounded, one Vietnamese killed and twelve wounded. Tan Son Nhut was last hit on 29 June. Terrorist incidents occurred in Saigon on 8, 16, 22, 23 and 24 December with the employment of explosives against the civilian population. These incidents were largely in effective.

II. GENERAL AFFAIRS

1. [redacted] a 15 years veteran [redacted] was appointed Director General of the company as a result of Air Vietnam strike in December. No immediate solution, however, is in sight for the employees' demand for a 50% salary increase. The company basic salary is far from being competitive but its cost of living allowance now stands at 200% thereof. A 50% salary increase, therefore, means a 150% increase in pay.

2. The new austerity tax promulgated by the GVN on 24 November, 1969 on the strength of the decree-law 20/61 was in serious trouble. The Supreme Court to which the decree-law as referred by the Senate for review of constitutionality and legality has declared it barred by limitation thus depriving the Executive action of its legal basis. The Senate is working on a compromise bill with reportedly a much lower tax rate (half of the Senate members are up for re-election this year).

3. Meanwhile the 1970 budget forecasted on the basis of the high tax rate has already been approved by both Houses. The pressure for inflation and devaluation of the piastre is mounting.

III. FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT

1. AR 7658 - Antenna Mast for Danang Station
Mast was erected on schedule, 11 December 1969.

2. AR 7659 - Antenna Mast for Nha Trang Station
The Base was poured on 11 December 1969. The mast was erected on 9 January 1970 using a 35' mobile crane borrowed from PA&E.

3. AR 2077 - Completion of Base Area Lighting (SGN)
Lights have been placed around the perimeter of the Northeast Ramp. RCAD crew is in the process of installing electrical connections.

4. AR 2236 - Additional 200 KVA Transformer (SGN)
On 16 December 1969, the SDL (City Power Company) arbitrarily installed a 300 KVA transformer in lieu of a 400 KVA transformer. They also informed us that a 400 KVA transformer will be installed when it becomes available probably next month.

5. Project 6695 - Renovation of the Operations Bldg. (SGN)
This project awaiting TPE approval.

6. Project 6702 - 204B Touchdown Pads (SGN)
This project awaiting TPE approval.

IV. SECURITY

1. Rumored Public Disturbances - The rumor from mouth to mouth that the Vietnamese currency will be devaluated to the lowest point after RVN Government puts into circulation the 1,000 bank notes which are expected to be issued soon this coming year, and the cost of living will be higher.

V. MEDICAL

1. Number of visits: 1670
2. Accidents: 74
3. Hospitalization: 1
4. Outcalls: 4
5. Physical examinations: 21
6. Sick leaves: 292

VI. PERSONNEL

1. Business for the month was a bit slow owing to the holiday season. "part from routine activeties our efforts were directed toward overseeing the Vietnamese Employee Representatives' Election and decking the Personnel Office halls with boughs of holly.

Employee participation in the election was somewhat less than impressive. Only 38.2 percent of the electorate in Saigon got out to vote. Most of the primary representatives elected are repeaters from past years.

2. Personnel Strength - Saigon Base

Classif. [redacted]								Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
Permanent	39	141	138	14	138	2	14	4	329	161

[redacted]						Total	
GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	GRD	GRD	FLT
Permanent 528#	14**	2		2	1*	533	14

Temporary: [redacted]

GRD
1

Pre-processed: [redacted]

GRD
3

(*) : 1 [redacted]
(**) : 1
(#) : 4

Ground personnel: 866
Flight personnel: 175
Total : 1041

Danang Sub-base

Classif. [redacted]				Total
GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent 4	14	19	82	119

Nha Trang Sub-base

Classif.	[redacted]				Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	4	12	24	61	101

Can Tho Sub-base

Classif.	[redacted]			Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	1	10	2	13

VII. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. Aircraft Maintenance, fixed wing - December has been an average month in expending skilled manhours on aircraft maintenance. Although workload has varied, from light to moderately heavy, it has been possible to fully utilize the manpower most of the time

2. Rotary wing - Approximately 1085 helicopter hours were flown during December.

N8512F was transferred to Udorn the first part of the month, this leaves a total of 7 helicopters based at Saigon now. Two Saigon helicopters (N1303X and N1305X) went over 7000 hours airframe time during the month.

The change over to Esso 2380 oil was completed during the prescribed amount of time listed on SL-208-004 so far no problems with any excessive carbon etc.. in any filters.

3. Shop Section - The overall RMD Shops activities remained on an even par. No annual inspections were performed this month, however, two form 337s were forwarded to the FAA Manila Office. These reports covered the installation of the B2C Automatic Flight Control System on aircraft N393R and N153L.

Since this is the final monthly activity report for the year 1969, it is a good time for reminiscing. Progress has been made in all areas and this is as it should be. Perhaps the best was to measure progress is by comparing the end product.

If one achievement during the past year were to be selected as the most significant, it would be the training of unskilled indigenous personnel as replacements for journeyman TCNs. One year ago there were no indigenous personnel in the Sheetmetal Shop. [redacted] This progress is not limited to only one shop. The combined RMD Shops complex has increased from a 17.2 percent indigenous staff one year ago to 41.2 percent today.

4.Planning - The present personnel strength of the Maintenance Planning Department in Saigon is 14 in comparison to the 19 persons in April 69, this personnel reduction percentage equals to the reduction of aircraft assigned in SVN.

Since the support from MMB by transferring to SGN a reconditioned stencil machine on exchange basis, the Publication Unit has been in its most efficient operation. It saves an estimate of US$300 permonth.

In December, the scheduling and Production section pre-planned, scheduled and processed, for aircraft of all types: 500 overnight services; 28 number 1 services; 22 number 2 services; 2 number 3 services; 2 number 4 services; 7 engine changes (2 for 204B); 7 propeller changes; 59 BA's; 130 SI's; 16 EI's; 219 time controlled components change on 204B; two T53 engine hot section inspections; 12 DRR's; and 383 shop work orders; 204

5. General Maintenance - A 300 KVA Transfer was installed 16 Dec. 69 in the vault by the City Power Company. A 400 KVA transformer will be installed soon as replacement.

A 200m^2 power cable is being laid between the utilities building and GMD complex.

Building and Grounds Manitenance Excavation of another manhole infront of the hangar is in progress.

The water supply problem is being worked on. A gate valve was installed on the piping system at the TSN well and their operators have been instructed on the pumping schedule. With proper monitoring of theconsumption, AAM will have water available from 0600-2200 from the elevated tank.

6. Technical Training - The following courses were completed during December: (a) Garrett TPE 331: Two courses were held at Can Tho; (b) Courses in Progress (Auto Maintenance): This course for GMD auto mechanics.

On 13/14 Dec. the FAA written examination was held in Saigon. Fourteen AAM students from the Powerplant course completed the written part.

Three FAA oral and practical mechanics successfully passed written and practical examinations and received their FAA mechanics licenses.

1969 was a year of increased training for our [redacted] employees with a total of 296 [redacted] receiving technical training in Aviation training.

The completion of our first helicopter flight mechanics course enabled four TCNs to qualify for flight mechanic.

7. Supply - Stock Control

In December, Stock Control's workload showed a slight four percent decrease in its overall transactions as compared with the previous month

In early part of this month, there were a total of 262 line items needed for the project; 126 line items were available in stock; 26 line items NIS and 111 line items found never carried in this station.

Procurement Section of Supply-Saigon experienced a high increase (42%) in the number of transactions during this reporting cycle. A total of 301 line items of commodities were purchased from local market in comparison with 212 line items procured last month.

Total value of commodities purchased from the Saigon/Cholon market amounted to VN$921,527.00.

A decrease of AGP cases was noted the past month with five aircraft grounded caused by the lack of six rotable or recoverable parts with no revenue hours lost.

Shipping and Receiving

This section's workload remained at the same busy level than during the previous months. Ever increasing emphasis has been given to this Section's personnel training in the correct handling and documentation of cargo.

The flow of critical items remained also constant and is being watched closely for faster processing back to MMB.

The movement of Personal Effects is still very much in evidence. Improved or new methods of handling Personal Effects to and from the SVN satellite stations are under discussion with the "door-to-door" VANPAC SEA representative.

The Customs Unit is kept hoping and is doing a remarkable job despite the holidays' congestion.

VIII. TRAFFIC/AAM

	November	December
Passengers departure SGN (All contracts)	6,007	5,997
Passengers arrival SGN (All contracts)	6,677	6,754
Outbound cargo SGN	82,893	64,725
Inbound cargo SGN	96,146	86,628

2. TRAFFIC/USAID

	Cargo (including AF Caribou A/C)	
	November	December
Outbound (lbs) SGN	1,534,916	1,717,396 lbs
Inbound (lbs) SGN	101,577	538,788 lbs

IX. OPERATIONS

1. We can expect a smoother running operation with our new telephone system. All incoming calls are routed thru Operations when the Air America Telephone Operator secures for the day and these calls can be transferred to other departments. Outgoing calls have been much simplified by the new automatic dialing system.

There were 28 controllable and 58 non-controllable delays with a total of 929 Saigon departures.

2. There were considerably less GTD complaints during the month. The earlier survey made on improving GTD certainly has a bearing on it becoming a smoother operation. New rules governing GTD have been made a part of the Base Manual. A study is underway now to reduce our Microbus fleet as a means to cut costs in this department. Subsequently, this opportunity will be used to release some of the less desirable drivers, however positions will be maintained to hire more suitable personnel to bring the department up to it newly established operations strength.

3. Flight Time Report (See attachment A)
Aircraft Incidents Report (See attachment B)

4. Accident Reports

Date	A/C Type/No.	Location	Remarks
05	PC6/N153L	V-167	One prop blade tip dented beyond limits on T/O or landing.
06	PC6/N192X	V-248	A/C arrived V-248 with left tire flat. Sharp object caused 3/4' puncture in sidewall.
08	VTB/N7770B	V-05	A/C arrived V-05 with right main tire flat. Tire blew out at large flat spot probably caused by excessive braking.
12	DHC-4/N539Y	V-05	Left nose gear damaged - stayed open on retraction. Inspection revealed erroneous pin-ball-lock had been installed. Wrong part P/N BLS4R1.25N, correct part P/N BLS4R1.5N.
13	PC6/N153L	V-56	Tail wheel dropped into 6' rut while turning around for T/O. Tail section buckled rt side fwd of tail wheel post and under right stabilizer tail wheel strut piston bent.
16	VTB/N9838Z	V-20	Cabin door came open on T/O roll, slight damage. Door not properly closed and latched.

16	DHC-4/N539Y	V-01	Both nose gear doors failed to open on retraction, both extensively bent. Link assy's P/N C4B1215-1 found bent, probably undiscovered after door incident on 12 December. Leadman received 3 days LWOP.
16	C-46/B928	V-27	Same damage reported in paragraph 5.
20	C-46/B910	V-01	Marketeer struck belly of A/C below passenger door, very slight dent in A/C, steering column of Marketeer bent back, and driver slightly injured. He stated Marketeer went forward when he placed trans handle in reverse. Marketeer transmission handles move forward for reverse and rearward for forward which is unnatural movement of control lever.
21	VTB/N9838Z	V-07	Right prop struck runway during landing, prop and nose section substantially damaged. Investigation complete, scheduled for Board Review on 9 Jan.
22	C-47/083	V-01	Left elevator found with 3' tear and trailing edge bent. Crew had no knowledge of damage, cause undetermined, suspect damaged on V-01 ramp by vehicle or cart.
23	PC6/N391R	V-17	Left horizontal stabilizer incurred a 1sq ft hole 6' deep on landing at V-17, suspect struck by rock
25	PC6/N185K	V-01	Right wing tip and aileron damaged by forklift. AAM driver received 3 days LWOP.
27	204B/N1307X	AT8647, SVN	Fatal injury incurred by VN National, ran into tail rotor. No A/C damage. Report being prepared.

5. Ground Transportation

Aggregate microbuses mileage:	22774 km or 14233 miles
Microbuses downtime:	378 hrs 24'
Microbus pax-carried:	3256 pax
Isuzu bus mileage:	6434 km approx. 4021 miles
Isuzu bus downtime:	255 hrs 72'
Isuzu bus pax-carried:	10520 pax
Supply vehicles mileage:	2859 km approx. 1786 miles
Supply vehicles downtime:	52 hrs.

X. FLYING

1. MFDSVN was absent during the first part of December and returned in time to step into the middle of the messes.

A week visit of AVPFO to Saigon and sub-stations was probably the single highlight of the month. It is believed he should now have a better current understanding of our problems. Equally important, the fact that anyone from the Taipei management level actually spent a considerable amount of time "out-amongst-um" gave a boost to crew morale when it was badly needed.

2. We finished the year without the myriad scheduling problems of attempting to stay within the flight time limits that plagued us a year ago. One captain had 1000 hours + 58 minutes. All others stayed under the limit.

XI. FISCAL

1. Budget matters - Total net reduction of work force during December was 31 persons. An analysis of salary costs by department was prepared and shown to weekly staff meeting. This created much interest in the total cost reduction program. Each department was asked to prepare a written evaluation of his department manning requirement and additional savings he can make during the last quarter of our fiscal year.

E.J. Theisen
Base Manager - Saigon

26 Dec	M8535F 204-B 7002	XS5266	A/C was enroute to V-17 when the PIC observed a burst of tracer fire directed at his a/c. Capt. KNOTTS immediately changed his a/c direction and gained altitude. No personnel injuries or a/c damage involved.	

PART II

- Situation Report -

I CORPS : Emphasis has been given to reports of LOC's (Lines of Communication) in Laos leading into RVN undergoing repair and logistic activity by recent sensor activation and sightings of vehicular movement along the Quang Tri/Laotian border just west of Khe Sanh [redacted] Sightings of logistic activity have been reported also in an area just south of the DMZ in NE Quang Tri province. These sightings along with a captured enemy document revealing objectives for a forthcoming offensive give credence to speculation of an enemy offensive in I Corps during Tet 1970.

II CORPS : During the reporting period enemy activity was largely concentrated in southwestern II Corps. Elements of the units involved in the attacks against Bu Prang and Du Lap Special Forces Camps are believed to be moving northwards towards the Tri-border area. Low level sources continue to mention the possibility of increased enemy activity prior to Tet 1970.

III CORPS : While there was a decline in attacks by fire for the reporting period, there was a sharp increase in the number of terrorists incidents the most significant taking place in Saigon. From the 22-24 of this month 9 terrorist sapper incidents were carried out in the capital. All involved the use of explosives apparently aimed at the civilian polulace, but were not particularly well executed. On 16 December two terrorist incidents were reported. On 8 December one incident was reported.

On 17 December Saigon had its first rocket attack since 15 August 1969. A 122mm rocket impacted six kilometers SW of Tan-Son-Nhut. On 19 December four 122mm rockets impacted on Tan-Son-Nhut Air Base resulting in five US wounded, one Vietnamese civilian killed, and 12 Vietnamese wounded. This was the first rocket attack against the base since 29 June. On 12 December Bien Hoa [redacted] took 11 rounds of 122mm rocket fire followed three days later by a rocket attack on the Naval Facility at Vung Tau [redacted] resulting in 2 Vietnamese civilians killed and seven US wounded.

IV CORPS : During the reporting period activity remain at a moderate level. The first indications of the 101D NVA Regiment intentions of infiltrating into Chau Doc province was provided by captured documents. Although there were numerous low level reports mentioning enemy plans to attack population centers, the GVN pacification program is still considered to be the primary goal.

R. N. Begien III
OPSP/SGN

ATTACH. "B"

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT

DECEMBER 1969.

1. Contract 7001 -

A/C No.	Revenue Block Time	Revenue Flight Time	Non-Revenue Block Time	Non-Revenue Flight Time
M67984	81+09	67+10	4+25	3+03
M67985	187+29	157+58	3+50	3+00
B910	121+44	103+37	1+20	1+04
B928	141+35	119+47		
B138	130+01	108+41		
B146	110+37	94+50		
6147	148+31	128+25		
8084	136+04	125+56		
5559	179+27	161+49		
5994	105+04	87+32		
6083	156+59	135+57		
B829	87+47	71+26	4+15	3+42
M539Y	68 +36	55+36	22+17	20+34
M544Y	27+08	21+52	24+37	22+51
M9518Z	144+39	124+50	2+12	1+25
M6154U	80+08	67+16	7+04	5+31
M9956Z	100+26	87+01	5+02	4+07
M7770B	71+10	57+56	8+22	7+09
M9577Z	107+01	89+20	1+46	1+02
M9838Z	59+26	49+29	18+47	16+28
M3728G	40+15	35+34	1+05	0+45
M9664C	0+46	0+44		
M3674G	68+10	58+35	11+45	9+44
M7695C	95+15	79+29	3+59	3+07
M91295	44+31	38+59	11+01	9+07
M9573Z	10+50	10+14		
M5269V	6+10	5+22	11+58	10+55
M285L	69+04	58+30	3+07	2+05
M391R	133+40	119+43	1+55	1+04
M394R	10+22	9+36		
M9444	124+21	107+15	3+36	2+57
M198X	96+46	88+04	1+09	0+42
M153L	110+04	98+19	3+43	2+08
M180K	76+42	70+44		
M12450	5+01	3+45	0+41	0+31
M748N	153+21	131+56	3+47	3+05
M152L	18+02	14+46	0+50	0+37
M184L	182+17	154+31	4+36	3+54
M185K	156+02	143+06		
M192X	113+36	99+00		

N393R	96+14	87+55	1+08	0+50
N194X	76+43	70+17		
N1303X	117+31	117+31		
N1304X	196+32	196+32	2+59	2+50
N1305X	172+36	172+36	4+30	4+30
N1306X	14+19	14+19	3+30	3+30
N1307X	123+59	123+59	6+10	6+10
N8512F	14+51	14+51	1+30	1+30
N8514F	119+04	119+04	2+10	2+10
N8535F	91+36	91+36	2+20	2+20
Sub-total	4783+41	4253+20	191+17	164+27

2. Contract 7002 -

B928	1+33	0+49
N539Y	17+07	14+17
N544Y	46+33	40+26
N3674G	22+26	19+57
N7695C	1+02	0+43
N91295	64+09	55+12
N9518Z	13+49	12+53
N6154U	23+22	20+15
N9956Z	22+16	19+21
N7770B	48+49	41+23
N9577Z	2+44	2+17
N9838Z	4+25	3+55
N3728G	50+49	43+40
N6622C	8+49	8+07
N5269V	4+17	3+33
N748N	18+27	15+02
N152L	55+10	51+03
N184L	14+58	11+41
N185K	8+35	7+03
N192X	35+51	29+34
N393R	9+56	8+15
N194X	102+49	95+17
N285L	92+16	87+14
N391R	7+04	5+49

N394R	79+33	73+00
N9444	47+55	41+07
N198X	5+42	4+41
N153L	15+18	13+03
N180K	37+03	34+31
N12450	68+53	63+34
N8512F	6+50	6+50
N8514F	17+09	17+09
N8535F	42+48	42+48
N1303X	23+29	23+29
N1305X	1+35	1+35
N1306X	89+55	89+55
N1307X	23+14	23+14
Sub-total	1136+40	1032+42

3. Contract 7003 -

B928	10+55	8+56
N539Y	9+48	8+31
N6154U	8+51	5+57
N9956Z	4+57	2+57
N7770B	16+46	11+35
N9577Z	10+01	7+17
N9838Z	1+30	1+19
N3728G	2+14	1+31
N7695C	6+00	3+54
N91295	1+00	0+43
N5269V	2+55	2+30
N285L	2+19	1+44
N152L	1+20	0+56
N1304X	13+16	13 +16
N1307X	1+35	1+35
Sub-total	93+27	72+41

4. Contract 0005 -

N6622C	52+07	45+53
N1304X	1+36	1+36
Sub-total	53+43	47+29

5. Contract 0069 -

N9664C	73+03	61+36
Sub-total	73+03	61+36

TOTAL REVENUE BLOCK TIME	6140+34
" " FLIGHT TIME	5467+48
TOTAL NON-REVENUE BLOCK TIME	191+17
" " " FLIGHT TIME	164+27
GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	6331+51
" " FLIGHT TIME	5632+15

Flight Time by Type of Aircraft

Type of A/C	REVENUE		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
C-46	785+03	661+48	9+35	7+07
C-47	87+47	71+26	4+15	3+42
Bailed C-47	726+05	639+39		
DHC-4	169+12	140+42	46+54	43+25
VTB	1190+00	1005+38	71+03	58+25
10-2	85+08	75+39	11+58	10+55
Porter	2025#24	1801+01	24+32	17+53
204B	1071+55	1071+55	23+00	23+00
TOTAL	6140+34	5467+48	191+17	164+27

Original Signed By
L. G. PARRISH
L.G.Parrish

ATTACH. "A"

M O N T H L Y R E P O R T

N H A - T R A N G

D E C E M B E R 1969

GENERAL

All U.S. Military facilities on our side of the Airport are now closed. Eating facilities have vanished in this area. Breakfast is now being taken at the "Neptune" NCO Club and we have obtained refrigerators for Sodas, Sandwiches and Doughnuts sold to flight crew for lunch when desired. The only remaining alternative would be to transport crewmembers to the other side of the airbase for these meals. Presently we are investigating the possibility of having someone operate a Snack-bar in the area. More will be known by the next report time.

No military incidents occured this month.

TRAFFIC

Another slight decrease in revenue flying time this month due to the CHARTER schedule, inclement weather, and loss of one DC-3 from this station. (See statistics)

AIR TRAFFIC

Passengers		Dec.	Nov.	11 Mo
Departing		4235	4092	7982
Arriving		3757	3564	1023
	TOTAL	7852	7656	4.05

CARGO

1. CARGO SERVICE (Lbs)

Departing		347,329	357,641	371,974
Arriving		347,630	261,744	209,665
	TOTAL	694,959	618,430	580,639

2. CHARTER SERVICE (Lbs)

Departing		5,439	3,468	5,804
Arriving		11,758	3,357	4,674
	TOTAL	16,197	6,825	10,680

3. [illegible] (Lbs) (Ton)

Departing		392,568	361,174	382,778
Arriving		314,382	246,481	207,941
	TOTAL	706,950	607,655	590,719

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

Customer relations continue to remain good to excellent with few problems occuring.

[illegible]

A. [illegible] : VH and VI are still creating problems. The Motorola unit has been out due to a burned out circuit [illegible]. We are unable to "duty reg" a suitable replacement as yet and must depend on the back-up unit until the new unit arrives. The new [illegible] terms will be completed in January and should resolve most of our communication problems.

B. [illegible] (See attached)

C. [illegible]

	DEC.	NOV.	1968
Arrival	511	502	443
Departure	515	501	451
A/N	240	271	224

D. DELAYS

Percentage on time	98	96

SECURITY

No major problems.

[illegible] (See attached)

[illegible] : No major problems

[illegible] : No major problems

[illegible]

	DEC.	NOV.	1968
1. Transient overnight	252	251	269
2. Overnight services	272	270	354
3. Engine changes	2	0	1
4. Propeller changes	1	0	2
5. No. 1 services	0	1	6
6. No. II services	0	0	1
7. Delays Maint/Tech.	2	3	22
8. Intermediate services	0	0	0
9. AOG	5	4	12
10. Outline recoveries	2	2	2
11. Accident report (A/C)	1	1	0
12. Accident report (INJ)	0	0	0

DAN LARSON
SE-AMA

MEMORANDUM

TO : BM/SGN

DATE: 05 December 1969

FROM : SZ/DAD

REF. No. SZDAD/69/121

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for November 1969

GENERAL

The apparent lull in hostile activity continued throughout the month of November. Nearly three months have now elapsed since the last significant incident involving casualties and destruction in the Danang Area.

No further changes have been effected in air base and city curfew hours. However, on 22 November, nine TCN personnel were denied entrance to the base due to expired air base passes. Special arrangements were made which would allow these personnel to enter the base and applications for temporary passes were submitted to the VNAF security authorities. These efforts can only be considered as expedients since applications for permanent 1970 base passes will be processed in December with valid extensions of stay required as supporting documents for all TCN personnel. Very few of these personnel have been granted an extension of stay due to difficulties being encountered in obtaining prerequisite work permits.

No problems were encountered with the five Southern Air Transport flights which transited Danang; routine turnaround maintenance support for these aircraft have ceased with the transfer of the station maintenance supervisor to Saigon.

The critical airconditioner situation reported previously was somewhat alleviated with the advent significantly lowered temperatures experienced during the last half of the month. As a result, airconditioning has not been a serious requirement.

The local director of Customs has verbally indicated that there should be little problem in obtaining authorization to load and offload cargo on company international flights transiting Danang. Formal written authorization has been requested but no reply has been received to date.

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

The AID/VN-70 Air Operations Officer has expressed some dissatisfaction with the amount of time being required to obtain company approval for the passenger terminal renovation project. It is understood that the proforma AR has now been forwarded to Washington for final approval.

Considering the number of flight delays and cancellations due to weather, overall relations with both customers on an operational level have remained excellent.

LEGAL

A local national was seriously injured when he entered the tail rotor arc of 204B N85357 at Dai-Loc on 15 November. He was evacuated to the Danang/USAID hospital where he was treated for a severe left arm fracture and moderate facial abrasions. The attending physician advised that skin grafts should be made on the arm, but the facilities for same are only available in a private clinic. SLC has been queried as to whether or not any company liability should be assumed for the cost of this medical treatment.

FACILITIES

The footing for the station eighty foot, free standing, antenna mast was poured during the month. Erection of the mast should take place on or about 10 December when the concrete will have adequately cured.

The USAF furnished generator was unusually reliable during the month. Power failures were infrequent and of short duration. Commercial power consumption was therefore substantially reduced.

The city power company, S.I.P.E.A., has announced an increase in electricity rates. The price per kilowatt hour is now 14 piastres, an increase of 1.63 piastres.

Routine maintenance of the station facilities has been reduced pending clarification of the means for obtaining customer materials support. All buildings at Danang are considered Government Furnished Property.

FISCAL

[redacted] payroll for the month totaled: [redacted]

Petty cash expenditures for the month totaled: 24,829$VN

OPERATIONS

Total revenue flight time declined substantially during November as compared to October. The decrease amounted to 155+02 hours. Although poor weather was the primary causal factor, the revenue loss figures somewhat conceal this fact since many flights were not even scheduled by the customers due to adverse weather conditions.

The following is a breakdown of flight time generated by this station during November:

VN/70 AID	692+03
VN/70 END	226+37
0005	Nil
0069	Nil
Non-Revenue	10+19
Total	928+59

Revenue losses for the month were as follows:

Weather - - - - - - - - - - -	15+40
Maintenance - - - - - - - - - -	2+00
Customer Cancellations - - -	30+30
Total - - - - - - - - - - -	48+10

Flight dispatch activity was somewhat hampered by a lack of timely weather reports. With the significant deterioration in overall I Corps weather the need for extensive and up to date weather information is becoming more and more critical. Although weather telstype and autowriter equipment has been installed in operations for over a year it has not been connected to the base circuits due to alleged radio interference problems associated with the ground radio transmitters.

Since these transmitters have been relocated and the USAF had recently installed a new 25 pair underground telephone cable in the Operations/Administration building, coordination with the local communications squadron was effected whereby this equipment will be reconnected in the near future. In fact, it appears as though Air America Danang is programmed to receive, from the Air Force, an upgraded weather teletype capable of receiving 100 words per minute in January.

Hostel occupancy factors were 85.65% and 33.50% for the Old and New hostels respectively.

COMMUNICATIONS

Periodic failures of the VHF/UHF ground radios were experienced during the month, but no extensive problems were encountered in their repair.

Incoming and outgoing messages totaled 1803 and 1388 respectively.

TRAFFIC

The Danang Traffic Manager, Mr. Ogsbury, resigned effective 25 November. Since this position was funded under the Ground Services complement, the AID customer has decided that a PS-D replacement is not necessary to supervise and manage the activities of the USAID warehouse operation.

Pending future developments in this area, TM/GS-SGN has been assigned to the station on a temporary basis. He is being primarily utilized in Flight Operations as a tentative replacement for SOR/DAD who is on extended home leave.

Passenger and cargo statistics for the month are as follows:

	Passengers In	Passengers Out	Cargo In	Cargo Out
VN-70/AID	2,574	2,696	316,868	346,454
VN-70/Embassy	476	525	1,200	2,982
0069	3	8	-	-
0005	5	1	-	-
AAM	105	119	8,482	34,564.9
Total	3,163	3,349	326,550	384,000.9

SECURITY

A meeting was held by the VNAF Security Office to outline the processing requirements for 1970 Air Base passes. Although it was admitted that air base pass processing procedures had been standardized throughout South Vietnam, a given pass will only be valid for the installation where issued. No problems are anticipated in obtaining new passes for local personnel, but as previously mentioned, serious difficulties may result if extension of stays are not received for TCN employees.

PERSONNEL

An employee representatives election is scheduled for 8 December. APM-SGN made a station visit to set up the election procedures and to coordinate with the local labor ministry officials. From all appearances, there is little employee interest in this matter and a scarcity of volunteer candidates.

This office has yet to be approached by any employee regarding the increased cost of living which has resulted from the recent government implementation of austerity taxes. The U.S. Consulate advised that several basic food prices have increased significantly in the Danang Area, but no formal manifestations of discontent have so far occurred.

The personnel breakdown at Danang station at the close of business, 30 November, was as follows:

	[redacted]			
Permanent	3	20	14	83
Pre-Process	0	0	0	0
Temporary	1	0	0	0
Daily-Hire	0	0	0	0
TOTAL (121)	4	20	14	83

TECHNICAL SERVICES

RMD handled a total of 616 arriving and 617 departing flights during the month, a slight decrease as compared to October. Flight delays attributable to maintenance also decreased, for a total of 3. Heavy services for the month totaled 6, including one PC-6 number 1 and two 204B number two services. Only one outstation recovery was necessary; two engine changes, and one propeller change were required. For the second consecutive month, five aircraft were placed on AGP status.

RGMD expended a total of 842 manhours of which 465 were utilised in general maintenance at the Old and New hostels.

No significant problems in the area of MSA procurement were reported during the month, but long delays are continuing to be encountered in the delivery of construction materials and POL products.

Original Signed by
WINSTON C. CAMBRE
Winston C. Cambre

cc: file

2-1824

AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

COUNTRY Cambodia

REPORT NO. CS-311/11057-69

SUBJECT Viet Cong Prisoner of War Camp in Cambodia

DATE DISTR. 11 December 1969

DATE OF [redacted] December 1968 - January 1969

PLACE & DATE ACQ. [redacted] Vietnam, Saigon (25 October 1969)

[redacted] learned from [redacted] who was [redacted] in the Foreign Relations Subsection (B.19) of COSVN's Propaganda, Culture, and Indoctrination Section, of a POW camp which held some 200 U.S. prisoners. [redacted] had visited the POW camp occasionally as [redacted] or the camp administrat[redacted] According to [redacted] the camp was located in Cambodia near the [redacted]der with South Vietnam and some five kilometers north of their own base camp, which was located in Loc Ninh District, Binh Long Province, South Vietnam, in the vicinity of XU 572199. During 1968 only about 30 percent of the prisoners arrived safely at the camp because many had been executed enroute to the camp. The chairman of

5 4 3 2 1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 20 AUG 2014

[redacted]

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	AID
OSI						

C-41

L7011 approx L-46 XU 595 253

NC48-3 11 59 20 N
106 26 55 E

PREK CHREW (Stream)

Cmd 143 (S-47, L01) DB-VA

Cog 1949

the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam became concerned about this action and offered rewards for safe delivery of prisoners to the camp, after which only those prisoners who attempted to escape were killed.

2. On or about 13 January 1969, while enroute from his COSVN base to Ba Thu, [redacted] met three Viet Cong guards escorting a U.S. POW from Ba Thu to the POW camp. While talking to the guards, he learned that the prisoner had been captured in Long An Province, South Vietnam. The prisoner was dressed in black pajamas, coolie hat, Ho Chi Minh sandals, and was carrying a rucksack and walking stick. The guards did not allow [redacted] to talk to the prisoner. [redacted] indicated that he observed the POW between COSVN commo-liaison Stations V25 and V27 about seven kilometers north of Ba Thu. He could not describe the prisoner further.

3. Field Dissem: State USMACV 7th Air Force NAVFORV CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF [redacted]

THAI-US RELATIONS TAKE ANOTHER THUMPING

Thai government leaders have voiced their strongest criticism of the US in several years over what they believe to be US interference with a pending sale of 20,000 tons of Thai rice to South Vietnam. Some cabinet officials assert that Saigon withdrew from the negotiations on US "orders," and they view the substitution of a delivery of US rice to Saigon as clear evidence of US chicanery. Foreign Minister Thanat has led the attack, implying to the US ambassador that Washington's action was deliberately cutthroat and labeling as specious the ambassador's explanations to the contrary.

Although the Thai leaders in a more halcyon period might have treated the incident as an isolated one, it has come at a time when they are deeply troubled over the nature of their relations with the US. Already apprehensive over what they believe to be a weakening in the US commitment to Thailand's security and dismayed over criticism in the US of Thailand's role in the Vietnam war, the Thai are reacting strongly to each instance in which Washington appears to be downgrading Thai interests.

Bangkok is apparently prepared to pursue the rice issue forcefully in an effort to regain an appearance of equality in its dealings with the US. Although the Thai have been careful in the past to mute their differences with the US, both Thanat and Prime Minister Thanom have made the issue a central theme in recent press conferences. Thanom also said his government plans to put the controversy on the top of its list of things to discuss during Vice President Agnew's coming visit to Bangkok. Thanat has already warned the US ambassador that a formal protest might be made if Washington is not "responsive" to his strong verbal protest.

Although the Thai can be expected to press hard for greater US recognition of Thai interests, for instance in the rice trade, they are aware of the limited leverage they can apply. The dispute over the rice contract will probably not go much beyond protests, but the Thai could complicate other matters of mutual concern, such as the determination of who has criminal jurisdiction in cases involving US personnel in Thailand. (~~CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~)

NND 941536 --- 3922

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
JANUARY 1970

I. GENERAL

1. Total block time in January 1970 was 6114 vs 6332 hours for December 1969.

2. VN-70 Customer (USAID/CORDS) Terminated 2 VTBs (N9838Z and N7695C) plus one C-46 (B138) effective 31 January 70. B-138 will remain in Tainan in temporary storage status whereas the VTBs (for the time being) will remain in SGN. VTB N7695C will go to temporary storage in SGN and N9577Z will be carried as a SGN spare. The VTBs were terminated due to internal customer problems however we expect full utilization of the spare aircraft and our experience so far in February bears this out. We will watch this situation very carefully and make recommendations accordingly. Meanwhile VN-70 has issued a Call Order for DHC-4 N544Y effective 1 February 70. I would forecast a fairly stabilized flying program between 6200 to 6500 block hours for an indefinite period.

3. The change in our pilots uniforms with the addition of epaulettes and "scrambled egg" hats for the Captains has had a noticeable effect. Our aircrews look sharper, act sharper, and (I hope) will fly sharper. Their over-all personal appearance is much improved with better creased trousers, haircuts and better polished boots resulting from what I believe is the psychological effect of the improved uniform. I am, indeed proud of their appearance. The customer is also favorably impressed.

II. FACILITY DEVELOPMENT

1. We are quite stabilized in our facility development with no major projects which urgently need doing except Project 6695 - Renovation of the Operations/MFD Building which formerly housed the Base Manager's Office, and Project 6697 - Relocation & Renovation of various Shops and Offices. These have been substandard facilities throughout our evolution as a major base within the company system. Both projects have been forwarded to the Head Office - TPE for approval.

III. CUSTOMER RELATIONS

1. Our relations with all customers has never been better. They are so congenial, it is unbelievable.

IV. GENERAL AFFAIRS

1. Cost of living - According to the National Institute of statistifs, the consumption index for Dec. 69 as compared with that of 1968 increases by 28.4% for the middle class and 31.7% for the workers class. Compared with the index of the base year 1963 of 100, the 1969 index is as follows: Middle class: 452.1 ; Workers class: 500.2

The cost of electricity has recently increased by 40% from VN$6 to VN$8.4 per kw/hr.

2. Air VN pay increase - The employees' demand for salary increase was finally settled. Effective 1 January 1970, The Board of Administration approved salary increase as follows:

Grade I - 4	:	2100	VN$	per month
Grade 5	:	1500	"	" "
Grade 6	:	1200	"	" "

The pay raise results in the company's payroll being increased by 5 million piastres per month.

3. Tet gifts - In appreciation for assistance during the past year, token gifts were presented to 148 GVN officials or ARVN officers with the following breakdown:

High level : 36
Supervisory level: 33
Working level: 79

V. SECURITY

1. Rumored public disturbances - None

2. Historical or customary dates & particulars forthcoming demonstration - The Vietnamese New Year "TET" took place on 6 through 8 Feb. 1970. All business has been suspended on those days and no customary demonstration anticipated. According to a joint communique of the Commander of the Special Military Capitol and the Military Governor of the Saigon and Gia Dinh, fire crackers were strictly prohibited.

VI. MEDICAL

Number of visits: 1351
Accidents: 78
Hospitalization: 1
Unhospitalization: 77
Outcalls: 6
Physical examination: 19
Sick leaves: 261

VII. PERSONNEL

1. General Information - It looks as though the Year of the Dog is also to be the Year of the [redacted] Trainees. We are assured at this time that a majority of the Tainan candidates will be able to leave for Tainan in February. As appropriate, cable correspondence will be sent to all concerned keeping them advised of all late developments.

There is lots of talk of an impending devaluation; the value of the piastre on the open market is still about VN$350 to US$1.

2. Personnel Strength - Saigon Base

Classif.	[redacted]								Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
Permanent	37	135	132	13	138	2	14	4	321	154

	[redacted]					Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	FLT
Permanent	525#	13**	2	2	1*	530	13

Pre-processed: 5

(*) : [redacted]
(**) :
(#) :

Ground personnel: 856
Flight personnel: 167
Total: 1023

Da Nang Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]				Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	4	14	19	79	116

Nha Trang Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]				Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	5	12	24	62	103

Can Tho Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]			Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	1	10	2	13

VIII. TRAFFIC/AAM

	December 69	January 70
Passengers departure SGN (all contracts)	5,997	6,356
Passengers arrival SGN (all contracts)	6,754	6,542
Outbound cargo SGN	64,725	91,938
Inbound cargo SGN	86,628	87,330

TRAFFIC/USAID

	Cargo (including AF Caribou A/C)	
	December 69	January 70
Outbound (lbs) SGN	1,717,396	1,458,201
Inbound (lbs) SGN	538,788	450,007

IX. OPERATIONS

1. There were 23 controllable and 68 non-controllable delays with a total of 930 Saigon departures. Early morning Saigon ground fog was a major factor in the number of non-controllable delays.

2. Flight Time Report (see Attachment A)

Acircraft Incidents Report (See Attachment B)

3. Accident Report

Date	A/C Type/No	Location	Remarks
02	PC6/N9444	V-02	Right wing struck Army truck while A/C was being marshalled into parking spot by USAF lineman. Substantial damage. Investigation complete, Local Board during week 8-14 February.
11	PC6/N394R	V-84 to V-23	PIC heard 1 rd hit A/C while at 1000' above terrain. PIC maintained heading and increased altitude. Minor damage from 30 cal hole leading edge of left wing.

4. Communications

Project 6683: Transmitter Building and Antenna System, Saigon Ninety-five percent completed. All transmitters and ancillary equipment were moved into the new transmitter building in mid-January/ Only power hook-up to the 300 KVA generator and minor wiring remain to be completed. Old transmitter building has been razed and all old antennas and antenna towers have been lowered.

Project 6696: Installation of 400 KVA Transformer, Saigon Base continues to utilize 300 KVA transformer which was installed on a temporary basis by the power company. Completion of power cable distribution system awaiting arrival of stand-off insulators from Hong Kong.

Project 6700: 60' Antenna Mast, Nha Trang (HF Transmitter Relocation) Mast and antennas erected. Construction of transmitter building near completion and expect to have transmitters relocated and operational by mid-February.

Project 6701: 80' Antenna Mast, Danang (HF Transmitter Relocation) Completed. All transmitters were relocated and were operational by mid-January.

Project 6708 & 6709: Telephone cabel distribution system and Base PABX Completed and 100 percent operation as of 7 Jan.

ATTITUDE SSB Voice Circuit: Transmitters installed in new transmitter building and new beam antenna erected in late December. Receiver console and ring down equipment transferred to Message Center. Muting devices for

receiver installed allowing headset operation only (no speakers).

The above represents the major projects which have been completed during the past two months after many years of planning and waiting for the fruition of said plans. Many projects remain to be completed. Some are, Southeast Asia Radio-teletype circuits, Tan Son Nhut/PTT Saigon speach plus radiotyletype UHF link, Saigon Paging System and P.A. System, Message/Communications Center Installation including added on and off-line teletype circuits as well as expanded on base teletype distribution system. These are but a few of the projects to improve the everincreasing need for more and better communications. They are in various stages of partial development with much remaining to be done before final completion.

5. Ground Transportation

Aggregate microbuses mileage:	23098 km or 14430 miles
Microbuses downtime:	154 hrs 23'
Microbus px-carried:	3248 pax
Isuzu bus mileage:	6315 km or 3946 miles
Isuzu bus downtime:	51 hrs 30'
Isuzu bus pax-carried:	10502 pax
Supply vehicle mileage:	2162 km or 1351 miles
Supply vehicle downtime:	131 hrs

6. Flying - The month also saw FEPA and associated activities take up a lot of time. The problem is becoming more acute as to just what position, attitude and relationship should exist between FEPA and MFD. There is the problem as to what and how much office and administrative support is to be provided. There does not appear to be any abuse of their requirements but the volume of work required continues to increase and there is a definite need for a definitive decision as to the policy that is to be applied to this area. A request for this guidance has been requested in a separate memo submitted earlier in the month but no response has been received to date.

In the middle of the month we received the new epaulettes and the hat bills for Captains. The general impression appears to be that it was an improvement from before but there was obvious disappointment in that the epaulettes were not the design that was the overwhelming choice of the crews.

FEPA and the Flying Department did considerable work in attempting to arrive at a reasonable and satisfactory proposal for the hostels and general crew accomodations at outstations.

The arrival of the first few transponders is already getting favorable comments from the pilots and greatly surprised reactions from various ground controllers.

Discussions at the end of the month with Senior representatives from the Embassy Customer indicate complete and enthusiastic support in obtaining UHF radios.

X. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. January was an uneventful month in respect to unplanned/unscheduled events, but progress was made in most areas on production and administrative problems.
The Cantho Station celebrated the completion of its First Year of successful operation on 10 January.
Inspite of progress in other areas, our primary objective: Flying hours took another drop with reduced hours on all types of aircraft, with the exception of the C47 and C46. The total flying being down more than 200 hours from the December level. The number of C45/10-2 aircraft assigned here remains at three with two in storage. Helios are reduced to one, in storage. Performance of the turbo-prop aircraft continued to improve . Consolidation of the Ground Communications facilities was completed with the transfer of the remaining transmitting equipment, and the CMD Offices to the CMD Complex.

2. Aircraft Maintenance The work load has remained steady during the month of January. Three C-46 and one C-47 aircraft were reported to have engine vibration in flight, the cause of which has been mainly the props. Shortage of serviceable props and engines for Porter and the Volpar aircraft was experienced for awhile.

The crew supervisors received class room instructions on various types of propellers.

3. Rotary Wing This month has been normal maintenance wise with total flying hours about average at 1010.

4. Shops Shop activities remained on an even par during the first half of the month, then picked-up during the second half. No annual Inspections were performed this month.

The number four service on PC-6 N285L is progressing.

Effective 1 January, an Open Maintenance Work Order numbering system was put into operation. There is no change in the basic system but this revision does eliminate a lot of unnecessary paperwork.

The installation of the ATC Transponders is progressing very well. It was necessary to change the location of the control unit on g the VTB-18 instrument panel from the position indicated on the proposed EA print. Engineering has been advised.

5. Planning/Engineering The Planning and Production Control Section pre planned, scheduled and processed, for aircraft of all types; 499 Overnight Svces, 29 Number 1 Svces, 19 Number 2 Svces, 5 Number 3 Svces, 2 Number 4 Svces, 13 Engines Changes, 16 Propeller changes, 56 EA's, 71 SI's, 2 EI's, 180 time controlled components change on 204B, two T53 engine hot section inspections, 4 DRR's, 4 CRR's and 313 shop work orders.

6. General Maintenance - All transmitter equipment from the old Transmitter Building has been moved to the new Transmitter Building located in the GMD Complex.

7. Equipment Maintenance - On 1 Jan. 70 PEMD went to the day/date scheduling of routine maintenance of equipment.

8. Electronics - Activities for the early part of the monthe were planning and scheduling of work for the approved AR-9053, EA draft, Freq plan changes for SEA, FM Transceiver Evaluation and approved EA were received simultaneously.

SCM and COMENG SGN Office was transferred to the new PABX room located in the GMD Complex.

9. AED Line Service - Completion of EA - issued for protection of VHF Antenna A-15 was made. A number of A-15 Antenna unit had to be repaired upon removal. S/Shops provided us support in manufacturing lock nut through machine lathe.

10. Technical Training activities increased during the month of January and with the holidays behind us several courses were completed: Garrett TPE-331, Integral fuel tanks, Propellers, A/C control cables, T-53 fuel control.

Courses in progress: Auto maintenance.

Three mechanics received their FAA Oral and Practical examinations with two men passing.

11. Quality control - The station started their first PC-6C No. 4B Service this month with only a few problems being encountered that involved Quality Control and most of them came from problem on components sent from TNN or from lack of parts.

12. Stores - During this reporting period, the workload for this section was increased by approximately 15% due to the original work of No. 4B SVC and PC6C Porter aircraft.

The tools display cabinets fabrication and installation are nearing the completion stage. This project should also see its conclusion during the next month.

Rearrangement and updating of stock records for all classes are still in progress and expected to be complete in the early part of February.

A total of 265 line items of commodities was purchased from the local market this month. Total valud of commodities purchased from the Saigon/Cholon market amount to VN$904,215.00.

E.J. Theisen
Base Manager - Saigon

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT
JANUARY 1970.

1. Contract 7001 –

A/C No.	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
N67984	106+10	89+18	21+14	18+12
N67985	149+23	125+30	19+40	18+02
B910	139+03	116+11	22+56	20+33
B928	155+19	126+11	2+39	2+45
B138	113+04	94+17	4+40	3+20
B146	164+03	135+32	2+23	1+37
6147	132+23	113+21	2+39	2+15
8084	157+03	136+45		
5559	184+07	165+41		
5994	114+52	90+39		
6083	131+10	115+05		
B829	106+02	91+17	20+12	17+45
B539Y	81+29	68+39		
B544Y	31+44	25+46	2+03	1+30
N95182	114+14	97+45	7+38	5+48
N6154U	32+16	28+40		
N99562	73+25	63+14	3+05	2+25
N77708	73+26	63+54	13+41	11+30
N95772	93+03	81+59	3+09	2+37
N98382	130+26	113+47	2+13	1+36
N37280	63+59	50+00	6+04	4+56
N9664C	3+51	3+16		
N36740	118+36	99+39	2+53	2+00
N76950	79+24	64+56	6+29	4+52
N91295	43+54	37+58	4+53	3+47
N6622C			3+03	1+15
N7950C			1+12	0+56
N2851	103+15	94+31	2+55	2+35
N391R	176+13	156+49	1+07	0+43
N394R	14+42	13+17	0+40	0+35
B9444	163+23	145+15	1+47	1+15
N1981	176+54	155+43	2+30	2+10
N1531	107+35	96+57		
N180K	24+50	22+59		
N12450	68+14	58+45	4 +12	3+28
N7481H	56+02	47+20	0+30	0+20
N1521	37+33	31+54	2+07	1+18
N184L	138+11	125+50	1+50	1+50
N185K	103+39	80+17	3+54	2+59
N192K	82+17	76+37	0+43	0+29
N393R	32+44	27+03	4+05	3+16
N194K	112+43	97+46	6+52	5+44

ATTACHMENT "A"

M1303X	112+09	112+09	7+43	7+43
M1304X	119+36	119+36	3+30	3+30
M1305X	105+37	105+37	1+00	1+00
M1306X	150+25	150+25	6+16	6+15
M1307X	139+03	139+03	3+25	3+25
M8514F	126+16	126+16	6+16	6+16
M8535F	40+01	40+01	5+20	5+20
B867			0+38	0+22
Sub-total	4783+48	4233+30	220+05	197+14

2. Contract 7002 -

M539Y	2+02	1+42
M544Y	10+51	7+24
M7695C	4+40	3+40
M9129S	13+17	11+50
M9518Z	10+07	8+01
M6154U	62+57	51+44
M9956Z	20+51	17+14
M7770B	28+56	25+05
M9577Z	16+53	14+18
M9838Z	7+01	6+34
M3728G	8+10	6+46
M7488	105+06	99+07
M1521L	42+18	34+54
M1841L	14+21	11+24
M185K	23+43	19+25
M192L	31+00	28+37
M393K	65+55	60+22
M194L	27+52	24+14
M285L	21+07	17+43
M391R	4+00	3+30
M394R	63+09	56+43
M9444	7+04	6+32
M198L	4+54	3+53
M153L	6+25	6+01
M190K	54+57	50+48
M12450	29+23	26+47

M8514F	7+40	7+40
M8535F	49+22	49+22
M1303X	37+21	37+21
M1305X	42+04	42+04
M1304X	12+38	12+38
M1306X	3+29	3+29
M1307X	3+31	3+31
Sub-total	843+04	760+23

3. Contract 7003 -

B510	1+32	0+57
B528	10+17	8+42
M138	2+21	1+50
M539Y	9+20	8+16
M544Y	5+27	4+46
M9518Z	4+29	3+07
M9954Z	3+16	2+26
M7770B	3+27	2+22
M9577Z	2+24	1+35
M3728G	4+53	3+33
M3674G	8+18	5+26
M7695G	6+22	4+01
M9129S	0+54	0+39
M9444	2+33	1+44
M198K	2+38	1+45
M152L	5+49	4+43
M184L	5+31	3+55
M185K	8+49	5+41
M1305X	11+03	11+03
M1307X	8+18	8+18
B8535F	4+00	4+00
Sub-total	111+41	88+21

4. Contract 0005 -

N66223	46+33	36+40
N1306X	0+54	0+54
Sub-total	47+27	37+34

5. Contract 0069 -

N96643	96+56	84+16
N99562	5+32	4+24
N91295	5+37	5+00
Sub-total	108+05	93+40

TOTAL REVENUE BLOCK TIME	5894+05
" " FLIGHT TIME	5213+28
TOTAL NON-REVENUE BLOCK TIME	220+05
" " FLIGHT TIME	187+14
GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	6114+10
" " FLIGHT TIME	5400+42

Flight Time by Type of Aircraft

Type of A/C	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
C-46	841+12	698+28	73+32	63+29
C-47	106+02	91+17	20+12	17+45
Ballad C-47	719+35	621+31	2+39	2+15
DHC-4	140+53	116+35	2+03	1+30
VIP	1141+34	966+39	50+05	39+31
10-2	46+33	36+40	4+15	2+11
Porter	1924+49	1708+51	33+12	26+42
20LB	973+27	973+27	33+29	33+29
Helio			0+38	0+22
TOTAL	5894+05	5213+28	220+05	187+14

Original Signed By
L. G. PARRISH
L.G.Parrish

FLIGHT INFORMATION CENTER

- SAIGON -

- MONTHLY ACTIVITY REPORT -
1-31 January 1970

PART I
—Ground Fire Incidents—

Date	A/C No., Type & Contract	Place	Description
02 Jan	N9577Z Volpar 7001	YD 3156	A/C was in climbout from Quang-Tri (V78) when pilot observed two men in separate small boats stand up and fire alternate automatic bursts at a/c. Pilot turned right and continued climb. No personnel injuries or a/c damage.
05 Jan	N1303X 204-B 7001	BT 0431	A/C was flying below weather when PIC heard a burst of small arms fire directed at the a/c. PIC immediately increased airspeed and departed area.
09 Jan	B138 C-46 7001	Vicinity of XT9903	A/C was being radar vectored to Tan-Son-Nhut ILS final approach on heading 280 degrees 3 to 4 miles east of outer marker. Tracer fire was noted to the right (north) of the a/c. Twelve to fifteen rounds of white, golf ball sized tracers passed just beneath the right wing arching to the left above the wing. PIC turned off the rotating beacon and advised Approach Control of ground fire. No personnel injuries or a/c damage involved.
11 Jan	N394R PC-6 7001	BS 6358	Pilots only awareness of ground fire was when he felt impact of one round on left wing. Pilot maintained heading and increased altitude. Bullet pierced front edge of left wing causing minor damage.

PART II
- Situation Report -

During January enemy activity and movements were observed closely for indicators of enemy intentions during the traditionally active Tet holiday period the most critical time frame being from late January to the middle of February. I Corps

ATTACHMENT "B"

and the Delta were shaping up during the month to become the focal points for pre-Tet activity; however, neither area was subject to the degree of activity predicated.

In northern I Corps pressure was maintained on Allied units below the central and eastern DMZ and logistical activity continued in the western provinces specifically into and around the A Shau Valley. Enemy units were reported in an advanced tactical position in the Danang-Hoi An City area prepared to launch coordinated attacks against friendly ~~ix~~ installations, refugee camps, and hanlets. An NVA regiment reportedly moved from southern I Corps to Quang Nam province (Danang area) to support these attacks. All indicators pointed for a high point of activity prior to Tet. On the night of 31 Jan - 1 Feb contact was made with an estimated three enemy companies SW of Con Thien (eastern DMZ area) and areas in southern I Corps came under attacks by fire. However, pre-Tet activity was not achieved to the degree anticipated and predications now call for a high point in I Corps following the Tet holidays.

In early January an NVA Division with all its elements moved into II Corps in the vicinity of Binh Dinh Province with the Pacification Program reported to be its primary target. Cam Ranh Bay, Phu Cat, and Phan Rang Air Bases came under attack during the month with light damage and no casualties reported. While much speculation was made as to possible pre-Tet activity, it now appears that an increase in activity can be expected in Binh Dinh, Pleiku, and Kontum Provinces following the Tet holidays due to large numbers of enemy troops in and near these three Provinces.

In III Corps the most significant increase in enemy activity came on the night of 20-21 January as 49 attacks by fire (ABF) were recorded against Allied positions throughout the Corps. One of the hardest hit of these targers was Song Be (V30) MACV Compound which received 90-100 rounds of 82mm mortar. It was hit again at 1350 on 21 January with an unknown number of 120mm mortar rounds which caused a fire destroying the ammo and POL dumps (AAM had an acft on the ground there at this time but sustained no damage). In what was described as "heavy" infiltration was reported coming from the Parrotss Beak and Angel's wing portions of the Cambodia border. Saigon was subject to a number of terrorists ~~inx~~ incidents two of which involved explosions in movie theaters and three others taking place from one to six kilometers from Tan Son Nhut involving charges placed in jeeps parked near military installations. A post-Tet increase in activity can be expected in connection with the initiation of the first phase of the spring campaign. Northern III Corps and Central War Zone C will see activity. No specific mention has been made of Bien Hoa, Saigon, or Tan Son Nhut during the upcoming phase.

Recent enemy infiltration into the Delta, IV Corps, from the Crow's nest portion of the Cambodian border and a build up of troops along the north-western portion of the border gave rise to much speculation as to the enemy intentions during the critical Tet time frame. Cities mentioned targeted for activity included Chau Doc and My Tho. Since much emphasis is being placed on the Vietnamization Program here, it is considered likely that the enemy will attempt to discredit the ARVN and at the same time hit targets involving the Pacification Program. These attacks should come following the Tet holidays.

R H Begien III

R.N. Begien III
OPSP SGN

M O N T H L Y R E P O R T

N H A - T R A N G

JANUARY 1970

GENERAL

January remained a quiet month with only routine problems. There was a slight increase in revenue block time relative to last month from 891 to 936 hours. This is reflected in the attached statistics.

The nearby camp Mc Dermott was hit twice by morters causing short term alerts.

TRAFFIC

No major problems a slight decline in passengers and cargo carrued. This however appears to be a seasonal fluctuation.

STATISTICS

	JAN.	DEC.	1969
PASSENGER			
Departing	3560	4135	2735
Arriving	3611	3757	1353
TOTAL	7171	7892	4088
CARGO			
1) GROUND SERVICES (Lbs)			
Departing	334,817	387,329	452,973
Arriving	214,914	307,630	160,989
TOTAL	549,731	694,959	613,962
2) COMPANY CARGO (Lbs)			
Departing	3,749	5,239	5,293
Arriving	9,202	11,758	5,890
TOTAL	12,951	16,997	11,183
3) GRAND TOTAL (Lbs) (1+2)			
Departing	338,566	392,568	458,266
Arriving	224,116	319,388	166,879
TOTAL	562,282	711,956	625,145

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

Customer relations remain good to excellent. Mr. B. KYKER was replaced by Mr. R. GRAMMER for a two week period while Mr. KYKER was on a military reserve obligation.

OPERATIONS

Operations smooth with slight crew scheduling problems near the end of the month. This is being worked out with CSS/SGN.

. . . .2 . .

A. COMMUNICATIONS

Still awaiting the arrival of a replacement fan blower moter put cur Motorola relay unit back on line.

B. FLIGHT FREQUENCY (See attached)

C. ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE COMPARISON

	JAN.	DEC.	1969
Arrival	474	514	740
Departure	475	515	751
R O N	250	262	358

D. DELAYS

Percentage on time	98%	98%	

SECURITY : No major problem.

PERSONNEL : See attached

FISCAL : No major problem.

LEGAL : No major problem.

TECHNICAL SERVICES

		JAN.	DEC.	1969
1.	Transient overnight	224	252	382
2.	Overnight services	250	262	358
3.	Engine changes	0	2	3
4.	Propeller changes	0	1	0
5.	No. I services	0	0	7
6.	No. II services	0	0	1
7.	Delays Maint/Mech.	4	2	26
8.	Intermediate services	0	0	0
9.	AGF	2	5	10
10.	Outline recoveries	2	2	3
11.	Accident report (A/C)	0	1	6
12.	Accident report (PNL)	0	0	0

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

Dan Lawson

DAN LAWSON
SZ-NHA

MONTHLY FLIGHT TIME REPORT

NHA TRANG

JANUARY 1970

A/C TYPE \ Contract / Time	7001		7002		0069		0005		0028	
	TIME		TIME		TIME		TIME			
	BLOCK	FLIGHT	BLOCK	FLIGHT	BLOCK	FLIGHT	BLOCK	FLIGHT		
C46	24+24	18+49	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
C47	417+55	365+05	-	-	-	-	-	-	1+39	1+2
VTB	251+39	198+35	70+55	61+32	100+29	87+35	-	-	-	-
10/2	-	-	-	-	-	-	2+40	2+07	-	-
PC6	10+36	10+11	52+38	48+50	-	-	-	-	-	-
204B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DHC4	23+43	21+26	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sub-Total	707+57	614+06	123+33	110+32	100+29	87+35	2+40	2+07	1 +39	1+2

GRAND TOTAL: BLOCK TIME : 936+18

FLIGHT TIME : 815+32

R. W. [redacted]

OM NHA

cc: BM SGN
SQM SGN
SZ NHA
FILE

MEMORANDUM

TO : BM/SGN

DATE: 05 January 1970

FROM : SZ/DAD

REF. No. SZDAD/70/002

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for December 1969

GENERAL

Hostile activity in the Danang area was neglible throughout the month. During a few evenings explosions were heard, but these were attributed to outgoing artillery fire.

Only two Southern Air Transport flights transited Danang in December, one of which operated the scheduled World Airways Stars and Stripes mission.

No information has yet been received regarding an authorization from the local Customs Directorate to permit the loading and offloading of company cargo on international flights transiting this station. Apparently the matter has been referred to Saigon for approval.

One local national sustained a severe head injury at An-Hoa on 27 December when he entered the tail rotor arc of 204B N1307X. The victim was evacuated to the Danang/USAID hospital but died shortly after arrival. According to the physician, the brain damage was so extensive that it was doubtful he would have lived regardless of the treatment facilities available.

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

Both AID and Embassy had TCS Air Operations Officers assigned at Danang during December but no significant problems have resulted during their assignments.

Numerous flights were cancelled due to weather, but with the exception of certain Volpar flights, difficulties in this regard were minimal. AID voiced some generalized complaints concerning the long block times experienced when Volpars were filed IFR. ATC departure delays in excess thirty minutes are common and extensive holding time is not infrequent for approaches, but AID would not make a clear cut decision as to whether or not flights should be dispatched IFR. In most instances, it was necessary to obtain their approval for the flight on the basis of the number of passengers manifested.

LEGAL

The lease on the New Hostel [redacted] will expire on 9 February. Due to the low occupancy rate at this facility it is doubtful that renewal of the lease will be recommended. Alternatives

LEGAL (Cont'd)

to relinquishing this property through either leasing another building to combine both hostels or leasing rooms in a local hotel are being investigated.

FACILITIES

The CSD shipping and receiving warehouse located adjacent to the ramp area was recently transferred to COMDS for operational control. Considering the long delay being experienced in obtaining approval for the Terminal Renovation Project, AID is exploring the possibility of renovating this warehouse for use as a passenger processing facility and to relocate flight operations so as to give this department visual access to the flight line. All work on this warehouse project, if approved, would be performed thru customer channels utilizing their GSO capability. The primary company expense and effort entailed in such a move would be the relocation of the station radio receivers and intercom system.

The station eighty foot antenna mast was erected on 11 December. A 204B was utilized to lift the mast into position which required 10 minutes flight time. Four poles are in the process of being installed to provide supports for the antennas. It is anticipated that this antenna may be operational by the end of January.

The USAF generator was almost one hundred per cent reliable during December. Commerical power was only required when scheduled maintenance was being performed on the unit.

FISCAL

[redacted] payroll for the month totaled [redacted] (includes year end bonus payment)

Petty cash expenditures totaled: 20,530$VN

OPERATIONS

Revenue flight time increased 74+57 hours as compared to the previous month. Although weather was responsible for several flight cancellations, there were days when unrestricted flying was possible. On these occasions, additional flights were scheduled which tended to compensate for previous revenue losses.

The following is a breakdown of flight time generated by this station during December:

VN-70/AID	764+56
VN-70/EMB	220+19
0005	8+22
0069	Nil
Non-Revenue	0+10
Total	993+47

Revenue losses for the month were as follows:

Weather - - - - - - - - - - -	49+45
Maintenance - - - - - - - - -	Nil
Customer Cancellation - - -	Nil
Other - - - - - - - - - - -	Nil
Total - - - - - - - - - - -	49+45

The station weather teletype and autowriter circuits were reactivated during the month by USAF personnel. NOTAMS are transmitted over the same circuit as the weather but these are usually transmitted at night. Presently, the teletype is being operated between 2230 and 2400 hours to receive the daily NOTAM summary. The night security guards turn the machine on and off at the above times.

Hostel occupancy factors were 78% and 43% for the Old and New Hostels respectively. The use of TCM flight mechanics and an increase in TCS RMD personnel are the primary reasons for the above distribution.

Mr. E.A. Clay, OM/SGN, arrived on 28 December to replace SOR/DAD who is on home leave.

COMMUNICATIONS

Telephone communications capability was doubled during the month with the installation of one additional Class A and Class C line. The Class C telephone is connected to an instrument in the passenger terminal for passenger use only. The remaining three telephone circuits are connected to the station intercom/telephone system. Unfortunately, there are no provisions for having two of these lines ring on incoming calls. Ground radio is attempting to connect the one ringer available to sound when any incoming call is received.

Incoming and outgoing messages totaled 1581 and 1433 respectively.

TRAFFIC

The PCS transfer of TM/GS SGN to DAD was approved, and with the arrival of Mr. Clay, TM/DAD has been relieved of responsibilities in Flight Operations.

Utilizing paint and materials supplied by the Embassy customer, the passenger processing area was repainted and rearranged and now presents a very attractive facility in comparison to the previous layout.

Passenger and cargo statistics for the month are as follows:

	Passengers In	Passengers Out	Cargo In	Cargo Out
VN-70/AID	2,393	2,581	372,963	298,404
VN-70/EMB	520	603	3,070	20,529
0069	5	2	-	-
0005	11	9	-	-
AAM	104	114	9,729.6	52,060.5
Total	3,033	3,309	385,762.6	370,993.5

SECURITY

Due to internal administrative difficulties, VNAF Base Security announced that 1970 base pass processing dates would be extended. Seventeen TCN personnel have yet to receive an extension of stay so it would not have been impossible to process new passes for these employees if it had been necessary to submit applications on 31 December as originally scheduled.

PERSONNEL

An employee representatives election was conducted on 8 December in compliance with Vietnamese Labor Law. Even though most indigenous employees participated, there was little interest displayed in the affair. One employee, elected as an alternate representative, formally resigned from the position.

The personnel breakdown at Danang station at the close of business, 31 December, was as follows:

	[redacted]			
Permanent	3	18	14	83
Pre-Process	0	0	0	0
Temporary	2	0	1	0
Daily Hire	0	0	0	0
TOTAL (121)	5	18	15	83

TECHNICAL SERVICES

RMD handled a total of 625 arriving and 624 departing flights, a slight increase as compared to November. There were no flight delays which resulted in a revenue loss attributable to maintenance during the reporting period. Four heavy services were performed during the month, all on 204B aircraft, two of which were Number 2 services. Only one aircraft was placed on AGP status.

RGMD expended a total of 740 manhours, of which 325 were consumed by leased properties. The main completed project was the installation to two high intensity lights to illuminate the PC-6 parking area.

No problem in the realm of MSA procurement was experienced, but a detailed reconciliation of those requisitions on back order status was requested.

Original Signed by
WINSTON C. CAMBRE
Winston C. Cambre

cc: file

MONTHLY REPORT

NHA-TRANG

DECEMBER 1969

GENERAL

All U.S. Military facilities on our side of the airport are now closed. Eating facilities have vanished in this area. Breakfast is now being taken at the "Neptune" NCO Club and we have obtained refrigerators for Sodas, Sandwiches and Doughnuts sold to flight crew for lunch when desired. The only remaining alternative would be to transport crewmembers to the other side of the airbase for these meals. Presently we are investigating the possibility of having someone operate a Snack-bar in the area. More will be known by the next report time.

No military incidents occured this month.

TRAFFIC

Another slight decrease in revenue flying time this month due to the CHARTERAIR schedule, inclement weather, and loss of one 204B from this station. (See statistics)

STATISTICS

Passenger		Dec.	Nov.	1968
Departing		4135	4092	2982
Arriving		3757	3564	1023
	TOTAL	7892	7656	4005

CARGO

1. GROUND SERVICES (Lbs)

Departing		387,329	357,606	376,974
Arriving		307,630	262,744	203,065
	TOTAL	694,959	620,430	580,039

2. CURRENT CARGO (Lbs)

Departing		5,239	3,488	5,804
Arriving		11,758	3,337	4,876
	TOTAL	16,997	6,825	10,680

3. GRAND TOTAL (Lbs) (1+2)

Departing		392,568	361,174	382,778
Arriving		319,388	266,081	207,941
	TOTAL	711,956	627,255	590,719

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

Customer relations continue to remain good to excellent with few problems occuring.

. . . 2 . . .

OPERATIONS

A. COMMUNICATIONS : VHF and HF are still causing problems. Our Motorola unit has been out due to a burned out blower fan motor. We are unable to "Jury rig" a suitable replacement as yet and must depend on the back-up unit until the new unit arrives. The new 60' OMNI-directional antenna will be completed in January and should resolve most of our communication problems.

B. FLIGHT INSPECTION (See attached)

C. ARRIVAL AND DEPARTING CONGESTION

	DEC.	NOV.	1968
Arrival	514	528	643
Departure	515	531	654
IOM	262	271	354

D. DELAYS

Percentage on time	98%	98%	

SECURITY

No major problems.

PERSONNEL (See attached)

MEDICAL : No major problems

LEGAL : No major problems

TECHNICAL SERVICES

		DEC.	NOV.	1968
1.	Transient overnight	252	258	289
2.	Overnight services	262	270	354
3.	Engine changes	2	0	1
4.	Propeller changes	1	0	2
5.	No. 1 services	0	1	6
6.	No. II services	0	0	1
7.	Delays Maint/Mech.	2	3	22
8.	Intermediate services	0	0	0
9.	ACF	5	4	12
10.	Outline recoveries	2	2	2
11.	Accident report (A/C)	1	1	0
12.	Accident report (PAL)	0	0	0

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

Dan Lawson

DAN LAWSON
SE-YDA

MEMORANDUM

TO : BM/SGN

DATE: 05 January 1970

FROM : SZ/DAD

REF. No. SZDAD/70/002

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for December 1969

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The USAF generator was almost one hundred per cent reliable during December. Commerical power was only required when scheduled maintenance was being performed on the unit.

FISCAL

[redacted] payroll for the month totaled: 1,827,506$VN (includes year end bonus payment)

Petty cash expenditures totaled: 20,530$VN

OPERATIONS

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VN-70/MAB - - - - - - - - - -	220+19
0005 - - - - - - - - - -	8+22
0069 - - - - - - - - - -	Nil
Non-Revenue - - - - - - - - -	0+10
Total - - - - - - - - - -	993+47

Revenue losses for the month were as follows:

Weather - - - - - - - - - - -	49+45
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Daily Hire	0	0	0	0
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Original Signed by
WINSTON C. CAMBRE
Winston C. Cambre

cc: file

~~SECRET~~

NO ~~FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

06 JAN 1970

RL-327

SUBJECT: Jane ~~X~~ GUNN

Subject works in some capacity at the Headquarters of the New Mobilization Committee in San Francisco where she is a resident. She is a friend of Irving SARNOFF and claims to have known Ralph ABERNATHY since 1954. She recently made the statement that the New Mobilization Committee on the West Coast was "broke". Subject is a Caucasian woman born circa 1927.

PLEASE TRANSMIT REPLY VIA LIAISON, MR. S. J. PAPICH

EX-105

62-111181-3749

1-Xerox
Copy to San Francisco
by routing slip for
☒ info ☐ action
date 1/26/70

59 FEB 3 1970

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved for Release
Date October 1997

Doc 24

MEMORANDUM

TO : AVP-TPE

FROM : BM-SGN

SUBJECT : Monthly Report

DATE: 16 January 1970

REF. No. BMSGN/70/24

Saigon Base Monthly Report for December 1969 is forwarded in three copies for your file.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
E. J. THEISEN
BM - SGN

E.J. Theisen

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
DECEMBER 1969

I. GENERAL

1. January 70 started with a real bang with heavy gunfire all over the city of Saigon. Fortunately, it was friendly fire although quite frightening to many Saigon residents. I am sorry to report this irresponsible performance was 100% American.

2. Otherwise the year ended quietly without serious incident. In reviewing progress and improvements for 1969, we feel that many noteworthy accomplishments were made. To recap the highlights;

Saigon

(1) We received and installed a 60 KW and a 30 Kw generator for our initial backup power, when city power fails.

(2) We renovated an old GMD Shop Bldg and made it into a nice Administrative Bldg for all Personnel Dept activities.

(3) We received a link trainer and installed it in the OPS Bldg - tail number of the bird is "007".

(4) We erected revetment walls along the majority of our property perimeter.

(5) We have installed ramp flood lights on almost every ramp and perimeter wall.

(6) We had a new Bldg built for the Fire Brigade Dept, which includes vehicle shelter.

(7) A magnuflux machine was received, made operational and a room constructed for that activity.

(8) The old GMD Warehouse was renovated into a nice Cafeteria Annex facility, serving Vietnamese style food only.

(9) The West Ramp (dust bowl) was finally concrete paved by A&M Enterprises and is being well utilized.

(10) A new large (50,000 Gal) elevated water tower and deep well was constructed by TSN Authorities AAM shared cost interms of advanced water rent. This has nearly resolved all our water supply problems of the past.

(11) Some additional toilet facilities were constructed adjoining the RMD hangar. A welcome relief to the other limited facilities.

(12) The city power transformer was replaced with a company financed 300 KVA unit and hopefully soon a 400 KVA transformer will be available. A big improvement in our previous marginal power supply problems

(13) At years end, we finally installed our new PABX telephone system (100 drop unit). Telephone communications have been tremendously improved by this new system.

Can Tho

(1) We saw the opening of a new station on 10 Jan 69 at Can Tho. Mr. John Carter is the Senior Company Representative there and also the Supervisor of RMD.

(2) The new RMD/Supply Bldg there was completed in May. It houses Supply, RMD and AED Functions.

Nha Trang

(1) A new lean-to was constructed onto the RMD Hangar.

(2) The ramp lighting and rewiring project added considerably to general improvement there.

(3) A new enclosed employees scooter shed was built.

Da Nang

(1) The new aircraft concrete ramp was completed.

(2) A new lean-to was built onto the RMD hangar for use by RMD, PEMD and AED.

(3) Ramp floodlights, blast fence and public address system were installed there.

Two 204B helicopters were transferred to Udorn. We now have seven Bells as does Udorn Base.

3. All the Beech C-45 aircraft were moved to TNN for storage. The Helio H395 aircraft were transferred to VTE, except for two which were put into storage here.

Only three Beech Ten/Two aircraft are left here. Two of these are in storage and the last one is on contract until end Jan 70.

Overall flying hours slowly dropped from Jan through May and then settled around 6200-6400. The rest of the year June thru Dec was in this same range.

4. The year saw considerable progress in development and advancement of our [redacted] employees. Much emphasis was directed towards training. We now have eleven (11) female mechanics in RMD Shops, seven of which are Sheetmetal Mechanics. [redacted]

5. Total block time was 6332 in December 69 as compared with 6238 in November.

6. BASGN Merrill Hulse departed on 18 Dec 69 for extended leave which will keep him absent from the company for at least five months and very probably for a longer period. Mr. Hulse has been with the company for seventeen years serving as Assistant Supply Mgr., Tachikawa; Station Manager, Seoul, Korea; President's Office; Assistant Base Mgr. Udorn; and Base Manager Saigon 1965-1969. The entire staff at Saigon wishes him the very best in his future endeavors. The undersigned E.J. Theisen, has been designated to function as Base Manager SVN. It became immediately apparent that certain decentralization of authority via delegation to Departments is necessary to prevent an administrative hang-up. A new Base Manual Notice is being printed and will be circulated to all concerned. It should be noted, last year at this time the BM Office was staffed with seven personnel including BM, ABM, and AA/BM. The AA/BM position, has been abolished plus several clerk positions. Our current office staff stands at one Acting BM plus two [redacted] female clerical assistants. Meanwhile, the administrative workload (despite a decline in flying hours) continues to rise due greater sophistication in company and customer management and administrative policies, procedures and requirements.

Acting BM is becoming more and more strapped to his desk (Sundays included) with less & less opportunity to move about within the SVN AAM complex or to maintain an adequate personal rapport with customers and associate company representatives. Decentralization with discrete delegation of authority will help but will not come close to resolving this problem. A proposal to correct this situation is being finalized for forwarding to the Head Office.

The imposition of a stiff Austerity tax (up to 400% on some items) plus strong rumors concerning the devaluation of the piaster has created a highly evolutionary condition within the local economy. I do not think anyone knows the full impact of this development. There are as many opinions as there are experts and we have an abundant supply of both. Actually I doubt if anyone knows exactly where we are now and what direction we are headed. Meanwhile, the "Free Market" rate is running at 350 to 400 to one US Dollar. The situation is reminiscent of the status of the currency on the Chinese mainland in 1944 and 1945.

7. On 17 December 69 Saigon experienced its first rocket attack since 15 August 1969. One 122mm rocket landed six kilometers southwest of Tan Son Nhut. On 19 December four 122mm rockets landed

on Tan Son Nhut causing five US wounded, one Vietnamese killed and twelve wounded. Tan Son Nhut was last hit on 29 June. Terrorist incidents occurred in Saigon on 8, 16, 22, 23 and 24 December with the employment of explosives against the civilian population. These incidents were largely in effective.

II. GENERAL AFFAIRS

1. [redacted] a 15 years veteran of Air Vietnam was appointed Director General of the company as a result of Air Vietnam strike in December. No immediate solution, however, is in sight for the employees' demand for a 50% salary increase. The company basic salary is far from being competitive but its cost of living allowance now stands at 200% thereof. A 50% salary increase, therefore, means a 150% increase in pay.

2. The new austerity tax promulgated by the GVN on 24 November, 1969 on the strength of the decree-law 20/61 was in serious trouble. The Supreme Court to which the decree-law as referred by the Senate for review of constitutionality and legality has declared it barred by limitation thus depriving the Executive action of its legal basis. The Senate is working on a compromise bill with reportedly a much lower tax rate (half of the Senate members are up for re-election this year).

3. Meanwhile the 1970 budget forecasted on the basis of the high tax rate has already been approved by both Houses. The pressure for inflation and devaluation of the piastre is mounting.

III. FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT

1. AR 7658 - Antenna Mast for Daneng Station
Mast was erected on schedule, 11 December 1969.

2. AR 7659 - Antenna Mast for Nha Trang Station
The Base was poured on 11 December 1969. The mast was erected on 9 January 1970 using a 35' mobile crane borrowed from PA&E.

3. AR 2077 - Completion of Base Area Lighting (SGN)
Lights have been placed around the perimeter of the Northeast Ramp. RGMD crew is in the process of installing electrical connections.

4. AR 2236 - Additional 200 KVA Transformer (SGN)
On 16 December 1969, the SDL (City Power Company) arbitrarily installed a 300 KVA transformer in lieu of a 400 KVA transformer. They also informed us that a 400 KVA transformer will be installed when it becomes available probably next month.

5. Project 6695 - Renovation of the Operations Bldg. (SGN)
This project awaiting TPE approval.

6. Project 6702 - 204B Touchdown Pads (SGN)
This project awaiting TPE approval.

IV. SECURITY

1. Rumored Public Disturbances - The rumor from mouth to mouth that the Vietnamese currency will be devaluated to the lowest point after RVN Government puts into circulation the 1,000 bank notes which are expected to be issued soon this coming year, and the cost of living will be higher.

V. MEDICAL

1. Number of visits: 1670
2. Accidents: 74
3. Hospitalization: 1
4. Outcalls: 4
5. Physical examinations: 21
6. Sick leaves: 292

VI. PERSONNEL

1. Business for the month was a bit slow owing to the holiday season. Apart from routine activeties our efforts were directed toward overseeing the Vietnamese Employee Representatives' Election and decking the Personnel Office halls with boughs of holly.

Employee participation in the election was somewhat less than impressive. Only 38.2 percent of the electorate in Saigon got out to vote. Most of the primary representatives elected are repeaters from past years.

2. Personnel Strength - Saigon Base

Classif. [redacted]								Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
Permanent	39	141	138	14	138	2	14	4	329	161

[redacted]						Total	
GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	GRD	GRD	FLT
Permanent	528#	14**	2		2	1*	533	14

Temporary: [redacted]		
GRD		GRD
1		3

(*) : [redacted]
(**) :
(#) :

Ground personnel: 866
Flight personnel: 175
Total : 1041

Danang Sub-base

Classif. [redacted]					Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	4	14	19	82	119

Nha Trang Sub-base

Classif.	[redacted]			Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	4	12	24	61	101

Can Tho Sub-base

Classif.	[redacted]		Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	1	10	2	13

VII. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. Aircraft Maintenance, fixed wing - December has been an average month in expending skilled manhours on aircraft maintenance. Although workload has varied, from light to moderately heavy, it has been possible to fully utilize the manpower most of the time

2. Rotary wing - Approximately 1085 helicopter hours were flown during December.

N8512P was transferred to Udorn the first part of the month, this leaves a total of 7 helicopters based at Saigon now. Two Saigon helicopters (N1303X and N1305X) went over 7000 hours airframe time during the month.

The change over to Esso 2380 oil was completed during the prescribed amount of time listed on SL-20B-004 so far no problems with any excessive carbon etc.. in any filters.

3. Shop Section - The overall RMD Shops activities remained on an even par. No annual inspections were performed this month, however, two form 337s were forwarded to the FAA Manila Office. These reports covered the installation of the B2C Automatic Flight Control System on aircraft N393R and N153L.

Since this is the final monthly activity report for the year 1969, it is a good time for reminiscing. Progress has been made in all areas and this is as it should be. Perhaps the best was to measure progress is by comparing the end product.

If one achievement during the past year were to be selected as the most significant, it would be the training of [redacted] personnel as replacements for journeyman TCNs. One year ago there were [redacted] in the Sheetmetal Shop. [redacted] This progress is not limited to only one shop. The combined RMD Shops complex has increased from a 17.2 percent [redacted] staff one year ago to 41.2 percent today.

4.Planning - The present personnel strength of the Maintenance Planning Department in Saigon is 14 in comparison to the 19 persons in April 69, this personnel reduction percentage equals to the reduction of aircraft assigned in SVN.

Since the support from MMB by transferring to SGN a reconditioned stencil machine on exchange basis, the Publication Unit has been in its most efficient operation. It saves an estimate of US$300 permonth.

In December, the scheduling and Production section pre-planned, scheduled and processed, for aircraft of all types: 500 overnight services; 28 number 1 services; 22 number 2 services; 2 number 3 services; 2 number 4 services; 7 engine changes (2 for 204B); 7 propeller changes; 59 BA's; 130 SI's; 16 EI's; 219 time controlled components change on 204B; two T53 engine hot section inspections; 12 DRR's; and 383 shop work orders;

5. General Maintenance - A 300 KVA Transfer was installed 16 Dec. 69 in the vault by the City Power Company. A 400 KVA transformer will be installed soon as replacement.

A 200m^2 power cable is being laid between the utilities building and GMD complex.

Building and Grounds Manitenance Excavation of another manhole infront of the hangar is in progress.

The water supply problem is being worked on. A gate valve was installed on the piping system at the TSN well and their operators have been instructed on the pumping schedule. With proper monitoring of theconsumption, AAM will have water available from 0600-2200 from the elevated tank.

6. Technical Training - The following courses were completed during December: (a) Garrett TPE 331: Two courses were held at Can Tho; (b) Courses in Progress (Auto Maintenance): This course for GMD auto mechanics.

On 13/14 Dec. the FAA written examination was held in Saigon. Fourteen AAM students from the Powerplant course completed the written part.

Three FAA oral and practical mechanics successfully passed written and practical examinations and received their FAA mechanics licenses.

1969 was a year of increased training for our [redacted] employees with a total of 296 [redacted] receiving technical training in Aviation training.

The completion of our first helicopter flight mechanics course enabled four TCNs to qualify for flight mechanic.

7. Supply - Stock Control

In December, Stock Control's workload showed a slight four percent decrease in its overall transactions as compared with the previous month.

In early part of this month, there were a total of 262 line items needed for the project; 126 line items were available in stock; 26 line items NIS and 111 line items found never carried in this station.

Procurement Section of Supply-Saigon experienced a high increase (42%) in the number of transactions during this reporting cycle. A total of 301 line items of commodities were purchased from local market in comparison with 212 line items procured last month.

Total value of commodities purchased from the Saigon/Cholon market amounted to VN$921,527.00.

A decrease of AOG cases was noted the past month with five aircraft grounded caused by the lack of six rotable or recoverable parts with no revenue hours lost.

Shipping and Receiving

This section's workload remained at the same busy level than during the previous months. Ever increasing emphasis has been given to this Section's personnel training in the correct handling and documentation of cargo.

The flow of critical items remained also constant and is being watched closely for faster processing back to MMB.

The movement of Personal Effects is still very much in evidence. Improved or new methods of handling Personal Effects to and from the SVN satellite stations are under discussion with the "door-to-door" VANPAC SEA representative.

The Customs Unit is kept hoping and is doing a remarkable job despite the holidays' congestion.

VIII. TRAFFIC/AAM

	November	December
Passengers departure SGN (All contracts)	6,007	5,997
Passengers arrival SGN (All contracts)	6,677	6,754
Outbound cargo SGN	82,893	64,725
Inbound cargo SGN	96,146	86,628

2. TRAFFIC/USAID

	Cargo (including AF Caribou A/C)	
	November	December
Outbound (lbs) SGN	1,534,916	1,717,396 lbs
Inbound (lbs) SGN	101,577	538,788 lbs

IX. OPERATIONS

1. We can expect a smoother running operation with our new telephone system. All incoming calls are routed thru Operations when the Air America Telephone Operator secures for the day and these calls can be transferred to other departments. Outgoing calls have been much simplified by the new automatic dialing system.

There were 28 controllable and 58 non-controllable delays with a total of 929 Saigon departures.

2. There were considerably less GTD complaints during the month. The earlier survey made on improving GTD certainly has a bearing on it becoming a smoother operation. New rules governing GTD have been made a part of the Base Manual. A study is underway now to reduce our Microbus fleet as a means to cut costs in this department. Subsequently, this opportunity will be used to release some of the less desirable drivers, however positions will be maintained to hire more suitable personnel to bring the department up to it newly established operations strength.

3. Flight Time Report (See attachment A)
Aircraft Incidents Report (See attachment B)

4. Accident Reports

Date	A/C Type/No.	Location	Remarks
05	PC6/N153L	V-167	One prop blade tip dented beyond limits on T/O or landing.
06	PC6/N192X	V-248	A/C arrived V-248 with left tire flat. Sharp object caused 3/4' puncture in sidewall.
08	VTB/N7770B	V-05	A/C arrived V-05 with right main tire flat. Tire blew out at large flat spot probably caused by excessive braking.
12	DHC-4/N539Y	V-05	Left nose gear damaged - stayed open on retraction. Inspection revealed erroneous pin-ball-lock had been installed. Wrong part P/N BLS4R1.25N, correct part P/N BLS4R1.5N.
13	PC6/N153L	V-56	Tail wheel dropped into 6' rut while turning around for T/O. Tail section buckled rt side fwd of tail wheel post and under right stabilizer tail wheel strut piston bent.
16	VTB/N9838Z	V-20	Cabin door came open on T/O roll, slight damage. Door not properly closed and latched.

16	DHC-4/N539Y	V-01	Both nose gear doors failed to open on retraction, both extensively bent. Link assy's P/N C4B1215-1 found bent, probably undiscovered after door incident on 12 December. Leadman received 3 days LWOP.
16	C-46/B928	V-27	Same damage reported in paragraph 5.
20	C-46/B910	V-01	Marketeer struck belly of A/C below passenger door, very slight dent in A/C, steering column of Marketeer bent back, and driver slightly injured. He stated Marketeer went forward when he placed trans handle in reverse. Marketeer transmission handles move forward for reverse and rearward for forward which is unnatural movement of control lever.
21	VTB/N9838Z	V-07	Right prop struck runway during landing, prop and nose section substantially damaged. Investigation complete, scheduled for Board Review on 9 Jan.
22	C-47/083	V-01	Left elevator found with 3' tear and trailing edge bent. Crew had no knowledge of damage, cause undetermined, suspect damaged on V-01 ramp by vehicle or cart.
23	PC6/N391R	V-17	Left horizontal stabilizer incurred a 1sq ft hole 6' deep on landing at V-17, suspect struck by rock
25	PC6/N185K	V-01	Right wing tip and aileron damaged by forklift. AAM driver received 3 days LWOP.
27	204B/N1307X	AT8647, SVN	Fatal injury incurred by VN National, ran into tail rotor. No A/C damage. Report being prepared.

5. Ground Transportation

Aggregate microbuses mileage:	22774 km or 14233 miles
Microbuses downtime:	378 hrs 24'
Microbus pax-carried:	3256 pax
Isuzu bus mileage:	6434 km approx. 4021 miles
Isuzu bus downtime:	255 hrs 72'
Isuzu bus pax-carried:	10520 pax
Supply vehicles mileage:	2859 km approx. 1786 miles
Supply vehicles downtime:	52 hrs.

X. FLYING

1. MFDSVN was absent during the first part of December and returned in time to step into the middle of the messes.

A week visit of AVPFO to Saigon and sub-stations was probably the single highlight of the month. It is believed he should now have a better current understanding of our problems. Equally important, the fact that anyone from the Taipei management level actually spent a considerable amount of time "out-amongst-um" gave a boost to crew morale when it was badly needed.

2. We finished the year without the myriad scheduling problems of attempting to stay within the flight time limits that plagued us a year ago. One captain had 1000 hours + 58 minutes. All others stayed under the limit.

XI. FISCAL

1. Budget matters - Total net reduction of work force during December was 31 persons. An analysis of salary costs by department was prepared and shown to weekly staff meeting. This created much interest in the total cost reduction program. Each department was asked to prepare a written evaluation of his department manning requirement and additional savings he can make during the last quarter of our fiscal year.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
E.J. THEISEN
BM-SGN

E.J. Theisen
Base Manager - Saigon

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT

DECEMBER 1969.

1. Contract 7001 -

A/C No.	Revenue Block Time	Revenue Flight Time	Non-Revenue Block Time	Non-Revenue Flight Time
N67984	81+09	67+10	4+25	3+03
N67985	187+29	157+58	3+50	3+00
B910	121+44	103+37	1+20	1+04
B928	141+35	119+47		
B138	130+01	108+41		
B146	110+37	94+50		
6147	148+31	128+25		
8084	136+04	125+56		
5559	179+27	161+49		
5994	105+04	87+32		
6083	156+59	135+57		
B829	87+47	71+26	4+15	3+42
N539Y	68 +36	55+36	22+17	20+34
N544Y	27+08	21+52	24+37	22+51
N9518Z	144+39	124+50	2+12	1+25
N6154U	80+08	67+16	7+04	5+31
N9956Z	100+26	87+01	5+02	4+07
N7770B	71+10	57+56	8+22	7+09
N9577Z	107+01	89+20	1+46	1+02
N9838Z	59+26	49+29	18+47	16+28
N3728G	40+15	35+34	1+05	0+45
N9664C	0+46	0+44		
N3674G	68+10	58+35	11+45	9+44
N7695C	95+15	79+29	3+59	3+07
N91295	44+31	38+59	11+01	9+07
N9573Z	10+50	10+14		
N5269V	6+10	5+22	11+58	10+55
N285L	69+04	58+30	3+07	2+05
N391R	133+40	119+43	1+55	1+04
N394R	10+22	9+36		
N9444	124+21	107+15	3+36	2+57
N198X	96+46	88+04	1+09	0+42
N153L	110+04	98+19	3+43	2+08
N180K	76+42	70+44		
N12450	5+01	3+45	0+41	0+31
N748N	153+21	131+56	3+47	3+05
N152L	18+02	14+46	0+50	0+37
N184L	182+17	154+31	4+36	3+54
N185K	156+02	143+06		
N192X	113+36	99+00		

ATTACH. "A"

N393R	96+14	87+55	1+08	0+50
N194X	76+43	70+17		
N1303X	117+31	117+31		
N1304X	196+32	196+32	2+59	2+50
N1305X	172+36	172+36	4+30	4+30
N1306X	14+19	14+19	3+30	3+30
N1307X	123+59	123+59	6+10	6+10
N8512F	14+51	14+51	1+30	1+30
N8514F	119+04	119+04	2+10	2+10
N8535F	91+36	91+36	2+20	2+20
Sub-total	4783+41	4253+20	191+17	164+27

2. Contract 7002 -

B928	1+33	0+49
N539Y	17+07	14+17
N544Y	46+33	40+26
N3674G	22+26	19+57
N7695C	1+02	0+43
N91295	64+09	55+12
N9518Z	13+49	12+53
N6154U	23+22	20+15
N9956Z	22+16	19+21
N7770B	48+49	41+23
N9577Z	2+44	2+17
N9838Z	4+25	3+55
N3728G	50+49	43+40
N6622C	8+49	8+07
N5269V	4+17	3+33
N748N	18+27	15+02
N152L	55+10	51+03
N184L	14+58	11+41
N185K	8+35	7+03
N192X	35+51	29+34
N393R	9+56	8+15
N194X	102+49	95+17
N285L	92+16	87+14
N391R	7+04	5+49

N394R	79+33	73+00
N9444	47+55	41+07
N198X	5+42	4+41
N153L	15+18	13+03
N180K	37+03	34+31
N12450	68+53	63+34
N8512F	6+50	6+50
N8514F	17+09	17+09
N8535F	42+48	42+48
N1303X	23+29	23+29
N1305X	1+35	1+35
N1306X	89+55	89+55
N1307X	23+14	23+14
Sub-total	1136+40	1032+42

3. Contract 7003 -

B928	10+55	8+56
N539Y	9+48	8+31
N6154U	8+51	5+57
N9956Z	4+57	2+57
N7770B	16+46	11+35
N9577Z	10+01	7+17
N9638Z	1+30	1+19
N3728G	2+14	1+31
N7695C	6+00	3+54
N91295	1+00	0+43
N5269V	2+55	2+30
N285L	2+19	1+44
N152L	1+20	0+56
N1304X	13+16	13 +16
N1307X	1+35	1+35
Sub-total	93+27	72+41

4. Contract 0005 -

N6622C	52+07	45+53
N1304X	1+36	1+36
Sub-total	53+43	47+29

5. Contract 0069 -

N9664C	73+03	61+36
Sub-total	73+03	61+36

TOTAL REVENUE BLOCK TIME	6140+34
" " FLIGHT TIME	5467+48
TOTAL NON-REVENUE BLOCK TIME	191+17
" " " FLIGHT TIME	164+27
GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	6331+51
" " FLIGHT TIME	5632+15

Flight Time by Type of Aircraft

Type of A/C	REVENUE		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
C-46	785+03	661+48	9+35	7+07
C-47	87+47	71+26	4+15	3+42
Bailed C-47	726+05	639+39		
DHC-4	169+12	140+42	46+54	43+25
VTB	1190+00	1005+38	71+03	58+25
10-2	85+08	75+39	11+58	10+55
Porter	2025+24	1801+01	24+32	17+53
204B	1071+55	1071+55	23+00	23+00
TOTAL	6140+34	5467+48	191+17	164+27

Original Signed By
L. G. PARRISH
L.G.Parrish

M O N T H L Y R E P O R T

N H A - T R A N G

FEBRUARY 1970

GENERAL

Continued routine problems and a quiet month during February. A decrease in revenue block time flown relative to January due to the Four day "TET" holidays.

The city of NHA TRANG remains "off limits" to all military personnel. This situation has continued from before "TET" and there is no indication that it will change. The reasons for this appear to be both economic and military.

TRAFFIC

As stated, a decline in all phases was experienced this month due to the "TET" holidays. This situation is outlined in the included statistics.

STATISTICS

	FEB.	JAN.	1969
Passenger			
Departing	2961	3560	2291
Arriving	3143	3611	2366
TOTAL	6104	7171	4657
CARGO			
1. GROUND SERVICES(Lbs)			
Departing	324.202	334.817	407.870
Arriving	122.947	214.914	166.100
TOTAL	447.149	549.731	573.970
2. COMPANY CARGO (Lbs)			
Departing	2.006	3.749	23.170
Arriving	3.846	9.202	19.042
TOTAL	5.852	12.951	42.212
3. GRAND TOTAL (Lbs) (1+2)			
Departing	326.208	338.566	431.040
Arriving	126.793	224.110	185.142
TOTAL	453.001	562.282	616.182

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

Mr. B. KYKER, the 7002 Air Operations Officer returned from a tour of reserve military duty while Mr. W.F. SPARKS, the 7001 Air Operations Officer has assumed the temporary duties of Assistant Director of Administration for Cords in NHA. Mr. T. LILLY replaces Mr. SPARKS. Relations remain unstrained and good.

OPERATIONS

A. The major accomplishment this month was the restoration of communication service via the remote Motorola unit and the switch-over to the new antenna. This switch-over was componied by a remoting of the transmitter equipment to the new location. This has eliminated XMTR feed-back into our RCVRS.

B. FLIGHT FREQUENCY (See attached)

C. ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE COMPARISON

	Feb.	Jan.	1969
Arrival	437	474	476
Departure	435	475	465
RON	201	250	294

D. DELAYS

Percentage on time	99%	98%

SECURITY

No major problems.

PERSONNEL

See attached.

FISCAL

No major problems.

LEGAL

No problems.

TECHNICAL SERVICES

	Feb.	Jan.	1969
1. Transient overnight	236	224	182
2. Overnight services	201	250	294
3. Engine changes	2	0	2
4. Propeller changes	0	0	1
5. No. 1 services	0	0	4
6. No. II services	0	0	0
7. Delays Maint/Mech.	4	4	5
8. Intermediate services	0	0	1
9. AGP	2	2	13
10. Outline recoveries	3	2	0
11. Accident report (A/C)	0	0	2
12. Accident report (PNL)	0	0	0

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

Dan Lawson

DAN LAWSON
SZ-NHA

[illegible]

NHA TRAMG

Contract / Time / A/C TYPE	7001		7002		0069		NON[illegible]	
	TIME		TIME		TIME		TIME	
	BLOCK	FLIGHT	BLOCK	FLIGHT	BLOCK	FLIGHT	BLOCK	FLIGHT
C46	25+35	18+41						
C47	221+33	200+18			4+26	3+56		
VTB	205+05	178+49	75+56	65+09	86+04	78+39		
10/2							3+37	2+36
PC6	7+07	6+32	50+46	46+41				
20AB								
DHC4	126+38	111+36						
Sub-Total	585+58	515+56	126+42	111+50	90+30	[illegible]+35	3+37	2+36

GRAND TOTAL: BLOCK TIME : 806+47

FLIGHT TIME : 712+57

R. W. Desmond

OM NHA

cc: BM SGM
SOM SGM
SZ NHA
FILE

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
FEBRUARY 1970

I. GENERAL

1. Total block time for February was 5482 hours vs 6332 hours in ~~December~~. January

2. VN-70 Customer (USAID/CORDS)terminated C-47 (GFE)43-16083 and C-47 (CFE) B829 effective 1 March 1970 due to failure to attain prescribed minimum on C-47 aircraft. C-47 083 is now in temporary storage at Tan Son Nhut.

3. Effective 28 February 1970, Beech N7950C was dropped from the ARPA (0030) contract and replaced with VTB N9577Z on 1 March 1970. N7950C was ferried to BKK on 6 March.

4. C-46 B912 will be substituted for B146 on 10 March after receiving No. 3 service at Tainan.

5. In view of the foregoing, the Saigon fleet stands at 49 aircraft vs 78 aircraft two years ago, with one C-47 #083, one VTB #695C, two 10-2s #622C and #77Y, and Helio #B849 in temporary storage. 41 aircraft comprise the active (basic) fleet on contract with C-46 #984, Porter #152L and C-47 #B829 carried as spares.

Two helicopters N8514F and N8535F were sent to UTH for TCS 18-28 February 70 at customer direction.

6. There were no major flying accidents in February 1970.

7. Our pilots continue to look sharper each day due to recent improvement in uniform by adding shoulder insignia and "scrambled eggs" to the hat shield. I observe the "duck tails" and sideburns getting shorter gradually. Attached are pittures of MFD Tidwell and Senior FEPA Representative SGN, Capt Zurla. I sincerely feel we must go one step further in the professional appearance of our pilots: Stay-pressed "wash and wear" pants of good quality plus an "Arrow Decton" type stay-pressed shirt. It has been my observation that if we dress our pilots up like gentlemen they tend to act that way both on and off the job with an improved professional performance.

8. Proposals to upgrade upcountry hostel facilities are being formalized to forward to AVP in the very near future. FEPA has participated with us and their recommendations have been considered..

9. The rising "free market" rate of 180 MPC to one USD and 400 piastres to one USD is having a marked effect on local economic conditions. Also merchants and local business men are taking into account the

strong rumor that the piastre will soon be devalued. They either delay any further business transactions while they wait to see what happens, or attempt to "make a deal" at an exorbitant price.

II. FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT

1. The hotest facility development projects are AR/69/055 "Renovations of Operations Building" ($20,605), and AR/69/054 "Renovation/Relocation of various AAM Shops and Offices" ($6,170). These ARs were forwarded to BCO TPE in October 1969. Priority approval would resolve a long standing problem of inadequate working environment due to past customer resistance to approving development of a new Operations/Administrative facility. With the accomplishment of the two cited ARs, Saigon Base will finally achieve an efficient working environment for all activities and provide a long standing facility requirement (i.e. locker and shower room) for pilots.

III. GENERAL AFFAIRS

1. Cost of living - Prices go on increasing amidst strong and sustained rumors that the piastre will soon be devalued. These rumors were based on the following indicators:

a. Forecast of GVN-financed import program for 1970 is lower than that of 1969. The reason being, as the US is pulling out, GVN funds of US Dollars accruing from the sale of piastres to the GI and Army's contractors is decreasing.

b. The commercialized import program (American aid) and P.L. 480 (US agricultural surplus products) may remain unchanged or slightly increase but far from being adequate to offset GVN increase spending, as a result of Vietnamisation of the war (particularly defense spending).

2. The piastres generated by these import programs and the resulting tax normally accounts for almost half of the total Government revenues. With these sources of revenues decreasing, the budget deficit estimated at 50 billions piastres is likely to be greater. More and more money will be chasing fewer and fewer goods.

3. The government efforts to bring rice from the rice surplus area (the Mekong delta) to the rice deficit area (Central VN and the highland) has failed. The farmers deliberately postpone sale in anticipation of higher price in the near future. Price of gold is officially fixed at 12,000 piastres per tael but the market price is VN$20,000. The black market rate for the green dollar and the MPC reached an all-time high of VN$400 and VN$180 respectively.

IV. SECURITY

1. Rumored public disturbances - None

2. Historical or customary dates & particulars forthcoming demonstration - None.

V. MEDICAL
Number of visits: 1069
Accidents: 80
Outcalls: 8
Physical Examination: 13
Sick leaves: 210

VI. PERSONNEL
1. A very routine month, with one exception: the TNN Training Program Candidates finally departed. We kept quite busy ministering to their last minute needs and assisting in their preparations for departure.

2. Personnel Strength - Saigon Base

Classif.	[redacted]								Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
Permanent	38	130	131	12	137	2	13	4	319	148

	[redacted]								Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
Permanent	524#	13**	2		2		1*		529	13

Pre-Processed: 8 1**

Temporary: American
GRD
1

(*) : [redacted]
(#) :
(**) : [redacted]

Ground Personnel: 857
Flight Personnel: 162
Total : 1019

Danang Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]				Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	4	14	19	72	109

Nha Trang Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]				Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	4	11	24	62	101

Can Tho Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]			Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
	1	10	2	13

VII. TRAFFIC/AAM

	January	February
Passengers departure SGN (all contracts)	6,356	5,212
Passengers arrival SGN (all contracts)	6,542	5,958
Outbound cargo SGN	91,938	40,940
Inbound cargo SGN	87,330	39,849

TRAFFIC/USAID

Cargo (including AF Caribou A/C)

	January	February
Outbound (lbs) SGN	1,458,201	1,209,056
Inbound (lbs) SGN	450,007	491,550

VIII. OPERATIONS

1. There were 16 controllable and 77 non-controllable delays with a total of 937 Saigon departures. Early morning Saigon ground fog continued to be the major factor in the non-controllable delays.

FIC, GTD and the Emergency Equipment Room are in good order.

2. Flight Time Report (see Attachment A)
Aircraft Incidents Report (See Attachment B)

3. Accident Report

Date	A/C Type/No.	Location	Remarks
16	DHC-4, N544Y	Noted at SGN after last trip of day	R.H. nose gear outer rim damaged. Suspect from piece of rock/large stone or the edge of bent-up PSP during days operation.
22	C-46/N67985	CORDS Warehouse Ramp	Driver attempted to pass under left wing of aircraft - Forklift impacted aileron resulting in minor damage. Driver was issued a written reprimand - Two days suspension.

4. Ground Transportation

Aggregate microbuses mileage	20601 km or 12875 miles
Microbuses down-time	184 hrs 12'
Microbus pax carried	3242 pax
Isuzu bus mileage	4556 km or 2847 miles
Isuzu bus downtime	54 hrs
Isuzu bus pax carried	10490 pax
Supply vehicle down-time	1504 km or 940 miles 108 hrs

5. Flying The month brought many changes in supervisory personnel and instructor pilots. Considerable P/O training was accomplished during this month. We had (DHC-4) and C-47 initial & ground school coverage. The realization of equitable flying time and duty time among our American First Officers is slowly approaching.

FEPA still is in the "lime light" with negotiations continuing at Tokyo. There was a strong threat of a standdown beginning on 20 Feb. Proper negotiations on part of the company must have been accomplished as the threat of a standdown was averted. The morale of our pilots are at an all time high with great expectations on the part of the negotiations taking place.

Morale of the VTB pilots has improved tremendously with an increase in flying time in the program.

The most significant item for the month was that it was a totally accident/incident free month.

IX. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. February was a good month with Maintenance Delays far less than January. It does indicate improvement in Maintenance quality.

We are now screening several of our TCN's who have responded to our request for 204B Flight Mechanic Trainees.

We recently finalized a formal Training Program for upgrading our Vietnamese employees working in the Supply Dept at Saigon. The intent is to utilize the Supply Trainee course that was developed by Tainan.

2. Aircraft Maintenance - The general activity and work load have further declined during the month, which has resulted in a low total number of aircraft departures and arrivals.

The completion of No.4B service on Porter N285L was delayed by several days due to late return of several overhauled components from the Main Base and also the nonavailability of some of the items in stock.

3. Rotary Wing - Flight time was down somewhat for the month because of Tet holidays and the temporary transfer of N5514F and N8535F to Udorn for 10 days.

Transponders are now installed in all but one 204B, however with no spares available it's rather difficult to maintain these units as no repairs are allowed at Regional Stations.

4. Shops Overall Shop activities remained on an even par.

The USFAA Inspection Authorization (IA) activities increased during the month with Annual Inspections on two Porters and one Volpar.

5. Planning/Engineering - The Planning and Production Control Section pre-planned, scheduled and processed, for aircraft of all types; 493 overnight services; 17 number one services; 19 number two services; 2 number three services; 3 annual inspections 6 engine changes (1 for 204B); 6 propeller changes; 85 EA's; 30 SI's; 4 EI's 137 time controlled components change on 204B; one T53 engine hot section inspections; 1 main rotor hub change; 1 main transmission change; and 204 shop work orders.

6. Utilities Maintenance - The TSN Airport well pump broke down for 5 days during this month and PMD had to revert to reinstallation of water pumps in the well near the Operations Bldg, as a source of water.

7. Electronics - This month must be registered as one of much accomplished EA, EI, SI to SVN base aircrafts.

A total of 13 ATC Transponder installation was completed. This brings to a total of 26 aircrafts equipped with transponders in SVN.

8. Technical Training - The following courses were completed during February: Auto Maintenance, Non Destructive Testing. Courses were in Progress: Ground Equipment and Aircraft Welding. Four FAA Oral & Practical A&P examinations were conducted.

Fifteen [redacted] Trainees were sent to Tainan for the International Line Service Mechanic's Course. The remaining ten Trainees should depart within the next few days.

9. Quality Control - Four Inspectors have satisfactorily completed the Technical Training Course on Non-Destructive Inspection.

The number 4 service on PC-6 N285L was completed this month with no major problems encountered for this dept.

10. Supply - The relocation project is still underway. The tools sale display cabinets fabrication and installation was completed early this month. The relocation of the Tool Crib Issue Window, now next to the Main Issue Window was completed too. Both Stock Control Section and Shipping & Receiving Section have maintained a smooth and normal function.

E.J. Theisen
Base Manager - Saigon

ADDENDUM

FISCAL

1. Customer Relations - Contract VN-70 has dropped two C-47 as of 1 March 1970 and also notified us they plan to drop the C-46 on the CAL sub-contract.

2. Budget Matters - Total net reduction of personnel during the two month period was 34. The monthly presentations of cost data continued to generate a lot of interest in our progress. Evaluation of monthly salary costs indicates almost all departments have made significant progress in reducing costs this fiscal year. For example total salary costs for April 1969 were $779,934 while total salary costs for December were $595,622 for a total reduction of $184,312.00. We are looking hard at remaining pooblem areas to see what further improvements can be made.

3. Exchange Rate - No change has occurred in the official exchange rate for piastres. Rumors abound or to the possibility of devaluation although no one can give us any definite information as to when or how much. Meanwhile the Black market rate continues to rise. Latest information is VN$400 to US$1.00.

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT

FEBRUARY 1970.

1. Contract 7001 -

A/C No.	Revenue		None-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
N67984	133+45	110+53	13+19	10+17
N67985	156+29	131+04	7+33	6+31
B910	138+13	114+22	16+26	13+30
B928	124+36	105+13	12+44	10+48
B146	126+16	102+19	4+33	3+46
6147	66+09	51+02	22+58	19+46
8084	123+52	107+26		
5559	92+43	79+03	1+08	1+00
5994	67+03	51+07		
B829	121+41	102+28	4+04	3+15
6083	114+26	95+35	2+55	2+28
N539Y	124+17	109+23	22+36	20+54
N544Y	72+39	60+02	2+58	2+36
N9518Z	97+38	84+51	8+23	7+34
N6154U	56+40	50+43	4+51	3+37
N9956Z	144+22	129+26	1+57	1+34
N7770B	31+55	27+44	6+07	5+13
N9577Z	100+04	84+14	2+06	1+25
N9838Z	85+04	72+32	2+39	2+10
N3728G	86+20	69+50		
N9664C	1+51	1+31		
N3674G	110+10	92+20		
N7695C	24+25	20+09		
N91295	87+44	76+00	2+08	1+42
N285L	62+36	53+23	1+26	0+52
N391R	100+24	87+54	1+14	0+30
N394R	15+13	12+34		
N9444	125+35	109+49	1+34	0+51
N198X	64+22	62+50		
N153L	110+37	103+20	2+53	2+15
N180K	15+02	13+54	1+05	0+57
N12450	128+19	113+28	0+30	0+16
N7488	107+32	91+27	11+35	9+34
N152L	57+34	47+11	6+17	5+18
N184L	120+51	104+56	0+35	0+22
N185E	12+18	11+42		
N192X	9+06	8+27		
N393R	106+32	105+07		
N194X	96+56	83+26	2+46	2+15
N1303X	178+26	178+26	9+10	9+10
N1304X	122+07	122+07	5+30	5+30
N1305X	95+14	95+14	2+20	2+20

M1306X	74+19	74+19	12+05	12+05
M1307X	25+30	25+30	1+30	1+30
M8514F	51+18	51+18	1+20	1+20
M8535F	50+41	50+41	2+30	2+30
Sub total	4027+54	3536+20	203+45	175+41

2. Contract 7002 -

B146	3+39	3+19
M544Y	29+32	25+17
M9518Z	2+37	2+09
M6154U	39+43	33+29
M9956Z	0+44	10+38
M7770B	47+23	40+20
M9577Z	22+53	20+12
M9838Z	4+16	3+40
M3728G	21+33	17+46
M9664C	8+15	7+07
M3674G	7+41	6+39
M7695C	31+51	27+49
M91295	17+54	15+22
M285L	20+40	15+34
M391R	25+13	21+27
M394R	41+58	37+14
M9444	7+56	6+57
M196X	62+14	59+42
M153L	21+34	17+22
M180K	42+34	37+12
M748H	27+23	21+49
M152L	9+07	8+17
M184L	5+55	5+27
M185K	107+18	101+12
M192X	52+50	48+30
M193R	4+09	4+06
M194X	33+42	29+08
M1303X	1+00	1+00
M1304X	2+14	2+14
M1305X	27+38	27+38
M1306X	2+00	2+00
M1307X	77+39	77+39
M8514F	81+34	81+34
M8535F	76+02	76+02
Sub total	968+41	885+51

3. Contract 7003 -

B910	6+58	5+57
B928	1+34	1+00
B146	10+48	8+55
6147	7+47	4+52
5994	10+41	6+59
M544Y	4+00	3+39
M9518Z	0+59	0+48
M9577Z	3+09	2+15
M9838Z	1+59	1+21
M3674G	2+42	2+16
M91295	1+13	0+40

	N393R	2+28	1+47
	N391R	4+50	3+51
	N9444	15+25	11+32
	N153L	1+08	0+55
	N748N	1+09	0+56
	N152L	1+53	0+53
	N393R	2+45	1+53
	N1306X	36+46	36+46
	N1307X	5+10	5+10
	N8535P	16+30	16+30
	Sub total	139+54	118+55
4.	Contract 0030 -		
	N7950C	49+37	39+20
	N1303X	1+11	1+11
	Sub total	49+48	40+31
5.	Contract 0069 -		
	N9664C	79+47	70+07
	8084	4+26	3+56
	N3728G	7+15	6+55
	Sub total	91+28	80+58

TOTAL REVENUE BLOCK TIME	5277+45
" " FLIGHT TIME	4662+35
TOTAL NON-REVENUE BLOCK TIME	203+45
" " FLIGHT TIME	175+41
GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	5481+30
" " FLIGHT TIME	4838+16

Flight Time by Type of Aircraft

Type of A/C	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
C-46	702+18	583+02	54+35	44+52
C-47	487+07	400+00	27+01	23+14
Bailed C-47	121+41	102+28	4+04	3+15
DHC-4	230+28	198+21	25+34	23+30
VIB	1128+07	968+53	28+11	23+15
10-2	48+37	39+20		
Porter	1634+08	1445+12	29+55	23+10
204-B	925+19	925+19	34+25	34+25
TOTAL	5277+45	4662+35	203+45	175+41

L. G. Parrish
SGM/SGH

FLIGHT INFORMATION CENTER

- S A I G O N -

- MONTHLY ACTIVITY REPORT -

1 - 28 February 1970

PART I

- Ground Fire Incidents -

Date	A/C No., Type & Contract	Place	Description
01 Feb.	N8535F 204-B 7001	XR 1192	After take off from an outpost, the PIC heard heavy small arms fire directed at the a/c. Capt. BASHAM immediately made a sharp left hand turn and departed the area. No a/c damage or personnel injury involved.
06 Feb.	N1305X 204-B 7002	XR 3196	As a/c was on touchdown at LZ, Capt. CASE observed ground personnel running for cover. After hurriedly disembarking six RD troops, the PIC immediately took off observing mortar fire in the LZ as a/c gained altitude. No a/c damage or personnel injury involved.
17 Feb.	N1304X 204-B 7001	BT 1050	As a/c was climbing, the PIC observed tracer fire to the rear of a/c. Capt. WINSTON changed course and departed the area. No a/c damage or personnel injury involved.

PART II

- Situation Summary -

Light enemy activity prevailed during the month of February. Acts of terrorism in Saigon and the uncovering of rice and weapons caches highlighted this months reports. Some fourteen terrorist/sapper incidents were reported in Saigon which included the shooting and subsequent wounding of a MACV courier who was proceeding down Pasteur Street shortly before sunrise on the 8th. Some twelve hours later an estimated twenty pound charge detonated at the corner of Tu-Do and Le-Loi Streets

PART II

- Situation Summary - (Con't) -

on top of the VN Press Club resulting in extensive damage but no casualties. On the 27th terrorists placed a ten pound charge near the wall of the metropole BEQ resulting in 4 WIA and minor damage. Two km SE of MACV headquarters, a USAHAC bus entering the intersection of Vo-Tanh and Truong-Tan-Buu Streets received one round of sniper fire wounding a USN Petty Officer.

Allied forces reported discovering enemy caches in the Central highlands, III Corps, and the Delta. Certainly one of the biggest finds of the war was uncovered at Ran-Rang (VL48) where to date 169 tons of various types of rifles, mortars, rockets, and munitions have been unearthed at 33 different cache sites. In addition to munitions and weapons, large numbers of picks, shovels, and entrenching tolls (manufactured in India) were recovered as well as bicycles, medical supplies, radio equipment, clothing, detonating cord (533, 525'), rocket motors (139) and rocket warheads (16). Of particular interest is how and when this amount of supplies reached an area 45 miles from the closest point of the Cambodian border. Analysts estimate that some of the material had been in place less than three months and that some storage bunkers were constructed less than six months ago. The supplies were in good condition with no sign of deterioration. While it is believed the supplies were transported via what is know as the JOLLEY Road to what extent vehicles were utilized is undetermined. Interestingly enough local newspapers report that a herd of some forty elephants were sighted at the cache site six months ago and another herd of some ninety elephants five months later.

R. N. Begien III
OPSP/SGN

MONTHLY REPORT
NHA-TRANG
FEBRUARY 1970

GENERAL

Continued routine problems and a quiet month during February. A decrease in revenue block time flown relative to January due to the Four day "TET" holidays.

The city of NHA TRANG remains "off limits" to all military personnel. This situation has continued from before "TET" and there is no indication that it will change. The reasons for this appear to be both economic and military.

TRAFFIC

As stated, a decline in all phases was experienced this month due to the "TET" holidays. This situation is outlined in the included statistics.

STATISTICS

	FEB.	JAN.	1969
Passenger			
Departing	2961	3560	2291
Arriving	3143	3611	2366
TOTAL	6104	7171	4657
CARGO			
1. GROUND SERVICES(Lbs)			
Departing	324.202	334.817	407.870
Arriving	122.947	214.914	166.100
TOTAL	447.149	549.731	573.970
2. COMPANY CARGO (Lbs)			
Departing	2.006	3.749	23.170
Arriving	3.846	9.202	19.042
TOTAL	5.852	12.951	42.212
3. GRAND TOTAL (Lbs) (1+2)			
Departing	326.208	338.566	431.040
Arriving	126.793	224.110	185.142
TOTAL	453.001	562.282	616.182

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

Mr. B. KYKER, the 7002 Air Operations Officer returned from a tour of reserve military duty while Mr. W.F. SPARKS, the 7001 Air Operations Officer has assumed the temporary duties of Assistant Director of Administration for Cords in NHA. Mr. T. LILLY replaces Mr. SPARKS. Relations remain unstrained and good.

. . . 2 . .

OPERATIONS

A. The major accomplishment this month was the restoration of communication service via the remote Motorola unit and the switch-over to the new antenna. This switch-over was componied by a remoting of the transmitter equipment to the new location. This has eliminated XMTR feed-back into our RCVRS.

B. FLIGHT FREQUENCY (See attached)

C. ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE COMPARISON

	Feb.	Jan.	1969
Arrival	437	474	476
Departure	435	475	465
RON	201	250	294

D. DELAYS

Percentage on time	99%	98%	

SECURITY

No major problems.

PERSONNEL

See attached.

FISCAL

No major problems.

LEGAL

No problems.

TECHNICAL SERVICES

	Feb.	Jan.	1969
1. Transient overnight	236	224	182
2. Overnight services	201	250	294
3. Engine changes	2	0	2
4. Propeller changes	0	0	1
5. No. 1 services	0	0	4
6. No. II services	0	0	0
7. Delays Maint/Mech.	4	4	5
8. Intermediate services	0	0	1
9. AGP	2	2	13
10. Cutline recoveries	3	2	0
11. Accident report (A/C)	0	0	2
12. Accident report (PNL)	0	0	0

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

Dan Lawson

DAN LAWSON
SE-NHA

MONTHLY FLIGHT TIME REPORT

NHA TRANG

Contract / Time / A/C TYPE	7001		7002		0069		NON-REVENUE	
	TIME		TIME		TIME		TIME	
	BLOCK	FLIGHT	BLOCK	FLIGHT	BLOCK	FLIGHT	BLOCK	FLIGHT
C46	25+35	18+41						
C47	221+33	200+18			4+26	3+56		
VTH	205+05	178+49	75+56	65+09	86+04	78+39		
10/2							3+37	2+36
PC6	7+07	6+32	50+46	46+41				
204B								
DHC4	126+38	111+36						
Sub-Total	585+58	515+56	126+42	111+50	90+30	82+35	3+37	2+36

GRAND TOTAL: BLOCK TIME : 806+47

FLIGHT TIME : 712+27

R. W. Desmond

OM NHA

cc: BM SGN
SOM SGN
SZ NHA
FILE

MEMORANDUM

TO : BM/SGN

DATE: 09 February 1970

FROM : SZ/DAD

REF. No. SZDAD/70/016

SUBJECT : DANANG Station Monthly Report for January 1970

GENERAL

The lull in hostile activity continued throughout the month of January. An increase in enemy action during the upcoming TET holidays is not unexpected, however. Three isolated instances of explosive charges being thrown at military vehicles were reported in the last week of the month.

Two Southern Air Transport flights transited Danang within the reporting period. Both were ferry departures and created little difficulty.

The Director of Danang Customs has tentatively approved the loading and offloading of cargo on international flights transiting this station, but this authorization contained several qualifications. These are being studied in SGN where a determination will be made as to the feasibility of utilizing this authority.

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

No problems were encountered in this area during the month.

LEGAL

No written notice of intention to renew the lease on the hostel [redacted] was furnished to the landlord of this property, therefore the present contract will expire on 9 February. There should be no difficulty in vacating these premises by the required time.

Alternative hostel arrangements continue under discussion and should be finalized by the end of February. No significant problems are expected in the interim due to not having the above hostel available.

FACILITIES

Plans to renovate the CSD shipping and receiving warehouse into a passenger terminal and flight operations office are progressing at a reasonable rate. Preliminary blueprints have been made and it appears funding by COMUSDS, Region I, should not be a problem. However, no target date to commence work has been established.

Dual HF antennas were hoisted into place on 24 January and were made operational the same day. The eighty foot antenna mast project can now be considered complete.

The contractor who submitted the lowest bid in April for the completion of the concrete paving and drainage ditch project has stated that he would still assume the job at the same price if awarded. Status of this project is pending higher echelon company approval.

FISCAL

[redacted] payroll for the month totaled: [redacted]

Petty cash expenditures totaled: 44,480$VN

OPERATIONS

Revenue flight time declined 15+04 hours as compared to December. Poor weather, a reduction in Embassy requirements, and the replacement of the AID Porter by a VTB all contributed to this decrease.

The normal complement of RON aircraft at this station will be reduced early in February. Due to a reduction in scheduled flight service between SGN and DAD, the C-47 RON will be eliminated. Requirements for two PC-6, two 204B and two VTB aircraft should continue.

The following is a breakdown of flight time generated by this station during January:

VN-70/AID	781+05
VN-70/EMB	196+00
0005	Nil
0069	1+38
Non-Revenue	Nil
Total	978+43

Revenue losses for the month were as follows:

Weather	24+40
Maintenance	Nil
Customer Cancellation	Nil
Other	Nil
Total	24+40

Hostel occupancy factors were 86% and 26% for the Old and New Hostels respectively.

COMMUNICATIONS

Some improvement in HF reception was reported by other stations since the installation of the new HF transmitting antennas, but interference problems continue to be experienced when receiving SGN signals.

The incoming ringing problem on the station telephones was eliminated, all four lines are now completely usable. The two Class A lines ring in Operations, and the two Class C lines ring in Traffic.

The [redacted] remote UHF/VHF was out of service one day, but AESU personnel were able to repair it without difficulty.

Incoming and outgoing messages totaled 1541 and 1591 respectively.

TRAFFIC

A Pro-forma AR was submitted for a set of cargo weighing scales for the USAID warehouse operation. No scales were includes in the provisions of the AID/VN-70 contract so it anticipated that their cost would be reimbursable.

Passenger and cargo statistics for the month are as follows:

	PAX IN	PAX OUT	CARGO IN	CARGO OUT
VN-7001/AID	2,456	2,358	384,478	287,078
VN-7002/EMB	682	679	635	6,371
0069	5	6	-	-
0005	-	-	-	-
AAM	85	89	7,582.5	14,877.5
TOTAL	3,228	3,132	392,695.5	308,326.5

SECURITY

All but eight TCN employees have received extensions of stay, and twenty three 1970 air base passes were received for TCN personnel. There are still three such personnel who do not have an extension of stay and whose temporary passes have expired. Special approval has been requested from VNAF Security to permit these employees to enter the base until the support documents for their permanent pass applications can be obtained.

PERSONNEL

The personnel breakdown at Danang Station at the close of business, 31 January, was as follows:

	[redacted]			
Permanent	4	18	14	81
Pre-Process	0	0	0	0
Temporary	1	0	0	0
Daily Hire	0	0	0	0
TOTAL (118)	5	18	14	81

TECHNICAL SERVICES

RMD handled a total of 603 arriving and 606 departing flights, a slight decrease as compared to December. For the second consecutive month there were no flight delays which resulted in a revenue loss attributable to maintenance. Heavy services increased substantially for a total of 9 (3 PC-6 and 4 204B number 1 services and 2 204B number 2 services). One engine change was required during the month. One aircraft was placed on AGP status, but no revenue loss resulted.

RGMD expended a total of 792 manhours of which 300 were consumed on leased properties. The routine airport building maintenance functions of this department have been somewhat frustrated by a lack of workable procedures whereby needed materials and supplies can be obtained. Although contractually it appears USAID is required to furnish, or at least reimburse the cost of, such supplies, little success has been forthcoming in this area. A CRR was submitted to the local customer for paint for the nose hangar, but this was forwarded to SGN for final approval. No action, either approval or disapproval, has been reported on this CRR since it was initiated on 06 December 1969.

Original Signed by
WINSTON C. CAMBRE
Winston C. Cambre

cc: file

MEMORANDUM

TO : BM/SGN

DATE: 09 February 1970

FROM : SZ/DAD

REF. No. SZDAD/70/016

SUBJECT : DANANG Station Monthly Report for January 1970

GENERAL

The lull in hostile activity continued throughout the month of January. An increase in enemy action during the upcoming TET holidays is not unexpected, however. Three isolated instances of explosive charges being thrown at military vehicles were reported in the last week of the month.

Two Southern Air Transport flights transited Danang within the reporting period. Both were ferry departures and created little difficulty.

The Director of Danang Customs has tentatively approved the loading and offloading of cargo on international flights transiting this station, but this authorization contained several qualifications. These are being studied in SGN where a determination will be made as to the feasibility of utilizing this authority.

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

No problems were encountered in this area during the month.

LEGAL

No written notice of intention to renew the lease on the hostel [redacted] was furnished to the landlord of this property, therefore the present contract will expire on 9 February. There should be no difficulty in vacating these premises by the required time.

Alternative hostel arrangements continue under discussion and should be finalized by the end of February. No significant problems are expected in the interim due to not having the above hostel available.

FACILITIES

Plans to renovate the CSD shipping and receiving warehouse into a passenger terminal and flight operations office are progressing at a reasonable rate. Preliminary blueprints have been made and it appears funding by COMUS, Region I, should not be a problem. However, no target date to commence work has been established.

Dual HF antennas were hoisted into place on 24 January and were made operational the same day. The eighty foot antenna mast project can now be considered complete.

The contractor who submitted the lowest bid in April for the completion of the concrete paving and drainage ditch project has stated that he would still assume the job at the same price if awarded. Status of this project is pending higher echelon company approval.

FISCAL

[redacted] payroll for the month totaled: 1,038,743$VN

Petty cash expenditures totaled: 44,480$VN

OPERATIONS

Revenue flight time declined 15+04 hours as compared to December. Poor weather, a reduction in Embassy requirements, and the replacement of the AID Porter by a VTB all contributed to this decrease.

The normal complement of RON aircraft at this station will be reduced early in February. Due to a reduction in scheduled flight service between SGN and DAD, the C-47 RON will be eliminated. Requirements for two PC-6, two 204B and two VTB aircraft should continue.

The following is a breakdown of flight time generated by this station during January:

VN-70/AID	781+05
VN-70/EMB	196+00
0005	Nil
0069	1+38
Non-Revenue	Nil
Total	978+43

Revenue losses for the month were as follows:

Weather	24+40
Maintenance	Nil
Customer Cancellation	Nil
Other	Nil
Total	24+40

Hostel occupancy factors were 86% and 26% for the Old and New Hostels respectively.

COMMUNICATIONS

Some improvement in HF reception was reported by other stations since the installation of the new HF transmitting antennas, but interference problems continue to be experienced when receiving SGN signals.

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	[redacted]			
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Pre-Process	0	0	0	0
Temporary	1	0	0	0
Daily Hire	0	0	0	0
TOTAL (118)	5	18	14	81

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Original Signed by
WINSTON C. CAMBRE

Winston C. Cambre

cc: file

MEMORANDUM

TO : AVP-TPE

FROM : BM-SGN

SUBJECT : Monthly Report

DATE: 18 February 1970

REF. No. BMSGN/70/55

Saigon Base Monthly Report for January 1970 is forwarded in three copies for your file.

E.J. Theisen

FORM 5670406

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
JANUARY 1970

I. GENERAL

1. Total block time in January 1970 was 6114 vs 6332 hours for December 1969.

2. VN-70 Customer (USAID/CORDS) Terminated 2 VTBs (N9838Z and N7695C) plus one C-46 (B138) effective 31 January 70. B-138 will remain in Tainan in temporary storage status whereas the VTBs (for the time being) will remain in SGN. VTB N7695C will go to temporary storage in SGN and N9577Z will be carried as a SGN spare. The VTBs were terminated due to internal customer problems however we expect full utilization of the spare aircraft and our experience so far in February bears this out. We will watch this situation very carefully and make recommendations accordingly. Meanwhile VN-70 has issued a Call Order for DHC-4 N544Y effective 1 February 70. I would forecast a fairly stabilized flying program between 6200 to 6500 block hours for an indefinite period.

3. The change in our pilots uniforms with the addition of epaulettes and "scrambled egg" hats for the Captains has had a noticeable effect. Our aircrews look sharper, act sharper, and (I hope) will fly sharper. Their over-all personal appearance is much improved with better creased trousers, haircuts and better polished boots resulting from what I believe is the psychological effect of the improved uniform. I am, indeed proud of their appearance. The customer is also favorably impressed.

II. FACILITY DEVELOPMENT

1. We are quite stabilized in our facility development with no major projects which urgently need doing except Project 6695 - Renovation of the Operations/MFD Building which formerly housed the Base Manager's Office, and Project 6697 - Relocation & Renovation of various Shops and Offices. These have been substandard facilities throughout our evolution as a major base within the company system. Both projects have been forwarded to the Head Office - TPE for approval.

III. CUSTOMER RELATIONS

1. Our relations with all customers has never been better. They are so congenial, it is unbelievable.

IV. GENERAL AFFAIRS

1. Cost of living - According to the National Institute of statistics, the consumption index for Dec. 69 as compared with that of 1968 increases by 28.4% for the middle class and 31.7% for the workers class. Compared with the index of the base year 1963 of 100, the 1969 index is as follows: Middle class: 452.1 ; Workers class: 500.2

The cost of electricity has recently increased by 40% from VN$6 to VN$8.4 per kw/hr.

2. Air VN pay increase - The employees' demand for salary increase was finally settled. Effective 1 January 1970, The Board of Administration approved salary increase as follows:

Grade I - 4	:	2100	VN$	per month
Grade 5	:	1500	"	" "
Grade 6	:	1200	"	" "

The pay raise results in the company's payroll being increased by 5 million piastres per month.

3. Tet gifts - In appreciation for assistance during the past year, token gifts were presented to 148 GVN officials or ARVN officers with the following breakdown:

High level : 36
Supervisory level: 33
Working level: 79

V. SECURITY
1. Rumored public disturbances - None

2. Historical or customary dates & particulars forthcoming demonstration - The Vietnamese New Year "TET" took place on 6 through 8 Feb. 1970. All business has been suspended on those days and no customary demonstration anticipated. According to a joint communique of the Commander of the Special Military Capitol and the Military Governor of the Saigon and Gia Dinh, fire crackers were strictly prohibited.

VI. MEDICAL
Number of visits: 1351
Accidents: 78
Hospitalization: 1
Unhospitalisation: 77
Outcalls: 6
Physical examination: 19
Sick leaves: 261

VII. PERSONNEL
1. General Information - It looks as though the Year of the Dog is also to be the Year of the [redacted] We are assured at this time that a majority of the Tainan candidates will be able to leave for Tainan in February. As appropriate, cable correspondence will be sent to all concerned keeping them advised of all late developments.

There is lots of talk of an impending devaluation; the value of the piastre on the open market is still about VN$350 to US$1.

2. Personnel Strength - Saigon Base

Classif.	[redacted]								Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
Permanent	37	135	132	13	138	2	14	4	321	154

	[redacted]					Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	FLT
Permanent	525#	13**	2	2	1*	530	13

Pre-processed: 5

(*) : [redacted]
(**) :
(#) :

Ground personnel: 856
Flight personnel: 167
Total: 1023

Da Nang Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]				Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	4	14	19	79	116

Nha Trang Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]				Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	5	12	24	62	103

Can Tho Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]			Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	1	10	2	13

VIII. TRAFFIC/AAM

	December 69	January 70
Passengers departure SGN (all contracts)	5,997	6,356
Passengers arrival SGN (all contracts)	6,754	6,542
Outbound cargo SGN	64,725	91,938
Inbound cargo SGN	86,628	87,330

TRAFFIC/USAID

	Cargo (including AF December 69	Jar
Outbound (lbs) SGN	1,717,396	
Inbound (lbs) SGN	538,788	

IX. OPERATIONS

1. There were 23 controllable and 68 non-c
a total of 930 Saigon departures. Early mc
was a major factor in the number of non-con

Flight Time Report (see Attachment A)

Acircraft Incidents Report (See Attachment B)

. Accident Report

ate	A/C Type/No	Location	Remarks
12	PC6/N9444	V-02	Right wing struck Army truck while A/C was being marshalled into parking spot by USAF lineman. Substantial damage. Investigation complete, Local Board during week 8-14 February.
11	PC6/N394R	V-84 to V-23	PIC heard 1 rd hit A/C while at 1000' above terrain. PIC maintained heading and increased altitude. Minor damage from 30 cal hole leading edge of left wing.

4. Communications

Project 6683: Transmitter Building and Antenna System, Saigon Ninety-five percent completed. All transmitters and ancillary equipment were moved into the new transmitter building in mid-January/ Only power hook-up to the 300 KVA generator and minor wiring remain to be completed. Old transmitter building has been razed and all old antennas and antenna towers have been lowered.

Project 6696: Installation of 400 KVA Transformer, Saigon Base continues to utilise 300 KVA transformer which was installed on a temporary basis by the power company. Completion of power cable distribution system awaiting arrival of stand-off insulators from Hong Kong.

Project 6700: 60' Antenna Mast, Nha Trang (HF Transmitter Relocation) Mast an antennas erected. Construction of transmitter building near completion and expect to have transmitters relocated and operational by mid-February.

Project 6701: 80' Antenna Mast, Danang (HF Transmitter Relocation) Completed All transmitters were relocated and were operational by mid-January.

Project 6708 & 6709: Telephone cabel distribution system and Base PABX Completed and 100 percent operation as of 7 Jan.

ATTITUDE SSB Voice Circuit: Transmitters installed in new transmitter building and new beam antenna erected in late December. Receiver console and ring down equipment transferred to Message Center. Muting devices for

receiver installed allowing headset operation only (no speakers).

The above represents the major projects which have been completed during the past two months after many years of planning and waiting for the fruition of said plans. Many projects remain to be completed. Some are, Southeast Asia Radio-teletype circuits, Tan Son Nhut/PTT Saigon speach plus radiotyletype UHF link, Saigon Paging System and P.A. System, Message/Communications Center Installation including added on and off-line teletype circuits as well as expanded on base teletype distribution system. These are but a few of the projects to improve the everincreasing need for more and better communications. They are in various stages of partial development with much remaining to be done before final completion.

5. Ground Transportation

Aggregate microbuses mileage:	23098 km or 14430 miles
Microbuses downtime:	154 hrs 23'
Microbus pax-carried:	3248 pax
Isuzu bus mileage:	6315 km or 3946 miles
Isuzu bus downtime:	51 hrs 30'
Isuzu bus pax-carried:	10502 pax
Supply vehicle mileage:	2162 km or 1351 miles
Supply vehicle downtime:	131 hrs

6. Flying - The month also saw FEPA and associated activities take up a lot of time. The problem is becoming more acute as to just what position, attitude and relationship should exist between FEPA and MFD. There is the problem as to what and how much office and administrative support is to be provided. There does not appear to be any abuse of their requirements but the volume of work required continues to increase and there is a definite need for a definitive decision as to the policy that is to be applied to this area. A request for this guidance has been requested in a separate memo submitted earlier in the month but no response has been received to date.

In the middle of the month we received the new epaulettes and the hat bills for Captains. The general impression appears to be that it was an improvement from before but there was obvious disappointment in that the epaulettes were not the design that was the overwhelming choice of the crews.

FEPA and the Flying Deparment did considerable work in attempting to arrive at a reasonableand satisfactory proposal for the hostels and general crew accomodations at outstations.

The arrival of the first few transponders is already getting favorable comments from the pilots and greatly surprised reactions from various ground controllers.

Discussions at the end of the month with Senior representatives from the Embassy Customer indicate complete and enthusiastic support in obtaining UHF radios.

X. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. January was an uneventful month in respect to unplanned/unscheduled events, but progress was made in most areas on production and administrative problems.
The Cantho Station celebrated the completion of its First Year of successful operation on 10 January.
Inspite of progress in other areas, our primary objective: Flying hours took another drop with reduced hours on all types of aircraft, with the exception of the C47 and C46. The total flying being down more than 200 hours from the December level. The number of C45/10-2 aircraft assigned here remains at three with two in storage. Helios are reduced to one, in storage. Performance of the turbo-prop aircraft continued to improve . Consolidation of the Ground Communications facilities was completed with the transfer of the remaining transmitting equipment, and the CMD Offices to the CMD Complex.

2. Aircraft Maintenance The work load has remained steady during the month of January. Three C-46 and one C-47 aircraft were reported to have engine vibration in flight, the cause of which has been mainly the props. Shortage of serviceable props and engines for Porter and the Volpar aircraft was experienced for awhile.

The crew supervisors received class room instructions on various types of propellers.

3. Rotary Wing This month has been normal maintenance wise with total flying hours about average at 1010.

4. Shops Shop activities remained on an even par during the first half of the month, then picked-up during the second half. No annual Inspections were performed this month.

The number four service on PC-6 N285L is progressing.

Effective 1 January, an Open Maintenance Work Order numbering system was put into operation. There is no change in the basic system but this revision does eliminate a lot of unnecessary paperwork.

The installation of the ATC Transponders is progressing very well. It was necessary to change the location of the control unit on g the VTB-18 instrument panel from the position indicated on the proposed EA print. Engineering has been advised.

5. Planning/Engineering The Planning and Production Control Section pre planned, scheduled and processed, for aircraft of all types; 499 Overnight Svces, 29 Number 1 Svces, 19 Number 2 Svces, 5 Number 3 Svces, 2 Number 4 Svces, 13 Engines Changes, 16 Propeller changes, 56 EA's, 71 SI's, 2 EI's, 180 time controlled components change on 204B, two T53 engine hot section inspections, 4 DRA's, 4 CRA's and 313 shop work orders.

6. General Maintenance - All transmitter equipment from the old Transmitter Building has been moved to the new Transmitter Building located in the GND Complex.

7. Equipment Maintenance - On 1 Jan. 70 PEMD went to the day/date scheduling of routine maintenance of equipment.

8. Electronics - Activities for the early part of the monthe were planning and scheduling of work for the approved AR-9053, EA draft, Freq plan changes for SEA, FM Transceiver Evaluation and approved EA were received simultaneously.

SCM and COMENG SGN Office was transferred to the new PABX room located in the GND Complex.

9. AED Line Service - Completion of EA - issued for protection of VHF Antenna A-15 was made. A number of A-15 Antenna unit had to be repaired upon removal. S/Shops provided us support in manufacturing lock nut through machine lathe.

10. Technical Training activities increased during the month of January and with the holidays behind us several courses were completed: Garrett TPE-331, Integral fuel tanks, Propellers, A/C control cables, T-53 fuel control.

Courses in progress: Auto maintenance.

Three mechanics received their FAA Oral and Practical examinations with two men passing.

11. Quality control - The station started their first PC-6C No. 4B Service this month with only a few problems being encountered that involved Quality Control and most of them came from problem on components sent from TNN or from lack of parts.

12. Stores - During this reporting period, the workload for this section was increased by approximately 15% due to the original work of No. 4B SVC and PC6C Porter aircraft.

The tools display cabinets fabrication and installation are nearing the completion stage. This project should also see its conclusion during the next month.

Rearrangement and updating of stock records for all classes are still in progress and expected to be complete in the early part of February.

A total of 265 line items of commodities was purchased from the local market this month. Total valud of commodities purchased from the Saigon/Cholon market amount to VN$904,215.00.

E.J. Theisen
Base Manager - Saigon

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT
JANUARY 1970.

1. Contract 7001 -

A/C No.	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
N67984	106+10	89+18	21+14	18+12
N67985	149+23	125+30	19+40	18+02
B910	139+03	116+11	22+56	20+33
B928	155+19	126+11	2+39	1+45
B138	113+04	94+17	4+40	3+20
B146	164+03	135+32	2+23	1+37
6147	132+23	113+21	2+39	2+15
8084	157+03	136+45		
5559	184+07	165+41		
5994	114+52	90+39		
6083	131+10	115+05		
B829	106+02	91+17	20+12	17+45
N539I	81+29	68+39		
N544I	31+44	25+46	2+03	1+30
N95182	114+14	97+45	7+38	5+48
N6154U	32+16	28+40		
N9956Z	73+25	63+14	3+05	2+25
N7770B	73+26	63+54	13+41	11+30
N95772	93+03	81+59	3+09	2+37
N98382	130+26	113+47	2+13	1+36
N3728G	63+59	50+00	6+04	4+56
N9664C	3+51	3+16		
N3674G	118+36	99+39	2+53	2+00
N7695C	79+24	64+56	6+29	4+52
N91295	43+54	37+58	4+53	3+47
N6622C			3+03	1+15
N7950C			1+12	0+56
N2851	103+15	94+31	2+55	2+35
N391R	176+13	158+49	1+07	0+43
N394R	14+42	13+17	0+40	0+35
N9444	163+23	145+15	1+47	1+15
N198I	176+54	155+43	2+30	2+10
N153L	107+35	96+57		
N180K	24+50	22+59		
N12450	68+14	58+45	4 +12	3+28
N748N	56+02	47+20	0+30	0+20
N152L	37+33	31+54	2+07	1+18
N184L	138+11	125+50	1+50	1+50
N185K	103+39	88+17	3+54	2+59
N192I	82+17	76+37	0+43	0+29
N393R	32+44	27+03	4+05	3+16
N194I	112+43	97+46	6+52	5+44

ATTACHMENT "A"

M1303I	112+09	112+09	7+43	7+43
M1304I	119+36	119+36	3+30	3+30
M1305I	105+37	105+37	1+00	1+00
M1306I	150+25	150+25	6+16	6+15
M1307I	139+03	139+03	3+25	3+25
M8514F	126+16	126+16	6+16	6+16
M8535F	40+01	40+01	5+20	5+20
B867			0+38	0+22
Sub-total	4783+48	4233+30	220+05	187+14

2. Contract 7002 -

M539I	2+02	1+62
M544I	10+51	7+24
M76950	4+40	3+40
M91295	13+17	11+50
M95182	10+07	8+01
M61540	62+57	51+44
M99562	20+51	17+14
M777GB	28+56	25+05
M95772	16+55	14+18
M98382	7+01	6+34
M37280	8+10	6+46
M746M	105+06	99+07
M1521	42+18	34+54
M184L	14+21	11+24
M185K	23+43	19+25
M192K	31+00	28+37
M393R	65+55	60+22
M194I	27+52	24+14
M285L	21+07	17+43
M391R	4+00	3+30
M394R	63+09	56+43
M544A	7+04	6+32
M198K	4+54	3+53
M153L	6+25	6+01
M180K	54+57	50+48
M12450	29+23	26+47

M8534F	7+40	7+40
M8535F	49+22	49+22
M1303X	37+21	37+21
M1305X	42+04	42+04
M1304X	12+38	12+38
M1306X	3+29	3+29
M1307X	3+31	3+31
sub-total	843+04	760+23

3. Contract 7003 -

B910	1+32	0+57
B928	10+17	8+42
M138	2+21	1+50
M539Y	9+20	8+18
M544Y	5+27	4+46
M9518Z	4+29	3+07
M9956Z	3+16	2+26
M7770B	3+27	2+12
M9577Z	2+24	1+35
M3728G	4+53	3+13
M3674G	8+18	5+26
M7695C	6+22	4+01
B91295	0+54	0+39
M9444	2+33	1+44
M198K	2+58	1+45
M152L	5+49	4+43
M184L	5+31	3+55
M185K	8+49	5+41
M1305X	11+03	11+03
M1307X	8+18	8+18
M8535F	4+00	4+00
sub-total	111+41	88+21

4. Contract 0005 -

N6622C	46+33	36+40
N1306X	0+54	0+54
Sub-total	47+27	37+34

5. Contract 0069 -

N9664C	96+56	84+16
N99562	5+32	4+24
N91295	5+37	5+00
Sub-total	108+05	93+40

TOTAL REVENUE BLOCK TIME	5894+05
" " FLIGHT TIME	5213+28
TOTAL NON-REVENUE BLOCK TIME	220+05
" " FLIGHT TIME	187+14
GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	6114+10
" " FLIGHT TIME	5400+42

Flight Time by Type of Aircraft

Type of A/C	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
C-46	841+12	698+28	73+32	63+29
C-47	106+02	91+17	20+12	17+45
Sailed C-47	719+35	621+31	2+39	2+15
UC-4	140+53	116+35	2+03	1+50
VIB	1141+34	966+39	50+05	39+31
10-2	46+53	36+40	4+15	2+11
Porter	1924+49	1708+51	33+12	26+42
20AB	973+27	973+27	33+29	33+29
Bello			0+38	0+22
TOTAL	5896+05	5213+28	220+05	187+14

Original Signed By
L. G. PARRISH

L.G.Parrish

FLIGHT INFORMATION CENTER

- SAIGON -

- MONTHLY ACTIVITY REPORT -
1-31 January 1970

PART I

—Ground Fire Incidents—

Date	A/C No., Type & Contract	Place	Description
02 Jan	N9577Z Volpar 7001	YD 3156	A/C was in climbout from Quang-Tri (V78) when pilot observed two men in separate small boats stand up and fire alternate automatic bursts at a/c. Pilot turned right and continued climb. No personnel injuries or a/c damage.
05 Jan	N1303X 204-B 7001	BT 0431	A/C was flying below weather when PIC heard a burst of small arms fire directed at the a/c. PIC immediately increased airspeed and departed area.
09 Jan	B138 C-46 7001	Vicinity of XT9903	A/C was being radar vectored to Tan-Son-Nhut IIS final approach on Heading 280 degrees 3 to 4 miles east of outer marker. Tracer fire was noted to the right (north) of the a/c. Twelve to fifteen rounds of white, golf ball sized tracers passed just beneath the right wing arching to the left above the wing. PIC turned off the rotating beacon and advised Approach Control of ground fire. No personnel injuries or a/c damage involved.
11 Jan	N394R PC-6 7001	BS 6358	Pilots only awareness of ground fire was when he felt impact of one round on left wing. Pilot maintained heading and increased altitude. Bullet pierced front edge of left wing causing minor damage.

PART II

- Situation Report -

During January enemy activity and movements were observed closely for indicators of enemy intentions during the traditionally active Tet holiday period the most critical time frame ~~was~~ being from late January to the middle of February. I Corps

ATTACHMENT "B"

and the Delta were shaping up during the month to become the focal points for pre-Tet activity; however, neither area was subject to the degree of activity predicated.

In northern I Corps pressure was maintained on Allied units below the central and eastern DMZ and logistical activity continued in the western provinces specifically into and around the A Shau Valley. Enemy units were reported in an advanced tactical position in the Danang-Hoi An City area prepared to launch coordinated attacks against friendly ~~ix~~ installations, refugee camps, and hanlets. An NVA regiment reportedly moved from southern I Corps to Quang Nam province (Danang area) to support these attacks. All indicators pointed for a high point of activity prior to Tet. On the night of 31 Jan - 1 Feb contact was made with an estimated three enemy companies SW of Con Thien (eastern DMZ area) and areas in southern I Corps came under attacks by fire. However, pre-Tet activity was not achieved to the degree anticipated and predications now call for a high point in I Corps following the Tet holidays.

In early January an NVA Division with all its elements moved into II Corps in the vicinity of Binh Dinh Province with the Pacification Program reported to be its primary target. Cam Ranh Bay, Phu Cat, and Phan Rang Air Bases came under attack during the month with light damage and no casualties reported. While much speculation was made as to possible pre-Tet activity, it now appears that an increase in activity can be expected in Binh Dinh, Pleiku, and Kontum Provinces following the Tet holidays due to large numbers of enemy troops in and near these three Provinces.

In III Corps the most significant increase in enemy activity came on the night of 20-21 January as 49 attacks by fire (ABF) were recorded against Allied positions throughout the Corps. One of the hardest hit of these targers was Song Be (V30) MACV Compound which received 90-100 rounds of 82mm mortar. It was hit again at 1350 on 21 January with an unknown number of 120mm mortar rounds which caused a fire destroying the ammo and POL dumps (AAM had an acft on the ground there at this time but sustained no damage). In what was described as "heavy" infiltration was reported coming from the Parrotés Beak and Angel's wing portions of the Cambodia border. Saigon was subject to a number of terrorists ~~ixx~~ incidents two of which involved explosions in movie theaters and three others taking place from one to six kilometers from Tan Son Nhut involving charges placed in jeeps parked near military installations. A post-Tet increase in activity can be expected in connection with the initiation of the first phase of the spring campaign. Northern III Corps and Central War Zone C will see activity. No specific mention has been made of Bien Hoa, Saigon, or Tan Son Nhut during the upcoming phase.

Recent enemy infiltration into the Delta, IV Corps, from the Crow's nest portion of the Cambodian border and a build up of troops along the north-western portion of the border gave rise to much speculation as to the enemy intentions during the critical Tet time frame. Cities mentioned targeted for activity included Chau Doc and My Tho. Since much emphasis is being placed on the Vietnamization Program here, it is considered likely that the enemy will attempt to discredit the ARVN and at the same time hit targets involving the Pacification Program. These attacks should come following the Tet holidays.

R.N. Begien III
OPSP SGN

M O N T H L Y R E P O R T

N H A - T R A N G

MARCH 1970

GENERAL

March proved to be a month of increased activity. This is a welcome change from the "doldrums" we had been experiencing. Revenue block time increased some 200 hours along with increases in all phases of activity.

The city remains "off limits" to all military personnel and the latest indication is that this situation will remain for an indefinite period.

The military situation remained quiet during March, however increased activity is expected during April.

TRAFFIC

Increased activity in all phases of the Traffic Department are shown in the attached statistics.

STATISTICS

PASSENGER	March	Feb.	1969
Departing	3627	2961	3411
Arriving	3372	3143	3407
Total	6999	6104	6818

CARGO

1. GROUND SERVICES (Lbs)

Departing	503,895	324,202	347,309
Arriving	266,492	122,947	284,187
Total	770,387	447,149	631,496

2. COMPANY CARGO (Lbs)

Departing	19,388	2,006	12,066
Arriving	9,122	3,846	22,315
Total	28,510	5,252	34,381

3. GRAND TOTAL (Lbs) (1+2)

Departing	523,283	326,208	359,375
Arriving	275,614	126,793	306,502
Total	798,897	453,001	665,877

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

Mr. B. KYSER, The 7002 Air Operations Officer, has returned to the United States and has been replaced by Mr. Holly Garrard, a new arrival from Conus. Our initial relations with Mr. Garrard are very good, and hopefully will remain so.

Relations with Mr. T. Lilly, 7001 Air Operations Officer remains unstrained and good. All previous problems on this front appear eliminated.

C069 relations continue to travel on an excellant plane.

OPERATIONS

A. COMMUNICATIONS

The last remaining problem area here is continued interference by the Usaid and/or other transmitters. Working with the 7001 customer, we will try to have them realign their XMTR and relocate their antenna. This will not guarantee an improvement but should help some.

B. FLIGHT FREQUENCY (See attached)

C. ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE COMPARISON

	March	Feb.	1969
Arrival	508	437	614
Departure	510	435	611
RON	207	201	340

D. DELAYS

Percentage on time	97%	99%	

SECURITY

No major problems.

PERSONNEL

See attached.

FISCAL

No major problems

LEGAL

No problems.

TECHNICAL SERVICES	March	Feb.	1969
1. Transient overnight	301	236	226
2. Overnight services	207	201	340
3. Engine changes	0	2	2
4. Propeller changes	0	0	1
5. No. I services	0	0	6
6. No. II services	0	0	1
7. Delays Maint/Mech	5	4	10
8. Intermediate services	0	0	1
9. A C F	7	2	16
10. Cutline recoveries	2	3	4
11. Accident report (A/C)	0	0	3
12. Accident report (PRL)	0	0	1

DAN LAWSON
SZ-MHA

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
MARCH 1970

I. GENERAL

1. SGN Base was honored by the visit of PRES and AVP on 26 and 27 March, as well as a follow-on visit by VPFO and DFD on 28 and 29 March. All departments gained much from an on-the-spot exchange from these gentlemen.

2. Total block time for March 1970 was 5910 hours as compared with 5482 hours in February 1970. The trend including performance so far in April, appears to be coming up.

3. The security situation in Saigon and RVN continues to improve with sporadic exceptions - - almost as good as Chicago and Washington.

4. Received a letter of termination for C-47 43-48084 (GFA) effective 1 April 1970 with a Call Order for Caribou B-851 effective 1 April 1970.

Due to possible other priority requirements for B-851, the Customer cancelled the termination on C-47 084 pending further developments.

5. Pictures attached were candid shots by BMSGN in our Saigon Shops area. I am very proud of the local Technical Services effort of over nine months to screen and train those pictured from coolies to Aircraft Technicians. In line with U.S. Government policy, we shall continue with follow-on programs. Meanwhile, we have 25 [redacted] Aircraft Technicians undergoing one year of intensive training in Tainan. This is an epoch-making endeavor never done before, by an American company in RVN. It also resulted in favorable press coverage previously reported.

6. The decision to close the Saigon hostel appears to be a wise one. We have issued only three Non-Availability Certificates from 25 March through 11 April 1970.

7. I cannot predict what will happen to our local economy as the trading rate goes up and buying-power of the piaster continues go down. It is now VN$450 to one U.S. Dollar. Sooner or later an adjustment in piaster pay scales might very well be in order.

8. There were NO MAJOR ACCIDENTS OR INCIDENTS in March to equal our February record. We have had one mishap since 1 January 1970 - a taxi accident. This is a vast improvement over our record last year when we experienced nine (9) accidents during the first three months.

II. CUSTOMER RELATIONS remain outstanding.

III. FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT
1. Forms "Fs" have been submitted for the Terminal Parking Apron, Renovation of MFD/SOM Bldg., Renovation of Various other Shops and Offices, and 204B Concrete Helicopter Pads for SGN. The customer has signed Form Fs for the improvement of the passenger lounge at Danang and also for Completion of Ramp Paving, and drainage ditch at Danang. MED SGN AR 69052 for an audiometric booth has been cancelled as the result of discussions with MFD and SMO. It was found that using existing facilities, failures of the audiometric test are extremely rare. If an individual should fail an audiometric test, he will be sent to the U.S. Air Force Clinic for further testing.

IV. GENERAL AFFAIRS
1. The company provided the Directorate of Civil Aviation with materials to reinforce the fences of its storage building for telecommunications equipment which has been the object of sporadic stealing recently.

2/ To build better relationship with the Government of Vietnam, a visit of AAM installations and Management by the Tan Son Nhut Airport Commandant and Staff was organized. Similar visit by other GVN agencies will be conducted in the near future.

3. Plan to improve company transient quarters up-country has been finalized and submitted to the Head Office for approval.

V. MEDICAL
Number of visits: 1341
Accidents: 51
Hospitalization: 7
Unhospitalization: 50
Outcalls: 1
Physical Examination: 34
Sick leaves: 235½

VI. PERSONNEL
1. After three long years, several meetings, countless revisions, the Gia Dinh Labor Service finally gave its seal of approval to our rules of Employment.

PM travelled to UTH to participate in the meeting called to discuss the terms of the agreement between the Company and the Far East Pilots Association.

2. Personnel Strength - Saigon Base

Classif.	[redacted]								Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
	38	130	130	13	138	2	12	4	318	149

Classif. [redacted]					Total	
Permanent	GRD	FLT	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	FLT
	498#	12**	2	2	1*	503	12

Temporary: [redacted] - 1 ; [redacted] - 1

Pre-processed: [redacted] 8

(*) : [redacted]
(**) :
(#) :

Ground Personnel: 831
Flight Personnel: 161
Total : 992

Da Nang Sub-Base

Classif. [redacted]					Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	4	13	18	69	104
Pre-processed :				1	1

Nha Trang Sub-Base

Classif. [redacted]					Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	3	11	23	59	96
Pre-processed:				1	1

Can Tho Sub-Base

Classif. [redacted]				Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	1	10	2	13

VII. TRAFFIC/AAM

1. During the month many difficulties with Immigration and Customs were encountered. Local officials desire to setup three control points within the Terminal for personal baggage check both outgoing and incoming, but the customer is strongly opposed.

2. Aircraft 912 arrived from HongKong with properly documented paperwork but with manifests showing only "Personal Effects" for some Customer HongKong purchases. The Customs people wanted to hold the aircraft and contents in bond until the individuals cleared the items.

One of the CORDS sponsored passengers on aircraft 084 failed to clear Immigration and caused some difficulty, which was cleared the next day.

	February	March
Passengers departure SGN (all contracts)	5,212	6,315
Passengers arrival SGN (All contracts)	5,958	6,997
Outbound cargo SGN	40,940	77,491
Inbound cargo SGN	39,849	127,260

TRAFFIC/USAID

	Cargo (including AF Caribou A/C)	
	February	March
Outbound (lbs) SGN	1,209,056	1,466,790
Inbound (lbs) SGN	491,550	414,349

VIII. OPERATIONS

1. Pres/TPE and AVP/TPE visited Saigon Base. The President was impressed with the new window in FOD overlooking the ramp and he suggested a study be made on the feasibility of installing a mirror outside which would enable us to view the departures from the Traffic Terminal. In conjunction with this requirement a study of closed circuit TV installation is being made.

2. [redacted] presently engaged in Operations Dispatcher OJT is progressing well. We expect her check out in routine operations by 1 June 1970. She will be the first female Flight Dispatcher in the history of Saigon Base.

The 7001 customer added VTB N7695C to the contract effective 1 April 70.

There were 13 controllable and 53 non-controllable delays with a total of 905 Saigon departures. This averages out to be 98.6% on time departures.

3. Flight time report (see attachment A)
Ground Fire Incidents report (see attachment B)

4. Accident reports

Date	A/C Type/No.	Location	Remarks
02	VTB/N3674G	V-193	R.H. engine flamed out and started smoking while taxiing to ramp after landing - F/O noted flame in tail pipe. R.H. engine fire bottle was discharged. A thorough inspection of the engine was made by maintenance and was found to be satisfactory. The cause of the engine flame out was not determined. The presence of smoke and flame in the engine exhaust tail pipe was possibly due to the residue of fuel in the Plenum Chamber and the failure to motor engine immediately after flame out.
22	VTB/N3674G	SVN operation exact location unknown	During overnight service found L.H. engine impeller blades damaged from foreign object damage. Foreign object damage was not determined.
	VTB/N6154U	SVN operation	On walk around after days flight, found R.H. engine first stage compressor blades have several deep nicks. Engine was satisfactory on previous overnight service. Foreign object damage source unknown. Continued emphasis on FOD is in progress.

5. Ground Transportation

Aggregate microbuses mileage	22661 km or 14163 miles
Microbuses down-time	216 hrs 06'
Microbuses pax carried	3188 pax
Isuzu Bus mileage	5792 km or 3620 miles
Isuzu bus down-time	31 hrs. 30'
Isuzu bus pax carried	10408 pax
Supply vehicle mileage	2147 km or 1341 miles
Supply vehicle down-time	45 hrs. 12'

6. Flying - The first half of the month was spent in anticipation of the Company/FEPA agreement and the last half in awe absorbing what was agreed upon. The FEPA agreement has been bolstered by the installation of transponders in the VTB aircraft. The transponders installation has done its share of raising morale. Our installation is running well ahead of schedule. Next item on the agenda to improve our lot - UHF.

MFDSVN with the BMSGN, PMSGN and MFASGN attended a meeting convened by the President at Udorn. This meeting attended by corresponding representatives from other bases, was to apprize all of the contents and interpretation of the FEPA agreement.

Our last operational 10-2 departed the station for Bangkok on 6 March. This leaves two 10-2s in storage for which there are no crews assigned. We have one Helio in storage for which we have no crews assigned or current.

IX. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. March was very productive and passed without a major problem. Several facility projects were completed and closed out.

2. We are trying to improve ground safety and general housekeeping. Two of these areas are (1) Employees walking across the East ramp at shift change with aircraft taxiing in/out of the same ramp. (2) Vehicle controls for possibly permitting a few managers to park their private vehicles behind the RMD hangar.

3. Regarding CTO accumulation, progress is being made in every department of Technical Services. The same equal attention has been applied to Home Leave and Annual Vacations.

4. The new elevated TSN airport water tower is not living up to our expectations - by any means. It is unable to supply all the water requirements of the few Airline users. Water supply lines are being turned off during the lunch period and also from about 1900L to 0600L every day, and we have to pump from our 50,000 Gal. underground reservoir, which must obtain its resupply from that same TSN tower.

2. Aircraft Maintenance - The aircraft maintenance activity was on the increase during the month with the resultant increase in work load which was generated by the higher number of aircraft departures and arrivals, engine changes and No.4B services on PC-6C N394R.

Ten aircraft departure delays were charged to maintenance during the month which has sharply increased over the month of February. Some of the delays appear to be beyond control of maintenance personnel however the majority were not and could be avoided if everyone concerned did put more thorough effort into aircraft maintenance.

3. Rotary Wing - This month we have been quite busy flying over 1000 hours and performing ten number two services, two No.3A services, one No.3B service, two high time engine changes and two engine changes with hot end inspections to facilitate turn around time.

A new Flight Mechanic Training Course started on the 30th and eleven TCN's were transferred into R/W Section for OJT.

4. Shops - Overall Shop activities remained on an even par. The number 4 service on PC-6 N394R was accomplished without any major problems.

5. Planning/Engineering - The Planning and Production Control Section pre-planned, scheduled and processed, for aircraft of all types; 503 overnight services; 28 number one services; 18 number two services; 7 number three services; 2 number 4 services; 5 annual inspections; 18 engine changes (4 for 204B); 7 propeller changes; 72 EA's; 33 SI's; 5 EI's; 237 time controlled components change on 204B; two T53 engine hot section inspections; 1 main rotor hub change; 3 DRR's and 160 shop work orders.

6. General Maintenance - Several moves have been made this month to better utilize existing space and enable the demolition of two shacks that have been eyesores for years. Offices affected in the moves were SGM, Technical Training offices, SAT, Accounting and Supply Storage. The Time Shack and Supply Storage (Rice Room) near the Operations Bldg were demolished. MSAFE was moved back to the BM Office.

Installation of porcelaine insulators for the 200 ^{2}mm power cable between the Utilities Building and the RGMD Complex is in progress.

7. Electronics - This month 15 ATC Transponder installations: 7EA PC6-34-2, 5 EA-VTB-34-9, 1 EA-C45-34-3 and 2 EA-204-34-2 were completed.

The project of in-country teletype circuits is dormant pending receipt of customers willingness or acknowledgement of intent to furnish the required land liner and circuit pattis at and betwwen SGN-DAD-NHA.

8. Technical Training - March had our Technical Training Department operating on a reduced schedule due to a shortage of two Instructors. However, no courses under instruction were dropped and the following courses were completed: Non-destructive Testing, Heat treating, Welding. Classes now in progress are: Management course, Helicopter Maintenance & Flight Mechanics course.

9. Quality Control - The month of March was about the same as the month of February. The work load has settled down on an even keel.

We had four Inspectors satisfactorily complete the four week Technical Training course on Non-destructive Inspection.

10. Stores Section - The closing of the hostel and tearing down of the C-Ration/rice room has placed a temporary burden on RSD as secured storage space needed for bulky items of this nature is becoming a scarcity.

11. Stock Control Section - During the month of March, Stock Control workload experienced a slight decrease as compared to previous months.

12. Customs - The Customs Agent continues to perform in an outstanding manner despite the never-ending petty and irritating problems which have to be faced daily. Thanks to his ability, fortitude and loyalty, he again managed to clear all commercially shipped Company cargo with celerity, thereby reducing any officially planned delays to a minimum.

13. Cycle Inventory - During the month of March, the Property and Inventory Unit completed cycle inventories of classes 01H and 01Q for a total of 738 line items. Also completed was property cycle inventory of A/C 1636 (A-D) for a total of 1242 line items. In addition to cycle inventories 173 property transactions were made.

E. J. Theisen
Base Manager - SGN

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT

MARCH

1. Contract 7001 -

A/C No.	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
N67984	181+02	147+09	1+43	1+15
N67985	111+23	98+03	3+50	3+29
B928	129+53	104+58		
B910	137+14	113+34	1+25	1+06
B912	89+32	73+04	9+27	7+49
6147	96+33	79+47		
8084	157+05	136+20	7+21	6+17
5559	122+14	103+03	0+54	0+35
5994	142+26	116+28		
B829	105+26	87+31	18+52	16+01
N539I	128+05	108+22	3+54	2+08
N544I	126+30	111+50	2+05	1+33
N9518Z	74+20	69+31	2+34	1+45
N61548	18+36	16+13	2+32	1+53
N99562	76+30	63+19	1+57	1+08
N7770B	80+58	69+49	2+17	1+55
N9577Z	52+24	43+45	6+29	4+57
N3674C	75+38	65+42		
N9664C	4+24	3+57	1+15	1+00
N91295	137+20	117+06		
N98382	141+03	120+27	0+40	0+30
N3728G	90+35	80+55	1+27	1+01
N7695C	2+28	2+19		
N180K	110+55	100+50	1+20	0+56
N285L	138+08	122+54		
N391R	2+57	2+28		
N394R	123+14	109+43	0+55	0+37
N9444	108+32	92+17		
N198K	24+18	22+35	3+55	2+41
N153L	126+02	108+17	6+53	3+52
N12450	53+45	46+48	3800	2+15
N7488	140+57	118+03	10+31	9+05
N152L	75+38	67+42	8+07	6+55
N184L	133+15	115+39		
N185K	38+15	36+07	2+26	1+40
N192K	96+47	80+23		
N194K	157+05	141+09	0+50	0+23
N393R	85+40	72+29		

M1303X	167+04	167+04	2+55	2+55
M1304X	128+38	128+38	6+05	6+05
M1305X	14+57	14+57	3+05	3+05
M1306X	134+45	134+45	2+25	2+25
M1307X	105+12	105+12	8+25	8+25
M8514F	111+14	111+14	8+37	8+37
M8535F	90+45	90+45	4+30	4+30
Sub total	4449+42	3923+01	142+51	118+28

2. Contract 7002

B928	11+03	9+08
6147	10+38	9+27
M539Y	14+06	10+49
M544Y	14+14	11+12
M95182	7+26	5+50
M61548	83+55	72+12
M9956Z	22+12	18+26
M77708	26+12	22+47
M95772	12+34	10+32
M36740	39+04	32+34
M96640	1+37	1+19
M91295	16+09	13+50
M9834Z	6+51	6+04
M37280	8+44	6+56
M180K	18+19	16+48
M285L	1+39	1+31
M391R	58+09	52+28
M394R	0+40	0+33
M9444	18+36	15+15
M198X	54+08	47+49
M153L	15+40	14+21
M12450	81+55	71+29
M748N	16+28	13+17
M152L	54+09	43+19
M184L	21+42	17+44
M185K	46+16	41+02
M192X	43+45	41+21
M393R	57+44	51+57
M1303X	11+18	11+18
M1304X	10+29	10+29
M1305X	96+19	96+19
M1306X	10+07	10+07
M1307X	33+50	33+50
M8514F	2+05	2+05
M8535F	33+59	33+59
Sub total	962+02	858+07

3. Contr act 7003

B928	16+34	13+09
B910	38+37	33+03
8084	5+48	4+50
8994	3+30	3+06
N539I	13+00	11+40
N544I	4+00	3+37
N777GB	1+29	1+09
N9577Z	2+14	1+22
N3674G	2+22	1+38
N394R	3+55	2+54
N9444	2+23	1+50
N198K	2+19	1+53
N153L	10+36	7+36
N12450	9+00	6+24
N748N	9+50	7+24
N184L	4+39	2+53
N192K	4+49	3+35
N194K	5+01	3+42
N393R	7+57	5+51
N1304X	14+57	14+57
N1305X	2+58	2+58
N1307X	44+06	44+06
Sub Total	218+04	179+37

4. Contract 0030

N9577Z	18+39	15+16
N393R	1+14	1+00
N1306X	0+45	0+45
N8514F	2+24	2+24
Sub Total	23+02	19+25

5. Contract 0069

N393R	7+17	6+29
N6154U	4+40	3+41
N9664C	97+20	87+41
N3728O	9+52	9+12
N7695C	0+56	0+47
N9956Z	0+08	0+00
B912	1+05	0+00
Sub Total	121+18	107+50

TOTAL REVENUE BLOCK TIME	5767+08
TOTAL REVENUE FLIGHT TIME	5088+41
TOTAL NON-REVENUE BLOCK TIME	142+51
TOTAL NON-REVENUE FLIGHT TIME	118+28
GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	5909+59
GRAND TOTAL FLIGHT TIME	5207+09

Flight Time by Type of Aircraft

Type of A/C	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
C-46	716+23	592+08	6+58	5+50
C-47	538+14	453+01	17+42	14+41
Bailed C-47	105+26	87+31	10+48	8+22
DHC-4	299+55	257+30	11+58	9+47
VIB	1117+40	964+50	21+16	15+22
Porter	1973+38	1717+49	38+07	28+24
204-B	1015+52	1015+52	36+02	36+02
TOTAL	5767+08	5088+41	142+51	118+28

Original Signed By
L. C. PARRISH
SOM/SON

FLIGHT INFORMATION CENTER

- SAIGON -

- MONTHLY ACTIVITY REPORT -
1 - 31 March 1970

PART I

- Ground-Fire Incidents -

Date	A/C No., Type & Contract	Place	Description
08 Mar.	N9577Z VTB 7001	BS510720	77Z was turning a right base for landing on runway 28 at V23 when the control tower requested he make a left 360 deg. turn. Entering the turn Capt. TURNER heard a chatter of automatic weapon's fire and felt the impact of one round against his a/c. Capt. TURNER continued the 360 deg. turn with no further incident. Inspection revealed the extent of a/c damage to be one round in through the right wheel well door and out through the engine exhaust. There was no personnel injuries.
12 Mar.	N3674C VTB 7001	BT309186	Capt. STOUDT was on final when he heard one small arms round pass near the a/c. No personnel injury or a/c damage involved.
16 Mar.	N1307X 204-B 7001	XR 3097	On landing at hotel pad PIC observed three rounds of 60mm mortar or 40mm grenades impact about 150 feet in front of a/c. PIC flew out immediately. 07X continued to operate in same area, but a safe distance from this pad. The PIC observed no further activity.
23 Mar.	N1303X 204-B 7001	BT 0534	While on climbout PIC heard groundfire directed at the a/c. PIC continued climbout and departed the area. No personnel injury or a/c damage involved.
31 Mar.	N1304X 204-B 7001	Vicinity of: XR 1494	While a/c was on the approach to an LZ, crew observed mortar fire in the vicinity of the LZ. PIC elected to go around and make his approach from a different direction. After landing, mortar fire impacted 100 meters from LZ. PIC immediately took off and departed the area. No personnel injury or a/c damage involved.

PART II

- Situation Summary -

During the early part of March all eyes here were focused on events transpiring on the Plain De Jars and in Cambodia. Reports were being received that the Cambodian Military Forces were pressuring the NVA to vacate their border by attempting to cut off enemy supply depots and transportation corridors. Enemy logistic activity was reported in all bordering provinces throughout RVN and increased terrorist/ sapper incidents were carried out in the larger cities for the second consecutive month (some 23 incidents in Saigon alone) most of which involved use of grenades thrown from motorbikes and small quantities of plastic charges targeted for allied and Vietnamese installations. On the evening of the 29th That-Son (V-173) in the Delta reported receiving an estimated 500 rounds of mixed mortar and rocket fire commencing what has turned out to be a country wide coordinated offensive (called a "highpoint" in military jargon) and what is believed to be another phase of the Spring Campaign. Attacks by fire and small unit ground attacks can be expected until the termination of this current phase of activity in early April

R N Begien III

Reported by: R. N. Begien III
OPSP/SGN

****

52574
501-08(6)

CIA CABLES:
INFO: J3-1 J5-1 SACSA-3 SECDEF-7 ASD/ISA-5
DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-8 CSAF-4 CMC-3 ASD/SA-1
FILE-1 (50) WJG/TP DA IN

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

...s United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Secs. 793 and 794, th... and possession is prohibited by law.

334893

301 14 592

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

0111302

CITE [redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

DIST 1 MARCH 1970

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI MARCH 1969

SUBJECT CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM DIRECTIVE ON TREATMENT AND DISPOSITION OF AMERICAN PRISONERS-OF-WAR

Deputy IPMG
Exec. Officer
Mgt-Svcs Off
Correction
MP Plans & Opers
Scty & Invgs

ACQ VIETNAM, BIEN HOA [redacted] FIELD NO.

1.3(a)(4)

SOURCE [redacted]

PW & ALLIED POLICE BRANCH
CHIEF
AR PRISONER OFF
ALLIED POLICE OFF
FOR AFFAIRS OFF

DISP
SECRET
FILE
DESTROY

5 Nov 70

1.3(a)(4)

DA IN 334893

IPMG

Approved for Release
Date August 1993

NND 927660-62

1.3(e)(4)

(classification) (dissem controls)

1.3(e)(4)

1. IN EARLY MARCH 1969, THE VIET CONG SUB-REGION (SR) 2 BORDER SECURITY BATTALION, WHICH WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR GUARDING THE CAMBODIAN BORDER ADJACENT TO SR-2, RECEIVED VIA SR-2 HEAD-

1.3(e)(4)

DA IN 334893

1.3(a)(4)

(classification) (dissem controls)

QUARTERS A CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM (COSVN) DIRECTIVE ON THE TREATMENT AND DISPOSITION OF AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR. THE DIRECTIVE, ISSUED BY COSVN'S MILITARY PROSELYTING SECTION, WAS READ TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE BORDER SECURITY BATTALION BY THE BATTALION'S POLITICAL OFFICER, CAPTAIN TU P H U O N G. HE PREFACED HIS READING OF THE DIRECTIVE BY STATING THAT IT PERTAINED TO AMERICAN PRISONERS ONLY. FOLLOWING A VERBATIM READING OF THE DIRECTIVE, PHUONG RELATED SR-2 HEADQUARTERS' SPECIFIC INSTRUCTION FOR THE BORDER SECURITY BATTALION AND ADDED HIS OWN COMMENTS.

1.3(a)(4)

2. ACCORDING TO THE DIRECTIVE, A GREATER EFFORT WAS TO BE MADE DURING THE BALANCE OF 1969 AND ALL OF 1970 TO CAPTURE AMERICAN SOLDIERS. ALL CAPTURED SOLDIERS WERE TO BE TREATED VERY WELL IN PREPARATION FOR THEIR EVENTUAL RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES. THEY WERE TO BE RE-INDOCTRINATED AND TO BE SHOWN THAT COMMUNISM OFFERS A BETTER WAY OF LIFE, BECAUSE THEIR "INEVITABLE" CONVERSION TO COMMUNISM WOULD BE OF GREAT

1.3(a)(4)

NND 927660-104

1.3(a)(4)

(classification) (dissem controls)

PSYCHOLOGICAL VALUE TO THE COMMUNIST CAUSE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE DIRECTIVE FURTHER INSTRUCTED ALL UNITS TO BE PREPARED TO MOVE AMERICAN PRISONERS TO THE COSVN HEADQUARTERS AREA IMMEDIATELY, WHERE THEY COULD BE TREATED AND FED PROPERLY, WHERE SECURITY WAS GOOD, AND WHERE THEY COULD BE MORE EASILY RE-INDOCTRINATED. THE DIRECTIVE ALSO WARNED THAT ANY MISTREATMENT OR KILLING OF AMERICAN PRISONERS WOULD RESULT IN STRONG DISCIPLINARY ACTION.

3. PHUONG THEN RELATED THAT AN UNNAMED OFFICER FROM SR-3 HEADQUARTERS HAD VISITED SR-2 HEADQUARTERS AND THAT AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED THAT ANY AMERICANS CAPTURED BY SR-3 WOULD BE BROUGHT TO SR-2 HEADQUARTERS. ALL PRISONERS FROM SR-2 AND SR-3 WOULD THEN BE MOVED FROM SR-2 HEADQUARTERS TO THE SR-2 BORDER SECURITY BATTALION FOR TRANSFER BY NIGHT THROUGH CAMBODIA TO THE COSVN HEADQUARTERS AREA. PHUONG REMARKED THAT HIS LISTERNERS SHOULD FEEL HONORED THAT THEIR BATTALION WAS SELECTED TO DELIVER THE PRISONERS TO COSVN HEADQUARTERS, AND THAT THEY SHOULD BE VERY CAREFUL WHEN MOVING THE PRISONERS. THE PRISONERS WERE TO BE GUARDED AT ALL TIMES AND WERE TO BE WELL FED WHEN THEY ARRIVED AT

1.3(a)(4)

MEMORANDUM

TO : BM/SGN

DATE: 04 March 1970

REF. No. SZDAD/70/025

FROM : SZ/DAD

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for February 1970

GENERAL

Reports of hostile activity during the month of February were limited to one small ground probe of the airbase perimeter and minor mortar attacks directed at Marble Mountain, about ten miles south of Danang. No increase in enemy activity was apparent during the TET holidays.

No Southern Air Transport flights transited Danang during the month.

Inauguration of the utilization of transiting international flights for the shipment of Danang originating or terminating cargo is now pending an interpretation of a certain customs form. Although this form ostensibly is to approve the payment of overtime to customs inspectors, it appears to also include provisions for supplying them transportation and an agreement to comply with any terms the Director of Customs may deem necessary.

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

At the request of AID a joint meeting was held between company, AID and Embassy to determine the feasibility of formulating written procedures to govern the routine aspects of the operation. No agreement was reached due to the differences between the AID and Embassy policies and methods.

LEGAL

The hostel [redacted] was vacated on 9 February. The remaining hostel is presently layed out to provide accommodations for fifteen personnel, but could be modified to increase this capacity slightly.

The normal complement of RON flight crew personnel dropped to seven for a two week period when the DAD/SGN early morning departure C47 flight was rescheduled and the Embassy 204B was reassigned temporarily to another location. However, due to revised scheduling, and the return of this 204B, thirteen RON crew members will again be required and additional hostel capacity may be desireable to handle contingencies. Hostel accommodations are no longer being provided for China Air Lines flight crews on a routine basis.

FACILITIES

No further information has been received concerning AID plans to renovate the CSD warehouse into a passenger terminal/flight operations office. One difficulty reported is that Embassy will not provide positive assurances that the building will not be required in the future for cargo storage purposes.

The status of the Concrete Paving/Drainage Ditch and the Passenger Terminal Renovation projects remains indefinite.

FISCAL

[redacted] payroll for the month totaled: [redacted]

Petty cash expenditures totaled: 40,225$VN

OPERATIONS

Revenue flight time declined substantially in February as compared to any previous month. Contributing factors included poor weather, the rescheduling of flights on the part of AID, reduced Embassy requirements, the lack of flying over the TET holidays and only one 204B being assigned during the last half of the month. Prospects for March are a little more encouraging although Embassy is not forecasting any significant increase in flying.

The following is a breakdown of flight time generated by this station during February:

VN-70/AID	501+50
VN-70/Embassy	148+18
0030	6+16
0069	4+18
Non-Revenue	2+30
TOTAL	663+18

Revenue losses for the month were as follows:

Weather	12+45
Maintenance	11+00
Customer Cancellation	Nil
Other	Nil
TOTAL	23+45

The Old Hostel occupancy factor was: 65%.

COMMUNICATIONS

Interference on HF was again pronounced and reception ability was reduced accordingly during several periods. On one day it was necessary to relay all message traffic thru Nha-Trang. Since both the Saigon and Danang improved transmitting antennas are in operation, better reception than experienced was expected.

The Monkey Mountain remote VHF/UHF relay was out of service approximately thirty six hours due to maintenance on the power supply.

Three ATEA telephone/intercom instruments are presently out of service due to broken dial gears. COMEMG/SGN has been requested to procure or fabricate replacements.

Incoming and outgoing messages totaled 1527 and 1771 respectively.

TRAFFIC

Traffic workload did not decrease significantly in February as had been expected. In fact, a projection of passenger handlings reveals a greater number of departing passengers in February as compared to January.

Passenger and cargo statistics for the month are as follows:

	PAX IN	PAX OUT	CARGO IN	CARGO OUT
VN-7001/AID	2,182	2,198	207,050	239,775
VN-7002/EMB	554	652	350	11,391
0069	-	3	-	-
0005	-	-	-	-
0030	1	3	-	-
AAM	79	90	2,819	12,964.7
TOTAL	2,816	2,946	210,219	264,130.7

SECURITY

A general increase in air base security measures threatened to create problems for all personnel not in possession of valid pass in gaining access to the base. For a few days Americans were stopped at the gates to produce identification. Fortunately no company employees were unduly detained.

The VNAF Security Officer has stated that effective 1 March, even flight crew personnel in uniform must have a valid pass (many of which will expire in March). However, to date this policy has not been enforced.

PERSONNEL

Another personnel reduction was accomplished in February involving Security Guards, Hostel Maids, and GTD drivers. However, the cost savings will be offset almost completely by the recent increase in meal per diem authorized for American flight crew personnel.

A potential problem may develop with the local immigration authorities concerning a requirement that non-indigenous personnel have their passports and extension of stay documents in their possession for possible residence checks. Compliance with this requirement, if enforced, will lead to serious consequences since employee passports are held in Saigon most of time for processing visas, work permits, extensions of stay, et cetera.

The personnel breakdown at Danang Station at the close of business, 28 February 1970, was as follows:

	[redacted]			
Permanent	4	13	18	72
Pre-Process	0	0	0	1
Temporary	1	0	0	0
Daily-Hire	0	0	0	0
TOTAL (109)	5	13	18	73

TECHNICAL SERVICES

RMD handled a total of 539 arriving and 542 departing flights, as compared to 603 and 606 respectively in January. Delays attributable to maintenance totaled three. Only three number 1 services were performed, all on 204B aircraft. Two aircraft were placed on AGP status during the month.

RGMD expended at total of 616 manhours, of which 250 were utilized in the maintenance or improvement of leased properties. Since MFA/SGN has advised that company furnished materials and supplies are required for all building maintenance and upkeep, with the exception of the USAID warehouse, additional projects of this nature will be commenced in March.

Original Signed by
WINSTON C. CAMBRE

Winston C. Cambre

cc: file

MEMORANDUM

TO : BM/SGN

DATE: 04 March 1970

FROM : SZ/DAD

REF. No. SZDAD/70/025

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[redacted] payroll for the month totaled: 1,131,330$VN

Petty cash expenditures totaled: 40,225$VN

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Original Signed by
WINSTON C. CAMBRE
Winston C. Cambre

cc: file

MEMORANDUM

DATE: 13 March 1970

REF. No. BMSGN/70/83

TO : AVP-TPE

FROM : BM-SGN

SUBJECT : Monthly Report

Saigon Base Monthly Report for February 1970 is forwarded in three copies for your file.

Comments concerning Customer Relations was overlooked in the attached report. This oversight will be corrected in suceeding reports. Meanwhile Customer Relations remain unbelievable - good, that is.

E.J. Theisen

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
FEBRUARY 1970

I. GENERAL

1. Total block time for February was 5482 hours vs 6332 hours in ~~December~~ January.

2. VN-70 Customer (USAID/CORDS)terminated C-47 (GFE)43-16083 and C-47 (CFE) B829 effective 1 March 1970 due to failure to attain prescribed minimum on C-47 aircraft. C-47 083 is now in temporary storage at Tan Son Nhut.

3. Effective 28 February 1970, Beech N7950C was dropped from the ARPA (0030) contract and replaced with VTB N9577Z on 1 March 1970. N7950C was ferried to BKK on 6 March.

4. C-46 B912 will be substituted for B146 on 10 March after receiving No. 3 service at Tainan.

5. In view of the foregoing, the Saigon fleet stands at 49 aircraft vs 78 aircraft two years ago, with one C-47 #083, one VTB #695C, two 10-2s #622C and #77Y, and Helio #B849 in temporary storage. 41 aircraft comprise the active (basic) fleet on contract with C-46 #984, Porter #152L and C-47 #B829 carried as spares.

Two helicopters N8514F and N8535F were sent to UTH for TCS 18-28 February 70 at customer direction.

6. There were no major flying accidents in February 1970.

7. Our pilots continue to look sharper each day due to recent improvement in uniform by adding shoulder insignia and "scrambled eggs" to the hat shield. I observe the "duck tails" and sideburns getting shorter gradually. Attached are pittures of MFD Tidwell and Senior FEPA Representative SGN, Capt Zurla. I sincerely feel we must go one step further in the professional appearance of our pilots: Stay-pressed "wash and wear" pants of good quality plus an "Arrow Decton" type stay-pressed shirt. It has been my observation that if we dress our pilots up like gentlemen they tend to act that way both on and off the job with an improved professional performance.

8. Proposals to upgrade upcountry hostel facilities are being formalized to forward to AVP in the very near future. FEPA has participated with us and their recommendations have been considered..

9. The rising "free market" rate of 180 MPC to one USD and 400 piastres to one USD is having a marked effect on local economic conditions. Also merchants and local business men are taking into account the

strong rumor that the piastre will soon be devalued. They either delay any further business transactions while they wait to see what happens, or attempt to "make a deal" at an exorbitant price.

II. FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT

1. The hotest facility development projects are AR/69/055 "Renovations of Operations Building" ($20,605), and AR/69/054 "Renovation/Relocation of various AAM Shops and Offices" ($6,170). These ARs were forwarded to BCO TPE in October 1969. Priority approval would resolve a long standing problem of inadequate working environment due to past customer resistance to approving development of a new Operations/Administrative facility. With the accomplishment of the two cited ARs, Saigon Base will finally achieve an efficient working environment for all activities and provide a long standing facility requirement (i.e. locker and shower room) for pilots.

III. GENERAL AFFAIRS

1. Cost of living - Prices go on increasing amidst strong and sustained rumors that the piastre will soon be devalued. These rumors were based on the following indicators:

a. Forecast of GVN-financed import program for 1970 is lower than that of 1969. The reason being, as the US is pulling out, GVN funds of US Dollars accruing from the sale of piastres to the GI and Army's contractors is decreasing.

b. The commercialized import program (American aid) and P.L. 480 (US agricultural surplus products) may remain unchanged or slightly increase but far from being adequate to offset GVN increase spending, as a result of Vietnamisation of the war (particularly defense spending).

2. The piastres generated by these import programs and the resulting tax normally accounts for almost half of the total Government revenues. With these sources of revenues decreasing, the budget deficit estimated at 50 billions piastres is likely to be greater. More and more money will be chasing fewer and fewer goods.

3. The government efforts to bring rice from the rice surplus area (the Mekong delta) to the rice deficit area (Central VN and the highland) has failed. The farmers deliberately postpone sale in anticipation of higher price in the near future. Price of gold is officially fixed at 12,000 piastres per tael but the market price is VN$20,000. The black market rate for the green dollar and the MPC reached an all-time high of VN$400 and VN$180 respectively.

IV. SECURITY

1. Rumored public disturbances - None

2. Historical or customary dates & particulars forthcoming demonstration - None.

V. MEDICAL
Number of visits: 1069
Accidents: 80
Outcalls: 8
Physical Examination: 13
Sick leaves: 210

VI. PERSONNEL
1. A very routine month, with one exception: the TNN Training Program Candidates finally departed. We kept quite busy ministering to their last minute needs and assisting in their preparations for departure.

2. Personnel Strength - Saigon Base

Classif.	[redacted]								Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
Permanent	38	130	131	12	137	2	13	4	319	148

	[redacted]								Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
Permanent	524#	13**	2		2		1*		529	13

Pre-Processed: 8 1**

Temporary: [redacted]

GRD
1

(*) : [redacted]
(#) :
(**) : [redacted]

Ground Personnel: 857
Flight Personnel: 162
Total : 1019

Danang Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]				Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	4	14	19	72	109

Nha Trang Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]				Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	4	11	24	62	101

Can Tho Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]			
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
	1	10	2	13

VII. TRAFFIC/AAM

	January	February
Passengers departure SGN (all contracts)	6,356	5,212
Passengers arrival SGN (all contracts)	6,542	5,958
Outbound cargo SGN	91,938	40,940
Inbound cargo SGN	87,330	39,849

TRAFFIC/USAID

Cargo (including AF Caribou A/C)

	January	February
Outbound (lbs) SGN	1,458,201	1,209,056
Inbound (lbs) SGN	450,007	491,550

VIII. OPERATIONS

1. There were 16 controllable and 77 non-controllable delays with a total of 937 Saigon departures. Early morning Saigon ground fog continued to be the major factor in the non-controllable delays.

FIC, GTD and the Emergency Equipment Room are in good order.

2. Flight Time Report (see Attachment A)
Aircraft Incidents Report (See Attachment B)

3. Accident Report

Date	A/C Type/No.	Location	Remarks
16	DHC-4, N544Y	Noted at SGN after last trip of day	R.H. nose gear outer rim damaged. Suspect from piece of rock/large stone or the edge of bent-up PSP during days operation.
22	C-46/N67985	CORDS Warehouse Ramp	Driver attempted to pass under left wing of aircraft - Forklift impacted aileron resulting in minor damage. Driver was issued a written reprimand - Two days suspension.

4. Ground Transportation

Aggregate microbuses mileage	20601 km or 12875 miles
Microbuses down-time	184 hrs 12'
Microbus pax carried	3242 pax
Isuzu bus mileage	4556 km or 2847 miles
Isuzu bus downtime	54 hrs
Isuzu bus pax carried	10490 pax
Supply vehicle mileage	1504 km or 940 miles
Supply vehicles down-time	108 hrs

5. Flying The month brought many changes in supervisory personnel and instructor pilots. Considerable F/O training was accomplished during this month. We had (DHC-4) and C-47 initial ground school coverage. The realization of equitable flying time and duty time among our American First Officers is slowly approaching.

FEPA still is in the "lime light" with negotiations continuing at Tokyo. There was a strong threat of a standdown beginning on 20 Feb. Proper negotiations on part of the company must have been accomplished as the threat of a standdown was averted. The morale of our pilots are at an all time high with great expectations on the part of the negotiations taking place.

Morale of the VTB pilots has improved tremendously with an increase in flying time in the program.

The most significant item for the month was that it was a totally accident/incident free month.

IX. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. February was a good month with Maintenance Delays far less than January. It does indicate improvement in Maintenance quality.

We are now screening several of our TCN's who have responded to our request for 204B Flight Mechanic Trainees.

We recently finalized a formal Training Program for upgrading [redacted] employees working in the Supply Dept at Saigon. The intent is to utilize the Supply Trainee course that was developed by Tainan.

2. Aircraft Maintenance - The general activity and work load have further declined during the month, which has resulted in a low total number of aircraft departures and arrivals.

The completion of No.4B service on Porter N285L was delayed by several days due to late return of several overhauled components from the Main Base and also the nonavailability of some of the items in stock.

3. Rotary Wing - Flight time was down somewhat for the month because of Tet holidays and the temporary transfer of N8514F and N8535P to Udorn for 10 days.

Transponders are now installed in all but one 204B, however with no spares available it's rather difficult to maintain these units as no repairs are allowed at Regional Stations.

4. Shops Overall Shop activities remained on an even par.

The USFAA Inspection Authorization (IA) activities increased during the month with Annual Inspections on two Porters and one Volpar.

5. Planning/Engineering - The Planning and Production Control Section pre-planned, scheduled and processed, for aircraft of all types; 493 overnight services; 17 number one services; 19 number two services; 2 number three services; 3 annual inspections 6 engine changes (1 for 204B); 6 propeller changes; 85 EA's; 30 SI's; 4 EI's 137 time controlled components change on 204B; one T53 engine hot section inspections; 1 main rotor hub change; 1 main transmission change; and 204 shop work orders.

6. Utilities Maintenance - The TSN Airport well pump broke down for 5 days during this month and PMD had to revert to reinstallation of water pumps in the well near the Operations Bldg, as a source of water.

7. Electronics - This month must be registered as one of much accomplished EA, EI, SI to SVN base aircrafts.

A total of 13 ATC Transponder installation was completed. This brings to a total of 26 aircrafts equipped with transponders in SVN.

8. Technical Training - The following courses were completed during February: Auto Maintenance, Non Destructive Testing. Courses were in Progress: Ground Equipment and Aircraft Welding. Four FAA Oral & Practical A&P examinations were conducted.

Fifteen [redacted] Trainees were sent to Tainan for the International Line Service Mechanic's Course. The remaining ten Trainees should depart within the next few days.

9. Quality Control - Four Inspectors have satisfactorily completed the Technical Training Course on Non-Destructive Inspection.

The number 4 service on PC-6 N285L was completed this month with no major problems encountered for this dept.

10. Supply - The relocation project is still underway. The tools sale display cabinets fabrication and installation was completed early this month. The relocation of the Tool Crib Issue Window, now next to the Main Issue Window was completed too. Both Stock Control Section and Shipping & Receiving Section have maintained a smooth and normal function.

E.J. Theisen
Base Manager - Saigon

ADDENDUM

FISCAL

1. Customer Relations - Contract VN-70 has dropped two C-47 as of 1 March 1970 and also notified us they plan to drop the C-46 on the CAL sub-contract.

2. Budget Matters - Total net reduction of personnel during the two month period was 34. The monthly presentations of cost data continued to generate a lot of interest in our progress. Evaluation of monthly salary costs indicates almost all departments have made significant progress in reducing costs this fiscal year. For example total salary costs for April 1969 were $779,934 while total salary costs for December were $595,622 for a total reduction of $184,312.00. We are looking hard at remaining pooblem areas to see what further improvements can be made.

3. Exchange Rate - No change has occurred in the official exchange rate for piastres. Rumors abound or to the possibility of devaluation although no one can give us any definite information as to when or how much. Meanwhile the Black market rate continues to rise. Latest information is VN$400 to US$1.00.

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT

FEBRUARY 1970.

1. Contract 7001 –

A/C No.	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
N67964	133+45	110+53	13+19	10+17
N67985	156+29	131+04	7+33	6+31
B910	138+13	114+22	16+26	13+30
B928	124+36	105+13	12+44	10+48
B146	126+16	102+19	4+33	3+46
6147	66+09	51+02	22+58	19+46
6084	123+52	107+26		
5559	92+43	79+03	1+08	1+00
5994	67+03	51+07		
B829	121+41	102+28	4+04	3+15
6083	114+26	95+35	2+55	2+28
N539Y	124+17	109+23	22+36	20+54
N544Y	72+39	60+02	2+58	2+36
N9518Z	97+38	84+51	8+23	7+34
N6154U	56+40	50+43	4+51	3+37
N9956Z	144+22	129+26	1+57	1+34
N7770B	31+55	27+44	6+07	5+13
N9577Z	100+04	84+14	2+06	1+25
N9838Z	85+04	72+32	2+39	2+10
N3728G	86+20	69+50		
N9664C	1+51	1+31		
N3674G	110+10	92+20		
N7695C	24+25	20+09		
N91295	87+44	76+00	2+08	1+42
N285L	62+36	53+23	1+26	0+52
N391R	100+24	87+54	1+14	0+30
N394R	15+13	12+34		
N9444	125+35	109+49	1+34	0+51
N198X	64+22	62+50		
N153L	110+37	103+20	2+53	2+15
N180K	15+02	13+54	1+05	0+57
N12450	128+19	113+28	0+30	0+16
N748N	107+32	91+27	11+35	9+34
N152L	57+34	47+11	6+17	5+18
N184L	120+51	104+56	0+35	0+22
N185K	12+18	11+42		
N192X	9+06	8+27		
N393R	106+32	105+07		
N194X	96+56	83+26	2+46	2+15
N1303X	178+26	178+26	9+10	9+10
N1304X	122+07	122+07	5+30	5+30
N1305X	95+14	95+14	2+20	2+20

M1306X	74+19	74+19	12+05	12+05
M1307X	25+30	25+30	1+30	1+30
M8514F	51+18	51+18	1+20	1+20
M8535F	50+41	50+41	2+30	2+30
Sub total	4027+54	3536+20	203+45	175+41

2. Contract 7002 -

B146	3+39	3+19
M544X	29+32	25+17
M9518Z	2+37	2+09
M6154U	39+43	33+29
M9956Z	0+44	10+38
M7770B	47+23	40+20
M9577Z	22+53	20+12
M9838Z	4+16	3+40
M3728G	21+33	17+46
M9664C	8+15	7+07
M3674G	7+41	6+39
M7695C	31+51	27+49
M91295	17+54	15+22
M285L	20+40	15+34
M391R	25+13	21+27
M394R	41+58	37+14
M9444	7+56	6+57
M198X	62+14	59+42
M153L	21+34	17+22
M180X	42+34	37+12
M748N	27+23	21+49
M152L	9+07	8+17
M184L	5+55	5+27
M185K	107+18	101+12
M192X	52+50	48+30
M193R	4+09	4+06
M194X	33+42	29+08
M1303X	1+00	1+00
M1304X	2+14	2+14
M1305X	27+38	27+38
M1306X	2+00	2+00
M1307X	77+39	77+39
M8514F	81+34	81+34
M8535F	76+02	76+02
Sub total	968+41	885+51

3. Contract 7003 -

B910	6+58	5+57
B928	1+34	1+00
B146	10+48	8+55
6147	7+47	4+52
5994	10+41	6+59
M9518Z	4+00	3+39
M9577Z	0+59	0+48
M9838Z	3+09	2+15
M3674G	1+59	1+21
	2+42	2+16

N393R	2+28	1+47
N391R	4+50	3+51
N9444	15+25	11+32
N153L	1+08	0+55
N748N	1+09	0+56
N152L	1+53	0+53
N393R	2+45	1+53
N1306X	36+46	36+46
N1307X	5+10	5+10
N8535F	16+30	16+30
Sub total	139+54	118+55

4. Contract 0030 -

N7950C	48+37	39+20
N1303X	1+11	1+11
Sub total	49+48	40+31

5. Contract 0069 -

N9664C	79+47	70+07
8084	4+26	3+56
N3728G	7+15	6+55
Sub total	91+28	80+58

TOTAL REVENUE BLOCK TIME	5277+45
" " FLIGHT TIME	4662+35
TOTAL NON-REVENUE BLOCK TIME	203+45
" " FLIGHT TIME	175+41
GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	5481+30
" " FLIGHT TIME	4838+16

Flight Time by Type of Aircraft

Type of A/C	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
C-46	702+18	583+02	54+35	44+52
C-47	487+07	400+00	27+01	23+14
Bailed C-47	121+41	102+28	4+04	3+15
DHC-4	230+28	198+21	25+34	23+30
VIB	1128+07	968+53	28+11	23+15
10-2	48+37	39+20		
Porter	1634+08	1445+12	29+55	23+10
204-B	925+19	925+19	34+25	34+25
TOTAL	5277+45	4662+35	203+45	175+41

L. G. Parrish
SCM/SCM

FLIGHT INFORMATION CENTER

- SAIGON -

- MONTHLY ACTIVITY REPORT -

1 - 28 February 1970

PART I

- Ground Fire Incidents -

Date	A/C No., Type & Contract	Place	Description
01 Feb.	N6535F 204-B 7001	XR 1192	After take off from an outpost, the PIC heard heavy small arms fire directed at the a/c. Capt. BASHAM immediately made a sharp left hand turn and departed the area. No a/c damage or personnel injury involved.
06 Feb.	N1305X 204-B 7002	XR 3196	As a/c was on touchdown at LZ, Capt. CASE observed ground personnel running for cover. After hurriedly disembarking six RD troops, the PIC immediately took off observing mortar fire in the LZ as a/c gained altitude. No a/c damage or personnel injury involved.
17 Feb.	N1304X 204-B 7001	BT 1050	As a/c was climbing, the PIC observed tracer fire to the rear of a/c. Capt. WINSTON changed course and departed the area. No a/c damage or personnel injury involved.

PART II

- Situation Summary -

Light enemy activity prevailed during the month of February. Acts of terrorism in Saigon and the uncovering of rice and weapons caches highlighted this months reports. Some fourteen terrorist/sapper incidents were reported in Saigon which included the shooting and subsequent wounding of a MACV courier who was proceeding down Pasteur Street shortly before sunrise on the 8th. Some twelve hours later an estimated twenty pound charge detonated at the corner of Tu-Do and Le-Loi Streets

PART II

- Situation Summary - (Con't) -

on top of the VN Press Club resulting in extensive damage but no casualties. On the 27th a terrorists placed a ten pound charge near the wall of the metropole BEQ resulting in 4 WIA and minor damage. Two km SE of MACV headquarters, a USAHAC bus entering the intersection of Vo-Tanh and Truong-Tan-Buu Streets received one round of sniper fire wounding a USN Petty Officer.

Allied forces reported discovering enemy caches in the Central highlands, III Corps, and the Delta. Certainly one of the biggest finds of the war was uncovered at Ran-Rang (VL48) where to date 169 tons of various types of rifles, mortars, rockets, and munitions have been unearthed at 33 different cache sites. In addition to munitions and weapons, large numbers of picks, shovels, and entrenching tolls (manufactured in India) were recovered as well as bicycles, medical supplies, radio equipment, clothing, detonating cord (533, 525'), rocket motors (139) and rocket warheads (16). Of particular interest is how and when this amount of supplies reached an area 45 miles from the closest point of the Cambodian border. Analysts estimate that some of the material had been in place less than three months and that some storage bunkers were constructed less than six months ago. The supplies were in good condition with no sign of deterioration. While it is believed the supplies were transported via what is know as the JCILEY Road to what extent vehicles were utilized is undetermined. Interestingly enough local newspapers report that a herd of some forty elephants were sighted at the cache site six months ago and another herd of some ninety elephants five months later.

for R. N. Begien III
OPSP/SGN

PHNOM PENH IS SERIOUSLY CHALLENGING SIHANOUK'S POWER

Sihanouk is returning to Cambodia to reassert his authority in the wake of unprecedented attacks against the Vietnamese Communist embassies in Phnom Penh. The sacking of the North Vietnamese and Provisional Revolutionary Government diplomatic installations by thousands of students caps a period of growing anti-Communist sentiment and has produced the most serious crisis to date in Cambodia's relations with Hanoi and the Viet Cong.

There is no doubt that the attacks, which protested the presence of Vietnamese Communist troops on Cambodian territory and the forthcoming visit of North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, were government inspired. The assaults in the capital were preceded and followed by anti - Viet Cong demonstrations in several provinces, and portions of the Vietnamese community in Phnom Penh also were objects of mob actions. The attacks received the unanimous support of a special session of both houses of the Cambodian legislature, which passed a declaration asking the government to take all measures necessary immediately to solve the problem of Viet Cong infiltration.

The Cambodian chief of state has curtailed his scheduled visits to Prague, Moscow, and Peking and notified the Queen that he is returning to Cambodia to call for a referendum, asking the people and the army to choose between himself and "those personalities" who organized the sieges on the embassies on 11 March. He threatened to step down if he loses; he has used such threats in the past to quiet domestic criticism.

Sihanouk's decision to return abruptly is a clear sign that he interprets these events as a strong challenge to his authority. Sihanouk and the government have been at odds for some time, but the assaults on the Vietnamese represent the first overt attempt by the government to undermine his foreign policy. Although Sihanouk has led the criticism of Vietnamese Communist activities in Cambodia, he has taken some pains to avoid pressing the Communists too far.

It is still not clear what government leaders hoped to achieve by the attacks. By playing on traditional Cambodian animosity toward the Vietnamese, they may have wanted to confront Sihanouk on an issue on which popular opinion would be against him. They may also, however, have miscalculated Sihanouk's reaction. Until now, the government's strategy has been to limit Sihanouk's power slowly and carefully. They must now decide whether to meet Sihanouk head on or give ground. Much will depend on how hard Sihanouk presses them and whether individuals like Deputy Prime Minister Matak, who has led the anti-Sihanouk forces, calculate that they can count on firm and continuing support from those forces. (CONFIDENTIAL)

NND 941536 --3794



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NND 941536 --- 379

BANGKOK STIFFENS EFFORTS AGAINST MALAYSIAN COMMUNISTS

Thai security forces, operating under Bangkok's newly reorganized security command in the south, are exerting more pressure along the Malaysian border against the Communist Terrorist Organization (CTO). The Thai Government, responding to rising domestic criticism of increased banditry and Communist terrorist activity in the southern provinces, late last year ordered its civilian-military Communist Suppression Operations Directorate (CSOD) to take over security responsibilities in the south. CSOD's newly appointed regional commander, who set up his headquarters in January, has indicated that he intends to step up operations against the CTO along the border as well as against Thai Communists. A gradual increase in minor contacts with CTO elements attests to greater Thai patrolling efforts.

In early March, Thai security forces in the border region may have ended their past practice of avoiding contact with the well-ensconced CTO units when they overran a major CTO base camp. It was their largest skirmish to date with the Malaysian Communists. Although discovery of the camp--believed to have been the headquarters of the CTO 8th "regiment"--was mostly accidental, Thai commanders were quick to commit substantial reinforcements to the fray, which claimed a dozen casualties on each side. Although poor Thai tactics allowed the 200 defending guerrillas to escape, a precedent for future actions may have been set.

As part of its pressure on the CTO, Bangkok has responded to Malaysia's long-standing effort to expand the limited border agreement that has governed joint border security operations between the two countries since 1965. The two governments announced last week the signing of a new agreement that for the first time allows Malaysian military forces to cross the border in "hot pursuit" of guerrillas and to operate five miles inside Thailand for a 72-hour period. Kuala Lumpur took immediate advantage of this concession by launching a sizable sweep operation into Thai territory. The agreement also provides for a new bilateral headquarters to facilitate joint security operations.

In spite of their increased aggressiveness, it remains to be seen if Thai security forces will mount a serious military challenge to the well-armed 1,300-man CTO military organization. Bangkok has yet to make a credible effort to counter the CTO's well-developed political infrastructure among the predominantly Muslim and Chinese border population. Although Malaysian leaders have not forgotten Bangkok's traditional lethargy in dealing with the CTO and are less than fully satisfied with the terms of the new border agreement, they are hopeful that the recent Thai actions are a sign of greater willingness to cooperate. (SECRET)

NND 941536 --- 379

China's Absent Leaders

Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung and his designated heir Lin Piao have once again slipped into the shadows. This time they have been publicly inactive for five months. In fact, aside from three ceremonial appearances in October 1969, they have been out of the public eye since last April and May, when they appeared in connection with the Ninth Party Congress.

Mao, now 76, may well be slowing down, but there have been no reports that his current absence has been caused by ill health. Instead, it appears that infrequent public appearances have become a style of leadership in China. Although Chou En-lai and several other leaders have appeared frequently, about one half of the politburo has failed to make a public appearance yet this year.

Adding to the impression of aloofness from Mao is the fact that he has entirely stopped turning out "latest instructions," pronouncements which played such an important part in Peking's propaganda during the Cultural Revolution. The last such instruction was originally issued in September as a National Day slogan without attribution to Mao, but later propaganda described it as Mao's own composition.

Despite his public inactivity, Mao may be very active behind the scenes. He presumably is following the Sino-Soviet border talks closely and he may also be receiving various provincial leaders in private, as he has over the past several years. (CONFIDENTIAL)

CHINA: Public Activity of the Politburo Members (as of 10 March 1970)

	Currently Active	Out 1 Month	Out 2 Months	Out 4-5 Months
Standing Committee	Chou En-lai	K'ang Sheng	Ch'en Po-ta	Mao Tse-tung Lin Piao
Full Members	Huang Yung-sheng Ch'en Hsi-lien Chang Ch'un-ch'iao Li Hsien-nien Hsieh Fu-chih	Hsü Shih-yu Tung Pi-wu Wu Fa-hsien Ch'iu Hui-tso	Chiang Ch'ing Yao Wen-yüan Li Tso-p'eng	Liu Po-ch'eng Chu Te Yeh Ch'ün Yeh Chien-ying
Alternate Members		Li Te-sheng Chi Teng-k'uei		Li Hsüeh-feng Wang Tung-hsing

NND 941536 --- 379

M O N T H L Y R E P O R T
N H A - T R A N G
APRIL 1970

GENERAL

The month of April began with a bang and ended very quietly. Nha-Trang airbase was hit twice during the first week of April. The airport lost part of the fuel depot while one round impacted within two hundred feet of the C. house killing one and wounding two Vietnamese.

Business however, slacked off a bit from last month which was the high month for 1970 so far.

TRAFFIC

Traffic activities remained normal throughout the month with a decrease in aircraft handeling and workload felt. Attached statistics relate the situation.

STATISTICS

PASSENGER	April	March	1969
Departing	3529	3627	3500
Arriving	3261	3372	3522
TOTAL	6690	6999	7100

CARGO

1. GROUND SERVICES (Lbs)

Departing	685,471	503,895	376,229
Arriving	159,376	266,492	234,530
TOTAL	844,847	770,387	610,759

2. COMPANY CARGO (Lbs)

Departing	4,736	19,388	17,337
Arriving	4,511	9,122	24,735
TOTAL	9,247	28,510	42,072

3. GRAND TOTAL (Lbs) (1+2)

Departing	690,207	523,283	393,566
Arriving	163,887	275,614	259,265
TOTAL	853,094	798,897	652,831

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

Relations with all customers remain good to excellent - No problems here.

OPERATIONS

A. Communications

The latter side of the UHF ground station repeater broke down and remained out for the better part of the month. Parts and tubes were obtained and the unit is now operational.

We still receive interference and background noises on the HF and SSB receivers. Our next approach is to relocate the COMM antennae.

B. FLIGHT FREQUENCY (See attached)

C. ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE COMPARISON

	April	March	1969
Arrival	480	508	573
Departure	479	510	571
ACN	193	207	324

D. DELAYS

Percentage on time	95%	97%	

SECURITY

No major problems. Two Guards are to be transferred to the Ground Services contract this next month.

PERSONNEL

A decrease of two TCN and one [redacted] personnel came about through the transfer of two and the surplusing of one employee. A continued planned decrease can be expected next month - (See attached chart for totals)

Continued effort is being placed on reducing outstanding CTC, but we are reaching the point where it is difficult, and in some cases impossible, to release persons for CTC without incurring more. Nevertheless we plan to further reduce this company obligation.

FISCAL : No problems.

LEGAL : No problems.

TECHNICAL SERVICES

		April	March	1969
1.	Transient overnight	287	301	449
2.	Overnight services	193	207	324
3.	Engine changes	0	0	11
4.	Propeller changes	0	0	1
5.	No. I services	0	0	5
6.	No. II services	0	0	1
7.	Delays Maint/Mech	5	5	17
8.	Intermediate services	0	0	1
9.	AOG	4	7	21
10.	Outline recoveries	2	2	3
11.	Accident report (A/C)	1	0	3
12.	Accident report (PAL)	0	0	0

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

Dan Lawson

DAN LAWSON
SE-NFA

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
APRIL 1970

I. GENERAL

1. Total block time for April was 5880 hours as compared with 5910 in March and 5482 in February.

2. The security situation in Saigon remains calm with a few more incidents than occurred last month. On 30 April at 0555L a satchel charge exploded at a military billet within 80 yards of the BM House wounding several military personnel and breaking glass in houses across the street. Except for rattling the occupants, there was no damage to the BM house. There has, however, been an upsurge of demonstrations (three in the last two-one-half weeks) which keeps downtown Saigon at a standstill while they are going on. The last series of demonstrations were by students, veterans and militant monks over the war, land reform, and greater recognition. Like dissident demonstrators all over the world, they had nothing constructive to offer to society — only criticism.

3. VPFCA advises Caribou B851 is still being considered for assignment to Saigon from Udorn. The VN-70 customer is still interested in this aircraft.

4. Our major Accident/Incident rate is fortunately still holding up with only one mishap since 1 January 1970 — a taxi accident on 3 January.

II. CUSTOMER RELATIONS have never been better.

III. Facilities DEVELOPMENT

1. Form F's have been approved by customers on Renovation of Operations Building plus Relocation of various Shops and Offices. Approval has been received from Taipei to proceed on these projects. Form F's have also been submitted to the customer for :

a. Terminal Parking Apron - SGN
b. 204- Helicopter Pads - SGN
c. Improvement of Passenger Lounge - DAD
d. Completion of Ramp and Drainage - DAD

I expect no action on these pending availability of FY 71 funds to the Customers. I am confident all the above will ba approved except "d" and that "g" will be reduced in scope.

IV. GENERAL AFFAIRS
See attachment.

V. MEDICAL

Number of visits:	1191
Accidents:	92
Hospitalization:	2
Unhospitalization:	90
Outcalls:	4
Phys. examinations:	28
Sick leaves:	154

VI. PERSONNEL

1. Personnel department activities were routine in nature, the only exception being PM's Company business trip to TPE at mid-month. APM at month's end, departed for HKG, TPE, LAX and NYC for a period of about two months. He is expected to return in early July.

2. General information - The RVN Ministry of Labor is trying, albeit unconsciously, to aid and abet the Company's cost reduction program they have begun to disapprove Work Permit applications submitted on behalf of some of our TCN employees and have been requiring these employees to leave Vietnam. It is a little too soon to tell just how many Work Permits will be disapproved. However, we do not feel that the situation will become critical since we do have the right of appeal, through and with the support of the U.S. Embassy.

3. Personnel Strength - Saigon Base

Classif.	[redacted]								Total	
Permanent	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
	37	130	128	13	137	2	10	4	312	149

[redacted]								Total	
GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
490≠	12**	2		2		1*		495	12

Temporary: [redacted] 1 ; [redacted] 1

Pre-processed: [redacted] 15

(*) : [redacted]
(**): [redacted]
(≠) :

Ground Personnel	:	824
Flight personnel	:	161
Total	:	985

Danang Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]						Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
Permanent	4		13		17		68	102
							1	1
Pre-processed								

NhaTrang Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]						Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
Permanent	3		10		23		59	95
							1	1
Pre-processed								

Cantho Sub Base

Classif.	[redacted]			Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	1	10	2	13

VII. TRAFFIC/AAM

1. The general flow of passengers and cargo continued at a normal rate with little difficulty encountered in the day to day operation.

2. This office has accepted the administration of the APDs during the absence of the MAPS and also is assisting the SAT arrivals and departures.

3. This is the occasional complaint of a passenger of items missing from their luggage when checked thru Air America. The majority of those losses reported are jewels, money and other hi-value items left in open or unlocked baggage which no doubt is a strong temptation to personnel with a limited income. We had our Security pull a spot check of the laborers lockers but did not uncover any customer items. The possibility remains that item was either not placed in the baggage or that it was removed by someone other than airline personnel.

	March	April
Passengers departure SGN (all contracts)	6,315	5,606
" arrival SGN "	6,997	6,573
Outbound cargo SGN	77,491	61,215
Inbound cargo SGN	127,260	68,369

TRAFFIC/USAID

Cargo (including AF Caribou A/C)

	March	April
Outbound (lbs) SGN	1,466,790	987,032
Inbound (lbs) SGN	414,349	425,494

VIII. OPERATIONS

1. C-47 revenue flying time was approximately 172 hours less than the previous month. The customer gives no indication that we can expect an increase in C-47 time.

2. There were 21 controllable and 27 non-controllable delays with a total of 891 Saigon departures. This averages out to be 97.0% on time departures.

FIC and the Emergency Section remain in good order.

3. Flight time report (see attachment A)
Ground Fire Incidents report (see attachment B)

4. Accident reports

Date	A/C Type/No.	Location	Remarks
04	C-46/N67984	Danang	Minor scratch across the bottom left aileron (approx 17" x 3/4" very light) noted during walk around at Danang prior to flight. Investigation revealed that the scratch resulted possibly as the result of a refueling truck attempted to drive under the outboard wing area. Continued emphasis on safe driving of vehicles in the vicinity of aircraft is being emphasized.
20	VTB/N91295	V-17, SVN	1/16" bend in one of first stage compressor blades found during pre-flight No. 2 engine. Cause: small piece of engine inlet duct, at leading edge, broke off and contacted speed check blade. After a thorough inspection aircraft was released for flight. SI issued for inspection on Engine Air Inlet Duct for cracks.
24	VTB/N91295	Cantho	During inspection damage was noted to the No.2 eng. seven each first stage compressor blades. Investigation revealed that a small part of the speed probe had separated and caused the damage to the first stage impeller. Two dents and heavy scratches on the remaining portion of the sensor indicated damage first caused by an unknown hard object possibly while operating in up-country fields.

5. Ground transportation

Aggregate microbusses mileage	24642 km or 15401 miles
Microbusses downtime	288 hrs 30'
Microbusses pax carried	3264 pax
Isuzu bus mileage	6291 km or 3931 miles
Isuzu bus down-time	33 hrs 48'
Isuzu bus pax carried	10394 pax
Supply vehicle mileage	2817 km or 1760 miles
Supply vehicle down-time	11 hrs

6. Flying

1. Another month accident free A great precedent and a good one, is being set. All will agree it is most gratifying to enjoy such a position.

2. MFD/SVN spent three days at Vientiane in Air Drop orientation. How qualified he became is a matter of conjecture, he got a "SHACK" one day and a "PANEL" the next. Overall the training received was most beneficial.

3. In general the morale of the pilots is very high. Few complaints are in evidence on the hostel at Danang and the Quarters at Cantho. The hostel at DAD is in the process of planning for renovation. The Customer at Cantho is to be approached regarding the facilities there.

IX. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. The installation of Transponders in our SVN aircraft was completed this month to give us the satisfaction of beating the schedule by several weeks.

2. The flow time on the Porter aircraft AB Services has leveled off at eight days. The first one turned out in January 1970 was scheduled at ten days. Further improvement will probably come at a slower rate, depending upon the application of experience and the development of methods and procedures.

3. Facilities improvements and development are reduced to a low level. Work is continuing on several projects, such as improvement of the water and power systems, and providing employee recreational facilities, etc; however, most activities are confined to reshuffling and maintaining that which we already have on hand.

4. MTS/SVN Boyd Messecher departs 1st May on Home Leave for four months.

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

Fixed Wing
The work load has slightly decreased during the month of April.

On turbo-prop aircraft several isolated cases of engine and airframe components malfunctioning were encountered. Several engines were changed due to oil leak at the front and rear carbon seals, low oil pressure, internal malfunction of torque system, low power output and one engine was changed due to FOD.

The first phase of training on the Management-Development Course has been completed by the group of twenty persons comprising Leadmen, Crew Chiefs and Supervisors. The second and the last phase will begin during the next month. A very favourable response has been shown by those attending the classes.

Rotary Wing
The month of April was quite busy, flying over 1050 hours and performing eight number 2 services, 1 number 3A service, 2 number 3B service, 2 Annual Inspections and 1 high time engine change.

Preplanning to cover the DAD heavy services with the present limited number of qualified Supervisors becomes quite a problem when flight schedules cannot be spaced to spread out the work load, as consistantly happens. The heavy vacation/home leave requirements contribute to that coverage problem.

Shops
Overall Shop activities remained on an even par. The USFAA Inspection Authorization (IA) activities were at a normal pace. The following aircraft underwent Annual Inspections and were recertificated: 204B N1305X, PC-6 N180K and C-46 N67984.

Planning/Engineering
DPLNG Mr. Burkett visited with us for 4 days in the last part of April. His visit was very beneficial to us.

General Maintenance
The deteriorated water pipe supplying the Personnel/Traffic Area is being replaced.

The installation of larger power cables between GMD and the Main Transformer Building is complete with the exception of Terminal lugs.

The extension of the revetment wall adjacent to the Operations Bldg by 12 feet is complete. This was required after the old "Mice Room" Shack was torn down.

The TSN water well is still marginal due to the dry season and we are forced to supplement the supply from the well in front of operations. The Airport Commandant has been queried as to the plan of action he is taking to supply the amount of water agreed upon.

Electronics

There has been a sigh of relief, that SVN easily met, and beat, the dates of completion for ATC Transponder installation. This was the project of AR 9053.

Two EA-PC6-34-2 and one EA-VTB-34-9 installation were completed for this month. This brought the project of AR 9053 to completion.

Technical Training

The following courses were completed during the month:

- Non-destructive Testing
- Basic Helicopter course
- Management Course (supervisor)

Courses now in progress:

- Management course
- 204B Helicopter flight mechanic
- Supply course

This month our training facilities increased by one small classroom. This room is now in use for small classes, meeting and FOT.

Supply

During this period, RSD/SGN held the first formal Supply Training Course ever conducted at a Regional Station. Due to work requirements the class was limited to six [redacted] Classes were organized and instructed by [redacted] from TNN with the help of STT/SGN. Because of the excellent results of the course a new class will start during May with again six more [redacted] students. Classes with the second course will be conducted by RSD Supervisors and Technical Training Instructors.

This was also a heavy month for Customs clearance, with his usual dispatch, and despite the daily increasingly stricter regulations, the Customs agent was able to clear the commercially shipped cargo again with minimum delays.

During the month, the Property and Inventory Unit completed cycle inventory of class 02H for a total of 505 line items. Also completed was property cycle inventory of A/C 1636 (E-Z) for a total of 542 line items. In addition to cycle inventory, 52 property transactions were made.

X. HOSTEL OCCUPANCY

From 25 March 1970 (Hostel COB) to the end of this month, nine Certificates of "non-availability of company furnished accommodations" were issued.

Original signed for SMSGN by
L. O. PARRISH, SOM/SGN

E. J. Theisen

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT

APRIL 1970

1. Contract 7001 -

A/C No.	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
N67984	130+12	104+25	10+02	8+37
N67985	165+05	134+48	8+13	6+59
B928	142+28	114+30	9+55	7+44
B910	119+28	99+28	9+00	7+18
B912	120+58	97+47	13+14	11+46
6147	83+51	64+20		
8084	118+53	97+41	1+56	1+45
5559	62+46	52+03		
5994	154+33	129+37		
B829	65+18	53+30	18+41	14+28
N539Y	154+05	130+44		
N544Y	167+10	147+48		
N9518Z	124+37	106+51	10+43	8+48
N6154U	94+40	84+09		
N9956Z	17+51	14+15	8+01	6+04
N7770B	95+57	84+08	3+07	2+14
N9577Z	7+38	6+08	13+07	10+40
N36740	60+07	52+00	2+24	1+20
N9664C			15+49	14+31
N91295	84+15	69+13	0+46	0+41
N9838Z	98+56	84+09	2+17	1+33
N3728G	66+42	58+37		
N7695C	68+22	59+24		
N180K	123+03	109+58	1+17	0+40
N285L	174+34	154+43	0+45	0+41
N391R	13+17	10+25	0+59	0+21
N394R	114+37	103+22	1+04	0+52
N9444	111+26	92+42	0+54	0+34
N198X	7+30	6+45	1+25	0+40
N153L	64+33	53+10	0+42	0+34
N12450	57+35	52+36		
N748N	32+46	112+28	3+34	2+24
N152L	55+19	44+34	16+59	15+26
N184L	46+27	127+33	8+34	7+14
N185K	12+52	27+30	1+57	1+07
N192X	15+24	74+27	1+03	0+32
N194X	114+04	104+44	7+45	6+33
N393R	87+31	72+55		
N1303X	121+34	121+34	2+30	2+30
N1304X	77+47	77+47	9+20	9+20

	N1305X	128+24	128+24	6+15	6+15
	N1306X	53+19	53+19	4+19	4+19
	N1307X	150+29	150+29	1+00	1+00
	N8514F	77+15	77+15	6+35	6+35
	N8535F	120+25	120+25	2+15	2+15
	Sub-total	4264+39	3722+40	331+49	282+19

2. Contract 7002 -

B928	9+22	7+49
N539Y	3+37	2+38
N544Y	4+22	3+27
N9518Z	6+24	5+23
N6154U	31+19	26+50
N9956Z	32+33	28+14
N7770B	25+31	22+07
N3674G	12+50	10+40
N91295	15+29	13+33
N9638Z	10+29	8+45
N3728G	44+41	36+55
N7695C	44+54	39+14
N180K	15+20	13+36
N391R	40+03	35+10
N394R	9+12	8+21
N9444	2+16	1+46
N198X	66+27	53+16
N153L	71+09	64+18
N12450	34+50	30+29
N748N	18+27	15+50
N152L	46+19	36+18
N184L	21+39	18+16
N185K	49+55	40+26
N192X	72+29	66+55
N194X	28+18	23+50
N393R	61+37	56+47
N1303X	19+00	19+00
N1304X	30+26	30+26
N1305X	31+40	31+40
N1306X	87+09	87+09
N1307X	9+21	9+21
N8514F	53+15	53+15
N8535F	34+07	34+07
Sub-total	1044+30	935+51

3. Contract 7003 -

B910	8+45	7+18
B912	15+07	12+16
5559	5+38	3+33

B829	1+18	0+55
N539Y	11+47	10+00
N544Y	4+45	3+48
N9956Z	6+16	4+17
N7770B	3+19	2+22
N9577Z	0+56	0+39
N91295	7+28	4+51
N9838Z	4+54	3+31
N3728G	2+07	1+24
N7695C	2+13	1+48
N180K	2+30	2+05
N285L	1+08	1+07
N394R	3+46	2+34
N9444	4+40	3+50
N748N	6+23	4+44
N152L	3+49	3+02
N184L	1+19	1+07
N185K	1+17	0+57
N192X	74+54	69+19
N194X	2+02	1+42
N393R	3+32	2+39
N1304X	3+28	3+28
N1305X	3+22	3+22
N8535F	18+06	18+06
Sub-total	204+49	174+44

4. Contract 0030 -

N9577Z	55+14	48+57
N7770B	1+54	1+30
N7695C	2+24	2+05
Sub-total	59+32	52+32

5. Contract 0069 -

N9664C	70+06	59+50
N391R	8+23	7+51
N152L	5+40	4+48
N185K	33+00	29+22
N6154U	4+54	4+29
N9956Z	4+22	3+55
N3674G	3+21	2+56
Sub-total	129+46	113+11

Total Revenue Block Time	5703+16
Total Revenue Flight Time	4998+58
Total Non-Revenue Block Time	331+49
Total Non-Revenue Flight Time	282+19
GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	6035+05
GRAND TOTAL FLIGHT TIME	5281+17

Flight Time by Type of Aircraft

Type of A/C	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
C-46	711+25	578+21	77+37	65+11
C-47	426+17	347+14	3+52	3+30
Bailed C-47	66+36	54+25	22+39	17+37
DHC-4	345+46	298+25		
VTB	1112+43	953+09	100+54	83+13
Porter	2021+22	1748+17	73+19	59+20
204-B	1019+07	1019+07	53+28	53+28
TOTAL	5703+16	4998+58	331+49	282+19

L. G. Parrish
SOM/SGN

"Attachment A"

cc: BM/SGN
MFD/SGN
TM/SGN
File.

FLIGHT INFORMATION CENTER

- SAIGON -

- MONTHLY ACTIVITY REPORT -

1 - 30 April 1970

PART I

- Ground Fire Incidents -

Date	A/C No., Type & Contract	Place	Description
3 Apr.	N1305X 204-B 7001	VS 9854	A/c was on approach to helipad when PIC heard moderate small arms fire. No personnel injury or a/c damage involved.
3 Apr.	N1305X 204-B 7001	VS 9746	A/c was on approach to helipad when PIC heard automatic weapons fire - a goaround was made and cargo was dropped at another location. No personnel injury or a/c damage involved.
8 Apr.	N1307X 204-B 7001	AT 9928	A/c was enroute to VH576 when crew observed 6 to 8 tracer rounds pass a/c of the a/c. No personnel injury or a/c damage involved.
15 Apr	N8514F 204-B 7001	XU 7413	A/c was on takeoff when PIC heard one round of sniper fire pass near the a/c. A/c continued climbing and departed the area. No personnel injury or a/c damage involved.
17 Apr	N184L FC-6C 7001	XT 7689	A/c was on let down a quarter of a mile from approach end rwy 05 at HON QUAN (V133) when PIC and pax noted a slight bump. Capt MARKHAM landed safely and later proceeded to VO1 where a post flight inspection revealed that the a/c sustained one small caliber round which had entered the forward edge of the left horizontal stabilizer shattering the main spar exiting through the rear horizontal stabilizer. No personnel injury involved.
28 Apr	N130TK 204-B 7001	BT 310187	PIC heard one round of small arms fire while sling loading cargo to a drop zone. Flying below weather in mountainous terrain, Capt HEINL reports no damage involved, but believes the sling load may have been hit.

PART II

- Country Situation -

The enemy's first phase of the summer campaign got underway here on the first of April with a significant rise in enemy activity being reported throughout the country. Terrorists and rocket attacks were compounded by student and disabled veterans demonstrations in Hue, Saigon and My-Tho causing disruption in the National Assembly, the Palace, and several Embassies. In NW II Civilian Irregular Defense Camps at Dak-Seang and Dak-Pek sustained almost three weeks of concentrated enemy rocket and ground attacks. Nha-Trang reported 500,000 gallons of JP-4 and 3,000 gallons of diesel fuel were destroyed by rocket fire. Da-Nang received a total of twenty-five rockets during the month while Saigon received a total of 8 in two separate attacks on the city the first taking place on the 13th when a Vietnamese school was hit near the U.S. Embassy as was as a movie theater. One rocket landed on the number three tennis court of the Cercle Sportif Saigonnaise leaving a gaping six foot deep hole twelve to fifteen feet in diameter. This attack was followed by another three days later when a U.S. Special Services library sustained rocket damage while two other rockets landed in a residential area. Reports from the Delta of sea infiltration of personnel and supplies into the U-Ming Forest were substantiated by sightings of Sampans off the coast of the U-Ming unloading uniformed personnel and supplies.

Press reports from the Delta of ARVN incursions into Cambodia to assist the Lon Nol Government were followed by reports of Cambodian authorities indiscriminately executing Vietnamese Nationals in an effort to weed out the NVA who have infiltrated the Vietnamese community in Cambodia. This further exacerbated local unrest as Vietnamese students occupied the vacant Cambodian Embassy in Saigon to protest these actions. There is little likelihood of a let up in activity next month in view of reports of a second pahse of the summer campaign planned to coincide with Buddas' and Ho-Chi-Mings'.birthday on 19 May.

R N Begien III

Reported by: R. N. Begien III
OPSP/SGN

"Attachment B"

GENERAL AFFAIRS

1. Following Airport Commandant and staff's visit of AAM, an Air Vietnam made up of:

Vice President [redacted] (the President [redacted]
[redacted] being hospitalised due to an automobile accident)
Technical Director [redacted]
Technical Training [redacted]
Assistant to the President [redacted]

made a similar tour of our installations after an informal lunch with company management at VNAF officers club.

During the tour, they were briefed on various departments' activities with particular emphasis on technical training. They saw the nine Vietnamese female aircraft mechanics at work in our metal shop and were very impressed.

Technical Director [redacted] expressed the desire of sending 2 or 3 technicians to attend our training courses for possible assignment as instructor after graduation.

2. The Directorate general of taxation has agreed in principle to reimburse taxes levied on meal and transportation allowances for Vietnamese employees for the period prior to 13 September 1969, the date on which exemption of these taxes were granted.

MONTHLY REPORT
NHA-TRANG
APRIL 1970

GENERAL

The month of April began with a bang and ended very quietly. Nha-Trang airbase was hit twice during the first week of April. The airport lost part of the fuel depot while one round impacted within two hundred feet of the SZ house killing one and wounding two Vietnamese.

Business however, slacked off a bit from last month which was the high month for 1970 so far.

TRAFFIC

Traffic activities remained normal throughout the month with a decrease in aircraft handeling and workload felt. Attached statistics relate the situation.

STATISTICS

PASSENGER	April	March	1969
Departing	3529	3627	3580
Arriving	3261	3372	3522
TOTAL	6890	6999	7100

CARGO

1. GROUND SERVICES (Lbs)

Departing	685,471	503,895	376,229
Arriving	159,376	266,492	234,530
TOTAL	844,847	770,387	610,759

2. COMPANY CARGO (Lbs)

Departing	4,736	19,388	17,337
Arriving	4,511	9,122	24,735
TOTAL	9,247	28,510	42,072

3. GRAND TOTAL (Lbs) (1+2)

Departing	690,207	523,283	393,566
Arriving	162,887	275,614	259,265
TOTAL	853,094	798,897	652,831

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

Relations with all customere remain good to excellent - No problems here.

OPERATIONS

A. Communications

The transmitter side of the UHF ground station repeater broke down and remaind out for the better part of the month. Parts and tubes were obtained and the unit is now operational.

We still receive interference and background noises on the HF and SSB receivers. Our next approach is to relocate the CORDS antennae.

B. FLIGHT FREQUENCY (See attached)

C. ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE COMPARISON

	April	March	1969
Arrival	480	508	573
Departure	479	510	571
RON	193	207	324

D. DELAYS

Percentage on time	95%	97%	

SECURITY

No major problems. Two Guards are to be transferred to the Ground Services contract this next month.

PERSONNEL

A decrease of two TCN and one indigineous personnel came about through the transfer of two and the surplusing of one employee. A continued planned decrease can be expected next month - (See attached chart for totals)

Continued effort is being placed on reducing outstanding CTO, but we are reaching the point where it is difficult, and in some cases impossible, to release persons for CTO without incurring more. Nevertheless we plan to further reduce this company obligation.

FISCAL : No problems.

LEGAL : No problems.

TECHNICAL SERVICES

		April	March	1969
1.	Transient overnight	287	301	449
2.	Overnight services	193	207	324
3.	Engine changes	0	0	11
4.	Propeller changes	0	0	1
5.	No. I services	0	0	5
6.	No. II services	0	0	1
7.	Delays Maint/Mech	5	5	17
8.	Intermediate services	0	0	1
9.	AGF	4	7	21
10.	Cutline recoveries	2	2	3
11.	Accident report (A/C)	1	0	3
12.	Accident report (PML)	0	0	0

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

Dan Lawson

DAN LAWSON
SZ-NHA

MEMORANDUM

TO : BM/SGN

DATE: 04 April 1970

FROM : SZ/DAD

REF. No. SZDAD/70/037

SUBJECT : DANANG Station Monthly Report for March 1970

GENERAL

No significant incidents of hostile activity were reported during the month of March. However, in the early morning of 1 April, two 122mm rockets impacted on the Danang Air Base. No casualities were sustained as a result of these explosions. There has been a generalized increase in overall security measures in the Danang area and increased enemy activity has been forecast by several sources.

One Southern Air Transport flight was handled by the station on 2 March.

The local customs office has agreed to the deletion of the ground transportation and generalized compliance with instructions provisions of their overtime authorization form. This information has been communicated to GAM/SGN and it is anticipated that approval to sign the form will be received shortly.

The sale of commodities in bulk quantities (cases of soft drinks and milk) to [redacted] personnel by the snack-bar was discussed with the USAF Base Commander. It was agreed that this practice would be discontinued and such sales have now ceased. A moderate renovation on the snack bar was accomplished by the NCO club during the last three days of March.

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

The local CORDS Air Operations Officer has voiced some interest in attempting to gain approval to embark and disembark customer passengers at Danang on company international flights. Apparently these flights are utilized to a certain extent by I Corps based personnel on R&R and such an arrangement would eliminate the need for travelling to Saigon to board the aircraft. The matter has been referred to customer channels in Saigon for action.

LEGAL

Tentative plans have been formulated to renovate the present company hostel and to expand same to include the adjacent Station Manager's residence. Should this plan be implemented, SZ/DAD will have to relocate to other quarters. Preliminary investigations indicate that with the recent reduction in the value of the piastre, suitable accommodations would cost approximately 40,000$VN per month in rent.

FACILITIES

It is understood that the pro forma ARs for the Danang concrete Paving/Drainage Ditch Completion and Passenger Terminal Renovation projects have now been approved. Further action on these facilities improvements are presently pending approval of the required Forms F.

If funds are provided, a customer decision will be necessary to determine which of the two passenger terminal improvement projects under consideration will be selected. Renovation of the CSD warehouse is still pending a release of the building from the Embassy.

FISCAL

The Grand Hotel, Danang, has agreed to extend credit to the company when rooms are required for flight crew personnel. Previously, it was necessary to make cash payments in advance when insufficient space was available in the company hostel. Room vouchers will be issued by flight operations when required.

[redacted] payroll for the month totaled: [redacted]

Petty cash expenditures totaled: 34,530$VN

OPERATIONS

As anticipated, revenue flight time returned to normal in March as compared to the depression in February. After two passenger flight schedule changes by CORDS, a morning departure, direct Saigon, was re-established utilizing C46 equipment, which requires this aircraft to ROM daily. It is not utilized on Sundays, since an alternate flight schedule with a C47 out of Saigon is substituted that day of the week. Apparently the C46 load factors are being closely monitored by the AID customer to determine if daily C47 service might be sufficient.

The following is a breakdown of flight time generated by this station during March:

VN-70/AID	788+08
VN-70/Embassy	182+07
0069	7+31
0005	Nil
Total	977+46

Revenue losses for the month were as follows:

Weather	23+50
Maintenance	13+30
Customer Cancellation	2+10
Other	Nil
Total	39+30

The hostel occupancy factor was 84%. During the month a total of 7,400 piastres were disbursed to provide hotel accommodations for flight crew personnel. Non-availability certificates for a total of 41 nights were issued to TCS ground personnel.

COMMUNICATIONS

Minor interference problems continue to be experienced on HF, but overall radio communications were satisfactory.

Incoming and outgoing messages totaled 1634 and 1758 respectively.

TRAFFIC

Discussions with SRTM/SVN indicate that reasonable progress is being made towards the eventual procurement of a set of cargo weighing scales. The processing of the Danang AR was delayed somewhat to permit consolidation with the same requirement at Nha-Trang.

Passenger and cargo statistics for the month are as follows:

	PAX IN	PAX OUT	CARGO IN	CARGO OUT
VN-70/AID	2,613	2,479	222,123	301,013
VN-70/Embassy	534	613	4,060	4,946
0069	-	6	-	-
0030	8	5	-	-
0005	-	-	-	-
AAM	71	110	13,706.4	41,567.1
TOTAL	3,226	3,213	239,889.4	347,526.1

SECURITY

Authorization was obtained from the VNAF security office to permit the scheduling of one GTD driver until 2100 hours daily. Previous to this approval it was necessary to have non-driver personnel operate company vehicles when transportation requirements generated past 1900 hours.

At least until the end of April, no problems with air base passes should be encountered. All ground personnel now have valid passes although some are only for temporary duration. To date, flight personnel have not been required to produce valid passes on entering the base.

PERSONNEL

Both CM/DAD and SOR/DAD returned from home leave in March.

Expected problems with the local immigration authorities did not materialize. No employee has reported being subjected to a residence check or being required to produce his passport for any reason. It is often difficult to determine whether or not various prerogatives of the local authorities will be exercised.

PM/SGN has advised that work permit applications for certain job titles are being closely scrutinized by the Ministry of Labor. Such a permit has already been disapproved for one Danang based TCN employee. It appears as though the Vietnamese Government is now making a concerted effort to require the replacement of non-technical TCN personnel with local nationals.

Since the closing of the "New Hostel" company provided accommodations have not been available to TCS ground personnel. Although not great in number, Scale B and Vietnamese personnel assigned TCS to Danang confirm that the present per diem rates are insufficient to meet living expenses on the economy.

The personnel breakdown for Danang Station at the close of business, 31 March 1970, was as follows:

[redacted]

Permanent	4	18	13	70
Pre-Process	0	0	0	1
Temporary	0	0	0	0
Daily Hire	0	0	0	0
TOTAL (105)	4	18	13	71

TECHNICAL SERVICES

RMD handled a total of 593 arriving and 591 departing flights, as compared to 539 and 542 respectively in February. Delays attributable to maintenance, which resulted in a revenue loss, totaled: 2. Five heavy (four number 1, and one number 2) services were performed on 204B aircraft. Five aircraft were placed on AGP status during the month, and two outstation recoveries were necessary. No engine changes were required but on VTB propeller was changed due to blade damage.

Maintenance services were requested by the pilots of two non-company aircraft. After coordination with SGN it was agreed to provide minor assistance if a CHR was signed. The Captain of a C.A.L. operated Tradewind aircraft refused this proposal, but a set of sparkplugs was changed on a RLAF C47 since the pilot in command had no such objection.

RCMD expended a total of 752 manhours of which 40 were utilized in the maintenance of leased properties. Significant projects included repainting the streetside of the Operations/Administration building and the construction of a "hump", with USAF provided PSP, at the road entrance to the aircraft parking ramp.

It has been reported that the U.S. Army will assume the operation of the present Naval Support Activity sometime in June or July. It is not known at this time if there will be any affect on the company supply account when this changeover is made.

Original Signed by
WINSTON C. CAMBRE

Winston C. Cambre

cc: file

COMMENTARY RAPS ACTIVITIES OF ROSS PEROT

Hanoi in Vietnamese to South Vietnam 0100 GMT 10 Apr 70 S

[Commentary: "Another Ridiculous U.S. Farce About the Aggressor Pilots' Problem"]

[Text] In the past few days, the Nixon administration again set up a new psychological warfare farce to stir public opinion about our army's and people's arrest and detention of U.S. aggressor pilots who committed crimes in North Vietnam. Recently American millionaire Ross Perot chartered three planes to transport nearly 100 newsmen, cameramen, photographers, and U.S. aggressor pilots' dependents to Saigon. First he craftily visited various centers where the U.S.-puppets have detained South Vietnamese patriots, then noisily stated to everyone that his act was fully humane. Next, Perot and his party went to our embassy in Vientiane and demanded that he be authorized to enter the north to visit the captured U.S. aggressor pilots.

Who is Perot? To our people, this news is not new or special. He is a Texas millionaire well-known for his talent in amassing fortunes. He now wants to gain political capital by cajoling Nixon. He is the president of a reactionary organization supporting Nixon's policy of prolonging the aggressive war in Vietnam. This organization is named "United, We Stand." Perot himself in December 1969 chartered two planes to transport foodstuffs, medicines, and letters to Vientiane where he demanded that our government authorize him to personally carry gifts to the U.S. aggressor pilots captured in North Vietnam. His act then was aimed at sabotaging our government regulations concerning the sending of gifts to the U.S. aggressor pilots.

Perot's new farce is only part of a fairly noisy new campaign being stirred by the Nixon administration about the captured U.S. aggressor pilots. At one of the recent sessions of the Paris conference, the U.S. representative repeatedly argued stupidly about the so-called problem of U.S. prisoners in North Vietnam. Rogers, Laird, and Nixon have also repeatedly raised their voices, feigning concern over the fate of the U.S. aggressor pilots detained in North Vietnam. All the arguments and tricks of the Nixon administration about this problem aim at achieving a dark goal to slander and distort the humanitarian policy of our government and people toward the U.S. aggressor pilots, while disorienting U.S. and world public opinion which is resolutely condemning the Nixon administration for seeking to prolong the aggressive war in Vietnam, brazenly escalating the aggressive war in Laos, and openly sabotaging Cambodian independence and neutrality.

Concerning the captured U.S. aggressor pilots, our government and people have many times clearly expressed their stand and attitude. They are air marauders who, on U.S. Government orders, bombed and strafed the DRV--an independent and sovereign country--and who were caught redhanded while perpetrating crimes. They are not entitled to enjoy the provisions on the treatment of POW's as stipulated in the 1949 Geneva convention, as the U.S. authorities have frequently clamored. They are only culprits who are under the jurisdiction of the current DRV law.

Approved for Release
Date MAR 1994

44

But basing itself on our regime's humanitarian policy, our government so far has treated them humanely and generously. They have been allowed to exchange letters with and receive gifts from their families. The wounded and sick have been cared for carefully. They have been allowed to celebrate holidays in accordance with their national customs. A number of them who have been released and returned to their families have thanked our government and people for their humanitarian treatment.

This time, after coming to South Vietnam and staging the trick of visiting the U.S.-puppet prisons, Perot lavishly praised the U.S. lackeys' fascist regime and shamelessly stated: "If I were to become a prisoner of war, I would like to be a prisoner of war in South Vietnam." These brazen words of a trader who is familiar with U.S. advertising methods cannot cover up the towering crimes of the U.S. aggressors and the Saigon puppets against our patriots who are detained in South Vietnamese prisons called hells on earth, such as Chi Hoa, Tan Hiep, Thu Duc, Con Dao, and so forth. Details of these crimes by the U.S.-puppets have been denounced by U.S. Representative Conyers in a report entitled "A Horrible Story Told With Sincere Words". This report, although incomplete, has bared the fascist and extremely cruel attitude of the U.S.-puppet (?clique) toward our incarcerated southern combatants and compatriots. It has so strongly moved U.S. public that the U.S. Congress had to publish it in its congressional records on 8 July 1969.

The fact that Perot and his group came to Vientiane and applied for permission to visit captured U.S. pilots in North Vietnam and give them gifts is only a trouble making plot. Our embassies in foreign countries have many times (?explained) our government's policy toward captured U.S. pilots to U.S. families who came to ask for news from their husbands and sons. Recently, Mrs (?David)--after being received by our embassy in Vientiane--admitted that she had been politely received. Perot himself was received by our embassy in Vientiane and clearly explained our government's policy and stand toward captured U.S. pilots. Yet he came to Vientiane again to create trouble for our embassy. It is crystal clear that Perot's action does not reflect his concern for the interests of the captured U.S. pilots and their families. In fact, it is aimed at materializing a psychological warfare scheme of the Nixon administration to excite public opinion and slander our government's humanitarian policy toward U.S. pilots. But such tricks will surely encounter ignominious defeat. As for Perot, he will draw no profit from this ridiculous trick, except (?the anger) of public opinion.

PAPER POINTS OUT FAILURE OF U.S. PACIFICATION PLAN

Hanoi VNA International Service in English 0557 GMT 10 Apr 70 B

[Text] Hanoi VNA April 10--The Hanoi daily QUAN DOI NHAN DAN (PEOPLE'S army) in a recent article reviewing the U.S. puppet "pacification" effort in the first three months of this year said that in spite of the huge amount of men, money and energy thrown into the project, the enemy has not moved any nearer to his goal while his "pacification" force continues to be depleted by the liberation forces and people.

(a)

"The stirring demonstrations and struggles against the coup d'etat group that have taken place in Cambodia since 18 March are the first manifestations of the mounting wave of anger of the Khmer people. The Khmer people, who possess righteousness and a tradition of solidarity and indomitable struggle and who have valiantly resisted imperialism during the past decades, are resolutely wresting back their fundamental national rights, namely, sovereignty, independence, and neutrality.

"Although confronted with temporary difficulties, the Khmer people will surely surmount all trials and will score ever greater victories."

PEROT'S ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MISLEAD PUBLIC OPINION

Hanoi in English to Southeast Asia 1000 GMT 10 Apr B

[Text] Ross Perot, a wealthy Texas businessman, put on the stage recently by the Nixon administration, [word indistinct] made a new campaign of slanders in Vientiane about the so-called problem of U.S. prisoners of war in North Vietnam. This [word indistinct] trick is but Nixon's effort to convince the public of the humanitarian policy of the United States and to whitewash the monstrous crimes perpetrated by the United States imperialists in their universally condemned war of aggression in Vietnam.

This is also aimed at distorting the humanitarian policy of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Government and people regarding the American air pirates found guilty of massacring our people with bombs and (?shells) and caught redhanded. Perot's new move is also designed to mislead the world public opinion which is strongly condemning the Nixon administration for prolonging the war in Vietnam, piling up heinous crimes against the South Vietnamese people, escalating the war in Laos, and sabotaging the independence and neutrality of Cambodia.

The commentary says: The Democratic Republic of Vietnam Government and people have more than once clearly expounded their stand and attitude toward U.S. air pirates caught in North Vietnam. American pilots captured in North Vietnam are offenders caught redhanded in the act of (?serious) crimes against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, an independent and soverign state. They are guilty in the eyes of the laws of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and cannot claim protection under the Geneva convention of August 12 1949 on the treatment of prisoners of war.

However, captured American pilots are treated in accordance with the humanitarian policy of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Government. They are allowed to exchange correspondence with their families. The sick and wounded are all given adequate and timely care and medical treatment. Many released U.S. air pirates have expressed their deep gratitude to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Government for this humanitarian treatment.

Nixon and company want to (?incite) public opinion and put the blame for the distress of the families of the captured air pirates on the Vietnamese people. But progressive public opinion in the United States and the whole world has long seen that it is Johnson and his successor Nixon who have been sending hundreds of thousands of young Americans to kill and be killed in Vietnam, thus bringing sufferings and (?shame) to their families.

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Date MAR 1994

The American people, including many families of captured American pilots, have realized clearly that the fastest way to bring the detained American pilots home is to press the demand to immediately end the U.S. war of aggression in South Vietnam and withdraw all U.S. troops from there. There is no other alternative.

LE DUC THO INTERVIEWED BEFORE LEAVING PARIS FOR DRV

Hanoi VNA International Service in English 0546 GMT 12 Apr 70 B

[Text] Hanoi VNA April 12--Le Duc Tho, special advisor to the D.R.V.N. Government delegation to the Paris conference on Viet Nam, left the French capital for home last Friday, according to VNA's correspondent there.

Addressing pressmen at the airport Le Bourget Le Duc Tho condemned the U.S. for prolonging and expanding the war to the whole of Indochina in an attempt to make use of military pressure, to negotiate on a "position of strength", and cow the Vietnamese people.

After pointing out that the course of events last week was not what the U.S. had expected, Le Duc Tho said with their militant solidarity the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia would certainly obtain final victory and the U.S. defeat in Indochina was a foregone conclusion. He declared: "If the Nixon administration gives up its policy of aggression and its search for a 'position of strength' at the talks, we will be ready to settle peacefully with the U.S. the Viet Nam issue on the basis of the 10-point overall solution proposed by the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam. But, if the U.S. obdurately persists in expanding and prolonging the war, the Vietnamese people will fight through to the end for genuine independence and freedom."

Interviewed on the French Government's recent proposal on the settlement of the Indochinese problem, Le Duc Tho said that French Foreign Minister Schumann at a recent meeting with him had declared that the French Government was pursuing De Gaulle's policy regarding Indo-China. Le Duc Tho said he hoped M. Schumann's statement would be translated into deeds, and that only in that way could France contribute to the restoration of peace in the Indo-Chinese peninsula and meet the legitimate aspirations and basic interests of the peoples in this region, as well as the interests of France.

He said that the Lon Nol-Matak clique are extremely reactionary, that in service of the U.S., they are destroying Cambodia's independence and neutrality in opposition to the Khmer people and the Vietnamese people.

He said that should the French Government back the Lon Nol-Matak regime it would, far from contributing to the restoration of peace in Indo-China, harm the basic interests of the Indo-Chinese people, as well as both the immediate and long-term interests of France.

Seeing him off at the airport were Raymond Guyot, political bureau member of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party, and V. Zorin, Soviet ambassador, and Huang Chen, Chinese ambassador, to France.

(4)

45

MEMORANDUM

TO : AVP TPE

FROM : BMSGN

SUBJECT : Monthly Report

DATE: 14 April 1970

REF. No. BMSGN/70/129

Saigon Base Monthly Report for March 1970 is forwarded in three copies for your file.

E. J. Theisen

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FORM 6970400

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
MARCH 1970

I. GENERAL

1. SGN Base was honored by the visit of PRES and AVP on 26 and 27 March, as well as a follow-on visit by VPFO and DFD on 28 and 29 March. All departments gained much from an on-the-spot exchange from these gentlemen.

2. Total block time for March 1970 was 5910 hours as compared with 5482 hours in February 1970. The trend including performance so far in April, appears to be coming up.

3. The security situation in Saigon and RVN continues to improve with sporadic exceptions - - almost as good as Chicago and Washington.

4. Received a letter of termination for C-47 43-48084 (GFA) effective 1 April 1970 with a Call Order for Caribou B-851 effective 1 April 1970.

Due to possible other priority requirements for B-851, the Customer cancelled the termination on C-47 084 pending further developments.

5. Pictures attached were candid shots by BMSGN in our Saigon Shops area. I am very proud of the local Technical Services effort of over nine months to screen and train those pictured from coolies to Aircraft Technicians. In line with U.S. Government policy, we shall continue with follow-on programs. Meanwhile, we have 25 [redacted] Aircraft Technicians undergoing one year of intensive training in Tainan. This is an epoch-making endeavor never done before [redacted] It also resulted in favorable press coverage previously reported.

6. The decision to close the Saigon hostel appears to be a wise one. We have issued only three Non-Availability Certificates from 25 March through 11 April 1970.

7. I cannot predict what will happen to our local economy as the trading rate goes up and buying-power of the piaster continues go down. It is now VN$450 to one U.S. Bollar. Sooner or later an adjustment in piaster pay scales might very well be in order.

8. There were NO MAJOR ACCIDENTS OR INCIDENTS in March to equal our February record. We have had one mishap since 1 January 1970 - a taxi accident. This is a vast improvement over our record last year when we experienced nine (9) accidents during the first three months.

II. CUSTOMER RELATIONS remain outstanding.

III. FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT
1. Forms "Fs" have been submitted for the Terminal Parking Apron, Renovation of MFD/SOM Bldg., Renovation of Various other Shops and Offices, and 204B Concrete Helicopter Pads for SGN. The customer has signed Form Fs for the improvement of the passenger lounge at Danang and also for Completion of Ramp Paving, and drainage ditch at Danang. MED SGN AR 69052 for an audiometric booth has been cancelled as the result of discussions with MFD and SMO. It was found that using existing facilities, failures of the audiometric test are extremely rare. If an individual should fail an audiometric test, he will be sent to the U.S. Air Force Clinic for further testing.

IV. GENERAL AFFAIRS
1. The company provided the Directorate of Civil Aviation with materials to reinforce the fences of its storage building for telecommunications equipment which has been the object of sporadic stealing recently.

2/ To build better relationship with the Government of Vietnam, a visit of AAM installations and Management by the Tan Son Nhut Airport Commandant and Staff was organized. Similar visit by other GVN agencies will be conducted in the near future.

3. Plan to improve company transient quarters up-country has been finalized and submitted to the Head Office for approval.

V. MEDICAL
Number of visits: 1341
Accidents: 51
Hospitalization: 7
Unhospitalization: 50
Outcalls: 1
Physical Examination: 34
Sick leaves: 235½

VI. PERSONNEL
1. After three long years, several meetings, countless revisions, the Gia Dinh Labor Service finally gave its seal of approval to our rules of Employment.

PM travelled to UTH to participate in the meeting called to discuss the terms of the agreement between the Company and the Far East Pilots Association.

2. Personnel Strength - Saigon Base

Classif.	[redacted]								Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
	38	130	130	13	138	2	12	4	318	149

Classif. Permanent	[redacted]					Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	FLT
	498#	12**	2	2	1*	503	12

Temporary: [redacted] 1 ; [redacted] - 1

Pre-processed: [redacted] 8

(*) : [redacted]
(**) :
(#) :

Ground Personnel: 831
Flight Personnel: 161
Total : 992

Da Nang Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]				Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	4	13	18	69	104
Pre-processed :				1	1

Nha Trang Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]				Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	3	11	23	59	96
Pre-processed:				1	1

Can Tho Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]			Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	1	10	2	13

VII. TRAFFIC/AAM

1. During the month many difficulties with Immigration and Customs were encountered. Local officials desire to setup three control points within the Terminal for personal baggage check both outgoing and incoming, but the customer is strongly opposed.

2. Aircraft 912 arrived from HongKong with properly documented paperwork but with manifests showing only "Personal Effects" for some Customer HongKong purchases. The Customs people wanted to hold the aircraft and contents in bond until the individuals cleared the items.

One of the CORDS sponsored passengers on aircraft 084 failed to clear Immigration and caused some difficulty, which was cleared the next day.

	February	March
Passengers departure SGN (all contracts)	5,212	6,315
Passengers arrival SGN (All contracts)	5,958	6,997
Outbound cargo SGN	40,940	77,491
Inbound cargo SGN	39,849	127,260

TRAFFIC/USAID

Cargo (including AF Caribou A/C)

	February	March
Outbound (lbs) SGN	1,209,056	1,466,790
Inbound (lbs) SGN	491,550	414,349

VIII. OPERATIONS

1. Pres/TPE and AVP/TPE visited Saigon Base. The President was impressed with the new window in FOD overlooking the ramp and he suggested a study be made on the feasibility of installing a mirror outside which would enable us to view the departures from the Traffic Terminal. In conjunction with this requirement a study of closed circuit TV installation is being made.

2. [redacted] presently engaged in Operations Dispatcher OJT is progressing well. We expect her check out in routine operations by 1 June 1970. She will be the first female Flight Dispatcher in the history of Saigon Base.

The 7001 customer added VTB N7695C to the contract effective 1 April 70.

There were 13 controllable and 53 non-controllable delays with a total of 905 Saigon departures. This averages out to be 98.6% on time departures.

3. Flight time report (see attachment A)
Ground Fire Incidents report (see attachment B)

4. Accident reports

Date	A/C Type/No.	Location	Remarks
02	VTB/N3674G	V-193	R.H. engine flamed out and started smoking while taxiing to ramp after landing - F/O noted flame in tail pipe. R.H. engine fire bottle was discharged. A thorough inspection of the engine was made by maintenance and was found to be satisfactory. The cause of the engine flame out was not determined. The presence of smoke and flame in the engine exhaust tail pipe was possibly due to the residue of fuel in the Plenum Chamber and the failure to motor engine immediately after flame out.
22	VTB/N3674G	SVN operation exact location unknown	During overnight service found L.H. engine impeller blades damaged from foreign object. Foreign object damage was not determined.
25	VTB/N6154U	SVN operation	On walk around after days flight, found R.H. engine first stage compressor blades have several deep nicks. Engine was satisfactory on previous overnight service. Foreign object damage source unknown. Continued emphasis on FOD is in progress.

5. Ground Transportation

Aggregate microbuses mileage	22661 km or 14163 miles
Microbuses down-time	216 hrs 06'
Microbuses pax carried	3188 pax
Isuzu Bus mileage	5792 km or 3620 miles
Isuzu bus down-time	31 hrs. 30'
Isuzu bus pax carried	10408 pax
Supply vehicle mileage	2147 km or 1341 miles
Supply vehicle down-time	45 hrs. 12'

6. Flying - The first half of the month was spent in anticipation of the Company/FEPA agreement and the last half in awe absorbing what was agreed upon. The FEPA agreement has been bolstered by the installation of transponders in the VTB aircraft. The transponders installation has done its share of raising morale. Our installation is running well ahead of schedule. Next item on the agenda to improve our lot - UHF.

MFDSVN with the BMSGN, PMSGN and MFASGN attended a meeting convened by the President at Udorn. This meeting attended by corresponding representatives from other bases, was to apprize all of the contents and interpretation of the FEPA agreement.

Our last operational 10-2 departed the station for Bangkok on 6 March. This leaves two 10-2s in storage for which there are no crews assigned. We have one Helio in storage for which we have no crews assigned or current.

IX. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. March was very productive and passed without a major problem. Several facility projects were completed and closed out.

2. We are trying to improve ground safety and general housekeeping. Two of these areas are (1) Employees walking across the East ramp at shift change with aircraft taxiing in/out of the same ramp. (2) Vehicle controls for possibly permitting a few managers to park their private vehicles behind the RMD hangar.

3. Regarding CTO accumulation, progress is being made in every department of Technical Services. The same equal attention has been applied to Home Leave and Annual Vacations.

4. The new elevated TSN airport water tower is not living up to our expectations - by any means. It is unable to supply all the water requirements of the few Airline users. Water supply lines are being turned off during the lunch period and also from about 1900L to 0600L every day, and we have to pump from our 50,000 Gal. underground reservoir, which must obtain its resupply from that same TSN tower.

2. Aircraft Maintenance - The aircraft maintenance activity was on the increase during the month with the resultant increase in work load which was generated by the higher number of aircraft departures and arrivals, engine changes and No.4B services on PC-6C N394R.

Ten aircraft departure delays were charged to maintenance during the month which has sharply increased over the month of February. Some of the delays appear to be beyond control of maintenance personnel however the majority were not and could be avoided if everyone concerned did put more thorough effort into aircraft maintenance.

3. Rotary Wing - This month we have been quite busy flying over 1000 hours and performing ten number two services, two No.3A services, one No.3B service, two high time engine changes and two engine changes with hot end inspections to facilitate turn around time.

A new Flight Mechanic Training Course started on the 30th and eleven TCN's were transferred into R/W Section for OJT.

4. Shops - Overall Shop activities remained on an even par. The number 4 service on PC-6 N394R was accomplished without any major problems.

5. Planning/Engineering - The Planning and Production Control Section pre-planned, scheduled and processed, for aircraft of all types; 503 overnight services; 28 number one services; 18 number two services; 7 number three services; 2 number 4 services; 5 annual inspections; 18 engine changes (4 for 204B); 7 propeller changes; 72 EA's; 33 SI's; 5 EI's; 237 time controlled components change on 204B; two T53 engine hot section inspections; 1 main rotor hub change; 3 DRR's and 160 shop work orders.

6. General Maintenance - Several moves have been made this month to better utilize existing space and enable the demolition of two shacks that have been eyesores for years. Offices affected in the moves were SGM, Technical Training offices, SAT, Accounting and Supply Storage. The Time Shack and Supply Storage (Rice Room) near the Operations Bldg were demolished. MSAFE was moved back to the BM Office.

Installation of porcelaine insulators for the 200 ^{2}mm power cable between the Utilities Building and the RGHD Complex is in progress.

7. Electronics - This month 15 ATC Transponder installations: 7EA PC6-34-2, 5 EA-VTB-34-9, 1 EA-C45-34-3 and 2 EA-204-34-2 were completed.

The project of in-country teletype circuits is dormant pending receipt of customers willingness or acknowledgement of intent to furnish the required land liner and circuit pattis at and between SGN-DAD-NHA.

8. Technical Training - March had our Technical Training Department operating on a reduced schedule due to a shortage of two Instructors. However, no courses under instruction were dropped and the following courses were completed: Non-destructive Testing, Heat treating, Welding. Classes now in progress are: Management course, Helicopter Maintenance & Flight Mechanics course.

9. Quality Control - The month of March was about the same as the month of February. The work load has settled down on an even keel.

We had four Inspectors satisfactorily complete the four week Technical Training course on Non-destructive Inspection.

10. Stores Section - The closing of the hostel and tearing down of the C-Ration/rice room has placed a temporary burden on RSD as secured storage space needed for bulky items of this nature is becoming a scarcity.

11. Stock Control Section - During the month of March, Stock Control workload experienced a slight decrease as compared to previous months.

12. Customs - The Customs Agent continues to perform in an outstanding manner despite the never-ending petty and irritating problems which have to be faced daily. Thanks to his ability, fortitude and loyalty, he again managed to clear all commercially shipped Company cargo with celerity, thereby reducing any officially planned delays to a minimum.

13. Cycle Inventory - During the month of March, the Property and Inventory Unit completed cycle inventories of classes 01H and 01Q for a total of 738 line items. Also completed was property cycle inventory of A/C 1636 (A-D) for a total of 1242 line items. In addition to cycle inventories 173 property transactions were made.

E. J. Theisen
Base Manager - SGN

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT

MARCH

1. Contract 7001 -

A/C No.	Revenue		None-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
N67984	181+02	147+09	1+43	1+15
N67985	111+23	98+03	3+50	3+29
B928	129+53	104+58		
B910	137+14	113+34	1+25	1+06
B912	89+32	73+04	9+27	7+49
6147	96+33	79+47		
3084	157+05	136+20	7+21	6+17
5559	122+14	103+03	0+54	0+35
5994	142+26	116+28		
3829	105+26	87+31	18+52	16+01
N539Y	128+05	108+22	3+54	2+08
N544Y	126+30	111+50	2+05	1+33
N9518Z	74+20	69+31	2+34	1+45
N61540	18+36	16+13	2+32	1+33
N99562	76+30	63+19	1+57	1+08
N7770B	80+58	69+49	2+17	1+55
N9577Y	52+24	43+45	6+29	4+57
N34740	75+38	65+42		
N9464C	4+24	3+57	1+15	1+00
N91295	137+20	117+06		
N9838Z	141+03	120+17	0+40	0+30
N3728G	90+35	80+55	1+27	1+01
N7695C	2+28	2+19		
N180E	110+55	100+50	2+20	0+56
N285L	138+08	122+54		
N391R	2+57	2+28		
N394R	123+14	109+43	0+55	0+37
N9444	108+32	92+17		
N198X	24+18	22+35	3+55	2+41
N153L	126+02	108+17	6+53	3+52
N12450	53+45	46+48	3800	2+15
N7488	140+57	118+03	10+31	9+05
N152L	75+38	67+42	8+07	6+55
N184L	133+15	115+39		
N185K	38+15	36+07	2+26	1+40
N192X	96+47	80+23		
N194X	157+05	141+09	0+50	0+23
N393R	85+40	72+29		

M1303X	167+04	167+04	2+55	2+55
M1304X	128+38	128+38	6+05	6+05
M1305X	14+57	14+57	3+05	3+05
M1306X	134+45	134+45	2+25	2+25
M1307X	105+12	105+12	8+25	8+25
M8514F	111+14	111+14	8+37	8+37
M8535F	90+45	90+45	4+30	4+30
Sub total	4449+42	3923+01	142+51	118+28

2. Contract 7002

B928	11+03	9+08
6147	10+38	9+27
M539Y	14+06	10+49
M544Y	14+14	11+12
M9518Z	7+26	5+50
M61548	83+55	72+12
M9956Z	22+12	18+26
M7770B	26+12	22+47
M9577Z	12+34	10+52
M6474G	39+04	32+34
M966AG	1+37	1+19
M91295	16+09	13+50
M9848Z	6+51	6+04
M5728G	8+44	6+56
M120K	18+19	16+48
M285L	1+39	1+31
M391R	58+09	52+28
M394R	0+40	0+33
M9444	18+36	15+15
M198K	54+08	47+49
M153L	15+40	14+21
M12450	81+55	71+29
M7488	16+28	13+17
M152L	54+09	43+19
M184L	21+42	17+44
M185K	46+16	41+02
M192K	43+45	41+21
M393R	57+44	51+57
M1303X	11+18	11+18
M1304X	10+29	10+29
M1305X	96+19	96+19
M1306X	10+07	10+07
M1307X	33+50	33+50
M8514F	2+05	2+05
M8535F	33+59	33+59
Sub total	962+02	858+07

3. Contr act 7003

B928	16+34	13+09
B910	38+37	33+03
8084	5+48	4+50
6994	3+30	3+06
N539I	13+00	11+40
N544I	4+00	3+37
N777QB	1+29	1+09
N9577Z	2+14	1+22
N36740	2+22	1+38
N394R	3+55	2+54
N9444	2+23	1+50
N198X	2+19	1+53
N153L	10+36	7+36
N12450	9+00	6+24
N748N	9+50	7+24
N184L	4+39	2+53
N192X	4+49	3+35
N194X	5+01	3+42
N393R	7+57	5+51
N1304X	14+57	14+57
N1305X	2+58	2+58
N1307X	44+06	44+06
Sub Total	210+04	179+37

4. Contract 0030

N9577Z	18+39	15+16
N393R	1+14	1+00
N1306X	0+45	0+45
N8514F	2+24	2+24
Sub Total	23+02	19+25

5. Contract 0069

N393R	7+17	6+29
N6154U	4+40	3+41
N9664C	97+20	87+41
N3728Q	9+52	9+12
N7695C	0+56	0+47
N9956Z	0+08	0+00
B912	1+05	0+00
—— Total	121+18	107+50

TOTAL REVENUE BLOCK TIME	5767+08
TOTAL REVENUE FLIGHT TIME	5088+41
TOTAL NON-REVENUE BLOCK TIME	142+51
TOTAL NON-REVENUE FLIGHT TIME	118+28
GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	5909+59
GRAND TOTAL FLIGHT TIME	5207+09

Flight Time by Type of Aircraft

Type of A/C	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
C-46	716+23	592+08	6+58	5+50
C-47	538+14	453+01	17+42	14+41
Sailed C-47	105+26	87+31	10+48	8+22
DHC-4	299+55	257+30	11+58	9+47
VIB	1117+40	964+50	21+16	15+22
Porter	1973+38	1717+49	38+07	28+24
204-B	1015+52	1015+52	36+02	36+02
TOTAL	5767+08	5088+41	142+51	118+28

Original Signed By
U.GG PARRISH
SGN/SGN

M O N T H L Y R E P O R T

N H A - T R A N G

MAY 1970

GENERAL

Once again the month began with unfriendly activity the first week of the month with the balance of the month going by very quietly. On Sunday 3 May, we were "hit" twice. Once in the morning and once in the early afternoon. This is appearing to become a pattern.

Flying fairly well held it's own this month with a Revenue block time of 941 hours. We seem to be working between 925/975 hours per month.

TRAFFIC

Traffic activities remainded fairly constant with an increase in passengers offset by a decrease in cargo.

STATISTICS

PASSENGER		May	April	1969
Departing		3677	3529	4824
Arriving		3125	3261	4079
	TOTAL	6802	6690	8901

CARGO

1. GROUND SERVICES (Lbs)

Departing		423,882	665,471	298,339
Arriving		199,430	159,376	288,349
	TOTAL	623,312	844,847	586,688

2. COMPANY CARGO (Lbs)

Departing		6,121	4,736	39,679
Arriving		8,845	4,511	40,246
	TOTAL	14,966	9,247	79,925

3. GRAND TOTAL (Lbs) (1+2)

Departing		430,003	690,207	328,018
Arriving		208,275	162,887	328,595
	TOTAL	638,278	853,094	656,613

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

This area remains quiet with little or no friction occuring this month. Mr. Don Mc Graw (A former AVN Traffic employee) will arrive in early June to replace Mr. Tom Lilly for a period of four months while Mr. Lilly is on Home Leave. This may or may not prove difficult. Hopefully, there should be no major problems.

OPERATIONS

Our remaining problem area is still radio communications. We improve little by little but it is a constant push against power outage and interference from other stations.

Two new teletype machines were installed in the Operations Office this month. This now gives us a LDC, back up on the weather units.

Flight operations remained smooth.

We moved into the new hostel on 3 May and continue to improve the facilities. There are start up problems, but another month should eliminate most complaints. Electric water heaters were obtained and installed along with lamps. Additional pillows, pillow cases, sheets and towels of high standard were obtained to better the service.

FLIGHT FREQUENCY (See attached)

ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE COMPARISON

	May	April	1969
Arrival	499	480	570
Departure	497	479	573
ACN	195	193	331

DELAYS

Percentage on time	94.	95.

SECURITY

No problems.

PERSONNEL

Outstanding compensatory time off was reduced another 333 hours this month. An approximate 500 hours reduction is planned for June. This will bring the station level to about 800 hours of outstanding CTL. By August or September we should be in the clear.

The station personnel complement was further reduced by two TCN and two VN employees. In addition, two Security Guards we transferred to the Ground Services payroll.

FISCAL

No problems.

LEGAL

No problems.

Technical Services . . . 3

TECHNICAL SERVICES

		May	April	1969
1.	Transient overnight	304	287	239
2.	Overnight services	195	193	331
3.	Engine changes	1	0	5
4.	Propeller changes	0	0	0
5.	No. I services	0	0	4
6.	No. II services	0	0	0
7.	Delays Maint/Mech.	3	5	11
8.	Intermediate services	0	0	0
9.	AOG	1	4	17
10.	Outline recoveries	1	2	20
11.	Accident report (A/C)	2	1	1
12.	Accident report (PAX)	0	0	0

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

Dan Lawson

DAN LAWSON
SZ-MHA

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
MAY 1970

I. GENERAL

1. Total block time for May was 5802 hours as compared with 5880 in April and 5910 in March.

2. The security situation in the Saigon and Cholon area again experienced changes this month. The curfew limitations earlier imposed (some areas as early as 2200L in the evening) were relaxed on the 22nd to what may be regarded as the normal 0100L to 0530L, for most areas effecting Company personnel.

One claymore mine was reported to have exploded in a BOQ area near the Seven Day Adventist hospital on 13 May causing extensive damage and injuries to indigenous personnel, but no Company personnel effected.

Danang sub-base also reported three rockets impacted the airbase on 12 May which caused only minor skin damage to one aircraft, VTB N3674G. Demonstrations, reported last month, continued in the downtown area, on an irregular basis, which proved to be more harassment than anything else.

3. DHC-4 B-851 continued to be a subject of interest to VN-70 customer and liaison with DFC was maintained to determine the availability of the aircraft, for assignment to that contract. At month's end a final determination had not been reached but the customer remained patient for a decision, which eventually was to his interest.

4. Major Accident/Incident rate for this month remains nil. ADSAFE continues to participate in pilot meetings and reportedly has covered numerous "safety" subjects, it is quite possible we here have a case of, "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure."

5. Danang hostel contract negotiations proved to be quite time consuming, requiring much coordination and discussions; however, an agreement was effective and plans for facilities improvement are beginning to materialize (More detailed information appears below).

II. CUSTOMER RELATIONS

Relations with Customers remain very good. Almost daily contacts have been made in the course of operations and there were no significant problems reported and no known questions unanswered.

III. FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT

Form F's were approved by the customers for: (1) Improvement of Passenger

Lounge (DAD) and (2) Completion of Concrete Paving and Drainage (DAD) and (3) Hostel and SZ Residence Renovation (DAD). AR Activities are reported as follows:

AR 2236 - Additional 200 KVA Transformer (SGN)

The SDL (City Power Company) installed twin 200 KVA Transformers late in the month. Project is considered complete. An AR Closure Notice has been forwarded.

AR 2163 - Emergency RGMD Water Supply (SGN)

This project is complete. An AR Closure Notice has been forwarded.

AR 2368 - Modification of SRSD and Material Control Offices (SGN)

This project is 60% complete. We are waiting delivery of materials from NSA, DAD.

AR 2377 - West Ramp Power and Air Compressor Lines (SGN)

We are waiting delivery of materials from NSA/DAD.

AR 2438 - Completion of Concrete Pavement and Drainage (DAD)

A contract has been signed with Le Tho, the Contractor. Construction is expected to commence on 15 June.

AR 2437 - Improvement on Passenger Lounge (DAD)

A proposal is being studied by various Contractors in DAD to supply only labor with the possibility of USAID supply most of the material. We expect to sign a contract within a week.

AR 2422 - Renovation of the Operations Bldg (SGN)

The Security Dept. has been moved from this building. The Accounting Dept. will be moved very shortly to as let the Contractor have access to the building. We expect to sign the contract on the 15th of the month.

AR 2421 - Relocation/Renovation of Various AAM Shops & Offices, SGN

This project will be complete this month with the exception of Federal Type steel partitions which may require a delay due to procurement.

AR 8320 - Danang Hostel & SZ Residence Renovation

Material procurement is underway. When material is on hand, a small team from Saigon will be sent to assist DAD in-house capabilities.

Project 6691 - Saigon Terminal Parking Apron

A Form F has been signed by the Customer to replace the asphalt directly in front of Traffic Terminal with concrete. An AR is being made up.

Project 6702 - 204B Touchdown Pads (SGN)

PFAR has been approved. A Form "F" has been submitted for Customer's consideration.

Project 6703 - Modification of Fire Brigade Station for Air Conditioning(SGN)

This project pending TPE approval

IV. GENERAL AFFAIRS (Unreported)

V. MEDICAL
Number of sick call: 1144
Accidents: 20
Hospitalized sick call: None
Unhospitalized accident: 20
Hospitalized accident: None
Outcalls: 5
Physical examination: 30
Sick leaves: 201½

VI. TRAFFIC/AAM
1. Utilization of the substituted S & S missions cleared a goodly portion of our backlog of Company cargo. With only four aircraft scheduled for Tainan this month we envision a building of backlog partidularly since no Taipei SAT ferries are known.

	April	May
Passengers departure SGN (all contracts)	5,606	5,414
Passengers arrival SGN (all contracts)	6,573	6,092
Outbound cargo SGN	61,215	81,608
Inbound cargo SGN	68,369	70,754

TRAFFIC/USAID

Cargo (incluxing Af Caribou A/C)

	April	May
Outbound (lbs) SGN	987,032	1,893,269
Inbound (lbs) SGN	425,494	364,518

VII. OPERATIONS
1. The 7001 customer released VTB N9838Z from contract effective 1 June 1970 and it was placed in temporary storage.

2. There were 17 controllable and 58 non-controllable delays with a total of 992 Saigon Departures.

3. Flight Time Report (See attachment A)
Ground Fire Incidents report (See attachment B)

4. Accident reports

Date	A/C Type/No.	Location	Remarks
04	VTB/N6154U	V-17	During overnight service FOD damage was noted to the No. 2 engine. Two first stage impeller blades sustained nicks. One blade approx. 1/16" deep and 1/8" in length at center of blade. The other blade nicked at lower leading edge - radius approx. 1/16". No excessive rubbing noted during rotation. Oil screen inspection results negative. FOD origin unknown. Continued emphasis on FOD is in progress.
17	204B/N1307X	Parked AAM chopper ramp DAD	During the night an unidentified vehicle struck the T/R blade resulting in one inch depth dent approx six inches in length. Tail rotor hub assembly and the other tail rotor blade was replaced for precautionary measures. Corrective action: SZ is checking the possibility of improved lighting in the helicopter parking area - Company employees were cautioned to exercise proper driving habits. Upon securing the helicopters the T/R blade will be aligned with the vertical (Dorsal) fin, this will eliminate some exposure of the tail rotor blade.
19	PC6C/N748N	SGN	While towing the aircraft the tow bar became disengaged from the tail gear. Tail section rolled into the tow tug resulting in minor damage to the RH elevator. Faulty tow bar and personnel error. Action: Tug driver given 3 days LWOP - Porter tow bars immediately inspected and design changes being made.

5. Ground Transportation

Aggregate microbusses mileage	22980 km or 14362 miles
Microbusses down-time	435 hrs 32'
Microbusses pax carried	3262 pax
Isuzu bus mileage	6183 km or 3864 miles
Isuzu bus down time	76 hrs 30'
Isuzu bus pax carried	10296 pax
Supply vehicle mileage	2795 km or 1746 miles
Supply vehicle downtime	97 hrs 18'

6. Flying

1. We experienced considerable wasted effort and lost time in attempting to get our flight crews deadhead space to Danang. The USAID/CORDS customer was refusing to provide any space on Sunday and forcing us to use the afternoon flights the rest of the week to move our deadheads. On 12 May the Acting Base Manager and MFD discussed the situation with the customer and as of this date it appears we have received satisfactory assistance and cooperation in this area.

Everyone was interested/involved/concerned regarding progress with the Danang hostel. Agreement on rent finally having been reached, we are looking forward to getting the place renovated so the crews can have adequate and comfortable quarters in which to stay during RONs. Along the same line, the renting of the hotel at Nhatrang has all the appearances of a very satisfactory solution to our quarters problems there. The situation at Cantho has also been greatly improved.

2. Approval was finally received to remodele the operations building which with the receipt of crew lockers should provide better security for flight gear and be a boost to morale when the new lounge and the toilet/shower room is completed.

Effort has been expended during the month. If we can ever get clear lines of agreement and understanding regarding all respects of the AAM-PEPA contract, a lot of effort and time will be available for other activities.

VIII. PERSONNEL

Personnel Strength - Saigon base

Classif.	[redacted]								Total	
Permanent	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
	37	130	125	13	136	2	9	4	307	149

[redacted]									Total	
GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
493*	11**	2		2		1*		498	11

Temporary: [redacted] 1 ; [redacted] 1

Pre-processed: [redacted] 9

(*): [redacted]
(**):
(#):

Ground Personnel: 816
Flight Personnel: 160
976

Danang Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]				Total
	GRD FLT	GRD FLT	GRD FLT	GRD FLT	GRD FLT
Permanent	3	13	17	67	100
Pre-processed				1	

Ground Personnel: 101
Flight Personnel: 0
101

Nha Trang Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]				Total
	GRD FLT	GRD FLT	GRD FLT	GRD FLT	GRD FLT
Permanent	3	8	23	56	90
Pre-processed				1	

Can Tho Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]			Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	1	10	3	14

IX. HOSTEL OCCUPANCY
Only three Certificates of "non-availability of company furnished accommodations were issued during the month.

X. TECHNICAL SERVICES
1. Overall activities for all SVN Technical Services functions during May was on an approximate level with that of past recent months. The production workload varied little from the routine scheduled requirements.

2. Total flying, up slightly, affected the workload only from the stand point that there was increased utilization of heavier aircraft and decreased utilization of smaller aircraft.

3. The correction of accumulated overtime and vacation balances continued with success in those departments and stations where scheduled were established and followed.

The Labor Cost Accounting system is progressing and is expected to be placed into effect on 1 July 1970 as scheduled.

Aircraft Maintenance, fixed wing
Four power plants were changed during the month, two R-2800-75M3 due to metal contamination in oil system and two R-1830-92 due to high time. Other unscheduled work was five outstation recovery of aircraft due to maintenance problem. Twelve aircraft departure delays were charged to maintenance during the month.

Three Garrett power plants were changed, one on Volpar due to FOD, two on Porters, one due to low torque output and one for interim inspection.

Aircraft Maintenance, rotary wing
This month has been busy, flying approximately 1050 hours, performing 10 Nr. 2 services, two of these at V03, and four engine changes: two were high time and two were remained to facilitate turn around time with hot section inspections

Shops
Overall shop activities increased this month with the beggest work-load in the sheetmetal shop.

Three Porter aircraft sustained substantial metal damage at V17 due to hostile action.

Planning/Engineering
The Planning and Production Control Section pre-planned, scheduled and processed, for aircraft of all types; 534 overnight services; 21 number one services; 20 number two services; 6 number three services; 2 number four services; 7 annual inspections; 12 engine changes (4 for 204B); 2 propeller changes; 66 EA's; 31 SI's; 11 EI's; 215 time controlled components change on 204B; three TS3 engine hot section inspections; two main rotor hub changes; one main transmission change; 3 CRR's, and 12 DRR's; 292 shop work orders.

General Maintenance
The replacement of the deteriorated water pipe supplying the Traffic are is completed.

A prefab, antilever tug shed was errected west of the AAM Traffic Terminal to keep the Tugs and ramp crew out of the elements during the raining season.

Utilities Maintenance - Water is still being pumped from the dug well in front of the Operations building.

Communications Maintenance
Our major problem for the month was the overhauling of the SSB transmitter 90T150 from Danang and the tuning of the 95A receivers of V07 & V03 for 9818 kc reception.

With lesser man-hour involved was the retuning of the ATTITUDE transmitter and other 90T150 transmitters at V01.

Within the month of May, there were two re-installations of TH-20 done.

Within the month of May, no major trouble were encountered in the PABX system. There were so many trouble caused by defective mechanical operation of telephone set dials, and leakage of telephone lines.

Some class A telephones were re-classified down to class B due to difficulties encountered at the Army Airforce exchanged of class A telephone calls.

Technical Training
Training department had the following courses completed:

(1) Supply Course, (2) Supervisor Management Course, (3) Fire Fighting Course.

Courses in Progress: 204B Maintenance

Sixteen employees were tested for exceptance as trainees in the Line Service Mechanics Course. This course will start in June and will train [redacted] in line service work.

Supply
Stores Section - During the month of May the issuing activities was the same as last month. The new storage rack for wheels and casings was built up and put in use the early part of this month.

Stock Control Section - In May, Stock Control workload stayed at par with that of the previous month.

The Director of Planning, during his visit, suggested that the time controlled items reserved for certain aircraft be reported on the daily rotable transaction report (DRTR).

Procurement Section - The Supply Procurement Section experienced nearly the same amount of transactions as that of last month. A total of 219 line items of commodities were purchased from the local market this month. Total value of commodities purchased from Saigon/Cholon market amounted to VN$1.406.197,00. The Naval Support Activity in Danang will cease its operation on 14 June 1970 and only 40% of the present stock will be carried in lesser quantity by its successor, the Army Support Command. This section plans to switch most of the expected non available items from the Danang to the Hongkong market.

L.C. Parrish

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT

- MAY 1970 -

1. Contract 7001 -

A/C No.	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
N67984	147+27	135+50	9+20	8+50
N67985	129+36	106+32	1+08	0+38
B928	84+15	71+05	14+48	13+26
B910	121+18	93+39	16+22	13+37
B912	79+38	62+39		
6147	125+33	102+05		
8084	129+29	106+56		
5559	91+23	71+39	2+50	2+16
5994	137+15	114+18		
B829	141+57	116+55		
N539I	155+15	125+22	26+57	23+25
N544I	144+30	114+43	5+12	4+23
N9518Z	112+28	95+18	1+01	0+41
N61540	80+02	65+26	3+50	1+24
N9956Z	87+20	76+33		
N7770B	78+24	69+18	1+21	0+54
N9577Z	11+23	10+05	7+15	5+43
N3674G	96+17	83+17	2+39	1+54
N91295	70+12	57+09	0+50	0+25
N9838Z	98+05	81+42	2+14	0+57
N37280	90+22	78+54	5+11	3+46
N7695C	21+57	17+40	2+22	2+06
N180K	144+57	126+44	0+51	0+33
N285L	54+05	48+49	0+42	0+26
N391R	145+48	120+45	1+15	0+35
N394R	8+21	7+29		
N9444	118+25	100+51	1+44	0+59
N198K	38+41	35+58		
N153L	93+21	81+57	5+31	4+27
N12450	22+32	20+55		
N748N	55+57	46+14	5+40	4+25
N152L	59+51	50+17	13+50	11+17
N184L	66+40	55+00	1+05	0+35
N185K	154+28	130+28	0+28	0+15
N192K	84+01	76+53	0+46	0+22
N194K	71+49	61+48	2+38	2+20
N393R	86+45	74+26	2+38	1+46
N1303K	176+24	176+24	1+05	1+05
N1304K	97+09	97+09	2+30	2+30
N1305K	90+27	90+27	8+20	8+20
N1306K	111+34	111+34	1+00	1+00
N1307K	150+42	150+42	4+05	4+05

M8514F	77+18	77+18	1+15	1+15
M8535F	68+58	68+58	5+10	5+10
Sub-total	4212+19	3668+11	163+53	135+50

2. Contract 7002 -

M539Y	7+51	6+37
M544Y	2+25	1+40
M9518Z	29+23	25+18
M61540	19+14	16+19
M9956Z	26+59	19+47
M7770B	45+49	39+07
M9577Z	1+15	0+58
M36740	27+14	22+51
M91295	17+19	15+07
M9638Z	10+02	8+35
M37280	2+13	1+51
M7695C	68+05	57+34
M180K	6+19	5+36
M285L	87+55	81+04
M391R	6+36	5+14
M394R	54+26	50+05
M9444	23+53	21+55
M198K	50+11	42+52
M153L	2+43	2+26
M12450	32+09	28+51
M7488	53+48	47+45
M152L	20+26	17+25
M184L	62+30	50+55
M185K	23+31	20+03
M192K	47+36	40+56
M194K	24+58	20+39
M393R	1+32	1+22
M1304K	5+50	5+50
M1305K	30+22	30+22
M1306K	40+56	40+56
M1307K	13+03	13+03
M8514F	43+31	43+31
M8535F	65+33	65+33
Sub-total	955+57	852+07

3. Contract 7003 -

M67984	6+48	5+56
M67985	3+49	2+53
B928	28+55	24+08
B910	34+26	29+27
B912	48+38	39+55
6147	11+35	8+28
5559	9+36	6+34
M539Y	1+09	0+45
M544Y	11+29	10+12
M9518Z	2+16	1+31

N6154U	9+31	16+10
N3674G	2+00	1+20
N91295	0+56	0+40
N9838Z	1+01	0+37
N3728G	1+04	0+45
N7695C	4+34	2+42
N180K	2+46	2+09
N285L	1+06	0+52
N391R	3+31	2+28
N153L	11+43	9+55
N748N	3+22	2+34
N152L	4+27	3+33
N192X	2+22	1+42
N194X	8+08	5+59
N1304X	28+46	28+46
N1306X	3+46	3+46
N8514F	5+25	5+25
Sub-total	253+09	209+12

4. Contract 0030 -

N9577Z	48+21	43+13
N1305X	1+17	1+17
N9577Z	18+45	15+20
Sub-total	67+83	59+50

5. Contract 0069 -

N9956Z	6+55	6+20
N3674G	2+23	2+04
N9664C	65+53	54+17
N7695C	6+26	5+31
N394R	6+34	5+44
N194X	6+15	5+47
N7770B	8+22	7+31
N9664C	42+45	37+19
N91295	3+15	3+00
Sub-total	148+48	128+33

Total Revenue Block Time	5636+96
Total Revenue Flight Time	4917+53
Total Non-Revenue Block Time	163+53
Total Non-Revenue Flight Time	135+50
GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	5802+09
GRAND TOTAL FLIGHT TIME	5053+43

Flight Time by Type of Aircraft

Type of A/C	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
C-46	684+50	572+04	41+38	36+31
Sailed C-47	504+51	410+00	2+50	2+16
C-47	141+57	116+55		
DHC-4	322+39	259+19	32+09	27+48
VIB	1218+30	1032+09	26+43	17+50
Porter	1754+28	1516+25	37+08	28+00
204B	1011+01	1011+01	23+25	23+25
TOTAL	5636+96	4917+53	163+53	135+50

A. L. Harris
A/SGM/SGM

cc: ARM/SGM
MPD/SGM
TM/SGM
File.

FLIGHT INFORMATION CENTER

- SAIGON -

- MONTHLY ACTIVITY REPORT -

1 - 31 May 1970

PART I

- Ground Fire Incidents -

Date	A/C No., Type & Contract	Place	Description
05 May	N8514F 204B 7001	V-68	While en the approach crew observed one round impact on rwy. PIC aborted and observed two additional rounds impact on the fld as he was departing the area.
07 May	N1306X 204B 7002	YU 7035	While enroute to an LZ PIC observed a muzzle flash from a weapon aimed in the direction of the a/c. PIC continued on course and departed the area.
12 May	N285L PC-6C 7001	XS 4735 3/4 of a mile from west end rwy V-14	While en the approach to V-14 - Captain TERRY heard and observed automatic weapons fire directed at the aircraft. PIC continued approach and landed safely.
14 May	N1307X 204B 7001	At 9525 1/2 mile SW VH-576	While enroute to VH-576 carrying a sling load, a/c came under heavy automatic weapons attack. One round entered under right pilot's seat passed through cabin floor, grazed flt mech's helmet and exited right cabin door window. Flt mech received minor cuts of face, neck and right leg.
14 May	N1304X 204B 7001	XR 1394	A/c was on approach to LZ when crew heard and observed automatic weapons fire. A/c landed safely and departed to the west without further incident.
14 May	N1304X 204B 7001		A/c was approaching LZ when PIC heard two rounds of small arms fire. A/c landed and departed to the east without further incident.
14 May	B928 C-46 7001	Traffic Pattern V-el	PIC was preparing for when he observed three tracers pass approximately 200 yards off his left wing at a 90 degree angle to the ground. PIC continued on course and landed safely.

- To be con't on page 2 -

16 May	N393R PC-6C 7001	Ramp V-17	A/c sustained shrapnel damage during early morning mortar attack on Can-Tho airfield.
16 May	N9444 PC-6C 7002	Ramp V-17	A/c sustained shrapnel damage during an early morning mortar attack on Can-Tho airfield.
16 May	N153L PC-6C 7001	Ramp V-17	A/c sustained shrapnel damage during an early morning mortar attack on Can-Tho airfield.

PART II

- Situation Summary -

May first marked the beginning of what is proving to be one of the most successful operations of the war. The combined US-ARVN sweep of Cambodia border sancturies has uncovered a formidable and well publicized inventory of arms, munitions, and supplies. Two significant, but less publicized, intangibles have born out of this operation. Theusands of refugees of Vietnamese origin are being shelter and clothed here - a massive effort and one which should net, in time, ralliers to the GVN. Equally important and already very apparent here is the soaring morale of the ARVN. For the first time he is on the offensive outside his own borders and an air of confidence prevails throughout the ranks. GVN officials, both past and present, are being quoted daily in most optimistic terms.

Mortar and rocket attacks were recorded in all Corps areas this month as was a significant ground assult on the resort city of Dalat. Danang received four 140mm rockets on the 20th one of which impacted on the east-west taxiway and another near the terminal. The Air America ramp sustained shrapnel from this attack causing minor skin damage to a Velpar. Chu-Lai received a total of 81 122mm rockets in two successive night attacks wounding 44 US and causing damage to three A-4E aircraft, two CH-47 helicopters, two mess halls, one hanger, and destroying 100 barrels of diesel cleaning fuel. Nha-Trang came under a rocket attack on the 8th with negative casualties and Can-Tho, in the Delta, received eighteen 82mm mortars on the 16th causing 8 US wounded and shrapnel damage to three company Porter aircraft. Saigon received three 122mm rockets in the city on the 21th causing four wounded and undetermined damage to a residence. Terrorists incidents were down in Saigon which can be attributed in part to a two week period of enforced curfew hours due to student and disabled veterans demonstrations. Enemy activity culminated for the month with a ground assult on the city of Dalat involving attacks on the Vietnamese Military Academy (the Cadets accounted for four enemy KIA), two airfields, and a cadet training center. Several key positions were occupied in and around the city. St Mary's Girls Academy and a Catholic church were attacked and occupied by enemy forces. Sporadic contacts were being reported some 72 hours after the initial assult on the city.

R H Begien-M

Reported by: R.H. Begien III
OPSP/SGN

MONTHLY REPORT
NHA-TRANG
MAY 1970

GENERAL

Once again the month began with unfriendly activity the first week of the month with the balance of the month going by very quietly. On Sunday 3 May, we were "hit" twice. Once in the morning and once in the early afternoon. This is appearing to become a pattern.

Flying fairly well held it's own this month with a Revenue block time of 941 hours. We seem to be working between 925/975 hours per month.

TRAFFIC

Traffic activities remainded fairly constant with an increase in passengers offset by a decrease in cargo.

STATISTICS

PASSENGER	May	April	1969
Departing	3677	3529	4824
Arriving	3125	3261	4079
TOTAL	6802	6890	8901

CARGO

1. GROUND SERVICES (Lbs)

Departing	423,882	685,471	298,339
Arriving	199,430	159,376	288,349
TOTAL	623,312	844,847	586,688

2. COMPANY CARGO (Lbs)

Departing	6,121	4,736	39,679
Arriving	8,845	4,511	40,246
TOTAL	14,966	9,247	79,925

3. GRAND TOTAL (Lbs) (1+2)

Departing	430,003	690,207	328,018
Arriving	208,275	162,887	328,595
TOTAL	638,278	853,094	656,613

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

This area remains quiet with little or no friction occuring this month. Mr. Don Mc Graw (A former ASM Traffic employee) will arrive in early June to replace Mr. Tom Lilly for a period of four months while Mr. Lilly is on Home Leave. This may or may not prove difficult. Hopefully, there should be no major problems.

. . . 2 . .

OPERATIONS

Our remaining problem area is still radio communications. We improve little by little but it is a constant push against power outage and interference from other stations.

Two new teletype machines were installed in the Operations Office this month. This now gives us a LDO: back up on the weather units.

Flight operations remained smooth.

We moved into the new hostel on 3 May and continue to improve the facilities. There are start up problems, but another month should eliminate most complaints. Electric water heaters were obtained and installed along with lamps. Additional pillows, pillow cases, sheets and towels of high standard were obtained to better the service.

FLIGHT FREQUENCY (See attached)

ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE COMPARISON

	May	April	1969
Arrival	499	480	570
Departure	497	479	573
ACN	195	193	331

DELAYS

Percentage on time	94%	95%

SECURITY

No problems.

PERSONNEL

Outstanding compensatory time off was reduced another 333 hours this month. An approximate 500 hours reduction is planned for June. This will bring the station level to about 800 hours of outstanding CTO. By August or September we should be in the clear.

The station personnel complement was further reduced by two TCN and [redacted] In addition, two Security Guards we transferred to the Ground Services payroll.

FISCAL

No problems.

LEGAL

No problems.

TECHNICAL SERVICES

		May	April	1969
1.	Transient overnight	304	287	239
2.	Overnight services	195	193	331
3.	Engine changes	1	0	5
4.	Propeller changes	0	0	0
5.	No. I services	0	0	4
6.	No. II services	0	0	0
7.	Delays Maint/Mech.	3	5	11
8.	Intermediate services	0	0	0
9.	AGP	1	4	17
10.	Cutline recoveries	1	2	20
11.	Accident report (A/C)	2	1	1
12.	Accident report (PAL)	0	0	0

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

Dan Lawson

DAN LAWSON
SZ-MHA

TO : BM SGN via SZ NHA

DATE : 3 June 1970

FROM : OM NHA

REF. No. OM/NHA/70/017

SUBJECT: MONTHLY FLIGHT TIME REPORT May 1970

CONT. / A/C TYPE	7001		7002		7003		0069		0030	
	BLOCK	FLIGHT	BLOCK	FLIGHT	BLOCK	FLIGHT	BLOCK	FLIGHT	BLOCK	FLIGHT
C-46	79+08	67+33								
C-47	287+10	238+24								
C-7A	54+36	47+14								
VTB	216+30	189+17	102+03	86+06			130+42	111+16	1+29	1+15
PC6	8+21	7+29	54+20	50+01			10+00	8+53		
204B										
Sub-Total	645+45	549+57	156+23	136+07			140+42	120+09	1+29	1+15

GRAND TOTAL: BLOCK TIME : 944+19

FLIGHT TIME: 807+28

R. W. Desmond
OM NHA

cc: SOM SGN
SZ NHA
File

MEMORANDUM

DATE: 12 May 1970

TO : AVP TPE

REF. No. BMSGN/70/168

FROM : BMSGN

SUBJECT : April Monthly Report

Saigon Base Monthly Report for April 1970 is forwarded in three copies for your file.

Original signed for BMSGN BY
L. G. HARRISON, SCHWISOW
E. J. Theisen

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
APRIL 1970

I. GENERAL

1. Total block time for April was 5880 hours as compared with 5910 in March and 5482 in February.

2. The security situation in Saigon remains calm with a few more incidents than occurred last month. On 30 April at 0555L a satchel charge exploded at a military billet within 80 yards of the BM House wounding several military personnel and breaking glass in houses across the street. Except for rattling the occupants, there was no damage to the BM house. There has, however, been an upsurge of demonstrations (three in the last two-one-half weeks) which keeps downtown Saigon at a standstill while they are going on. The last series of demonstrations were by students, veterans and militant monks over the war, land reform, and greater recognition. Like dissident demonstrators all over the world, they had nothing constructive to offer to society -- only criticism.

3. VPFCA advises Caribou B851 is still being considered for assignment to Saigon from Udorn. The VN-70 customer is still interested in this aircraft.

4. Our major Accident/Incident rate is fortunately still holding up with only one mishap since 1 January 1970 -- a taxi accident on 3 January.

II. CUSTOMER RELATIONS have never been better.

III. Facilities DEVELOPMENT

1. Form F's have been approved by customers on Renovation of Operations Building plus Relocation of various Shops and Offices. Approval has been received from Taipei to proceed on these projects. Form F's have also been submitted to the customer for :

a. Terminal Parking Apron - SGN
b. 204- Helicopter Pads - SGN
c. Improvement of Passenger Lounge - DAD
d. Completion of Ramp and Drainage - DAD

I expect no action on these pending availability of FY 71 funds to the Customers. I am confident all the above will ba approved except "c" and that "d" will be reduced in scope.

IV. GENERAL AFFAIRS
See attachment.

V. MEDICAL

Number of visits:	1191
Accidents:	92
Hospitalization:	2
Unhospitalization:	90
Outcalls:	4
Phys. examinations:	28
Sick leaves:	154

VI. PERSONNEL

1. Personnel department activities were routine in nature, the only exception being PM's Company business trip to TPE at mid-month. APM at month's end, departed for HKG, TPE, LAX and NYC for a period of about two months. He is expected to return in early July.

2. General information - The RVN Ministry of Labor is trying, albeit unconsciously, to aid and abet the Company's cost reduction program they have begun to disapprove Work Permit applications submitted on behalf of some of our TCN employees and have been requiring these employees to leave Vietnam. It is a little too soon to tell just how many Work Permits will be disapproved. However, we do not feel that the situation will become critical since we do have the right of appeal, through and with the support of the U.S. Embassy.

3. Personnel Strength - Saigon Base

Classif.	[redacted]								Total	
Permanent	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
	37	130	128	13	137	2	10	4	312	149

[redacted]								Total	
GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
490(f)	12**	2		2		1*		495	12

Temporary: [redacted] 1 ; [redacted] 1

Pre-processed: [redacted] 15

(*) : [redacted]
(**): [redacted]
(f) :

Ground Personnel	:	824
Flight personnel	:	161
Total	:	985

Danang Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]								Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
Permanent	4		13		17		68		102	
Pre-processed							1		1	

NhaTrang Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]								Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
Permanent	3		10		23		59		95	
Pre-processed							1		1	

Cantho Sub4 Base

Classif.	[redacted]			
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	1	10	2	13

VII. TRAFFIC/AAM

1. The general flow of passengers and cargo continued at a normal rate with little difficulty encountered in the day to day operation.

2. This office has accepted the administration of the AFDs during the absence of the MAPS and also is assisting the SAT arrivals and departures.

3. This is the occasional complaint of a passenger of items missing from their luggage when checked thru Air America. The majority of those losses reported are jewels, money and other hi-value items left in open or unlocked baggage which no doubt is a strong temptation to personnel with a limited income. We had our Security pull a spot check of the laborers lockers but did not uncover any customer items. The possibility remains that item was either not placed in the baggage or that it was removed by someone other than airline personnel.

	March	April
Passengers departure SGN (all contracts)	6,315	5,606
" arrival SGN "	6,997	6,573
Outbound cargo SGN	77,491	61,215
Inbound cargo SGN	127,260	68,369

TRAFFIC/USAID

Cargo (including AF Caribou A/C)

	March	April
Outbound (lbs) SGN	1,466,790	987,032
Inbound (lbs) SGN	414,349	425,494

VIII. OPERATIONS

1. C-47 revenue flying time was approximately 172 hours less than the previous month. The customer gives no indication that we can expect an increase in C-47 time.

2. There were 21 controllable and 27 non-controllable delays with a total of 891 Saigon departures. This averages out to be 97.0% on time departures.

FIC and the Emergency Section remain in good order.

3. Flight time report (see attachment A)
Ground Fire Incidents report (see attachment B)

4. Accident reports

Date	A/C Type/No.	Location	Remarks
04	C-46/N67984	Danang	Minor scratch across the bottom left aileron (approx 17" x 3/4" very light) noted during walk around at Danang prior to flight. Investigation revealed that the scratch resulted possibly as the result of a refueling truck attempted to drive under the outboard wing area. Continued emphasis on safe driving of vehicles in the vicinity of aircraft is being emphasized.
20	VTB/N91295	V-17, SVN	1/16" bend in one of first stage compressor blades found during preflight No. 2 engine. Cause: small piece of engine inlet duct, at leading edge, broke off and contacted speed check blade. After a thorough inspection aircraft was released for flight. SI issued for inspection on Engine Air Inlet Duct for cracks.
24	VTB/N91295	Cantho	During inspection damage was noted to the No.2 eng. seven each first stage compressor blades. Investigation revealed that a small part of the speed probe had separated and caused the damage to the first stage impeller. Two dents and heavy scratches on the remaining portion of the sensor indicated damage first caused by an unknown hard object possibly while operating in up-country fields.

5. Ground transportation

Aggregate microbusses mileage	24642 km or 15401 miles
Microbusses downtime	288 hrs 30'
Microbusses pax carried	3264 pax
Isuzu bus mileage	6291 km or 3931 miles
Isuzu bus down-time	33 hrs 48'
Isuzu bus pax carried	10394 pax
Supply vehicle mileage	2817 km or 1760 miles
Supply vehicle down-time	11 hrs

6. Flying

1. Another month accident free A great precedent and a good one, is being set. All will agree it is most gratifying to enjoy such a position.

2. MFD/SVN spent three days at Vientiane in Air Drop orientation. How qualified he became is a matter of conjecture, he got a "SHACK" one day and a "PANEL" the next. Overall the training received was most beneficial.

3. In general the morale of the pilots is very high. Few complaints are in evidence on the hostel at Danang and the Quarters at Cantho. The hostel at DAD is in the process of planning for renovation. The Customer at Cantho is to be approached regarding the facilities there.

IX. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. The installation of Transponders in our SVN aircraft was completed this month to give us the satisfaction of beating the schedule by several weeks.

2. The flow time on the Porter aircraft 4B Services has leveled off at eight days. The first one turned out in January 1970 was scheduled at ten days. Further improvement will probably come at a slower rate, depending upon the application of experience and the development of methods and procedures.

3. Facilities improvements and development are reduced to a low level. Work is continuing on several projects, such as improvement of the water and power systems, and providing employee recreational facilities, etc; however, most activities are confined to reshuffling and maintaining that which we already have on hand.

4. MTS/SVN Boyd Messecher departs 1st May on Home Leave for four months.

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

Fixed Wing
The work load has slightly decreased during the month of April.

On turbo-prop aircraft several isolated cases of engine and airframe components malfunctioning were encountered. Several engines were changed due to oil leak at the front and rear carbon seals, low oil pressure, internal malfunction of torque system, low power output and one engine was changed due to FOD.

The first phase of training on the Management-Development Course has been completed by the group of twenty persons comprising Leadmen, Crew Chiefs and Supervisors. The second and the last phase will begin during the next month. A very favourable response has been shown by those attending the classes.

Rotary Wing
The month of April was quite busy, flying over 1050 hours and performing eight number 2 services, 1 number 3A service, 2 number 3B service, [redacted] Inspections and 1 high time engine change.

Preplanning to cover the DAD heavy services with the present limited number of qualified Supervisors becomes quite a problem when flight schedules cannot be spaced to spread out the work load, as consistantly happens. The heavy vacation/home leave requirements contribute to that coverage problem.

Shops
Overall Shop activities remained on an even par. The USFAA Inspection Authorization (IA) activities were at a normal pace. The following aircraft underwent Annual Inspections and were recertificated: 204B N1305X, PC-6 N180K and C-46 N67984.

Planning/Engineering
DPLNG Mr. Burkett visited with us for 4 days in the last part of April. His visit was very beneficial to us.

General Maintenance
The deteriorated water pipe supplying the Personnel/Traffic Area is being replaced.

The installation of larger power cables between GMD and the Main Transformer Building is complete with the exception of Terminal lugs.

The extension of the revetment wall adjacent to the Operations Bldg by 12 feet is complete. This was required afterthe old "Mice Room" Shack was torn down.

The TSN water well is still marginal due to the dry season and we are forced to supplement the supply from the well in front of operations. The Airport Commandant has been queried as to the plan of action he is taking to supply the amount of water agreed upon.

Electronics
There has been a sigh of relief, that SVN easily met, and beat, the dates of completion for ATC Transponder installation. This was the project of AR 9053.

Two EA-PC6-34-2 and one EA-VTB-34-9 installation were completed for this month. This brought the project of AR 9053 to completion.

Technical Training
The following courses were completed during the month:

- Non-destructive Testing
- Basic Helicopter course
- Management Course (supervisor)

Courses now in progress:

- Management course
- 204B Helicopter flight mechanic
- Supply course

This month our training facilities increased by one small classroom. This room is now in use for small classes, meeting and FOT.

Supply
During this period, RSD/SGN held the first formal Supply Training Course ever conducted at a Regional Station. Due to work requirements the class was limited to six [redacted] employees. Classes were organized and instructed by [redacted] from IMN with the help of STT/SGN. Because of the excellent results of the [redacted] course a new class will start during May with again six more [redacted] employees students. Classes with the second course will be conducted by RSD Supervisors and Technical Training Instructors.

This was also a heavy month for Customs clearance, with his usual dispatch, and despite the daily increasingly stricter regulations, the Customs agent was able to clear the commercially shipped cargo again with minimum delays.

During the month, the Property and Inventory Unit completed cycle inventory of class 02H for a total of 505 line items. Also completed was property cycle inventory of A/C 1636 (P-Z) for a total of 542 line items. In addition to cycle inventory, 52 property transactions were made.

X. HOSTEL OCCUPANCY

From 25 March 1970 (Hostel COB) to the end of this month, nine Certificates of "non-availability of company furnished accommodations" were issued.

Original signed for SMSGN by
[illegible]

E. J. Theisen

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT

APRIL 1970

1. Contract 7001 -

A/C No.	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
N67984	130+12	104+25	10+02	8+37
N67985	165+05	134+48	8+13	6+59
B928	142+28	114+30	9+55	7+44
B910	119+28	99+28	9+00	7+18
B912	120+58	97+47	13+14	11+46
6147	83+51	64+20		
8084	118+53	97+41	1+56	1+45
5559	62+46	52+03		
5994	154+33	129+37		
B829	65+18	53+30	18+41	14+28
N539Y	154+05	130+44		
N544Y	167+10	147+48		
N9518Z	124+37	106+51	10+43	8+48
N6154U	94+40	84+09		
N9956Z	17+51	14+15	8+01	6+04
N7770S	95+57	84+08	3+07	2+14
N9577Z	7+38	6+08	13+07	10+40
N36740	60+07	52+00	2+24	1+20
N9664C			15+49	14+31
N91295	84+15	69+13	0+46	0+41
N9838Z	98+56	84+09	2+17	1+33
N37280	66+42	58+37		
N7695C	68+22	59+24		
N180K	123+03	109+58	1+17	0+40
N285L	174+34	154+43	0+45	0+41
N391R	13+17	10+25	6+59	6+21
N394R	114+37	103+22	1+04	0+52
N9444	111+26	92+42	0+54	0+34
N198X	7+30	6+45	1+25	0+40
N153L	64+33	53+10	0+42	0+34
N12490	57+35	52+36		
N748N	132+46	112+28	3+34	2+24
N152L	55+19	44+34	16+59	15+26
N184L	146+27	127+33	8+34	7+14
N185K	32+52	27+30	1+57	1+07
N192X	85+24	74+27	1+03	0+32
N194X	124+04	104+44	7+45	6+33
N393R	87+31	72+55		
N1303X	121+34	121+34	2+30	2+30
N1304X	77+47	77+47	9+20	9+20

N1305X	128+24	128+24	6+15	6+15
N1306X	53+19	53+19	4+19	4+19
N1307X	150+29	150+29	1+00	1+00
N8514F	77+15	77+15	6+35	6+35
N8535F	120+25	120+25	2+15	2+15
Sub-total	4264+39	3722+40	331+49	282+19

2. Contract 7002 -

B928	9+22	7+49
N539I	3+37	2+38
N544I	4+22	3+27
N9518Z	6+24	5+23
N6154U	31+19	26+50
N9956Z	32+33	28+14
N7770B	25+31	22+07
N3674G	12+50	10+40
N91295	15+29	13+33
N9638Z	10+29	8+45
N3728G	44+41	36+55
N7695C	44+54	39+14
N180K	15+20	13+36
N391R	40+03	35+10
N394R	9+12	8+21
N9444	2+16	1+46
N198X	66+27	53+16
N153L	71+09	64+18
N12450	34+50	30+29
N748N	18+27	15+50
N152L	46+19	36+18
N184L	21+39	18+16
N185K	49+55	40+26
N192X	72+29	66+55
N194X	28+18	23+50
N393R	61+37	56+47
N1303X	19+00	19+00
N1304X	30+26	30+26
N1305X	31+40	31+40
N1306X	87+09	87+09
N1307X	9+21	9+21
N8514F	53+15	53+15
N8535F	34+07	34+07
Sub-total	1044+30	935+51

3. Contract 7003 -

B910	8+45	7+18
B912	15+07	12+16
5559	5+38	3+33

B829	1+18	0+55
N539I	11+47	10+00
N544I	4+45	3+48
N9956Z	6+16	4+17
N7770B	3+19	2+22
N9577Z	0+56	0+39
N91295	7+28	4+51
N9838Z	4+54	3+31
N3728G	2+07	1+24
N7695C	2+13	1+48
N180K	2+30	2+05
N285L	1+08	1+07
N394R	3+46	2+34
N9444	4+40	3+50
N748N	6+23	4+44
N152L	3+49	3+02
N184L	1+19	1+07
N185K	1+17	0+57
N192K	74+54	69+19
N194K	2+02	1+42
N393R	3+32	2+39
N1304K	3+28	3+28
N1305K	3+22	3+22
N8535F	18+06	18+06
Sub-total	204+49	174+44

4. Contract 0030 -

N9577Z	55+14	48+57
N7770B	1+54	1+30
N7695C	2+24	2+05
Sub-total	59+32	52+32

5. Contract 0069 -

N9664C	70+06	59+30
N391R	8+23	7+51
N152L	5+40	4+48
N185K	33+00	29+22
N6154U	4+54	4+29
N9956Z	4+22	3+55
N3674Q	3+21	2+56
Sub-total	129+46	113+11

Total Revenue Block Time	5703+16
Total Revenue Flight Time	4998+58
Total Non-Revenue Block Time	331+49
Total Non-Revenue Flight Time	282+19
GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	6035+05
GRAND TOTAL FLIGHT TIME	5281+17

Flight Time by Type of Aircraft

Type of A/C	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
C-46	711+25	578+21	77+37	65+11
C-47	426+17	347+14	3+52	3+30
Bailed C-47	66+36	54+25	22+39	17+37
DHC-4	345+46	298+25		
VIE	1112+43	953+09	100+54	83+13
Porter	2021+22	1748+17	73+19	59+20
204-B	1019+07	1019+07	53+28	53+28
TOTAL	5703+16	4998+58	331+49	282+19

L. G. Parrish
SON/SGN

cc: BK/SGN
MFD/SGN
TM/SGN
File.

"Attachment A"

GENERAL AFFAIRS

1. Following Airport Commandant and staff's visit of AAM, an Air Vietnam made up of:

[redacted]

made a similar tour of our installations after an informal lunch with company management at VNAF officers club.

During the tour, they were briefed on various departments' activities with particular emphasis on technical training. They saw the nine [redacted] aircraft mechanics at work in our metal shop and were very impressed.

[redacted] expressed the desire of sending 2 or 3 technicians to attend our training courses for possible assignment as instructor after graduation.

2. The Directorate general of taxation has agreed in principle to reimburse taxes levied on meal and transportation allowances for [redacted] employees for the period prior to 13 September 1969, the date on which exemption of these taxes were granted.

THAI COMMUNIST INSURGENTS INCREASE ACTIVITY

Communist guerrilla operations, which have been moderate so far this dry season, are on the increase. The major threat remains in the remote north and north-central provinces, where a force of some 1,600 insurgents continues to erode the government's positions along the Lao border. The security situation is especially bad in portions of Nan and Chiang Rai provinces, where guerrillas have harassed several army outposts, forcing the evacuation of at least one.

Bangkok has sought to ease guerrilla pressure by the heavy use of air and artillery strikes. An army sweep operation last month into an insurgent stronghold near the Lao border in eastern Nan Province met with disastrous results, however. The guerrillas shot down two government helicopters besides managing to overrun several government base camps and inflicting a number of casualties on Thai regulars. The operation was sparked by a growing number of reports that the insurgents were trying to seize and administer whole villages in this region.

The security situation is more favorable in the northeast, where the Communists are still on the defensive. The enemy's much-heralded dry-season offensive has not materialized, a development that may further undermine the wavering morale of many rank-and-file guerrillas, as well as the appeal of the insurgency to villagers. Guerrilla incidents involving the assassination of informants and ambushes of local security teams remain endemic to the northeast region, however.

Communist guerrillas in the mid-South region have sharply increased their activity in recent months, particularly in the province of Phatthalung. The government's counterinsurgency apparatus has not made any meaningful effort to deal with the marked deterioration of security in this area. As a result, police are reluctant to wear uniforms; travel to outlying villages by provincial and district officials is reported to be at a standstill; and local officials appear uncertain about how to cope with increased guerrilla terrorism.

The counterinsurgency picture is considerably brighter in the southern reaches of the peninsula, where activity by the Malayan Communist Terrorist Organization has been at a fairly low level. In recent weeks joint ground and air operations by Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur have uprooted several insurgent base camps along the Malaysian border, one of which was believed to have been the headquarters of the terrorists 12th "regiment." (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

NND 941536 --- 3902

Thailand: Insurgent Activity



NND 941536 --- 3 903

COMMUNIST CHINA TAKES OVER TANZANIAN MILITARY PROGRAM

Peking now is virtually the sole provider of military aid and training to Tanzania, following the departure of Soviet and Canadian advisers early this year. A small group of East German advisers in Zanzibar, however, still shares naval training activities with the Chinese.

With the elimination of Soviet and Canadian advisers, work has begun on several long-term projects. A naval base is being constructed, with Chinese assistance, near Dar es Salaam. The base is part of a $10-million naval development program toward which the Chinese are providing assistance of some $4 million agreed to in late 1968. In early 1970, over 100 Tanzanians went to China for a long-postponed, one- to two-year naval engineering and technology course. Peking has also started work on an air defense "system" that reportedly will include the construction of an air base, the training of pilots, and the provision of an undetermined number of aircraft. An unknown number of Chinese military construction experts arrived in the early part of the year, reportedly to begin work on the military airfield.

Chinese military assistance to Dar es Salaam dates back to September 1964, when a small contingent of advisers was sent to familiarize the army with the new Chinese small arms that had been delivered under the first contract signed in February of that year. Since that time, agreements totaling over $12 million have been signed for military hardware including small arms, antiaircraft guns, medium tanks, patrol boats and landing craft, and an assortment of other military-related equipment. Part of the attraction of Chinese military aid is Peking's willingness to supply equipment free of charge, or, at most, on liberal credit terms. ~~(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)~~

* * *

NND 941536 ---3904

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
JUNE 1970

I. GENERAL

1. Total block time for June was was 5588 hours as compared with 5825 hours in May and 5811 hours in April 1970.

2. The security condition in Saigon remains "stable". There were several student demonstrations to establish peace in Vietnam plus several other obscure issues of government controls and school administration. They did not reach the violent proportions of those routinely experienced in the USA. The veterans manifested dissent by constructing market stalls on public property along several boulevards in downtown Saigon which degraded the environment and disrupted the orderly conduct of business and traffic in these areas. The veterans were complaining about the lack of veterans benefits. After several days of strong persuasion by the police, the veterans agreed to dismantle their stalls. At the moment, all is calm in Saigon.

3. Labor conditions: Because of the cutback in labor strength at Thu Duc due to the take-over by RVN from USAID of extensive warehousing facilities, there was a threat of a General Sympathy Strike with employees of Esso, Caltex, Shell and several lesser companies participating. The general strike, due to government controls and lower wages never "got off the ground". It is gratifying to note that AAM employees never considered the possibility of participation.

4. BM Saigon returned from 35 days annual leave in the Z.I. to find that SOM Parrish had done an excellent job of filling in as Acting BM during his absence. Meanwhile our management-level manning is sagging due to accrued leave which must be liquidated. Boyd Mesecher (RTS) is on four months leave (1 May through 31 August). SZ DAD Cambre is on four months leave (11 July through 17 October 1970). MF/RW Hitchman will be on leave 20 July through 30 Sept. PM, Frank Nihill is on leave 13 July through 8 August. ADSAFE George Keller will be on leave 20 July through 8 Sept. Al Harris (Assistant to SOM Parrish) is on leave 25 June through 30 July. Other absences on leave of lower levels of supervision result in very thin management manning in SVN, however, the "second team" seems to be carrying the load quite well.

5. Air Cambodia is operating in and out of Saigon carrying well-dressed "refugees" on a non-scheduled basis four to six days a week.

With the exception of a few intransit passengers to Singapore, the outbound passenger manifest is almost negative.

6. We have performed a number 2 service and major clean-up of VTB M3728G in anticipation of transfer to UTH. Meanwhile it is being kept in service under VN-70 Contract. After transfer, 28G will be replaced on VN-70 Contract by VTB M98382 now in temporary storage.

7. It is apparent we are about to "overrun" AR #8320 for the Danang hostel by approximately US$1700.00 due to the discontinuance of NSA supply support and per diem costs for TCS personnel from CMD SGN to perform the work. This was an oversight on our part. In any event an existing AR #2255 to upgrade SZ DAD quarters, which will now become part of the hostel facilities, was with held from further work due change in programming and is more than adequate to provide funding for the total Danang hostel project which includes the existing hostel plus SZ quarters which are being converted to additional hostel facilities under the cited Appropriation Requests.

8. As of 8 July 1970, Continental Air Services has operated the following fleet in SVN :

C-47	8
DO-28	2
Skyvan	1
Beech Baron	6
H-18 Super Beech	1
Total	18

II. CUSTOMER RELATIONS

Have reached an all time high. There are no known areas of misunderstanding or question involving AAM Operations.

III. FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT

In the area of facilities development it appears there is very little left to be accomplished to achieve a completely efficient configuration:

(1) AR 2438 - Concrete Drainage Ditch and Concrete Pavement DAD. This project is 60% complete and progressing on schedule.

(2) AR 2422 - Renovation of Operations Building Saigon. Contract has been signed. Work should commence in late July.

(3) AR 2449 - Saigon Terminal Parking Apron. Out for bid. Expect to get this project moving soon.

(4) Project 6702 - 204B touchdown Pads SGN. Form F has been submitted for Customer consideration. We will continue to exert pressure on this project but at the moment it does not look very hopeful.

IV. GENERAL AFFAIRS (Unreported)

V. FISCAL

Saigon Base Accounting was moved into new offices located on the second floor of the MHD Maintenance building south side of Hangar #1.

The station allowance increase for American [redacted] employees was reflected on the June payslips and was retroactive from April 1, 1970. The adjustment for [redacted] personnel are being made now and will be reflected in next month's report.

The station allowance increase for American and TCN personnel has tended to tone down the hard feelings of ground personnel, but the general opinion is that ground personnel should receive other benefits the pilots received. Such other benefits being increased weight allowance for personnel effects, better insurance coverage and family relocation per diem.

VI. MEDICAL

Number of sick call: 1269
Accidents: 30
Hospitalized sick call : 1 died
Unhospitalized accident: 30
Hospitalized accident: None
Outcalls: 3
Physical examination : 34
Sick leaves: 211

VII. PERSONNEL

Apart from routine activities, [redacted] spent a week in Taiwan escorting three RVN Government Officials (from the Ministries of Labor and Education) on a tour of Company facilities. The Officials came away extremely impressed with the facilities and our training programs, and this public relations effort should aid us considerably in future dealings with the government (especially with respect to securing Work Permits for our TCNs).

Our Vietnamese employees declined to participate in either of the month's general strikes, the second of which ultimately involved over 100,000 workers. This non-participation is a fine tribute indeed to our management - employee relations at all levels.

The piastre is being traded on the open market at approximately VN$ 370 to US$1.

Personnel Strength - Saigon Base

Classif.	[redacted]								Total	
Permanent	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
	37	128	123	13	135	2	8	3	303	146

[redacted]								Total	
GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
489@	11#*	2		2		1*		797	157

Temporary: [redacted] 1

Pre-processed: GRD 15 [redacted] FLT 2 [redacted]

(*) [redacted]
(**)
(@)

Ground Personnel	813
Flight Personnel	159
Total	972

Danang Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]								Total	
Permanent	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
	3		13		18		68		102	

Pre-processed 2

Ground Personnel	104
Flight Personnel	0
Total	104

Nha Trang Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]								Total	
Permanent	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
	3		8		22		56		89	

Pre-processed 1

Ground Personnel	90
Flight Personnel	0
Total	90

Can Tho Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]			Total
Permanent	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
	1	10	3	14

Total Ground Personnel 14

HOSTEL OCCUPANCY

During the month of June, only three Certificates of "non-availability of company furnished accommodations" were issued.

VIII. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. Overall activities in SVN Stations were lower than that of recent months. The reduced activity was a fairly direct reflection of the 4.7 percent drop in overall flying.

The rainy season has brought its usual problems of productive time losses, interruptions of communications and aircraft ignition systems breakdown. Power interruptions have been less than in previous years.

Preparations for the implementation of the new Skilled Labor Cost Accounting System required a lot of attention and training time by all employees; particularly Supervisory.

Facilities improvements at SGN included the completion of the Accounting offices and movement of the accounting personnel to the RMD Shops Building. The completion of a walkway from the hangar to the terminal has contributed the safety of personnel by reducing pedestrian traffic on the aircraft ramp. Concreting of the Danang terminal/hangar area is well underway. This project, as well as the Danang Hostel renovation has required considerable time and attention from GMD

2. Aircfaft Maintenance - Fixed Wing
As a result of a decrease in total number of aircraft departures and arrivals, the general activity declined. Routine maintenance comprised the major portion of the workload.

3. Rotary Wing - June workload was average until the last week; one number two service was performed at VO3, eight at VO1, one number three A at VO1, two engine hot section inspections, and three engine changes.

Flying time for the month was down somewhat to about 980 as compared with the previous three month of 1050.

4. Shops - The overall workload for the early part of June was routine but turned heavy toward the last part due to a PC-6 and a helicopter No. 4 service.

The Shops Equipment Shop has placed increased effort in reworking and marking VTB seats on a fleet basis.

5. Planning - S/PLNG has made a tour to VCA, DAD and NHA this month giving training classes to the Technical Services personnel. Training classes for RAD and RGMD personnel in SGN Base were held at the same time by S/TT, SGN

6. General Maintenance - AR 2421, relocation of offices is well along. AR 2422, renovation of the Operations building, the contract was signed with A&M Enterprise. AR 2438, Concrete Paving in DaNang was started this month. AR 8320, Renovation of the Hostel in DaNang begun on 24

June, this is being accomplished by in-house labor.

7. Building and Grounds Maintenance: The grass plots in front of the Cafeteria were reworked and seeded with grass seeds obtained from HongKong. However the seeds were received with zero germination.

8. Communications Maintenance - We were more concerned during the month with the cables for teletypes and telephones which gave us more delays on traffic than the equipment to which they are connected.

Teletype circuits and Maintenance: Most of the troubles were due to bad cables. If there is a heavy down pour in one day, the following day TTY circuits are all in bad shape including telephone trunk lines. It takes two, three or four days before the circuits are restored to normal. The Creed TTY circuit on the sending side was out twelve days because of defective lines. Cable trouble is also true with CCR-CAT TTY circuits this time of the year.

Transmitters' Maintenance: We encountered trouble with our daytime 34-A HF transmitter. The 30-volt rectox rectifiers developed leakage which brought down the 30-volt control voltage to only 20 volts.

9. Technical Training - Courses completed: Supervisor management, 204B maintenance. The SGN-line Service Mechanic course has been delayed due to the poor response of the Vietnamese to Air America's "Help wanted ads".

Shipping/Receiving activities experienced a slightly decrease.

Procurement section experienced a little smaller number of transactions than May. A total of 210 line items of commodities were purchased from the local market this month. Total value of commodities purchased from Saigon/Cholon market amounted to VN$658,204.00.

Since the Naval Support Activity (NSA) in DAD has been deactivated on 14 June 70, Procurement switched its sources to HKG and local vendors for certain items. This entailed a somewhat slower procedure and more careful approach to bying. The sometimes wide range of qualities, prices and local problems have significantly added to the workload, when compared to the relatively simpler NSA operation. Negotiations to open an account with the U.S. Army Vietnam are still being carried on.

10. Customs. Surface vessel shipments are becoming more complicated as the customs requirements for documentation has been increased. On re-exportations, the temporary import documents must be furnished. This requirement can be easily filled on large equipment or vehicles.

X. OPERATIONS

1. Flight Time Report (See attachment A)
2. Ground Fire Incidents Report (See attachment B)
3. Accident reports

Date	A/C Type/No.	Location	Remarks
09	VTB/N6154U	V-11, SVN	During operation at V-11 number 3 blade sustained a nick approximately 1 inch deep, believed from a piece of small rock.
13	204B/N1304X	V-69,SVN	During post flight inspection noted a 1/2" hole in the leading edge of the tail rotor blade. The result of hostile action.

4. Flying Safety

No accidents or incidents since 2 January 1970.

5. Ground Transportation

Aggregate microbusses mileage	25071 km
Microbusses down-time	335 hrs 32'
Microbusses passengers carried	3234 pax
Isuzu bus mileage	6009 km
Isuzu bus down time	55 hrs 54'
Isuzu bus pax carried	10290 pax
Supply vehicle mileage	2946 km
Supply vehicle down-time	22 hrs 50'

6. Flying

Our time and most of our efforts were primarily concerned with DHC4/b851 and pilot requirements for same, Captains Broussard, Parker and McCauley and the over-temp of VTB N7770B.

Caribou B-851 arrived and was put to work by the customer shortly after it arrived. Because of the "B" registry there has been some difficulty in setting up proper crew manning in the program. The problem appears to be resolved on a temporary basis by cross training pilots. Presumably the Bid System will provide a final solution. Meanwhile the pilots in this program are "maxing" the time limit.

Investigation, coordination, termination and the hearings concerning Broussard and Parker definitely took a disproportionate amount of the month's time. The biggest single problem in this and similar cases is the involvement of FEPA and the AAM Agreement. Since FEPA benefits from the continuous services of a trained attorney, the odds are somewhat stacked in their favor when MFD is forced to present the prosecution side of a case without professional or trained legal help.

MFD visited Danang facilities. The most notable finding was the water which is taken from the well on the premises is grossly contaminated.

The Nhatrang quarters seem to be in good shape except the lack of air conditioners which are definite necessities for our crews to get adequate

rest while on RON. A steady stream of complaints has been produced by this one shortage.

Crews lockers are now available in Saigon and are being issued.

And another month accident free.

XI. TRAFFIC/AAM

	May	June
Passengers departure SGN (all contracts)	5,414	5,432
Passengers arrival SGN (all contracts)	6,092	6,231
Outbound cargo SGN	81,608	146,640
Inbound cargo SGN	70,754	70,700

TRAFFIC/USAID

Cargo (inclucing AF Caribou A/C)

	May	June
Outbound (lbs) SGN	1,893,269	800,054
Inbound (lbs) SGN	364,518	392,621

E.J. Theisen

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT

- JUNE 1970 -

1. Contract 7001 -

A/C No.	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
N67984	156+08	134+37		
N67985	195+19	160+31	3+50	3+28
B928	71+38	56+45	1+52	1+36
B910	79+32	66+31	2+47	2+20
B912	120+49	102+33	3+34	2+48
6147	54+22	43+43	3+00	2+25
8084	58+55	47+07		
5559	120+50	104+22		
5994	108+39	89+07	10+52	9+20
B829	83+25	67+46	20+16	18+48
N539Y	159+42	139+16	4+25	3+40
N544Y	144+48	115+25	5+47	4+43
B851	44+22	36+28	3+52	2+56
N9518Z	129+27	110+06	1+40	0+52
N6154U	30+25	25+53		
N9956Z	124+34	107+21		
N7770B	61+14	52+19	2+20	1+38
N9577Z	1+20	0+49	11+46	9+19
N36740	77+15	65+47		
N91295	76+30	67+01		
N37280	103+19	89+51	1+20	1+05
N7695C	74+18	62+57		
N180K	94+54	83+51		
N285L	115+41	100+30		
N391R	56+09	49+47		
N394R	87+42	73+53	2+52	1+36
N9444	119+07	105+18	0+55	0+32
N198X	98+36	89+29	2+30	1+48
N1531	121+23	110+10	5+33	4+21
N12450	5+55	5+33		
N748N	46+41	43+08	1+33	1+05
N1521	102+08	85+00	9+49	8+52
N1841	129+00	105+51	3+22	2+37
N185K	48+59	39+46	1+16	0+50
N192X	29+13	24+05		
N194X	108+48	93+02	4+45	3+33
N393R	40+13	36+17		
N1303X	99+47	99+47	3+20	3+20
N1304X	154+32	154+32	3+30	3+30
N1305X	23+34	23+34	0+30	0+30
N1306X	132+24	132+24	6+35	6+35
N1307X	95+21	95+21	11+23	11+23

M6514F	87+05	87+05	2+15	2+15
M8535F	138+09	138+09	1+00	1+00
Sub total	4012+12	3522+47	138+29	118+45

2. Contract 7002 -

M544Y	10+25	8+20
B851	3+40	2+33
M9516Z	5+38	4+59
M6154U	63+59	53+47
M9956Z	5+42	4+52
M7770B	44+33	37+57
M36740	44+53	39+20
M91295	16+58	14+54
M37280	3+29	3+03
M7695C	29+57	25+01
M180X	24+24	21+20
M285L	17+22	15+45
M391R	25+19	22+02
M394R	29+56	26+32
M9444	6+15	5+27
M198X	23+00	20+08
M153L	1+59	1+32
M12450	61+30	53+54
M748N	96+06	88+17
M152L	2+50	2+15
M184L	46+05	37+01
M185X	77+17	70+31
M192X	53+29	75+15
M194X	2+52	2+39
M393R	62+45	57+21
M1303X	24+15	24+15
M1304X	12+38	12+38
M1305X	61+36	61+36
M1306X	3+45	3+45
M1307X	3+03	3+03
M8514F	28+03	28+03
M8535F	33+26	33+26
Sub total	926+49	860+51

3. Contract 7003 -

B928	37+19	32+17
B910	49+54	42+41
6147	3+47	2+19
8084	2+54	2+17
M539Y	37+20	32+47
M544Y	14+44	11+39
B851	16+07	12+52

N95182	0+56	0+42
N6154U	1+47	1+11
N9956Z	1+32	1+24
N3674G	2+51	1+51
N3728G	1+05	0+40
N7695C	0+59	0+40
N180K	2+12	1+47
N285L	7+52	6+17
N391R	2+09	1+31
N394R	6+50	5+01
N9444	5+55	5+08
N198X	5+04	4+28
N153L	7+01	6+16
N748N	2+50	2+37
N152L	6+08	4+39
N184L	3+19	2+18
N185K	10+01	6+59
N192X	1+09	0+50
N194X	1+28	0+57
N1303X		
N1304X	13+21	13+21
N1307X	10+18	10+18
N8514F	29+12	29+12
N8535F	52+51	52+51
Sub total	286+04	244+39

4. Contract 0080 -

N9577Z	88+24	75+11
N192X	0+52	0+33
N152L	6+08	5+30
Sub total	95+24	81+14

5. Contract 0069 -

N9664C	97+36	83+08
N91295	5+26	4+32
N6154U	1+52	1+43
N152L	8+39	7+52
N185K	3+15	2+58
N184L	3+51	3+15
Sub total	120+39	103+28

TOTAL REVENUE BLOCK TIME	5441+08
TOTAL REVENUE FLIGHT TIME	4812+59
TOTAL NON-REVENUE BLOCK TIME	138+29
TOTAL NON-REVENUE FLIGHT TIME	118+45

GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	5579 + 37
GRAND TOTAL FLIGHT TIME	4931 + 44

FLIGHT TIME BY TYPE OF AIRCRAFT

Type of A/C	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
C-46	710+39	595+55	12+03	10+12
Bailed C-47	349+27	288+55	13+52	11+45
C-47	83+25	67+46	20+16	18+48
DHC-4	431+08	359+20	14+04	11+19
VIB	1095+39	936+19	17+06	12+54
Porter	1820+15	1614+11	32+55	25+14
204-B	950+29	950+29	28+33	28+33
TOTAL	5441+08	4812+59	138+29	118+45

L. G. Farrish
SGM/SGH

cc: BK/SGH
MFL/SGH
TN/SGH
File.

FLIGHT INFORMATION CENTER

- SAIGON -

MONTHLY ACTIVITY REPORT

01-30 JUNE 1970

PART I

- Ground Fire Incidents -

Date	A/C No., Type & Contract	Place	Description
02 Jun	B912 C-46 7001	XS 8899	Capt. STALLMAN was on final at Tan-Son-Nhut when he heard one round pass near the starboard side of the a/c. Both pilot and co-pilot believed the a/c had sustained a hit, but no trace of the round or hole could be located. PIC continued his approach and landed safely. No personnel injury or a/c damage involved.
12 Jun	B829 C-47 7001	XS 3727	A/c was at 1000 ft altitude (just below overcast) when pilot heard one round of groundfire. Pilot immediately ascended into overcast and shortly thereafter another shot was heard. No personnel injury or a/c damage involved.
12 Jun	N1303X 204-B 7001	ZC 1551	While a/c was loading paxs at chopper pad, one round of 82mm mortar fire impacted approximately 30 yards from a/c. A/c immediately took off and returned to V206. No personnel injury or a/c damage involved.
13 Jun	N91295 VTB 7002	AQ 868020	Capt. SHINE was on the approach to Ban-Me-Thuot East when one small caliber round of groundfire hit the right tire of the a/c. The tire did not deflate and Capt. SHINE landed safely. A/c returned to Nha-Trang where the tire was replaced.

PART II

- Country Situation -

Air America's activity reports for South Vietnam are indicative of the low level of activity reported throughout the country this month. Danang, Bien Hoa, and Binh Thuy airfields received light indirect fire attacks sustaining minor damage. Saigon's activity was confined to two reported terrorists incidents and a continuation of student demonstrations. Allied operations in Cambodia diverted VC/NVA attention towards reestablishment of a seriously impaired logistic network outside of RVN. ARVN may soon have the opportunity to demonstrate the valuable experience and confidence gained in Cambodia in meeting an enemy "High Point" expected here earlier but delayed by Allied successes in Cambodia.

Reported by: R.N. Begien III
OPSP/SGN

Saigon 10th July 1970

[redacted]

M O N T H L Y R E P O R T
N H A - T R A N G
JUNE 1970

CAPITAL

June remained a quiet month with only routine problems. The first part of the month brought light hostile activity, but the balance of the month was peaceful.

Fueling increased slightly during this reporting period with a total of 968 + 28 Block Time generated at this station.

TRAFFIC

Traffic activities decreased slightly from previous months on both Passenger service and Cound service. No critical problems were encountered during June. This station is still awaiting the arrival of a cargo scale for the Cords Warehouse.

STATISTICS

	JUNE	MAY	1969
PASSENGER			
Departing	3598	3677	3402
Arriving	3267	3125	3264
TOTAL	6865	6802	6666
CARGO			
1. GROUND SERVICES (lbs)			
Departing	514,180	423,842	396,646
Arriving	143,927	199,470	240,360
TOTAL	658,107	623,312	637,006
2. COMPANY CARGO (Lbs)			
Departing	8,328	6,121	14,256
Arriving	5,478	8,845	11,624
TOTAL	13,806	14,966	25,880
3. GRAND TOTAL (Lbs) (1-2)			
Departing	522,508	430,003	328,018
Arriving	149,405	208,275	328,595
TOTAL	671,913	638,278	656,613

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

During the short period of time the undersigned has been on-station, it appears that the relationship with all customers is excellent. No problems in this area have arisen during this reporting period.

. . . 2

OPERATIONS

Weather was a minor problem during June. Early morning ground fog and low ceilings in the interior caused a number of flights to be aborted.

A/SZ attended a meeting with Military officals on 30 June. The meeting was called to discuss the proposed resurfacing of runway 12-30 at Nha Trang.

If and when this project is undertaken, the primary runway will be closed approximately thirty to forty days. Resurfacing will begin as soon as a decision is made as to which way it is to be done.

At present they are debating the possibility of opening the secondary runway (05-23) to fixed-wing aircraft. This will be decided after a survey team from 7th Air Force files it's report.

If, for safety reasons, they are unable to open runway C5-23, the Nha Trang airbase will be closed to fixed-wing operations while 4200 feet of runway 12-30 is resurfaced.

The entire project is now in a state of suspended animation while these decisions are being made.

Results of the resurfacing and the problems encountered will be reflected in subsequent reports.

A. COMMUNICATIONS

We are still plaqued with problems with the Motorola remote UHF/VHF equipment. It was off the air for three days during June and back-up VHF had to be utilized. It appears to the undersigned that there are still some bugs in the installation that must be ironed out.

HF communication remains normal with occasional interference caused by the Usaid radio.

B. FLIGHT FREQUENCY (see attached)

C. ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE COMPARISON

	June	May	1969
Arrival	477	499	531
Departure	479	497	533
RON	189	195	275

D. DELAYS

Percentage on time	97%	94%	98%

SECURITY

No major problems.

PERSONNEL

See attached.

FISCAL

No major problems.

LEGAL

No major problems.

TECHNICAL SERVICES

		JUNE	MAY	1969
1.	Transient overnight	278	304	256
2.	Overnight services	129	195	275
3.	Engine changes	4	1	1
4.	Propeller changes	0	0	1
5.	No. I services	0	0	3
6.	No II services	0	0	1
7.	Delays Maint/Mech	3	3	9
8.	Intermediate services	0	0	1
9.	AGF	7	1	23
10.	Outline recoveries	1	1	3
11.	Accident report (A/C)	0	2	2
12.	Accident report (PNL)	0	0	0

There was only one serious problem encountered in this area during this reporting period; that being the over-temp of both engines on VTB, N7770B, which resulted in a double engine change.

Original Signed By:
D. P. Grace
D.P. GRACE
A/SZ-NHA

UNCLASSIFIED

4 June 1970

LIST OF JOURNALISTS CAPTURED IN CAMBODIA

Americans:

1.	Sean Flynn, Svay Rieng prov.	6 April 1970.	Time photographer.
2.	Dana Stone, Svay Rieng prov.	6 April 1970.	CBS cameraman.
3.	Richard Dudman, Svay Rieng prov.	7 May 1970.	St.LOuis PD corr.
4.	Michael Morrow, Svay Rieng prov.	7 May 1970.	Dispatch News Serv.
5.	Miss Elizabeth Pond, Svay Rieng prov.	7 May 70.	Christian Sci. Mon.
6.	Welles Hangen, Takeo prov.	31 May 1970.	NBC, Hong Kong bur.
7.	George Syvertsen, Takeo prov.	31 May 1970.	CBS, Tokyo bur. ch.
8.	Merry Miller, Takeo prov.	31 May 1970.	CBS, New York prod.

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8.	Merry Miller, Takeo prov.	31 May 1970.	CBS, New York prod.

25223

JAN 1990

Doc 5

MEMORANDUM

TO : BM/SGN

DATE: 08 June 1970

FROM : SZ/DAD

REF. No. SZDAD/70/055

SUBJECT : DANANG Station Monthly Report for May 1970

GENERAL

Significant hostile activity was limited to one incident on the evening of 20 May. Four 140mm rockets impacted due west of the company ramp between the taxiway and runway 35R. Although several pounds of shrapnel were found scattered around the ramp, only one aircraft was hit. This damage was minor, consisting of a small skin puncture in the upper fuselage.

Four Southern Air Transport flights were handled during the month. All were apparently substitute service flights for the World Airways Stars and Stripes schedule. The first of these aircraft arrived shortly before midnight due to the necessity of pre-positioning crews, but the remainder created no problems since they arrived between 10:00 and 12:00 hours in the morning.

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

An arrangement has been made thru local CORDS channels to billet flight crews in their transient quarters when the company hostel is full. Since this situation usually arises when an additional aircraft RONs at Danang for CORDS, no reimbursement type difficulties were encountered.

LEGAL

The lease was renewed on the Old Hostel but complex problems developed regarding additional renewal options on the property. The landlord advised that he was no longer interested in granting any further options except at an exorbitant rent. He first demanded 800,000 piastres per year for the options, but finally came down to 600,000 piastres if paid two years in advance. To protect the company's planned renovation expenditures on this building, these terms were found agreeable.

FACILITIES

Hostel renovation plans have been finalized, and actual construction should commence in June. Significant improvements include the construction of interior walls to provide a total of thirteen seperate bed rooms (including four in the adjacent SZ residence), additional airconditioning, and the installation of more shower and lavatory facilities.

Forms F were signed on two long outstanding station facilities improvements. Funding was provided for the completion of the entire area paving and drainage ditch and passenger terminal renovation projects. The next problem will be that of reaching an agreement with the local contractors to perform the work

on the basis of bids submitted one year, and six months ago, respectively. Since no long term agreement could be reached on the utilization of the CSD shipping and receiving warehouse for an improved passenger terminal area, the original concept will now be implemented.

FISCAL

[redacted] payroll for the month totaled: [redacted]

Petty cash expenditures totaled: 37,940$VN.

OPERATIONS

Revenue flight time increased 38+37 hours as compared to the previous month. Scheduled Sunday flying has been further reduced by rescheduling a province, all day PC-6 requirement, to Saturday. Unless special requirements generate, the earliest Sunday departure is 10:00 hours and the latest arrival is 14:00 hours. All department personnel schedules have been revised to provide only one shift coverage on Sundays which permits fewer individual days off during the week.

The following is a breakdown of flight time generated by this station during May:

VN-70/AID	740+13
VN-70/Embassy	174+52
0069	6+26
Total	921+31

Revenue losses for the month were as follows:

Weather	1+40
Maintenance	Nil
Customer Cancellations..	10+30
Other	1+30
Total	13+40

The hostel occupancy factor was 90.13%. During the month, 780 piastres were disbursed to provide hotel accommodations for flight crew personnel. Non-availability certificates for a total of 35 nights were issued to TCS ground personnel.

COMMUNICATIONS

Saigon reception of Danang HF signals was only marginal during the month. Additional frequencies were installed, but the problem still remained. The remote VHF/UHF unit [redacted] performed without major difficulty.

Incoming and outgoing messages totaled 1492 and 1665 respectively.

TRAFFIC

Overall Traffic workload remained fairly constant. Close supervision of transiting international flights has precluded any further problems with local customs officials. It was necessary to bump 1200 pounds of cargo from one international flight due to additional fuel requirements and this cargo was reloaded on a subsequent flight without any delay from customs.

Passenger and cargo statistictics for the month of May are as follows:

	PAX IN	PAX OUT	CARGO IN	CARGO OUT
VN-7001/AID	2,783	2,631	235,986	319,085
VN-7002/EMB	364	695	1,430	5,660
0069	5	4	-	-
0030	19	25	-	-
AAM	97	110	8,087.7	16,224.2
Total	3,268	3,465	245,503.7	340,969.2

SECURITY

Several TCN air base passes expired during the month. It has been necessary to resort to obtaining temporary indorsements on Travel Orders to preclude problems with these personnel entering and departing the base. Renewed extension of stay receipts have been requested from Saigon so that permanent passes can be processed, but these have not been received as yet.

PERSONNEL

An updated listing extending the validity of residence permits for all TCN personnel until July was received from PM/SGN. No significant problems with local immigrations officials are anticipated until this list expires.

The personnel breakdown for Danang Station at the close of business, 31 May 1970, was as follows:

	[redacted]			
Permanent	3	17	13	68
Pre-Process	0	0	0	2
Temporary	0	0	0	0
Daily-Hire	0	0	0	0
TOTAL (103)	3	17	13	70

TECHNICAL SERVICES

RMD handled a total 590 arriving and 590 departing flights, as compared to 550 in each category in April. There were no delays which resulted in a revenue loss chargeable to maintenance. Number 1 services were performed on one PC-6 aircraft and five 204B aircraft, and two number 2 services on 204B aircraft were accomplished. One aircraft was placed on AOP status.

CM/DAD departed for an extended TCS assignment on 07 May. His duties were assumed by Crew Chief J. V. Rejante.

RCMD expended a total of 720 manhours of which 36 were utilized at the Old Hostel. Significant projects included painting the exterior of the Operations/Administration building and airconditioner maintenance.

The company account with the Danang Naval Support Activity will be terminated on 30 June. A similar account with the superceding Army Support Command will require an Inter-Service Support Agreement (ISSA). This agreement is being negotiated directly by Saigon since it is issued by USARV, Long-Binh. If the ISSA is obtained, it should be possible for RSD/SGN to open an account locally with the Army and thus eliminate the need for procuring the items carried thru Danang.

Original Signed by
WINSTON C. CAMBRE
Winston C. Cambre

cc: file

MEMORANDUM

TO : BM/SGN

DATE: 08 June 1970

FROM : SZ/DAD

REF. No. SZDAD/70/055

SUBJECT : DANANG Station Monthly Report for May 1970

GENERAL

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LEGAL

The lease was renewed on the Old Hostel but complex problems developed regarding additional renewal options on the property. The landlord advised that he was no longer interested in granting any further options except at an exorbitant rent. He first demanded 800,000 piastres per year for the options, but finally came down to 600,000 piastres if paid two years in advance. To protect the company's planned renovation expenditures on this building, these terms were found agreeable.

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on the basis of bids submitted one year, and six months ago, respectively. Since no long term agreement could be reached on the utilization of the CSD shipping and receiving warehouse for an improved passenger terminal area, the original concept will now be implemented.

FISCAL

[redacted] payroll for the month totaled: 899,463$VN.

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OPERATIONS

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Original Signed by
WINSTON C. CAMBRE
Winston C. Cambre

cc: file

MEMORANDUM

DATE: 11 June 1970

REF. No EMSGN/70/193

TO : AVP TPE

FROM : A/EMSGN

SUBJECT : May Monthly Report

Saigon Base Monthly Report for May 1970 is forwarded in three copies for your file.

L.G. Parrish

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
MAY 1970

I. GENERAL

1. Total block time for May was 5802 hours as compared with 5880 in April and 5910 in March.

2. The security situation in the Saigon and Cholon area again experienced changes this month. The curfew limitations earlier imposed (some areas as early as 2200L in the evening) were relaxed on the 22nd to what may be regarded as the normal 0100L to 0530L, for most areas effecting Company personnel.

One claymore mine was reported to have exploded in a BOQ area near the Seven Day Adventist hospital on 13 May causing extensive damage and injuries to indigenous personnel, but no Company personnel effected.

Danang sub-base also reported three rockets impacted the airbase on 12 May which caused only minor skin damage to one aircraft, VTB N3674G. Demonstrations, reported last month, continued in the downtown area, on an irregular basis, which proved to be more harassment than anything else.

3. DHC-4 B-851 continued to be a subject of interest to VN-70 customer and liaison with DFC was maintained to determine the availability of the aircraft, for assignment to that contract. At month's end a final determination had not been reached but the customer remained patient for a decision, which eventually was to his interest.

4. Major Accident/Incident rate for this month remains nil. ADSAFE continues to participate in pilot meetings and reportedly has covered numerous "safety" subjects, it is quite possible we here have a case of, "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure."

5. Danang hostel contract negotiations proved to be quite time consuming, requiring much coordination and discussions; however, an agreement was effective and plans for facilities improvement are beginning to materialize (More detailed information appears below).

II. CUSTOMER RELATIONS

Relations with Customers remain very good. Almost daily contacts have been made in the course of operations and there were no significant problems reported and no known questions unanswered.

III. FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT

Form P's were approved by the customers for: (1) Improvement of Passenger

Lounge (DAD) and (2) Completion of Concrete Paving and Drainage (DAD) and (3) Hostel and SZ Residence Renovation (DAD). AR Activities are reported as follows:

AR 2236 - Additional 200 KVA Transformer (SGN)

The SDL (City Power Company) installed twin 200 KVA Transformers late in the month. Project is considered complete. An AR Closure Notice has been forwarded.

AR 2163 - Emergency RGMD Water Supply (SGN)

This project is complete. An AR Closure Notice has been forwarded.

AR 2368 - Modification of SASD and Material Control Offices (SGN)

This project is 60% complete. We are waiting delivery of materials from NSA, DAD.

AR 2377 - West Ramp Power and Air Compressor Lines (SGN)

We are waiting delivery of materials from NSA/DAD.

AR 2438 - Completion of Concrete Pavement and Drainage (DAD)

A contract has been signed with Le Tho, the Contractor. Construction is expected to commence on 15 June.

AR 2437 - Improvement on Passenger Lounge (DAD)

A proposal is being studied by various Contractors in DAD to supply only labor with the possibility of USAID supply most of the material. We expect to sign a contract within a week.

AR 2422 - Renovation of the Operations Bldg (SGN)

The Security Dept. has been moved from this building. The Accounting Dept. will be moved very shortly to as let the Contractor have access to the building. We expect to sign the contract on the 15th of the month.

AR 2421 - Relocation/Renovation of Various AAM Shops & Offices, SGN

This project will be complete this month with the exception of Federal Type steel partitions which may require a delay due to procurement.

AR 8320 - Danang Hostel & SZ Residence Renovation

Material procurement is underway. When material is on hand, a small team from Saigon will be sent to assist DAD in-house capabilities.

Project 6691 - Saigon Terminal Parking Apron

A Form F has been signed by the Customer to replace the asphalt directly in front of Traffic Terminal with concrete. An AR is being made up.

Project 6702 - 204B Touchdown Pads (SGN)

PFAR has been approved. A Form "F" has been submitted for Customer's consideration.

Project 6703 - Modification of Fire Brigade Station for Air Conditioning(SGN)

This project pending TPE approval

IV. GENERAL AFFAIRS (Unreported)

V. MEDICAL
Number of sick call: 1144
Accidents: 20
Hospitalized sick call: None
Unhospitalized accident: 20
Hospitalized accident: None
Outcalls: 5
Physical examination: 30
Sick leaves: 201½

VI. TRAFFIC/AAM
1. Utilization of the substituted S & S missions cleared a goodly portion of our backlog of Company cargo. With only four aircraft scheduled for Tainan this month we envision a building of backlog partidularly since no Taipei SAT ferries are known.

	April	May
Passengers departure SGN (all contracts)	5,606	5,414
Passengers arrival SGN (all contracts)	6,573	6,092
Outbound cargo SGN	61,215	81,608
Inbound cargo SGN	68,369	70,754

TRAFFIC/USAID

Cargo (including Af Caribou A/C)

	April	May
Outbound (lbs) SGN	987,032	1,893,269
Inbound (lbs) SGN	425,494	364,518

VII. OPERATIONS
1. The 7001 customer released VTB N9838Z from contract effective 1 June 1970 and it was placed in temporary storage.

2. There were 17 controllable and 58 non-controllable delays with a total of 992 Saigon Departures.

3. Flight Time Report (See attachment A)
Ground Fire Incidents report (See attachment B)

4. Accident reports

Date	A/C Type/No.	Location	Remarks
04	VTB/N6154U	V-17	During overnight service FOD damage was noted to the No. 2 engine. Two first stage impeller blades sustained nicks. One blade approx. 1/16" deep and 1/8" in length at center of blade. The other blade nicked at lower leading edge - radius approx. 1/16". No excessive rubbing noted during rotation. Oil screen inspection results negative. FOD origin unknown. Continued emphasis on FOD is in progress.
17	204B/N1307X	Parked AAM chopper ramp DAD	During the night an unidentified vehicle struck the T/R blade resulting in one inch depth dent approx six inches in length. Tail rotor hub assembly and the other tail rotor blade was replaced for precautionary measures. Corrective action: SZ is checking the possibility of improved lighting in the helicopter parking area - Company employees were cautioned to exercise proper driving habits. Upon securing the helicopters the T/R blade will be aligned with the vertical (Dorsal) fin, this will eliminate some exposure of the tail rotor blade.
19	PC6C/N748N	SGN	While towing the aircraft the tow bar became disengaged from the tail gear. Tail section rolled into the tow tug resulting in minor damage to the RH elevator. Faulty tow bar and personnel error. Action: Tug driver given 3 days LWOP - Porter tow bars immediately inspected and design changes being made.

5. Ground Transportation

Aggregate microbusses mileage	22980 km or 14362 miles
Microbusses down-time	435 hrs 32'
Microbusses pax carried	3262 pax
Isuzu bus mileage	6183 km or 3864 miles
Isuzu bus down time	76 hrs 30'
Isuzu bus pax carried	10296 pax
Supply vehicle mileage	2795 km or 1746 miles
Supply vehicle downtime	97 hrs 18'

6. Flying

1. We experienced considerable wasted effort and lost time in attempting to get our flight crews deadhead space to Danang. The USAID/CORDS customer was refusing to provide any space on Sunday and forcing us to use the afternoon flights the rest of the week to move our deadheads. On 12 May the Acting Base Manager and MFD discussed the situation with the customer and as of this date it appears we have received satisfactory assistance and cooperation in this area.

Everyone was interested/involved/concerned regarding progress with the Danang hostel. Agreement on rent finally having been reached, we are looking forward to getting the place renovated so the crews can have adequate and comfortable quarters in which to stay during RONs. Along the same line, the renting of the hotel at Nhatrang has all the appearances of a very satisfactory solution to our quarters problems there. The situation at Cantho has also been greatly improved.

2. Approval was finally received to remodele the Operations building which with the receipt of crew lockers should provide better security for flight gear and be a boost to morale when the new lounge and the toilet/shower room is completed.

Effort has been expended during the month. If we can ever get clear lines of agreement and understanding regarding all respects of the AAM-PEPA contract, a lot of effort and time will be available for other activities.

VIII. PERSONNEL

Personnel Strength - Saigon base

Classif.	[redacted]								Total	
Permanent	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
	37	130	125	13	136	2	9	4	307	149

[redacted]									Total	
GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	
493#	11**	2		2		1*		498	11	

Temporary: [redacted] 1 ; [redacted] 1

Pre-processed: [redacted] 9

(*): [redacted]
(**):
(#):

Ground Personnel: 816
Flight Personnel: 160
976

Danang Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]				Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
Permanent	3		13	17	67	100
Pre-processed					1	

Ground Personnel: 101
Flight Personnel: 0
101

Nha Trang Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]				Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
Permanent	3		8	23	56	90
Pre-processed					1	

Can Tho Sub-Base

Classif.	[redacted]			Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
Permanent	1	10	3	14

IX. HOSTEL OCCUPANCY

Only three Certificates of "non-availability of company furnished accommodations were issued during the month.

X. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. Overall activities for all SVN Technical Services functions during May was on an approximate level with that of past recent months. The production workload varied little from the routine scheduled requirements.

2. Total flying, up slightly, affected the workload only from the stand point that there was increased utilization of heavier aircraft and decreased utilization of smaller aircraft.

3. The correction of accumulated overtime and vacation balances continued with success in those departments and stations where scheduled were established and followed.

The Labor Cost Accounting system is progressing and is expected to be placed into effect on 1 July 1970 as scheduled.

Aircraft Maintenance, fixed wing
Four power plants were changed during the month, two R-2800-75M3 due to metal contamination in oil system and two R-1830-92 due to high time. Other unscheduled work was five outstation recovery of aircraft due to maintenance problem. Twelve aircraft departure delays were charged to maintenance during the month.

Three Garrett power plants were changed, one on Volpar due to FOD, two on Porters, one due to low torque output and one for interim inspection.

Aircraft Maintenance, rotary wing
This month has been busy, flying approximately 1050 hours, performing 10 Nr. 2 services, two of these at V03, and four engine changes: two were high time and two were remained to facilitate turn around time with hot section inspections

Shops
Overall shop activities increased this month with the beggest work-load in the sheetmetal shop.

Three Porter aircraft sustained substantial metal damage at V17 due to hostile action.

Planning/Engineering
The Planning and Production Control Section pre-planned, scheduled and processed, for aircraft of all types; 534 overnight services; 21 number one services; 20 number two services; 6 number three services; 2 number four services; 7 annual inspections; 12 engine changes (4 for 204B); 2 propeller changes; 66 EA's; 31 SI's; 11 EI's; 215 time controlled components change on 204B; three TS3 engine hot section inspections; two main rotor hub changes; one main transmission change; 3 CRR's, and 12 BRR's; 292 shop work orders.

General Maintenance
The replacement of the deteriorated water pipe supplying the Traffic are is completed.

A prefab, antilever tug shed was errected west of the AAM Traffic Terminal to keep the Tugs and ramp crew out of the elements during the raining season.

Utilities Maintenance - Water is still being pumped from the dug well in front of the Operations building.

Communications Maintenance
Our major problem for the month was the overhauling of the 55B transmitter 90T150 from Danang and the tuning of the 95A receivers of VO7 & VO3 for 9818 kc reception.

With lesser man-hour involved was the retuning of the ATTITUDE transmitter and other 90T150 transmitters at VO1.

Within the month of May, there were two re-installations of TH-20 done.

Within the month of May, no major trouble were encountered in the PABX system. There were so many trouble caused by defective mechanical operation of telephone set dials, and leakage of telephone lines.

Some class A telephones were re-classified down to class B due to difficulties encountered at the Army Airforce exchanged of class A telephone calls.

Technical Training
Training department had the following courses completed:

(1) Supply Course, (2) Supervisor Management Course, (3) Fire Fighting Course.

Courses in Progress: 204B Maintenance

Sixteen employees were tested for exceptance as trainees in the Line Service Mechanics Course. This course will start in June and will train [redacted] in line service work.

Supply
Stores Section - During the month of May the issuing activities was the same as last month. The new storage rack for wheels and casings was built up and put in use the early part of this month.

Stock Control Section - In May, Stock Control workload stayed at par with that of the previous month.

The Director of Planning, during his visit, suggested that the time controlled items reserved for certain aircraft be reported on the daily rotable transaction report (DRTR).

Procurement Section - The Supply Procurement Section experienced nearly the same amount of transactions as that of last month. A total of 219 line items of commodities were purchased from the local market this month. Total value of commodities purchased from Saigon/Cholon market amounted to VN$1.406.197,00. The Naval Support Activity in Danang will cease its operation on 14 June 1970 and only 40% of the present stock will be carried in lesser quantity by its successor, the Army Support Command. This section plans to switch most of the expected non available items from the Danang to the Hongkong market.

L.G. Parrish

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT

- MAY 1970 -

1. Contract 7001 -

A/C No.	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
N67984	147+27	135+50	9+20	8+50
N67985	129+36	106+32	1+08	0+38
B928	84+15	71+05	14+48	13+26
B910	121+18	93+39	16+22	13+37
B912	79+38	62+39		
6147	125+33	102+05		
8084	129+29	106+56		
5559	91+23	71+39	2+50	2+16
5994	137+15	114+18		
B829	141+57	116+55		
N539Y	155+15	125+22	26+57	23+25
N544Y	144+30	114+43	5+12	4+23
N9518Z	112+28	95+18	1+01	0+41
B6154U	80+02	65+26	3+50	1+24
N9956Z	87+20	76+33		
N7770B	78+24	69+18	1+21	0+54
N9577Z	11+23	10+05	7+15	5+43
N3674G	96+17	83+17	2+39	1+54
N91295	70+12	57+09	0+50	0+25
N9638Z	98+05	81+42	2+14	0+57
N3728G	90+22	78+54	5+11	3+46
N7695C	21+57	17+40	2+22	2+06
N180K	144+57	126+44	0+51	0+33
N285L	54+05	48+49	0+42	0+26
N391R	145+48	120+45	1+15	0+35
N394R	8+21	7+29		
N9444	118+25	100+51	1+44	0+59
N196X	38+41	35+58		
N153L	93+21	81+57	5+31	4+27
N12450	22+32	20+55		
N748N	55+57	46+14	5+40	4+25
N152L	59+51	50+17	13+50	11+17
N184L	66+40	55+00	1+05	0+35
N185K	154+28	130+28	0+28	0+15
N192X	84+01	76+53	0+46	0+22
N194X	71+49	61+48	2+38	2+20
N393R	86+45	74+26	2+38	1+46
N1303X	176+24	176+24	1+05	1+05
N1304X	97+09	97+09	2+30	2+30
N1305X	90+27	90+27	8+20	8+20
N1306X	111+34	111+34	1+00	1+00
N1307X	150+42	150+42	4+05	4+05

M8514F	77+18	77+18	1+15	1+15
M8535F	68+58	68+58	5+10	5+10
Sub-total	4212+19	3668+11	168+53	135+50

2. Contract 7002 -

M539Y	7+51	6+57
M544Y	2+25	1+40
M9518Z	29+83	25+18
M6154U	19+14	16+19
M9956Z	26+59	19+47
M7770S	45+49	39+07
M9577Z	1+15	0+58
M3674Q	27+14	22+51
M91295	17+19	15+07
M9838Z	10+02	8+35
M3728Q	2+13	1+51
M7695C	68+05	57+34
M180K	6+19	5+36
M285L	87+55	81+04
M391R	6+36	5+14
M394R	54+26	50+05
M944A	23+53	21+55
M198K	50+11	42+52
M153L	2+43	2+26
M12450	32+09	28+51
M748N	53+48	47+45
M152L	20+26	17+25
M184L	62+30	50+55
M185K	23+31	20+03
M192K	47+36	40+56
M194K	24+58	20+39
M393R	1+52	1+22
M1304K	5+50	5+50
M1305K	30+22	30+22
M1306K	40+56	40+56
M1307K	13+03	13+03
M8514F	43+31	43+31
M8535F	65+33	65+33
Sub-total	955+37	852+07

3. Contract 7003 -

M67984	6+48	5+56
M67985	3+49	2+53
B928	28+55	24+08
B910	34+26	29+27
B912	48+38	39+55
6147	11+35	8+28
5559	9+36	6+34
M539Y	1+09	0+45
M544Y	11+29	10+12
M9518Z	2+16	1+31

N6154U	9+31	16+10
N3674G	2+00	1+20
N91295	0+56	0+40
N9838Z	1+01	0+37
N3728G	1+04	0+45
N7695G	4+34	2+42
N180K	2+46	2+09
N285L	1+06	0+52
N391R	3+31	2+28
N153L	11+43	9+55
N748H	3+22	2+34
N152L	4+27	3+33
N192X	2+22	1+42
N194X	8+08	5+59
N1304X	28+46	28+46
N1306X	3+46	3+46
N8514F	5+25	5+25
Sub-total	253+09	209+12

4. Contract 0030 -

N9577Z	48+21	43+13
N1305X	1+17	1+17
N9577Z	18+45	15+20
Sub-total	67+83	59+50

5. Contract 0069 -

N9956Z	6+55	6+20
N3674G	2+23	2+04
N9664C	65+53	54+17
N7695G	6+26	5+31
N394R	6+34	5+44
N194X	6+15	5+47
N7770B	8+22	7+31
N9664C	42+45	37+19
N91295	3+15	3+00
Sub-total	148+48	128+33

Total Revenue Block Time	5636+96
Total Revenue Flight Time	4917+53
Total Non-Revenue Block Time	163+53
Total Non-Revenue Flight Time	135+50
GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	5802+09
GRAND TOTAL FLIGHT TIME	5053+43

Flight Time by Type of Aircraft

Type of A/C	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
C-46	664+50	572+04	41+38	36+31
Sailed C-47	504+51	410+00	2+50	2+16
C-47	141+57	116+55		
DHC-4	322+39	259+19	32+09	27+48
VIB	1218+30	1032+09	26+43	17+50
Porter	1754+28	1516+25	37+08	28+00
206B	1011+01	1011+01	23+25	23+25
TOTAL	5636+96	4917+53	163+53	135+50

A. L. Harris
A/SGM/SGM

cc: ABN/SGM
MFD/SGM
TM/SGM
File.

MEMORANDUM

TO : BM/SGN

DATE: 03 July 1970

FROM : SZ/DAD

REF. No. SZDAD/70/064

SUBJECT : DANANG Station Monthly Report for June 1970

GENERAL

An unconfirmed number of rockets impacted in the downtown area of the city of Danang during the early morning of 20 June. Several Vietnamese fatalities were reported but no injuries were sustained by company personnel. Hostile activity directed at the air base was of a minor nature.

Three Southern Air Transport flights transited Danang during the month. All were substitute service Stars & Stripes missions. No problems were encountered in their handling since no night arrivals were involved.

The NCO Club operated terminal snack bar was closed down on the evening of 19 June. The Secretary/Custodian of the club advised that repeated Public Health Sanitation discrepancies were the primary cause for this action, but various complaints by other agencies and patrons were a strong contributory factor. There is a possibility that either CORDS or the Vietnam Regional Exchange may be interested in setting up a beverage/cold sandwich type of service in the area vacated by the NCO Club.

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

The arrangement with CORDS to billet excess flight crew personnel in their transient quarters is working out very well. To date no request for rooms has been refused. In fact, two rooms have been reserved for a one week period so that the hostel renovation can be expeditiously completed with a minimum of inconvenience. As construction proceeds through the hostel, those occupants involved can be temporarily transferred to CORDS billets.

LEGAL

The agent for the landlord of the SZ residence received and acknowledged the renewal notice for an additional one year lease on this property. A substantial increase in rent was requested due to the rising cost of living. However, since under the present terms and conditions of the lease contract, the company is under no obligation to pay additional rent, it is anticipated that payment will be made as presently stipulated.

FACILITIES

The contractor for the Area Paving and Drainage Ditch Completion project commenced work on 16 June. By the end of the month 216 cubic yards of ready mix concrete were poured, which constitutes over half the area to be paved. Ready mix concrete was purchased rather than bagged cement due to non-availability of the latter commodity. The estimated completion date for this project is 15 August.

FACILITIES (Cont'd)

The Hostel Renovation project is underway and should be completed by 10 July. The installation of some air conditioners and commodes may be delayed since the source of these items is Hong-Kong. Fortunately, most of the basic materials required were obtainable from the Naval Support Activity just prior to its closing down operations. A higher capacity watt hour meter will be installed to handle the additional electrical loads.

The Passenger Terminal Renovation project is being frustrated by a lack of materials and insufficient funding. The AR and Form F for this project were predicated on a contractor bid submitted in September 1969. This contractor has advised that as a result of local inflation, the bid is no longer valid and the cost would now be approximately fifty per cent higher. Very few of the materials needed for this project were obtainable from NSA so that expected cost savings from this source of procurement were not realized. Unless CORDS is able to supply materials at no cost, the project will probably be only completed on a scale far reduced from that originally contemplated. Another possibility is that this project will be revised to concentrate on the space vacated by the NCO Club Snack-Bar. A smaller facility would result, but by utilizing existing structures, the cost would be significantly reduced.

FISCAL

With the closing down of the Snack-Bar, the station's primary source of electrical power is in jeopardy. The main justification for the 100 KVA USAF furnished, maintained and operated generator was to supply power for the Snack-Bar. Although USAF Power Production allows that Air America may retain the generator until a critical requirement for it elsewhere developes, it is still subject to being removed at any time. 100% operation on commercial power would result in monthly costs approaching $1500.00. In addition, a source of back up power would also be required.

Per diem expenses for the station increased greatly during June as a result of the Hostel Renovation team being assigned TCS from Saigon and additional TCS replacements required to replace personnel on emergency and annual leave.

[redacted] payroll for the month totaled: [redacted]

Petty cash expenditures totaled: 55,060$VN

OPERATIONS

Revenue flight time increased 70+19 hours as compared to the previous month. Most of this increase is attributable to additional C-46 RONs

required by CORDS to shuttle cargo between Danang and Cantho. Reduced flying on Sundays continues but personnel scheduling is somewhat frustrated by last minute customer requirements for early departures or late arrivals not originally envisaged as a problem.

The following is a breakdown of flight time generated by this station during June:

VN-70/AID - - - - - - - -	789+44
VN-70/Embassy - - - - -	202+06
Total - - - - - - - - - -	991+50

Revenue losses for the month were as follows:

Weather - - - - - - - -	1+00
Maintenance - - - - - -	12+30
Customer Cancellations	0+30
Other - - - - - - - - -	00
Total - - - - - - - - - -	14+00

The hostel occupancy factor was 96.5%. During the month, 13,280 piastres were disbursed to provide hotel accommodations for flight crew personnel. Non-availability certificates for a total of 121 nights were issued to TCS ground personnel.

COMMUNICATIONS

Moderate reception problems were encountered from the UHF relay of the Monkey Mountain remote VHF system. It was necessary on several occasions to transmit position reports over HF. Overall HF operation was somewhat improved over last month.

Incoming and outgoing messages totaled 1466 and 1658 respectively.

TRAFFIC

Passenger and cargo statistics for the month of June are as follows:

	PAX IN	PAX OUT	CARGO IN	CARGO OUT
VN-7001/AID	2,753	2,641	239,158	251,270
VN-7002/EMB	397	665	800	7,922
0069	0	0	0	0
0030	18	21	0	0
0005	0	0	0	0
AAM	89	103	9,771	28,887.6
TOTAL	3,257	3,430	249,729	288,079.6

SECURITY

The VNAF Security Office continues to validate company travel orders for a limited duration in lieu of requiring the processing of temporary air base passes. What was originally an arrangement to facilitate the entry and departure to and from the base for TCS flight mechanics is now being utilized for all TCS personnel and eight permanently assigned employees. Five of the latter personnel still require an extension of stay receipt before application can be made for a permanent pass.

PERSONNEL

The undersigned will depart on Home Leave on 10 July. SOR/DAD, Mr. D.P. Grace,will be assigned as Acting Station Manager in the interim.

The personnel breakdown for Danang Station at the close of business, 30 June 1970, was as follows:

[redacted]

Permanent	3	13	17	68
Pre-Process	0	0	0	2
Temporary	0	0	0	0
Daily Hire	0	0	0	0
TOTAL (103)	3	13	17	70

TECHNICAL SERVICES

RMD handled at total of 581 arriving and 581 departing flights, as compared to 590 in each category in May. There were a total of 4 delays which resulted in a revenue loss chargeable to maintenance. Number 1 services were performed on 1 PC-6 aircraft and 3 204B aircraft, and 1 number 2 service on 204B aircraft was accomplished. 2 aircraft were placed on AGP status. Extensive maintenance was required on transiting C7A #61-2392, enroute to TNN from VTE. Total ground time was four days; a cylinder change, engine change, and two propeller changes were required.

RGMD expended a total of 824 manhours of which 132 were utilized at the Hostel. Air conditioner failures are on the increase.

The final invoice from NSA is expected during the first part of July. Procurement from the ARMY Support Command is still pending the negotiation of an Inter Service Support Agreement.

Original Signed by
WINSTON C. CAMBRE

Winston C. Cambre

cc: file

MEMORANDUM

DATE: 18 July 1970

REF. No. BMSGN/70/227

TO : AVP TPE

FROM : BMSGN

SUBJECT : June Monthly Report

Saigon Base Monthly Report for June 1970 is forwarded in three copies for your file.

E. J. Theisen

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
JUNE 1970

I. GENERAL

1. Total block time for June was was 5588 hours as compared with 5825 hours in May and 5811 hours in April 1970.

2. The security condition in Saigon remains "stable". There were several student demonstrations to establish peace in Vietnam plus several other obscure issues of government controls and school administration. They did not reach the violent proportions of those routinely experienced in the USA. The veterans manifested dissent by constructing market stalls on public property along several boulevards in downtown Saigon which degraded the environment and disrupted the orderly conduct of business and traffic in these areas. The veterans were complaining about the lack of veterans benefits. After several days of strong persuasion by the police, the veterans agreed to dismantle their stalls. At the moment, all is calm in Saigon.

3. Labor conditions: Because of the cutback in labor strength at Thu Duc due to the take-over by RVN from USAID of extensive warehousing facilities, there was a threat of a General Sympathy Strike with employees of Esso, Caltex, Shell and several lesser companies participating. The general strike, due to government controls and lower wages never "got off the ground". It is gratifying to note that AAM employees never considered the possibility of participation.

4. BM Saigon returned from 35 days annual leave in the Z.I. to find that SOM Parrish had done an excellent job of filling in as Acting BM during his absence. Meanwhile our management-level manning is sagging due to accrued leave which must be liquidated. Boyd Mesecher (MTS) is on four months leave (1 May through 31 August). SZ DAD Cambre is on four months leave (11 July through 17 October 1970). MF/RW Hitchman will be on leave 20 July through 30 Sept. PM, Frank Nihill is on leave 13 July through 8 August. ADSAFE George Keller will be on leave 20 July through 8 Sept. Al Harris (Assistant to SOM Parrish) is on leave 25 June through 30 July. Other absences on leave of lower levels of supervision result in very thin management manning in SVN, however, the "second team" seems to be carrying the load quite well.

5. Air Cambodia is operating in and out of Saigon carrying well-dressed "refugees" on a non-scheduled basis four to six days a week.

With the exception of a few intransit passengers to Singapore, the outbound passenger manifest is almost negative.

6. We have performed a number 2 service and major clean-up of VTB M3728G in anticipation of transfer to UTH. Meanwhile it is being kept in service under VN-70 Contract. After transfer, 28G will be replaced on VN-70 Contract by VTB M9838Z now in temporary storage.

7. It is apparent we are about to "overrun" AR #8320 for the Danang hostel by approximately US$1700.00 due to the discontinuance of NSA supply support and per diem costs for TCS personnel from GKD SGN to perform the work. This was an oversight on our part. In any event an existing AR #2255 to upgrade SZ DAD quarters, which will now become part of the hostel facilities, was with held from further work due change in programming and is more than adequate to provide funding for the total Danang hostel project which includes the existing hostel plus SZ quarters which are being converted to additional hostel facilities under the cited Appropriation Requests.

8. As of 8 July 1970, Continental Air Services has operated the following fleet in SVN :

C-47	8
DO-28	2
Skyvan	1
Beech Baron	6
H-18 Super Beech	1
Total	18

II. CUSTOMER RELATIONS

Have reached an all time high. There are no known areas of misunderstanding or question involving AAH Operations.

III. FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT

In the area of facilities development it appears there is very little left to be accomplished to achieve a completely efficient configuration:

(1) AR 2438 - Concrete Drainage Ditch and Concrete Pavement DAD. This project is 60% complete and progressing on schedule.

(2) AR 2422 - Renovation of Operations Building Saigon. Contract has been signed. Work should commence in late July.

(3) AR 2449 - Saigon Terminal Parking Apron. Out for bid. Expect to get this project moving soon.

(4) Project 6702 - 204B touchdown Pads SCN. Form P has been submitted for Customer consideration. We will continue to exert pressure on this project but at the moment it does not look very hopeful.

IV. GENERAL AFFAIRS (Unreported)

V. FISCAL

Saigon Base Accounting was moved into new offices located on the second floor of the MMD Maintenance building south side of Hangar #1.

The station allowance increase for [redacted] employees was reflected on the June payslips and was retroactive from April 1, 1970. The adjustment [redacted] are being made now and will be reflected in next month's report.

The station allowance increase for American and TCN personnel has tended to tone down the hard feelings of ground personnel, but the general opinion is that ground personnel should receive other benefits the pilots received. Such other benefits being increased weight allowance for personnel effects, better insurance coverage and family relocation per diem.

VI. MEDICAL

Number of sick call: 1269
Accidents: 30
Hospitalized sick call : 1 died
Unhospitalized accident: 30
Hospitalized accident: None
Outcalls: 3
Physical examination : 34
Sick leaves: 211

VII. PERSONNEL

Apart from routine activities [redacted] spent a week in Taiwan escorting three RVN Government Officials (from the Ministries of Labor and Education) on a tour of Company facilities. The Officials came away extremely impressed with the facilities and our training programs, and this public relations effort should aid us considerably in future dealings with the government (especially with respect to securing Work Permits for our TCNs).

Our [redacted] employees declined to participate in either of the month's general strikes, the second of which ultimately involved over 100,000 workers. This non-participation is a fine tribute indeed to our management - employee relations at all levels.

The piastre is being traded on the open market at approximately VN$ 370 to US$1.

Personnel Strength - Saigon Base

Classif. Permanent	[redacted]								Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
	37	128	123	13	135	2	8	3	303	146
	[redacted]								Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
	489@	11**	2		2		1*		797	157

Temporary: [redacted] 1

Pre-processed: GRD 15 [redacted] FLT 2 [redacted]

(*) [redacted]
(**)
(@)

Ground Personnel	813
Flight Personnel	159
Total	972

Danang Sub-Base

Classif. Permanent	[redacted]								Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
	3		13		18		68		102	

Pre-processed 2

Ground Personnel	104
Flight Personnel	0
Total	104

Nha Trang Sub-Base

Classif. Permanent	[redacted]								Total	
	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
	3		8		22		56		89	

Pre-processed 1

Ground Personnel	90
Flight Personnel	0
Total	90

Can Tho Sub-Base

Classif. Permanent	[redacted]			Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
	1	10	3	14

Total Ground Personnel 14

HOSTEL OCCUPANCY

During the month of June, only three Certificates of "non-availability of company furnished accommodations" were issued.

VIII. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. Overall activities in SVN Stations were lower than that of recent months. The reduced activity was a fairly direct reflection of the 4.7 percent drop in overall flying.

The rainy season has brought its usual problems of productive time losses, interruptions of communications and aircraft ignition systems breakdown. Power interruptions have been less than in previous years.

Preparations for the implementation of the new Skilled Labor Cost Accounting System required a lot of attention and training time by all employees; particularly Supervisory.

Facilities improvements at SGN included the completion of the Accounting offices and movement of the accounting personnel to the RMD Shops Building. The completion of a walkway from the hangar to the terminal has contributed the safety of personnel by reducing pedestrian traffic on the aircraft ramp. Concreting of the Danang terminal/hangar area is well underway. This project, as well as the Danang Hostel renovation has required considerable time and attention from GMD

2. Aircfaft Maintenance - Fixed Wing
As a result of a decrease in total number of aircraft departures and arrivals, the general activity declined. Routine maintenance comprised the major portion of the workload.

3. Rotary Wing - June workload was average until the last week; one number two service was performed at VO3, eight at VO1, one number three A at VO1, two engine hot section inspections, and three engine changes.

Flying time for the month was down somewhat to about 980 as compared with the previous three month of 1050.

4. Shops - The overall workload for the early part of June was routine but turned heavy toward the last part due to a PC-6 and a helicopter No. 4 service.

The Shops Equipment Shop has placed increased effort in reworking and marking VTB seats on a fleet basis.

5. Planning - S/PLNG has made a tour to VCA, DAD and NHA this month giving training classes to the Technical Services personnel. Training classes for RAD and RGMD personnel in SGN Base were held at the same time by S/TT, SGN

6. General Maintenance - AR 2421, relocation of offices is well along. AR 2422, renovation of the Operations building, the contract was signed with A&M Enterprise. AR 2438, Concrete Paving in DaNang was started this month. AR 8320, Renovation of the Hostel in DaNang begun on 24

June, this is being accomplished by in-house labor.

7. Building and Grounds Maintenance: The grass plots in front of the Cafeteria were reworked and seeded with grass seeds obtained from HongKong. However the seeds were received with zero germination.

8. Communications Maintenance - We were more concerned during the month with the cables for teletypes and telephones which gave us more delays on traffic than the equipment to which they are connected.

Teletype circuits and Maintenance: Most of the troubles were due to bad cables. If there is a heavy down pour in one day, the following day TTY circuits are all in bad shape including telephone trunk lines. It takes two, three or four days before the circuits are restored to normal. The Creed TTY circuit on the sending side was out twelve days because of defective lines. Cable trouble is also true with CCR-CAT TTY circuits this time of the year.

Transmitters' Maintenance: We encountered trouble with our daytime 34-A HF transmitter. The 30-volt rectox rectifiers developed leakage which brought down the 30-volt control voltage to only 20 volts.

9. Technical Training - Courses completed: Supervisor management, 204B maintenance. The SGN-line Service Mechanic course has been delayed due to the poor response [redacted] to Air America's "Help wanted ads".

Shipping/Receiving activities experienced a slightly decrease.

Procurement section experienced a little smaller number of transactions than May. A total of 210 line items of commodities were purchased from the local market this month. Total value of commodities purchased from Saigon/Cholon market amounted to VN$658,204.00.

Since the Naval Support Activity (NSA) in DAD has been deactivated on 14 June 70, Procurement switched its sources to HKG and local vendors for certain items. This entailed a somewhat slower procedure and more careful approach to bying. The sometimes wide range of qualities, prices and local problems have significantly added to the workload, when compared to the relatively simpler NSA operation. Negotiations to open an account with the U.S. Army Vietnam are still being carried on.

10. Customs. Surface vessel shipments are becoming more complicated as the customs requirements for documentation has been increased. On re-exportations, the temporary import documents must be furnished. This requirement can be easily filled on large equipment or vehicles.

X. OPERATIONS

1. Flight Time Report (See attachment A)
2. Ground Fire Incidents Report (See attachment B)
3. Accident reports

Date	A/C Type/No.	Location	Remarks
09	VTB/N6154U	V-11, SVN	During operation at V-11 number 3 blade sustained a nick approximately 1 inch deep, believed from a piece of small rock.
13	204B/N1304X	V-69,SVN	During post flight inspection noted a 1/2" hole in the leading edge of the tail rotor blade. The result of hostile action.

4. Flying Safety

No accidents or incidents since 2 January 1970.

5. Ground Transportation

Aggregate microbusses mileage	25071 km
Microbusses down-time	335 hrs 32'
Microbusses passengers carried	3234 pax
Isuzu bus mileage	6009 km
Isuzu bus down time	55 hrs 54'
Isuzu bus pax carried	10290 pax
Supply vehicle mileage	2946 km
Supply vehicle down-time	22 hrs 50'

6. Flying

Our time and most of our efforts were primarily concerned with DHC4/B851 and pilot requirements for same, Captains Broussard, Parker and McCauley and the over-temp of VTB N7770B.

Caribou B-851 arrived and was put to work by the customer shortly after it arrived. Because of the "B" registry there has been some difficulty in setting up proper crew manning in the program. The problem appears to be resolved on a temporary basis by cross training pilots. Presumably the Bid System will provide a final solution. Meanwhile the pilots in this program are "maxing" the time limit.

Investigation, coordination, termination and the hearings concerning Broussard and Parker definitely took a disproportionate amount of the month's time. The biggest single problem in this and similar cases is the involvement of FEPA and the AAM Agreement. Since FEPA benefits from the continuous services of a trained attorney, the odds are somewhat stacked in their favor when MFD is forced to present the prosecution side of a case without professional or trained legal help.

MFD visited Danang facilities. The most notable finding was the water which is taken from the well on the premises is grossly contaminated.

The Nhatrang quarters seem to be in good shape except the lack of air conditioners which are definite necessities for our crews to get adequate

rest while on RON. A steady stream of complaints has been produced by this one shortage.

Crews lockers are now available in Saigon and are being issued.

And another month accident free.

XI. TRAFFIC/AAM

	May	June
Passengers departure SGN (all contracts)	5,414	5,432
Passengers arrival SGN (all contracts)	6,092	6,231
Outbound cargo SGN	81,608	146,640
Inbound cargo SGN	70,754	70,700

TRAFFIC/USAID

Cargo (including AF Caribou A/C)

	May	June
Outbound (lbs) SGN	1,893,269	800,054
Inbound (lbs) SGN	364,518	392,621

E.J. Theisen

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT

- JUNE 1970 -

1. Contract 7001 -

A/C No.	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
N67984	156+08	134+37		
N67985	195+19	160+31	3+50	3+28
B928	71+38	56+45	1+52	1+36
B910	79+32	66+31	2+47	2+20
B912	120+49	102+33	3+34	2+48
6147	54+22	43+43	3+00	2+25
8084	58+55	47+07		
5559	120+50	104+22		
5994	108+39	89+07	10+52	9+20
B829	83+25	67+46	20+16	18+48
N539Y	159+42	139+16	4+25	3+40
N544Y	144+48	115+25	5+47	4+43
B851	44+22	36+28	3+52	2+56
N9518Z	129+27	110+06	1+40	0+52
N6154U	30+25	25+53		
N99562	124+34	107+21		
N7770B	61+14	52+19	2+20	1+38
N95772	1+20	0+49	11+46	9+19
N36740	77+15	65+47		
N91295	76+30	67+01		
N37280	103+19	89+51	1+20	1+05
N7695C	74+18	62+57		
N180K	94+54	83+51		
N285L	115+41	100+30		
N391R	56+09	49+47		
N394R	87+42	73+53	2+52	1+36
N9444	119+07	105+18	0+55	0+32
N196X	98+36	89+29	2+30	1+48
N153L	121+23	110+10	5+33	4+21
N12450	5+55	5+33		
N748N	46+41	43+08	1+33	1+05
N152L	102+08	85+00	9+49	8+52
N184L	129+00	105+51	3+22	2+37
N185X	48+59	39+46	1+16	0+50
N192X	29+13	24+05		
N194X	108+48	93+02	4+45	3+33
N393R	40+13	36+17		
N1303X	99+47	99+47	3+20	3+20
N1304X	154+32	154+32	3+30	3+30
N1305X	23+34	23+34	0+30	0+30
N1306X	132+24	132+24	6+35	6+35
N1307X	95+21	95+21	11+23	11+23

M8514F	87+05	87+05	2+15	2+15
M8535F	138+09	138+09	1+00	1+00
Sub total	4012+12	3522+47	138+29	118+45

2. Contract 7002 -

M544Y	10+25	8+20
B851	3+40	2+33
M9518Z	5+58	4+59
M6154U	63+39	53+47
M99562	5+42	4+52
M7770B	44+33	37+57
M36740	44+53	39+20
M91295	16+58	14+54
M3728G	3+29	3+03
M76950	29+57	25+01
M180K	24+24	21+20
M285L	17+22	15+45
M391R	25+19	22+02
M394R	29+56	26+32
M944A	6+15	5+27
M198K	23+00	20+08
M153L	1+59	1+32
M12450	61+30	53+54
M748N	96+06	88+17
M152L	2+50	2+15
M184L	46+05	37+01
M185K	77+17	70+31
M192K	53+29	75+15
M194K	2+52	2+39
M393R	62+45	57+21
M1303K	24+15	24+15
M1304K	12+38	12+38
M1305K	61+36	61+36
M1306K	3+45	3+45
M1307K	3+03	3+03
M8514F	28+03	28+03
M8535F	33+26	33+26
Sub total	926+49	860+51

3. Contract 7003 -

B928	37+19	32+17
B910	49+54	42+41
6147	3+47	2+19
8084	2+54	2+17
M539Y	37+20	32+47
M544Y	14+44	11+59
B851	16+07	12+52

N95182	0+56	0+42
N61540	1+47	1+11
N99562	1+32	1+24
N36740	2+51	1+51
N3728G	1+05	0+40
N7695C	0+59	0+40
N180K	2+12	1+47
N285L	7+52	6+17
N391R	2+09	1+31
N394R	6+50	5+01
N9444	5+55	5+08
N198X	5+04	4+28
N153L	7+01	6+16
N748N	2+50	2+37
N152L	6+08	4+39
N184L	3+19	2+18
N185K	10+01	6+39
N192X	1+09	0+50
N194X	1+28	0+57
N1303X		
N1304X	13+21	13+21
N1307X	10+18	10+18
N8514F	29+12	29+12
N8535F	52+51	52+51
Sub total	286+04	244+39

4. Contract 0059 -

N9577Z	88+24	75+11
N192X	0+52	0+33
N152L	6+08	5+30
Sub total	95+24	81+14

5. Contract 0062 -

N9664C	97+36	83+08
N91295	5+26	4+32
N61540	1+52	1+43
N152L	8+39	7+52
N185K	3+15	2+58
N184L	3+51	3+15
Sub total	120+39	103+28

TOTAL REVENUE BLOCK TIME	5441+08
TOTAL REVENUE FLIGHT TIME	4812+59
TOTAL NON-REVENUE BLOCK TIME	138+29
TOTAL NON-REVENUE FLIGHT TIME	118+45

GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	5579 + 37
GRAND TOTAL FLIGHT TIME	4931 + 44

FLIGHT TIME BY TYPE OF AIRCRAFT

Type of A/C	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
C-46	710+39	595+55	12+03	10+12
Bailed C-47	349+27	288+55	13+52	11+45
C-47	83+25	67+46	20+16	18+48
DHC-4	431+08	359+20	14+04	11+19
VIB	2095+59	936+19	17+06	12+54
Porter	1820+15	1614+11	32+35	25+14
204-B	950+29	950+29	28+33	28+33
TOTAL	5441+08	4812+59	138+29	118+45

L. C. Parrish
SGM/SGH

cc: BM/SGH
HFD/SGH
TH/SGH
File.

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

1.3(a)(4)

REPORT NO. [redacted]

DATE DISTR. 3 August 1970

COUNTRY South Vietnam

DOI July 1969

SUBJECT Viet Cong Policies and Procedures Regarding U.S. Prisoners of War in Military Region 5

501-08(6)

ACQ Vietnam, Saigon (10 May 1970)

FIELD NO. [redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

SOURCE [redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

Summary: The camp for U.S. prisoners of war held by

5 4 3 2 1 • [redacted] (classification) (dissem controls)

1.3(a)(4)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

5 4 3 2 1

Approved for Release
Date September 1993

1.3(a)(4)

the Viet Cong (VC) in Military Region 5 (MR-5) was located in the Tra Khe area, Tra Bong District, Quang Ngai Province, and was run by the Quang Da Special Zone (QDSZ) Military Proselyting Section. There were also two province-level prisoner of war (POW) camps under the QDSZ. The Hon Tau camp held prisoners only temporarily, while the camp in Quang Da Province kept prisoners permanently. Dang Van Hien claims that no U.S. POWs were sent to North Vietnam (NVN), primarily because of the transportation difficulties. End Summary.

1. Each of the VC regions in South Vietnam (SVN) had one region-level POW camp where U.S. POWs of all ranks and captured Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) officers were held for debriefing and indoctrination. The VC camp for U.S. POWs in MR-5 was located in the Tra Khe area, Tra Bong District, Quang Ngai Province. It was located in a heavily forested area northwest of the Na Nieu River, about six hours' walking distance from the point where the Vien(g) River flows south into the Na Nieu River, approximately 15 kilometers southwest of Tra Bong City. The Tra Khe camp was run by the Military Proselyting Section of the QDSZ Party Committee, the chief of which was Colonel Than Tan T r i n h, aka T r i. The chief of the Tra Khe camp in late 1969 was Senior Captain (fnu) P h u o n g.

2. Two English-speaking interpreters, Lieutenants (fnu) H u n g and (fnu) N h o, who were both graduates of the Foreign Language College of Hanoi University, were assigned to the Tra Khe camp. Two other English-speaking officers, both propaganda leaflet writers, were available at the camp to interrogate and indoctrinate U.S. POWs. Both were officers of the Military Proselyting Section of the QDSZ. They were Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen T h a i, deputy chief of the Military Proselyting Section, and Senior Lieutenant (fnu) T i n h. As of late 1967, eight U.S. and 12 ARVN POWs were being held at the Tra Khe camp. (Field Comment: Dang Van H i e n visited the camp in 1967 but did not see the U.S. POWs as he stayed just one night.)

3. The administration staff of the Military Proselyting Section of QDSZ authorized the acquisition of rice for the camp through the use of a ticket system. Each month the Tra Khe camp received a ticket which was then turned in for a specific amount of rice. The administration staff provided instructions with the ticket which indicated where the rice could be picked up. A sum of money also always accompanied the rice tickets for use in the purchase of vegetables, salt, fish, meat and other food items.

4. There were also two province-level POW camps under the QDSZ. One was located in the Hon Tau Mountains, VC Que Son District, Quang Nam Province, where prisoners were kept only temporarily; and the other, to which U.S. POWs were sent permanently, was in a forested area on the SVN/Laos border in VC Quang Da Province. (Field Comment: VC Quang Nam Province contains Government of Vietnam /GVN/ Quang Tin Province and Que Son District and portions of Duc Duc and Duy Xuyen of Quang Nam Province. VC Quang Da Province contains portions of GVN Quang Nam Province.) All captured members of U.S. and Free World Forces and ARVN officers were escorted by the capturing unit to the Hon Tau camp. When VC Main Force units captured POWs, the latter were turned over to local guerrilla units to be escorted to the Hon Tau camp. From Hon Tau the U.S. POWs immediately were escorted by the Hon Tau guards to the Tra Khe camp for debriefing and indoctrination by English-speaking interrogators. Hien claimed that primarily because of transportation difficulties, no U.S. POWs captured in SVN were sent to NVN. Hien emphasized the transportation difficulties by stating that even seriously wounded [illegible] were not sent north. Because all of the travel from [illegible] be through heavily

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mountainous areas, it would take at least two months to travel from the region to NVN and most U.S. POWs would, in Hien's opinion, die within one week if they were forced to travel north. According to Hien, it was VC procedure to relocate a POW camp after the release of any POWs. 1.3(a)(4)

5. Most U.S. troops captured in SVN were low-level soldiers or noncommissioned officers and for this reason there was no point in sending them to NVN for exploitation. In contrast, pilots captured in NVN were officers and, thus, were exploited for their information. All U.S. airmen captured in NVN were considered criminals and would be released only when the war ends. While in NVN, Hien heard NVN cadres say that even though the airmen would not be tried for committing criminal acts against the people, the NVN Government would not advise the U.S. Government concerning airmen who were captured, wounded or killed.

6. [redacted] information on the Tra Khe POW camp was kept current through conversations [redacted] with VC cadres in the Military Proselyting Section, QDSZ, MR-5, concerning the treatment and handling of U.S. POWs at the camp and through Central Office for South Vietnam communiques which outlined VC procedures for handling U.S. and Free World Forces POWs. [redacted] any changes in VC POW policies would have been reflected in the communiques which were disseminated throughout MR-5 in the fall of 1969. Beginning in 1967, the communiques were usually disseminated twice a year in MR-5.) 1.3(a)(4)

7. Field Dissem: State USMACV USAID CORDS Dir/JUSPAO (Mr. Nickel only) 7th Air Force USARV NAVFORV 525th MI Gp 6499 SAG OSI CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC.

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92661-35

MEMORANDUM

TO : BM/SGN

DATE: 04 August 1970

FROM : A/SZDAD

REF. No. SZDAD/70/072

SUBJECT : DANANG Station Monthly Report - July 1970

GENERAL

No significant incidents of hostile activity were reported during the month of July. However, there has been a generalized increase in overall security measures in the DaNang area and increased enemy activity for the early part of August has been forecasted by several sources.

The early part of the month brought an increase in the number of Southern Air Transport flights transiting this station. All were substitute service Stars & Stripes missions scheduled as a result of the World Airways flight crew walk-out.

Traffic and Operations had been geared to handle seventeen SAT flights during July. However, an agreement was reached after only six flights were operated and the remaining unflown missions were cancelled.

An agreement has been reached with the Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron - 16, of Marine Air Group 16, to remove from their supply area Helicopter and aircraft parts that they are unable to use.

To date we have received approximately 3,000 pounds of aircraft parts and miscellaneous supplies. The most noteworthy being a bell 204 tail boom assembly and four main rotor mast assemblies.

As Hand MS-16 continues to weed through the supplies they have on-hand, they will call us whenever they run across something they feel we may be able to utilize.

There is no way of projecting the monetary valve possible from this project.

LEGAL

Payment of the rent for the former SZ residence was paid on 11 July. The Agent for the landlord expressed great disappointment due to the fact his request for a rent increase was not approved.

FACILITIES

The Area Paving and Drainage Ditch Completion project was at a stand-still for better than a week due to the non-availability of a cement mixer.

On the 15 July a mixer was obtained and the project has moved along swiftly. There should now be no problem meeting the 15 August completion date.

FACILITIES (CONT'D)

The major portions of the Hostel Renovation project were completed during the last week in July. All that remains is minor clean-up and small touch-up jobs that will be handled in-house.

Plans for the Passenger Terminal Renovation project have been received from Saigon and they have been reviewed with the local customer and his approval was received.

The project is still frustrated by a lack of materials and the apparent reluctance on the part of the contractor to submit a bid.

FISCAL

Per diem expenses for the station showed a decrease the second half of July with the return of the Hostel Renovation team to Saigon.

[redacted]ayroll for the month totaled: 1,012,010$VN

Petty cash expenditures totaled: 103,255$VN

OPERATIONS:

Total flight time for this reporting period reflects a decrease of 35+58 over the month of June. This decrease is attributable to the reduction of the additional C-46 RONs.

The reduced Sunday flight schedule continues and only minor personnel scheduling problems were encountered when the customers programmed last minute early departures or late arrivals.

Following is a breakdown of flight time generated by this station during July:

VN-70/AID	755+53
VN-70/Embassy	194+34
VN-70/RDC	5+00
C/0069	0+25
TOTAL	955+52

There were no controllable revenue losses during July.

The hostel occupancy factor for the period 01 July through 09 July was 90%. For the remainder of the month it dropped to 64.5%. This decrease is the result of our utilizing the additional rooms and beds as they became available.

OPERATIONS (CONT'D)

Non-availability certificates for a total of 124 nights were issued to TCS ground personnel. During the month 2,400 piastres were disbursed to provide hotel accommodations for flight crew personnel. This amount is a drastic reduction over the amount disbursed in June (13,280$VN) as a result of the completion of the Hostel Renovation project.

COMMUNICATIONS

It appears that we still are experiencing problems with the Motorola Remote UHF/VHF system. Numerous trips had to be made to the remote site [redacted] The system was off-the-air two days during the month and was not repaired until the Motorola maintenance manuals were received from CMD/SCN. Overall HF operation was normal with only minor interference encountered.

Incoming and outgoing messages totaled 1331 and 1563 respectively.

TRAFFIC

Passenger and cargo statistics for the month of July are as follows:

	PAX IN	PAX OUT	CARGO IN	CARGO OUT
VN-70/AID	2,662	2,328	138,255	118,112
VN-70/Embassy	379	602	1,900	5,801
C/0069	12	12	0	0
AF/0030	5	5	0	0
AAH	88	109	7,495.7	4,149.4
TOTAL	3,146	3,056	147,650.7	128,062.4

SECURITY

There were no major problems encountered in this area during this reporting period. The VNAF Security Office continues to validate Company Travel Orders for a limited time in lieu of requiring the processing of temporary air base passes.

PERSONNEL

Station Manager, Winston C. Cambre, departed on Home Leave on 10 July. The undersigned assumed the duties of Acting Station Manager on that date.

The personnel breakdown for this station at the close of business, 31 July 1970, was as follows:

MEMORANDUM

TO : AVP TPE

DATE: 18 August 1970

FROM : BMSGN

REF. No. BMSGN/70/252

SUBJECT : July Monthly Report -

Saigon Base Monthly Report for July 1970 is forwarded in three copies for your file.

E.J. Theisen

FORM 837000

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
JULY 1970

I. GENERAL

1. Total block time for July was 5295 hours as compared to 6398 for July 1969, and 5518 hours for June 1970.

2. VTB N3728G was positioned to Udorn on 1 August 1970, and on 28 July 1970 VTB N9638Z was removed from temporary storage and placed on the 7001 contract.

3. Vietnamese students supported by other Allied Representatives have held a demonstration on 11 July 1970 declaring that they want to obtain Peace, Independence and Unification for Vietnam without American and Allied troops' help and support. Nixon is only a war monger, all American must withdraw from Vietnam.

On July 20th, at 1530, VC launched two rockets: one hit the yard of the Independence Palace, another landed in downtown Saigon area. Also on 25 July, a plastic bomb was detonated behind the 3rd Field Hospital, a few miles from the airport, causing minor damage.

On July 22nd, an Air Vietnam domestic flight (Pleiku-Saigon) was hijacked by an American GI [redacted] Capt F.L. Derieux (former AAM pilot) and two other Koreans crew members were involved. Unofficial sources reported that [redacted] attempted to escape to HongKong due to the previous crime he has had committed during his tour in Vietnam. The aircraft landed safely in Saigon and the hijacker was apprehended.

On July 27th, the Vietnamese students and disabled veterans attacked the Indian Consulate at Saigon protesting against the official welcoming of Madame Nguyen Thi BINH who is the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Liberation Front (VC).

4. Local management has been approached both at DAD and SGN by US Air Force Representatives concerning master planning which, if effective, would relocate the AAM DAD Operations across the runways to the military side of the field. This matter has been turned over to the customers to take up with proper authorities.

AR 2438 - Completion of Concrete Pavement and Drainage Ditch, DAD
Complete.

AR 2437 - Improvement on Passenger Lounge, DAD
This project is out for bid. Expect it will take 30 days to complete after starting construction.

AR 2422 - Renovation of the Operations Building, SGN
This project moving along quite rapidly, should be complete by 30 September 1970.

AR 8320 - Danang Hostel & SZ Residence Renovation
This project is complete. Pictures will be forwarded in the near future. To give you a feeling for the vast improvement which has been effective.

AR 2449 - Saigon Terminal Parking Apron
Only one bid from A&M Enterprises was received on this project which fell within the limit of the approved AR & Form F. Customer John Williams has approved. Letter being forwarded to PRES and SLC for approval to sub-contract. Construction time required is about 45 days.

5. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Vietnam has sent instructions to all Vietnamese Embassies/Consulates abroad that starting 14 August 1970 the new regulations will apply ---all nationals including American must obtain entry visa before entering the Republic of Vietnam. The seven-day stay without visa in SVN is no longer granted to Americans or any other foreign nationals.

II. CUSTOMER RELATIONS remain excellent as ever.

III. FLYING
1. Facilities inspections were made at Can Tho and Da Nang primarily for the purpose of getting a check made of the water used for showers, but at present we have not received any specific results. MFD's visit to Da Nang was cut short with the arrival of VPFO - continuation of MFD's visit will be made in August.

2. The grievance hearing for P.A. Broussard and G.V. Parker was held, and due to the lack of complete evidence, including "failure-to-appear" on the part of the customer who initiated the original complaint, it was recommended that both pilots be reinstated. This was upheld by Taipei and they were returned to duty, retroactive to the date they were withhold from service.

Renovation and construction was started on the FD/OPs building in Saigon.

VPFO and NVPFO made separate visits to Saigon.

Our safety record went "down the drain" with the gear-up landing of VTB N7770B at Bac Lieu (V58).

IV. MEDICAL
Number of sick call: 120
Accidents: 50
Hospitalized sick call: None
Unhospitalized accident: 50
Outcall: 1
Physical examination: 22
Sick leaves: 339½

V. PERSONNEL

1. Personnel Department activities were routine. PM was on Annual Leave from 11 July-8 August 1970.

2. Our appeal through the US Embassy for the reconsideration of the work permits were successful. We have just obtained the reconsideration for the work permits of 10 TCN from the RVN Ministry of Labor.

The piaster is being traded in the open market at approximately VN$380 to US$1.

3. Personnel Strength

[redacted]

Classif. Permanent	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	Total GRD	Total FLT
	34	132	117	13	133	3	8	3	292	151

[redacted]

GRD	FLT	GRD	GRD	GRD	Total GRD	Total FLT
485#	14**	2	2	1*	490	14

Temporary: [redacted] 1

Pre-processed: GRD 75 [redacted]

(*) : [redacted]
(**) :
(#) :

Ground Personnel: 790
Flight Personnel: 165

Total : 955

Danang Sub-Base

[redacted]

Classif. Permanent	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	Total GRD
	3	13	17	69	102

Pre-processed: GRD [redacted] 1

Ground Personnel: 103

Nha Trang Sub-Base

[redacted]

Classif. Permanent	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	Total GRD
	4	8	22	56	90
				2	

Pre-processed

Ground Personnel: 92

Can Tho Sub-Base

Classif. Permanent	[redacted]			Total
	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
	1	10	3	14

VI. FISCAL

1. A group of officials from the Philipines visited to discuss banking in the Philipines. They were treated with every courtesy [redacted]

2. We were queried by Taipei regarding non-logging of project time. Seems that the customer, after signing the log sheets for 10 months discovered that we were no longer logging project time. Our pilots will start logging project time in August.

HOTEL/HOSTEL OCCUPANCY

		Beds Available	Beds Utilized
a.	Danang	588	332
b.	Nha Trang	513	407

c. Saigon - Not even a single certificate of "Non-Availability of company furnished accommodations was issued during this month.

VII. OPERATIONS

1. Flight Time Report (See attachment A)

2. Ground Fire Incidents Report (See attachment B)

3. Ground Transportation
   Aggregate microbuses mileage: 24852 km approx. 15532 miles
   Total microbuses downtime: 256 hrs 48'
   Total microbuses pax carried: 3236 pax
   Isuzu bus mileage: 6130 km approx. 3831 miles
   Total Isuzu bus downtime: 41 hrs 32'
   Isuzu bus pax carried: 10288 pax
   Supply vehicle mileage: 3055 km approx. 1909 miles
   Supply vehicles downtime: 21 hrs. 48'

VIII. TRAFFIC/AAM

	June	July
Passengers departure SGN (all contracts)	5,432	5,771
Passengers arrival SGN (all contracts)	6,231	6,486
Outbound cargo SGN	146,640	65,891
Inbound cargo SGN	70,700	68,553

TRAFFIC/USAID

	Cargo (including AF Caribou A/C)	
	June	July
Outbound (lbs) SGN	800,054	706,114
Inbound (lbs) SGN	392,621	231,436

IX. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. There is little to report in Technical Services - SVN, activities for July versus that of June. In the aircraft activities, flying hours utilized were approximately the same. The workload due to delays, recoveries and premature engine removals was down slightly.

Initiation of the new Skilled Labor Cost Accounting System was off on Schedule, 1 July. Preparatory training was carried out, but such a program requires strong and constant supervisory follow-up.

General Maintenance activities at SGN includes the start of renovation of the Flight and Operations department building; installation of the 160 KW standby generator, water faucets for aircraft washing to reduce towing and accident potential, area beautification and general housekeeping. At Danang, the terminal/hangar area concreting is approximately 90% complete and the hostel is complete except for touch-up.

2. Aircraft Maintenance - Fixed Wing . There were several incidents during the month involving aircraft accidents. Two aircraft received minor damage due to hostile fire action, one aircraft had propeller damage due to FOD, another aircraft lost a cargo door in flight and one aircraft was involved in a major accident by landing on the runway with gear-up position.

3. Rotary Wing - This month has been a little slow; two number two service at DAD, five number two, one number 3A and one number 3B, and one number 4A service at Saigon.

4. Shops - The overall shops workload remained steady with a certain amount of overtime required for M198X number 4 service.

5. General Maintenance - Building and Grounds Maintenance - Water pipe has been run through existing culverts under the taxiway from the RMD building to the South Ramp. Water pipe has also been installed along the north side of the Northeast Ramp.

6. Electronics - PABX and Intercom Systems- We have one PTT trunk line that can be used and another line (on emergency basis only) that can be used to call Saigon telephones thru the PABX operator.

CMD has recently finished the installation of the Paging System, initiated a year ago. Ten speakers are distributed to cover all existing AAM Ramps, inside hangar, sheet-metal shop and Cafeteria. One dynamic microphone and two 100-watt Philips amplifiers are used to operate these speakers.

7. Technical Training -
Courses completed : Quality control Inspector Training; Garrett TPE-331; Supply Course; Flight Mechanic's Course.

Courses in progress: Line Service Mechanics Course; Welding Course.

8. Supply - Supply activities remained the same as last month . The 2nd Supply Training Course for newly employed storekeepers was conducted this month. The students gained considerable basic knowledge of the functions of the supply business.

The Procurement Section of MSD SGN experienced a slightly smaller amount of transactions than last month. A total of 171 line items of commodities were purchased from local market this month.

Total value of commodities purchased from Saigon/Cholon market amounted to VN$ 765,857.00.

Since Naval Support Activity (NSA) in Danang has been deactivated, 60% of the general supplies have been purchased from HKG.

E. J. Theisen

SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT

- JULY 1970 -

1. Contract 7001 -

A/C No.	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
N67984	115+03	99+22	18+40	16+38
N67985	134+47	117+33		
B928	83+28	66+19		
B910	87+50	77+29	12+38	10+15
B912	89+21	70+47		
6147	59+58	49+51		
5559	76+46	63+32		
5994	172+00	141+14		
B829	126+35	106+16	1+05	0+39
N539Y	119+55	98+13	27+18	23+52
N544Y	149+35	125+08	25+55	23+45
B851	142+58	114+00	23+49	21+46
N9518Z	72+32	60+37		
N61540	74+55	65+12	3+57	3+11
N9956Z	90+06	76+35	16+16	13+53
N77708	110+02	95+16	1+24	0+57
N9577Z			3+17	2+27
N36740	19+35	16+23		
N91295	76+45	65+35	1+05	0+55
N9838Z	0+48	0+21	1+05	0+50
N37280	81+39	71+07	5+43	3+54
N7695C	115+22	98+10	0+22	0+17
N180K	137+42	123+11	0+33	0+18
N285L	95+38	85+29		
N391R	9+10	8+16		
N394R	51+34	45+21	0+43	0+18
N9444	44+38	39+36		
N196K	80+38	69+13	1+49	1+13
N153L	147+10	127+04	0+14	0+07
N12450	15+39	12+43	0+46	0+33
N748N	61+08	51+07	3+37	3+07
N152L	91+41	77+34	13+40	11+46
N184L	126+49	105+29		
N185K	111+53	99+25		
N192K	122+37	110+12	0+57	0+37
N194K	109+15	90+59	6+54	5+33
N393R	30+13	26+40	4+56	4+26
N1303K	108+04	108+04	16+12	16+12
N1304K	111+53	111+53		
N1305K	109+09	109+09	4+15	4+15
N1306K	109+01	109+01	2+15	2+15
N1307K	128+36	128+36	13+00	13+00
N8514F	169+13	169+13	2+50	2+50
N8535F	11+09	11+09	4+38	4+38
Sub-total	3982+45	3498+24	219+53	194+27

ATTACHMENT "A"

2. Contract 7002 -

B851	1+29	1+18
M9518Z	4+46	3+33
M61540	48+23	42+39
M9956Z	13+38	11+29
M77708	8+20	7+10
M36740	77+51	66+18
M91295	12+50	10+27
M9838Z	2+22	1+59
M37280	11+25	9+20
M7695C	2+55	2+14
M285L	52+12	47+57
M391R	75+54	65+20
M394R	104+58	97+47
M9444	14+46	13+37
M198X	60+01	50+12
M153L	8+37	7+34
M12450	69+05	62+27
M748N	6+45	4+59
M152L	8+25	7+40
M184L	6+24	5+10
M185X	25+57	23+36
M192X	17+00	14+52
M194X	9+53	8+15
M393R	72+12	61+39
M1303X	4+37	4+37
M1304X	18+11	18+11
M1305X	24+03	24+03
M1306X	14+15	14+15
M1307X	8+02	8+02
M8514P	12+14	12+14
M8535P	74+22	74+12
Sub-total	871+42	782+46

3. Contract 7003 -

M67965	6+08	5+32
B928	27+28	22+43
B910	40+46	34+49
B912	54+51	43+06
6147	20+11	13+11
5559	10+31	6+45
B629	8+11	5+44
M539X	7+28	5+59
M544X	11+12	9+30
B851	4+43	3+35
M61540	4+20	2+51
M37280	2+43	1+57
M7695C	1+41	1+21
M285L	2+13	1+56
M153L	1+02	0+48
M748N	2+26	2+00
M152L	2+16	1+40
M184L	8+28	6+03
M185X	1+10	0+52
M194X	3+52	2+42

N393R	0+40	0+00
N1304X	24+54	24+54
N1307X	15+06	15+06
Sub-total	262+20	213+04

4. Contract 0030 -

N9577Z	49+46	42+41
N152L	4+35	3+52
Sub-total	54+21	46+33

5. Contract 0062 -

N6154U	1+39	1+28
N3671G	5+19	4+46
N9664C	106+36	91+49
N7695C	10+00	8+45
N1249D	1+28	1+22
N393R	2+04	1+50
Sub-total	127+06	110+00

TOTAL REVENUE BLOCK TIME	5298+14
TOTAL REVENUE FLIGHT TIME	4650+47
TOTAL NON-REVENUE BLOCK TIME	219+53
TOTAL NON-REVENUE FLIGHT TIME	194+27
GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	5518+07
GRAND TOTAL FLIGHT TIME	4845+14

Flight Time by Type of Aircraft

	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
Type of A/C	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
C-46	639+42	537+40	31+18	26+53
Relled C-47	339+26	274+33		
C-47	134+46	112+00	1+05	0+39
DHC-4	437+20	357+43	77+02	69+23
VTB	1006+18	860+03	33+09	26+24
PC-6	1798+03	1566+09	34+09	27+58
204-B	942+39	942+39	43+10	43+10
TOTAL	5298+14	4650+47	219+53	194+27

Original Signed By
L. G. PARRISH
SOM/SOM

cc: BM/SOM
MFD/SOM
TM/SOM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report

Thailand's Khmer Minority

~~Secret~~
CIA/BGI GR 71-2
September 1970

OCMH, S C No. 571

NND 941536 --- 3996

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
September 1970

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Thailand's Khmer Minority

Introduction

Royal Thai Army training of Thai-Khmer recruits for possible service in support of the Lon Nol regime in Cambodia has focused attention on a relatively large but little known minority that occupies much of Thailand's frontier with Cambodia.* There are indications, moreover, that the Thai Government is growing increasingly concerned about the ability of this traditionally peaceful and apolitical minority to withstand propaganda emanating from Communist elements in Northeast Thailand or from across the border in Cambodia. This report presents a brief description of the Thai-Khmer community.

Note: This report was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence.

* Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, in an interview with the Bangkok World on 9 September 1970, revealed that the Thai Government had, for the time being, decided against sending any Thai troops -- including Thai-Khmers -- into Cambodia.

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Numbers and Location

1. Although estimates of the Thai-Khmer population appearing in various US intelligence reports during the past 10 years range widely, from a low of 160,000 to a high of 600,000 persons, a realistic approximation would appear to lie between 600,000 and 800,000. According to an American missionary who surveyed the population in Buriram, Surin, and Sisaket in 1963-64, there were then more than 600,000 Khmers in these provinces alone. Most of the Khmers live in Ubon Ratchathani, Sisaket, Surin, Buriram, Prachinburi, Chanthaburi, and Trat Provinces, which collectively form a territorial arc along the full length of the Thailand-Cambodia border. Khmers reportedly comprise a majority of the population of Buriram and Surin Provinces,* and between one-fourth and one-third of the population of Sisaket. No information is available to indicate the percentage of Khmers in the other provinces involved, where their numbers are considerably fewer. Total provincial population, according to the 1960 Thailand census, is as follows (the census does not provide a breakdown by ethnic group):

Border Province Population

Province	Population
Ubon Ratchathani	1,130,712
Sisaket	601,356
Surin	581,732
Buriram	583,585
Prachinburi	334,895
Chanthaburi	157,803
Trat	66,328
Total	3,456,411

2. Most Khmer villages lie well away from the generally rugged terrain of the border and are concentrated along the railroad in Buriram, Surin, and

* The provincial capital of Surin is essentially a Khmer city.

NND 941536 --- 4001

Sisaket. The border belt of territory lying south of the railroad in these provinces and extending some 20 miles to the west of the border in Prachinburi, Chanthaburi, and Trat Provinces is more "purely" Khmer -- even though it is more sparsely populated and contains numerically fewer Khmers -- than the areas farther toward the interior (see Map 78820).

3. Small Khmer communities are also scattered outside the border provinces -- in Northeast Thailand as far north as Loei and in the central lowland within and around the cities of Bangkok, Rat Buri, Kanchanaburi, Chachoengsao, and Chon Buri. The lowland communities are reported to be comprised of the descendents of resettled Khmer prisoners-of-war. They were moved to specified settlements during World War II by the Royal Thai Government (RTG), which gave them land in return for their pledge to perform certain services, including military duty.

4. Buriram, Surin, Sisaket, and Ubon Ratchathani Provinces are situated on the Khorat Plateau of Northeast Thailand, their southern boundaries alined along the Dangrek Ridge (Thiu Khao Phanom Dongrak). This ridge rises relatively gently from Thai territory on the north but drops precipitously some 600 to 1,800 feet to Cambodian territory on the south. It is a barrier to the development of surface transportation between the two countries; no all-weather road crosses it.* Prachinburi occupies a natural lowland corridor between Thailand and Cambodia. It is crossed by a railroad and an all-weather road, both of which link the two countries.** Chanthaburi and Trat occupy Thailand's isolated southeastern salient, which is cut off from Cambodia by the rugged, heavily forested, and lightly peopled Cardamomes Mountains.

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* The Khmers of the Khorat Plateau call their ethnic cousins across the border "Khmer tam" (lower Cambodians) while the latter refer to the Thai-Khmers on the Khorat Plateau as either "Khmer dong" or "Khmer doi", meaning wild or mountain Cambodian.

** The rail link has been restored in 1970, after having been closed during the 9 years that Thailand-Cambodian diplomatic relations were severed.

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5. The Thai-Khmers occupy territory that was controlled centuries ago by their Khmer ancestors, whose empire was for several hundred years the dominant power in much of Southeast Asia. The Khmer Empire, which flourished from the ninth until the 13th centuries A.D., encompassed territory in much of present-day Thailand and as far westward as Burma's Tenasserim Coast. From the 13th century onward, however, Khmer power waned, and the borders of the Khmer lands succumbed to the onslaught of the increasingly powerful Siamese. By the early 19th century, Siam (now Thailand) had pushed the Khmers southward beyond the edge of the Dangrek Ridge and well to the east of the present boundary. Siam retained much of present-day Battambang and Siem Reap Provinces in western Cambodia (see Map 77970) until the early 20th century when they became a part of French Indo China. (She regained them temporarily, with Japanese assistance, during World War II.) Although their Thai territory has been lost for some time, the Khmers have remained in Thailand where they have been for many generations an impoverished but peaceful minority.

6. Few Thai-Khmers were born in Cambodia; according to the 1960 Thailand census, they totaled 4,494 persons, many of whom may have emigrated from Cambodia to escape the unsettled conditions after World War II. Others have fled recently to escape the current imbroglio in Cambodia. According to RTG border officials, more than 1,200 persons (excluding Government officials and troops, tourists, and villagers living in the border area) moved from Cambodia into the Thai border provinces -- principally Surin, Sisaket, and Trat -- during the first 6 months of 1970; about two-thirds of them were Cambodian citizens and one-third Thai citizens, the latter apparently returning to Thailand after unsuccessful attempts to resettle in Cambodia prior to the Sihanouk coup. The RTG reportedly expects to quickly repatriate the Cambodian refugees.

Cultural Factors

7. There is little to distinguish the Khmers physically from their Thai neighbors. They are

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

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about the same height and have generally similar facial traits; only the slightly darker complexion of the Khmers is distinctive. Nor is there much to set them apart culturally. Both espouse Theravada Buddhism and their passive life styles reflect that faith.*

8. The extent of assimilation into Thai culture varies geographically; it is least in the relatively "pure" Khmer areas near the border, where the Khmer cling to close-knit communities, and is greatest in the enclaves of the Northeast and the central lowland, well away from the Khmer strongholds. Many of the Khmers living in such small, scattered enclave communities surrounded by Thais probably retain only a trace of their Khmer identity.

9. Language is the major distinguishing cultural feature. The Khmer language is spoken almost exclusively within the family and in the local community, although most Thai-Khmers -- particularly the men and residents of the provincial capitals -- have learned Thai and use it as a second language. Young Thai-Khmers, who are generally getting a better education than did their elders, are likely to be more fluent in the Thai tongue.

10. The RTG has used education as a vehicle to enhance the assimilation of the country's minorities, including the Khmer, and literacy in the Thai language has been emphasized. Educational facilities in the Khmer strongholds are still not good, however, and few Thai-Khmers receive more than a 4-year education. A recent literacy study

* An estimated 100,000 to 150,000 Kui people (called Soai by the Thai) are scattered among the Khmers and Thais in Buriram, Surin, and Sisaket Provinces (see Map 78820) as well as across the borders in northern Cambodia and southwestern Laos. Additional numbers retain only a trace of their Kui identity, having been assimilated into either Khmer or Thai society (one or the other, depending on proximity). Although the Kui language remains distinct, the people are otherwise closely related to the Khmers and, like them, inhabited this territory long before the arrival of the Siamese.

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in rural areas of the Northeast revealed that in those villages where Khmer was the spoken language, 78 percent of the people were either totally illiterate or could not comprehend the lowest-level Thai language materials.

11. The Thai-Khmers remain largely isolated and ignored by both the Thai and the Cambodian Governments. Like their Thai neighbors, the Thai-Khmer peasants are engrossed in eking out a living from farming the generally infertile soils of their homesteads. They have little interest in politics outside the village, and there are no well-developed political ties with either country. Terrain barriers, such as the Dangrek Ridge and the Cardamomes Mountains, and the cross-border language differences discourage the development of political attachments with Phnom Penh.* After World War II, some Thai-Khmers sought the re-creation of a natural Khmer state through the annexation of the Thai border provinces to Cambodia. Otherwise, there has been little manifestation of Thai-Khmer desire to belong to a greater Khmer community.

12. An ambivalent attitude toward the RTG prevails among the Thai-Khmers. Most avow at least a nominal loyalty to the King and Queen, whose pictures may be found on the walls of many homes; nevertheless, the Thai-Khmers may talk about Bangkok as if it were in a foreign country. The communications gap between Bangkok and the Thai-Khmer country has been widened by a paucity of newspapers and radios. Broadcasts from Bangkok, moreover, are in a Thai dialect alien to Khmer ears.

13. RTG policy toward the Khmer minority may best be described as indifferent, particularly when compared to its efforts to accommodate the hill tribe minorities of northern Thailand. But, unlike the northern uplanders -- or the Vietnamese of the Northeast -- the Khmers are an unusually stable

* Phnom Penh radio broadcasts reach into Thai territory. The Khmer dialect spoken in Thailand, however, is distinct from that of Phnom Penh, and Thai-Khmers reportedly have difficulty comprehending Cambodian-Khmer broadcasters.

NND 941536 --- 9006

minority. Although some Communist propaganda has been disseminated among them and there are a few Communist-activated students, little else indicates that the Thai-Khmers are a disruptive element. An undercurrent of antipathy is directed toward most Thais, however, and RTG officials, in rare visits to Khmer villages, are likely to be coolly received. Few such officials speak Khmer, a disability that causes confidence in the RTG to be weakened. Even Thai schoolteachers serving the Khmers are reported to suffer from a language handicap. Much of the RTG presence in the Khmer-settled lands, moreover, is related to military operations of the Royal Thai Army or the Border Patrol Police, and the Khmers undoubtedly are doubly suspicious of uniformed personnel. Educated Khmers must surely relate the poverty of their people to discriminatory policies of the RTG.

14. Although most Thai-Khmers are sedentary and content to remain in their villages year round, many of the men seek employment outside the village during the dry season. Most of them join their Thai neighbors from the Northeast in mass migrations to provincial capitals, to Bangkok, or to other large cities, where they seek employment as day laborers or pedicab drivers.* The communities of Khmer itinerants in these cities tend to be close-knit. Some Thai-Khmers living close to the border reportedly migrate to Cambodia, returning to their families with the onset of the monsoon rains in late May or early June to work in the ricefields. There is, moreover, a "floating" Khmer element in the border area, comprised of oxcart drivers who transport dried fish from the Tonle Sap into Thailand in exchange for such commodities as home-woven textiles and salt. Villagers in the border area apparently cross the border freely.

Military Experience

15. The Thai-Khmers, as a group, have no strong military proclivities. Their history is

* An increasing number of better educated Thai-Khmer youths have been leaving their impoverished villages to establish permanent residence in the Thai cities.

NND 941536 --- 4007

noteworthy for its peaceful -- although not necessarily friendly -- relations with their neighbors. Some, however, have served in the Royal Thai Army and others with the Khmer Serei (Free Cambodia) movement -- a Thai- and South Vietnam-based insurgent force whose objective was the overthrow of the Sihanouk Government.*

16. Thailand assisted the Khmer Serei during the late 1950's and throughout the 1960's by recruiting, training, and offering sanctuary to personnel. During the peak of its insurgent activities in the mid-1960's, the Khmer Serei maintained several bases in Prachinburi, Buriram, and Surin Provinces in Thailand, from which it conducted hit-and-run raids against Cambodian Army outposts in northwestern Cambodia. Although comprised mostly of Cambodian Khmers and Khmer Kroms (ethnic Khmers living in South Vietnam), the Khmer Serei reportedly recruited as many as several hundred Thai-Khmers. RTG military representatives, recruiting for the Khmer Serei in 1969, reportedly sought out Thai-Khmers who had lived in Cambodia. Recruiters often capitalized on grievances that were directed against officials in the Sihanouk Government. Perhaps a greater incentive to recruitment, however, was the fact that the Khmer Serei movement offered the Thai-Khmers cover for such illicit activities as cattle rustling or timber smuggling. This attraction may still motivate Thai-Khmer personnel to volunteer to fight against Communist forces in Cambodia.

17. Reports in late 1969 and early 1970 (before the Sihanouk coup) indicated that a number of Thai-Khmers, dissatisfied with conditions in Thailand (and often enticed by Cambodian Government recruiters), were fleeing to Cambodia to be resettled in Government-run camps in the provinces of

* Khmer Serei units in Thailand apparently have been disbanded; the founder and leader, Son Ngoc Thanh, a prominent figure in the struggle for Cambodian independence, has accepted a position as Counselor in the Lon Nol Government.

NND 941536 --- 4008

Oddar Meanchey and Preah Vihear (see Map 77970). Reportedly, many refugees were recruited for Cambodian paramilitary training, apparently to form a counterforce to the Thailand-based Khmer Serei insurgents. Allegedly, trainees were told that the southern parts of the Thai provinces of Buriram, Surin, Sisaket, and Ubon Ratchathani rightfully belonged to Cambodia; they were further informed that they would become part of a force fighting for the return of these lands. Many, however, disillusioned with conditions in the camps and the prospects of military life, returned to Thailand.

18. Cross-border ethnic ties would motivate few Thai-Khmers to fight in Cambodia. Recent immigrants into Thai territory, however, especially those with relatives still in Cambodia, would certainly be more inclined to aid fellow Khmers than would Thai-Khmers who are long established and without such ties. Fewer still would be motivated by political ideology. The promise of improved economic status would seem to be the inducement most likely to motivate impoverished Thai-Khmer peasants to volunteer for military service.

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PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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REPORT NO. [redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

DATE DISTR. 9 September 1970

COUNTRY South Vietnam

DOI April 1970

SUBJECT Tran Van Luc, aka Nam Luc, Chief, Policy Section, Enemy Proselyting Staff, Political Staff Department of COSVN

ACQ Vietnam, Saigon (17 June 1970)

FIELD NO. [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted]

1. Tran Van L u c, aka Nam L u c, born in 1927 in Bien Hoa City, Bien Hoa Province, South Vietnam (SVN), is the chief of the Policy Section, Enemy Proselyting Staff, Political Staff Department of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). Luc has been very active in the handling of all American prisoners of war (POW's) since April 1966. He was the official COSVN delegate on POW Exchange Affairs in October 1968 at the occasion of the anniversary of the establishment of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) when three American prisoners were returned.

2. Tran Van Luc is an active participant drafting COSVN policy statements and is one of the most astute men in the Political Staff Department. He is a man with a

1.3(a)(4)

Approved for Release Date August 1993

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STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

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promising political future in view of his close association with the chief of the Enemy Proselyting Staff, close friend and confidant Le C h a n, aka Tam T r a n, chief of the Political Staff Department of COSVN, and Pham H u n g, aka Bay H o n g, the Party secretary of COSVN.

3. Luc was born into a rich South Vietnamese family with French citizenship and graduated from the Petrus Ky School in Saigon with a French baccalaureate. He began his revolutionary cadre background in September 1945 when he entered the Binh Xuyen Party and actively fought against the French. He was appointed to serve in the Binh Xuyen Party Staff Section with such leaders as Hai D u o n g, Ba C h i, and Bay V i e n until he attempted to eliminate graft and corruption in the Binh Xuyen Party. He was sentenced to death and imprisoned in the Sat Forest by Bay Vien. However, he was rescued by the Dong Nai Regiment of the Ve Quoc Doan Viet Minh. Other idealistic members of the Binh Xuyen joined Luc to form a guerrilla company. Luc was the company political officer, and 3 months later Luc and his company became Party members.

4. In 1950 Luc was transferred to Battalion 302 where he became a lifelong friend of the other political officer, Nam P h o n g, who, as of April 1970, was a colonel and political officer of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 9th Division. Luc concentrated on the Dau Tieng area of Eastern Nam Bo and formed Party cells among the rubber workers. He organized agents targeted against the Officers' Training School run by the French military and initiated an attack which ended in the death of all the French officers and many students. In 1954, Battalion 302 regrouped to Thanh Hoa Province, North Vietnam (NVN), and Luc was transferred to the Political Office, Eastern Nam Bo headquarters, where he worked as a political cadre until 1957. He attended a three-year course at the Intermediate and Advanced Political School, Hanoi. Upon graduation in 1960, Luc was promoted to senior captain and was assigned as the political officer of the Engineering Battalion, Division 330, NVA. In 1962, the division was split and some units were sent to Houa Phan Province, Laos, to fight with Kong L e. Luc remained in NVN as battalion political officer for the remaining units until July 1965 when he was transferred to the Cuc Nghien Cuu, General Political Department, General Headquarters of the People's Army of Vietnam. He attended the Enemy Proselyting Course, Hanoi, from August until November 1965.

5. In November 1965, Luc infiltrated SVN with Group 714 and upon reaching Bau Co (XT 245670), Tay Ninh Province, in April 1966 was assigned to B.620, COSVN Political Staff Department. In April 1966 Luc became chief of the Policy Section, Enemy Proselyting Staff.

6. In April 1968, Luc was assigned to the COSVN Forward Headquarters (Tien Phuong) in Subregion 1 (SR-1) and was in charge of 40 enemy proselyters of both company and battalion levels. In late April he himself launched and commanded a successful campaign against the Cau Vang Outpost (XT 490190) located near Trang Bang, Hau Nghia Province. Luc was recalled to COSVN in July 1968 and made the COSVN chief delegate for Prisoner Exchange Affairs. In October 1968 he directed the first return of American POW's in Tay Ninh Province. Although suffering from a severely abscessed tooth, Luc personally directed the POW return. Under his contingency plans for Viet Cong (VC)/NVN units, a dummy camp was constructed in the vicinity of the prisoner exchange and as a

result, no VC/NVA casualties were suffered in the subsequent Allied air strikes. After May 1969, Luc spent all his time at COSVN Headquarters directing the Policy Section of the Enemy Proselyting Staff.

7. Luc is a rather distinguished-looking man, has graying hair, and is tall, erect and slender. He has a nervous tic in the right corner of his mouth and always wears glasses. He is not married. Although somewhat introverted, he is quite open with his few close friends and is well liked by his comrades.

8. Field Dissem: State USMACV USAID CORDS Dir/JUSPAO (Mr. Nickel only) 7th Air Force USARV NAVFORV 6499 SAG 525th MI Gp OSI CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC.

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NND 927660-25

The Thai Insurgency: *A Mixed Bag*

Bangkok has struck hard at the insurgency in the north. In one of the most successful counter-insurgency operations ever waged by government forces, a 450-man Thai Army task force conducted a series of raids in late August against the principal insurgent stronghold area in northern Nan Province along the Thai-Lao border. The well-coordinated and executed operation, which involved night movement with helicopter support, as well as assistance from intelligence teams on the Lao side of the border, took the insurgents completely by surprise. Fourteen enemy cadre were captured and several others killed without significant loss to government forces.

The operation should help boost Thai morale in an area where the insurgents had enjoyed consistent tactical success—which they had begun to exploit politically—and where the government has been at a loss to develop a coherent strategy. The insurgency in the north continues to spread, however. Small enemy units have recently been spotted farther from the Lao border than heretofore, and it will take a good deal more than one success to rectify the situation.

In the northeast, on the other hand, the insurgent movement is continuing to rebound from the setbacks it suffered during 1967-68. The Communists there have maintained a level of activity markedly higher this rainy season than last. Most of this increased activity has been organizational rather than military, with the Communists seeking to strengthen their support base and extend their writ into new areas of the interior. In contrast to their focus this spring on Nakhon Phanom and Sakhon Nakhon provinces, insurgent activity now affects portions of at least eight northeastern provinces.

Bangkok's growing preoccupation with developments in Cambodia may be contributing to rising insurgent fortunes in the northeast. In an effort to counter the potential threat to its border posed by recent Communist advances in northern and western Cambodia, the government has reassigned seven of the 15 Thai Army companies normally committed to counterinsurgency tasks in the northeast to security missions along the Cambodian frontier. This evidently has contributed to a winding down of government pressure against the insurgents in the northeast.

The fundamental problem, however, is the top Thai leaders' continued discounting of the insurgent threat in the northeast. Based on the experience of 1967-68—when the overextended insurgents were forced to retrench in the face of government pressure—and the continuing weakness of insurgent leadership and appeal, the Thai are convinced that they can keep the insurgency in the northeast within manageable proportions. For their part, the insurgents can profitably use an extended period free from serious harassment, which is likely if they choose to avoid the kind of flamboyant actions that force the government to take countermeasures. *(SECRET)*

Northern Thailand: Areas of Insurgency

NND 941536 ---3f7f

Cambodia: *Phnom Penh Launches an Offensive*

The government's most ambitious military operation of the war attained initial success when a government amphibious relief convoy reached Kompong Thom this week. Advance elements of a second Cambodian Army task force headed north from Skoun on Route 6 in a parallel effort to reinforce and resupply the embattled defenders of Kompong Thom city. This task force is spearheaded by six infantry battalions recently returned from retraining in South Vietnam. Five other battalions are moving westward from Kompong Cham to provide route security behind the advance elements. The government's advance has been slowed by destroyed bridges along Route 6 and the numerous obstacles placed across it by the enemy. The Communists have so far offered only token resistance.

The major area of Communist military activity shifted during the last week from east of Phnom Penh to areas south of the capital. Government forces recaptured Srang, 25 miles southwest of Phnom Penh, when the enemy withdrew after holding the town for five days. The Cambodian Army, however, continues to report sizable enemy troop concentrations nearby and in areas around the nearby towns of Tram Khnar and Saang to the east, both of which came under repeated enemy harassing attacks.

Elsewhere, the Communists launched light harassing attacks near several provincial capitals in the south and southeast. In the northwest, the enemy increased its harassment of government defensive positions at isolated Siem Reap city. Cambodian troops clashed with Communist units north and west of the city, and in one encounter 13 Cambodian soldiers were killed by Communists wearing uniforms similar to those of Cambodian paratroop units.

Status of Communist Supply Routes

Recent aerial photography and reports from controlled sources provide no evidence of major logistic activity in enemy-controlled provinces in northern and northeastern Cambodia. Several of the major routes are impassable for trucks because of destroyed bridges and deteriorated roads, with few signs of repair activity in evidence. Route 19, the main road from northeastern Cambodia into South Vietnam, is in good condition but little traffic or other logistics activity was observed by sources operating there in mid-August. Little or no significant enemy activity was observed on the major rivers in the area during late August.

Vacancy at Lusaka

The Nonaligned Conference formally opened on 8 September, and as anticipated neither the Lon Nol nor the Sihanouk delegation was seated. According to a reliable clandestine source, more delegations supported Sihanouk than Lon Nol at the preparatory foreign ministers' conference on 6 and 7 September. The majority, however, favored seating neither, and believed that Cambodia should remain a member of the conference without official representation in attendance. This ministerial compromise was apparently accepted by the full conference. ~~(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)~~

• • •

NND 941536 --- 38 79

MEMORANDUM

DATE: 21 September 1970

TO : #VPATPE

REF. No BMSGN/70/276

FROM : BMSGN

SUBJECT : August Monthly Report

Saigon Base Monthly Report for August 1970 is forwarded in three copies for your file.

E.J. Theisen

TO: VPA - TPE

Pom SGN/70/376

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
AUGUST 1970

I. GENERAL

1. Total block time for August was 5386 hours as compared to 6128 for August 1969 and 5295 hours for July 1970.

2. Several 120mm rockets impacted within the perimeter of the Danang Air Base Facilities. Several persons were killed and several additional persons were seriously injured, there was no damage to AAM Facilities or personnel.

3. Locally, in Saigon the situation remains quite stable with negative rockets attacks and diminishing terrorist activities. However there is an increasing number of demonstrations by Vietnamese war veterans augmented by questionable organizations. There were also several students demonstrations against the Vietnamese Government and American participation in the war effort here which makes this American unproud of some of the bad lessons being learned from our activities in the United States

4. We have given up numerous contacts with the U.S. Air Force to solve vehicular traffic situation along our taxi way (which includes VIP vehicles! from MACV and 7th Air Force plus a variation of military vehicles which use our area as a shortcut. Also there has been increased irregulated traffic on 6th Street which crosses our main taxi way from the AAM Ramp to the runway. Since this is a VNAF Base, I have addressed official correspondence to the VNAF authorities and I am pleased with their enthusiastic appreciation of our problem. I expect that an acceptable vehicle control will be established within the AAM area within the next 30 days. This has been the subject of separated correspondence -- see BMSGN/70/262 and BMSGN/70/263. (Attachment C)

5. PANAM continues to press forward with plans to bring their 747 Jumbos into Saigon on a daily basis beginning 1 October. Special ground handling equipment has already been received. My contacts with the Vietnamese Aviation authorities indicate however that there are still questions whether TSN airfield facilities are adequate to handle this operation. Meanwhile Air Cambodge (Cambodia) Caravelle operations into Saigon have diminished from 6 daily flights per week to one, and sometimes, two flights per week.

6. We have heard nothing further concerning USAF-VNAF plans to relocate AAM facilities in Danang.

AR 2438 - Completion of Concrete Pavement and Drainage Ditch, DAD

The target date for completion is 10 September 1970.

AR 2437 - Improvement on Passenger Lounge, DAD

The scope of work and total cost of the project by about 50%. The bid proposal of the contractor was also cut by 50%. A meeting is scheduled with the contractor for the first week in September to negotiate and sign a contract. Construction is expected to begin on or about 15 Sept. 1970.

AR 2422 - Renovation of the Operations Building, SGN

Approximately 15% of the work has been completed. This project has a scheduled completion date of 30 Sept 1970

AR 2421 - Relocation/Renovation of Various AAM Shops and Offices, SGN

All scheduled moves have been made.

AR 8320/8348 - Da Nang Hostel & SZ Residence Renovation

This project is complete. The AR Closure Notice was submitted on 27 August 1970.

AR 2449 - Saigon Terminal Parking Apron

The contract is scheduled for signing during the first week of September. Approximately 30 - 45 days will be required for actual construction.

AR 8343 - Air Conditioning NHA Crew Quarters

To date eleven units have been installed. The remaining two units were received 31 August 1970 from HKG.

Proforma AR - Phase One have been submitted for the following projects:

Convert the Cafeteria Annex for the Security Dept. - Local management is projecting the closure of the Phu Kiet Office located in down town Saigon during the month of December. If this materialises, the Security Dept will have to be provided adequate space. It is felt that a portion of the Cafeteria Annex could be developed into adequate offices.

7. Training: I am very proud of the consistently high grades being maintained by our 25 [redacted] students in Tainan. I am informed they are the highest ever achieved by "outside" students.

II. GENERAL AFFAIRS

1. Consequences of the unrealistic exchange rate of the piaster at VN$118 to US$1 - It must be recognized that this exchange rate is unrealistic because in the "open" market a dollar is worth 400 piasters. This situation has created many difficulties for the nation:

a. It paralyzes export: In the face of increasing local costs of production the exporter cannot sell at competitive prices when he can only recover 118 piasters per dollar and government subsidies remain too low.

b. It creates an irrational foreign exchange transfer system: Foreign firms operating in Vietnam for instance may transfer abroad a portion of their profits. With the existing rate of 118 piasters per US$ these firms appear to be over privileged.

c. The existing unrealistic exchange rate is unfair to the US and allied troops and foreign residents, who consequently tend to minimize their expenses in local currency or to exchange their dollars on the black market which involves some 100 million dollars per year.

III. CUSTOMER RELATIONS - Our relations with all customers have never been better. They ar so congenial, it is unbelievable.

IV. HOSTEL OCCUPANCY

1. Danang - All rooms at the hostel were occupied every night during the month. Of the 682 beds available, 454 beds were used during August for an occupancy rate of 67%.

2. Nha Trang - During the month, 6 rooms were unoccuped a total of 57 days. In addition, the hotel had been vacated 29-30 August due civil disturbance. All crew members were moved to the Nautique Hotel. Of the 499 beds available, 358 were occupied for an occupancy rate of 72%.

V. MEDICAL

Number of sick call: 1358
Accidents: 28
Hospitalized sick call: 1
Unhospitalized accident: 28
Outcall: 2
Physical examination: 24
Sick leaves: 239

VI. PERSONNEL

1. Apart from routine activities, we have expended considerable effort trying to iron out the problems with respect to the new Entry Visa requirement for U.S. citizens. Since we are not in a "command" position, we ourselves have not been able to make much progress.

However, the U.S. Embassy is going full steam ahead in its efforts, and they advise that procedures should become consistent and simplified "before too long".

2. Personnel Strength

Saigon Base

Classif. Permanent	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	Total GRD	Total FLT
	33	132	117	13	126	3	7	3	283	151

[redacted]	GRD	FLT	GRD	GRD	GRD	Total GRD	Total FLT
	481#	12**	2	2	1*	489	12

Temporary [redacted] 1 [redacted] 1

Pre-processed: [redacted] - GRD 12 FLT 2

(*) : [redacted]
(**) :
(#) :

Ground Personnel: 786
Flight Personnel: 165
Total : 951

Danang Sub-Base

Classif. Permanent	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	Total GRD
	3	13	16	70	102

Pre-processed: [redacted] GRD 1

Nha Trang Sub-Base

Classif. Permanent	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	Total GRD
	4	8	21	59	92

Can Tho Sub-Base

Classif. Permanent	GRD	GRD	GRD	Total GRD
	1	10	3	14

VII. OPERATIONS

1. Flight Time Report (See Attachment A)

2. Ground Fire Incidents Report (See Attachment B)

3. On 2 January 1970, taxi accident in a Porter aircraft (PC-6C, N9444) at Bien Hoa (V-02) South Vietnam.

1. From 2 January 1970, taxi accident in a Porter aircraft (PC-6C, N9444) at Bienhoa (V-02) South Vietnam until 27 July 1970 a gear up landing N7770B at Bac Lieu, SVN. Substantial damage was incurred to the aircraft. The pilot and four passengers received no injuries. We had no accidents or incidents however we destroyed our good record in a catastrophic demonstration.

2. On 8 September 1970, shortly after climb out from Hoi An Airstrip, the external sling load on 204B, N1303X was inadvertantly dropped in the outskirts of the village. The load consisted of two 55 gallon drums of gasoline, one 55 gallon drum of diesel fuel. As the cargo impacted the ground a fire resulted, three small houses were totally destroyed and two houses were fifty per cent destroyed. There were 9 fatalities and three seriously injured on the ground. There was no damage to the aircraft or injuries to the three crew members. This is still being investigated and right now it appears AAH was not completely at fault. Local emphasis is being taken to get this trend "back on track".

4. Ground Transportation
Aggregate microbuses mileage : 24916 km approx. 15572 miles
Total microbuses downtime : 191 hrs 8'
Total microbuses pax carried : 3244 pax
Isuzu bus mileage: 6353 km approx. 3970 miles
Total Isuzu bus downtime : 78 hrs 42'
Isuzu bus pax carried : 10280
Supply vehicle mileage : 2770 km approx 1731 miles
Supply vehicles downtime : 30 hrs 12'

VIII. TRAFFIC/AAM

	July	August
Passengers departure SGN (all contracts)	5,771	5,314
Passengers arrival SGN (all contracts)	6,486	6,066
Outbound cargo SGN	65,891	49,778
Inbound cargo SGN	68,553	80,236

TRAFFIC/USAID

Cargo (including AF Caribou A/C)

	July	August
Outbound (lbs) SGN	706,114	595,821
Inbound (lbs) SGN	231,436	55,296

IX. FLYING

The month was relatively quiet and no earth-shaking incidents marked our operation as other than routine. Assorted problems arose with

trying to schedule crews returning from TDs or leave due to the VN visa restrictions. Theft from crewmembers cars in the AAM parking has taken a sharp increase. There have been a number of instances of the fuel tanks being drained.

The hostel at Danang is almost completely reconditioned. The Nhatrang hostel is finished with the installation of air conditioners.

Fixed-wing bidding was closed and the bids were submitted to Taipei.

X. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. Technical Services - SVN productive activities continued along the level set in June, with flying hanging between the 5500 and 5600 hour level. Damage repair work was up due to a YTB gear-up landing, motor damage to a 204B and wind damage to a PC6C. Recoveries, incidents AGP's and flight delays were down. The flying hour level was supported by a heavy and very successful refugee movement in the early part of the month.

2. Fixed Wing Unscheduled work consisted of eight engine changes, handling of five aircraft departure delays and two aircraft recovery missions.

3. Rotary Wing August was a very quiet month with no outstanding problems or difficulties encountered.

4. Shops Volpar N777CB suffered considerable damage from a gear up landing. Helicopter N1306X suffered over sixty holes from unfriendly mortars. USFAA inspection activities were quite active during the month.

5. Planning The Planning and Production Control Section pre-planned scheduled and processed for all types of aircrafts.

6. General Maintenance Grass plots on the south side of the R&D building and at the Traffic have been reworked to upgrade their appearance. Water pipe has been installed along the front of the CITCA Hangar and along the south side of the Northeast Ramp.

7. Airborne Electronics August was a good month for AED/SGN. With 458 O/N SVC and 49 Heavy Services, there were no delays due to AED.

8. Quality Control Five inspectors attended courses in aircraft inspection techniques and practices, fluorescent and dye penetrant inspection, magnetic particle inspection and aircraft radio graphic inspection.

The work load was somewhat light this month.

9. Supply activities remained routine. The procurement Section experienced a slightly larger amount of transactions as compared to last month. Total value of commodities purchase from local market amounted to VN 971,639.00.

Local customs authorities enforced strict regulations to inspect incoming and outgoing shipments, requiring more time to clear.

E.J. Theisen

MEMORANDUM

DATE: 15 October 1970

REF. No. BMSGN/70/291

TO : VPA-TPE

FROM : A/BMSGN

SUBJECT : September Monthly Report

Saigon Base Monthly Report for September 1970 is forwarded in three copies for your file.

B.D. Mesecher

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
SEPTEMBER 1970

I. GENERAL

1. Total revenue block time for September was 4705 hours as compared to 6134 for September 1969 and 5386 for August 1970.

2. Locally in Saigon the situation remains quite stable with diminishing terrorist activities. TSN Airport was quiet throughout the month.

3. The cost reduction program is being enforced by everybody at Saigon Base, recently, Acting BMSGN had called a meeting in which he reminded the Department Heads to re-emphasize the cost reduction program. In order to save the company a large amount of money by avoiding costly TCS personnel, many managers in Saigon Base are wearing two hats: MTS as A/BMSGN; OM as A/SOMSGN; AA/MTS as A/SGM; SIP/RW as A/MF/RW; APM as A/PM and A/GAM.

4. Saigon Base was happy to welcome several company visitors from the Head Office TPE/TNN during the month: DGTD, DCD, MPEMD, MCS. Accompanying BMSGN on his trip to TPE for contract negotiations, [redacted] Mr. McFarlane FIC and both of our customers.

5. One tragic incident happened at Nha Trang. One of our captains was assaulted and robbed at the entrance to a hotel in Nha Trang. While endeavoring to stop the thief's accomplice on a honda, he fell against the moving honda and caught his left hand in the revolving wheel spokes. Extent of injuries included an amputated first finger and evulsed middle finger of his left hand. We have recently sent one microbus from Saigon to provide shuttle transportation to the flight crews to and from the Nha Trang airfield, hostel and eating facilities. This "enclosed transportation" is a big improvement over the open jeeps we utilized previously. It reduces the risk of anti-foreigner harassment which prevails in Nha Trang.

6. There was one major incident which involved a 204B Helicopter N1303X. Shortly after climb out from Hoi An airstrip on 8 September, the sling load on the aircraft consisting of two barrels of fuel and one barrel of oil was inadvertently dropped on the outskirts of a village. There were 10 fatalities and 2 serious injuries to the villagers, there was no damage to aircraft nor crew member injuries.

7. A letter was sent to the Commander of 33rd Defence Group and Airport Commandant requesting their approval to close the ramp gate on the West side of the Air America Traffic Terminal (for formality only). The gate had been closed prior to their approval, because of the construction work going on to repave the terminal apron. We plan to greatly restrict use of this gate when the construction is completed on 1 November.

8. The SVN Government announced a new"parallel rate" of 275 piasters to US$ 1 effective 5 October. The parallel market is for personal accommodation sale only. The currency conversion trading on the open market is approximately VN$500 to US$1 and VN$290 to MPC$1. As a consequence, it is rumored that aircraft parts will be highly taxed, with import duties. Therefore we are only sending the most critical aircrafts parts by commercial air and plan to utilize company cargo flights more. We have not as yet received any official notification from the government here.

9. Our Technical Training Department here is conducting a [redacted] Mechanic Trainee Course for a group of eleven (11) employees. This is similar to the more sophisticated International Line Service Course being conducted at Tainan but our facilities are more limited. We do expect to develop some good mechanics from our in-country trainee course and the savings will be quite impressive.

10. Our total flying hours decreased considerably from the previous month, but based on discussions between VN70 and comments from negotiators now in Taipei, this months total revenue block time of 4705 hours is about what we are to expect for the rest of the contract year 71.

II. FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT

AR 2438 - Completion of Concrete Pavement and Drainage Ditch, DAD
This project is completed yet. Final acceptance by our company remains to be made.

AR 2437 - Improvement of Passenger Lounge, DAD
The contract prepared according to the revised plans and reduced costs, was signed and work started on 20 Sept. The scheduled completion date is 20 Oct. 70.

AR 2422 - Renovation of the Operations Building, SGN
The project has moved very slowly, with the result that the contractor has requested a three week extension beyond the scheduled completion date of 30 September because of unforeseen difficulties with the electrical conduit installation. The project is approximately 30% completed. The revised completion schedule is 21 Oct. 70.

AR 2421 - Relocation/Renovation of Various AAM Shops and Offices, SGN
The installation of work counters in the Accounting Department offices in lieu of partial metal partitions will be undertaken with construction of the counter to be done by GMD.

AR 2449 - Saigon Terminal Parking Apron, SGN
The contract for this project was signed with A & M Enterprises for work to start on 1 October 1970, with a scheduled completion date of 15 Nov. 70.

AR 8343 - Air conditioning NHA Crew Quarters, NHA
All units are installed and AR is completed. Closure notice will be processed in late October.

AR 2368 - Modification of SRSD and Material Control Offices, SGN
The partial metal partitions needed to complete this project are not yet available. A review is being made towards the possibility of using Okamura partitions in lieu of Fedral GSA type of partition.

AR 2377 - West Ramp Power and Compressor Lines, SGN
The project is being held in abeyance for further review of the future use of this ramp. (Materials have been purchased).

AR 8349 - Modification of Fire Brigade Station for Air Conditioning - SGN
The project is being held for further consideration.

III. CUSTOMER RELATIONS - Our relations have been always excellent.

IV. MEDICAL
Number of sick call: 1483
Accidents: 40
Hospitalized sick call: 1
Unhospitalized accident: 40
Hospitalized accident: None
Outcall: 6
Physical Examination: 19
Sick leaves: 265

V. PERSONNEL
1. Personnel Department Activities - Apart from routine activities, we have devoted a good amount of time this month to keeping our TCNs out of jail. The Vietnamese National Police have begun a campaign to rid the country of undesirable and illegal foreign residents, directed primarily against TCNs. Their tactics consist of personal or house search, and incarceration of those not in possession of valid residence permits. While all of our foreign personnel are legally in country, many do not presently have residence permits as their renewal applications are under process. (And this process is slow moving.) Our TCNs thus become victimized by the procedures to which we must subscribe.

2. We have been extremely fortunate in that very few of our personnel have been apprehended. Furthermore, the U.S. Embassy has advised us that they will immediately come to the aid of any of our personnel who are arrested for lack of possession of currently valid documentation, as the Embassy is aware that all of our employees are abiding by Vietnamese Government regulations. We are doing all possible to expedite approval of the Work and Residence permits so as to preclude further apprehensions.

3. Personnel Strength - [redacted] Saigon Base

Classif. Permanent	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	Total GRD	Total FLT
	32	130	113	13	117	3	7	3	269	149

[redacted]

GRD	FLT	GRD	GRD	GRD	Total GRD	FLT
484#	14**	2	2	1*	489	14

Temporary: [redacted] 1

Preprocessed: [redacted] 10

(*) : [redacted]
(**) :
(#) :

Ground personnel: 769
Flight personnel: 163
Total: 932

Danang Sub-Base

Classif. [redacted]

Permanent	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	Total GRD
	3	14	15	71	103

Preprocessed [redacted] 1

Nha Trang Sub-Base

Classif. [redacted]

Permanent	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	Total GRD
	4	8	20	57	89

Preprocessed: [redacted] 1

Can Tho Sub-Base

Classif. [redacted]

Permanent	GRD	GRD	GRD	Total GRD
	1	10	3	14

VI. OPERATIONS

1. This 681 hours decrease in revenue flying from the previous month is contributed mainly to a lack of customer cargo to be moved. There are no indication that cargo flights will increase in the foreseeable future.

2. SGM departed on 50 days annual leave and Mr. A. Harris assumed the duties of A/SGM.

3. Flight time report (See attachment A)
Ground Fire Incidents Report (See attachment B)
Accident Reports

Date	A/C Type/No.	Location	Remarks
18	204B/N1307X	Can Tho V-17	Aircraft was damaged while static, during the late evening, from shrapnel during a mortar attack. Approx. 32-40 rounds landed on the airstrip. The A/C received approx. 10 small hits resulting in skin damage.

4. Ground Transportation
Aggregate microbuses mileage: 23593 Km approx. 14745 miles
Total microbuses downtime: 193 hrs 48'
Total microbuses pax carried: 3265 pax
Isuzu bus mileage: 5926 Km approx. 3703 miles
Total Isuzu bus downtime: 112 hrs 42'
Isuzu bus pax carried: 10272 pax
Supply vehicle mileage: 2696 Km approx. 1685 miles
Supply vehicles downtime: 38 hrs 54'

VII. TRAFFIC/AAM
1. The good services of the USAF were utilized to ship a 9,500 pound generator to Danang for station use.

2. Adequate manning for Customer slots as noted in August report has been accomplished to the Customers satisfaction.

	August	September
Passengers departure SGN (all contracts)	5,314	5,313
Passengers arrival SGN (all contracts)	6,086	5,938
Outbound cargo SGN	49,778	46,099
Inbound cargo SGN	80,236	54,996

3. Training classes for all Traffic Agents in the review of proper procedures were conducted. Such refresher training will be provided on a continuing basis.

Three new Traffic personnel for Danang and Nhatrang stations spent 1 week each on OJT at this station prior to being sent to their new duty stations. Training included base, ground service and air freight dispatcher familiarization.

TRAFFIC/USAID
1. Six utilitymen and four security guards were surplussed per customer's request effective 1 Oct. 70

Cargo (including AF Caribou A/C)

	August	September
Outbound (lbs) SGN	595,821	416,031
Inbound (lbs) SGN	55,296	66,607

VIII. FLYING
1. Coordination between FEPA and MFD [redacted] appears to be excellent. This is not to say there are no areas of disagreement, but most actions by either side are discussed in advance and reasonable positions can be taken as a result of both sides knowing the problems and reasoning of the other. It is a situation that hopefully will continue after [redacted] the next FEPA election.

2. The logging of Project time continues to be a problem. Among other things, no one could give us the references that stated other than it should be logged. AVPFO finally gave us the reference in the Accounting Manual. Hopefully it can be cleared up completely in the near future. The announcement last fall that it was no longer necessary to log was received with open arms by everyone in the field. The change in policy has generated more than a little confusion. At any rate it has been directed that pilots log it, and so it is.

3. Lights have been installed in the company vehicle parking lot and whether that is the reason or not, there have not been any reported thefts from employees' vehicles since the installation.

4. The directed transfer of Capt. Sullivan which came up unannounced and completely out of seniority sequence, created a number of problems, not the least of which was a repeat of the "move-the-man-now" concept we have had in the past. This completely disregards any consideration for the individual. FEPA was also upset at the disregard for all policies and agreements. As it turned out, it was all a mistake. Our attempts to question the matter went unanswered.

5. The separation of the MFD-SVN Office into two separate sections, Fixed Wing and Rotary Wing was, directed and accomplished. There still remains an awful lot of details to be clarified before it will be a practical situation. No provisions seem to have been made for the organizational structure regarding the Crew Scheduling Section and the administrative part of the old MFD Office. Meanwhile MF/FW is attempting to continue operating with a minimum of confusion. Coordination with other departments and outside agencies is just one of the areas in which DFD or someone will have to make a decision regarding what is desired. Stating a necessity for cooperation and coordination does not provide a realistic answer. This was the basis for past FW/RW problems in Saigon. Clearly defined areas of responsibility are a definite necessity.

6. On 28 September N1303X went down with a suspected engine fire approximately ten miles northwest of Danang. The crew of N1303X had to spend the night in a small outpost. Information regarding the location was relayed from the outpost to Danang Operations through military channels. Three SAR attempts were made during the night of September 28, but were unsuccessful due to erroneous coordinates of the location. The crew was picked up on the morning of September 29. The aircraft was released for one time ferry to Danang by SAM/RW and was flown to Danang on the afternoon of September 29th. The 7002 customer arranged popular forces security for the aircraft during the night. This incident could have been handled much more efficiently if our high frequency radios were reliable.

IX. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. Regional Maintenance Department - The month saw several priority projects and all seemed to be urgent. Our Teletype circuit land line between the airport and the downtown telegraph company was disrupted on several occasions during this month. We executed a priority project to set up a radio link to back up the land line. As soon as CCMENG/SGN obtains the approval to operate the new radio link, then we can close out this project.

2. Aircraft Maintenance - Fixed Wing - We recommended that Saigon Base perform every other number 3 service on C47 aircraft. Thereby reducing maintenance costs of TNN ferry flights and reducing down time from the previous 4 days to Saigon service time of 2 days. It required the number 3 services to be reidentified as 3A and 3B services, with Saigon doing the 3A and TNN doing the 3B. The heavy Xray requirements are on the 3B service. Our proposal was approved and our first 3A service is scheduled for early October. We anticipate no problems to perform these services incountry. Our next proposal will be to do the same on the C46 number three services. In addition we recently started performing No. 2 services on DHC-4 aircraft incountry without serious problems. Now if we are allowed to retain the spare Porter fuselage in Saigon, then our PC6C No. 4 service downtime goes from our standard of 7 days to 3 days as we did our last two No. 4 services in.

3. Rotary Wing - Due to an incident involving one of our aircraft dropping a sling load, all cargo hooks were given a one time inspection, EA 204-25-15 compliance, and a rigging check which resulted in 3 hooks assy's removed for worn parts. An SI was also issued (SI-SGN-204B-002) for a complete check on the next heavy service.

4. General Maintenance - Our emergency power generator (175 KW) developed a burnt field after only 20 hours of operation. Luckily we recently received a 60 KW generator for our Nha Trang Station and short-stopped it for temporary use here. About all we can operate from the 60 KW unit is the RMD Shops Bldg. essential equipment, the Supply Bldg. lighting and the RMD Hangar lights. This results in no power to the Personnel Bldg., the Passenger Terminal, the Cafeteria, the GMD Complex and the Usaid Warehouse. The Operations Bldg. uses a 10 KW unit for radios and Bldg. lighting. Our Transmitter Bldg. utilises two 10 KW generators for its. back up.

Proforma Base one AR's for SGN were submitted for improvement of the water system and to increase the electrical power supply for the South-east Quadrant.

5. Planning/Engineering - On 1 October we input C47 aircraft B829 for a number 3A service. This was the first time any base outside Tainan had attempted a No. 3 service on C47 type aircraft. This particular service also involved several X-ray shots to be taken. On 2 October we received an urgent message from VPTS B829 was sold to a new owner and we were to accomplish several modifications prior to the aircraft departure for VTE on early morning of 7 October. These modifications

included considerable electronics rework, exterior painting, right engine change, replacing of plywood flooring and general weight reduction efforts. The project was completed on schedule though the special attention and hard work of Technical Services Dept..

6. Airborne Electronic - The fusion of communication maintenance and airborne electronics as Electronics Maintenance was a very commendable move. This is a program of adaptability for the personnel. The versability and aptitude of our mechanics in the Electronics Department can be seen in this merger. The new UHF transceiver for teletype link between PTT/SGN and AAM/TSN were all in operating condition. All the units have undergone the simulated test and found satisfactory. Automatic transfer of the PTT telephone pair cables to the UHF transceiver were in fabrication. Final installation will commence as soon as the transfer system and one-fourth timing pulse spped is completed.

7. Training - TCN Flight Mechanic training is progressing on schedule with target date of mid-December. The only problem of any magnitude involving existing TCN Flight Mechanics and potential Flight Mechanics is one of speaking and understanding English. Various situations have been encountered where it become very necessary for the entire flight crew to understand each other on a limited time basis. In these not so rare occasions, it has become apparent that this problem must be remedied for satisfactory operation.

Course in Progress - The Line Service Mechanic Course to qualify [redacted] as Mechanic III is in progress. Basic essentials are given morning and afternoon in the classroom to prepare them for OJT as soon as the requisitioned mechanic tools are received. OJT will be given in the afternoon only.

8. Quality Control - The X-ray workload was up somewhat this month with us X-raying two VTB aircraft to comply with SI 562 and SI 583, both aircraft showed satisfactory results. We also did the X-ray on one C-47 aircraft to comply with TC to IC-47-544 radiographic inspection of flight controls with this aircraft also showing satisfactory results. This X-ray was somewhat of bigger job than we had undertaken before as it required some 63 different shots.

9. Supply - The first DHC-4 No. 2 service performed at Saigon started on 5 Sept. 70 and was completed on 7 Sept 70 as scheduled, without encountering any parts shortage. To increase the stock level authorized for No. 2 services, a completed review was conducted and subsequent stock requisitions forwarded to MMB for replacement action.

The project of assembling 15 Mechanic II tool kits for the newly employed and trained Mechanics was completed this month. Several items are still required, both for these kits and stock. Requisitioning is presently underway, and both kits and stock will be completed upon receipt. In that unit also, the locator cards systems is being brought up to date and expected to be in order during October 1970.

B.D. Mesecher
Acting Base Manager - Saigon

- SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT -

- SEPTEMBER 1970 -

1. Contract 7001 -

A/C no.	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
N67984	90+32	72+57		
N67985	125+37	110+23		
B928	66+13	153+47	20+58	19+26
B910	33+48	25+06	9+36	6+27
B912	68+11	54+51	2+07	1+40
6147	40+51	32+50	2+16	1+58
5559	52+53	43+28	3+23	2+40
5994	98+11	79+51	3+02	2+40
B829	126+30	105+29		
N539Y	136+52	112+04		
N544Y	112+52	92+39	5+07	4+25
B851	99+57	70+34	13+07	12+14
N95182	89+35	76+39	5+04	4+23
N6154U	12+28	10+05	2+00	1+46
N99562	90+50	77+26		
N7770B	105+37	92+07		
N95772			8+44	7+25
N36740	44+55	37+41	0+55	0+45
N91295	82+03	69+00	1+07	0+38
N9838Z	114+09	96+23		
N7695C	78+13	65+52		
N180K	143+43	121+49	3+32	2+57
N285L	116+43	99+43		
N991R	3+01	2+42		
N994R	73+43	64+02		
N9444	27+40	25+33		
N198X	18+48	16+14		
N153L	120+35	100+21	0+53	0+20
N12450	116+49	100+10		
N7488H	62+28	54+57	0+36	0+26
N152L	113+53	100+15	2+30	2+16
N184L	45+08	36+20	2+08	1+19
N185K	77+58	70+34		
N192X	68+35	62+01	1+50	0+58
N194X	49+39	44+29	5+12	4+30
N893R	99+21	88+33	0+48	0+31
N1303X	89+27	89+27	2+15	2+15
N1304X	144+32	144+32	2+20	2+20
N1305X	40+24	40+24	21+30	21+30
N1306X	126+30	126+30	4+15	4+15
N1307X	106+09	106+09	11+25	11+25
N8514F	109+14	109+14	3+08	3+08
N8535F	92+14	92+14	3+00	3+00
Sub-total	3505+22	3075+25	142+28	126+57

ATTACHMENT "A"

2. Contract 7002 -

M539Y	2+50	2+18
M9518Z	29+19	25+47
M6154U	92+52	77+02
M99562	2+47	2+24
M7770B	11+28	10+17
M95772		
M36740	44+31	37+54
M91295	32+20	28+35
M9838Z	3+47	3+08
M7695C	2+43	2+22
M180K	14+14	11+31
M285L	10+11	8+48
M991R	65+12	57+16
M994R	47+40	39+52
M9444	57+33	50+30
M198X	55+55	45+06
M153L	15+26	14+03
M12450	4+16	3+36
M748M	17+14	15+19
M152L	0+56	0+50
M184L	69+13	60+13
M185K	51+15	47+04
M192X	47+25	44+31
M194X	37+53	33+51
M993R	3+13	2+38
M1303X	21+21	21+21
M1304X	14+44	14+44
M1305X	28+36	28+36
M1306X	8+24	8+24
M1307X	8+57	8+57
M8514P	21+11	21+11
Sub-total	823+26	728+28

3. Contract 7003 -

M67985	6+37	6+03
B928	35+00	28+41
B910	36+13	30+21
B912	54+51	47+11
6147	4+16	2+42
5559	4+08	2+47
5994	3+34	2+18
M539Y	6+17	5+06
M544Y	15+35	13+06
B851	4+13	3+41
M99562	0+45	0+33
M7770B	3+03	3+01
M36740	9+05	5+99
M91295	2+00	1+20
M9838Z	4+27	2+38
M7695C	2+47	1+54

N285L	3+18	2+26
N196X	6+29	5+11
N153L	1+12	0+59
N12450	1+01	0+49
N152L	5+09	4+08
N184L	2+29	1+52
N194X	7+01	5+21
N393R	1+02	0+47
N8535F	44+03	44+03
Sub-total	265+35	222+57

4. Contract 0030 -

N9577Z	19+15	16+35
Sub-total	19+15	16+35

5. Contract 0069 -

N9956Z	2+03	1+51
N9664C	90+15	74+34
Sub-total	92+18	76+25

Total Revenue Block Time	4705+56
Total Revenue Flight Time	4119+50
Total Non-Revenue Block Time	142+28
Total Non-Revenue Flight Time	126+57
GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	4848+24
GRAND TOTAL FLIGHT TIME	4246+47

Flight Time By Type Of Aircraft

Type of A/C	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
C-46	518+02	429+20	32+41	27+33
Bailed C-47	208+33	163+56	8+41	6+38
C-47	126+30	105+29		
DHC-4	367+56	299+28	18+14	16+39
VIB	971+17	821+07	17+50	14+57
PC-6	1668+12	1444+44	17+09	13+17
204-B	855+46	855+46	47+53	47+53
TOTAL	4705+56	4119+50	142+28	126+57

Original signed by
A. L. HARRIS

A. L. Harris
A/SGM/SGH

cc: BM/SGH
TM/SGH
MFD/SGH
File.

MONTHLY REPORT
NHA-TRANG
NOVEMBER 1970

GENERAL

Station customer activities decreased slightly from the previous month. This was the result of flight cancellations and delays due to weather.

Heavy monsoon rains continued throughout the month with general flooding in rural and town areas. Absenteeism [redacted] was high and there is evidence of real suffering and loss [redacted]

The Station Manager departed for Home Leave 8 December. The undersigned will undertake this duty until his expected return in mid March.

HOSTEL

The Hostel continued to function with modicum amount of complaints from Crew members. Every effort is being expended to minimize complaints and raise the general standard of service and fomfort.

General repainting of rooms and hallways will begin this month. Paint will be supplied via the Company with Hotel Management supplying labor.

TRAFFIC

Station traffic activites for November decreased slightly in both passenger and cargo movement from the previous month.

TA-L (Pax Service) [redacted] departed station 30 November for thirty day Home/Leave. [redacted] (TA-I) of Saigon Station will fulfill senior duties of the passenger section [redacted]

STATISTICS

	NOV.	OCT.	1969
PASSENGER			
Departing	3338	3920	4092
Arriving	3084	3476	3564
TOTAL	6422	7396	7656
CARGO			
1. GROUND SERVICES (lbs)			
Departing	375,027	415,177	357,687
Arriving	157,394	152,019	262,744
TOTAL	532,421	567,196	620,430
2. COMPANY CARGO (Lbs)			
Departing	12,017	2,874	3,488
Arriving	12,564	12,670	3,337
TOTAL	24,581	15,544	6,825

[redacted]

3. GRAND TOTAL (Lbs) (1+2)

Departing	387,044	418,051	361,174
Arriving	169,958	164,689	266,081
TOTAL	557,002	562,740	627,255

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

Relations with the customers remain good.

OPERATIONS

Further investigation of possible facilities for relocation of VHF/VHF Motorola unit on Hon-Tre island have resulted in the offer of two(2) inside, temperature controlled locations for Air America use. Once of these will be selected during December and the unit transferred. This will also abviate need for communications van originally intended for this purpose.

Complete 618T transceiver set (Collins) was installed during the month. Voice quality and range improvement is expected after general tests are completed.

Frequency 6.682 MHZ continues poor for station use due to constant outside voice saturation.

Mr. Robert McFarlane (OA/SCR) arrived on station to assume and assist in OM/TM duties during the absence of SC/NMA.

FLIGHT FREQUENCY (see attached)

ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE COMPARISON

	NOV.	OCT.	1969
Arrival	432	496	528
Departure	429	489	531
RON	194	209	270

DELAYS

Percentage on time	100%	97%

SECURITY

No problems.

PERSONNEL

See attached.

FISCAL

No problems.

. . . .3

LEGAL

No problems.

TECHNICAL SERVICES

[redacted] arrived on station 2 November. He replaces Mr. J. GRIFFIS as Chief Mechanic at Nhatrang.

STATISTICS

		NOV.	OCT.	1969
1.	Transient overnight	235	287	258
2.	Overnight services	194	209	270
3.	Engine changes	0	1	0
4.	Propeller changes	0	1	0
5.	No. 1 Services	0	0	1
6.	No. II services	0	0	0
7.	Delays Maint/Mech	1	6	3
8.	Intermediate services	0	0	0
9.	AOF	1	7	4
10.	Outline recoveries	0	5	2
11.	Accident report (A/C)	2	0	1
12.	Accident report (PAL)	0	0	0

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

E. W. SIMMONS

R. h. DESMOND

A/SZ-MHA

file: ~~50-2008~~ 501-08(6)

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

[redacted] C060

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

REPORT NO. [redacted]

DATE DISTR. 3 November 1970

COUNTRY North Vietnam

DOI September 1970

SUBJECT Personal Views on Possible North Vietnamese Refusal to Comply Fully with Terms of a Prisoner Exchange Agreement

BJR

ACQ Vietnam, Saigon (5 September 70) FIELD NO. [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

5 4 3 2 1 [redacted] 1.3(a)(4) 5 4 3 2 1

(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

Approved for Release
Date September 1993

NND 927660-48

1.3(e)(4)

1. At the end of hostilities in South Vietnam (SVN), whether or not a coalition government is formed there, or if a prisoner of war exchange should occur before the end of hostilities, North Vietnam (NVN) will make impossible demands in order not to comply fully with any agreement that might be made with the Government of Vietnam (GVN) and Allied governments. At the time when a prisoner exchange is to take place, NVN will also demand that all ralliers to the GVN as well as prisoners be returned to NVN. Since the GVN and Allied forces have offered sanctuary to all ralliers, this demand will be impossible to fulfill. However, it will give the NVN Government a reason for not complying fully with the terms of a prisoner exchange agreement and conceivably could be a reason for not returning all American prisoners.

2. As of September 1967, a great deal of proselyting of American pilots was being carried out in an effort to try to convince them to go to other Communist countries as advisers. This was discussed during an official Party briefing Attempts were made to proselyte only those pilots who were considered the most cooperative during their interrogations. No effort was made to convert them to Communism but only to show them that the U.S. was doing great harm both to NVN and throughout the world through its military imperialism. The North Vietnamese claimed the Communist countries needed the advice of American pilots to counter any attack which the U.S. might make against the Communist countries. The NVN Government was successful in convincing some American pilots to accept this offer, and these pilots will be the prisoners which NVN will refuse to return.

1.3(e)(4)

3. Field Dissem: State USMACV USAID CORDS Dir/JUSPAO (Mr. Nickel only) 7th Air Force USARV NAVFORV 525th MI GP 6499 SAG OSI CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC

1.3(e)(4)

1.3(e)(4)

5
4
3
2
1

MEMORANDUM

DATE: 17 November 1970

REF. No. BMSGN/70/325

TO : VPA IPE

FROM : BMSGN

SUBJECT : October Monthly Report

Saigon Base Monthly Report for October 1970 is forwarded in three copies for your file.

E.J. Theisen

SAIGON BASE
MONTHLY REPORT
OCTOBER 1970

I. GENERAL

1. Total block time for October was 4884 as compared to 6345 for October 1969 and 4705 for September 1970.

2. Locally in Saigon the situation remains quite stable. However on 2 November we have experienced four 122mm rocket impacts across the river from the Majestic Hotel. According to public rumor, the VC are going to reduce their military activities due to insufficient strenght but will increase shelling and terrorism.

3. Facilities Development

AR 2438 - Completion of Concrete Pavement and Drainage Ditch - DAD Completed.

AR 2437 - Improvement of Passenger Lounge -DAD - 70% completed

AR 2422 - Renovation of Operations Bldg - SGN - 50% completed

AR 2449 - Terminal Parking Apron - SGN - 15% completed. Delay is due to daily rainfall.

4. Recent aircraft movement and disposition

204B N8535F depositioned to Udorn on 2 November 1970
C47 5994 placed in storage SGN on 9 November 1970
C-46 N67984 added to 9101 contract
C-46 B910 dropped from contract and will remain as active spare.
PC6 N152L will be dispositioned to VTE on 15 November 1970.
The CORDS VTE at V17 will be replaced with a PC6 on Sunday as they are behind on PC6 minimum.

II. CUSTOMER RELATIONS - Our relations remain excellent.

III. MEDICAL

Number of sick call: 1274
Number of accidents: 38
Hospitalized sick calls : 2
Unhospitalized accidents: 39
Outcalls: 3
Physical Examination: 28
Sick leaves: 143

IV. PERSONNEL

1. The Vietnamese National Police seem to have slacked off in their "apprehend the TCNs" campaign (September Monthly Report refers). Only one of our TCNs was detained during the month. With U.S. Embassy assistance we have been able to obtain substitute documentation from the Ministry of Interior showing that our employees are legally in country. This substitute documentation has proved acceptable to the National Police and appears to be keeping our employees out of the pokey.

2. To date there has been surprisingly little reaction to the partial devaluation from employers (both commercial and contractor) and Vietnamese workers. Company postures are still pretty much "Let's wait and see"; and Vietnamese workers, while asking for increased wages and salaries, are doing so in very moderate tones. The workers' temperance seems almost unnatural, especially in view of the fact that prices of essentials (especially foodstuffs and rents) have increased appreciably since devaluation. We are spending a good bit of time keeping abreast of this situation.

3. After an upsurge just following the devaluation, the open market rate for piastres seems to have settled down. The open market rate is now approximately VN$415-525 to US$1.

4. Personnel strength - Saigon Base

Classif.	[redacted]								Total	
Permanent	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT	GRD	FLT
	32	131	114	13	117	3	7	2	270	149

[redacted]					Total	
GRD	FLT	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	FLT
480#	12**	2	2	1*	485	12

Temporary [redacted]

Preprocessed [redacted] 5

(*) : [redacted]
(**) :
(#) :

Ground Personnel: 761
Flight Personnel: 161

Total : 922

Da Nang Sub-base

Classif.	[redacted]				Total
Permanent	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD
	3	14	15	71	103

Preprocessed: [redacted] 1

Nhatrang Sub-Base

Classif. Permanent	[redacted] GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	Total GRD
	3	8	20	61	92

Pre-processed: [redacted] GRD : 1

Cantho Sub-Base

Classif. Permanent	[redacted] GRD	GRD	GRD	GRD	Total GRD
	1		10	3	14

V. OPERATIONS

1. Flight time report (See attachment A)
   Ground Fire Incidents Report (See attachment B)
   Accident Reports

Date	A/C Type/No.	Location	Remarks
29 Sept (not reported in Sep)	204B/N1303X	Approx 21 miles N.E. of Danang	While inflight noted a strong smell - while smoke also coming from the engine area. A precaution landing was made. Later flown to DAD & engine changed. Possible No. 1 bearing carbon seal malfunction.
05 Oct	PC/6C/N153L	V-163	During landing roll-out prop contacted single strand of concertina wire on runway. Minor damage to two prop. tips. Prior to landing pilot over-headed the strip, however, he did not note the wire obscured by grass.

2. Ground Transportation

Aggregate microbuses mileage: 24868 km approx 15542 miles
Total microbuses down-time: 97 hrs 12'
Total microbuses pax carried : 3468 pax
Isuzu bus mileage: 5149 km approx 3218 miles
Total isuzu bus down-time: 118 hrs 30'
Isuzu bus pax carried: 11840 pax
Supply vehicle mileage: 2224 km approx 1390 miles
Supply vehicles down-time: 165 hrs 42'

VI. TRAFFIC/AAM

1. GMD is working on the parking apron in front of the terminal via Commercial contract. Heavy rains have interfered with scheduled completion date but will be a great improvement upon completion.

2. Training Terminal and Ramp Agent recurrent training was conducted during the month to review and realign daily procedures.

	September	October
Passengers departures SGN (all contracts)	5,313	5,670
Passengers arrivals SGN (all contracts)	5,938	6,007
Outbound cargo SGN	46,099	64,044
Inbound cargo SGN	54,996	63,010

TRAFFIC/USAID

1. One Senior Clerk position and one Clerk One Position were cancelled effective 31 October 1970.

Cargo (including AF Caribou A/C)

	September	October
Outbound (lbs) SGN	416,031	657,622
Inbound (lbs) SGN	66,607	194,919

VII. FLYING

1. The taxiway vehicle traffic was cut considerably by virtue of the ramp being torn up and the parking-lot/ramp gate being closed to all traffic. However as might have been expected the vehicles were not to be denied. They now are delivering many of their passengers to the ramp side of the passenger terminal.

2. On 7 October we had an MPC conversion which didn't catch too many by any great surprise, except possibly Air America.

3. The annual cost reduction program came up once more and we were asked to cut personnel from our rosters. That same old "Bug-a-boo" concept of transferring crews permanently to the outstations naturally came up again. The same old arguments were presented again with an additional factor considering FEPA/Company agreement. Hopefully this consideration for transferring crews to outstations will again be shelved.

4. The 70-10 Bid awards were received with mixed emotions. Most of the bidding went pretty much as was expected, but there were naturally a few disappointments. With that out of the way, we initiated action to firm-up the 1970 leave schedule.

5. During the month we had several cases of theft, one known case of being shot at and another that was observed. While leaving a party for Mr. Hana at a downtown restaurant, MPD and A/MF/.h both had their watches stolen. While returning from Long Binh on the Bienhoa Highway, MPD had a number of shots fired at his car.

VIII. TECHNICAL SERVICES

1. The unreliable C46 situation has improved. We are now back to about routine maintenance.

2. The ramp access gate which we closed and locked on 2 October has not been opened once during the month and it goes without saying that we have proven we can survive with it closed. The biggest complainers about our efforts of restricting access of private vehicles to the ramp were always the pilots. It sure made that area of the taxiway a lot safer for our employees using the crosswalk and the pilots no longer had to fear cars darting onto the ramp and driving down the south taxiway.

3. The renovation of the Operations Building is progressing at snails pace. The contractor started the work on 20 July with a 2 month projection to complete. Based on recent talks with him he now hopes to complete the project by about 20 November.

The same contractor (A&M) is working on the project of repaving the passenger terminal parking apron, which is scheduled for 6 weeks to complete. He started on 2 October but has lost about 10 days because of almost daily raining from the typhoon weather recently.

4. Our second training course, to produce more TCN flight mechanics for the 204B Helicopters is scheduled to begin on 2 November. The group has already completed the basic Helicopter maintenance training and the 204B maintenance training portions. In mid-November they will start some six weeks of actual OJT flying. This final phase includes one week assignments at each sub-base in country and sling load flight training. The group is developing very well and we are quite proud of the quality of these men.

E.J. Theisen
Base Manager - SGN

SECRET

Talks Falter

Economic negotiations between the Cambodians and the South Vietnamese were suspended without agreement on several major issues when the Saigon cabinet withheld approval of agreements covering trade relations. The Cambodians, for their part, balked over Saigon's request for a $38 million "contribution" from Phnom Penh to help defray costs of South Vietnamese military operations in Cambodia. Although South Vietnamese intransigence may be largely a bargaining ploy for the next unscheduled series of talks in Phnom Penh, such apparent bad faith likely did not sit well with some Cambodian leaders who are already hypercritical of their Saigon allies. *(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)*

• • •

Thailand: *Insurgent Prospects Improve*

The insurgent movement in northeast Thailand is continuing to rebound from the setbacks suffered during the 1967-68 period. During the past rainy season, the insurgents concentrated on improving their organization and village support network in traditional operating areas rather than significantly expanding their armed strength—which remains around 1,500—or attempting to move into new operational sectors. There is evidence, however, that for the first time in the northeast the insurgents have established a secure base, in the Duong Luang area of Nakhon Phanom Province. This region has been the most active insurgent area since the movement in the northeast began in 1965.

In addition to supporting the training and indoctrination of insurgents and the filling out of quasimilitary village units, the base has facilitated an increase in external support for the insurgency. Chinese AK-47 rifles reportedly have been infiltrated into the region from Laos in increasing numbers, and there are indications that more Thai cadre who have been training in China and North Vietnam are returning to the area. There is also limited evidence suggesting an increase in the links between insurgents and their sympathizers in urban areas.

Despite their improved capabilities, the insurgents have avoided large-scale or highly visible actions. Increased terrorism and harassment of the government's fledgling village defense forces are designed to gain the initiative without prompting a major government counteroffensive. Such tactics are effectively playing on both Bangkok's belief that the insurgency in the northeast is well in hand and the Thai Army's desire to turn over its counterinsurgency role to police and civilian agencies.

With the deteriorating situations in Cambodia and Laos providing the pretext, the 2nd Army has since midsummer reduced its counterinsurgency force commitment in the northeast by two thirds, or to less than 1,000 troops. Moreover, the army now is under orders to engage in suppression operations only in response to emergency situations. *(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)*

• • •

Laos: *The Southern Campaign Begins*

Communist forces overran several key government positions on the Bolovens Plateau in a series of closely coordinated attacks on 22 November. The enemy captured two main irregular bases, Sites 26 and 38, northwest of Attopeu as well as four other outposts in the same general area. Two other sites, about 15 and 30 miles north of Attopeu, were also captured.

SECRET

NND 941536 --- 3872

Cobo

Intelligence Information Report

File: 502-03

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DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

[redacted] 501-08 (6)

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1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

REPORT NO. [redacted]

COUNTRY North Vietnam

DATE DISTR. 3 December 1970

DOI 1964 - September 1969

SUBJECT Exploitation of U.S. Prisoners of War

NSF

FYI - ATC KRAAK

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ACQ Vietnam, Saigon (8 September 70) FIELD NO. [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted]

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STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

Approved for Release
Date September 1993

[redacted]

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Summary: The Lao Dong Party Central Committee, based on experience gained during the French resistance, established policies regarding U.S. prisoners of war which included exploiting each prisoner to the fullest extent possible. Exploitation of the prisoners was carried out by either or both the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), depending on such criteria as time and circumstances of capture, current tactical and strategic objectives, and long-range potential of individual prisoners. Information on or from the U.S. prisoners was shared with other Communist countries, principally the USSR and Cuba. End Summary.

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1. (Field Comment: In the following report [redacted] was vague and inconsistent on the exact roles played by the MPS and the MND in prisoner of war exploitation, possibly indicating that his interpretations of the delineation of responsibility between the MND and the MPS may be based on only general information. He gave a much larger role to the MPS than did several other sources whose access to this information was much more direct, although less broad, [redacted] One source claimed that the MPS conducted no interrogations at the Hoa Lo Prison, whereas other sources reported a limited role for the MPS in this field.)

1.3(a)(4)

2. North Vietnamese policy, as set forth by the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party, concerning the handling and exploitation of U.S. prisoners of war was based on Viet Minh policy towards prisoners who had been captured during the French resistance and knowledge of prisoner exploitation which North Vietnam (NVN) had acquired from both the USSR and Communist China. The policy also drew upon the personal experiences of senior members of the NVN Government who at various times had served in French prisons or prisoner of war camps.

3. The capture of U.S. and other prisoners of war was considered the responsibility of every agency, facility and citizen in NVN. The initial screening and subsequent exploitation of each U.S. prisoner depended on the place, date and circumstances of capture and the criteria for classifying prisoners into categories. /During the period of heavy U.S. bombing of NVN and the resulting destruction of transportation facilities, the established procedures for handling prisoners of war and for evacuating them to central NVN establishments were modified somewhat. The proximity to Hanoi of a province where a prisoner was captured and the availability of transportation were primary considerations affecting the immediate exploitation of a prisoner and his prompt transfer to Hanoi. Consequently, while Hanoi was subjected to heavy aerial bombings, representatives of the MPS and/or MND, depending on which was in possession of the prisoner, traveled to the province to exploit the prisoner locally until arrangements could be made for his transfer to Hanoi.

4. Information obtained from a prisoner at each level was recorded in detail and incorporated into a "Preliminary Personal Record." The information was correlated with that already acquired on the prisoner from other sources, including, if the prisoner were a pilot, information on his aircraft, its flight plan, tactics, apparent targets and accompanying aircraft. The apparent targets were deduced from information received from the antiaircraft unit which shot down the plane and from units responsible for the physical security of the targets. This information was used to help establish the veracity of the information provided by the prisoner and to aid NVN's defense of the targets.

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1.3(a)(4)

5. Exploitation of the prisoner depended upon the category in which he was placed. The categorization of prisoners depended upon the affiliation of the initial capturing/screening unit; the extent to which the prisoner had been exploited prior to his transfer to Hanoi; the prisoner's apparent areas of knowledgeability as established during preliminary screening; the prisoner's age, grade, intelligence, position and degree of cooperation; evidence of possible compromise of security within a element of the NVN Government; possibility of escape by the prisoner, and the national origin of the prisoner.

6. Prisoners handled by public security service elements when captured were transferred to MPS facilities, and prisoners handled initially by military elements in the provinces were transferred to MND detention facilities in Hanoi. The MND interrogated prisoners for tactical and strategic military information, and the MPS interrogated for political, scientific, economic and, to some degree, military information. The MND was not interested in long-range exploitation of prisoners, and it confined its activities primarily to the collection of tactical and strategic military information, with little time given to longer range objectives. The responsibility of the MND was considerably broader than that of the MPS in collecting tactical and strategic military information. Information collected by the MND was passed to the MPS Combined Research Agency for review to determine if requirements from other government agencies had been satisfied. Information collected by the MPS was similarly passed to the MND. (Field Comment: [redacted] did not know what requirements from other NVN agencies were serviced. He was not acquainted with the specific MND elements involved in this, other than the information was passed to the MND's Intelligence Department /Cuc Tinh Bao/.)

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7. The assignment of a prisoner to either the MPS or the MND depended not only on factors enumerated in paragraph 5 but also on the prisoner's "Preliminary Personal Record" and on the MND or MPS screening which occurred at the central level upon the prisoner's arrival in Hanoi to determine more precisely the prisoner's areas of knowledgeability. The ensuing interrrogations, whether conducted by the MND or the MPS, included the following:

a. Enemy combat tactics, techniques and order of battle.

b. Enemy personnel, morale, fighting spirit and motivation factors.

c. Enemy weaponry, technical equipment and war materiel, with especial attention to enemy use of armor and armored vehicles.

d. Enemy knowledge of the Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces in South Vietnam (SVN) generally, and specifically in the prisoner's activity and field of interest.

e. History of enemy presence in SVN, units and activities.

f. War-making potential of the enemy and his units both in SVN and other areas where enemy support and reinforcements could be obtained.

g. Nature of coordination and cooperation between U.S. and other Allied units, including relationship between Allied units and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces.

h. Economic war-making potential of the U.S., concentrating on information regarding production capabilities of U.S. war-related industries.

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i. Social class origin of members of U.S. military services. [redacted] the MND reportedly had established that most members of the U.S. Air Force were from the wealthier social class, whereas infantry and artillery troops were from the poorer, less-educated social class.) 1.3(a)(4)

j. Professional background, psychological makeup and aspirations of the prisoner.

k. General knowledge and comprehension of Americans in SVN of the military, political and economic situations in SVN and other countries.

l. Behavior, mental attitude and viewpoints of Americans while under combat stress in SVN.

m. Professional backgrounds and previous assignments of other U.S. prisoners in NVN.

n. Effect of NVN's ideological indoctrination programs on U.S. prisoners in NVN and results of NVN military proselyting efforts in SVN.

8. Interrogations were aimed at gaining the complete cooperation of a prisoner so his services could be employed in anti-war activities such as letter writing to Americans in the U.S., including not only relatives and friends but also individuals whose names had been obtained from other prisoners; making pro-NVN and anti-U.S. radio broadcasts; and other forms of propaganda. After a prisoner had cooperated, he might be employed in technical fields where his specialized knowledge could be used. U.S. prisoners were indoctrinated to adopt a friendly attitude toward NVN and upon their return to the U.S. to convey a pro-NVN, anti-war feeling to their families, friends and relatives. [redacted] this followed the example of Viet Minh proselyting activities against French prisoners. The Viet Minh objective was to recruit as many French prisoners as possible to foment revolutions against the French Government and the governments of French-dominated countries. [redacted] the MPS and MND did not believe that U.S. prisoners could be successfully proselyted into attempting a revolution in the U.S.) 1.3(a)(4)

9. Field Dissem: State USMACV 7th Air Force NAVFORV CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC [redacted]

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY REVIEW

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532

4 December 1970

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CONTENTS

(Information as of noon EST, 3 December 1970)

Page

FAR EAST

[redacted] . 1

. . 2

. . 3

Vietnam: Fallout from Son Tay *(SE[redacted]* 4

[redacted] 6

8

9

10

10

11

13

14

15

16

[redacted]

Vietnam: *Fallout from Son Tay*

Hanoi appears to have taken a down-to-earth "war is hell" attitude toward the Son Tay raid and US air strikes a fortnight ago. A high-level and knowledgeable North Vietnamese official reportedly said last week that Hanoi did not consider Son Tay an escalation and will not make US air attacks a major issue. He explained that the Communists realistically expect the US to continue aerial reconnaissance over the North and to retaliate when these flights are challenged. The threat of reprisals, however, would not deter the North Vietnamese from trying to shoot down the planes, but, the official went on, Hanoi was not of a mind to allow such matters to seriously jeopardize the Paris talks.

This attitude has been reflected in the way the Communists have played the affair: their propaganda has been noisy, but it has not gone beyond the position Hanoi has taken on reconnaissance since the bombing halt two years ago—that reconnaissance is a violation of North Vietnamese sovereignty and that the Communists will make every effort to stop it. Air strikes, however, are termed in propaganda as a violation of the US agreement to stop the bombing. In more than two years Hanoi never has raised these as excuses to either stall or break off the talks.

Despite its apparent relaxed attitude about some aspects of the air and commando raids, Hanoi is plainly embarrassed and wary that they were brought off with such ease and it is trying hard to plug the holes in North Vietnam's internal defenses. A flood of domestic broadcasts has reflected new measures, under close party control and high level military supervision, designed to ensure faster and more effective reactions from both militia and regular army units in the countryside. There has been mention of 24-hour watches, better coordination, harder training, and many more outposts, sentinels, and bunkers. Aside from shoring up the North's defenses Hanoi probably is seeking to fire the collective energies of the North Vietnamese populace to the level prevalent earlier in the war, but which has flagged since the US bombing halt in 1968. Hanoi may also harbor some hope that by painting an impressive picture of fortress North Vietnam, the allies may be dissuaded from mounting new commando assaults.

With so much attention riveted on POWs, Hanoi also has taken some steps to dress up its image on the prisoner question. The Foreign Ministry last week broke with past practice and provided to a Western diplomat information that first had been requested more than 18 months ago on the whereabouts of missing American pilots. Radio Hanoi also has started to broadcast brief taped holiday messages from US captives as in past years. A fairly prominent Western journalist, moreover, has been invited into North Vietnam and he almost certainly will be permitted to film American POWs. The overriding considerations for Hanoi are its image and its belief that eventually it will be able to squeeze some concessions from Washington in return for a general prisoner release. Although neither a tougher policy toward captives nor any wholesale releases are likely, some additional gestures such as providing more information on missing American airmen may be made to lend weight to Hanoi's professions of leniency.

Troops, Supplies Move in High Gear

Hanoi is continuing to send substantial numbers of troops, both replacements and complete units, down the infiltration trail this dry season. Some 17,100 North Vietnamese soldiers set off in November, the highest monthly total since February 1969. Over half are earmarked for COSVN, probably for duty in Cambodia; about 4,400 are

headed for northern South Vietnam; and about 2,500, including a regiment of North Vietnamese regulars, are most likely bound for southern Laos. A minimum of four other regular regiments have also started south since September. One clearly is going to COSVN, two are now in southern Laos and a fourth is just above the DMZ. Moreover, two division headquarters are moving south through North Vietnam and one is nearing the Lao and South Vietnamese borders.

Although threats now have developed against the northern provinces and lower Military Region I of South Vietnam, and the central and southern sector of the Lao panhandle, the pattern of over-all Communist dry season deployments in Indochina still is unfolding. It seems clear that many of these units are still on the move while others have been assigned to protect the vital Communist supply arteries running the length of Laos.

Communist truck movements in the Laotian corridors have again increased after several weeks of reduced activity caused by unexpected heavy rains and intensified bombing. [redacted] logistic organizations as far south as the confluence of the Cambodia, South Vietnam, and Lao borders are handling truck and waterborne cargo. Various sources confirm a recent sharp increase in truck traffic on two main North Vietnamese passes into Laos and around the western end of the Demilitarized Zone. It will be several weeks, however, before the substantial quantity of supplies now moving will reach the tri-country border area.

The level of resupply during the latter part of November was apparently higher than that of a year ago. This trend is likely to continue. During this dry season the Communists will have to send more supplies just to maintain the force structure and level of fighting of recent months in Laos and South Vietnam. Increased materiel will be needed to offset losses caused by allied incursions last spring, the rainy season depletion of stocks, the loss of the Sihanoukville supply route, and the new need to supply increased tactical and rear service forces in Laos and Cambodia.

Action Picks Up in the South

In South Vietnam, Communist military activity picked up this week, but still featured the small actions that the enemy has been emphasizing for over a year and a half. The enemy shelled several province capitals and numerous smaller towns and military bases throughout the country. Casualties and damages were generally light.

The sporadic timing of the attacks reflects the current Communist practice of letting local field commanders set their own timetable for action. This permits the enemy to take advantage of local conditions and strike when ready—in contrast to previous so-called "highpoints," that were generally well coordinated and often captured headlines abroad.

Individually these attacks seldom inflict heavy casualties or damage, but they are cumulatively substantial. For example, the Communists have succeeded in overrunning some 65 government outposts in the Mekong Delta so far this year. Although scattered successes on this scale have not rolled back pacification gains, they do help create a significant amount of insecurity in rural areas where the government is trying to consolidate its control.

Despite Communist emphasis on guerrilla tactics and other economy-of-force methods to keep their losses down, South Vietnamese forces have triggered clashes that were costly to the enemy, especially in the Mekong Delta. Late last week, for example, heavy ground battles developed in three delta provinces as the result of aggressive ARVN operations. Stepped-up US and

South Vietnamese operations in the coastal lowlands of the northernmost provinces comprising MR 1 have also flushed out concentrations of enemy forces and accounted for over 400 Communists killed there each week.

Some South Vietnamese commanders are reorganizing their forces to improve their performance in the many localized actions. For example, Major General Dzu, who assumed command of MR 2 last August, has directed his two divisions to operate in small units rather than in the often cumbersome multibattalion operations of the past. He has given his territorial security forces—Regional Forces and Popular Forces—a new system of goals and quotas to encourage more aggressiveness against the enemy. Already, Dzu claims that the ratio of enemy-to-friendly casualties has risen markedly since last summer. [redacted]

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Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

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1.3(a)(4)

REPORT NO.

DATE DISTR. 5 JANUARY 1971

501-08(6)

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI OCTOBER 1970

SUBJECT VC PROCEDURES FOR DETAINING AND EXECUTING PRISONERS IN TUYEN DUC PROVINCE AS IMPLEMENTED BY THE 810TH NVA MF BATTALION

ACQ VIETNAM, NHA TRANG /3? NOVEMBER 1970/ FIELD NO.

1.3(a)(4)

SOURCE

1.3(a)(4)

5 4 3 2 1

(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

1.3(a)(4)

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Approved for Release
Date September 1993

NMD 027660 TS

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SUMMARY--PRISONERS APPREHENDED BY THE VIET CONG /VC/ IN TUYEN DUC PROVINCE WERE DIVIDED INTO THREE CATEGORIES--THIRD COUNTRY CIVILIANS, ALLIED AND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM /ARVN/ SOLDIERS, AND GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM /GVN/ OFFICIALS. THIRD COUNTRY CIVILIANS, WHOSE BACKGROUNDS AND REASONS FOR BEING IN VIETNAM WERE INVESTIGATED BY THE VARIOUS VC INFRASTRUCTURE /VCI/ MEMBERS IN WHOSE JURISDICTION THEY LIVED, USUALLY WERE RELEASED UNHARMED. ALLIED PERSONNEL AND ARVN SOLDIERS USUALLY WERE RETAINED IN PRISONER OF WAR /POW/ STATUS. GVN OFFICIALS WERE GIVEN WARNINGS BY VCI MEMBERS AND ASKED TO ACCOMMODATE THE VC--IF THESE WARNINGS WERE IGNORED, THEY WERE EXECUTED. THIRD COUNTRY CIVILIANS, ALLIED PERSONNEL AND ARVN SOLDIERS WERE NOT EXECUTED UNLESS SPECIFIC ORDERS WERE RECEIVED FROM VC MILITARY REGION 6 /MR-6/ HEADQUARTERS. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY /NVA/ 810TH MAIN FORCE /MF/ BATTALION PROVIDED THE DETENTION AND COURT FACILITIES FOR ALL INDIVIDUALS CAPTURED BY THE VC IN TUYEN DUC PROVINCE. END SUMMARY.

1. ALL PERSONS DETAINED BY THE VC IN TUYEN DUC PROVINCE, EITHER BY INTENTION OR CHANCE ENCOUNTER, WERE DIVIDED INTO THREE CATEGORIES--THIRD COUNTRY CIVILIANS, ALLIED AND ARVN SOLDIERS, AND GVN OFFICIALS. PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING THE DETAINEES WERE BASED UPON THESE CATEGORIES.

2. CHANCE ENCOUNTERS WHICH RESULTED IN THE CAPTURE OF THIRD COUNTRY CIVILIANS REQUIRED THAT THE INDIVIDUAL BE DETAINED WITH MINIMUM DURESS, DEPENDING ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE, SUCH AS RESISTANCE BY THE INDIVIDUAL, OR THE NATURE OF THE INCIDENT WHICH BROUGHT ABOUT THE CAPTURE. THE POSSESSION OF ARMS, CONCEALED OR NOT, HAD NO EFFECT UPON THE TREATMENT OF THE CAPTIVE, AS MOST CIVILIANS CARRIED WEAPONS. UNLESS THE INDIVIDUAL REQUIRED MEDICAL

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TREATMENT, HE WAS IMMEDIATELY TAKEN TO THE 810TH NVA MF BATTALION SECURITY SECTION FOR INTERROGATION. THE PERSON WAS QUESTIONED AND HIS POSSESSIONS AND DOCUMENTS WERE EXAMINED. HE WAS REQUIRED TO EXPLAIN HIS PRESENCE IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA AS WELL AS HIS REASON FOR BEING IN VIETNAM. IF HE WAS FROM THE LOCAL AREA, THE 810TH NVA BATTALION SECURITY SECTION FORWARDED THE RESULTS OF THE INTERROGATION TO THE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE OR THE DALAT CITY COMMITTEE, DEPENDING ON WHERE HE LIVED. THE RESPECTIVE COMMITTEE ASSISTED THE INVESTIGATION BY CONTACTING VCI MEMBERS, WHO DETERMINED THE VALIDITY OF THE PRISONER'S EXPLANATION, RESIDENCE, OFFICE ADDRESS AND BIOGRAPHICAL DATA. IF THE PERSON WAS FROM A DISTANT CITY, THE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE CONTACTED VC MR-6 HEADQUARTERS, WHICH IN TURN CONTACTED THAT CITY COMMITTEE FOR IT TO CONTACT ITS CITY UNITS OF VCI. THE 810TH BATTALION USED A CHINESE COMMUNIST-MANUFACTURED RADIO SET, MODEL 102E, TO CONTACT THE PROVINCE COMMITTEE, VC MR-6 HEADQUARTERS, AND THE DALAT CITY COMMITTEE. /FIELD COMMENT-- [redacted] WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH HIGHER LEVEL NOR LATERAL LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS DEVICES OR PROCEDURES. VC MR-6 INCLUDES GVN BINH TUY, LAM DONG, BINH THUAN, NINH THUAN AND TUYEN DUC PROVINCES./ THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION DETERMINED THE DISPOSITION OF THE PRISONER. ALL THIRD COUNTRY CIVILIANS WHEN ARRESTED WERE CONSIDERED PRISONERS OF WAR /POW/, BUT PROOF OF CIVILIAN STATUS AND CORRECTNESS OF EXPLANATIONS COULD REVERT THEM TO A STATUS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THEY COULD BE RELEASED. THE PERIOD OF TIME FOR THEIR DETENTION WAS BASED PRIMARILY UPON THE TIME THE VCI NEEDED TO INVESTIGATE THEIR CLAIMS. IF THE EXPLANATION WAS DISPROVED AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE PERSON WAS ENGAGED IN MILITARY OR POLITICAL DUTIES, HE WAS RETAINED IN THE STATUS OF A POW AND PROCESSED ACCORDINGLY. A PROVISION EXISTED FOR THE EXECUTION OF THIRD COUNTRY CIVILIANS, BASED UPON AN ORDER FROM VC MR-6 OR A HIGHER COMMAND. SPECIFIC ORDERS EXISTED, HOWEVER, THAT THIRD COUNTRY CIVILIANS WERE NOT TO BE EXECUTED UNLESS THE ORDER FOR EXECUTION WAS RECEIVED. /FIELD COMMENT-- [redacted] KNEW OF NO SUCH EXECUTIONS./

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3. ALLIED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND ARVN SOLDIERS WERE DIVIDED INTO TWO CATEGORIES, BASED UPON WHETHER OR NOT THEY WERE CAPTURED OR HAD SURRENDERED. ALL WERE CONSIDERED POW'S, BUT THOSE WHO HAD SURRENDERED RECEIVED PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT BY THE 810TH BATTALION. /FIELD COMMENT--HONG DID NOT KNOW IF THIS DISTINCTION WAS MADE BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE 810TH. SEE CS-311/00093-71 WHICH DESCRIBED THE TREATMENT AND QUESTIONING OF AN AMERICAN POW WHO WAS CAPTURED IN TUYEN DUC PROVINCE./ THE PRISONERS WERE NOT TO BE EXECUTED UNLESS VC MR-6 SO ORDERED. 1.3(a)(4)

4. GVN OFFICIALS WERE SPOTTED FOR WARNINGS, KIDNAPPING OR EXECUTION BY THE VCI IN THEIR AREA. THE LOCAL VCI COULD RECOMMEND THE NAME OF A GVN OFFICIAL TO A LOCAL ACTION ARROW TEAM /AAT/ WHICH THEN PLACED THE NAME ON A BLACK LIST. THE AAT CONTACTED THE DALAT CITY COMMITTEE FOR ITS RECOMMENDATION AS TO PUNISHMENT FOR THE GVN OFFICIAL. A NEWLY-EMPLOYED GVN OFFICIAL WAS GIVEN A WRITTEN OR ORAL WARNING TO TERMINATE HIS EMPLOYMENT OR TO ACCOMMODATE THE VC. GVN OFFICIALS WITH TWO OR THREE YEARS OF EMPLOYMENT AND THOSE WHO DISREGARDED THE WARNINGS, WERE KIDNAPPED FOR INDOCTRINATION. GVN OFFICIALS WHO CONTINUED TO DISREGARD THE INDOCTRINATION OR THE VCI INSTRUCTIONS WOULD BE ORDERED EXECUTED. ORDERS WERE SENT FROM THE DALAT CITY COMMITTEE TO THE PROPER AAT FOR EXECUTION. IF THE GVN OFFICIAL DID NOT RESIDE WITHIN THE DALAT CITY COMMITTEE AREA, THE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE SERVED THE NOTICE. ALL AAT AND VCI MEMBERS WERE ORDERED NOT TO ENGAGE IN EXECUTION OR KIDNAPPING WITHOUT SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS.

5. EXECUTIONS WERE USED AS A PUNISHMENT FOR CRIMES COMMITTED BY VC AND MEMBERS OF THE NVA. THE 810TH BATTALION SERVED AS A COURT, BUT THE FINAL DECISION IN CAPITAL CASES RESTED WITH VC MR-6 HEADQUARTERS. /FIELD COMMENT--[redacted] SAID HE HAD NEVER KNOWN OF AN EXECUTION NOR OF OFFENSES COMMITTED THAT HAD BEEN PUNISHABLE BY EXECUTION./ 1.3(a)(4)

6. FIELD DISSEM--STATE, USMACV, USAID, CORDS, DIR/JUSPAO /MR. NICKEL ONLY/, 7TH AIR FORCE, USARV, NAVFORV, 525TH MI GP, 6499 SAG, OSI, CINCPAC, PACFLT, PACAF, ARPAC [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1998

6 January 1971

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Khrushchev on Vietnam

In Chapter 19 of his reminiscences, Khrushchev argues that the Chinese have been and are likely to continue exercising a good deal more influence in Hanoi than do the Soviets and that this not only is inimical to Soviet interests, but is unhealthy for the Vietnamese Communist effort in Indochina. He accuses Peking of waffling in its support to the Viet Minh in the crucial days of 1954 and of failing to cooperate with Moscow in trying to hammer out a common approach to Indochina during the 1960 World Communist Conference. At the latter meeting, Khrushchev says that Ho Chi Minh urged the Soviets to yield on some points to the Chinese lest a rupture develop that would benefit no one, and least of all, Hanoi. Following the Moscow-Peking break, Khrushchev asserts, China began to lead the Vietnamese Communists "around by a halter" and used its considerable influence among the many "pro-Chinese" in the North Vietnamese Party to sour Hanoi's relations with Moscow. This hostility persisted, he laments, despite continued Soviet aid to the Vietnamese. Khrushchev advances the proposition, albeit cautiously, that Hanoi in the wake of Ho's death is likely to be under Peking's sway even more and that Moscow's relations with the Vietnamese are likely to worsen further.

Whatever the merits and authenticity of the rest of Khrushchev's memoirs, we think that his argument in this chapter is particularly self-serving and, in the main, rests on an over simplified view of the facts of life in Hanoi and on dubious inter-

pretations of some not-so-solid evidence. Moreover, his line has a suspiciously familiar ring to it; it is very much like the line that the Soviets long have pushed with US interlocutors about how they and the Chinese get on with Hanoi. Presumably in these cases the Soviets are trying to persuade the US to "do something" to strengthen the Soviet hand in Hanoi, but Khrushchev's statements suggest that Moscow's sensitivity to real or imagined slights from Hanoi is genuine and deep-seated.

We doubt that pro-Chinese or pro-anything tendencies weigh overwhelmingly in Hanoi. What does count is the war and, in a foreign policy context, Hanoi's perception of how Soviet or Chinese policies mesh with its own. It is true, for instance, that Hanoi edged closer to Peking and away from Moscow in the early 1960's, but mainly because Khrushchev himself turned his back on the North Vietnamese effort in the South, which was then greatly expanding and required outside assistance. The most telling example of this, of course, was his reaction to US retaliatory raids after the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964. All that Khrushchev provided was propaganda support, and it was rather mild at that. Mao, on the other hand, immediately sent the North Vietnamese a squadron of MIGs. It was only after Khrushchev was ousted that Moscow became involved in a big way. Even when the Soviets were on the sidelines, however, North Vietnam was never a Chinese Communist lackey.

To support his contention that Moscow's relations with Hanoi are likely to sour even more, Khrushchev cites, among other things, Ho Chi Minh's will and "the famous speech by Le Duan" (the latter could be either Duan's funeral oration or the long treatise published last February). He makes much of the omission from Ho's will of any expression of gratitude for Soviet wartime aid to Hanoi -- assistance which he asserts has been indispensable to the Vietnamese war effort and irreplaceable from any quarter including China. In fact, these documents provide no basis for

conclusions on how Hanoi might lean; indeed, neither even directly addresses the issue. Ho's testament comes closest when it makes a rather explicit plea for an end to the Sino-Soviet rift; but it does so in a neutral way. It thanks no one by name for aid, only "the fraternal countries of the socialist camp, and friendly countries in the whole world."

Khrushchev obviously was impressed by Ho--as indeed most Westerners were. Even Ho, however, was allegedly viewed with suspicion when he tried to follow what we would consider a nonpartisan policy vis-a-vis the Soviets and the Chinese. Nonpartisanship in Hanoi without Ho would naturally be the object of even greater suspicion. We think, in other words, that Khrushchev's perception of North Vietnam's attitude toward Moscow was warped by a number of subjective factors: the natural "they're-either-for-us-or-against-us" outlook of a man deeply embroiled in the Sino-Soviet dispute; and perhaps also the distrust one might expect a Ukrainian peasant to have for inscrutible Orientals, whether in Hanoi or in Peking. Even more to the point, however, is the indication in his memoirs that Khrushchev could not, or would not, admit that Hanoi's antipathy toward his stewardship, was occasioned largely by his own reluctance to give the North Vietnamese strong support.

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JAN 26 1971
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NEW MOBILIZATION GROUP MEETS PRESS IN HANOI

[Article: "You Have Helped Us Achieve A Better Understanding of Many Profound Issues"; Hanoi, Thong Nhat, Vietnamese, 20 November 1970, p 8]

Recently, a delegation of the New Mobilization Committee in the United States for ending the war in Vietnam visited our country. Before departing for home, the American friends happily expressed the following sentiments to a reporter from the newspaper Thong Nhat ("Reunification"):

Mr. Anthony Ac-gi-von (phonetic): "Before visiting Vietnam, I had participated in a number of pro-Vietnam activities. I learned about Vietnam through books and through articles written by people who had been to Vietnam. I knew from films that Vietnam is very beautiful. These facts impelled me to want to visit Vietnam in order to obtain a better understanding and, at the same time, to try to find out the truth about the war which the U.S. government is waging here so that, when we return home, we can intensify our struggles in the United States to end the aggressive war in Vietnam.

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The realities of your country have helped me to achieve a better understanding of many profound issues. This is especially true in regard to the matter of the struggle against the Americans during the war of destruction in North Vietnam. You demonstrated very strong determination, reflected in combat and production. This proves that the Vietnamese people are fully capable of overcoming all difficulties in order to fight and produce. Even the Vietnamese teenagers and children have made a beautiful impression on me. The teenagers and children of Vietnam are very courageous, joyful, and so forth.

9 FEB 23 1971

The U.S. government's war in Vietnam has given rise to a resistance war right in the United States. Numerous organizations have been established for various age groups, and each has its own methods of operation appropriate to the character of its struggle. Recently, these organizations have attracted greater participation, particularly among the poor. Some organizations have reorientated their struggle, from the point of initially struggling only

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for their own happiness to the point of gradually recognizing that the immense expenditures for the war in Vietnam are swallowing up all of the funds for their welfare. Consequently, they have begun to struggle against the war. This is likewise true of new activists organizations among American soldiers. The reason that these organizations are struggling with their increasing strength is that they have clearly recognized the relationship between their interests and the war. They are conducting more and more struggles in order to keep from going to Vietnam. In the past, anyone who was drafted but failed to report or tore up his draft card, was thrown in jail by the government. At present, with more than 50 percent of the draftees failing to report and a constantly increasing number of people tearing up their draft cards, the American government has been revealed as ineffective in face of this movement.

The constant intensification of the movement of U.S. youth against military service has created a major obstacle for the American government. The earlier burning of the military recruitment camp in Philadelphia was a major victory for us. The burnt military recruitment lists have prolonged the military recruitment time for supplying the war in Vietnam, and so forth. Our struggles definitely will achieve many more successes in the future and so forth.

My first visit to Vietnam was also my first visit to a socialist country. I have clearly recognized the beautiful system through your equality in your way of life and in your work and social activities. I think that this is the essence of the socialist society.

(Phil Lawson)

Mr. Phin Lao-son: I bring with me two major ideas on my visit to Vietnam: first of all, I think that we are friends. I am visiting Vietnam as a fellow combattant. I also think that the people of North Vietnam have defeated the United States. Therefore, I want to visit Vietnam in order to study your experiences and struggle methods in order to go home to apply them to the struggle in our country, particularly for the struggle of our black people.

I have found considerable food for thought from the realities in Vietnam during the past several days. It is difficult to describe these thoughts but the thing which dominates and captivates my heart and mind more than anything else is your optimism and your confidence in the inevitability of victory. With these ideas, one struggles very aggressively.

In my Kansas City, the anti-war movement is primarily a movement of the black people. Some of the young people are opposed to the military service. The movement exists, but generally speaking, it is only in its initial stage. It is still necessary to further educate the people in order to bring the movement forward and have more successful activities. As far as our black people are concerned, the U.S. imperialists have exported the war from the United States to Vietnam, killing the Vietnamese people. The reason for this is that there is a war right in the United States which is intended to wipe out the black people in the United States. This fact

forces us to struggle and we think that this struggle must be able to change the system and to change the present life.

In visiting the Vietnamese Revolutionary Museum, we realize that it is necessary to struggle, as the Vietnamese people have done, to protect the national culture. As black people brought over from Africa, we too have our own culture. For this reason, after returning home from our visit to Vietnam, we will work together with the American people to further intensify the struggle to end the war in Vietnam, and, at the same time, to struggle to protect the culture of our people. There is one point which has given me considerable food for thought: Your victory has obviously not been determined by weapons but by the spirit of determination and the strength of solidarity of all the people. In my opinion, the reason that our movement has so long been weak is because it has lacked this spirit. In our struggle, we have also given more thought to weapons than to educating, mobilizing, and uniting the people carrying the weapons. This lesson of yours is particularly useful for us.

Martha Westover: We have achieved a better understanding of the problem by coming to Vietnam. People say that Vietnam is very poor. However, the facts indicate to me that this poverty is only external... Under that exterior, you have lived a very rich life, and have enthusiastically produced in order to supply the essential needs of the country. Despite such a fierce war environment, you have your vital necessities and your people are supplied all types of goods. In our country, on the outside it looks like there is very great prosperity, but actually only some people live like that. Most of our people live a life of poverty and misery and a large number of people go hungry.

You are really happy. In the areas that I have passed through, I have seen you preparing materials such as bricks, tiles, cement, and so forth for rebuilding the country. This has given me much food for thought. Another image which I find it difficult to become accustomed to during my visit to your country is the image of Vietnamese women. The Vietnamese women are very simple, very normal, but very beautiful. Women participate in every combat and construction sector and in all social activities. This proves that the capability of Vietnamese women is very enormous and indispensable...

At present, our American women are organizing the struggle against the U.S. government's war, using every different form. I am participating in an organization which is studying the American war industry. Through the publications of the Defense Department and the White House, this organization is studying how the U.S. government plans to unleash wars and what funds it will use to do this. The results of our research help local organizations to clearly perceive the government's objective in producing weapons of war, which is to serve the interests of military industrial groups, so that the local organizations can establish specific struggle plans in the centers of production of war weapons. Our work has begun to achieve success in a number of areas, particularly among American students.

6477

CSO:3909-DC

MEMORANDUM

TO : DFD/THE via BM/SGN

DATE : 5 Feb. 1971

FROM : CP/FW-SGN

REF. No.CP-V-71-068

SUBJECT : Monthly Report, Saigon, January 1971.

MFD/FW spent the month on leave and Capt. Clarke substituted as head of the Fixed-Wing branch of the Flying Department, Saigon.

For a number of years the idea of a CB radio net for Saigon has been rejected by the company as impossible due to GVN regulations. Through the efforts of Mr. Brassil, COMENG-SGN, it develops that this was not true and that if approached properly the necessary authorizations can in all probability be obtained. While not yet approved, things look very optimistic for approval in the near future. This will provide considerable assistance in maintaining contact with our crews under all sorts of typical Saigon situations which now require dispatching a vehicle and driver with a note, let him fight the local traffic and hope the individual is home. This net will be at no cost to the company except for one or two "base station" set, one in Operations and one in Crew Scheduling. It is unfortunate this concept was not supported and pursued years ago.

The 7C-10/11/12/13 bids generated a lot of problems in getting personnel moved out. Lack of authorization for pick up and shipment of household goods has resulted in a great number of completely wasted work days by crewmembers transferred PCS. Ten days to two weeks was not an uncommon delay for the authorization alone actual schedule of pick-up further delayed departures. Admittedly part of the problem was a result of TET, but lack of authorization was the primary reason and cause of these delays.

Capt. Bays became Acting SIP/PC6 aftera a request was received from Capt. Grover that he be relieved from the position.

It should go without saying that the biggest single "excitement" item for the month was the edict that there would be no exceptions to the flight duty limits imposed by the SEA Operations manual and flights should be cancelled rather than deviate from these criteria. Considering the number of messages, phone calls and time spent in meetings, it would seem the problem would be solved or at least stabilized. Actually there are still many problems to be resolved. Perhaps we are too far down the line to recognize what is really going on, but everyone is making a maximum effort to coordinate and cooperate to make the schedule work as requested by the customer and still live within the limits imposed.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
F. M. TIDWELL
MFD-SGN
F.M. TIDWELL

cc: BMSGN
MF/RW-SGN
File

MEMORANDUM

TO : BM/SGN

DATE: 05 February 1971

FROM : SZ/DAD

REF. No. SZDAD/71/018

SUBJECT : DANANG Station Monthly Report for January 1971

GENERAL

Only minor incidents of hostile activity were reported in the Danang area during January. Increased security measures were undertaken by U.S. and Vietnamese military forces over the TET holidays. Scheduled flights to Quang-Ngai on 3 January, and all CORDS passenger flights within Military Region I on 4 January, were cancelled due to anticipated civil disturbances.

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

The strict enforcement of company flight time limitations for flight crews has disrupted customer requirements somewhat. Not exceeding 8 hours flight time per day and complying with the crew rest provisions of these limitations have created the greatest problems. Both customer air operations officers have manifested discontent over the situation.

LEGAL

No payment has yet been made regarding the lease of a residence for SZ DAD due to delays in accomplishing required improvements. However, the new residence has been occupied.

FACILITIES

Nightly operation of the hostel generator has commenced. The noise level is considered high but not intolerable. The significant cost savings of this unit will probably not be realized until warmer weather results in increased air-conditioner operation.

A work request was submitted to the Base Civil Engineering Squadron (USAF) in an attempt to have the 204B touchdown pads, on the company ramp, resurfaced with concrete. The asphalt surface has deteriorated to the extent that they are only marginally usable and a potential FOD hazard is evident.

USAF plans to install a gate across the flight line access road, adjacent to the station facility, have been delayed due lack of required materials.

FISCAL

Conversion of the station timeclock to 50 herts operations is being undertaken at this time; attendance rosters are being submitted by each department in the interim.

FISCAL (Cont'd)

[redacted] payroll for the month totaled: 954,102$VN

Petty cash expenditures totaled: 31,965$VN

OPERATIONS

Revenue flight time decreased 114+18 hours as compared to December. Adverse weather, reduced flying over the TET holidays, and fewer PC-6 requirements contributed greatly to this reduction. No revenue losses were incurred as a result of the enforcement of company flight time limitations in January, but such is not expected to continue in February.

The following is a breakdown of revenue flight time generated by this station in January:

VN-91/AID	607+29
VN-91/Embassy	215+42
0069	4+07
TOTAL	827+18

Revenue losses for the month were as follows:

Customer cancellations ...	19+00
Weather	18+40
Maintenance	2+00
TOTAL	39+40

The station complement of GTD vehicles was reduced from 6 to 5 with the transfer of one Mitsubishi Jeep to SZ DAD to replace the previously utilized M-38 Jeep shipped to Saigon. No status has been received concerning a request to survey the two station micro-busses.

HOSTEL

Of 548 beds available at the hostel, 451 were utilized which yields a monthly occupancy rate of 85%. The total number of beds at the hostel was reduced from 22 to 21 as one room was considered too small to accommodate two beds. There are now 8 double rooms and 5 single rooms at the hostel.

Certificates of non-availability for a total of 16 nights were issued to TCS ground personnel.

COMMUNICATIONS

Difficulties continue to be experienced with the Motorola remote VHF/UHF system. Flight crews frequently report that Danang transmissions are unreadable. Although all receivers and transmitters

COMMUNICATIONS (Cont'd)

involved in this system were thoroughly checked and overhauled as necessary in December, its performance is far below previous levels.

Incoming and outgoing messages totaled 1217 and 805 respectively.

TRAFFIC

The customer funded cargo weighing scale for the Traffic/USAID warehouse was received and should be installed in the second week of February.

Passenger and cargo statistics for the month of January are as follows:

	PAX IN	PAX OUT	CARGO IN	CARGO OUT
VN-9101/AID	2,356	2,216	190,906	56,854
VN/9102/EMBASSY	317	503	28	3,593
0030	02	04	-	-
0069	07	05	-	-
AAM	82	86	10,287	10,994.5
TOTAL	2,764	2,814	201,221	70,941.5

SECURITY

Approved, 1971, airbase passes have not as yet been received from VNAF security for any station personnel. Only minor problems have been encountered to date by those employees without a valid pass.

PERSONNEL

Leave plans for several TCN personnel are being modified due to difficulties in obtaining exit/re-entry visas. Much of the problem seems to result from the processing involved in new extensions of stay and work permits which requires the employee's passport as part of the supporting documentation.

The personnel breakdown for Danang Station at the close of business, 31 January 1971, was as follows:

[redacted]

Permanent	3	11	15	64
Pre-Process	0	0	0	1
Temporary	0	0	0	0
Daily-Hire	0	0	0	0
TOTAL (94)	3	11	15	65

TECHNICAL SERVICES

RMD handled a total of 437 arriving and departing flights as compared to 488 in December. 1 PC-6 and 4 204B number one services were performed during the month. Number 2 services were limited to 204B aircraft and totaled: 2. One engine change was required (VTB) and two aircraft were grounded for parts (VTB and 204B).

RCMD expended a total of 608 manhours, of which 49 were utilised in maintaining the company hostel.

Some hostel expendable supplies are now being stocked by RSD/SGN which will reduce considerably the payment of inflated prices for these items on the local economy (a box of soap powder costs 200 piastres and a can of insect spray from 260 to 400 piastres).

Original Signed by
WINSTON C. CAMBRE
Winston C. Cambre

cc: file

Intelligence Information Report

[redacted]

[redacted] INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

[redacted]

REPORT NO. CS-311/01044-71

DATE DISTR. 8 February 1971

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DATE NOVEMBER 1969 - 1 DECEMBER 1970

SUBJECT VC PW-S PRISONER OF WAR CAMP CONTAINING U.S. AND ARVN PRISONERS

ACQ

SOURCE

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	[redacted]	[redacted]

1580-16-5

000307

#207

[redacted]

SUMMARY. A PRISONER OF WAR CAMP OPERATED BY VIET CONG /VC/ MILITARY REGION 5 /MR-5/, WHICH HELD EIGHT AMERICAN AND THREE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM /ARVN/ PRISONERS AS OF 1 DECEMBER 1970 WAS LOCATED IN THE MOUNTAINS ON THE BORDER OF QUANG TIN AND QUANG NGAI PROVINCES. THE AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE EMACIATED AND TWO SUFFERED FROM MALARIA. THE CAMP CONSISTED OF TWO BUILDINGS FOR THE PRISONERS INSIDE A STOCKADE AND THREE FOR THE STAFF AND GUARDS ON THE OUTSIDE. THE CAMP STAFF DID NOT APPEAR TO FEAR AN ESCAPE BY THE AMERICANS, WHO WERE NOT WORKED AS HARD AS THE ARVN PRISONERS. BECAUSE OF VC REGULATIONS, THE AMERICANS RECEIVED A LARGER FOOD RATION THAN THE ARVN PRISONERS. END SUMMARY.

1. VC MR-5 OPERATED A PRISONER OF WAR /POW/ CAMP, KNOWN UNOFFICIALLY AS THE "U.S. POW CAMP" IN THE MOUNTAINS ON THE BORDER OF QUANG TIN AND QUANG NGAI PROVINCES, FOUR OR FIVE KILOMETERS NORTH OF THE VC MR-5 T-15 THOUGHT REFORM CAMP, WHICH IS LOCATED AT APPROXIMATELY BS8587 OR BS8687. [redacted] COMMENT--VC MR-5 INCLUDES GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM /GVN/ QUANG NAM, QUANG TIN, QUANG NGAI, BINH DINH, PHU YEN AND KHANH HOA PROVINCES./ [redacted] VISITED THE POW CAMP THREE TIMES IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN NOVEMBER 1969 AND 1 DECEMBER 1970, WHILE CARRYING MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO A FOOD

[redacted]

[redacted]

PRODUCTION UNIT LOCATED ABOUT A THREE AND A HALF HOURS' WALK FROM THE T-15 CAMP. ON HIS FIRST VISIT IN NOVEMBER 1969 [redacted] SAW THREE ARVN OFFICERS AND FIVE AMERICANS WHO WERE PRISONERS AT THE POW CAMP. ON 3 DECEMBER 1970 THESE SAME PRISONERS WERE STILL THERE, TOGETHER WITH THREE NEW AMERICAN PRISONERS. [redacted] DID NOT LEARN THE NAMES OF THE PRISONERS, ALTHOUGH HE WAS ABLE TO CONFRONT THEM. THE THREE ARVN OFFICERS INCLUDED TWO SECOND LIEUTENANTS AND ONE FIRST LIEUTENANT. [redacted] SAID HE WAS UNABLE TO CONVERSE WITH THE AMERICAN PRISONERS, ALL OF WHOM WERE CAUCASIANS, BECAUSE OF THE LANGUAGE BARRIER. [redacted] DID NOT KNOW THEIR RANKS NOR THE TIME AND PLACE OF THEIR CAPTURE, BUT HE WAS TOLD THAT ONE WAS A DOCTOR. ALL OF THE AMERICAN PRISONERS APPEARED TO BE LESS THAN 30 YEARS OLD. FIVE OF THE AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE ABOUT FIVE FEET EIGHT INCHES TALL WITH BLACK HAIR, TWO WERE ABOUT FIVE FEET FIVE INCHES TALL WITH BROWN HAIR, AND ONE WAS ABOUT FIVE FEET FIVE INCHES TALL WITH BLACK HAIR. SOME HAD BEARDS AND MOUSTACHES, AND ALL WERE EMACIATED. ALL WORE TWO-PIECE BLACK PAJAMAS, SHOES MADE OF OLD TIRES, AND HATS MADE OF LEAVES COVERED WITH GREEN NYLON CLOTH. [redacted] COMMENT--FROM A PHOTOGRAPH, [redacted] IDENTIFIED PVT. FREDERICK L. ELBERT, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, AS BEING ONE OF THE AMERICANS AT THE POW CAMP. PVT. ELBERT WAS MISSING ON 16 AUGUST 1968 AND WAS DECLARED CAPTURED BASED ON THE DEBRIEFINGS OF THE THREE AMERICANS WHO WERE RELEASED BY THE VC IN NOVEMBER 1969./

2. IN TALKING WITH CAMP CADRES AND MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCE, [redacted] LEARNED THAT THE POW CAMP HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED IN 1966 OR 1967 BUT HAD NO FIXED LOCATION UNTIL 1969. THE POW CAMP STAFF, ALL VC, INCLUDED THE CAMP COMMANDER FIRST LIEUTENANT /PHU/ P H U O N G. THE GUARD FORCE CONSISTED OF THREE VC AND FOUR NVA SOLDIERS, OF WHOM [redacted] COULD REMEMBER ONLY THE NAME OF /PHU/ T H I N. THE CAMP, WHICH COVERED ABOUT ONE ACRE OF LAND, HAD FIVE BUILDINGS MADE OF BAMBOO WITH THATCHED ROOFS UNDER A JUNGLE COVER. THE FIVE BUILDINGS INCLUDED A SIX BY THREE METERS STRUCTURE TO HOUSE THE

[redacted]

16

PRISONERS, A FOUR BY THREE METERS KITCHEN AND MESS HALL FOR THE PRISONERS, A FOUR BY FOUR METERS STORAGE BUILDING, SIX BY THREE METERS BUILDING TO HOUSE THE STAFF AND GUARD FORCE, AND A FOUR BY SIX METERS KITCHEN AND MESS HALL FOR THE STAFF AND GUARDS. THE PRISONERS' MESS AND QUARTERS WERE INSIDE A BAMBOO FENCE ABOUT 2.5 METERS HIGH FORMING A STOCKADE ABOUT 50 METERS SQUARE. THE OTHER THREE BUILDINGS WERE ABOUT 60 METERS OUTSIDE THE STOCKADE. A PLACE TO URINATE WAS LOCATED INSIDE THE STOCKADE, AND SLIT TRENCHES WERE ABOUT 100 METERS OUTSIDE. A SINGLE GUARD TOWER ABOUT TWO METERS HIGH WAS LOCATED ON THE EAST SIDE AT THE ONE GATE OF THE STOCKADE. THE TOWER WAS LOCATED ON THE OUTSIDE AND ON THE RIGHT-HAND SIDE FACING THE STOCKADE. THIS GUARD TOWER WAS MANNED BY ONE MEMBER OF THE GUARD FORCE AT ALL TIMES WITH CHANGES IN GUARD OCCURRING AT 0600 AND 1800 HOURS. THE GUARDS WERE ARMED WITH AK-47'S AND COMMUNIST CHINESE-MADE SKS RIFLES WITH 50 ROUNDS PER MAN. THE CAMP COMMANDER AND HIS ASSISTANT WERE ARMED WITH COMMUNIST CHINESE-MADE K-54 PISTOLS WITH AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF ROUNDS. THERE WERE NO KNOWN COMBAT OR OTHER GUARD UNITS WITHIN A FIVE-KILOMETER RADIUS OF THE CAMP, NOR WERE THERE ANY BUNKERS, MINE FIELDS, BOOBY TRAPS, OR PUNJI STICKS. THE CAMP WAS IN A VALLEY SURROUNDED BY A HILL 1,000 METERS HIGH ON THE WEST, A 600-METER HIGH HILL ON THE NORTH AND NORTHWEST, AN 800-METER HIGH HILL ON THE SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST, AND A 50-METER HIGH HILL ON THE EAST. A SMALL, JUNGLE-COVERED STREAM RAN NEAR THE CAMP. A CORN AND MANIOC FIELD, ABOUT 1,000 METERS BY 300 METERS, LYING ABOUT 200 METERS EAST OF THE CAMP, WAS THE ONLY LANDMARK. THERE WERE NO ACCESS ROADS AND ONLY TWO MONTAGNARD VILLAGES IN THE AREA--MANG KIEN VILLAGE /UNLOCATED/ WAS EIGHT TO 10 KILOMETERS SOUTHEAST OF THE CAMP AND ONG AJ VILLAGE /UNLOCATED/ WAS ABOUT THE SAME DISTANCE NORTHEAST OF THE CAMP.

3. THE CAMP STAFF DID NOT FEAR THE AMERICAN PRISONERS WOULD ESCAPE SINCE THEY WERE UNACQUAINTED WITH THE AREA AND WERE IN NO CONDITION TO TRAVEL. [redacted] DID NOT KNOW OF ANY CAMP EVACUATION PLAN IN THE EVENT OF AIR ATTACKS. THE PRISONERS WERE NOT SHACKLED OR BOUND AT ANY TIME. THEY AROSE AT 0600 HOURS DAILY AND, IF THE WEATHER PERMITTED, THEY EXERCISED FOR 15 MINUTES. THE AMERICAN

PRISONERS WERE ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE STOCKADE FOR UP TO AN HOUR WITHOUT A SECURITY GUARD, BUT THE ARVN PRISONERS COULD NOT. ALTHOUGH THE ARVN OFFICERS WORKED ALONG WITH THE GUARDS IN THE FOOD PRODUCTION SITE, A 90-MINUTE WALK FROM THE CAMP, THE AMERICAN PRISONERS ONLY CARRIED THE FOOD BETWEEN THE SITE AND THE CAMP. TWO AMERICAN PRISONERS PERFORMED THIS DUTY DAILY, WHILE THE OTHER AMERICANS AND PRISONERS HAVING A MALARIA ATTACK WERE ALLOWED TO REST. KEROSENE LAMPS COULD BE USED UP TO 2100 HOURS. [redacted] DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PRISONERS WERE INTERROGATED OR GIVEN ANY INDOCTRINATION AT THIS POW CAMP. THE MEDICAL SUPPLIES USED TO TREAT THE PRISONERS CAME FROM MR-5. ALTHOUGH NO NEWSPAPERS OR PERIODICALS WERE AVAILABLE, THE PRISONERS COULD LISTEN TO CERTAIN BROADCASTS OF RADIO HANOI.

4. AMERICAN PRISONERS RECEIVED A DAILY FOOD RATION OF 588 GRAMS OF RICE AND VN$20-30 /US$0.17-0.25 AT THE OFFICIAL RATE VN$118 EQUALS US$1.00/. ARVN PRISONERS RECEIVED A DAILY RATION OF 388 GRAMS OF RICE AND VN$8 /US$0.07/. THE CAMP STAFF AND THE SECURITY FORCE RECEIVED DAILY 250 GRAMS OF RICE AND VN$10 /US$0.08/. FOOD AND FUNDS TO SUPPLEMENT THE DIET WERE PROVIDED BY THE POLITICAL SECTION OF MR-5. THE PRISONERS NEVER ACTUALLY RECEIVED ANY MONEY. FOR MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCE USED THE FUNDS TO MAKE ONE TRIP EACH WEEK TO THE LOWLANDS TO PURCHASE FISH SAUCE, CANNED FISH, AND OTHER FOOD WHICH THEY BROUGHT BACK TO THE CAMP FOR DISTRIBUTION TO THE PRISONERS AND THE CAMP PERSONNEL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ALLOWANCES. THE ROUND TRIP TO THE LOWLANDS TOOK SIX DAYS. THE AMERICAN PRISONERS GOT PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT BECAUSE OF VC REGULATIONS. ALTHOUGH THE STAFF AND SECURITY FORCE RESENTED THE AMERICAN PRISONERS RECEIVING DOUBLE THEIR RATION, THEY DID NOT OBJECT OPENLY. [redacted] BELIEVES THE PRISONERS RECEIVED ALL THE FOOD PURCHASED WITH THEIR ALLOWANCES. THERE WAS NO APPARENT FRICTION BETWEEN THE PRISONERS AND THE CAMP STAFF OR SECURITY FORCE.

5. FIELD DISSEM--STATE, USMACV, USAID, CORDS, DIR/JUSPAO /MR. NICKEL ONLY/, 7TH AIR FORCE, USARV, NAVFORV, 525TH MI GP, 6499 SAG, DSI, CINCPAC, PACFLT, PACAF, ARPAC

[redacted]

MEMORANDUM

765

mp/lw

TO : VPA/TPE

DATE : 20 Feb. 1971

REF. No. CP-V-71-099

FROM : CP/RW-SGN

SUBJECT : Evaluation of Project Operations 204-B Program.

REFERENCE: VPA TPS B71 010115

A. The 204B program in Saigon has six assigned aircraft. Two operate out of Da-Nang, two out of Can-Tho, and two out of Saigon. This is the normal operating set up and varies somewhat according to circumstances.

DANANG UTILIZATION:

One aircraft stationed in Da-Nang works for Customer 9101 or CORDS. The second aircraft is assigned to Customer 9102 or Embassy. The 9101 aircraft is scheduled to fly 8 hrs each day at some location in I CORDS and usually flies more than the 8+00 scheduled hours. All normal daily schedules for CORDS are at the direction of FU/PSD Advisor at the various locations. The main work locations are Tam-Ky [redacted], Hoi-An [redacted] Quang-Ngai [redacted], Hue [redacted], and Quang-Tri [redacted]. Working for the PSD Advisor at these locations involves both passenger and cargo operations. The passengers are normally VN Troops of some description, National Police, ARVN, PF etc.

The Embassy aircraft does not work a set schedule. Missions are scheduled as needed. It is interesting to note that there is a large increase in flight time for the Embassy aircraft during the rainy season. This is due to the fact that many Embassy fixed-wing flights are aborted during the rainy season for weather reasons. When this happens the mission is re-scheduled for the 204B aircraft. Other Embassy missions are both cargo and passenger with a large percentage of VIPs. The total 204B time out of Da-Nang averages approximately 300 hrs. Of this approximately 90% is CORDS or 9101. The overall cargo operation averages 28% hazardous cargo.

CAN-THO UTILIZATION:

Can-Tho 204B aircraft are also assigned one to each customer. The CORDS aircraft is utilized in the same manner as the Da-Nang, CORDS aircraft with the exception that several missions are flown for Phoenix each month. The Phoenix missions are usually flying inspection teams to various locations. The normal CORDS missions are out of Ca-Mau [redacted] Rach-Gia [redacted], Ben-Tre [redacted], Tra-Vinh [redacted], Ha-Tien [redacted], Chau-Doc [redacted] and Phuoc-Hoa Island [redacted]. Can-Tho CORDS aircraft are scheduled daily rather than a set schedule. The Embassy aircraft in Can-Tho does very little work. It is normally used for missions with the VN National Police. The total flight time out of Can-Tho is approximately 175 hours per month. Again approximately 90% of this time is for CORDS.

SAIGON UTILIZATION:

The CORDS aircraft in Saigon has a pre-set schedule 8+00 hrs each day seven days a week. This aircraft usually flies more than the scheduled 8+00 hrs. It is utilized in both cargo and passenger operations. Two days each week missions originate at Saigon. Other missions originate at An-Loc [redacted], Song-Be [redacted], Ham-Tan [redacted], Tan-An [redacted], Xuan-Loc [redacted], Phu-Loi [redacted], and Bien-Hoa [redacted].

.../....

FORM AF0330

Missions also include low level recons. and command and control operations for Province Chiefs in ARVN Military Operations. The second aircraft at Saigon flies some (very few) Embassy missions, extra CORDS missions, training missions, and is used as a maintenance "swap" aircraft. Total time out of Saigon averages 360 hrs of which 95% is CORDS.

Regarding aircraft utilization the following chart is interesting as it demonstrates the exposure time as compared to other programs. The statistics for this chart are taken from actual FSO's and are accurate. This chart covers a sixty day period, October and November of 1970.

Program	Landings	Total Time	Average leg in min.
204B	4967	1830	22 min.
PC6C	7349	3388	26 min.
VTB	3140	2086	39 min.
DHC4	1009	808	48 min.
C-47	687	623	63 min.
C-46	822	1250	96 min.

Also interesting is the following chart which shows the percentage of project pay that is paid on actual flight time comparing the C-47 program to the 204B program. This is over a 30 day period.

Program	Block Hours	Flight Hours	Project Hours	Project @ of Flight Hours
204B	943	906	@ 77% 726	80%
C-47	380	307	@ 60% 258	84%

B. Hazardous cargo for the 204B program includes fuel drums, Butane bottles, insecticides, hard rice, tear gas, and troops carrying loaded weapons and grenades. Grenades are usually carried hung from the uniform by the detonation lever.

DANANG:

Most of our sling cargo work is done out of Danang. Approximately 30% of cargo out of Danang is by cargo sling. Hazardous cargo averages 85% overall in Danang Operations.

CAN-THO:

Can-Tho Embassy missions are usually either inspection teams or VN National Police missions. All cargo on National Police missions is hazardous. CORDS missions are both cargo and passenger and of the cargo 25% is hazardous.

SAIGON:

The Saigon 204B operation is primarily a passenger, recon. operation and secondarily a cargo operation. However, most of the passengers are some type of VN Military and carry ammunition with them. The hazardous cargo operation out of Saigon averages 20%. The overall cargo operation averages 24% hazardous cargo.

C. During the sixty day period the 204B made 4967 landings and take-offs. Of these 1065 were made to unimproved, unlisted landing areas. This means that over 20% of 204B program landings were made without benefit of any FIC briefing or any written information regarding security, obstacles, condition of surface etc. Of the 262 Heliports listed in the Tactical Aerodrome Directory, 55 show some form

.../...

of hazard. This gives us 22% marginal landing areas of those listed. However, the information given in the Tactical Aerodrome Dierctory regarding heliports is very sketchy and incomplete to say the least. For instance looking at a random FSO flown on 14 Feb. out of Tan-An (VH-665) we find the following differences between the Tactical Aerodrome Directory and actual conditions. There were 20 landings and take-offs. Of the 20 landing areas, 12 were listed in the TAD. Of these 12, all had obstacles, uneven touchdown areas, debris in landing area or some other hazard making the area marginal for landing. However, only 2 of these had any hazards listed in the TAD. My conservative estimate is that 90% of our landing zones are marginal.

D. The 204B program I CORDS operations averages 50% remote area operation. This is based on criteria set up in message VPA TPE B71 010115. Saigon and Can-Tho operations average 70% remote area operation. The overall remote area operation averages 60%. This is based on a 15 minute reaction time and a 30 minute flight from SAR centers.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
R. W. HITCHMAN
MP (RW) SGN

R.W. Hitchman, Jr.

cc: DFD/TPE
BM/SGN
File

MEMORANDUM

TO : DFD/TPE via BM/SGN

DATE : 9 Mar. 1971

FROM : MF/RW-SGN

REF. No. CP-V-71-127

SUBJECT : Monthly Report (February 1971).

The 20AB program for the month of February was routine for RW/SVN. Flying time for the month remained relatively the same. It is believed the monthly flying time will remain at the present level until the VN Customer and Taipei work out hazardous pay.

There were 2 Route Checks, 5 Proficiency Checks, 8 F/O Evaluation Rides. This brings the program up-to-date.

A Pilots Meeting was held on the 28 Feb. in which 14 Pilots attended. The rest of the Pilots who did not attend will be briefed on the meeting throughout the month of March.

All the First Officers are progressing in a normal manner. Their attitude and initiative is well above average.

The morale of the pilot seems to be as in previous month a problem. There seems to be some stronge rumblings among the Captains and First Officers and a curious silence about, what the company is going to do about extra - hazardous flight pay; also rumors have it that the twin pack will not come up for Bid. The lull before the Storm???

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
R. W. HITCHMAN
MF (RW) SGN

R.W. Hitchman

cc: File
BM/SGN

Intelligence Information Report

b3

PAGE 1 OF 11 PAGES

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPOT NO. ( ) b1+b3

COUNTRY South Vietnam

DOI April 1968 to April 1970

SUBJECT South Vietnamese Liberation Army Enemy Proselyting Office Handling of Prisoners of War

J.M. RAY (DIC)

ACQ Vietnam, Saigon (12-28 October 1970) ( ) b3

SOURCE [redacted]

b1+b3

Summary: The Enemy Proselyting Office of the South Vietnamese Liberation Army (SVNLA) Political Staff has the primary responsibility for the administration, indoctrination and interrogation of foreign military and civilian prisoners as well as for Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) captured personnel. It had no jurisdiction over captured VC deserters, captured Vietnamese civilians or U.S./Allied/ ARVN deserters who voluntarily rally directly to VC organizations.

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CONFIDENTIAL

(Classification) (Control markings)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CIA	(Dissemination and extraction information)

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Approved for Release
Date 30 09 93

The Enemy Proselyting Office between April 1968 and April 1970 had three administrative Prisoner of War (POW) units which supervised about seven POW camps for U.S./foreign military and civilian POWs, and at least three POW camps for ARVN personnel. In April 1970, the POW administrative units and their subordinate POW camps were reorganized and combined into at least three POW camps for U.S./foreign personnel and at least one for ARVN personnel. Heavy emphasis was placed on the persuasive indoctrination of all POWs under its jurisdiction. Indoctrination and interrogation results were sent to Hanoi, to the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) Military Proselyting Section, and to SVNLA campaign planners in support of projected combat operations. The Enemy Proselyting Office Policy Section supervised all detention facilities, maintained a central registry of all POWs under its jurisdiction, recommended and arranged POW release ceremonies, approved the recruitment of ARVN POWs into the SVNLA, as well as implementing policies on the handling and treatment of POWs and issuing guidance instructions to VC Military Region and subregion-level enemy proselyting organizations. As of 2 April 1970, at least sixteen U.S. POWs and one captured U.S. deserter were being detained in subordinate Enemy Proselyting Office detention facilities. End Summary.

1. The Enemy Proselyting Office (Phong Dich Van (PDV)) of the South Vietnamese Liberation Army (SVNLA) Headquarters, Political Staff, was charged with the primary responsibility for the administration, indoctrination and interrogation of foreign military and civilian prisoners as well as for Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) captured personnel. The PDV was also responsible for compiling information for draft propaganda leaflets, arranging prisoner of war (POW) release ceremonies, maintaining central POW record logs, conducting research on the psychological, moral and ideological beliefs of captured enemy personnel (excluding captured Vietnamese civilians) and drafting enemy proselyting programs which were to be used during combat situations against enemy military personnel. All captured foreign civilian personnel were categorized as enemy espionage agents and were detained and treated as captured foreign military personnel. The PDV between April 1968 and April 1970 administered at least seven detention camps for captured U.S. and other foreign military and civilian POWs and at least three other detention camps for ARVN POWs. The PDV did not have any responsibility for detained VC personnel. Such detainees were under the jurisdiction of the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) Security Section, which was also responsible for detaining captured civilian Vietnamese and Government of Vietnam (GVN) civil servants, who were classified as GVN espionage agents and traitors to the Vietnamese people. PDV POWs were made available for interrogations and debriefings conducted by the COSVN Military/Troop Proselyting Section and the Security Protection Office (Phong Ban Ve) of the SVNLA Headquarters Political Staff. Both sources stated specifically that neither the COSVN Security Section nor the Military Intelligence Office (MIO) of the SVNLA Military Staff was involved in the interrogation of POWs at PDV detention facilities. However, the MIO was normally informed of the capture of all U.S./foreign military and civilian personnel, according to Source Nguyen Thanh L i n h, and could, upon request, dispatch its own qualified personnel to interrogate such prisoners who were being detained by the capturing unit. In the case of VC Subregion 1 (SR-1), the SR-1 Political Office Enemy Proselyting Section was charged with the primary responsibility of immediately interrogating POWs in the field for perishable tactical military information. Such information was given directly to the local VC military unit commander for immediate use against the enemy.

2. Prior to the Allied military incursion into Cambodia in May 1970, the Headquarters of the PDV was located in the Bridge 48 area within the COSVN/SVNLA Headquarters complex in the Fishhook area of Cambodia. The PDV Headquarters was composed of six major subordinate

elements: Command Group, Policy Section (Ban Chinh Sach), Propaganda Section (Ban Tuyen Truyen), Cadre Section (Ban Can Bo), Enemy Situation Section (Ban Dich Tinh), and the In-Combat Proselyting Section (Ban Dich Van Trong Chien Dau). A PDV Reception Station was located in an unknown area approximately a one-hour walk southeast of Phu Khuong District, Tay Ninh Province.

3. The PDV Headquarters Command Group was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Ngo Dac Trieu, aka Le Tan Vi, aka Muoi Vi, aka Muoi Tam, and his two deputies, Major Pham Ngoc Thao and Bui Thanh Nghiem, aka Ba Nghiem. One English-speaking interpreter named (fnu) Hoa was permanently assigned to the Command Group. The PDV Headquarters was still designated 72, with letter box number 86,300/YK as of April 1970. About 50 personnel were assigned to the PDV Headquarters with about 300 personnel for subordinate PDV detention facilities.

4. The PDV Policy Section was the most important subordinate PDV element. The Policy Section was responsible for supervising the administration of subordinate PDV detention facilities, interrogating and indoctrinating POWs and deserters, recommending POWs for release and arranging POW release ceremonies, maintaining central registry of POWs and deserters processed through and/or detained by the PDV as well as implementing policies on the treatment and handling of POWs and deserters and issuing guidance, instructions to Military Region- and subregion-level Policy Sections. Prosclyting Sections within the COSVN geographical area of jurisdiction. The responsibilities and functions of this section were almost identical with those of the Ministry of Defense Enemy Prosely[illegible] Department Policy Office in NVN. [illegible] dated 10 August 1970 (for further details on the Enemy Prosely[illegible] Department Policy Office in NVN.) The Chief of the PDV Policy Section was Major Tran Van Luc, aka Nam Luc. At least five other personnel were in this section.

5. The Policy Section directly supervised [illegible] tive units between April 1968 and 2 April 1970, when these units underwent a major reorganization. The three units were designated Inter-Unit A, B and C.

A. Inter-Unit A: established about May 1968 in the Cut Spring area about 12 kilometers southeast of Katum, Phu Khuong District, Tay Ninh Province. In October 1969, the Cut Spring area was bombed by B-52's; however, Inter-Unit A suffered no casualties and relocated in the Phum Trapcang, Phlos/Phum Dar area (vicinity XT203977) of Cambodia, about four kilometers south of National Route 7. The Inter-Unit A Headquarters was composed of 25 personnel headed by Senior Captain Le Hong Bien, aka Hai Bien. Inter-Unit A supervised four POW detention camps and one POW escort unit.

(1) Unit 23A (designated Unit 23 prior to April 1968): established pre-Tet 1968 as an ARVN enlisted and NCO POW detention camp. In April 1969, Unit 23A was relieved of its POW detention function and became purely a POW escort unit for ARVN prisoners, picking up ARVN POWs from Rear Services Group 82 and Comco/Liaison Station V15. Between April 1969 and April 1970, Unit 23A picked up and escorted only ten ARVN POWs who were detained for interrogation by the PDV Headquarters elements before being delivered to Inter-Unit B for permanent detention and/or later release. In May 1968, Unit 23A picked up and detained 25 ARVN enlisted POWs who were all released in August/September 1968; 28 ARVN enlisted POWs in December 1968, who were all released in February 1969; 12 in February 1969, eight of whom were

released in March 1969 and four of whom were transferred to Inter-Unit B. One U.S. POW, who was picked up in June 1963, was turned over to Unit 2A for detention, and one ARVN lieutenant, (fnu) X u a n, was turned over to Unit 3A for detention. Unit strength: 25 personnel.

(2) Unit 1A (designated Unit A20 prior to April 1968): Unit 1A was the only PDV detention facility in existence prior to January 1968 for both ARVN/Allied military and civilian POWs. After April 1969, Unit 1A was no longer responsible for ARVN POWs. Unit 1A was located in the Bo Tuc area in Binh Long Province. Unit strength: 25 personnel.

(3) Unit 2A (known as Unit 21 prior to April 1968): established pre-Tet 1968 as a detention facility for foreign military and civilian POWs. As of 2 April 1970, about seven or eight U.S. POWs were detained in this camp. Unit strength: 25 personnel. In January 1969, three U.S. POWs were released in Tay Ninh Province.

(4) Unit 3A (designated Unit 26 prior to April 1968): established pre-Tet 1968 as a detention facility for foreign military and civilian POWs. As of 2 April 1970, this unit detained seven U.S. POWs. One unidentified Caucasion U.S. POW died from malignant malaria in October 1969. Unit Strength: 25 personnel.

(5) Unit 4A: established pre-Tet 1968 to detain foreign military deserters. Unit 4A was located with the Inter-Unit A Headquarters. As of 2 April 1970, only one U.S. deserter was detained at this facility. The deserter was positively identified by [redacted] photograph as McKinley [redacted] Noland, a negro, was at the camp with his half Vietnamese/half Cambodian wife and her two children by previous marriages, one a 13-year-old boy sired by a Cambodian father and the other a 3-year-old girl sired by a Korean. According to Source, Noland had been involved in black market activities in Saigon and had been caught by either U.S. military police or GVN National Police, resisted arrest, allegedly killed the policeman, escaped, hid and continued his black market activities in the Saigon area. Later he met his wife who reportedly convinced him to flee into Cambodia to live. Noland and his family were picked up by the VC and turned over to Unit 4A where he was detained with relative freedom of movement between at least April 1968 and April 1970. On several occasions, PDV indoctrinators met with Noland at the Inter-Unit A Headquarters for unknown reasons. His degree of cooperation with the VC was never revealed, although he did volunteer his stepson as an office boy for Inter-Unit A and was allowed occasionally to cut wood for the Inter-Unit A Headquarters nearby under guard. In 1969 Noland allegedly requested to be set free with his family in Cambodia, but no action was taken. Unit Strength: 10 personnel.

B. Inter-Unit B: established in May 1968 in the Xom Giua area, Cambodia, opposite Tay Ninh Province. The Inter-Unit B Headquarters was composed of 25 personnel headed by Senior Captain (fnu) D a u. Inter-Unit B supervised three POW detention camps for ARVN POWs from enlisted to officer ranks. Only one ARVN second lieutenant, (fnu) X u a n, was identified by name. The three subordinate POW camps were designated Unit 1B, 2B and 3B, which were each staffed by about 25 personnel. An unknown number of ARVN POWs were

C O N F I D E N T I A L

detainee at these camps.

C. Inter-Unit C was established in May 1968 in an unused mined area for the detention of foreign military and civilian POWs in a [illegible] subordinate camps. It was staffed by about 25 personnel and there were about 15 to 20 personnel at the Inter-Unit C headquarters.

Between March and early April 1970, the above-mentioned POW detention facility system was reorganized because the anticipated receipt of large numbers of ARVN Allied POWs had never materialized after Tet 1968, VC military activities had been toned down and the VC were in need of qualified cadres and enlisted personnel to fill vacancies in combat units. Upon instructions from the SVNLA Political Staff, the PDV streamlined its organization in the following manner:

A. Inter-Unit A was reorganized into two U.S./foreign POW detention facilities. Unit 1A was kept intact, while the Inter-Unit A headquarters and its four other subordinate elements were disbanded and formed into one detention unit (designation unknown) headed by Junior Captain [illegible], aka Ut, H u e, formerly the Deputy Chief of Inter-Unit A. Following the reorganization, the two units were directly subordinate to the PDV Policy Office with about 25 to 30 personnel. The remaining personnel were sent to replace personnel in combat units in other parts of the country. Unit C620 [illegible]

B. Inter-Unit B was disbanded and formed into one ARVN POW detention facility directly subordinate to the PDV Policy Office with about 25 to 35 personnel. Unit designation and location unknown.

C. Inter-Unit C was disbanded and formed into at least one foreign POW detention facilities directly subordinate to [illegible] with about 25 to 35 personnel. Unit designation and location unknown.

7. Between April 1968 and April 1970, PDV Propaganda Section personnel were observed on several occasions frequenting the above mentioned Inter-Unit A POW detention facilities. Section personnel, such as Junior Captain Duy, H o a, aka Ba, H o a, had direct access to POWs. Hoa conducted indoctrination sessions designed to convince the POWs of the heroism and determination of the Vietnamese people in their struggle for independence from foreign domination. POWs were required to read books, documents and pamphlets on Vietnamese history and on the reconstruction of North Vietnam (NVN). According to Hoa, such reading materials were not as effective as oral group discussions. Hoa prescribed topics for discussions in which the POWs were required to participate actively. Such discussions were presented in question-and-answer form with Hoa guiding the POWs to the type of answers he wanted. For example, discussion topics dealt with the comparison of VC and ARVN treatment of POWs; North Vietnamese assistance to the VC in SVN; and the U.S. presence in SVN as aggressors. POWs were guided to conclude that the VC used no form of torture against POWs while the ARVN did; that the NVN presence in SVN was as Vietnamese helping Vietnamese in a brotherly fashion since there was only one Vietnam and not two Vietnams; and that the U.S. was the aggressor military power in SVN interferring with the internal politics of the Vietnamese people and hence was the aggressor, not NVN. After group discussions the POWs were required to write a statement, based on the questions and answers, admitting that the U.S. was the aggressor in the war. According to Hoa, the statements were later studied at the PDV and were used to develop indoctrination materials, including leaflets. Statements were sent to Hanoi and were used to assist in the indoctrination of U.S. POWs in NVN. Consequently, the PDV knew

to detain a number of U.S. POWs in SVN in order to gain more experience in proselyting efforts and believed that U.S. POWs were valuable in its enemy proselyting operations and later in bargaining for the exchange of high-ranking VC cadres held by the GVN. A secondary function of the PDV Propaganda Section was to conduct political reorientation courses for its own subordinate cadres and personnel.

6. PDV indoctrinators in the Enemy Situation Section were responsible for interrogating U.S./ARVN POWs for information on the history, morale, and biographic background of division-level units and their commanders, as well as the identification and number of unit personnel who opposed the war, refused to take part in military operations or deserted their units. Attention was also given to the degree of racism/segregation in U.S. units and the relationship between enlisted personnel and officers. Special emphasis was placed on identifying the psychological, morale and ideological status of key enemy unit commanders as well as the effectiveness of their units during combat against VC/NVA forces. Such information was provided to SVNLA campaign planners. The Enemy Situation Section was composed of about 10 personnel headed by Senior Captain (fnu) Hai Ca.

9. Based on the results of indoctrination and interrogation sessions by the Propaganda and Enemy Situation Sections, further research was conducted by the In-Combat Proselyting Section headed by Senior Captain (fnu) Tu Sen. This Section took the debriefing results and drew up enemy proselyting programs which were to be used during VC/NVA combat operations. Proselyting programs were keyed to specific VC/NVA combat tactics, and were designed to support tactical operations be it a major campaign, small-scale hit-and-run attack or an ambush. These proselyting programs were also sent to the SVNLA campaign planners for their review and use in planning combat actions against enemy military forces.

10. Although the PDV did not have, per se, an Administrative Staff Section, all PDV administrative personnel affairs were handled by the PDV Cadre Section, which kept all personnel records. The Cadre Section was responsible for personnel assignments and processed recommendations for promotions, awards and disciplinary action.

11. The PDV was also responsible for drawing up and disseminating instructions and regulations concerning the treatment, evacuation and release of POWs who were brought to, and detained by, the PDV. Upon capture each POW was given a bilingual letter of instruction on how the POW was to act during the period he was being escorted to the next higher echelon. POWs were instructed to march fast, camouflage themselves with tree branches when enemy aircraft appeared and do nothing to signal circling aircraft, willingly submit to being blindfolded when instructed, and ask the permission of the armed escorts to toilet. Upon arrival at the PDV detention camp location, POWs were given the following instructions: do not attempt to reveal the camp location; do not make smoke from cooking fires during daylight hours or allow any light to show at night; do not dry clothes in the sun; ask permission to toilet; do not reveal to fellow POWs the subject of interrogations at the facility; report any attempts of others to resist captivity; eat all food immediately and do not build up food reserves; do not attempt to escape. Any POW caught trying to escape was tied to a tree overnight and given only rice to eat for three days in view of other POWs. If a POW overpowered and killed an armed guard the maximum penalty was death.

12. At Unit 23A of Inter-Unit A, all personal belongings, such as military clothing and equipment, money and jewelry were taken from the POWs and not given back until their release. Civilian foreigners were allowed to wear their civilian clothes. Upon arrival at the

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detention camp each POW was issued a hammock, a mosquito net, a blanket, a pair of sandals, a tooth brush and other items. Each POW was kept separately in an underground trench except during meals, indoctrination, interrogation and toilet time. He was with two armed guards at all times, and a cord which doubled as a fetter was placed around his neck. Each POW was also chained to the trench. Except for escapees, those who had proven sympathetic to the VC. The daily work schedule was as follows: 0545 hours wake up, wash and physical exercise; 0600 breakfast; 0630-0700 required listening to VC/NVN propaganda radio broadcasts in English; 0700-1130 indoctrination/interrogation sessions; 1130 lunch; 1200-1400 siesta; 1400-1700 indoctrination/interrogation sessions; 1700 supper. If the POW was not needed for indoctrination/interrogation sessions he was allowed out of the trench three times a day for one hour maximum each time. Deserters were given permission to remain outside their trench during daylight hours within the prescribed camp limits. Food rations for foreign POWs were 4.50 Cambodian riels per day, 35 liters of rice per month and an undetermined cash allowance for soap, cigarettes and other items. ARVN POWs were allowed 2.70 Cambodian riels per day, 24 liters of rice per month and 15 riels a month allowance for soap, cigarettes and other items. Increased food allowances were given for 22 December (NVA day), 2 September (NVN Independence Day) and during the Tet holidays. After August 1969, the PDV experienced difficulties in obtaining sufficient quantities of rice. The ARVN POW monthly rice allowance was cut from 26 liters to 24 liters, while foreign POW monthly rice allowance remained unchanged. This was done deliberately to keep the fact of rice shortages secret from foreign POWs. On the other hand, PDV rice rations were cut in half--half of the monthly rice allowance was issued in manioc. PDV detention facility personnel were under strict orders not to torture or abuse any POWs; otherwise, disciplinary action would be taken against them. All deaths of foreign POWs were investigated in detail by PDV headquarters personnel. In the case of one death of an unidentified Caucasian POW due to malaria in October 1969, the camp medical technician was severely criticized by the PDV which sent investigators to confirm the cause of death.

13. Although the criteria for releasing POWs were not known to sources, especially in regard to U.S. POWs, most ARVN enlisted and NCO POWs were usually eligible for release, but not ARVN officers. The PDV Policy Section determined who would be released. The VC psychology behind the release of ARVN POWs was based on the assumption that the released ARVN POW would return to his family and/or unit and spread propaganda favorable to the VC, even if he had not been recruited or dispatched by the VC. Prior to the release of 35 ARVN enlisted and NCO POWs in July/August 1968, Senior Lieutenant (fnu) V i of the SVNLA Political Staff Security Protection Office (Phong Bao Ve (J5)) visited the Unit 23A detention facility for three days and interrogated each of the 35 personnel being considered for release. The interrogations were conducted separately; Sources knew no other details, nor were they able to comment on the involvement of J5 personnel with the January 1969 release of three U.S. POWs in Tay Ninh Province. (Field Comment: The J5 Security Protection Office is responsible for counterespionage and internal security activities within the SVNLA. Its functions are similar to the COSVN Security Section, which is subordinate to the COSVN Current Affairs Committee.)

14. The only other COSVN-level organization which was in contact with POWs at PDV detention facilities was the COSVN Military Proselyting Section (Ban Binh Van). Prior to the July/August 1968 release ceremony for ARVN POWs, two Military Proselyting Section cadres, Chin T h o and (fnu) C h i e n, went to Unit 23A. Chin Tho interviewed each ARVN POW with a tape recorder and instructed

each POW to write a letter to his family which he reviewed and corrected before the POW read the letter into the tape recorder. The tape-recorded letters were later broadcast over the National Liberation Front Radio. Colen took a group picture of the POWs with a still camera for unknown reasons. No Military Proselyting Section cadres were identified by Source in either the motion picture film or still pictures of the January 1969 release of three U.S. POWs in Tay Ninh Province. Neither Source was able to comment on whether personnel of this section were involved in the recruitment and dispatch of released ARVN POWs. The Military Proselyting Section had the responsibility of detaining, indoctrinating and interrogating U.S./Allied/ARVN deserters who rallied to the VC. The PDV sent information copies of all its indoctrination and interrogation reports to the Military Proselyting Section via the SVNLA Political Staff.

15. As each ARVN POW was considered for release, the PDV attempted to recruit the POW into the SVNLA. For a POW to be accepted into the SVNLA he had to be a member of the basic social class (landless/poor farmer), have no relatives working as GVN civil servants or in the ARVN and have been politically indoctrinated by accepting the VC revolutionary cause, and had to submit a handwritten request volunteering to join the SVNLA. The ARVN POW detention unit then made up a list of all POWs who met these criteria and submitted a report to the Inter-Unit Headquarters for final approval by an unidentified PDV approving authority. At least ten members of Inter-Unit A were former ARVN POWs recruited in this fashion.

16. Field Dissem: USMACV J-2, USARV G-2, 525 MI Gp, OSI, NAVFORV K-2, NISOV, CINCPAC, PACFLT, ARPAC, PACAF [redacted] b1+b3

Intelligence Information Report

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

[redacted]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

[redacted]

REPORT NO. [redacted] 1.3(e)(4)

DATE DISTR. 26 March 1971

COUNTRY South Vietnam

DOI April 1968 - April 1970

SUBJECT Biographic Profiles on Personnel of the South Vietnam Liberation Army, Enemy Proselyting Office, Concerned with Handling of Prisoners of War

ACQ Vietnam, Saigon (12-28 October 1970) Field No. [redacted] 1.3(e)(4)

SOURCE [redacted]

1.3(e)(4)

5 4 3 2 1

[redacted]

Sub 501-08(6)

~~502-02-3~~ 1.3(e)(4)

5 4 3 2 1

(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

[redacted]

1.3(e)(4)

Approved for Release
Date September 1993

NND 927660-82

1.3(a)(4)

1. The following cadres and personnel of the South Vietnamese Liberation Army (SVNLA), Political Staff, Enemy Proselyting Office (Phong Dich Van (PDV)), were involved in the administration, indoctrination and interrogation of U. S./Allied/ARVN POWs at PDV prisoner-of-war Administrative Inter-Units A, B and C:

A. Command Group:

1. Chief: Lieutenant Colonel Ngo Dao T r a i, aka Le T r a i, aka Muoi T r a i, aka Muoi T a i, born circa 1924, NVN. Prior to infiltrating SVN in 1963/1964, Trai was assigned to an unidentified position in the Enemy Proselyting Department (Cuc Dich Van (CDV)) of the Ministry of Defense, General Political Department. Upon arrival in SVN, Trai was first assigned to an unidentified position in the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), Military/Troop Proselyting Section, for a period of time before becoming Chief of PDV. Source Huynh Ngoc N h u a n heard in early 1970 that Trai was suffering from an unidentified mental disorder. Trai spoke Chinese fluently and had a long facial scar.

2. Deputy: Major Pham Tran B a n, aka Ba B a n, born circa 1925, NVN. He was assigned to the CDV before infiltrating [illegible] with Major Bui Thanh N g o n. Upon arrival in SVN, Ban was assigned as Deputy Chief, PDV. Ban spoke fluent Chinese and appeared in a VC propaganda film which reported the January 1969 release of three U. S. POWs in Tay Ninh Province.

3. Deputy: Major Bui Thanh Ngon, aka Ba N g o n, born circa 1928 in Phong Dinh Province, a regroupee. In NVN Ngon was assigned to an unidentified position in the CDV. He infiltrated SVN with Pham Tran Ban in early 1965 and was immediately assigned as Deputy PDV Chief. Ngon spoke fluent French.

4. Interpreter: (fnu) H o a; born circa 1942 in SVN; spoke with a Saigonese accent; and spoke fluent English.

B. Policy Section:

1. Chief: Major Tran Van L u c aka Nam L u c. (Field Comment: See [redacted] for extensive biographic data provided by Source [redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

2. Deputy: Unknown.

3. Staff Assistant: Junior Captain T r a n C h a u; born circa 1932, Phuoc Tuy Province.

4. Staff Assistant: Senior Lieutenant Thai Thanh P h o n g, aka Q u y e n; born circa 1934, Gia Dinh Province; served in a Viet Minh combat unit in the Eastern Nam Bo area; regrouped to NVN; attended the Hanoi University of Pedagogy while demobilized; worked as a NVN 3rd form teacher at the Nguyen Khuyen High School in Haiphong; recalled to the NVA in 1963; and [redacted] assigned to the PDV Policy Section in late 1967 upon arrival in SVN. Phong often interrogated U. S. POWs at subordinate Policy Section detention camps which were administered by Inter-Unit A (Lien Doi A). Phong spoke fluent French, English and Russian.

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1.3(a)(4)

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1.3(a)(4)

5. Staff Assistant for Research: Senior Captain (fnu) N g u; born circa 1926, Haiphong; was assigned upon arrival in SVN to the PDV Policy Section in 1968; and spoke fluent Chinese and fair Russian.

6. Staff Assistant: Senior Captain Vo D a u, aka Bay D a u; born circa 1930, Gia Dinh Province; regrouped to NVN; infiltrated SVN at an unknown date; and assigned to the PDV Policy Section in early 1968 from VC Division 9. His wife is a civilian nurse at an unidentified COSVN-level hospital. Dau was probably assigned as Chief of the Policy Section Inter-Unit C in 1969.

7. Staff Assistant: Senior Phi L o n g, aka Sau Phi L o n g; born circa 1930, Kien Hoa Province; regrouped to NVN; and assigned to the PDV Policy Section at an unknown date. He often had contact with the Policy Section Inter-Unit A Headquarters.

C. Propaganda Section:

1. Chief: Unknown.

2. Staff Assistant for Training and Operations: Junior Captain Duy H o a, aka Ba H o a, born in NVN. During the Viet Minh Resistance he was a squad leader at Dien Bien Phu. Hoa infiltrated SVN in 1965 and was assigned to the PDV Propaganda Section. Hoa was seen several times by Source Huynh Ngoc Nhuan at the Inter-Unit A Headquarters. Hoa conducted 3-day political indoctrination courses for POWs who were to be released.

3. Staff Assistant: Senior Captain (fnu) Bay T u i; born circa 1935 in either Tay Ninh or Long An Province. During the Viet Minh Resistance he was assigned to a combat unit in the Eastern Nam Bo area; regrouped to NVN; and attended a 3-year journalism course. Upon graduation he was promoted to senior Lieutenant and assigned to the CDV Propaganda Office, where he wrote articles for radio broadcast against ARVN troops in SVN. In early 1965 he was assigned to the PDV in SVN. Source Huynh Ngoc Nhuan observed Tui on several occasions interviewing/interrogating U. S. POWs in Inter-Unit A detention facilities. His wife, Hue M u i (a native of Hanoi), was a member of an SVNLA, Political Staff, Psywar Entertainment Group.

4. Staff Assistant: Junior Captain Dao Si T o, aka Tam T o, born circa 1925 in NVN. In December 1968 To conducted a political orientation course for Unit 23 personnel of the Policy Section Inter-Unit A. To occasionally contacted the Inter-Unit A Headquarters and had access to POWs detained there.

D. Enemy Situation Section:

1. Chief: Senior Captain (fnu) Hai C a, born circa 1930 in Dinh Tuong Province, where his wife and children resided. Ca was a member of the My Tho Company during the Viet Minh Resistance; regrouped to NVN; worked in the CDV; infiltrated SVN in early 1965; and was immediately assigned as Chief of the PDV Enemy Situation Section.

5 4 3 2 1

1.3(a)(4)

2. Staff Assistant: Second Lieutenant (fnu) T r i; born circa 1946 in Hanoi; and attended the Hanoi University of Pedagogy where he majored in foreign languages. In late 1964 he was drafted and assigned to the CDV. In early 1965 he infiltrated SVN and was assigned to the PDV Enemy Situation Section. Tri spoke fluent English and Russian and was in frequent contact with PDV Policy Section as an interpreter/interrogator. 1.3(a)(4)

E. In-Combat Proselyting Section:

1. Chief: Senior Captain (fnu) Tu S e n; born circa 1930 in Trang Bang District, Tay Ninh Province. He was a member of Battalion 302 in the Eastern Nam Bo area during the Viet Minh Resistance. Sen regrouped to NVN and infiltrated SVN at an unknown date. He was first assigned to VC Division 9 before being transferred to the PDV as Chief of the In-Combat Proselyting Section in late 1965.

F. Cadre Section:

1. Chief: Unknown.

2. Staff Assistant: Senior Lieutenant (fnu) A n; born circa 1934 in Long An Province; a regroupee.

G. POW Administrative Inter-Unit A, Policy Section for U. S./Foreign POWs:

1. Chief: Senior Captain Le Hong B i e n, aka Hai B i e n; born circa 1925, Binh Dinh Province; a regroupee; former Battalion Commander and later Deputy Chief of Staff of VC Regiment Q16. After being seriously wounded in the left arm, he was transferred to Inter-Unit A as Chief in June 1968, replacing Le H u e, who became his deputy.

2. Deputy: Junior Captain Le Hue, aka Ut H u e; born circa 1930 in Long Xuyen Province; a regroupee. His wife and children resided in Hanoi. Hue was Chief of Inter-Unit A between May and early June 1968. After the deactivation of Inter-Unit A in late March/early April 1970, he became Chief of an unidentified POW detention facility for U. S./ foreign military and civilian POWs..

3. Political Officer: Senior Captain Truong Huynh M a o, aka Tu T r u o n g; born circa 1930 in Kien Hoa Province; a regroupee. Prior to May 1968, Mao was Chief of the COSVN Military Proselyting Section, Administrative Staff. His wife, (fnu) Nam D i e u, was a member of the COSVN Military Proselyting Section.

4. Staff Assistant for Politics: Second Lieutenant (fnu) Ba Hai T h a n h; born circa 1935 in VC MR-5; a regroupee. His wife, a Northerner, lived in NVN.

5. Staff Assistant for Security Protection (Tro Ly Bao Ve): Senior Lieutenant Tran Dinh D i e p, born circa 1930, Ha Bac Province, where his wife and children lived.

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

6. Chief Medical Element: Senior Lieutenant/ Doctor (fnu) Muoi H i e n; born circa 1922, SVN; a regroupee.

7. Medical Technician, Medical Element: Aspirant (fnu) Minh C h a u; born circa 1935, SVN; a regroupee.

8. Female Nurse, Medical Element: Deputy Squad Leader (fnu) Thanh T a m, born circa 1948, Kien Hoa Province.

9. Female Nurse, Medical Element: Deputy Squad Leader (fnu) Hong T i e n, born circa 1946, Kien Hoa Province.

10. Female Nurse, Medical Element: Squad Leader (fnu) Nam C h a n g, born circa 1938, SVN.

11. Pharmaceutical Technician, Medical Element: Squad Leader Tran Hong L u a n, born circa 1946, SVN.

12. Adjutant, Rear Service Element: Squad Leader (fnu) V a n g, born circa 1935, NVN.

13. Clerk, Rear Service Element: Squad Leader (fnu) D o a n.

14. Supply Specialist: Squad Leader (fnu) Bay L a p, born circa 1935, Cu Chi District, Hau Nghia Province.

15. Finance Specialist: Squad Leader Vu S i e u, born circa 1946, Kien Hoa Province.

16. Cook: (fnu) Thi T a m; born circa 1951, Cu Chi District, Hau Nghia Province; wife of T r i e u, who was a Unit 3A food purchaser.

17. Cook: (fnu) Thi Tu T r u y e n, born circa 1940, Long An Province.

18. Chief, Security Guard/Transport Element: Platoon Leader (fnu) T r o n g.

19. Member, Security Guard/Transport Element: (fnu) Ho C o n g, born circa 1940, SVN.

20. Member, Security Guard/Transport Element: (fnu) Thanh C o n g, born circa 1938, SVN.

21. Member, Security Guard/Transport Element: (fnu) T h i e u, born circa 1945, SVN.

22. Member, Security Guard/Transport Element: (fnu) T y; born circa 1945, Cambodia; reassigned to VC Division 9 in March/April 1970.

23. Member, Security Guard/Transport Element: Tran Van L o i, aka C a n g; born circa 1923, Ca Mua Province; reassigned to VC Division 9 in March/ April 1970.

24. Chief, Food Production Element: Squad Leader (fnu) L u a n, born circa 1945, Nghe An Province.

5 4 3 2 1

1.3(a)(4)

5 4 3 2 1

1.3(e)(4)

25. Member, Food Production Element: Dinh Van C a o; born circa 1935, SVN; a reclassified ARVN POW.

H. POW Detention/Escort Unit 23A, Inter-Unit A, for ARVN POWs:

1. Chief: Senior Lieutenant Vo Van T h a n g, aka Nam T h a n g; born circa 1932, Kien Hoa Province; a regroupee. Thang was with an Eastern Nam Bo unit during the Viet Minh. Prior to 20 May 1968, Thang was the Political Officer of POW detention Unit 21, aka Unit 2A. Afterwards, he became Chief of Unit 23A, replacing Deputy Company Commander Nguyen Cong T r u o n g, aka Sam T r u o n g, who became Deputy Chief of Inter-Unit B, Unit 1B.

2. Deputy: Aspirant Nguyen Van T y, aka Tu T y; born circa 1935, Can Tho; a regroupee. During the Viet Minh he served with the Cai Rang (now called Chau Thanh) District Local Force Unit, Phong Dinh Province. Prior to July 1968, he was Deputy Chief of Unit 3A, Inter-Unit A. His wife and one child lived in Ha Dong Province. Ty replaced Company Commander Tran Toc C h i e n, who was killed in a B-52 air strike on 27 June 1968.

3. Political Officer: Senior Lieutenant Nguyen Xuan S u, aka Hai S'u; born circa 1928, Ha Dong Province, where his wife and children resided. During the Viet Minh he served with a Main Force unit in NVN. After 1954 he became an instructor at the Son Tay Artillery School No. 400. He infiltrated SVN in January 1968 and became Unit 23A Political Officer in April 1968, being reassigned from the SVNLA Replacement Company C620.

4. Deputy Political Officer: Deputy Company Commander Ly Q u a n g; born circa 1933, Vinh Long Province, where his wife resided. He joined the VC in 1960.

5. Staff Assistant for Security Protection (Tro Ly Bao Ve): Platoon Leader Le M a i, aka M a o.

6. Chief, POW Guard Squad (Doi Ve Binh): Platoon Leader Pham Van M a y; born circa 1940, Cu Chi District, Hau Nghia Province; formerly assigned to Unit 21, aka 2A, Inter-Unit A. In March/April 1970 he was reassigned to Unit 2A.

7. Deputy Chief, POW Guard Squad: Deputy Platoon Leader Vu S a o, aka Nam T r u c, born circa 1937, Kien Giang Province. In April 1970 he was reassigned to Unit 4A, Inter-Unit A.

8. Member, POW Guard Squad: Squad Leader Huynh Van N o; born circa 1946, Long An Province; reassigned to Unit 3A, Inter-Unit A in April 1970.

9. Member, POW Guard Squad: Deputy Squad Leader Tran Van A n; born circa 1946, NVN; reassigned to Unit 3A in April 1970.

10. Member, POW Guard Squad: Deputy Squad Leader Nguyen V u o n g; born circa 1948, NVN; medically evacuated to NVN post-March 1970.

1.3(e)(4)

NND 927660-87

1.3(a)(4)

11. Member, POW Guard Squad: Le Van L i e m; born circa 1946, Cambodia; a reclassified ARVN POW in February 1970.

12. Member, POW Guard Squad: Deputy Squad Leader Tran Van R i, born circa 1937, Kien Hoa Province.

13. Member, POW Guard Squad: Deputy Squad Leader Truong Minh N g h i a; born circa 1946, Kien Hoa Province; reassigned to Unit 3A in March 1970.

14. Member, POW Guard Squad: Deputy Squad Leader Nguyen Van L o i; born circa 1948, Cu Chi District, Hau Nghia Province; reassigned to Unit 3A in March 1970.

15. Member, POW Guard Squad: Deputy Squad Leader Tran Van L a m; born circa 1948, NVN; reassigned to Unit 3A in April 1970.

16. Member, POW Guard Squad: Deputy Platoon Leader L i e m, killed in a B-52 strike on 27 June 1968.

17. Member, POW Guard Squad; Platoon Leader K h o a, killed in a B-52 strike on 27 June 1968.

18. Chief, Adjutant Cell: Deputy Platoon Leader Le Anh H u e; born circa 1946, Ca Mau Province; replaced Source Huynh Ngoc Nhuan as Adjutant in June 1969.

19. Food Purchaser, Adjutant Cell: Squad Leader Nguyen Van L o c, born circa 1932, Long An Province.

20. Chief Cook, Adjutant Cell: Deputy Squad Leader Nguyen Minh D a o, born circa 1942, NVN.

21. Cook, Adjutant Cell: Source Huynh Ngoc Nhuan, after July 1969.

22. Chief, Nurse Cell: Squad Leader Le Xuan N h a; born circa 1944, NVN; reassigned to Unit 3A in April 1970.

23. Nurse, Nurse Cell: Deputy Squad Leader Vu Ngoc T h u y, born circa 1946, Ninh Binh Province.

24. Chief, Food Production Cell: Squad Leader Duong Van L a n g; born circa 1937, NVN; medically evacuated to NVN post-April 1970.

25. Member, Food Production Cell; Dinh Van S u a; born circa 1946, SVN; a reclassified ARVN POW.

26. Member, Food Production Cell: Nguyen Van C a m; born circa 1943, SVN; a reclassified ARVN POW.

I. Detention Unit 2A, Inter-Unit A, for U.S./Foreign POWs:

1. Chief: Senior Lieutenant (fnu) H u y; born circa 1930, SVN; a regroupee. Huy was a graduate and lecturer at Hanoi University and spoke fluent English.

2. Political Officer: (fnu) L a m; born circa 1930, SVN; replaced Vo Van T h a n g on 20 May 1968, who became Chief of Unit 2A, Inter-Unit A.

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1.3(e)(4)

5 4 3 2 1

1.3(e)(4)

3. Adjutant: Squad Leader, (fnu) O n, born circa 1943, NVN.

4. Chief, Food Production Cell: Squad Leader (fnu) H u a, born circa 1940, NVN.

5. Member, Food Production Cell: (fnu) L o n g, born circa 1948, SVN.

6. Member, Transport Element: Ly D a n h, born circa 1935, Kien Hoa Province.

7. Member, POW Guard Squad: Platoon Leader Pham Van May (see subparagraph H(6) above).

J. POW Detention Unit 1A, Inter-Unit A, for U.S./Foreign POWs:

1. Chief: Junior Captain (fnu) Ba M a n h, born circa 1930, Ca Mau Province. His wife and one 16-year-old daughter lived with him at the Unit 1A base, where they worked as tailors.

2. Member, POW Guard Squad: Deputy Squad Leader (fnu) C h a n h, born circa 1943, Cu Chi District, Hau Nghia Province.

3. Member, Food Production Cell: Tran Hong C h u n g; born circa 1942, SVN; a Vietnamese of Chinese descent and a reclassified ARVN POW.

K. POW Detention Unit 3A, Inter-Unit A, for U.S./Foreign POWs:

1. Chief: Senior Lieutenant (fnu) T u n g; born circa 1932, Central Vietnam; a regroupee.

2. Deputy: (fnu) Ut T r u o c; born circa 1930, Central Vietnam; a regroupee.

3. Member, Food Production Cell: (fnu) Ngoc A n h; born circa 1930, Central Vietnam; a reclassified ARVN POW.

4. Member, Food Production Cell: (fnu) S a; born circa 1939, Bien Hoa Province; a reclassified ARVN POW.

5. Member, Food Production Cell: (fnu) H u e; born circa 1940, Central Vietnam; a reclassified ARVN POW.

6. Food Purchaser, Adjutant Cell: Squad Leader (fnu) Trieu; born circa 1937, Long An Province; husband of Inter-Unit A cook Thi Tam.

7. Adjutant Cell: Squad Leader (fnu) T h a c h, born circa 1945, Kien Hoa Province.

8. Political Officer: Senior Lieutenant (fnu) Nam Tu B i n h; born circa 1930, SVN; a regroupee; his wife, Unit 3A nurse Muoi D u o n g, and her three children lived with him at Unit 3A.

9. Member, POW Guard Squad: Squad Leader Huynh Van No (see subparagraph H(8) above).

10. Member, POW Guard Squad: Deputy Squad Leader Tran Van An (see subparagraph H(9) above).

1.3(e)(4)

5 4 3 2 1

11. Member, POW Guard Squad: Deputy Squad Leader Nguyen Van Loi (see subparagraph H(14) above). 1.3(a)(4)

12. Member, POW Guard Squad: Deputy Leader Tran Van Lam (see subparagraph H(15) above).

13. Member, POW Guard Squad: Deputy Squad Leader Truong Minh Nghia (see subparagraph H(13) above).

14. Nurse, Nurse Cell: Squad Leader Le Xuan Nha (see subparagraph H(22) above).

L. POW Detention Unit 4A, Inter-Unit A, for U.S./Foreign Deserters:

1. Chief: Platoon Leader (fnu) Q u a n g; born circa 1935, SVN; replaced Senior Lieutenant (fnu) Ba G i a o, who was medically evacuated to NVN in February 1970.

2. Deputy Chief: Platoon Leader (fnu) Thang C o n g, aka T r u c, born circa 1938, SVN. His wife was one of the nurses at the Inter-Unit A Headquarters.

3. Nurse: (fnu) Thi T a m.

4. Member, POW Guard Squad: Deputy Platoon Leader Vu Sao (see subparagraph H(7) above).

M. Administrative Inter-Unit B, Policy Section, for ARVN POWs:

1. Chief: Senior Captain (fnu) D a u; born 1925, SVN; a regroupee.

2. Political Officer: Senior Captain (fnu) H a o, born circa 1925, NVN.

3. Deputy Chief: Junior Captain (fnu) K i e n, born circa 1930, NVN.

N. POW Detention Unit 1B, Inter-Unit B, for ARVN POWs:

1. Chief: Unknown.

2. Deputy Chief: Deputy Company Commander Nguyen Cong Truong, aka Sam Truong, former Deputy Chief of Inter-Unit A, Unit 23A, prior to 20 May 1968.

3. Other Personnel: Unknown.

O. POW Detention Unit 2B and 3B, Inter-Unit B, for ARVN POWs:

No information available on personalities.

P. POW Administrative Inter-Unit C, Policy Section, for U.S./Foreign POWs:

No information available on personalities.

2. Field Dissem: USMACV J-2, USARV G-2, 525 MI Gp, OSI, NAVFORV N-2, NISOV, CINCPAC, ARPAC, PACAF, PACFLT

5 4 3 2 1

1.3(a)(4)

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NND 927660-70

MONTHLY REPORT
NHA TRANG
APRIL 1971

****

GENERAL

1.1 CM/TM Desmond continued his home leave throughout the month. SZ-NHA covered his duties.

1.2 Enemy harassment in the immediate area consisted of one rocket impacting on Camp McDermott (adjacent to the air base) the last day of the month. There were no instances of friendly harassment affecting operations.

1.3 There was on instance of revenur lors (four hours fifty minutes) due to crew duty limitations. The aircraft involved was a C46 on the 23rd of the month.

2. HOSTEL

2.1 No major developments.

3. TRAFFIC

3.1 Station Traffic activities were down significantly this month as indicated in the below statistics.

4. STATISTICS

		APRIL	MARCH	1970
4.1	PASSENGER			
	Departing	2970	3614	3529
	Arriving	2603	3241	3261
	TOTAL	5573	6855	6790
4.2	CARGO - GROUND SERVICES (Lbs)			
	Departing	175,851	300,314	685,471
	Arriving	151,130	175,465	159,376
	TOTAL	326,981	475,779	844,847
4.3	COMPANY CARGO (Lbs)			
	Departing	7,775	11,386	4,736
	Arriving	5,358	8,395	4,511
	TOTAL	13,133	19,781	9,247
4.4	GRAND TOTAL (Lbs) (2+3)			
	Arriving	183,626	311,700	690,207
	Arriving	256,488	183,860	162,887
	TOTAL	440,114	495,560	853,094

5. CUSTOMER

5.1 Customer relations remain good to excellent.

6. OPERATIONS

6.1 No major problems.

6.2 Flight frequency (See attached)

7. ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE COMPARAISON	Apr.	Mar.	1970
7.1 Arrival	406	451	480
Departure	405	451	479
ECH	148	151	193
7.2 Delays - perentage on time	97%	96%	

8. SECURITY

8.1 No major problems.

9. PERSONNEL

9.1 See attached.

10. FISCAL

10.1 No majorproblems.

11. LEGAL

11.1 No major problems.

12. TECHNICAL SERVICES

12.1 Activity	Apr.	Mar.	1970
1. Transient overnight	275	300	287
2. Overnight services	148	151	193
3. Engine changes	2	1	0
4. Propeller changes	0	0	0
5. No. I services	0	1	0
6. No. II services	0	0	0
7. Delays Maint/Mech.	3	3	5
8. Intermediate services	0	0	0
9. ACF	2	3	4
10. Outline recoveries	3	0	2
11. Accident report (A/C)	0	0	1
12. Accident report (Pnl)	0	0	0

R.B. MACFARLANE
A/SZ-MHA

MEMORANDUM

TO : BM SGN

DATE: 03 April 1971

FROM : SZ DAD

REF. No. SZDAD/71/037

SUBJECT : DANANG Station Monthly Report for March 1971

GENERAL

Two major incidents of hostile activity affecting the Danang Air Base occurred during the month of March. On the morning of 4 March ten 122mm rockets impacted in widely dispersed areas causing some damage to five structures but no serious casualties.

There were three separate rocket attacks directed at the air base and surrounding area during the morning of 29 March. The first of these attacks commenced at 01:57 local time and resulted in one 122mm rocket impacting within the station complex. The USAID warehouse absorbed most of the concussion from this explosion but shrapnel damage was widely dispersed. Two VTBs were hit, one of which, after temporary repairs, was ferried to SGN due to extensive skin damage. The RMD offices, transmitter room and the nose hangar also sustained moderate shrapnel damage.

All indicators of station workload reflect a significant increase in operations as compared to the previous few months.

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

Relations with Embassy and CORDS Air Operations were unusually good throughout March. Aircraft availability was very high since few problems were encountered as a result of inclement weather or crew scheduling. A number of maintenance difficulties were experienced but the customers were very impressed by the speed in which they were corrected.

FACILITIES

USAF Base Civil Engineering has not to date commenced work on resurfacing the 20/8 touchdown pads or the construction of a gate across the flight line access road. A lack of certain materials has been given as the reason for the delay.

FISCAL

It is expected that payment for the new SZ residence will be made sometime in April.

[redacted] payroll for the month totaled: 1,078,643$VN

Petty cash expenditures totaled: 68,970$VN

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for March 1971 (Cont'd)

OPERATIONS

Revenue flight time increased 143+05 hours as compared to February. Special flights on the part of AID and increased PC-6 and 204B utilization by the Embassy combined with very few cancellations were the main contributing factors for this increase. June 1970 was the last month in which greater flight time has been reported.

The following is a breakdown of flight time generated by this station in March:

VN-91/AID	734+22
VN-91/Embassy	230+17
VN-91/RDC	1+41
Non-Revenue	1+11
Total	967+31

Revenue losses for the month were as follows:

Maintenance	1+00
Weather	6+50
Other	12+00 *
Total	19+50

* Damage repair VNB 9577Z and 204B 1303X.

Two of the seven GTD drivers were on Sick Leave the entire month. The shortage of drivers caused some delays in normal transportation which primarily effected flight crews desiring expedited transport from the air base to the hostel upon the completion of flying. Problems are also being experienced in keeping both micro-busses in reasonable operating condition since no major repairs are being accomplished pending approval of a request to survey these vehicles.

HOSTEL

The hostel occupancy rate again declined slightly. Of 563 beds available, 415 were utilized (70.37%).

Certificates of non-availability for a total of 37 nights were issued to TCS ground personnel.

COMMUNICATIONS

The performance of the Motorola UHF/VHF system was noticeably better than the previous month, but for no apparent reason. The primary back-up VHF was in Saigon undergoing repairs most of March so it was indeed fortunate no serious problems were experienced.

Incoming and outgoing messages totaled 1213 and 809 respectively.

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for March (Cont'd)

TRAFFIC

Passenger and cargo statistics for the month of March are as follows:

	PAX IN	PAX OUT	CARGO IN	CARGO OUT
VN-91/AID	2,872	2,908	310,324	36,232
VN-91/Embassy	433	717	1,700	8,723
AAM	111	117	9,605.8	16,674.9
Total	3,416	3,742	321,629.8	61,629.9

SECURITY

No significant problems in this area were encountered.

PERSONNEL

One automotive mechanic was daily-hired for a period 17 days to provide adequate coverage in PRMD.

The personnel breakdown for Danang Station at the close of business, 31 March 1971, was as follows:

[redacted]				
Permanent	3	15	12	63
Pre-Process	0	0	0	1
Temporary	0	0	0	0
Daily-hire	0	0	0	0
TOTAL (94)	3	15	12	64

TECHNICAL SERVICES

RMD handled a total of 549 arriving and departing flights as compared to 450 in February. A total of four number 1 services (one PC-6 and three 204B) and three number 2 services (204B) were performed. One engine change was required (PC-6) and five aircraft were grounded for parts (2-VIB, 1-PC6, 1-DHC4, and 1-204B).

RGMD expended a total of 552 manhours of which 220 were attributable to hostel maintenance. Large scale projects included repainting the interior of the main hostel building, and the installation of incandescent iodine lamps and removal of the existing flourescent lamps in the nose hangar.

USAF Base Supply has been contacted regarding the establishment of a local procedure for the issuance of parts for transiting bailed C123K and C7A aircraft. Progress in this endeavor is pending receipt of complete copies of the concerned contract modifications.

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for March (Cont'd)

Original Signed by
WINSTON C. CAMBRE
Winston C. Cambre

cc: file

MEMORANDUM

TO : BM SGN

DATE: 03 May 1971

FROM : SZ DAD

REF. No. SZDAD/71/048

SUBJECT : DANANG Station Monthly Report for April 1971

GENERAL

Significant incidents of hostile activity in the Danang area included rocket attacks during the nights of 8 and 26 April. In the former five 122mm rockets impacted in the city resulting in some civilian fatalities. One rocket in the attack of 26 April impacted in a Navy POL area, setting off one JP-4 storage tank. It took more than 12 hours to control the resulting fire.

Effective 25 April the city of Danang was placed on-limits for U.S. military personnel. The city had been off-limits since around 1964.

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

The Embassy Air Operations Officer, Mr. O.B. Harnage, was transferred to Saigon as the Deputy Chief of Air. Continuing excellent relations with this customer can be expected from his replacement.

FACILITIES

No significant changes occurred in this area during the month. No action has been forthcoming from USAF Civil Engineering regarding the installation of a gate across the flight line access road or resurfacing of the 20/8 touchdown pads.

FISCAL

The French operated electric company, S.I.P.E.A., increased the rate for electricity from 14 to 15 piastres per kilowatt hour effective 1 March 1971.

[redacted] payroll for the month totaled: 983,983$VN

Petty cash expenditures totaled: 28,222$VN

OPERATIONS

Revenue flight time declined 41+08 hours as compared to the previous month. On three occasions deviations to established flight time standards were made to meet Embassy emergency requirements.

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for April 1971 (Cont'd)

The following is a breakdown of flight time generated by this station in April:

VN-91/AID	728+47
VN-91/Embassy	196+25
Non-Revenue	6+27
Total	931+39

Revenue losses for the month were as follows:

Maintenance	3+30
Weather	2+30
Customer Cancellations	4+10
Crew Rest	0+50
Total	11+00

HOSTEL

The hostel occupancy rate increased as compared to March. Of 525 beds available, 438 were utilised (83.43%).

Certificates of non-availability for a total of 7 nights were issued to TCS ground personnel.

COMMUNICATIONS

An automatic on-off switch was installed for the Motorola UHF/VHF system. This action was apparently taken to preclude possible interference problems when the set was left on all the time.

Incoming and outgoing messages totaled 1243 and 712 respectively.

TRAFFIC

No action has been taken by USAID to repair the damage to the Ground Services warehouse resulting from a rocket attack on 29 March.

Passenger and cargo statistics for the month of April are as follows:

	PAX IN	PAX OUT	CARGO IN	CARGO OUT
VN-9101/AID	2,473	2,749	192,781	48,719
VN-9102/Embassy	534	643	550	11,073
0069	-	-	-	-
AAM	94	88	16,183.9	21,202.5
Total	3,101	3,480	209,514.9	80,994.5

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for April 1971 (Cont'd)

SECURITY

Two ground personnel were the victims of armed robbery while enroute to the air base. The incidents were reported to local police officials who advised an increase in the number of patrols in the general area would be instituted.

PERSONNEL

The personnel breakdown for Danang Station at the close of business, 30 April 1971, was as follows:

	[redacted]			
Permanent	3	15	12	64
Pre-Process	0	0	0	0
Temporary	0	0	0	0
Daily-hire	0	0	0	0
TOTAL (94)	3	15	12	64

TECHNICAL SERVICES

RMD handled a total of 495 arriving and departing flights as compared to 549 in March. A total of four number 1 services (one FC-6 and three 204B) and one number 2 service (204B) were performed. No engine changes were required and two aircraft were grounded for parts (1-VIB and 1-204B).

EGMD expended a total of 584 manhours of which 276 were consumed in hostel upkeep. A new leaching well was constructed at the hostel to remedy an overflowing septic vault problem. PEMD modified an unusable potable water trailer into a fuel tank for the hostel generator. It is no longer necessary to order drum fuel for this unit.

Routine access to the MSD warehouse was eliminated in order to reduce a moderate pilferage problem. It was therefore necessary to relocate EGMD storage and the RMD lockers to other areas.

Original Signed by
WINSTON C. CAMBRE
Winston C. Cambre

cc: file

MEMORANDUM

TO : DFD/TPE via BM/SGN

DATE : 12 May 1971

FROM : CP/SVN

REF. No. CP-V-71-229

SUBJECT : Monthly Report - April.

The policy of two separate and equal flying divisions at Saigon came to an end with the decision that Capt Heinl would be a line pilot rather than Acting CP/RW. Since the CP/RW and SIP/RW are TCS for an indefinite period, this leaves a gap in the continuity and control of the RW program. The change of scheduling from Capt Heinl to the Scheduling Section has thus far not created any great problems as the program was in excellent condition at the time Capt Heinl dropped the handling of it. Time will tell if the situation will change as things progress. With the absence or imminent departure of all the RW supervisory personnel, one annot help but wonder who is to take over the operational supervision of the program. Capt Johnson has indicated that as Acting SIP/RW his duties are limited by the AAM/FEPA contract to action directly related to flight instruction.

The manning situation continued to cause morale and other problems, particularly in the non-existent C47 program. Things have started to settle down to a degree, but have a long way to go to achieve stability. Scheduling continued to present its share of difficultities related to compliance with the various time limitations. The present "no waiver" policy is generally permitting us to begin getting well from our prior situation where we were slipping backward with each day of borderline activity. The exception is in the C46. The extra flying requested by the customer and use of the fifth "uncontracted" aircraft has greatly cut into our available time used to try and get the crews time-off and meet all the limitation ceilings which exist. An example of the schedule juggling which goes on, it is often necessary for Capt A to fly to NHA or DAD with Capt B deadheading. Capt B then flys back to SGN with Capt A as a deadhead. This meets the flight time limits (usually compliance with the "30 in 7" or "100 in 30") but realistically does nothing but cost the company for a round-trip deadhead. There is certainly no added safety factor established, as few would argue that this type of deadheading was more restful than flying. (Perhaps even the contract). The limitations have, on a number of occassions, caused considerable alienation of the customer. This is particularly true of those in the field who are not informed that it is their own management who has requested or supported the restrictions. They still feel we should provide the quality of service that was standard several years ago and not plague them with administrative limitations.

Capt Herrington was reinstated as a life VTB Capt after six weeks LWOP for his accident and for permitting his medical certification to lapse. His reinstatement was of considerable help in maintaining the VTB schedule within the required limits and permitting crews reasonable time off to get away from Saigon.

It is unfortunate that all the programs cannot afford a similar situation since as local conditions continue to worsen, with increasing harassment and petty stubling blocks constantly generated. Even the military has experienced an increase

..../....

Cont'd.....

of armed robbery and gunshot wounds in Saigon. Mr Grundy was delayed in his departure as a result of an Immigration error which is rather a typical problem for our employees. The burden of corrective action was thrown on him and the company as the local authorities refused to acknowledge there could have been any fault on their part. Only with the assistance of the airlines, customers and senior company representatives did he manage to depart 8 hours later. (Needless to say all this assistange is not available to run-of-the mill employees who would have been delayed from Saturday until at least Monday). Such harrassments make it so necessary for personnel to get away from Vietnam as often as possible for real relaxation. (Even that time-off spent in country does little toward decreasing the local "ulcer juice" situation.)

Captains Collard and Johnson were awarded positions in Udorn but at present have not had word as to when they might expect to be transferred. The bids for vacancies published in the 71-20 through 71-32 notices were announced at the end of the month, almost two weeks after the 71-20 Bid closed. There were not too many radical surprises although a couple of awards went to people who were not really sure then wanted to make the change.

The latest form of local harassment is from the customs people in refusing to let anything into the country which they consider not acceptable. This is not based on what, how much or who, but only on the whim of the individual inspector at the moment. (It effects VN, TCN, US etc. - Only VIPs and Diplomatic Passport holders are exempt.) One person going through can bring in unlimited amounts of something and the next one with small amounts of the same item have it confiscated. To quote some sage thinker, "There is no reason for it, it is just their policy". Unfortunately there are no guide lines and no assistance or support available to our personnel when this sort of thing comes about. The individual can try to argue but usually ends up paying a bribe or losing the articles. Everyone intending to visit Vietnam would be well advised to bring only what is actually required and thus preclude confrontations with the customs authorities.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
F. M. TIDWELL
MFD SGN
F.M. Tidwell

cc: BM/SGN
File

MEMORANDUM

TO : BM SGN

DATE: 03 June 1971

FROM : SZ DAD

REF. No. SZDAD/71/057

SUBJECT : DANANG Station Monthly Report for May 1971

GENERAL

Several rocket attacks were directed against the Danang City and air base during May, but no impacts within company facilities resulted. The largest of these attacks occurred in the early morning of 30 May. 14 rockets were involved and 12 fatalities in the downtown area were reported.

Discussions with the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing Plans office indicate that nearly all U.S. Military facilities on the east side of the air base north of the F-4 areas will be turned over to the Vietnamese Air Force. It was allowed that the VNAF may make renewed attempts by September to obtain the company facility for their use. Many USAF units have already been relocated to the west side of the air base, utilizing facilities vacated by the 1st Marine Air Wing.

CUSTOMER RELATIONS

On two occasions both customers had 204B schedules for the same day which resulted in the cancellation of the AID requirement since only one crew was available due to crew rest. Embassy took the position that the problem was created by AID flying on the previous day. In one instance 6 hours of revenue loss was sustained but a revenue loss was avoided on the other by AID rescheduling the requirement to the following day.

LEGAL

A renewal notice on lease contract 66-45 was sent by registered mail to the landlord's agent on 18 May. It was returned unsigned with a letter indicating that continued use of the property would be contingent on receiving a substantial rent increase not provided for in the existing contract. Legal counsel in Saigon will be contacted to confirm our legal position on this matter.

FACILITIES

The USAF Civil Engineering Squadron was relocated to the west side of the air base so no firm status on the access road gate or the 204B touch-down pad resurfacing projects could be obtained.

Preliminary investigations are being made to determine the possibility and feasibility of obtaining the vacated Special Forces quarters building adjacent to the company compound for use as a crew hostel.

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for May (Cont'd)

FISCAL

It is anticipated that the lease payment for contracts 67-59A/B will be made by 10 June. 600,000$VN is involved and NFA/SGN is in the process of ascertaining whether or not this payment can be made at the parallel exchange rate.

[redacted] payroll for the month totaled: 950,871$VN

Petty cash expenditures totaled: 48,460$VN

OPERATIONS

Revenue flight time declined 103+03 hours as compared to the previous month. Revenue losses increased substantially as a result of poor weather and compliance with flight time and crew rest standards. Efforts at the Danang level to minimize the impact of these standards are complicated by a lack of information concerning individual crew flight time over the previous 7 and 30 days and conflicting interpretations of recently announced revised standards regarding daily flight and crew rest requirements.

The following is a breakdown of flight time generated by this station in May:

VN-91/AID	672+15
VN-91/Embassy	149+54
Non-revenue	3+21
TOTAL	825+30

Revenue losses for the month were as follows:

Weather	16+50
Maintenance	2+30
Crew Rest	13+20
TOTAL	32+40

A requirement was levied to provide company transportation between the hostel and the MACV Club (dining facility and movie) to alleviate increasing concern on the part of flight crews for their personal safety. Two hours of driver overtime is necessary on a daily basis to support this requirement.

HOSTEL

The hostel occupancy rate decreased significantly in May due to a change in the method of computing the rate. Previously, if a Captain occupied a double room, and the vacant bed was not utilized, that bed was not considered available. From instructions received from SMHC, all vacant

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for May (Cont'd)

beds are considered available, so the rate is necessarily lower. There were 651 beds available during the month of which 418 were utilized (64.2%).

Certificates of non-availability for a total of 9 nights were issued to TCS ground personnel.

COMMUNICATIONS

Incoming and outgoing messages totaled 750 and 483 respectively.

TRAFFIC

Repairs to the USAID warehouse, damaged by a rocket attack on 29 March, have not as yet commenced.

Passenger and cargo statistics for the month of May are as follows:

	PAX IN	PAX OUT	CARGO IN	CARGO OUT
VN-91/AID	2,371	2,736	295,087	54,413
VN-91/Embassy	506	589	600	6,321
AAM	108	97	8,830.8	13,602.9
TOTAL	2,985	3,422	304,517.8	74,336.9

SECURITY

The U.S. Consulate has written a letter to the Mayor of Danang requesting assistance in controlling the increasing criminal activity in the city. Apparently this letter was the result of several instances of assault and robbery reported to the consulate by U.S. and Third Country nationals and various contractors (including Air America).

PERSONNEL

Four station TCN personnel had to cancel their scheduled leaves since they were unable to obtain an exit/re-entry visa for Vietnam. It is understood that a re-entry visa will not be issued unless the individual has a work permit, which in turn will not be approved without a valid extension of stay. This situation is a recurring problem.

The personnel breakdown for Danang Station at the close of business 31 May 1971, was as follows:

[redacted]				
Permanent	3	11	15	63
Pre-Process	0	0	0	1
Temporary	0	0	0	0
Daily-Hire	0	0	0	0
TOTAL (93)	3	11	15	64

SUBJECT: DANANG Station Monthly Report for May (Cont'd)

TECHNICAL SERVICES

RMD handled a total of 469 arriving and departing flights as compared to 495 in April. A total of 4 number 1 services were performed on 204B aircraft. One engine change (C46) and one propeller change (PC6) were required and five aircraft were grounded for parts (2-C46, 2-VTB and 1-204B). One outstation recovery was necessary to temporarily repair a cracked engine fuel line on a VTB.

RGMD expended a total of 576 manhours, of which 43 were consumed in hostel upkeep.

Repairs on both the airbase and the hostel generators were required and the availability of spare parts for these units was found to be very discouraging. Each day these generators are out of service results in electricity costs of approximately $50.00 and $20.00 respectively.

Both micro-busses required substantial repairs during the month. An engine and transmission overhaul was necessary on one and the engine mounts on the other had to be welded back into place. A survey report was submitted on these vehicles on 5 December 1970 but the present status of it is unknown.

Increasing requests from other locations are being received for various equipment and supplies, supposedly to be obtained from "local sources". Personnel at this station are not in a very good position to reciprocate tangibly when it is possible to obtain some of these items. In addition, a large volume of requests will probably result in compromising the possibility of obtaining critical items, such as to support a local AGP.

Another undesirable side of effect of these efforts is that it has been necessary to accept a large volume of parts and supplies of little use value in order to obtain a few necessary items. The RSD warehouse is now nearly full of various materials and the sorting and crating for shipment of them requires a not insignificant amount of time and expense.

Original Signed by
WINSTON C. CAMBRE

Winston C. Cambre

cc: file

** SAIGON BASE FLIGHT TIME REPORT **

- MAY 1971 -

1. Contract 9101 -

A/C No	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
N67984	119+57	103+45	0+50	0+24
N67985	112+25	98+24	21+16	19+09
B928	116+20	95+18		
B910	111+30	95+18	4+47	3+53
B912	63+04	55+25	24+30	21+37
N539Y	149+36	128+19	2+35	2+03
N544Y	128+20	108+32	24+55	22+50
B851	151+47	124+52	3+05	2+31
N9518Z	60+29	52+19		
N6154U	100+23	85+02	2+29	1+51
N9956Z	115+36	100+42		
N7770B	58+31	51+04	2+17	1+57
N9577Z	118+35	103+24	1+13	0+56
N3574G	90+59	79+30		
N9664C	13+57	11+23	17+50	16+31
N91295	134+49	113+26		
N285L	111+55	97+00	1+30	1+01
N391R	45+30	36+58		
N394R	118+47	101+27		
N9444	42+27	36+16	1+20	1+02
N198X	142+03	122+02	0+28	0+18
N153L	113+24	98+27		
N12450	56+16	46+39	0+47	0+38
N748N	110+57	92+30		
N184L	126+35	111+55	2+35	2+10
N185X	69+17	62+28		
N192X	36+22	30+54		
N194X	82+27	68+20	2+44	2+20
N1303X	101+20	101+20	6+41	6+41
N1304X	82+53	82+53	4+00	4+00
N1305X	102+39	102+39	2+50	2+50
N1306X	114+21	114+21	0+50	0+50
N1307X	90+09	90+09	11+30	11+30
N8514P	156+01	156+01	1+10	1+10
Sub Total	3349+41	2959+02	142+12	128+42

Attachment "A"

2. Contract 9102 -

M9518Z	32+51	28+30
M6154B	23+52	20+50
M9956Z	1+17	1+07
M7770B	34+35	28+58
M9577Z	2+01	1+38
M3674G	23+15	20+24
M9664C	67+31	58+01
M9838Z	3+15	2+50
M285L	5+34	4+35
M391R	47+24	40+26
M394R	17+05	14+56
M9444	69+56	62+35
M198X	9+22	8+03
M153L	2+37	2+22
M12450	55+39	48+22
M748N	32+38	28+25
M184L	2+43	2+16
M185X	69+20	61+13
M192X	52+21	46+25
M194X	18+50	14+56
M1303X	7+45	7+45
M1304X	24+24	24+24
M1305X	10+56	10+56
M1306X	9+53	9+53
M1307X	21+41	21+41
Sub Total	646+45	571+41

3. Contract 9103 -

B928	4+34	3+59
B910	5+25	4+32
B912	23+22	19+45
M539X	9+24	7+41
B851	9+09	8+13
M7770B	0+57	0+39
M3674G	0+57	0+37
M285L	1+11	0+53
M391R	9+46	6+54
M394R	1+09	0+51
M153L	8+26	6+12
M12450	9+18	7+03
M748N	1+09	0+49
M184L	1+04	0+52
M192X	1+02	0+51
M194X	14+58	11+06
M1305X	23+34	23+34
B8514F	7+14	7+14
Sub Total	132+39	111+43

4. Contract 9104 -

N9518Z	6+37	5+28
Sub Total	6+37	5+28

Total Revenue Block Time	4135+42
" " Flight Time	3647+54
Total Non-Revenue Block Time	142+12
" " " Flight Time	128+42
GRAND TOTAL BLOCK TIME	4277+54
GRAND TOTAL FLIGHT TIME	3776+36

Flight Time by Type of Aircraft

C Type	Revenue		Non-Revenue	
	Block Time	Flight Time	Block Time	Flight Time
-46	556+37	476+26	51+23	45+33
3C4	448+16	377+37	30+35	27+24
IB	890+27	765+52	23+49	21+15
C6	148+32	1275+09	9+24	7+29
04B	752+50	752+50	27+01	27+01
TOTAL	4135+42	3647+54	142+12	128+42

Original Signed By
E. G. PARRISH
L.G. Parrish
SOM/SGH

Distribution:
- BM/SGH (6)
- File

BM/SGN

MEMORANDUM

TO : SCP-TPE via BM-SGN

DATE : 12 June 1971

FROM : CP-SVN

REF. No. CP-V-71-286

SUBJECT : Monthly Report (May 1971)

1. Crew Scheduling problems continued to plague the department throughout the month. There would be no purpose served to elaborate on the situation as it has been discussed and cussed at great length verbally and in writing. It just boils down to not being able to get six gallons out of a five gallon can. You either have to change the requirement or get another can. No amount of scheduling changes can correct the problem. When all the pilots have run out of time, the schedule can either be cancelled or someone grant a waiver.

2. FEPA continues to operate with a free hand and apparently full support and backing from the company. That they are immune from serious criticism becomes ever more evident with every situation. That they are completely supported by the general membership is seriously doubted as there is much evidence to the contrary. However, a few leaders have joined together and are completely dominating the actions and decisions of the whole pilot group in Saigon. They appear to be immune from any serious criticism by management without their own concurrence.

3. We now have five pilots on extended sick leave and their return is indefinite. The instances of becoming sick and grounded has increased with the necessity of cutting down on scheduled time off. Several have become ill in time to make the week-end and are well again by the first of the week. With the limitations placed on how much they are permitted to fly, this is a convenient way to have the week-ends off. When there were no such severe restrictions, it was very seldom that pilots were sick except when it was readily apparent that they should be in bed. The present system creates a situation where loyality and a desire to do the right thing result in the individual being penalized rather than rewarded.

4. On two different occasions R/W First Officers were going to be sent directly to SGN without ground school. If the school is to be held here, this is of no consequence whether they have G/S or not. If the requirement is to be met elsewhere it is almost a necessity that the school be held prior to coming to SGN. The present visa situation makes any other action impractical. After arrival we must plan on one or two months in country until a final multiple entry/exit visa is received.

5. The revision of the crew rest policy to permit 12 hours rest for a nine hour day provided some relief for the 204-B program working out of Danang. Other than that it was a step in the right direction but not nearly enough relief from the other restrictions of the Flight Time Standards policy.

.../...

FORM 5270300

6. The Chief Pilot/FW made two trips out of country during the month. One to VTE to attend the C46 Manual conference and another to TPE regarding the new contract and some of the scheduling problems with which we are confronted.

7. In summary, the month was frustrating but relatively uneventful as far as anything of a spectacular nature. No one was particularly sorry to see it past. On the other hand it could certainly have been worse. (Presumably).

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
F. M. TIDWELL
MFD-SGN
F.M. Tidwell

cc: BM-SGN
File

502-02-3 C060

Intelligence Information Report

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sect. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

[redacted]

REPORT NO. [redacted] 1.3(e)(4)

DATE DISTR. 14 June 1971

COUNTRY South Vietnam

DOI 1 March-2 December 1970

SUBJECT Organization and Activities of the Viet Cong Military and Prisoner of War Detention Camp T.15, Quang Ngai Province

ACQ Vietnam, Saigon [redacted]

SOURCE [redacted] 1.3(e)(4)

1.3(e)(4)

Summary. The VC T.15 Military and Prisoner of War Camp was established in spring 1965 in Quang Ngai Province. It moved several times and in autumn of 1968 was located at Sa Ngang, about 25km. west of Tra Bong District Town. Parts of the camp may have been moved since early December 1970. The camp was primarily a temporary detention facility for detainees or prisoners, prior to sending them on to

5 4 3 2 1 [redacted] 1.3(e)(4) [redacted] 5 4 3 2 1

Approved for Release
Date August 1993

(classification) (dissem controls)

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

NND 927660-13-2

1.3(a)(4)

North Vietnam; however, trials of some detainees were held in the camp by its military court, and detainees sentenced to short-term imprisonment remained at the camp and those sentenced to death were executed at the camp. There were two distinct detention areas, one for Viet Cong(VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) prisoners, and a small one for Army of Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and American prisoners. The security unit for the camp consisted of 60 armed men, who provided physical security for the camp and who controlled the detainees and prisoners who worked at the camp's food production sites from 5 to 12 km. distant from the camp area. The average number of detainees was about 200. The cases of detainees were processed while they were at the camp and trials were held by the camp's military court. The number of detainees at the camp increased during 1969 and 1970. The detainees were charged with such offenses as desertion, murder, anti-communist actions and other offenses. Camp detainees had to work in the camp food production details both prior to their trials and after sentencing (if they remained at the camp). Rice, manioc, corn, sweet potatoes and tea were grown at the food production sites. The camp supplemented its food production with purchased salt, seasonings and salted fish. At the end of November 1970, there were 3 ARVN prisoners and 8 American personnel detained at the camp. They probably were moved from the camp some time after early December 1970. End Summary.

1. The Viet Cong (VC) Military and Prisoner of War (POW) Detention Camp coded T.15 was established in the spring of 1965 in Quang Ngai Province, South Vietnam (SVN). Camp T.15 has been moved three times within the province since 1965, including the move to its present location Sa Ngang, in the autumn of 1968, a site close to Nui Ong Mountain and Nui Ong Stream, about 25 kilometers west of Tra Bong District Town, Quang Ngai Province (vicinity AS920850). The Sa Ngang area has heavy jungle-type foliage and provides natural cover for the camp. There are no other important VC installations in the immediate area, although there are isolated and scattered groups of Montagnards in the area. Physical separation and language differences are such that there are no security problems with these minorities.

2. Camp T.15 was under the direction and management of VC Colonel Nguyen Long B a, a lawyer and accredited military court presiding judge of VC Military Region 5, and Hoang Minh T a n, a political officer representing both Hanoi and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN) military/political superior echelons. Camp T.15 was originally established as a temporary detention area only, for VC and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) military personnel and for South Vietnamese and Allied POW's, prior to the removal of both categories of personnel to North Vietnam for proper detention, sentencing and carrying out of sentences. Over the years, however, this practice changed, and Camp T.15 took on many permanent type activities itself, including indefinite detention, trials for accused persons and the carrying out of sentences at the camp. Under the new system, Ba and Tan reported to the Hanoi

1.3(a)(4)

NLJ 02-766 - 33

Judiciary Department, the Military/Political Staffs of VC Military Region 5, and higher Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) echelons. 1.3(a)(4)

3. Camp T.15 was composed of two distinct detention areas separated by a distance of about 3 kilometers. One camp area was under the control of Nguyen Duy H o n g, a 55 year old political officer and native of Quang Binh Province, North Vietnam (NVN), and was known as Hong's camp or Hong's element. This camp housed and managed VC/NVA military prisoners. The second camp was under the control of (fnu) P h u o n g, a 45 year old political officer and native of SVN, and was known as Phuong's camp or Phuong's element. This camp housed and handled POW's. At the end of November 1970, there were about 120 detainees and 50 sentenced prisoners in Hong's camp and 3 ARVN and 8 American personnel under detention in Phuong's camp. these POWs were said to have been captured in VC Military Region 5 during operations prior to October 1970 and were to be moved to NVN in early spring of 1971. However, there was talk in Camp T.15 about Phuong's camp having been spotted by enemy aircraft and, although it had not been moved by 2 December 1970, it may have been moved since then. There was no talk concerning the probable exposure of Hong's camp and this camp is probably still located at Sa Ngang. Hong's camp consisted of six long wood-frame structures, surrounded by a double bamboo fence and an outer defense system of pointed punji sticks to prevent enemy penetration of the camp and the escape of prisoners. The security unit for this camp consisted of 60 armed men, who had the responsibility for physical protection of the camp and control of prisoners working at production sites from 5 to 12 kilometers away from the main compound. 1.3(a)(4) 1.3(a)(4)

4. The average number of detainees at Hong's camp was about 200. The VC/NVA unit responsible for bringing charges against an accused was also responsible for delivering the accused, with full documentation concerning each case, to Camp T.15 for judicial processing. The "temporary" detention period pending formal trial of an accused was set at six months for normal cases, but was not to exceed 15 months for even unusual cases requiring extensive investigation and administrative processing. When processing was completed, the accused was brought before the Camp T.15 military court which met only twice yearly. Colonel B a acted as the court presiding judge and Tan as court prosecutor; the accused did not have a defense representative working on his behalf. The sentence was entirely dependent on the prosecutor and judge. If the accused received an imprisonment sentence of up to five years, he might remain at Camp T.15 to complete his term of imprisonment; in cases where sentences to imprisonment were in excess of five years, the prisoner was held at Camp T.15 only until he could be transferred to NVN. Death sentences were carried out immediately within the confines of Camp T.15.

5. In 1970, the Camp T.15 military court held its first session from 5 to 25 May. A total of 44 cases were tried during this session: one defendant was sentenced to death

5 4 3 2 1 1.3(a)(4) 5 4 3 2 1

and was executed on 7 May 1970; 12 defendants received sentences of from 10 to 20 years imprisonment; and 22 defendants received prison sentences of from five to nine years. These 34 detainees were moved out of Camp T.15 in early June 1970, destined for NVN. Five defendants received prison sentences of two years and were to be held at Camp T.15 for production work; four detainees were found not guilty and released. The second 1970 session of the court was scheduled from 1 to 20 December. Another cadre who escaped from Camp T.15 after 20 December 1970 and arrived at Son Tinh ARVN Base prior to the end of February 1971, revealed that this session considered a total of about 50 cases, including several involving multiple defendants. This escapee, said two defendants were given death sentences; 40 received sentences of over 10 years imprisonment; 30 defendants were sentenced to 10 years; 15 received sentences of over two years; and five were declared innocent of charges brought against them

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

6. The number of detainees handled by Camp T.15 increased during the years 1969 and 1970, as the camp officials began taking on broader responsibilities. It is estimated that the military court has considered the cases of at least 500 defendants since 1965 and transferred about 200 of these to NVN. The proportions of NVA defendants have been: officers - 20 percent; non-commissioned officers - 40 percent; enlisted ranks - 40 percent. Of all defendants processed, about 85 percent were males and 15 percent females; 75 percent were northerners and 25 percent were southerners. Defendants have included about 52 percent charged with desertion; 15 percent charged with murder; 20 percent charged with anti-communism; 8 percent charged for allowing themselves to be taken prisoner; and 5 percent charged with minor offenses. The majority of defendants charged with desertion were northerners who escaped from their units, remained in remote areas and awaited an opportunity to rally to the Government of South Vietnam (GVN), but were captured by the VC/NVA. Camp T.15 authorities considered that an NVA deserter was very dangerous since the deserter knew he would receive the death penalty if recaptured. He would be willing to take enormous risks to escape, including killing security guards and guerrilla look-outs and, if he should reach ARVN units, the NVA deserter would be able to provide information to the enemy which could lead to the destruction of both VC and NVA units.) The majority of defendants charged with murder were officers and commanding VC cadres who committed illegal killings of innocent civilians and leaders of organizational elements without orders from superiors. Anti-communist defendants, both military and civilian cadres, were usually charged with speaking against communism, both verbally and in written letters, with listening to Free World radio news, with possession of anti-communist documents and with having in other ways indicated their interests to surrender at first opportunity. The other main category of defendants included those persons who had misused or embezzled military funds.

1.3(a)(4)

7. A Camp T.15 detainee, whether during his processing time or after sentencing, had to work on the food production details. On a daily schedule, detainees were awakened at 0530 hours, had breakfast at 0600, began work at the production sites at 0630, had lunch at 1130, returned to work

1.3(a)(4)

NND 927660-135

1.3(a)(4)

at 1300, had dinner at 1800, attended compulsory meetings at 1900 and were in bed by 2000 hours. Detainees were granted two one-day holidays during each year: Independence Day on 2 September and Army Day on 22 December. On these holidays, meat was provided, but otherwise the diet consisted of salted fish and food obtained from the production sites; an exception was the occasional wild boar meat which had been hunted and brought back to camp by the camp's armed security personnel. The detainees were assigned to working groups consisting of from 20 to 60 men and women, who worked under an assigned group chief and about 10 security guards. Normally, about 60 percent of the detainees reported in sick in an effort to evade the work detail, but whether this percentage was actually sick or not, only 30 percent of the detainees at the camp were allowed to be within the camp at any given time during working hours. Standard rations allowances per year for each detainee were 100 kilograms of rice and the equivalent of 3,000 piasters (about US$25.40) for additional food, exclusive of extra rations from the production sites, if available. Rice, corn, manioc, sweet potatoes and tea plants were grown at the production sites. The produce was assigned not only to Camp T.15, but also had to augment the supplies of the Rear Services of VC Military Region 5. Since 1965, Camp T.15 production sites have produced 140 tons of rice, 300 tons of manioc and 3.5 tons of corn. There were about 500 square meters devoted to growing tea plants. Of the 140 tons of rice produced, Camp T.15 consumed about 40 tons, and the remaining 100 tons was moved to other areas within the military region. Every three months Camp T.15 sent a five-man team to go shopping at Son Tinh market, which is about 50 kilometers from the camp. On each occasion this shopping detail spent about 100,000 piasters (about US$847.40) for salt, seasoning powders and salted fish. The trip took about 10 to 25 days, depending on ARVN operations in the area. Early in 1969, the shopping detail was attacked by aircraft and three of the five-man detail were killed.

8. Field Dissem: State USMACV USAID CORDS Dir/JUSPAO (Mr. Nickel only) 7th Air Force USARV NAVFORV 1021 FAS 525th MI Gp OSI CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC.

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1.3(a)(4)

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NND 927660-136

BM/SGN

MEMORANDUM

TO : SCP/TPE via BM/SGN

DATE : 30 June 1971

FROM : CP/SVN

REF. No. CP-V-71-311

SUBJECT : Monthly Report (June 1971).

After collecting notes and making up several pages of draft report, it all seemed to be a collection of deficiencies and problems which from past experience has indicated gets little attention and no action. Therefore it was decided to summarize and forget the details.

Thieft, armed robbery and robbery by the National Police were all items of note during the month. The armed robbery was in an employee's driveway at noontime. The police were making a two o'clock in the morning house search and after they departed a number of items were found missing. Needless to say, nothing has been done on there or any other illegal acts, nor is anyone so optomistic as to believe anything ever will be done or even attempted to provide assistance.

Many man-hours have and are being expended getting ration and identification cards and re-registration of vehicles. Many copies of numerous forms and trips to downtown Saigon are time consuming, hazardous and completely frustrating. Leave, STO and official travel is potentially going to be a problem until the new visas are granted. It turned out that the problem was not the VN, but rather USAID who was holding up the process. Some of the applications dated back to March and were sitting in USAID without action. It is reported that the situation has improved, but there has been no indication of the "improvement" as yet.

Scheduling was put on the carpet to comply with the restrictions of the Flight Time Standards and get the training accomplished to have the C47s operational by the first of July. Mr. Reed Chase, who arrived from Vientiane to replace Frank Smith, who is leaving the company, has done a fine job thus far. With the resignation of one the expericnced schedulers, as well as Gordon Smith, the number two scheduler, the section is operating short handed. In spite of this, there have been a minimum of serious problems and the schedule has required less (emergency) waivers that were needed in the past. Hopefully this will be a turning point in the overall shortcommings of the Scheduling Section, although as long as we are forced to comply with the limitations of the Flight Time Standards we will have problems in meeting the heavy loads the customer often has to impose to meet his requirements for student moves and other such surges in flying. It is the same old story of "feast and famine". If the time is spread out over the whole month it is easy to meet, but it just never comes out that way.

ASCP-A's visit to Saigon came at an appropriate time when the C47 "reactivation" was announced. His presence helped considerably in smoothing over some of the problems and "special considerations" required from FEPA to keep operating and still get the necessary C47 training out of the way. It is believed that he also gained a much better insight on some of the local problems and contentions

.../...

FORM 5270300

CONT'D...

which have to be constantly dealt with. It would be nice to think that more of the "headquarters" types might make similar visits. After all, there are so many more enjoyable places to make "official visits".

CPSVN paid a visit to Taipei to sit in on the VN100 contract negotiations in regards to crew manning. Many problems were resolved otherwise in conference with SCP and ASCP-A.

FEPA continues to be the main source of information regarding what is going on and planned for the company (e.g. message "Walton F71/290001 from FEPA President to FEPA SVN/UTH/VTE). While the example is not a critical item, it is demoralizing that FEPA can advise their members of what is happening and the company does not so advise its managers and supervisors. This puts the managers and supervisors in the field, continiously on the defensive. We have no official sanction with which to debate or accept their published word.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
F. M. TIDWELL
MED-SGN
F.M. Tidwell

cc: BM/SGN ✓
File

BM/SGN

MEMORANDUM

TO : SCP/TPE via BM/SGN

DATE : 30 July 1971

FROM : CP/SVN

REF. No. CP-V-71-366

SUBJECT : Monthly Report (July 1971).

All of the problems previously reported seem to continue with the exception of visas for the cockpit-crews. These have mostly been issued or at least the work-permits have been approved. Harassment by police, customs and immigration officials continue, with middle of the night house searches by police, reminiscent of Germany in the 30's, becomming more prevalent daily. Bribery and/or theft are to be expected as the least of the losses to be expected if personnel receive one of these visits. No help, support or symathy is expected or received from the US Embassy on these matters.

The National Police did come up with one new form of harassment this month. When B910 returned from TNN, it was late in the evening and the passengers, crew and cargo cleared immigration and customs without any difficulty. When everyone arrived at AAM Traffic the National Police delayed them over an hour and a half for no apparent reason. No further searches or checks were made. The only two assumptions which could be drawn, they were looking for a pay-off or it was just open harassment. The fact that two of the passengers were the wife and son of the Chief of USAID Air Operations made no apparent difference. Perhaps this may generate some relief from such foolishness in the future. At least we can be optimitic.

The C47's (3) were returned to service 1 July 71. So far we have met all schedules ~~by hook and crook~~. We have 3 of the assigned crews in service. The balance of manning is made up of pilots "borrowed" from other programs. Since the scheduling of the C47's have been very heavy during the month we have been denied training aircraft by the customer. CP/VTE and CP/BKK have been assisting us in our training. We have yet to begin initial training on two assigned PIC and one SIC. We have 2 SIC's requiring proficiency checks and we have one SIC yet to report in from BKK.

AVPFO made an overnight visit and conducted a short pilots meeting regarding the forthcomming furloughs. Due to his very brief stay he was unable to have a "question and answer" session, consequently all of those who could be affected by the cut-back are in rather low spirits pending the outcome of their immediate future and the overall impact on their position with the company.

FEPA's intelligence system continues to be the first to know of what is going on and they have seen fit to advise us as to what is programed for the company and the station. Their information has proven to be accurate more often than not, even though some of their information is in the form of rumor or "word-of-mouth".

Generally the month could best be summed up as one of apathy. The reduction in force, lack of information as to what was either going on or programed supressed any feelings of interest or loyality that might otherwise have been in evidence.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
F. M. TIDWELL
MFD-SGN

cc: BM/SGN ✓
File

F.M. Tidwell

FAA 2270300

[redacted] 1-1521 PAGE 1 OF 7 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

[redacted]

REPORT NO. CS-311/05834-71

COUNTRY: CAMBODIA

DATE DISTR. 6 AUGUST 1971

DOI: MARCH 1970 - 17 JUNE 1971

SUBJECT: VIET CONG/NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (VC/NVA) AND KHMER COMMUNIST (KC) GENERAL SITUATION IN TUK PHOS DISTRICT OF KOMPONG CHHNANG PROVINCE AREA, INCLUDING INFORMATION ON CAPTURED AMERICAN JOURNALIST

Photographs

ACQ: [redacted]

SOURCE: [redacted]

[redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date JUN 1978

ENCLOSURE 42-43-44 106-4H.

SUMMARY: THERE ARE THREE VC/NVA AND FIVE KC INSTALLATIONS IN THE VICINITY OF THE PHNOM DISTRICT OF KOMPONG CHHNANG PROVINCE. THE VC/NVA INSTALLATIONS ARE A MILITARY ENCAMPMENT, A HOSPITAL-AMMUNITION DEPOT AND A REST-AND-RECREATION CAMP. THE KC INSTALLATIONS ARE THE PROVINCE HEADQUARTERS, SECTOR HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS, A PRINTING PLANT AND A POW CAMP AT WHICH AN AMERICAN JOURNALIST IS IMPRISONED. THE VC/NVA, ALTHOUGH NUMERICALLY INFERIOR, APPEAR TO DOMINATE THE KC. THE VC/NVA AND KC STRICTLY CONTROL THE AREA ECONOMY AND ENJOY UNTROUBLED, ALBEIT SOMETIMES STRAINED, RELATIONS WITH THE LOCAL INHABITANTS. END SUMMARY.

1. VC/NVA COMPANY D44, 150 MEN UNDER AN UNKNOWN COMMANDER, IS CAMPED AROUND THE THREE HILLS COMPRISING PHNOM KRANG (VU 295562). ITS MISSION IS TO INTERDICT COMMUNICATION ROUTES AND HARASS FANK TROOPS. VC/NVA ARMS INCLUDE ONE 82MM MORTAR, TWO 60 MM MORTARS, SOME B40 ROCKET LAUNCHERS, TWO CHINESE 30 CALIBER MACHINE GUNS, AND AK47 ASSAULT RIFLES. THE TROOPS SLEEP IN HAMMOCKS IN THE FORESTED AREA AROUND THE PHNOM AND HAVE FOXHOLES FOR PROTECTION AGAINST ATTACK. THERE ARE THREE OR FOUR CLOSELY GUARDED CAVES IN THE PHNOM. [redacted] COMMENT: [redacted] ON ONE OCCASION HE SAW ABOUT 20 JERRYCANS BEING CARRIED FROM ONE OF THE CAVES. HE DOES NOT KNOW WHAT THEY CONTAINED.)

2. A VC/NVA AMMUNITION STORAGE AND HOSPITAL AREA COMMANDED BY AN UNKNOWN COMMANDER IS LOCATED AT PHUM CHREAV (VU 2315). INCLUDING PERMANENT PARTY PERSONNEL AND HOSPITAL PATIENTS, THE NUMBER OF VC/NVA IS APPROXIMATELY 1000. ARMS AT THE BASE INCLUDE 60 AND 82 MM MORTARS, A BAZOOKA, B40 ROCKET LAUNCHERS [illegible]

THE SITE OF A POW CAMP, WHERE SPECIALLY BROUGHT-IN KC GUARDS WATCHED APPROXIMATELY 400 MINOR PRISONERS. PROBABLY IN MARCH 1971, IN AN EVENT MARKED BY GREAT FESTIVITY AND ATTENDED BY LOCAL

[redacted]

VILLAGERS, THE PONS WERE RELEASED AND DRIVEN TO THE VICINITY OF A FANK OUTPOST. [redacted] COMMENT: [redacted] WAS NOT VERY FAMILIAR WITH THIS INSTALLATION BECAUSE OF LIMITED ACCESS. FANK G-2 HAS NOT ATTEMPTED TO VERIFY THE PRISONER RELEASE IN ORDER TO CHECK [redacted] RELIABILITY.)

3. A FORESTED AREA IMMEDIATELY SOUTH OF PHUM AM LEANG (VU 2894), LOCATED IN KOMPONG SPEU PROVINCE WITHIN A KILOMETER OF THE KOMPONG CHHNANG PROVINCE LINE, IS THE SITE OF A VC/KVA REST-AND-RECREATION AREA WHICH ACCOMMODATES APPROXIMATELY 300 SOLDIERS AT A TIME. IT IS INFORMALLY SET UP BECAUSE OF ITS NON-STRATEGIC VALUE.

4. THE KC KOMPONG CHHNANG PROVINCE HEADQUARTERS IS LOCATED IN A COTTAGE COMPLEX SITUATED ABOUT 500-600 METERS NORTH OF A LINE DRAWN BETWEEN THE TWO SECTIONS OF TANG TALAT (VU 312257), WHICH IS LAID OUT ON AN EAST-WEST AXIS. EACH SECTION OF THE VILLAGE, SEPARATED FROM THE OTHER BY 60-70 METERS, CONSISTS OF TEN HOUSES. A PATH AND A STREAM (STUNG SRE BAK) PASS BETWEEN THE TWO SECTIONS. THE COTTAGE COMPLEX IS LAID OUT IN A ROUGHLY NORTH-SOUTH RECTANGLE, WITH FOUR COTTAGES LAID OUT IN A DIAMOND PATTERN IN THE CENTER.

5. THE SOUTHERNMOST COTTAGE IS THE HOME AND OFFICE OF N O N SUON, THE KC CHIEF OF KOMPONG CHHNANG PROVINCE. NON SUON IS AGED AROUND 50, IS TALL BY CAMBODIAN STANDARDS AND SLENDER, HAS GRAYING HAIR AND A VERY DARK COMPLEXION, AND IS SOFT SPOKEN. [redacted] COMMENT: [redacted] NON SUON WAS A MEMBER OF THE KHMER VIET MINH, AN ORGANIZATION OF CAMBODIANS WORKING WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

[redacted]

CAMBODIA VIA POCHENTONG AIRPORT, IMMEDIATELY BEGINNING TO FOMENT REVOLUTION AGAINST THE NEW GOVERNMENT. IN 1956-57 HE DROPPED HIS MILITARY STANCE TO BECOME EDITOR OF THE ANTI-S I H A N O U K, COMMUNIST-FINANCED PHNOM PENH NEWSPAPER

[redacted]

RELEASED AT L O K MAL'S REQUEST IN 1970. HE LEFT PHNOM PENH TO BECOME ONE OF THE CHIEFS OF THE KHMER COMMUNIST PARTY. AS SUCH, HE ALSO WEARS THE HATS OF UNDERSECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PARTY AND CHIEF OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE KC SOUTHWEST MILITARY REGION, WHICH CORRESPONDS GEOGRAPHICALLY TO THE FANK 2ND MILITARY REGION (TAKEO, KOMPOT, KOMPONG SPEU AND KOH KONG PROVINCES). THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE, WHICH ACTS AS THE LINK BETWEEN THE KC AND VC/NVA, MOVES ITS PERIODIC MEETING SITES FOR SECURITY REASONS. [redacted] COMMENT: SEE CS-311/05608-7 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON KC PARTY PERSONALITIES. [redacted] NON SUON IS AGED AROUND 60, IS A NATIVE OF KOMPOT AND HAS HIS HEADQUARTERS NEAR PHNOM TAUCH (VT 5955) [redacted] A NO-MAN'S LAND IN THE THMAT POUNG REGION OF KOMPONG SPEU PROVINCE. ACCORDING TO THIS SOURCE, HE LIMPS FROM A THIGH WOUND INCURRED IN A 1970 ATTACK ON A FANK POST AT PURSAT. [redacted] NON SUON DOES NOT LIMP. [redacted] NON SUON IS A "SICK LION" WITH 600 HALF-ARMED, UNRELIABLE KC TROOPS UNDER HIS COMMAND. [redacted]

6. THE OTHER THREE COTTAGES ARE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES. TWO RICE STORAGE GRANARIES ARE SITUATED WITHIN THE COMPLEX TO THE NORTHWEST AND SOUTHEAST OF THE COTTAGES. TRENCHES ARE SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE COMPLEX FOR PROTECTION AGAINST ATTACK. APPROXIMATELY 230 TROOPS ARE STATIONED WITHIN THE COMPLEX. OF THESE, 150 ARE VC/NVA / 80 VIETNAMESE CAMBODIANS BELONGING TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES, SERVING AS SOLDIERS IN TIME OF NEED. MOST SLEEP IN HAMMOCKS SLUNG THE LENGTH THAT COVER THE COMPLEX. ARMS INCLUDE ONE 82 MM MORTAR, TWO 60 MM MORTARS, ONE [redacted]

30 CALIBER MACHINE GUN, AK-47 ASSAULT RIFLES AND OTHER RIFLES.

7. FIVE VEHICLES WERE ALLOTTED TO THE COMPLEX: THREE LAND ROVERS AND TWO HONDA MOTOR BIKES. TWO OF THE LAND ROVERS WERE ON A TRAIL SOUTHEAST OF TANG TALAT TRANSPORTING RICE TO THE COTTAGE COMPLEX IN JUNE 1970 WHEN A C-119 TRANSPORT PLANE STRAFED THEM, KILLING THREE MEN AND DESTROYING TWO OF THE LAND ROVERS. THE THIRD LAND ROVER IS NOW KEPT BENEATH A STILTED BUILDING IN WAT TANG PHLOCH (VU 320237).

8. THE HEADQUARTERS FOR SECTOR 18, ONE OF THE NUMEROUS SECTIONS INTO WHICH THE KC HAVE ADMINISTRATIVELY DIVIDED CAMBODIA, IS LOCATED AT PHUM MOUNG (VU 253241). THE CHIEF OF SECTOR 18, WHICH COMPRISES TUK PHOS, ROLEA . PEIR, KOMPONG LENG AND BABAUR DISTRICTS, IS 32 YEAR OLD U T H, WHO LEFT THE CAMBODIAN ARMED FORCES WHEN SHIHANOUK WAS OVERTHROWN. THE SECTOR HEADQUARTERS IS HOUSED IN THE ABANDONED BARRACKS OF A ONE-TIME MILITARY POST IN THE 100-HOUSE VILLAGE. THE 150 MEN AND WOMEN ASSIGNED TO PHUM MOUNG ARE DIVIDED INTO FOUR SECTIONS: PROPAGANDA, ECONOMIC, AND SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION, EACH WITH ABOUT 50 PEOPLE, AND COMMUNICATION AND LIAISON, 4 PEOPLE. THE INSTALLATION HAS NO VEHICLES, BUT IS ARMED WITH U.S. M1A1 CARBINES, U.S. M1 GARAND RIFLES, ENGLISH ENFIELD RIFLES, FRENCH MAS 36 RIFLES AND THOMPSON SUBMACHINE GUNS.

9. THE CHIEF OF TUK PHOS DISTRICT, A KC NAMED P A T H, HAS HIS HEADQUARTERS AT WAT VIVHEA BETNEAS (VU 270225). THE HEADQUARTERS IS LOCATED IN TWO BUILDINGS SITUATED TO THE WEST OF AND ACROSS A STREAM FROM THE PAGODA ITSELF. THE LARGER

[redacted]

WOMEN ASSIGNED TO THE INSTALLATION. THE OTHERS LIVE AND WORK IN A SMALLER, CORRUGATED IRON-TOPPED HOUSE. THE WOMEN OUTNUMBER THE MEN, THE TASKS OF ALL BEING MOSTLY ADMINISTRATIVE. THE HEADQUARTERS HAS NO VEHICLES AND IS ALLOTTED ABOUT 10 MAS 36

[redacted]

AND ENFIELD RIFLES.

10. (FIELD COMMENT: THERE FOLLOWS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, [redacted] ON THE PRINTING PLANT DESCRIBED IN CS-311/05614-71.) THE FULL VILLAGE NAME IS PHUM TANG SYA, AND MORE ACCURATE COORDINATES ARE VU 268224. THE TRUCKS AT THE SITE ARE GMC AND NUMBER TWO, NOT THREE; THERE IS ONE BULLDOZER, NOT TWO. THE TRUCKS ARE USED TO TRANSPORT RICE TO AREA INSTALLATIONS AND AMMUNITION TO AREA VC/NVA CAMPS TWO OR THREE TIMES MONTHLY. WHILE RICE IS PURCHASED OR REQUISITIONED LOCALLY, AMMUNITION IS BROUGHT IN FROM NORTHEASTERN CAMBODIA ACROSS ROUTE 6 (AROUND VU 1351) AND ROUTE 5 (AROUND VU 6748). THE BULLDOZER IS USED TO CLEAR PERIODICALLY THE PATH LEADING FROM TANG SYA. ABOUT 1000 ISSUES OF THE NEWSPAPER "KONG TAP RUMDOS PRACHEACHON PADIVATH" ("ARMY OF LIBERATION OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTION"), PRINTED HALF IN KHMER AND HALF IN VIETNAMESE, ARE PRINTED THREE TIMES MONTHLY AND CARRIED BY VEHICLE TO KRASANG DOH LAEUNG (VU 250289) AND PHUM MOUNG FOR FURTHER DISTRIBUTION THROUGHOUT THE AREA.

11. A VC POW CAMP IS LOCATED AT WAT KRASANG DOH LAEUNG, WHICH IS LOCATED IN THE 50-HOUSE VILLAGE OF THE SAME NAME. BEFORE JUNE 1971 SOME 500 PRISONERS GUARDED BY ABOUT 50 GUARDS WERE QUARTERED IN A WIRE-SURROUNDED PORTION OF THE VILLAGE AND IN THE PAGODA ITSELF. TURNING THE EVENT INTO A GALA AFFAIR, PROBABLY FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES, THE VC IN JUNE RELEASED THE PRISONERS HELD IN THE VILLAGE, DRIVING THEM TO THE VICINITY OF A FANK OUTPOST NEAR PHUM SDOK ACH ROMEAS (VU 4932). THE APPROXIMATELY 100 PRISONERS STILL HELD IN THE PAGODA ARE, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF [redacted] KHMER SOLDIERS. THE POWS, WHILE CLOSELY WATCHED BY [redacted], APPEAR WELL TREATED, ARE NOT LOCKED

OF THE GUARDS, THE [redacted] RICE AND OCCASIONAL VEGETABLES FOR THE PRISONERS BESIDE [redacted] ADDITIONAL FOOD DONATIONS MADE BY THE VILLAGERS TO THE BONZES (BUDDHIST MONKS) IN THE

[redacted]

[redacted]

PAGODA. THEY SLEEP IN THE BONZE DORMITORY. THE KC GUARD FORCE, WHICH WORKS IN SHIFTS AROUND THE CLOCK, IS REINFORCED AT KC REQUEST BY VILLAGERS, WHO ALSO PATROL THE AREA DAY AND NIGHT. WHILE THE KC HAVE THOMPSON AND CHINESE SUBMACHINE GUNS AND U.S. CARBINES, THE VILLAGERS HAVE ONLY FIVE RIFLES. THE KC COMMANDER AT KRASANG DOH LACUNG IS T A HOS (ALIAS).

12. AN AMERICAN JOURNALIST IS THE ONLY NON-KHMER PRISONER AT THE KRASANG PAGODA. HE IS IN HIS TWENTIES, TALL, WITH HAIR SHADED BETWEEN BLOND AND BROWN, HAS A SMALL MUSTACHE AND WEARS GLASSES. HE WAS CAPTURED ON ROUTE 4 PROBABLY IN FEBRUARY OR MARCH 1971, AND WAS SLIGHTLY WOUNDED IN THE LEFT FOREARM. AT TIME OF CAPTURE HE WAS WEARING A LONG-SLEEVED, STRIPED RED AND DARK BLUE OR BLACK SHIRT, BLACK TIE AND LIGHTWEIGHT GREEN-STREAKED-WITH-BLACK TROUSERS SOMEWHAT RESEMBLING CAMOUFLAGE PATTERN. HE ..SO HAS WHITE AND YELLOW SHIRTS AND DARK GRAY TROUSERS. SELECTED FOR PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT, HE ALSO DAILY RECEIVES A CHICKEN WHICH HE SHARES WITH A KHMER COLONEL. [redacted]

COMMENT: THE ABOVE INFORMATION PARALLELS THAT CONTAINED IN [redacted] SEEMING DISCREPANCIES ARE PROBABLY DUE TO DIFFERENT FOCUS OF QUESTIONING, TRANSLATOR ERROR OR [redacted] INCONSISTENCIES.)

13. ALTHOUGH INFERIOR IN NUMBER, THE VC/NVA APPEAR TO RULE THE ROOST. ORDERS CUSTOMARILY ORIGINATE WITH THE VC/NVA IN ACTIVITIES IN WHICH BOTH VC/NVA AND KC PARTICIPATE. AT COMMAND LEVEL, FOR EXAMPLE, NON SUON, WHO SPEAKS VIETNAMESE, DOES NOT RECEIVE MOST INCOMING MESSAGES; THE UNNAMED NON-KHMER SPEAKING VC/NVA RANKING OFFICER AT TANG TALAT DOES. ALSO, THE

BY THE VC/NVA. AT A LOWER LEVEL, A VC/NVA SOLDIER ONCE TOOK A CHINESE SUBMACHINE GUN FROM A KC SOLDIER BECAUSE IT WAS BETTER THAN HIS OWN WEAPON. ALSO, IN THE TRANSPORTATION OF AMMUNITION THE MANUAL LABOR WAS LEFT TO THE KC.

14. ALTHOUGH SECTORS OF THE LOCAL POPULATION ACTIVELY SUPPORT THE VC/NVA AND KC, THE VILLAGERS ARE GENERALLY PASSIVELY ANTI-COMMUNIST. FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN ASKED TO PROVIDE CERTAIN FOOD ITEMS BY VC/NVA OR KC SOLDIERS, MOST VILLAGERS IN KRASANG DOH LAEUNG ADOPT A "THERE IT IS, GET IT YOURSELF" ATTITUDE. A MORE EXTREME EXAMPLE IS ALIENATION CAUSED BY OVERLY HARSH AND UNFAIR COMMUNIST PUNISHMENT. THE WIFE OF A FANK SOLDIER LIVING IN KOMPONG CHHNANG RECENTLY VISITED RELATIVES IN THE AREA. WHEN THE COMMUNISTS LEARNED OF THIS, THEY ARRESTED AND SHOT THE HEAD OF THE FAMILY FOR COLLABORATION WITH THE ENEMY.

15. IN THE ECONOMIC REALM, THE VC/NVA AND KC PROHIBIT THE TRANSPORTATION OR SALE OF LOCAL GOODS OUTSIDE THE AREA UNDER THEIR CONTROL. PERMANENT CONTROL POINTS ARE SET UP AT SUCH STRATEGIC LOCATIONS AS CROSSROADS TO ENFORCE THE RULING, BUT VILLAGERS OFTEN BYPASS THESE TO SELL GOODS OUTSIDE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE IMPORTATION OF GOODS IS ENCOURAGED. ALTHOUGH THE POLICY IS PROBABLY ESTABLISHED AT A HIGHER ECHELON, ORDERS FOR THESE GOODS CONTROLS IN THE AREA ORIGINATE AT THE PROVINCE CHIEF LEVEL AND ARE TRANSMITTED TO THE DISTRICT LEADERS.

16. STRICT PRICE CONTROLS ARE IN EFFECT IN THE AREA, WITH FOLLOWING PRICES IN EFFECT:

A. 60 RIELS PER 20 LITERS OF RICE
B. 20 RIELS PER KILO OF PORK
C. 23 RIELS PER KOLO OF BEEF
D. 12 RIELS PER KILO OF FISH
E. 12 RIELS PER KILO OF CHICKEN
F. 5 RIELS PER KILO OF SALT.

VILLAGERS ARE REQUIRED TO GIVE 12 LITERS OF RICE PER MONTH AND 10,800 RIELS YEARLY, WITH THE MONEY BEING COLLECTED

[redacted]

[redacted]

ERRATICALLY ACCORDING TO NEED. THE POOREST INHABITANTS ARE
TAXED 28 LITERS OF RICE MONTHLY AND 1,800 RIELS A YEAR.

18. FIELD DISSEM: STATE DEFATT CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

[redacted]

BM/SGN

MEMORANDUM

TO : SCP/TPE via BM/SGN

DATE : 1 Sep. 1971

REF. No. CP-V-71-430

FROM : CP/SVN

SUBJECT : Monthly Report (August 1971).

This should prove to be my last Monthly Activity Report as Chief Pilot/Saigon. I say this as I do have a request in the System Chief Pilot's office to allow me to return to the line as a line Captain. To date I have not received any official notice that my request has been received nor of any comtemplated action upon it, if it has been received. I have been advised by a number of pilots that I am to be replaced by Captain Harry Hudson sometime during the month of September. One pilot relayed to me a message from Captain Hudson to the effect that Captain Hudson would be here after returning from his leave. Also from the pilot body, I was informed that there would be another American Crew Scheduler assigned to CSS/SGN. Whether true or not, it is interesting to see how often these sources are our first indication of what is to take place. Their batting average in the past has been exceptional. It is most embarrassing to be constantly pre-empted by the pilot body on information which is thought would be officially announced to them rather than have this information always received from them. Rumors are the life blood in any working group. The pilot body here is no exception. It is perhaps sound philosophy to permit leakage of priviledged information to allow the employees to become adjusted to any given change well before the change is made.

The highlight of the month was the assignment of a new Base Manager. As with all new brooms, the seepings follows a different tack. The big change is the establishment of new duty hours, to be effective 1 September. The new duty day, 0900 to 1730 with a 30 minute lunch break, is the result of the shifting of emphasis to nigh-time aircraft maintenance. This, as indicated by BM/SGN and MTS/SGN, will produce approximately 54 more "Aircraft-Days" per month. What impact this will have upon crew scheduling is speculative. At present our manning is at the saturation point considering the Flight Time Restrictions. Then again with a more definite aircraft maintenance schedule, rather with a less vacillating maintenance schedule, may prove a boon to scheduling in reducing last minute changes, so prevelant in the past. Another big policy change directed by BM/SGN is a 30 day moratorimm on the adherence to the 30 hours in seven day Flight Time Restriction to equalize flight time and trip time within various programs. He has directed that pilots be flown outside the restrictions, through use of customer emergency waiver, even if there are pilots who are within the legal limits. Hopefully this will permit us to gain some ground and get back on reasonable footing. Under the present manning it has been somewhat hopeless, heretofore, and stay within the purview of the restrictions. The Base Manager also announced the abolishment of the CP/RW position. The CP/FW goes back to CP/SGN encompassing the Rotary-Wing Division/SGN. Another edict of the Base Manager having a great impact upon this department is the withdrawal of ground transportation priviledges for quarters to work to quarters of American personnel. Those affected are MCSS and SITI/SGN.

The Saigon Chapter/FEPA conducted elections for Chapter officers. The election was contested as not being legal according to their by-laws. This contest was upheld and a re-run is in the offing. As it was, the first "Election" generated

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Cont'd.....

considerable amount of internal animosity between the two factions as well as animated interest both in management as well as the pilot body. It was enjoyable to be able to observe without having to really worry about one problem at least. It will be interesting to see how the re-run goes and if anything is really solved.

The final announcement of 71-73 Displacement was made. Suprisingly enough we here in Saigon were not overly effected. With minimum amount of training we should be off and running, provided of course we get the pilots as assigned. [redacted] We are still trying to get Rex Young from Bangkok. He was assigned here under the provisions of 70-10 announcement made last October. Now we are waiting for another [redacted] pilot from Bangkok as well, [redacted] To date nothing has been generated to start his transfer to Saigon. PM/SGN has not been informed that [redacted] is to be transferred consequently no efforts have been made towards applying for work permits and visas. This brings to light the same problems we encountered during the 70-10 shuffle. From our view down here it is apparent that Personnel Departments/ Division is not being coordinated with to effect a smooth transfer of pilots in conjunction with various bid awards. At least here at Saigon this is the case. It is suggested that the Personnel Managers at each station be copied on the bid award announcements. This with pre-issued policies regarding the mechanics of transfering the affected personnel should minimumize delays experienced last year.

In closing, I wish to express my sincere appreciation for having been allowed the priviledge of serving as Chief Pilot. The trust and faith the company placed in me by elevating me to the position three years ago, filled me with great pride and humility. I pray, that in the discharge of my duties, I in no way violated the trust and faith bestowed upon me. I hope that as Chief Pilot I have contributed to the success of the station and to the company.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
F. M. TIDWELL
MFD-SGN

F.M. Tidwell

cc: BM/SGN ✓
File

[redacted] CS 317/09048/71

5 October 1971

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: American Journalists Held Captive by the VC/NVA in Kompong Cham Province

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

[redacted]

28 1 1257-04

[redacted]

1. As of 27 August 1971, two American journalists were being held prisoner by the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army (VC/NVA) in the Tapao plantation at WU 785380. Both had been held in the area since their capture, within two days of each other, in October or November of 1970. Both were captured near the Svay Antor airstrip at WT 4678 after having become separated from government units to which they had been attached. As of 27 August, both were in good health and were allowed considerable freedom of movement within the VC/NVA camp.

2. The older of the two newsmen appears to be between 40-45 years of age and is extremely tall. * He has receding blond hair and blue eyes, and always wears untinted glasses. He has a soft-spoken manner, and speaks French and Vietnamese.

3. The second journalist appears to be between 20-25 years of age, is about 6'2" tall, and heavily muscled. He has a full head of short black hair, and has blue eyes. He also speaks French and Vietnamese.**

4. Ever since their capture in late 1970, the two prisoners have been held at the headquarters of Khmer Communist (KC) Region 304. This headquarters is mobile, moving ev ery several dyas to various points in the Chup, Tapao, and Peam Cheang plantations.***

[redacted] Comparison made by t[redacted] with a European male of above average height indicates that the newsman is 6'5" or 6'6" tall.

** [redacted] said [redacted] that they had identified themselves [redacted] as U.S. nationals.

*** [redacted] said that until the capture of the two Americans, Region 304 headquarters had been in a fixed location. It is not clear whether the capture of the Americans was a factor in the new policy of continual relocation of this element.

[redacted]

28/2

1257-74

~~SECRET~~

5398

S-3838

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1999

S-3838
13 October 1971

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Soviet Military Aid to North Vietnam

1. During 1965-70 the USSR provided an estimated $1.5 billion in military aid to North Vietnam, about three-quarters of total deliveries from Communist countries. Soviet deliveries rose rapidly during the first three years of the war to a peak of about in 1967 Thereafter, deliveries from the USSR declined

Estimated Communist Military Deliveries
to North Vietnam

	Million US $						
	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	Total
USSR							1,555
Communist China							590
Eastern Europe							5 a/
Total							2,150 b/

a. The cumulative value of deliveries from Eastern Europe during 1965-70 is estimated at $5 million.
b. Negligible amounts of military aid have also bee received from North Korea, Cuba, and Mongolia since 1966.

~~SECRET~~

2. The rise and fall in the military aid provided by the USSR is explained by North Vietnam's changing requirements for military equipment. During 1965-68, North Vietnam constructed an extensive air defense system composed of 25 to 30 surface-to-air missile battalions, hundreds of surface-to-air sites and thousands of antiaircraft guns. This system and its operation were made possible largely by deliveries of air defense equipment, missiles and AAA ammunition from the USSR. Deliveries for the build-up of North Vietnam's air defense system account for more than 85% of Soviet military aid during the past five years.

The overall military aid delivery picture is presented in the attached table. Following the bombing halt over North Vietnam, Soviet deliveries of air defense equipment and related munitions dropped sharply.

Estimated Soviet Air Defense Aid
to North Vietnam

	Million US $						
	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	Total
Total							1,364
AAA ammunition							666
SAM missiles							202
Air defense equipment							496

3. There is no evidence that political considerations, as opposed to Hanoi's reduced needs, explain the decline in military aid deliveries by the USSR in the last two years. Moscow's continuing willingness to supply North Vietnam with military aid was reaffirmed by Soviet President Podgorny during the course of his recent visit to Hanoi. However,

even if the USSR were to restrict deliveries in an effort to influence Hanoi's conduct of the war, its leverage would be severely limited. North Vietnam's essential requirement for continuing the war in the south consists largely of ground forces equipment, ammunition and trucks. If the Communist Chinese were to take on the entire task of providing this aid, the burden would not be unmanageable.

There are a few items which Communist China would have difficulty providing, such as MIG-21 aircraft and SA-2 missiles, but these are not presently essential to the conduct of the war.

4. The most probable outlook for the next several years is that Communist military aid deliveries to North Vietnam will remain at or near the 1970 level, assuming no major change in the scale of fighting on the ground and that the bombing of North Vietnam will not be resumed. Deliveries in 1971 may be slightly higher than in 1970 to offset losses incurred during Lam Son 719. The USSR evidently has been delivering tanks to replace some or all of the large number of tanks lost by North Vietnam during the campaign.

CIA/OER

MEMORANDUM

Intelligence Information Report

1-1571
2-7900

[redacted]

[redacted] PAGE 1 OF 31 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

[redacted]

REPORT NO. CS-311/07801-71

DATE D[redacted] NOVEMBER 1971

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI 1966 - 1969

SUBJECT OBSERVATION OF AMERICAN PRISONERS IN HANOI

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 20 AUG [redacted] Date

ACQ VIETNAM, CAN THO (8 OCTOBER 1971)

SOURCE



1. IN OCTOBER 1966 [redacted] WAS [redacted] 103RD HOSPITAL IN HANOI, NORTH VIETNAM, AND WHILE THERE HE [redacted] AN AMERICAN PRISONER WHO HAD A BROKEN ARM. [redacted] WAS THE PILOT OF AN F4-H FIGHTER BOMBER WHICH WAS SHOT DOWN ON A MISSION OVER HA TAY PROVINCE, NORTH VIETNAM, ON 15 OCTOBER 1966.

CAMP LOG # N-87

REPORT LOG # 1390

1:50,000 Card:

1:250,000 Coord:

UTM Card:

P.W. DESCRIPTIONS

[redacted]

[redacted]	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CIA	(For Field Distribution see final page)

INFO Card:

P.W. CAMP (AP LONG BIEN PRISON)

[redacted] AND THE AMERICAN WERE ABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER [redacted] IN GOING OVER A LIST OF STATES [redacted] RECOGNIZED THE STATE OF VIRGINIA AND, WHEN SHOWN A ROAD MAP OF VIRGINIA, [redacted] PICKED OUT THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH AS BEING PART OF THE PILOT'S ADDRESS. ACCORDING TO [redacted] THE PILOT WAS A LIEUTENANT, 1.8 METERS (5 FEET, 11 INCHES) TALL AND WEIGHED ABOUT 100 KILOGRAMS (220 LBS.). HE HAD BLOND, MEDIUM LENGTH HAIR, SQUARE FACE, THICK EYEBROWS, PLUMP CHEEKS, HIGH NOSE, WELL-TRIMMED MUSTACHE, SMALL EVEN TEETH, SQUARE CHIN, STOCKY BUILD AND DARK HAIR ON HIS ARMS AND CHEST.

2. IN EARLY 1967 AN AMERICAN F-105 FIGHTER PLANE WAS HIT BY A NORTH VIETNAMESE MISSILE OVER THANH BA DISTRICT, VINH PHUC PROVINCE. THE PILOT PARACHUTED INTO BINH QUYEN VILLAGE, PHU NINH DISTRICT, VINH PHUC PROVINCE, AND WAS CAPTURED BY A LOCAL MILITIA UNIT. [redacted] THE PILOT WAS TAKEN TO BINH QUYEN VILLAGE, WHERE HE WAS INTERROGATED FOR TWO HOURS BY DISTRICT AND PROVINCE PUBLIC SECURITY OFFICERS. THE INTERROGATION WAS IN VIETNAMESE AND THE PILOT DID NOT ANSWER THE QUESTIONS. A PUBLIC SECURITY CAPTAIN ARRIVED ON THE SCENE AND SPOKE TO THE PILOT IN ENGLISH. THE PILOT ANSWERED BUT [redacted] DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT HE SAID. THE PILOT WAS TAKEN TO HANOI BY AUTOMOBILE. THE PILOT WAS A CAPTAIN, 1.9 METERS TALL, WHO HAD LONG, RED, CURLY HAIR, LARGE EYES, LARGE RED NOSE, FAT CHEEKS, SMALL CHIN, THIN LIPS, SMALL UNEVEN TEETH AND YELLOW HAIR ON HIS ARMS. WHEN CAPTURED, HE WAS DRESSED IN A DARK BROWN FLIGHT SUIT AND WAS ARMED WITH TWO PISTOLS AND A KNIFE. [redacted] SAID THE PILOT WAS WOUNDED IN THE LEFT LEG.

3. IN SEPTEMBER 1969 [redacted] WHILE CROSSING THE LONG BIEN BRIDGE, HE OBSERVED ABOUT TEN AMERICAN PRISONERS, DRESSED IN BLACK SHIRTS AND SHORTS, [redacted]

SWEEPING THE BRIDGE. [redacted] WAS NOT CERTAIN WHERE THE PRISONERS CAME FROM BUT SAID THAT THERE WAS A PRISON CAMP NEAR THE LONG BIEN BRIDGE CALLED THE BEN PHA DEN (BLACK FERRY) CAMP. HE SAW ABOUT 40 PRISONERS IN THE CAMP. THE CAMP WAS ABOUT 500 METERS FROM THE LONG BIEN BRIDGE AND ABOUT 150 METERS FROM THE FERRY LANDING. IT WAS 25 METERS OFF THE DAI LO TRAN QUANG KAI HIGHWAY WHICH RAN FROM THE BRIDGE TO THE CAN DUC STREET INTERSECTION. BETWEEN THE BRIDGE AND THE CAMP WERE A MAINTENANCE SHOP ABOUT 50 METERS FROM THE BRIDGE, A GASOLINE STATION, BLACK FERRY LANDING ABOUT 300 METERS FROM THE BRIDGE, AND A CARPENTRY SHOP.

4. [redacted] SAID THE PRISON CAMP WAS BUILT OF STONE, 30 METERS LONG AND 2.5 METERS HIGH. A STONE FENCE THREE METERS HIGH WITH BARBED WIRE SURROUNDED THE CAMP, WITH A GUARD POST AT ITS ENTRANCE. [redacted] SAID THAT PRIOR TO 1969 THE CAMP HAD BEEN USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE DETENTION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE PRISONERS BUT SINCE 1969 HAD BEEN USED TO DETAIN AMERICAN PRISONERS WHO HAD BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM SON TAY PRISON. THERE WERE ONE CHINESE COMMUNIST ANTIAIRCRAFT BATTALION AND TWO NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY BATTALIONS IN THE AREA. ACCORDING TO LIEUTENANT DOAN THAN D U C, AGED 39, AN INTERROGATION OFFICER IN CAMP, THE AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE TREATED WELL. THEY WERE GIVEN BREAD, MILK, CIGARETTES AND A SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCE OF .80 DONG PER DAY (3.5 DONG ARE EQUIVALENT TO US$1.00 AT THE OFFICIAL RATE OF EXCHANGE). THEY HAD A CLUB AND WERE ALLOWED TO PLAY SOCCER, PING PONG AND OTHER SPORTS.

5. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE, USMACV, 7TH AIR FORCE, NAVFORV, CINCPAC, PACFLT, ARPAC, PACAF [redacted]

[redacted]

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ZNY SSSSS ZOC STATE ZZH
MJA190JFA436
PP RUEHC RUFNCR RUEHIA RUEKJCS RUHHHQA RUHKACT
DE RUMJFS 1042 0360745
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 050714Z FEB 72
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6774
INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 8555
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3802
RUMJNO/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH PRIORITY 1162
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY 7337
RUFNCR/USDEL FRANCE PRIORITY
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 2253
RUEKJCS/JCS PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF PRIORITY
RUHHHQA/CINCPAC PRIORITY
RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV PRIORITY
RUHKACT/COMUSMACTHAI PRIORITY
RUMOSRA/DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI PRIORITY
RUMOSRA/HQ 7/13 AF PRIORITY
[redacted] VIENTIANE 1042

MACV FOR COMMAND CENTER

SUBJECT: LAOS SITREP

REF: A. VIENTIANE 1005
B. VIENTIANE 1008

SUMMARY: FORWARD MOST ROUTE 23 POSITIONS IN MR IV WERE EVACUATED ON 4 FEB AFTER HEAVY ENEMY ATTACKS. SHARP CLASH REPORTED EAST OF KHONG SEDONE. TROOP LIFT AIRCRAFT CRASHED SOUTHEAST OF LONG TIENG. ENEMY MAINTAINED PRESSURE AGAINST SAM THONG POSITIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. IN MR IV, ATTACK AGAINST MOST FORWARD ROUTE 23 POSITION APPROX 3 MM WEST OF BAN GNIK (REPORTED

[redacted]

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52666 pg 2 of 3

REFTEL A) CONTINUED THROUGH NIGHT 3-4 AND INTO DAY 4 FEB WHEN POSITION WAS REPORTED SURROUNDED. RELIEF COLUMN ARRIVED LATE AFTERNOON 4 FEB BUT DEFENDERS HAD ALREADY WITHDRAWN SOUTH AND WEST TO UNKNOWN LOCATION WITH UNKNOWN CASUALTIES. POSITION 4 KM WEST OF BAN GNIK WAS ALSO EVACUATED AFTER BEING SHELLED AND REPORTEDLY SURROUNDED AT SAME TIME. RLAF STRIKES YIELDED BDA OF 9 ENEMY PROBABLE KBA, 2 MORTARS DESTROYED AND ANOTHER DAMAGED.

2. ELSEWHERE IN MR IV, SHARP CLASH WITH ESTIMATED ENEMY BATTALION APPROX 20 KM EAST OF KHONG SEDONE ON 4 FEB RESULTED IN ONE FRIENDLY KIA, 6 WIA, 5 ENEMY KIA AND ESTIMATED 10 WIA. THERE WERE 2 ATTACKS BY FIRE AGAINST ROUTE 23/231 JUNCTION POSITIONS (5 FRIENDLY WIA) AND ONE CLASH APPROX 3 KM WEST SOUTHWEST OF BAN KENG GNAO (NO CASUALTIES).

3. IN MR II, THERE WERE 3 ATTACKS BY FIRE WITHOUT CASUALTIES AGAINST SAM THONG POSITIONS ON 3-4 FEB. THERE WERE SMALL CLASHES APPROX 6 KM WEST NORTHWEST AND APPROX 3 KM SOUTHEAST OF LONG TIENG (ONE FRIENDLY WIA). SKYLINE RIDGE PATROL FOUND BODIES OF 5 NVA AND ONE FRIENDLY. POSITION NORTHWEST OF PA DONG WAS AGAIN HEAVILY SHELLED WITHOUT CASUALTIES. NORTH OF PDJ, THERE WERE 2 CLASHES, ONE SHELLING AND ONE MINE INCIDENT SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST OF BOUAM LONG ON 2-4 FEB (ONE FRIENDLY KIA, 2 WIA). ENEMY SHELLED REFUGEE VILLAGE NORTH OF PHU CUM WITH UNKNOWN CASUALTIES ON 4 FEB. USAF REPORTED 9 TRUCKS DESTROYED AND 14 DAMAGED ON PDJ AND ALONG ROUTE 7 BOTH NORTHEAST AND WEST OF PDJ AS WELL AS ONE 37 MM GUN DESTROYED AND ONE 12.7 MM GUN DAMAGED.

4. AIR AMERICA CARIBOU CRASHED VICINITY PHA KHAO (SITE 14) APPROX 13 KM SOUTHEAST OF LONG TIENG ON 4 FEB WHILE MOVING MR III TROOPS. PRELIMINARY

[redacted]

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#52606 pg 343

ACTION UNIT | INFO | FILE, VR

ACTION NO.

REPORT ON CAUSE OF CRASH INDICATED ENGINE FAILURE. CASUALTIES: 3 U.S. CREWMEN INJURED AND EVACUATED TO BANGKOK, ONE LAO CREWMAN KILLED, ONE SOLDIER KILLED, 15 SOLDIERS SERIOUSLY INJURED AND 18 SOLDIERS INJURED.

5. IN MR V, ENEMY SHELLED POSITION 6 KM SOUTH OF MUONG KASSY (FROM WHICH FRIENDS HAD ALREADY WITHDRAWN) AS WELL AS BATTALION COMMAND POST APPROX 5 KM FARTHER SOUTH ON 4 FEB (NO CASUALTIES). ONE CLASH OCCURRED 16 KM SOUTH SOUTHWEST OF MUONG KASSY WITHOUT CASUALTIES ON 3 FEB. ARMORED CAR OVERTURNED APPROX 5 KM NORTH OF VANG VIENG ON 3 FEB, KILLING ONE AND INJURING 4. APPROX 2500 REFUGEES MOVED FROM MUONG KASSY AREA TO VANG VIENG AREA DURING WEEK ENDING 4 FEB. STILL UNCONFIRMED UPDATE OF CASUALTIES FROM LOSS OF SALA PHOU KHOUN (SEE VIENTIANE 0613 AND 0753) INDICATED 70 FRIENDLY KIA, 150 WIA AND 249 STILL MIA.

6. IN MR I, POSITION APPROX 30 KM NORTHEAST OF LUANG PRABANG WAS SHELLED WITHOUT CASUALTIES ON 4 FEB. CASUALTY UPDATE FROM LOSS OF POSITION NORTH OF LUANG PRABANG ON 29 JAN (SEE VIENTIANE 0647) INDICATED 13 FRIENDLY KIA, 3 WIA, 13 RIFLES, 2 MORTARS AND ONE RECOILLESS RIFLE LOST. APPROX 3100 REFUGEES MOVED CLOSER TO LUANG PRABANG AFTER LOSS OF KIOU KA CHAM DURING WEEK ENDING 4 FEB.

GP-4. GODLEY

BT

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

5373

10 February 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Elmer Glaser
Statistics and Reports Division
Agency for International Development

SUBJECT : Repayment Terms of Communist Aid

Attached is the information you requested concerning repayment terms of Communist aid to the Less Developed Countries.

Office of Economic Research

Attachment
As stated above

(S-4141)

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1999

UNCLASSIFIED

Repayment Terms of Communist Aid to the Less Developed Countries

Economic Aid

1. During 1954-71, the Communist countries extended some $13 billion of economic aid to less developed countries (LDCs). Almost all of this aid has been provided as credits with fixed terms of repayment. 1/ Less than 5%, or about $600 million, was in grant aid. The People's Republic of China (PRC) provided about $355 million, more than three-fourths of which was allocated to Cambodia, Nepal, and Pakistan. 2/ The USSR provided $245 million of grant aid, largely to Afghanistan in 1959 for road construction. East European countries have provided only negligible amounts of grant aid to the LDCs.

2. The terms of repayment of Communist economic credits to the LDCs have changed little during the 18 years of the program. Chinese repayment terms always have been more liberal than those of other Communist donors. Its aid is interest-free and usually requires repayment over 10 years, after 5-10 year grace periods. In a few cases, however, China has permitted longer repayment periods. On the $400 million credit extended in 1970 for the Tan-Zam Railroad, China allowed 30 years for repayment after a 10 year grace period; a $110 million credit extended to Somalia in 1971 may carry 20 year terms as does the Chinese credit of $28 million provided to Afghanistan in 1965.

3. Soviet aid is provided under less favorable terms. Most Soviet credits call for repayment over 12 years at 2.5% beginning one year after project completion. These terms usually are applied to project-type aid administered by the Soviet State Committee on Foreign Economic Relations. More than 68% of the $7.6 billion of Soviet aid extended since 1954 has carried these terms.

4. Moscow has allowed longer repayment periods on about $1.2 billion of its aid. Nearly $400 million of aid to Afghanistan involve repayment periods ranging between 19 and 25 years with grace periods of 8-25 years. Algeria, Turkey, and Yemen (San'a) received more than $685 million of credits calling for repayment over 15 years.

---

1. Includes credits with amortization periods of five years or more.
2. Includes $107 million extended to Pakistan during 1964-68 as credits but converted to grants in 1972.

5. About 15% of total Soviet economic aid consists of supplier-type credits provided by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade. These credits, which Moscow calls "commercial credits," often are allocated by recipient governments to private companies. They allow 5-10 years for repayment, carry interest of 3-3.5%, and require downpayments of up to 25%. Almost all Soviet aid to Latin America has consisted of such credits. The first major Soviet credit of this type was a $100 million credit to Argentina in 1958. 3/ During 1964-67, the USSR extended some $775 million of these credits, more than two-thirds of which went to Egypt, India, and Pakistan. During the past four years, Latin American countries have received about $115 million of these 5-10 year credits; Iraq, approximately $140 million; and Egypt, about $95 million. Nevertheless, this type of aid has not directly reduced Soviet project assistance, as is sometimes assumed, nor has it continued to grow as a percent of total aid extended. These credits, which accounted for almost 30% of total Soviet aid extended during 1964-67, were less than 15% of the aid provided in 1968-69 and 10% of 1970-71 extensions.

6. Aid extended by East European countries almost always carries harder terms than that provided by the USSR or China. Downpayments often are required, repayments usually are made over 5-8 years and interest normally is set at 3-3.5% although it has ranged up to 7%. Occasionally, they have allowed 12 years, 2.5-3% terms. In 1971, about 45% of their aid to Latin American countries carried 12 year repayment periods.

7. Most Communist credits allow repayment in the local currency or goods of the aid recipient. The exceptions to this rule generally apply to countries, such as Indonesia, that do not have clearing agreements with Communist countries. The goods used for repayment often are the output of Communist-assisted plants. Some repayment arrangements are highly advantageous to the donor country, such as Iran's and Afghanistan's repayments in natural gas and Iraq's repayments in crude oil. They contrast with previous agreements with these LDCs that called for repayments in other commodities.

Military Aid

8. Communist military aid to the LDCs totaled about $9 billion at the end of 1971. Soviet assistance accounts for more than 85% of the total

3. This credit was reduced to the amount drawn ($29 million) when it expired in 1961.

5383

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1998

29 February 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Thomas Buchanan
INR/REC/IR
Department of State

SUBJECT : Unclassified Aid Data

Attached is the information you requested for your unclassified version of the EIC annual.

Office of Economic Research

Attachment: a/s

Table 1

Net Flow of Soviet Economic Aid to
the Less Developed Countries
1954-71

Million US $

	Deliveries of Economic Aid[1]	Estimated Scheduled Repayment[2]	Net Outflow[3]
Total	3,610	1,225	2,385
1954-64	1,195	155	1,040
1965	315	80	235
1966	270	105	165
1967	300	125	175
1968	300	150	150
1969	400	175	225
1970	410	185	225
1971	420	250	170

1. Based on annual issues of Ministry of Foreign Trade, USSR, Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR (International Relations Publishing House, Moscow), with adjustments for grant aid and commodity assistance.
2. Interest and principal on deliveries made under credit.
3. Includes grant aid.

CIA/OER
29 Feb 72

Table 2

Communist Economic Technicians
in the Less Developed Countriesa/
1971

Persons

	Total	USSR	Eastern Europe	PRC
Total	35,050	11,025	5,425	18,600
Africa	24,700	4,200	3,300	17,200
East Asia	225	150	75	0
Latin America	225	75	150	0
Near East and South Asia	9,900	6,600	1,900	1,400

a. Minimum estimates of the number of persons present for a period of one month or more.

CIA/OER
29 Feb 72

Table 3

Technical Personnel from Less Developed Countries
Receiving Training in Communist Countries a/

Persons

	Total		USSR		East Europe		China (PRC)	
	1970	1971	1970	1971	1970	1971	1970	1971
Total	1,550	2,745	1,020	1,310	530	1,435	0	0
Africa	210	170	65	90	145	80	0	0
East Asia	15	0	0	0	15	0	0	0
Latin America	0	10	0	10	0	0	0	0
Near East and South Asia	1,325	2,565	955	1,210	370	1,355	0	0

a. Minimum estimates, round to nearest five, as of December 1970 and December 1971.

CIA/OER
29 Feb 72

Table 4

Academic Students from Selected Less Developed Countries Being Trained in Communist Countries as of December 1971

	Persons
Total	22,350
Africa	11,050
Algeria	1,080
Botswana	15
Burundi	160
Central African Republic	160
Chad	105
Congo	375
Dahomey	90
Equatorial Guinea	20
Ethiopia	250
Gambia	35
Ghana	300
Guinea	435
Ivory Coast	55
Kenya	550
Mali	380
Mauritania	65
Mauritius	85
Morocco	195
Nigeria	1,150
Rwanda	80
Senegal	140
Sierra Leone	500
Somalia	600
Sudan	1,320
Tanzania	250
Togo	80
Tunisia	315
Uganda	250
Upper Volta	45
Zaire	100
Zambia	150
Other	1,715
East Asia	700
Burma	125
Indonesia	110
Laos	95
Other	370
Latin America	2,650
Brazil	130
Chile	270
Costa Rica	150
Ecuador	120
El Salvador	15
Guatemala	5
Nicaragua	120
Peru	190
Uruguay	25
Venezuela	35
Other	1,590
Near East and South Asia	7,950
Afghanistan	500
Ceylon	135
Cyprus	1,000
India	600
Iraq	425
Jordan	535
Kuwait	15
Lebanon	275
Nepal	300
Pakistan	15
Syria	1,435
UAR	1,100
Yemen (Aden)	600
Yemen (San'a)	750
Other	265

Table 5

Annual Soviet Military Aid Extensions
to Less Developed Countries
1955-71

	Millions of US $
Total	7,950
1955-60	1,285
1961	830
1962	415
1963	385
1964	875
1965	260
1966	450
1967	515
1968	465
1969	330
1970	1,065
1971	1,075

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29 Feb 72

Table 6

Soviet Military Aid Extended
to the Less Developed Countries
1955-71

	Millions of US $
Total	7,950
Africa	685
Algeria	400
Burundi	Negl.
Congo	15
Equatorial Guinea	Negl.
Ghana	10
Guinea	15
Libya	80
Mali	5
Morocco	15
Nigeria	15
Somali	50
Sudan	65
Tanzania	5
Uganda	10
East Asia	1,115
Burma	Negl.
Cambodia	10
Indonesia	1,100
Laos	5
Near East & South Asia	6,150
Afghanistan	450
Ceylon	2
Cyprus	25
Egypt	2,500
India	1,100
Iran	325
Iraq	1,000
Lebanon	3
Pakistan	65
Syria	580
Yemen (Aden)	25
Yemen (San'a)	75

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29 Feb 72

Table 7

Soviet Military Personnel Employed
in Less Developed Countries
1971

Total	16,480
Afghanistan	150
Algeria	1,000
Ceylon	100
Egypt	12,500
Guinea	100
India	150
Iraq	400
Somali	300
Sudan	500
Syria	800
Yemen (Aden)	180
Yemen (San'a)	100
Other	200

Military Trainees

At least 2,500 military personnel from 13 Less Developed Countries were being trained in the USSR in 1971. This brings to 26,000 the number that have received military training in the USSR since 1965.

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29 Feb 72

DIRECTORATE FOR PLANS

Intelligence Information Report

[redacted]

2-1961

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

[redacted]

REPORT NO. CS-311/01241-72

DATE DISTR. 3 MARCH 1972

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 1969 - EARLY OCTOBER 1971

SUBJECT VIET CONG POLICY ON HANDLING OF VIETNAMESE MILITARY, POLITICAL AND U.S. PRISONERS IN VIET CONG BEN TRE PROVINCE IN THE DELTA

ACQ

SOURCE

VIETNAM, CAN THO (EARLY NOVEMBER 1971)

[redacted]

CAMP LOG # S-471

REPORT LOG # 1250

1:50,000 Coord:

1:250,000 Coord:

UTM Card:

INFO Card:

APPROVED FOR RELEASE Date 20 [redacted]

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	[redacted]	(For Field Distrib.)

[redacted]

XS 45K 244

DIA #181

S-471

Mo Cay (D), Ben Tre (P)

10 10 N 106 30 E 181 (S-47,601) (VC 48-7 DB4H)

#182

1. [redacted] REPORTED THAT VIET CONG (VC) MO CAY DISTRICT, VC BEN TRE PROVINCE, OPERATED TWO PRISON CAMPS DURING THE PERIOD 1960 TO 1969. [redacted] COMMENT: VC BEN TRE PROVINCE INCLUDES GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) KIEN HOA AND PART OF VINH LONG PROVINCES.) ONE CAMP WAS FOR MILITARY PRISONERS, SUCH AS ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) AND REGIONAL FORCES (RF) TROOPS, AND THE SECOND PRISON WAS FOR PERSONS ACCUSED OF WORKING FOR GVN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. [redacted] KNEW OF NO U.S. PRISONERS IN THESE TWO CAMPS DURING THIS PERIOD. THE CAMP FOR MILITARY PRISONERS USUALLY HELD ABOUT 20 PERSONS AND THAT FOR CIVILIANS FROM 30 TO 40. AS A GENERAL PRACTICE, PRISONERS WERE KEPT IN THE MILITARY PRISON CAMP FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS TO A YEAR, WERE INDOCTRINATED AND RELEASED. IN THE CIVILIAN PRISON CAMP, THOSE FOUND TO HAVE COMMITTED SERIOUS CRIMES AGAINST THE VC WERE INTERROGATED AND THEN SENTENCED BY A MILITARY COURT. SOME PRISONERS WERE SECRETLY EXECUTED, INCLUDING CHIN C U C, HAI M I E N, HAI C A T, CHIN C U O I, YEN S U O N G, NGUYEN VAN T I E P, HOANG V U, HO VAN C A M, NGUYEN VAN H Y AND NGUYEN CAN R E.

2. IN MID-1969, THE CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM (COSVN) ISSUED A DIRECTIVE TO THE VC MO CAY DISTRICT PARTY COMMITTEE INSTRUCTING IT TO REVIEW THE RECORDS OF ALL PRISONERS AND, BASED ON THE CRIMES WHICH HAD BEEN COMMITTED, TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY SHOULD BE RELEASED OR EXECUTED. [redacted] SAID THAT PRISONERS HELD IN BOTH THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN CAMPS AT THIS TIME WERE RELEASED AND NONE WERE EXECUTED. COSVN ALSO DIRECTED THAT THE DISTRICT PARTY COMMITTEE ESTABLISH TEMPORARY DETENTION FACILITIES AT THE DISTRICT AND VILLAGE LEVELS TO HOLD PRISONERS. THE DIRECTIVE STATED THAT THE CHANGE WAS NECESSARY TO ECONOMIZE ON FOOD AND TO RELEASE GUARDS FOR OTHER DUTIES. THE DIRECTIVE NOTED THAT A LACK OF SECURE AREAS IN THE PROVINCE WAS EXPOSING THE PRISON CAMPS TO GVN OPERATIONS AND THAT PRISONERS WOULD PROBABLY BE LESS EMBITTERED AGAINST THE VC IF RELEASED THEN, RATHER THAN LATER BY THE GVN FORCES.

3. [redacted] SAID THAT THE PRISON CAMPS IN VC NO CAY DISTRICT WERE NOT AT FIXED LOCATIONS. PRISONERS WERE INITIALLY INTERROGATED IN THE VILLAGE BY A TEAM FROM THE DISTRICT SECURITY SECTION OR SENT TO THE DISTRICT FACILITY FOR QUESTIONING. CHIN G A N G, CHIEF OF THE DISTRICT SECURITY SECTION, DECIDED WHETHER A PRISONER SHOULD BE EXECUTED OR INDOCTRINATED AND RELEASED. AT THE DISTRICT AND VILLAGE TEMPORARY CAMPS, IT WAS THE PRACTICE TO DIVIDE THE PRISONERS INTO GROUPS OF THREE, EACH MAN ROPED TO TWO OTHERS, AND PLACE THEM IN A CAMOUFLAGED TRENCH. TWO GUARDS WATCHED OVER EACH THREE-MAN GROUP AND THE TRENCH WAS SURROUNDED BY BOOBY TRAPS MADE WITH GRENADES. THE GUARDS WERE ORDERED TO MOVE THE PRISONERS IN CASE OF GVN OPERATIONS IN THE AREA, BUT AT TIMES THEY LEFT THE PRISONERS IN THE TRENCH UNTIL THE OPERATION WAS OVER. THEY ALSO HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO SHOOT A PRISONER IF HE ATTEMPTED TO ESCAPE AND, WHEN BEING PURSUED BY GVN TROOPS, A GUARD COULD SHOOT PRISONERS IF NECESSARY IN ORDER TO ESCAPE.

4. [redacted] SAID THAT WHEN A VILLAGE COMMITTEE WANTED TO CAPTURE A PERSON FOR A SPECIFIC REASON, THE COMMITTEE FIRST GOT THE APPROVAL OF THE DISTRICT SECURITY SECTION CHIEF. HOWEVER, IF A PERSON WAS ARMED AND OPERATING IN A VC AREA, HE COULD BE APPREHENDED WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL.

5. PRISONERS WHO WERE TO BE RELEASED WERE INDOCTRINATED BY VILLAGE SECURITY SECTION CADRES, BUT IF THE PRISONER WERE AN ARVN OFFICER, A CADRE FROM THE DISTRICT SECURITY SECTION WAS SENT TO CONDUCT THE INDOCTRINATION.

6. INSTRUCTIONS FROM COSVN SPECIFIED THAT U.S. PRISONERS WERE NOT TO BE RELEASED OR EXECUTED, BUT RATHER TO BE SENT BY THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS TO THE MILITARY REGION HEADQUARTERS. U.S. PRISONERS WERE CONSIDERED VERY IMPORTANT FOR PROPAGANDA EXPLOITATION AND WERE NOT TO BE MISTREATED.

7. BETWEEN MID-1969 AND 6 OCTOBER 1971, VC NO CAY DISTRICT HANDLED A TOTAL OF NINE PRISONERS, OF WHOM SIX WERE RELEASED AND THREE EXECUTED.

8. [redacted] COMMENT: THE JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY CENTER HAS COMMENTED THAT OTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE SUBSTANTIATES THE REPORTED COSVN POLICY TOWARD ARVN, U.S., AND VIETNAMESE POLITICAL PRISONERS AS REPORTED ABOVE.)

9. [redacted] DISSEM: EMBASS; USAID CORDS 7TH AIR FORCE USARV NAVFORV 1021ST FAS 525TH MI GP OSI AT SAIGON: SENT TO CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC [redacted]

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EYES ONLY

NLE MR Case No 94-157
Document No. #36

1 JUN 1972

Program Objectives
Special Operations Group, Counter Intelligence Staff

The Special Operations Group is responsible for managing and implementing the Agency program for collection and dissemination of information on the countersubversive aspect of counterintelligence. This responsibility includes:

A. Collection: Clandestine collection abroad of information on foreign (Soviet, Chinese Communist, Cuban, North Korean, North Vietnamese, the Communist Front of South Vietnam, [redacted] efforts to support/encourage/exploit domestic extremism and dissidence in the United States. These efforts include funding, training, propaganda, provision of safe haven, provision of alias documentation, etc. The collection emphasis is on foreign involvement, whether directly or by indirect third national leftist groups or individuals. Principal concern is for coverage of foreign involvement in the extremist antiwar movement, extremist student/youth/faculty groups, black extremism, Chicano extremism, Puerto Rican extremism, deserter/evader support and inducement, and international aspects of domestic underground media. Examples of organizations of interest with respect to possible foreign involvement therein include [redacted]

1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)

1.5(c)
1.6(d)(1)

B. Dissemination: Information on the above subject, collected by all elements of this Agency, including the Clandestine Service, the Office of Communications, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, and the Domestic Contact Service, is disseminated as obtained

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15 OCT 1996

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via special reports series. The bulk of the disseminations are to the Federal Bureau of Investigation but disseminations are also made to other agencies, including the White House as appropriate.

C. Data Base Maintenance: Since all cable and dispatch correspondence in relation to the program is compartmented for reasons of operational security and sensitivity, and is not processed by either the Cable Secretariat or the Information Services Division (ISD) of the Clandestine Service, a complex, highly sophisticated system is utilized for the control and retrieval of this information. (An additional reason for the need for such a system is the receipt of a large volume of reporting from the Federal Bureau of Investigation which requires detailed retrieval capability for pertinent names cited, and which would not otherwise be retrievable under existing ISD procedures.) The control and retrieval system has an on-line remote query and remote input capability and is linked to an IBM 360/67 computer of the Office of Computer Services. Hardware involved includes nine IBM 2260 Cathode Ray Tube Terminals, five IBM 2741 Typewriter Terminals, one Data 100 Offline Printer, and one Data 100 Card Reader.

D. Production: In addition to disseminating pertinent information as collected, the Agency is responsible for preparation and provision of special reports, studies, and estimates on the sub-paragraph A above subject, in response to requirements levied upon it by other elements of the Government. To maximize compartmentation, such special studies, reports, or estimates are prepared by the Special Operations Group, rather than the DDI, utilizing either all information available to the Agency or all information available to the Government, depending upon the nature and scope of the particular requirement.

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1999

7 July 1972

MEMORANDUM

Response to Questions on Soviet/PRC Airlift Capabilities to North Vietnam, Introduction of New Weapons, and Use of PRC Airfields

Question A. USSR/PRC Airlift Capabilities

1. What is the capacity of the PRC and the USSR to airlift to NVN? How many aircraft suitable for airlift operation does each nation have? (What portion of total Soviet airlift capability would be utilized to deliver the estimated maximum 1,540 metric tons per day?)

The USSR, and to a lesser extent the PRC, each have an independent capability -- aircraft, staging airports, and trained manpower -- to institute an airlift to NVN. The extent of this capability as measured against the limitations on available aircraft, airports, routes, and serviceability is discussed below. Rather than taking the 1540 tons as a given, we have worked through the methodology not only to answer the specific questions asked but to check on the validity of the 1540 ton estimate itself.

a. USSR

The USSR has some 2,900 high-performance transport aircraft in their combined military and civil inventories (see Table 1). Because of operational range and cargo carrying capacity however, it is probable that only the medium transport AN-12s and heavy transport AN-22s would be used in such an airlift and that only aircraft in the military inventory would be involved.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Moreover, for this analysis we assume only 385 AN-12s (of a total inventory of 963 aircraft of this type) and 10 AN-22s (of a total of 22) would be made available because of other military requirements. The following tabulation shows the cargo carrying capacity of this fleet of 395 aircraft, assuming one round trip per aircraft per day, and an 85% utilization factor for the first week, 75% the next week, and 50% thereafter.*

Time Period	Total Per Day			
	AN-12**	AN-22**	Daily Total	Weekly Total
1st seven days	2,350	700	3,050	21,350
2nd seven days	2,100	600	2,700	18,900
After 14 days	1,200	400	1,600	11,200

Under these conditions, the cargo carrying capacity of this fleet would permit over 40,000 tons of cargo to be airlifted during the first two weeks and more than 11,000 tons per week thereafter. We estimate that on a 50% utilization rate the USSR could probably maintain its airlift effectively for about 4 to 6 months during which period carriage would approximate 1,600 tons per day.***

---

* These utilization factors reflect historical experience of other Soviet airlift operations including those noted in field exercises within the Soviet Union. (See paragraph 2.)

** For the purposes of this estimate we have assumed that the AN-22 will carry its maximum payload of 88 tons and the AN-12s will carry a little over 7 tons. These loadings would permit either aircraft to fly non-stop to NVN. (See paragraph 4.)

***

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b. PRC

Any airlift mounted by the PRC would essentially be a short haul operation. Nonetheless, such an operation would be hampered by the overall mix of available aircraft which is relatively obsolete and has limited cargo carrying capacities. For example, the PRC's combined military and civil air transport inventory numbers some 750 aircraft. Of this number, more than 60% (480) consist of the single engine AN-2 with a range of about 900 miles and a cargo capacity of 1.5 tons. An additional 63 are made up mainly of the twin engined LI-2 which can carry only about 3 tons and has a range of about 1200 miles. Ten other relatively modern aircraft, three Tridents and seven Vicounts, are excluded from consideration in this analysis because of their key role in Chinese civil and military air operations. We are, therefore, left with only about 207 aircraft for any airlift operation (see table 2). For this estimate we assume no more than one half of these aircraft (by type and subordination) would be made available for such an airlift. A larger allocation probably would cause massive dislocations of regular civil and military air traffic within the PRC. With these some 100 aircraft the PRC would be able to mount a relatively efficient airlift using close in staging bases in South China -- Kunming, Nanning, Ning Ming, and Fort Bayard. The following tabulation postulates the cargo carrying capacity for these aircraft subject to the same serviceability constraints applied to the Soviet fleet.*

Time Periods	Tons per Day	Tons per Week
1st week	600	4,200
2nd week	525	3,675
After 14 days	350	2,450

* Although the PRC would be operating older aircraft, their airlift would entail considerably shorter flight time. On this basis no changes were made in serviceability rates. In all cases the maximum cargo payload was used as the basis for calculations.

We estimate that during the first two weeks the PRC could move in about 8,000 tons of cargo and nearly 2,500 tons per week thereafter. At a 50% utilization, the PRC could probably maintain its airlift for about 3 to 5 months. At its peak the airlift could deliver about 600 tons per day which would be nearly halved after only two weeks.

2. What limiting factors exist in using PRC and USSR aircraft for airlift purposes?

Factors limiting the use of Soviet and PRC aircraft have been mentioned and taken into account in the estimates presented above. The constraints on aircraft serviceability may, indeed, be the single most important factor, particularly as they may affect the Soviet program because of its long haul nature. To the extent that aircraft suffer increasing levels of down time as the airlift proceeds, additional aircraft would either have to be added to the program or would have to be rotated in and out of the effort. Taking into account respective inventories, the USSR has greater flexibility than does the PRC.

3. What air routes and air terminal points might be utilized (including through India for USSR flights)?

The Soviet airlift could operate over two possible routes -- one via Tashkent-India-Burma-Laos and a second via Irkutsk transiting PRC airspace. Of the two, only the PRC route would be realistic; the distances (7,400 miles roundtrip) involved in the India route would reduce cargo carrying capacity by more than one half. The China route entails a roundtrip of about 5,000 miles. The effort could be launched from staging airports such as Tashkent, Omsk, Semipalatinsk, Novosibirsk, Usol'ye-Sibirskoye, and Irkutsk. The AN-22 aircraft would likely be operated from a single airport, probably Irkutsk. The AN-12s could operate from any or all of these six airports, but likely would be concentrated at one or two, including Irkutsk. Both aircraft would require a refueling stop either in North Vietnam or more likely at airports in southern China -- Kunming, Nanning, Ning Ming, and Fort Bayard. The terminal points in North Vietnam would be a few airports such as Yen Bai and Phuc Yen, but possibly including Cat Bai, Hanoi/Gia Lam, Kep, and Kien An. Because

of required runway length, the AN-22s would probably be limited to operating into Phuc Yen airport; the AN-12s could use all of the airports listed above. During the first week the Soviet estimate assumes a total of 335 flights per day handled by six airfields; 300 daily flights the second week; and 200 flights thereafter. The PRC estimate assumes a total 85 flights per day during the first week; 75 daily flights the second week; and 50 flights thereafter. North Vietnamese facilities could readily handle the PRC airlift, but they may be stretched to the maximum in handling the Soviet program which would require at its peak an average of more than 55 landings per day at each of the six airports, and at its lowest about 35 landings per day.

4. Assuming no authority to interdict USSR and/or PRC aircraft in-flight, what is our estimate of our capability to destroy items at the off-loading point?

The North Vietnamese would have difficulty in moving even the minimum daily tonnages contained in the Soviet estimate. Efficient movement would require expeditious handling and transporting of the cargo out of the environs of the airports. Some cargo almost certainly would be backed up and susceptible to destruction by air attack. If we assume that the airfields would not be attacked while the Soviet aircraft are on the ground, this means that the trucks might seek protection by being parked close to the Soviet or Chinese aircraft until nightfall at which time supplies would be moved out of the area. To the extent that night air attacks could be conducted on a sustained basis, the supply flows from the airfield would offer lucrative targets. However, at the present time most air attack are being flown during the day and it is questionable how effective night operations could be made under the high threat situation at most airfields -- the airfields in question are well defended by AAA, SAMs, and MIGs and the interdiction effort would be difficult and costly. Attacks against runways, however, would disrupt operations if carried out in a sustained and concentrated manner. Because of the much smaller tonnages involved, we anticipate that the North Vietnamese could handle the PRC airlift with much less difficulty, and could quickly disperse the arriving cargoes.

Question B. New Weapons

The introduction of a large, Soviet-manned SAM force into North Vietnam would seriously degrade US bombing capabilities in the area. Assuming such a force were to include improved SA-2 equipment and SA-3, SA-4, and SA-6 equipment, the effectiveness of US attacks against targets in North Vietnam would be reduced for several reasons:

a. The increased number of SAM launchers and the higher proficiency of Soviet crews would result in increased US aircraft losses.

b. The deployment of the SA-3 and SA-6 to North Vietnam would increase the low-altitude coverage of the air-defense system, thereby reducing US attack options.

c. The mobility of the SA-4 and SA-6 would make counterstrikes against these systems more difficult.

d. The greater number and variety of SAM systems would complicate the US electronic countermeasures problem.

Question C. Use of PRC Airfields

Several factors would limit the military advantage that might result from changing the rules of engagement to permit hot pursuit of North Vietnamese aircraft using China as a sanctuary. Combat in the Sino-North Vietnamese border regions would be conducted at minimum range for North Vietnamese aircraft but at long range for US land-based aircraft. Fuel constraints would impose at least some limits on tactics and maneuver for US aircraft, whereas the North Vietnamese would gain from the proximity of GCI radars immune from attack.

By far the greatest military disadvantage that must be considered in any decision to remove the buffer zone, however, could arise from the virtual certainty that accidential over-flights of Chinese territory would result, coupled with China's demonstrated willingness and capability to defend its airspace. The Chinese can conduct intensive air patrols of the entire North Vietnamese border, and even a brief intrusion into Chinese territory could draw an immediate response. A total of at least 150 Chinese jet fighters are currently based at Ning Ming, T'ien-yang, Nanning, Meng-tzu, and Ssu-mao airfields, and more could be deployed quickly to Ping-yuan-chieh (and to the other airfields as well) if the Chinese chose. All six airfields are within 100 nautical miles of the North Vietnamese border and capable of supporting defensive fighter patrols. Only MIG-19s and MIG-17s are now based in the border region, but small numbers of MIG-21s were active there during the previous US bombing campaign, and they could return on short notice.

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Table 1

The USSR: Cargo Lift Capacity of the Civil (Aeroflot) and Military Transport Aircraft

Type and Model	Cruise Speed (Knots	Range (Nautical Miles) Normal Payload	Range (Nautical Miles) Maximum Payload	Cargo Capacity Normal	Cargo Capacity Maximum	Civil (Aeroflot) Inventory Number of Units	Civil (Aeroflot) Inventory Cargo* Capacity	Military Inventory Number of Units	Military Inventory Cargo* Capacity	Total Number of Units	Total Cargo* Capacity
Jet											
TU-104A (Camel)	465	2,200	1,550	16	15	60	900	9	135	69	1,035
TU-104B (Camel)	445	2,150	1,600	18	15	85	1,275	--		85	1,275
TU-124 (Cookpot)	430	1,550	1,250	13	8	75	600	25	200	100	800
TU-134 (Crusty)	420	1,850	1,420	15	10	80	800	5	50	85	850
TU-154 (Careless)	460	2,850	2,050	18	25	8	200			8	200
IL-62 (Classic)	435	4,950	3,700	13	30	44	1,320	--	--	44	1,320
YAK-40 (Codling)	300	820	310	2	4	200	800	1	4	201	804
Sub-total						525	5,895	40	389	592	6,284
Turboprop											
AN-8 (Camp)	285	2,650	800	8	14	--	--	100	1,400	100	1,400
AN-10 (Cat)	335	1,450	540	10	16	85	1,360	27	432	112	1,792
AN-12 (Cub)	335	1,670-3,800	150-730	5-11	22	153	3,366	810	17,820	963	21,186
AN-22 (Cock)	360	5,100	2,900	50	88	2	176	20	1,760	22	1,936
AN-24/26	255	1,150	430	4	4	635	4,445	70	490	705	4,935
IL-18 (Coot)	320	3,120-4,250	2,020-2,400	12	17	362	6,154	9	153	371	6,307
TU-114 (Cleat)	415	5,500	4,000	17	33	29	957	--	--	29	957
Sub-total						1,266	16,458	1,036	22,055	2,302	38,513
Total						1,818	22,353	1,076	22,444	2,894	44,797

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* Cargo capacity in tons.

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Table 2
PRC Transport Aircraft Inventory and Cargo Lift Capability a/

Type and Model	Range (Nautical Miles)		No. of Aircraft			Unit Cargo Capacity		Total Cargo Capacity	
	Normal Payload	Maximum Payload	Military	Civilian	Total	Normal	Maximum	Normal	Maximum
Turboprop									
AN-12	1670-3800	150-730	11	2	13	5-11	22	65-143	286
AN-24	1,150	430	6	6	12	4	4	48	48
IL-18(D)	3120-4250	2020-2400	9	11	20	12	17	240	340
Piston									
C-46(A)	1,025	500 or less	28	-	28	28	5	78	140
C-47	1,040	800	3	-	3	2	4.8	6	14
IL-12	1,600	500	32	4	36	2.4	4.0	86	144
IL-14(M)	1,600	500	48	47	95	3.2	5.2	304	494
Totals			137	70	207			827-905	1,466

a/ Excludes 480 AN-2 aircraft, 63 other aircraft types deemed unsuitable for a large cargo airlift and 3 Tridents and 7 Viscounts. Most of the piston type transports are capable of side-loading only and would therefore be restricted to handling relatively small size cargoes.

c. How many Latin American Governments follow this procedure? How many don't follow it?

There are 23 countries in OAS. Only a few trade with Cuba. There is small but growing exchange with Chile (sugar for beans and wine); with Peru (sugar for fish meal); and with Mexico. Mexican trade consists primarily of Cuban imports of Mexican corn, almost all of which are on Soviet account. Latin American islands trading with Cuba are Guadelupe, Martinique, and Jamaica. This trade, however, is insignificant. Available statistics on the trade of these countries with Cuba in 1971 is given in the tabulation below. (in US$ 1,000)

	Cuban Exports	Cuban Imports
Chile	15,000	15,000
Peru	Negl.	4,000
Mexico	6	70
Jamaica	Insig.	Insig.
Guadelupe	Insig.	Insig.
Martinique	Insig.	Insig.

Question 8. As far as Latin American policy goes, what difference does it make it they did ship government or government-financed cargo to Cuba?

In economic terms probably none. Of the trade mentioned above, we are not aware that any Latin American exports have involved government or government financed cargo. We doubt that there would be any significant amount of government or government financed trade with Cuba, with the possible exception of Chile.

[redacted]

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JUL 20 1972

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[redacted]

20 JUL 1972

SUBJECT: Broadcasts from North Vietnam

1. [redacted]

2. The following broadcasts from North Vietnam have been monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and are attached for your convenience and retention:

A. "American Actress Jane Fonda Arrives for Hanoi Visit," Hanoi, Vietnam News Agency (VNA) International Service in English, 1542 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), 8 July 1972.

REC-66 100-459279-381

B. "Talk to POW's Attributed to Jane Fonda," Hanoi in English to Southeast Asia, 1000 GMT, 10 July 1972.

ST-105

C. "Jane Fonda Describes Impressions of North Vietnam," Hanoi, Domestic Service in Vietnamese, 1115 GMT, 11 July 1972.

14 JUL 21 1972

D. "Jane Fonda in Hanoi Says She Will Report to U.S. Public," Paris, Agence France Presse (AFP) in French, 0817 GMT, 12 July 1972.

E. "Jane Fonda Condemns U.S. Bombings in Message to U.S. Pilots," Hanoi, VNA in English to Southeast Asia, 1530 GMT, 13 July 1972.

MCT-61 sd.

[redacted]

[redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY [redacted]

Returned DD via WO Cuyler Thurston

[redacted]

[redacted]

51 JUL 31 1972

FBI/DOJ

Encl. (2)

100-459279-381

[redacted]

F. "Jane Fonda Condemns Bombing of Dikes", Hanoi, VNA International Service in English, 0246 GMT, 14 July 1972.

G. "Jane Fonda's Activities, Statement on Bombed Dikes", Hanoi, VNA in English to Havana, 0709 GMT, 14 July 1972.

3. According to your report from Los Angeles, dated 20 January 1972, Subject; Jane FONDA, FONDA was issued a passport under the name Jane Seymour PLEMIANNIKOV.

4. The above information is provided in response to your request for information on FONDA's travel to Hanoi made in your Teletype 002, dated 17 March 1971, Subject: Jane FONDA.

Please transmit reply via [redacted] channel

Attachments: a/s

[redacted]

[redacted]

ZZYUW RUATKMA4968 1941612-UUUU--RUTLAAA,

UUUUU ZYN

1215342 JUL 72 ZYZ1

M FBIS OKINAWA

O RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV

UADFBA/FBIS TOKYO

UAOBQA/7TH PSYOPS OKINAWA

UTLAAA/FBIS WASHDC

RUHCMMA/FBIS SAIGON

RUDOMKA/FBIS LONDON

FBOW/

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UNCLAS BBC RUAD

COPY TO LIAISON

TALK TO POWS ATTRIBUTED TO JANE FONDA

B121534 HANOI IN ENGLISH TO SOUTHEAST ASI 1830 GMT 10 JUL 72 B

((TEXT)) IN A COMMENTARY ON NIXON'S DECLALATION THAT HE HAS MADE

PROGRESS IN ENDING THE WAR AND PARTICULARLY IN ENDING AMERICAN

[redacted]

OLVEMENT IN THE WAR, VISITING AMERICAN ACTRESS JANE FONDA SAID
[redacted]
AY MORNING:

((RECORDED VOICE OF A WOMAN WITH AN AFRICAN ACCENT--FADES))

THE ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES ARE DRAWING NEAR,

CHARD NIXON IS USING THE MOST CYNICAL AND CRIMINAL KINDS OF

IES AND TRICKERY TO FOOL THE AMERICAN OPINION AND WORLD OPINION

NTO BELIEVING THAT HE IS TRYING TO END THE WAR IN INDOCHINA, HOW

AN HE BE ENDING THE WAR WHEN HE IS KILLING MORE PEOPLE IN

NDOCHINA THAN EVER BEFORE, DROPPING MORE TONS OF BOMBS THAN

VER BEFORE CREATING MORE DAMAGE THAN EVER BEFORE, AND NOW BOMBING

HE DIKES IN THE RED RIVER DELTA, ENDANGERING THE LIVES OF 15

ILLION PEOPLE, AD THEIR CROPS AND ANIMALS,

HE IS COUNTING UPON WHAT HE BELIEVES THAT THE AMERICAN

AVE NO CONSCIENCE, HE BELIEVES THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE DON'T

ARE, SINCE THERE ARE FEWER AMERICAN LIVES BEING LOST, BUT HE IS

RONG, WE WILL LEARN THE TRUTH, INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE COME HERE

AVE HAD THE HONOR TO HAVE COME HERE AND--AND MET--MEET THE VIETNAMESE

PEOPLE AND SEEN THE DAMAGE BEING DONE, WE WILL SPEAK OUT LOUDER

THAN EVER BEFORE, WE WILL EXPOSE HIS LIES, PARTICULARLY NOW IN

THIS MOST IMPORTANT TIME JUST PRIOR TO ELECTIONS,

WE KNOW THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE WAY TO END THE WAR, AND THAT

IS IN THE PARIS PEACE TALKS, THE ONLY WAY TO END THE WAR IS BY

[redacted] TO OURSELVES IN HONOR AND [redacted] AS TRUE PLACE-LO...G

CPLE TO THE SEVEN-POINT PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD LAST JULY 31ST

THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT, THE UNITED STATES

ST SET A DATE UNCONDITIONALLY FOR ALL TROOPS--AIR TROOPS,

OUND TROOPS, AND CIA ADVISORS TO WITHDRAW FROM INDOCHINA, WE MUST

STOP THE SUPPORT OF THE THIEU CLIQUE AND LET THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH

VIETNAM TO DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES WHAT KIND OF GOVERNMENT THEY WANT

TO LIVE UNDER, AND WE WILL SPEAK OUT ABOUT THE SEVEN POINTS ALL

OVER THE WORLD.

((ANNOUNCER'S VOICE--FBIS)) COMMENTING ON U.S. ATTACKS ON NORTH

VIETNAM'S DIKES AND IRRIGATION WORKS, JANE FONDA SAID:

((RECORDED VOICE OF A WOMAN WITH AN AMERICAN ACCENT--FBIS))

A RELATIVELY SHOT TIME AGO ((WORDS INDISTINCT)) 3 YEARS AGO,

PEOPLE TOLD ME THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WAS COMMITTING

CRIMES IN--IN VIETNAM, CRIMES ON THE GROUND AGAINST THE PEOPLE AND

CRIMES FROM THE AIR WITH BOMBS, AND I REFUSED TO BELIEVE IT,

I THOUGHT VERY HARD BECAUSE I HAD BEEN BROUGHT UP TO

BELIVE THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT STOOD FOR FREEDOM

AND DEMOCRACY, THEN I BEGAN TO STUDY--I BEGAN TO READ, I BEGAN

TO LISTEN TO REPORTS COMING FROM THE BATTLEFIELD, AND I BEGAN TO

TALK TO SOLDIERS, BRAVE HEROES OF THE WAR WOULD COME BACK FROM

INDOCHINA AND I WAS TOLD THAT IT IS WE WHO COMMITTED CRIMES,

S[redacted] WHO BURNED VILLAGES AND MASSACRED CIVILIAN PEOPLE AND

D THE VIETNAMESE WOMEN. IT IS WE WHO DID IT AND WE ARE

Y, AND WE WANT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO KNOW WHAT IS BEING DONE

THEIR NAMES.

AND AT THAT POINT I HAVE--HAD TO, LIKE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF OTHER

ERICAN PEOPLE, I HAD TO LET GO OF THE LIE. I HAD TO ADMIT TO

YSELF--AND WE ALL MUST--THAT SOMEWHERE ALONG THE WAY THE UNITED

TATES STOPPED BEING WHAT IT HOPED TO BE IN THE BEGINNING WHEN WE

IRST FOUGHT A REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO FREE OURSELVES FROM THE BRITISH,

ROM THE BRITISH CONTROL.

THIS IS WHAT IS A HAPPENING IN VIETNAM TODAY, IT IS A PEOPLE

IGHTING TO BE FREE. THEY ARE FIGHTING A RIGHTEOUS, REVOLUTIONARY

AR TO BE FREE AND INDEPENDENT THE WAY WE, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE,

DID IN THE BEGINNING OF OUR OWN COUNTRY. AND WE MUST ALLOW THEM

TO DO THIS, AND IF WE ARE ARE TRUE AMERICANS, AND IF WE TRULY

BELIEVE WHAT IT IS OUR COUNTRY STANDS FOR OR STARTED OUT TO STAND

FOR, WE MUST NOT ONLY STOP THESE BARBARIOUS ACTS BEING COMMITTED

AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, BUT WE MUST HELP THEM ACHIEVE THEIR--

THEIR REVOLUTION.

WE MUST DO EVERYTHING WE CAN IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY AND FREDOM

TO ALLOW THEM TO LIVE IN PEACE AND INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM. WE

MUST TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY SINCE WE ARE HERE ON [redacted] THEIR SOIL--UNDER

T[illegible] CONDITIONS WE ARE HERE--TO STUDY THEIR CULTURE AND STUDY THEIR

I [redacted]

TORY AND TALK TO THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, TRY TO SENSITIZE OURSELVES

ANOTHER KIND OF CULTURE. ONE OF THE WORST THINGS THAT HAS

EN PLACE IN THE UNITED STATES, I BELIEVE, IS THAT WE ARE CUT

FROM OTHER PEOPLES AROUND THE WORLD. WE ARE--WE ARE MADE TO--TO

CK RESPECT FOR OTHER PEOPLES, PARTICULARLY PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT

HITE, AND I THINK THAT THIS IS WRONG, I FEEL THAT PEOPLE WHO ARE

ULY AMERICAN AND TRULY PATRIOTIC MUST SAY WE LOVE ALL PEOPLE,

ND WE HAVE TO UNDERSTAND HOW ALL PEOPLE LIVE, AND WE HAVE TO

ESPECT EVERYONE'S RIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE.

AND, I'M SURE THAT YOU--THAT YOU KNOW THAT WE WISH THAT YOU

ONE HOME AS FAST AS POSSIBLE. I BELIVE THAT THE PEOPLE WHO

RE SPEAKING OUT AGAINST THE WAR, WHO ARE TRYING TO STOP

HE WAR--BY VOTING AGAINST MR. NIXON FOR ONE THING, BY ECONOMIC

OYCOTT FOR ANOTHER THING, AND BY EDUCATION AND PERSUASION AMONG

HE GENERAL AMERICAN PUBLIC--THAT IT IS WE WHO ARE DOING WHAT

S BEST TO GET YOU HOME AS FAST AS POSSIBLE. THE KEY TO THE

PRISONS IN THE NORTHERN PART OF VIETNAM IS IN NIXON'S HANDS,

T IS NIXON WHO--WHO WILL BE ABLE TO FREE ALL OF THE PRISONERS,

E CAN DO THIS BY [AUTHORING THE SEVEN-POINT PEACE PROPOSAL THAT

AS PUT FORWARD A YEAR AGO, LAST JULY,

IT IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR [redacted] TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE SOLUTION

YOUR PROBLEMS HAS EXISTED FOR 1 YEAR, FOR 1 YEAR, IF RICHARD

[redacted]

N AT THE PARIS PEACE TALKS LAST JULY HAD ADDRESSED HIMSELF

THE SEVEN-POINT PEACE PROPOSAL, WHICH IS RECOGNIZED BY

PLE ALL OVER THE WORLD AS BEING THE MOST JUST AND RIGHTEOUS

POSAL EVER PUT FORWARD BY ONE SIDE DURING A PERIOD OF WAR, ALL

YOU WOULD HAVE BEEN HOME WITHIN 3 MONTHS. AND WE THINK

HIS IS A CRIME,

WE THINK THIS IT IS A CRIME THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED

TATES HAS CYNICALLY PREVENTED YOUR FREEDOM, HAS CYNICALLY LIED

O THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, MAKING THEM BELIVE THAT IT IS HE WHO IS

EKING PEACE, WHEN WE KNOW IT IS THE COUNTRARY,

WE HOPE THAT YOU ARE TAKING THIS TIME TO STUDY, TO LEARN, SO

HAT WHEN YOU COME HOME YOU CAN SPEAK TO THE REST OF THE AMERICAN

EOPLE, AND WE HOPE THAT WILL BE SOON, ((RECORDING ENDS--FBIS))

21400 [redacted] 12/1653Z JUL

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[redacted]

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ZNR UUUUU ZYN

O 150552Z JUL 72 ZFZ1

FM FBIS OKINAWA

TO RHHSMVA/COMUSMACV

RUADRGA/7TH PSYOPS OKINAWA

RUALFBA/FBIS TOKYO

RUTLAAA/FBIS WASHDC

RUHCMHA/FBIS SAIGON

RUDCMKA/FBIS LONDON

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UNCLAS BPC RUAD

COPY TO LIAISON

AMERICAN ACTRESS JANE FONDA ARRIVES FOR HANOI VISIT

RO61555 HANOI VNA INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN ENGLISH 1542 GMT

5 JUL 72 B

[redacted]

((TEXT)) HANOI VNA JULY 5 "I COME TO VIETNAM AS A COMRADE," 100-459279-381 Enc.

LARED JANE FONDA ON HER ARRIVAL HERE TODAY FOR A VISIT TO NORTH

TNAM AT THE INVITATION OF THE VIETNAM COMMITTEE FOR SOLIDARITY

H THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

THE AMERICAN ACTRESS SAID: "MY LIFE HAS CHANGED OVER THE PAST

EV YEARS BECAUSE OF MY RECOGNIZING THE HYPOCRISY AND CRIMINALITY

F A SUCCESSION OF U.S. GOVERNMENTS PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO VIETNAM,

LONG WITH TENS OF THOUSANDS FOF OTHER AMERICANS OF ALL AGES

ND CLASSES. THIS NEW CONSCIOUSNESS WAS AWAKENED BY THE VIETNAMESE

EOPLE. YOUR STRUGGLE, COURAGE, CULTURE HAS FORCED US TO RECOGNIZE

ERTAIN TRUTHS ABOUT OUR COUNTRY AND WHAT WILL BE NECESSARY TO CHANGE

T... I COME TO VIETNAM AS A COMRADE."

THE AMERICAN ACTRESS WHO HAS BEEN PLAYING AN ACTIVE ROLE IN

THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES WAS WELCOMED BY

NGUYEN DINH THI, VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE HOST COMMITTEE, NGUYEN

HONG NGHI, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE VIETNAM CINEMA WORKERS ASSOCIATION;

FILM ACTRESS TRA GIANG, AND OTHERS. 081542 [redacted] SH 88/2220Z JUL

BT

#2652

[redacted]

[redacted]

UZYUW RUHOHHA0u14 1947550-UUUU--RUTLAAA.

ZF UUUUU ZYH

127547Z JUL 72 ZNZ1

FM FBIS SAIGON

TO RUTLAAA/FBIS WASHDC

INFO RUAOPLA/7TH PSYOPS GP OKINAWA

RUQMKA/FBIS LONDON

RUDFBA/FBIS TOKYO

RUEKHA/FBIS OKINAWA

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UNCLAS FBC

COPY TO LIAISON

JANE FONDA DESCRIBES IMPRESSIONS OF NORTH VIETNAM

SK127547 HANOI DOMESTIC SERVICE IN VIETNAMESE 1115 GMT

11 JUL 72 S

((TEXT)) FAMOUS U.S. MOVIE ACTRESS JANE FONDA ARRIVED

IN HANOI LAST SATURDAY BEGINNING HER VISIT TO THE DRV AT

[redacted]

INVITATION OF THE VIETNAM COMMITTEE FOR SOLIDARITY WITH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

T AS U.S. AIRCRAFT,

NIXON'S ORDERS, HAVE VIOLENTLY AND BARBAROUSLY BOMBING

ULOUS AREAS OF HANOI CAPITAL. MEANWHILE NIXON BRAZENLY

ATED THAT "WE HAVE MADE PROGRESS IN ENDING THE WAR

D PARTICULARLY IN ENDING U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE WAR."

EXPRESSING HER VIEWS ON THIS STATEMENT, JANE FONDA

OLD OUR STATION CORRESPONDENT:

((STATEMENT IN ENGLISH, FADING INTO VIETNAMESE

RANSLATION--RECORDING)) AS THE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

RE DRAWING NEAR RICHARD NIXON IS USING CYNICAL WORDS

ND UGLY, CRIMINAL TRICKERY TO FOOL AMERICAN OPINION AND

ORLD OPINION INTO BELIEVING THAT HE IS TRYING TO END THE

AR IN INDOCHINA. HOW CAN HE END THE WAR WHEN HE KILLS MORE

EOPLE IN INDOCHINA THAN EVER BEFORE, DROPS MORE TONS OF

OMBS THAN EVER BEFORE AND CREATES MORE DAMAGE THAN EVER BEFORE?

E IS NOW DROPPING BOMBS ON DIKES AND DAMS IN THE RED RIVER

ELTA, THUS THREATENING THE LIVES OF 16 MILLION PEOPLE

AND THEIR CROPS AND LIVESTOCK. HE IS THINKING OF WHAT HE

BELIEVES THE AMERICAN PEOPLE NO LONGER PAY ATTENTION TO.

E THINKS THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE NO LONGER INTERESTED

[redacted]

...S. CASUALTIES IN THAT WAR. BUT HE IS MISTAKEN.

...E WILL KNOW THE TRUTH. MANY PEOPLE HAVE COME TO

THAM AND MANY OTHERS HAVE HAD THE HONOR TO COME HERE

MEET THEIR FRIENDS--THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE--AND SEE

...TH THEIR OWN EYES THE LOSSES CAUSED BY THE AMERICANS HERE.

OUGHT TO SPEAK OUT THAT TRUTH MORE EXTENSIVELY AND

...EARLY THAN EVER. WE WILL EXPOSE THAT DECEIT, ESPECIALLY

THE PRESENT, MOST IMPORTANT MOMENT PRIOR TO THE

...ECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.

WE KNOW THAT THE ONLY WAY TO END THE WAR THROUGH THE

...RIS PEACE TALKS IS TO RESPOND, IN HONOR AND IN THE CAPACITY

...F TRUE PEACE-LOVING PEOPLE, TO THE SEVEN-POINT PROPOSAL

...T FORTH BY THE PRGRSV ON 1 JULY 1971. THE UNITED STATES

/

...UST UNCONDITIONALLY SET A DEADLINE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL

...F ALL THE U.S. ARMED FORCES AND CIA ADVISERS FROM INDOCHINA.

...HE UNITED STATES MUST STOP SUPPORTING THE THIEU CLIQUE

...ND LET THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE DECIDE THE TYPE

...F GOVERNMENT AS THEY PLEASE; AND WE WILL CLEARLY PRESENT

...HESE SEVEN POINTS ALL OVER THE WORLD. ((END RECORDING))

FOLLOWING THIS, EXPRESSING HER FIRST IMPRESSIONS UPON

...RRIVING[redacted]

CIAL - PRESENTATION OF THE MAY 16 PEACE PROPOSALS

A NUMBER OF FIGHTERS, ARTISTS AND VICTIMIZED PEOPLE COMING

SOUTH VIETNAM. SHE WAS CORDIALLY RECEIVED BY NGUYEN PHU

, ACTING HEAD OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATION.

STATEMENT BY JANE FONDA, AFTER VISITING DIKES AND DAMS AT NAM

ICH HIT BY U.S. AIRCRAFT ((R--SUBHEAD TRANSMITTED IN VIETNAMESE

VNA--FBIS))

YESTERDAY MORNING ON JULY 12, I WENT TO THE DISTRICT OF NAM

ACH TO SEE THE DAMAGE THAT HAS BEEN DONE TO THE DYKES IN THAT

ISTRICT. AND I WONDERED WHAT HAS BEEN GOING ON WITH THE HANDS

F THOSE WHO WERE PULLING THE LEVER AND DROPPING THE BOMBS ON

HE FIELDS AND ON THE DYKES OF THE RED RIVER DELTA. DO YOU KNOW

OR EXAMPLE THAT FOR CENTURIES SINCE THE MIDDLE AGES, THE VIETNAMESE

EASANTS HAVE BUILT, BUILT UP, AND REINFORCED A GREAT COMPLEX

ETWORK OF DYKES WHICH HOLD BACK THE TORRENTIAL WATER OF THE RIVERS

LOWING DOWN FROM THE MOUNTAINS IN SUMMER DURING THE MONSOON SEASON.

ITHOUT THESE DYKES 15 MILLION PEOPLE'S LIVES WOULD BE ENDANGERED,

ND WOULD DIE BY DROWNING AND BY STRVATION. ANTHONY LEWIS

ROM THE NEW YORK TIMES WROTE AND ARTICLE JUST BEFORE I LEFT THE

.S. IN WHICH HE SAID THAT SUCCESSIVE U.S. ADMINISTRATIONS

AD REJECTED THE IDEAS OF BOMBING THE DYKES IN THE RED RIVER DELTA,

ECAUSE THEY ALL FELT THE DYKES AREN'T ENTIRELY MILITARY TARGETS.

[redacted] WAS ITS TYPE OF TERRORIST TACTIC THAT IS UNWORTHY OF AMERICAN

[redacted]PLE AND OF AMERICAN FLAGS. BUT TODAY, AMERICAN PHANTOM

S ARE BOMBING THE STRATEGIC POINTS IN THE DYKE NETWORKS

THIS AREA.

IN THE AREA WHERE I WENT YESTERDAY IT WAS EASY TO SEE THAT

HERE ARE NO MILITARY TARGETS. THERE IS NO IMPORTANT HIGHWAY,

HERE IS NO COMMUNICATION NETWORK, THERE IS NO HEAVY INDUSTRY,

HESE ARE PEASANTS. THEY GROW RICE AND THEY REAR PIGS. THEY

RE SIMILAR TO THE FARMERS IN THE MIDWEST MANY YEARS AGO IN THE

.S. THEY ARE HAPPY PEOPLE, THE PEACE-LOVING PEOPLE. WHEN I WENT

Y WALKING ON THE WAY TO THE DYKES TO SEE THE DAMAGE, WOULD IT

E MADE ENOUGH I WAS AN AMERICAN AND I WAS AFRAID OF THE REACTION

OULD BE TAKEN BY THE LOCAL PEOPLE. ((SENTENCE AS RECEIVED))

UT THEY LOOKED AT ME CURIOUSLY AND I SAW NO HOSTILITY IN THEIR

YES. I LOOKED VERY CAREFULLY. I THOUGHT CURIOUSLY. I AM

HE WOMEN. THEY SEEMED TO BE ASKING THEMSELVES: WHAT KIND OF

EOPLE CAN AMERICANS BE, THOSE WHO WOULD DROP ALL KINDS OF BOMBS,

O CARELESSLY ON THEIR INNOCENT HEADS, DESTROYING THEIR VILLAGES

ND ENDANGERING THE LIVES OF THESE MILLIONS OF PEOPLE. 140709

[redacted] 14/1233Z JUL

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:11c8 [redacted]

[redacted]

AT WAR. VIETNAM SEEMS TO LIVE IN PEACE AND IS NORTH

IND. THE COMBATANTS WHOM I HAVE MET ON THE STREETS DO NOT

A LIKE SOLDIERS, BUT LOOK AS PEACEFUL AND KIND AS

ILIANS AT WORK. I LOOKED AT THE EYES OF THE VIETNAMESE

OPLE WHOM I MET WHEN I CROSSED A BRIDGE ON MY WAY

) HANOI AND I WAS EXTREMELY SURPRISED BY THE FACT THAT I

AW NO MANIFESTATION OF HATRED FOR US, THE AMERICANS.

THOUGHT THE PEOPLE HERE WOULD MANIFEST THEIR HATRED FOR US,

HE AMERICANS, V BUT THE TRUTH IS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT.

HAVE BEEN EXTREMELY MOVED BY THIS, AND IT MADE ME

LEARLY REALIZE THAT I MUST ACT MORE AND MORE TO OPPOSE

HIS WAR AVIEND IT AND MAKE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

LIZE THAT THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ARE FRIENDS OF OUR

MERICAN PEOPLE, NOT OUR ENEMY. ((END RECORDING)) iiiii5

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FM FBIS PUERTO RICO

TO FBIS WASHDC

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COPY TO LIAISON

JANE FONDA IN HANOI SAYS SHE WILL REPORT TO U.S. PUBLIC

R121518 PARIS AFP IN FRENCH 0817 GMT 12 JUL 72 C

(TEXT)) HANOI, 12 JUL--BY AFP CORRESPONDENT JEAN THOROVAL--AMERICAN ACTRESS JANE FONDA, WHO HAS BEEN VISITING HANOI SINCE LAST SATURDAY, HAS BEEN HONORED BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PRESS, THE PARTY PAPER NHAN DAN DEVOTED A LONG ARTICLE TO HER THE DAY AFTER HER ARRIVAL WITH A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN AT THE GIA LAM AIRPORT WHICH SHOWS HER EMBRACING NORTH VIETNAMESE ACTRESS TRA GIANG. THIS FACT IS EXTREMELY RARE, SINCE IT INVOLVES A NONCOMMUNIST U.S. CITIZEN.

[redacted]

[redacted] PRESIDENT OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE COMMITTEE OF SOLIDARITY WITH AMERICAN PEOPLE, GREETEDHERE WHEN SHE LEFT THE PLANE;

THE ARTS AND LETTERS NEWSPAPER, VAN-NGHE, DEVOTED A PAGE AND HALF THE ACTRESS, RECALLING HER MILITANT ACTIVITIES AND HER DIFFERENCES WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, VAN-NGHE WROTE: JANE FONDA IS THE TYPE OF PERSON WHO IS AWARE THAT AS LONG AS THERE ARE MASSACRES IN THE WORLD, A PERSON CANNOT REMAIN A MERE SPECTATOR.

JANE FONDA TOLD THE AFP CORRESPONDENT THAT SHE HAD COME TO NORTH VIETNAM TO MAKE RADIO REPORTS AND WRITE ARTICLES FOR THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. THE ACTRESS SAID DURING THIS CONVERSATION THAT AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION HAS PRESENTLY BEEN POISONED BY THE FALSE U.S. PROPAGANDA ON THE VIETNAM WAR AND THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

JANE FONDA SAID THAT THE U.S. PILOTS WHO TAKE PART IN THE BOMBING ARE CONDITIONED ASSASSINS, HANDSOMELY PAID. THEY HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT BY BOMBING THE VIETNAMESE THEY ARE IN FACT ONLY BOMBING APES.

THE ACTRESS, ON HER VISIT TO NORTH VIETNAM, HAS ALREADY HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET SOME U.S. PILOTS WHO ARE PRISONERS OF WAR BEING HELD IN HANOI. SHE WILL VISIT THE INTERIOR AREAS AFTER MEETING WITH SEVERAL NORTH VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES IN HANOI.

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

UZYUW RUAJKMA1251 1971208-UUUU--RUTLAAA.

ZR UUUUU ZYH

151225Z JUL 72 ZNZ1

FM FBIS OKINAWA

TO RHMSNVA/COMUSMACV

UADBOA/7TH PSYOPS OKINAWA

UADFBA/FBIS TOKYO

UTLAAA/FBIS WASHDC

UMCHMA/FBIS SAIGON

RUDONKA/FBIS LONDON

ZEN/BOW

ZNY

UNCLAS BBC RUAD

COPY TO LIAISON

JANE FONDA CONDEMNS U.S. BOMBINGS IN MESSAGE TO U.S. PILOTS

R171205 ANSWERING O'DONNELL'S 141712

FOR EARLIER, VARIANT VERSIONS SEE FBIS 141112 HANOI VNA ENGLISH TO

[redacted]

[redacted]

[1] IN ENGLISH TO SOUTHEAST ASIA 1533 GMT 13 JULY 72 C

((TEXT)) AMERICAN ACTRESS JANE FONDA, NOW ON THE CURRENT VISIT

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, ALSO VISITED THE BOMBED

ES AT NAM SACH, WEDNESDAY MORNING, WITNESSING THE U.S.

RIMES IN DESTROYING NORTH VIETNAM'S DIKES AND IRRIGATION WORKS.

HE HAD THIS TO SAY TO THE AMERICAN PILOTS WHO ARE FLYING CRIMINAL

AIDS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM ON NIXON'S ORDER: ((FOLLOWS RECORDED

EMALE VOICE WITH AMERICAN ACCENT--FBIS))

THIS IS JANE FONDA IN HANOI, YESTERDAY MORNING, ON JULY

.2. I WENT TO THE DISTRICT OF NAM SACH TO SEE THE DAMAGE THAT HAS

EEN DONE TO THE DIKES IN THAT DISTRICT, AND I WONDERED WHAT CAN

BE GOING ON IN THE HEADS OF THE MEN WHO ARE PULLING THE LEVERS

AND DROPPING THE BOMBS ON THE FIELDS AND ON THE DIKES OF THE RED

RIVER DELTA.

DO YOU KNOW, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THIS CENTURY, CRUCIAL MIDDLE

AGES, ((AS HEARD)) THE VIETNAMESE PEASANTS HAVE BUILT, BUILT UP

AND REINFORCED A VERY COMPLEX NETWORK OF DIKES, WHICH HOLD BACK

THE TORRENTIAL WATERS FROM THE RIVERS THAT FLOW DOWN FROM THE

MOUNTAINS EVERY SUMMER DURING THE MONSOON SEASON. WITHOUT THESE

DIKES, 15 MILLION PEOPLE'S LIVES WOULD BE ENDANGERED, BY DROWNING

AND BY STARVATION. [redacted]

[redacted]

UZYUW RUADKNA1143 1660610-UUUU--RUTLAAA.

· UUUUU ZYN

14R3157 JUL 72 ZNZ1

H FBIS OKINAWA

O RHMSHVA/COMUSMACV

UADBOA/7TH PSYOPS OKINAWA

UADFBA/FBIS TOKYO

UTLAAA/FBIS WASHDC

UHDMNA/FBIS SAIGON

UDOMKA/FBIS LONDON

BCN

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UNCLAS BBC RUAD

COPY TO LIAISON

ACTRESS JANE FONDA CONDEMNS BOMBING OF DIKES

R140315 HANOI VNA INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN ENGLISH 0246 GMT

14 JUL 72 B

((TEXT)) HANOI VNA JULY 14--CONTRARY TO THE STATEMENT OF U.S.

[redacted]

ARTICLE JUST BEFORE I LEF, THE UNITED STATES IN WHIC. HE SAID
T A SUCCESS--THE SUCCESSIVE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIONS HAD REJECTED
IDEA OF BOMBING THE DIKES IN THE RED RIVER DELTA BECAUSE THEY
FELT THAT IT WAS A TYPE OF TERRORIST TACTIC THAT WE UNWORTHY
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE AMERICAN FLAG. BUT TODAY, AS YOU
NOW BETTER THAN I, PHANTOM JETS, AMERICAN PHANTOM JETS, ARE
OMBING AT STRATEGIC POINTS THE DIKE NETWORKS IN THIS AREA.
I IMPLORE YOU, I BEG YOU TO CONSIDER WHAT YOU ARE DOING.
N THE AREA WHERE I WENT YESTERDAY IT WAS VERY EASY TO SEE THAT
HERE ARE NO MILITARY TARGETS, THERE IS NO IMPORTANT HIGHWAY,
HERE IS NO COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK, THERE IS NO HEAVY INDUSTRY.
HESE ARE PEASANTS; THEY GROW RICE, AND THEY BREED PIGS, VERY
IMILAR TO THE FARMERS IN THE MIDWEST MANY YEARS AGO IN THE UNITED
STATES. PERHAPS YOUR GRANDMOTHERS AND GRANDFATHERS WERE NOT TO
IFFERENT FROM THESE PEASANTS. THEY ARE HAPPY PEOPL. THEY ARE A
EACELOVING PEOPLE.

WHEN I WENT BY, WALKING ON THE WAY TO THE DIKES TO SEE THE DAMAGE,
ORD HAD GOTTEN OUT THAT I WAS AN AMERICAN, AND I WAS AFRAID OF
WHAT THEIR REACTION WOULD BE. BUT THEY LOOKED AT ME CURIOUSLY,
AND I SAW NO HOSTILITY IN THEIR EYES, AND I LOOKED VERY CAREFULLY,
I SAW CURIOSITY. I SAY BEWILDERMENT. THEY SEEMED TO BE ASKING

SELVES WHAT KIND OF PEOPLE CAN AMERICANS BE AND WOULD DROP

SE KINDS OF BOMBS SO CALLOUSLY ON THEIR INNOCENT HEADS,

TROYING THEIR VILLAGES AND ENDANGERING THE LIVES OF THESE

LIONS OF PEOPLE.

ALL OF YOU, IN THE COCKPITS OF YOUR PLANES, IN ((WORDS INDISTINCT))

U ARE CALLING IN THE BOMBING RAIDS, ON THE AIRCRAFT CARRIERS,

OSE OF YOU WHO ARE LOADING THE BOMBS, THOSE OF YOU WHO ARE

EPAIRING THE PLANES, THOSE OF YOU WHO ARE WORKING ON THE 7TH

LEET, PLEASE, THINK WHAT YOU ARE DOING.

ARE THESE PEOPLE YOUR ENEMY? WHAT WILL YOU SAY TO YOUR CHILDREN

EARS FROM NOW WHEN THEY ASK YOU WHY YOU FOUGHT THIS WAR? WHAT

ILL YOU BE ABLE TO SAY TO THEM? ((RECORDING ENDS--FBIS))

YOU HAVE JUST LISTENED TO AMERICAN ACTRESS JANE FONDA'S

DDRESS TO U.S. PILOTS FLYING CRIMINAL RAIDS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

ON NIXON'S ORDERS, AFTER VISITING U.S. CRIMES IN DESTROYING

NORTH VIETNAM DIKES AND IRRIGATION WORKS. 13153[redacted]

15/1220Z JUL

3T

#1251

[redacted]

[redacted]

TUZYUW RUADKMA1168 190115Z-UUUU--RUTLAAA.

ZR UUUUU ZYN

141136Z JUL 72 ZNZ1

FM FBIS OKINAWA

TO RHMSMVA/COMUSMACV

UADDOA/7TH PSYOPS OKINAWA

UADFBA/FBIS TOKYO

UTLAAA/FBIS WASHDC

UMLMHA/FBIS SAIGON

UDOMSA/FBIS LONDON

UBON

UT

UNCLAS BBC RUAD

COPY TO LIAISON

REPORT ON JANE FONDA'S ACTIVITIES, STATEMENT ON BOMBED DIKES .

B141138 FOR EARLIER, VARIED REPORT ON JANE FONDA'S STATEMENT AFTER

VISITING BOMBED DIKES SEE B140315 HANOI VNA INTERNATIONAL ENGLISH

[redacted]

[redacted]

...VNA IN ENGLISH TO NAV[illegible] 0749 GMT 14 JULY 72 B

((FOR NGUYEN DUY PHUC, CORRESPONDENT OF VOICE OF VIETNAM))

((TEXT)) HANOI--VISITING AMERICAN ACTRESS JANE FONDA JULY 12 ...NT TO SEE THE DYKES BOMBED BY AMERICAN PLANES THE DAY BEFORE IN NAM SACH DISTRICT, HAI HUNG PROVINCE. SHE NOTED THAT IN THE AREA SHE VISITED, IT WAS EASY TO SEE THAT THERE ARE NO MILITARY TARGET, THERE IS NO IMPORTANT HIGHWAY, THERE IS NO COMMUNICATION NETWORK AND THERE IS NO HEAVY INDUSTRY. IN HER ASSESSMENT, THE U.S. HAS MADE DELIBERATE ATTACKS ON DYKES TO JEOPARDISE LIFE AND TERRORISE THE PEOPLE.

LATER SHE VISITED HONG PHONG VILLAGE, A REMOTE LOCALITY FAR FROM MAJOR COMMUNICATION LINES AND INDUSTRIAL CENTRES.

ON JULY 11, AT DAYBREAK WHEN THE VILLAGERS WERE ABOUT TO BEGIN ...ARM WORK, U.S. WAR PLANES RACED IN AND WANTONLY BOMBED A HAMLET IN THE VILLAGE. MANY HOUSES WERE BLASTED; FRUIT TREES MANGLED AND HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE WAS SERIOUSLY DAMAGED. TWO OLD PERSONS WERE KILLED AND MANY OTHERS WOUNDED.

JANE FONDA FELT GREAT INDIGNATION AT THIS U.S. ATTACK ON CIVILIAN POPULATIONS.

IN THE PAST FEW DAYS, SHE HAD CONTACTS WITH MANY WORKERS, PEASANTS AND INTELLECTUALS TO GATHER INFORMATION. SHE CALLED ON THE

[redacted]

[redacted] OF U.S. PLANES ON JULY [redacted] ONLY HIT MILITARY TARGETS [illegible] NAM

[illegible] DISTRICT, ABOUT 60 KILOMETRES EAST OF HANOI, ACTRESS

JANE FONDA NOW ON A VISIT TO NORTH VIETNAM ASSERTED THAT

"THERE WAS NO MILITARY TARGET" IN THE BOMBED AREA.

SHE WENT TO THE PLACE SHORTLY AFTER THE RAID TOOK PLACE

AND MADE THIS COMMENT OVER VOICE OF VIETNAM RADIO, ADDRESSING

TO ALL THE U.S. SERVICEMEN INVOLVED IN THE BOMBING OF NORTH

VIETNAM:

"YESTERDAY MORNING JULY 12 I WENT TO THE DISTRICT OF NAM

SACH TO SEE THE DAMAGE THAT HAS BEEN DONE TO THE DYKES IN THAT

DISTRICT, AND I WONDERED WHAT HAS BEEN GOING ON WITH THE HANDS OF

THOSE WHO WERE PULLING THE LEVER AND DROPPING THE BOMBS ON THE

FIELDS AND ON THE DYKES OF THE RED RIVER DELTA, DO YOU KNOW FOR

EXAMPLE THAT FOR CENTURIES SINCE THE MIDDLE AGES, THE VIETNAMESE

PEASANTS HAVE BUILT UP AND REINFORCED A GREAT COMPLEX

NETWORK OF DYKES WHICH HOLD BACK THE TORRENTIAL WATER OF THE

RIVERS FLOWING DOWN FROM THE MOUNTAINS IN SUMMER DURING THE MONSOON

SEASONS, WITHOUT THESE DYKES 15 MILLION PEOPLE'S LIVES WOULD BE

ENDANGERED, AND WOULD DIE BY DROWNING AND BY STARVATION.

ANTHONY LEWIS FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES WROTE AN ARTICLE JUST

BEFORE I LEFT THE U.S. IN WHICH HE SAID THAT SUCCESSIVE U.S.

[redacted]

[redacted] RED RIVER DELTA, BECAUSE THEY ALL FELT THE DYKES ARE NOT ENTIRELY
MILITARY TARGETS AND THAT THIS WAS THE TYPE OF TERRORIST TACTIC
THAT IS UNWORTHY OF AMERICAN PEOPLE AND AMERICAN FLAGS. BUT TODAY,
AS YOU KNOW BETTER THAN I, AMERICAN PHANTOM JETS ARE BOMBING
STRATEGIC POINTS IN THE DYKE NETWORKS IN THIS AREA.

I (IMPLORE) YOU, I BEG YOU TO CONSIDER WHAT YOU ARE DOING.
IN THE AREA WHERE I WENT YESTERDAY IT WAS EASY TO SEE THAT THERE
ARE NO MILITARY TARGETS, THERE IS NO IMPORTANT HIGHWAY, THERE IS NO
COMMUNICATION NETWORK, THERE IS NO HEAVY INDUSTRY. THESE
ARE PEASANTS. THEY GROW RICE AND THEY REAR PIGS. THEY ARE SIMILAR
TO THE FARMERS IN THE MIDWEST MANY YEARS AGO IN THE U.S. PERHAPS YOUR
GRANDMOTHERS AND GRANDFATHERS WOULD NOT BE SO DIFFERENT FROM THESE
PEASANTS. THEY ARE HAPPY PEOPLE, PEACE-LOVING PEOPLE. WHEN I WENT
BY WALKING ON THE WAY TO THE DYKES TO SEE THE DAMAGE, WOULD IT
BE MADE ENOUGH I WAS AN AMERICAN AND I WAS AFRAID OF THE REACTION WOULD
BE TAKEN BY THE LOCAL PEOPLE. ((SENTENCE AS RECEIVED)) BUT THEY
LOOKED AT ME CURIOUSLY AND I SAW NO HOSTIE IN THEIR EYES.

I LOOKED VERY CAREFULLY. I THOUGHT CURIOUSLY. I SAW THE WOMEN.
THEY SEEMED TO BE ASKING THEMSELVES: WHAT KIND OF PEOPLE CAN
AMERICANS BE, THOSE WHO WOULD DROP ALL KINDS OF BOMBS, SO CARELESSLY
ON THEIR INNOCENT HEADS, DESTROYING THEIR VILLAGES AND ENDANGERING
[redacted]

ALL OF YOU IN THE COCKPI[redacted] OF YOUR PLANES, ON THE A[illegible]RAFT

ARRIERS, THOSE WHOAARE LOADING THE BOMBS, THOSE WHO ARE

CPAIRING THE PLANES, THOSE WHO ARE WORKING ON THE 7TH FLEET,

LEASE THINK WHAT YOUR ARE DOING.

ARE THESE PEOPLE YOUR ENEMY? WHAT WILL YOU SAY TO YOUR

CHILDREN YEARS FROM NOW WHO MAY ASK YOU WHY YOU FOUGHT THE WAR?

WHAT WORDS WILL YOU BE ABLE TO AY TO THEM? 143246[redacted]

14/26192 JUL

ST

#1143

[redacted]

[redacted]

RECEIVED FROM

JUL 31 1972

CIA VIA COURIER

[redacted] 21 JUL 1972

SUBJECT: Broadcasts from North Vietnam

1. Attached for your retention is a tape recording of a radio broadcast from North Vietnam monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. The broadcast was made in English to Southeast Asia at 1000 hours Greenwich Mean Time, 10 July 1972, and was attributed to Jane FONDA.

2. This is a recording of the broadcast cited in paragraph 2 B of our memorandum [redacted] dated 20 July 1972, same Subject. We have again attached the monitored transcript of the recording for your convience.

3. We are attempting to obtain additional tape recordings to supplement the transcripts and will forward them to you promptly on receipt.

EX-105

Attachment: a/s

Please transmit reply v[redacted] channel

REC-32 100-459279-395

14 AUG 8 1972

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

"ENCLOSURE ON BULKY RAMP"

[redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date [redacted] OCT 1990

2 ENCLOSURE

58 AUG 7 1972

[redacted]

(2)

100-459279-395

[redacted]

PTTUZYJH RUADKMA#988 1941612-UUUU--RUTLAAA.

ZNR UUUUU ZYN

R 121534Z JUL 72 ZNZ1

FM FBIS OKINAWA

TO RHKSMVA/COMUSMACV

RUADFBA/FBIS TOKYO

RUADBQA/7TH PSYOPS OKINAWA

RUTLAAA/FBIS WASHDC

RUHSMKA/FBIS SAIGON

RUDOMKA/FBIS LONDON

FBCK

LT

UNCLAS BAC RUAL

COPY TO LIAISON

TALK TO POWS ATTRIBUTED TO JANE FONDA

R121534 HANOI IN ENGLISH TO SOUTHEAST ASI 1200 GMT 12 JUL 72 B

((TEXT)) IN A COMMENTARY ON NIXON'S DECLALATION THAT HE HAS MADE PROGRESS IN ENDING THE WAR AND PARTICULARLY IN ENDING AMERICAN

100-459279-395 En

[redacted] VISITING AMERICAN ACTIVISTS JANE FONDA SAID

MONDAY MORNING:

((RECORDED VOICE OF A WOMAN WITH AN AMERICAN ACCENT--FADE))

AS THE ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES ARE DRAWING NEAR, RICHARD NIXON IS USING THE MOST CYNICAL AND CRIMINAL KINDS OF LIES AND TRICKERY TO FOOL THE AMERICAN OPINION AND WORLD OPINION INTO BELIEVING THAT HE IS TRYING TO END THE WAR IN INDOCHINA. HOW CAN HE BE ENDING THE WAR WHEN HE IS KILLING MORE PEOPLE IN INDOCHINA THAN EVER BEFORE, DROPPING MORE TONS OF BOMBS THAN EVER BEFORE CREATING MORE DAMAGE THAN EVER BEFORE, AND NOW BOMBING THE DIKES IN THE RED RIVER DELTA, ENDANGERING THE LIVES OF 15 MILLION PEOPLE, AD THEIR CROPS AND ANIMALS.

HE IS COUNTING UPON WHAT HE BELIEVES THAT THE AMERICAN HAVE NO CONSCIENCE. HE BELIEVES THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE DON'T CARE, SINCE THERE ARE FEWER AMERICAN LIVES BEING LOST. BUT HE IS WRONG. WE WILL LEARN THE TRUTH. INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE COME HERE HAVE HAD THE HONOR TO HAVE COME HERE AND--AND MET--MEET THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND SEEN THE DAMAGE BEING DONE, WE WILL SPEAK OUT LOUDER THAN EVER BEFORE. WE WILL EXPOSE HIS LIES, PARTICULARLY NOW IN THIS MOST IMPORTANT TIME JUST PRIOR TO ELECTIONS.

WE KNOW THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE WAY TO END THE WAR, AND THAT [redacted]

PEOPLE TO THE SEVEN-POINT PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD LAST JULY 31ST BY THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT, THE UNITED STATES MUST SET A DATE UNCONDITIONALLY FOR ALL TROOPS--AIR TROOPS, GROUND TROOPS, AND CIA ADVISORS TO WITHDRAW FROM INDOCHINA, WE MUST STOP THE SUPPORT OF THE THIEU CLIQUE AND LET THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM TO DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES WHAT KIND OF GOVERNMENT THEY WANT TO LIVE UNDER, AND WE WILL SPEAK OUT ABOUT THE SEVEN POINTS ALL OVER THE WORLD.

((ANNOUNCER'S VOICE--FADE)) COMMENTING ON U.S. ATTACKS ON NORTH VIETNAM'S DIKES AND IRRIGATION WORKS, JANE FONDA SAID:

((RECORDED VOICE OF A WOMAN WITH AN AMERICAN ACCENT--FADE))

A RELATIVELY SHORT TIME AGO ((WORDS INDISTINCT)) 3 YEARS AGO, PEOPLE TOLD ME THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WAS COMMITTING CRIMES IN--IN VIETNAM, CRIMES ON THE GROUND AGAINST THE PEOPLE AND CRIMES FROM THE AIR WITH BOMBS. AND I REFUSED TO BELIEVE IT. I THOUGHT VERY HARD BECAUSE I HAD BEEN BROUGHT UP TO BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT STOOD FOR FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY. THEN I BEGAN TO STUDY--I BEGAN TO READ, I BEGAN TO LISTEN TO REPORTS COMING FROM THE BATTLEFIELD, AND I BEGAN TO TALK TO SOLDIERS. BRAVE HEROES OF THE WAR WOULD COME BACK FROM INDOCHINA AND I WAS TOLD THAT IT IS WE WHO COMMITTED CRIMES.

RAPED THE VIETNAMESE WOMEN. [redacted] IT IS HE WHO DID IT AND WE ARE SORRY, AND WE WANT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO KNOW WHAT IS BEING DONE IN THEIR NAMES.

AND AT THAT POINT I HAVE--HAD TO, LIKE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF OTHER AMERICAN PEOPLE, I HAD TO LET GO OF THE LIE. I HAD TO ADMIT TO MYSELF--AND WE ALL MUST--THAT SOMEWHERE ALONG THE WAY THE UNITED STATES STOPPED BEING WHAT IT HOPED TO BE IN THE BEGINNING WHEN WE FIRST FOUGHT A REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO FREE OURSELVES FROM THE BRITISH, FROM THE BRITISH CONTROL.

THIS IS WHAT IS A HAPPENING IN VIETNAM TODAY, IT IS A PEOPLE FIGHTING TO BE FREE. THEY ARE FIGHTING A RIGHTEOUS, REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO BE FREE AND INDEPENDENT THE WAY WE, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, DID IN THE BEGINNING OF OUR OWN COUNTRY. AND WE MUST ALLOW THEM TO DO THIS. AND IF WE ARE ARE TRUE AMERICANS, AND IF WE TRULY BELIEVE WHAT IT IS OUR COUNTRY STANDS FOR OR STARTED OUT TO STAND FOR, WE MUST NOT ONLY STOP THESE BARBARIOUS ACTS BEING COMMITTED AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, BUT WE MUST HELP THEM ACHIEVE THEIR-- THEIR REVOLUTION.

WE MUST DO EVERYTHING WE CAN IN THE NAME OF DEMOCRACY AND FREDOM TO ALLOW THEM TO LIVE IN PEACE AND INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM. WE MUST TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY SINCE WE ARE HERE ON [redacted] THEIR SOIL--UNDER

[redacted] ARE [illegible] [redacted] AND STUDY THE HISTORY AND TALK TO THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, TRY TO SENSITIZE OURSELVES TO ANOTHER KIND OF CULTURE. ONE OF THE WORST THINGS THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE IN THE UNITED STATES, I BELIEVE, IS THAT WE ARE CUT OFF FROM OTHER PEOPLES AROUND THE WORLD. WE ARE--WE ARE MADE TO--TO LACK RESPECT FOR OTHER PEOPLES, PARTICULARLY PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT WHITE. AND I THING THAT THIS IS WRONG, I FEEL THAT PEOPLE WHO ARE TRULY AMERICAN AND TRULY PATRIOTIC MUST SAY WE LOVE ALL PEOPLE, AND WE HAVE TO UNDERSTAND HOW ALL PEOPLE LIVE, AND WE HAVE TO RESPECT EVERYONE'S RIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE.

AND, I'M SURE THAT YOU--THAT YOU KNOW THAT WE WISH THAT YOU COME HOME AS FAST AS POSSIBLE. I BELIVE THAT THE PEOPLE WHO ARE SPEAKING OUT AGAINST THE WAR, WHO ARE TRYING TO STOP THE WAR--BY VOTING AGAINST MR. NIXON FOR ONE THING, BY ECONOMIC BOYCOTT FOR ANOTHER THING, AND BY EDUCATION AND PERSUASION AMONG THE GENERAL AMERICAN PUBLIC--THAT IT IS WE WHO ARE DOING WHAT IS BEST TO GET YOU HOME AS FAST AS POSSIBLE. THE KEY TO THE PRISONS IN THE NORTHERN PART OF VIETNAM IS IN NIXON'S HANDS. IT IS NIXON WHO--WHO WILL BE ABLE TO FREE ALL OF THE PRISONERS. HE CAN DO THIS BY AUTHORING THE SEVEN-POINT PEACE PROPOSAL THAT WAS PUT FORWARD A YEAR AGO, LAST JULY.

[redacted]

[redacted] ISTS FOR 1 YEAR, FOR 1 [redacted]. IF RICHARD NIXON AT THE PARIS PEACE TALKS LAST JULY HAD ADDRESSED HIMSELF TO THE SEVEN-POINT PEACE PROPOSAL, WHICH IS RECOGNIZED BY PEOPLE ALL OVER THE WORLD AS BEING THE MOST JUST AND RIGHTEOUS PROPOSAL EVER PUT FORWARD BY ONE SIDE DURING A PERIOD OF WAR, ALL OF YOU WOULD HAVE BEEN HOME WITHIN 3 MONTHS. AND WE THINK THIS IS A CRIME.

WE THINK THIS IT IS A CRIME THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS CYNICALLY PREVENTED YOUR FREEDOM, HAS CYNICALLY LIED TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, MAKING THEM BELIVE THAT IT IS HE WHO IS SEEKING PEACE, WHEN WE KNOW IT IS THE COUNTRARY.

WE HOPE THAT YOU ARE TAKING THIS TIME TO STUDY, TO LEARN, SO THAT WHEN YOU COME HOME YOU CAN SPEAK TO THE REST OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. AND WE HOPE THAT WILL BE SOON, ((RECORDING ENDS--FBIS))

1713GMT [redacted] SH 12/1643Z JUL

LT

cv985

[redacted]

RECEIVED FROM

AUG 22 1972

NSA BY COURIER

22 AUG 1972

b7C per FBI

SUBJECT: Broadcasts from North Vietnam

1. The following broadcast attributed to Jane FONDA about her visit to North Vietnam has been monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and the transcript is attached for your convenience and retention:

> "Alleged Jane FONDA Impressions of Talk With the U.S. P.O.W.'s, Hanoi in English to American Servicemen Involved in the Indochina War, 1300 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), 15 August 1972."

2. The attached is provided in response to the request for additional transcripts contained in your letter dated 21 August 1972, Subject: Jane FONDA; Security Matter-Subversion.

Attachment: a/s

[redacted]

b7C

EX-104

REC-28 100-452793-431

30 SEP 1 1972

DISCLOSURE

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date [redacted] OCT 1990

100-452793-431

CLASSIFIED BY [redacted]

15

[redacted]

[redacted]

U.S. VIETNAM MISSION

Y TO LIAISON

.GED JANE FONDA IMPRESSIONS OF TALK WITH U.S. POW'S

71232 HANOI IN ENGLISH TO AMERICAN SERVICEMEN INVOLVED IN THE

NDOCHINA WAR 1303 GMT 15 AUG 72 C

((TEXT)) HERE IS JANE FONDA TELLING HER IMPRESSIONS AFTER

EETING CAPTURED U.S. PILOTS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM:

((FOLLOWS RECORDED FEMALE VOICE WITH AMERICAN ACCENT--FBIS))

THIS IS JANE FONDA SPEAKING FROM HANOI. YESTERDAY EVENING,

JULY 19, I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY OF MEETING SEVEN U.S. PILOTS. SOME

OF THEM WERE SHOT DOWN AS LONG AGO AS 1966 AND SOME OF THEM HAD

BEEN SHOT DOWN VERY RECENTLY. THEY ARE ALL IN GOOD HEALTH.

WE HAD A VERY LONG TALK, A VERY OPEN AND CASUAL TALK. WE

EXCHANGED IDEAS FREELY. THEY ASKED ME TO BRING BACK TO THE AMERICAN

PEOPLE THEIR SENSE OF DISGUST OF THE WAR AND THEIR SHAME

FOR WHAT THEY HAVE BEEN ASKED TO DO.

THEY TOLD ME THAT THE PILOTS BELIEVE THEY ARE BOMBING MILITARY

TARGETS. THEY TOLD ME THAT THE PILOTS ARE TOLD THAT THEY ARE

BOMBING TO FREE THEIR BUDDIES DOWN BELOW; BUT, OF COURSE,

WE ALL KNOW THAT EVERY BOMB THAT FALLS ON NORTH VIETNAM ENDANGERS

THE LIVES OF THE AMERICAN PRISONERS.

[redacted]

100-459279-431 End.

[redacted]

CK HOME TO THEIR LOVED ONES AND FRIENDS, TELLING TH TO PLEASE

AT ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE PEACE MOVEMENT AS POSSIBLE,

REVIEW THEIR EFFORTS TO END THE WAR.

ONE OF THE MEN WHO HAS BEEN IN THE SERVICE FOR MANY, MANY YEARS

HAS WRITTEN A BOOK ABOUT VIETNAMESE HISTORY, AND I THOUGHT

THIS WAS VERY MOVING, THAT DURING THE TIME HE'S BEEN HERE, AND

THE TIME THAT HE HAS HAD TO REFLECT ON WHAT HE HAS BEEN

THROUGH AND WHAT HE HAS DONE TO THIS COUNTRY, HE HAS--HIS THOUGHT

HAS TURNED TO THIS COUNTRY, ITS HISTORY OF STRUGGLE AND THE

PEOPLE THAT LIVE HERE.

THEY ALL ASSURED ME THAT THEY HAVE BEEN WELL CARED FOR.

THEY--THEY LISTEN TO THE RADIO, THEY RECEIVE LETTERS, THEY

ARE IN GOOD HEALTH, THEY ASKED ABOUT NEWS FROM HOME.

I THINK WE ALL SHARED DURING THE TIME THAT I SPENT WITH THEM

A SENSE OF--OF DEEP SADNESS THAT A SITUATION LIKE THIS HAS TO

EXIST, AND I CERTAINLY FELT FROM THEM A VERY SINCERE DESIRE TO

EXPLAIN TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT THIS WAR IS A TERRIBLE CRIME

AND THAT IT MUST BE STOPPED, AND THAT RICHARD NIXON IS DOING

NOTHING EXCEPT ESCALATING IT WHILE PREACHING PEACE, ENDANGERING

THEIR LIVES WHILE SAYING HE CARES ABOUT THE PRISONERS.

AND I THINK ONE OF THE THINGS THAT TOUCHED ME THE MOST WAS

[redacted]

[redacted] PILOTS SAID TO ME THAT HE WAS READING A BOOK

[redacted] "THE DRAFT", A PUBLICATION BY THE AMERICAN FRIENDS

SERVICE COMMITTEE, AND THAT IN READING THIS BOOK, HE HAD UNDERSTOOD

LOT ABOUT WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO HIM AS A HUMAN BEING IN HIS

[redacted] YEARS OF MILITARY SERVICE. HE SAID THAT DURING THOSE 16 YEARS,

HE HAD STOPPED RELATING TO CIVILIAN LIFE. HE HAD FORGOTTEN THAT

THERE WAS ANYTHING ELSE BESIDES THE MILITARY AND HE SAID IN REALIZING

WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO HIM, HE WAS VERY AFRAID THAT THIS WAS

HAPPENING TO MANY OTHER PEOPLE.

I WAS VERY ENCOURAGED BY MY MEETING WITH THE PILOTS

(BECAUSE) I FEEL THAT THE STUDYING AND THE READING THAT THEY HAVE

BEEN DOING DURING THEIR TIME HERE HAS TAUGHT THEM A GREAT DEAL

IN PUTTING THE PIECES OF THEIR LIVES BACK TOGETHER AGAIN IN A

BETTER WAY, HOPEFULLY. AND I AM SURE THAT WHEN--WHEN THEY GO

HOME, THEY WILL GO HOME BETTER CITIZENS THAN WHEN THEY LEFT.

191300 [redacted] 17/1250Z AUG

ET

#1442 [redacted]

O

RECEIVED FRO [redacted]

AUG 24 1972

CIA BY COURIER

[redacted] 24 AUG 1972

[redacted] SUBJECT: Broadcasts from North Vietnam

1. Attached for your retention are tape recordings of radio broadcasts from North Vietnam monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service which have been attributed to Jane FONDA:

A. "6-minute Recorded Statement Attributed to Jane Fonda on Failure of U.S. to Turn Vietnam into Neocolony", Hanoi in English to American Servicemen Involved in the Indochina War, 1300 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), 7 August 1972.

B. "5-minute Recorded Statement Attributed to Jane Fonda on 'Who has Betrayed Democracy'", Hanoi in English to American Servicemen Involved in the Indochina War, 1300 GMT, 9 August 1972.

C. "5-minute Recorded Message Attributed to Jane Fonda After Her Visit with Captured U.S. Pilots", Hanoi in English to American Servicemen Involved in the Indochina War, 1300 GMT, 15 August 1972.

tr.

2. These recordings are cited in paragraphs 1-A and 1-B of our memorandum [redacted] dated 14 August 1972, same Subject, and in our memorandum [redacted] dated 22 August 1972, same Subject.

3. The attached is provided in response to the request for additional transcripts contained in your letter dated 21 August 1972, Subject: Jane FONDA; Security Matter-Subversion.

SI-116 REC-70 100-459279-430 AUG 30 1972

Attachments: a/s

Please transmit reply via [redacted] channel

ENCLOSURE

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE ON BULKY RAMP

SIGN [redacted]

FILE 100-459279

[redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE Date OCT 1990

100-459279-430 (14)

MOCRACY IN AMERICA! ((FOLLOWS RECORDED FEMALE VOICE WITH AMERICAN

CLICHE-FILLED))

THIS IS JANE FONDA SPEAKING FROM HANOI. LIKE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF

HER AMERICANS, I'M EXTREMELY CONCERNED THESE DAYS ABOUT THE BETRAYAL

EVERYTHING THAT MY COUNTRY STANDS FOR--ABOUT THE BETRAYAL

F OUR FLAG, ABOUT THE BETRAYAL OF THE VERY PRECEPTS UPON

HICH OUR COUNTRY WAS FOUNDED: EQUALITY FOR ALL PEOPLE, LIBERTY,

ND FREEDOM.

IN 1954, THE GENEVA ACCORDS WERE SIGNED, WHICH CALLED FOR THE

EMPORARY DIVIDING OF VIETNAM INTO TWO MILITARY REGROUPMENT

ONES. THE GENEVA ACCORDS ALSO STATED THAT IN 1956, GENERAL

LECTIONS WERE TO BE HELD WHICH--WHICH WOULD REUNITE THIS COUNTRY.

AT THAT TIME, PRESIDENT EISENHOWER NOTED THAT IF ELECTIONS WERE

HELD, PRESIDENT HO CHI MINH WOULD HAVE BEEN ELECTED PRESIDENT OF

A REUNITED VIETNAM BY 80 PERCENT OF THE VOTES. AND SO, AS HAS BEEN

THOROUGHLY DOCUMENTED IN THE PENTAGON PAPERS, THE UNITED STATES,

VIA THE CIA, SABOTAGED THE ELECTIONS AND INSTALLED NGO DINH DIEM

AS A PUPPET DICTATOR IN SOUTH VIETNAM. JUST AS WE ARE SUPPORTING

A PUPPET DICTATOR, THIEU, IN SAIGON TODAY. THAT WAS ONE BETRAYAL

OF WHAT OUR COUNTRY STANDS FOR.

IN 1968, AFTER HAVING SUFFERED A SERIES OF DEFEATS IN SOUTH

4

[redacted] TO RECOGNIZE THE FACT [redacted] THE

BOMBING OF VIETNAM, AND THE BOMBING OF THE DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC

F VIETNAM IN PARTICULAR, WAS NOT GOING TO FORCE THE VIETNAMESE

EOPLE TO GIVE UP THEIR RESISTANCE TO FIGHT FOR FREEDOM, INDEPENDENCE,

ND DEMOCRACY. PRESIDENT JOHNSON WAS FORCED TO THE PARIS PEACE

ALKS AND WAS FORCED TO (SIGN) AN UNCONDITIONAL BOMBING HALT AND

TOP ALL BOMBINGS OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

RICHARD NIXON HAS VIOLATED THE 1968 BOMBING HALT, AND IN

DOING SO HAS BEEN A TRAITOR TO EVERYTHING THAT THE UNITED STATES

STANDS FOR. I WOULD LIKE TO STATE HERE PUBLICLY THAT THE

AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL ONE DAY KNOW--THE BOOKS WILL ONE DAY BE

OPEN TO ALL OF THE CRIMES WHICH (IRI--WHICH--WHICH) RICHARD NIXON

HAS COMMITTED.

RICHARD NIXON, HISTORY WILL ONE DAY REPORT YOU AS THE NEW

HITLER, AND PATRIOTIC AMERICANS WILL ONE DAY HAVE TO WORK LONG

AND HARD TO ERASE--ERASE THE BLIGHT OF YOUR YEARS IN OFFICE.

IT IS NO WONDER THAT YOU (TOO) TO SUCH LENGTHS TO LIE TO THE

WORLD ABOUT WHAT YOU ARE DOING. IT IS NO WONDER THAT YOU ARE

SO CYNICALLY MANIPULATING THE AMERICAN PUBLIC INTO BELIEVING

THAT YOU ARE STRIVING FOR PEACE, WHEN YOU ARE IN FACT COMMITTING

THE MOST HEINOUS CRIMES AGAINST THE INNOCENT CIVILIANS OF VIETNAM.

SO, WHEN WE HEAR THE WORD TREASON, WE SHOULD THINK VERY

[redacted]

[redacted]

ND IS KILLING, ABOUT WHO IS BREAKING THE LAW, AND WHO IS BETRAYING

HE BEST QUALITIES OF MANKIND?

I THINK THAT ALL AMERICANS TODAY WOULD LIKE THE U.S. SOLDIERS,

E U.S. ADVISORS, THE U.S. PLANES TO COME HOME TO AMERICA,

WE CAN WE PRETEND TO BE EXPORTING DEMOCRACY TO OTHER COUNTRIES

HEN WE CAN'T PRETEND TO PRACTICE DEMOCRACY AT HOME, WHEN WE

CAN'T PRETEND TO PRACTICE EQUALITY AT HOME? THERE IS NO EQUALITY

FOR THE BLACK PEOPLE, THE BROWN PEOPLE, THE ASIAN PEOPLE, THE RED

PEOPLE, THE PUERTO RICANS, THE WORKING PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES.

THE VERY FACT THAT THE MAJORITY OF PEOPLE WANT THE TROOPS TO COME

HOME AND WANT THE BOMBING TO STOP, AND YET THIS CONTINUES, IS A

BLATANT PROOF OF THE FACT THAT NIXON HAS BETRAYED DEMOCRACY

IN AMERICA. 091300 [redacted] 09/21/62 AUG

BT

#0784

[redacted] LD, HQC PARIS RUAU

R U.S. VIETNAM MISSION

PY TO LIAISON

LEGED JANE FONDA IMPRESSIONS OF TALK WITH U.S. POW'S

71232 HANOI IN ENGLISH TO AMERICAN SERVICEMEN INVOLVED IN THE

DOCHINA MAR 1300 GMT 15 AUG 72 d

((TEXT)) HERE IS JANE FONDA TELLING HER IMPRESSIONS AFTER

EETING CAPTURED U.S. PILOTS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

((FOLLOWS RECORDED FEMALE VOICE WITH AMERICAN ACCENT--FUIS))

THIS IS JANE FONDA SPEAKING FROM HANOI, YESTERDAY EVENING,

ULY 19. I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY OF MEETING SEVEN U.S. PILOTS. SOME

F THEM WERE SHOT DOWN AS LONG AGO AS 1968 AND SOME OF THEM HAD

BEEN SHOT DOWN VERY RECENTLY. THEY ARE ALL IN GOOD HEALTH.

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PEOPLE THEIR SENSE OF DISGUST OF THE WAR AND THEIR SHAME

FOR WHAT THEY HAVE BEEN ASKED TO DO.

THEY TOLD ME THAT THE PILOTS BELIEVE THEY ARE BOMBING MILITARY

TARGETS. THEY TOLD ME THAT THE PILOTS ARE TOLD THAT THEY ARE

BOMBING TO FREE THEIR BUDDIES DOWN BELOW, BUT, OF COURSE,

WE ALL KNOW THAT EVERY BOMB THAT FALLS ON NORTH VIETNAM ENDANGERS

THE LIVES OF THE AMERICAN PRISONERS.

[redacted]

THEY ASKED ME WHAT [redacted] YOU BUT THEY ASKED ME [redacted] BRING MESSAGES

ACK HOME TO THEIR LOVED ONES AND FRIENDS, TELLING THEM TO PLEASE

E AS ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE PEACE MOVEMENT AS POSSIBLE,

D RENEW THEIR EFFORTS TO END THE WAR.

ONE OF THE MEN WHO HAS BEEN IN THE SERVICE FOR MANY, MANY YEARS

HAS WRITTEN A BOOK ABOUT VIETNAMESE HISTORY, AND I THOUGHT

THIS WAS VERY MOVING, THAT DURING THE TIME HE'S BEEN HERE, AND

THE TIME THAT HE HAS HAD TO REFLECT ON WHAT HE HAS BEEN

THROUGH AND WHAT HE HAS DONE TO THIS COUNTRY, HE HAS--HIS THOUGHT

HAS TURNED TO THIS COUNTRY, ITS HISTORY OF STRUGGLE AND THE

PEOPLE THAT LIVE HERE.

THEY ALL ASSURED ME THAT THEY HAVE BEEN WELL CARED FOR.

THEY--THEY LISTEN TO THE RADIO; THEY RECEIVE LETTERS. THEY

ARE IN GOOD HEALTH. THEY ASKED ABOUT NEWS FROM HOME.

I THINK WE ALL SHARED DURING THE TIME THAT I SPENT WITH THEM

A SENSE OF--OF DEEP SADNESS THAT A SITUATION LIKE THIS HAS TO

EXIST. AND I CERTAINLY FELT FROM THEM A VERY SINCERE DESIRE TO

EXPLAIN TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT THIS WAR IS A TERRIBLE CRIME

AND THAT IT MUST BE STOPPED, AND THAT RICHARD NIXON IS DOING

NOTHING EXCEPT ESCALATING IT WHILE PREACHING PEACE, ENDANGERING

THEIR LIVES WHILE SAYING HE CARES ABOUT THE PRISONERS.

AND I THINK ONE OF THE THINGS THAT TOUCHED ME THE MOST WAS

[redacted]

[redacted] THE PILOTS SAID TO [redacted] THAT HE WAS READING A BOOK

ED "THE DRAFTS, A BOOK WRITTEN BY THE AMERICAN FRIENDS

VICE COMMITTEE, AND THAT IN READING THIS BOOK, HE HAD UNDERSTOOD

OT ABOUT WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO HIM AS A HUMAN BEING IN HIS

YEARS OF MILITARY SERVICE. HE SAID THAT DURING THOSE 16 YEARS,

E HAD STOPPED RELATING TO CIVILIAN LIFE. HE HAD FORGOTTEN THAT

HERE WAS ANYTHING ELSE BESIDES THE MILITARY AND HE SAID IN REALIZING

HAT HAD HAPPENED TO HIM, HE WAS VERY AFRAID THAT THIS WAS

APPENING TO MANY OTHER PEOPLE.

I WAS VERY ENCOURAGED BY MY MEETING WITH THE PILOTS

(BECAUSE) I FEEL THAT THE STUDYING AND THE READING THAT THEY HAVE

BEEN DOING DURING THEIR TIME HERE HAS TAUGHT THEM A GREAT DEAL

IN PUTTING THE PIECES OF THEIR LIVES BACK TOGETHER AGAIN IN A

BETTER WAY, HOPEFULLY. AND I AM SURE THAT WHEN--WHEN THEY GO

HOME, THEY WILL GO HOME BETTER CITIZENS THAN WHEN THEY LEFT.

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[redacted]

SECRET/SENSITIVE [redacted] 1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1)

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI EARLY SEPTEMBER 1972

SUBJECT NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT PLAN TO RELEASE U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES

1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1)

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (3 OCTOBER 1972) FIELD NO. [redacted]

SOURCE

1. NGUYEN HUU THO, CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM (NFLSV) AND TRAN BUU KIEM, NFLSV

[redacted] 1.5(e) 3.4(b)(1)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE 6/29/98

SECRET/SENSITIVE

NND 942005-683

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MINISTER . SAID IN EARLY SEPTEMBER 1972 THAT THE NFLSV PLANS TO RELEASE SOME U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR IN MUCH THE SAME WAY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE DONE. THE NFLSV LEADERS SAID THAT A FEW PRISONERS WOULD BE TURNED OVER TO AN AMERICAN ANTIWAR ORGANIZATION IN ORDER TO GET THE MOST PROPAGANDA IMPACT. THE LEADERS DID NOT SPECIFY THE NUMBER OF PRISONERS TO BE RELEASED NOR DID THEY OUTLINE WHAT CHANNELS WOULD BE USED TO CONTACT THE AMERICAN ANTIWAR GROUP. HOWEVER, THE LEADERS DID SAY THAT THE PRISONERS TO BE RELEASED ARE NOW IN PRISON CAMPS IN "LIBERATED AREAS" OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

2. THO WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE NFLSV LEADERSHIP IS CONFIDENT THAT THE FRONT WILL SUCCEED. THO ADDED THAT THE NFLSV LEADERS ARE REALISTIC, REALIZING THAT THEY WILL NOT ACHIEVE A LARGE SUCCESS, BUT WILL SETTLE FOR A SMALL SUCCESS. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE CURRENT OFFENSIVE, THO SAID THAT IT HAS ACHIEVED SOME SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES ALREADY, BUT DID NOT CLARIFY WHAT THESE OBJECTIVES WERE.

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.

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SECRET SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

20 September 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Plans of the War Crimes Commission of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam and Swedish Media for Propaganda Exploitation of Released American Prisoners of War

1. The press and other media in Sweden have recently carried extensive coverage of the North Vietnamese Government's release of the three American prisoners of war. This coverage has included reports that the three Americans will return to the United States via Moscow and Stockholm, with a layover in Stockholm on 24 September. [redacted] [redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

[redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

2. An Aeroflot plane has been chartered by the War Crimes Commission (WCC) of the Stockholm Conference for departure from Hanoi on Saturday, 23 September 1972, at about 1500 hours. The plane is to transport the three American prisoners of war to

[redacted] 1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

Classified by Agner. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E. O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (2). Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

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Moscow and possibly on to Stockholm, Sweden, if no convenient commercial flight is available. The possibility exists of a stop en route in Vientiane, Laos, although the planners prefer to by-pass Vientiane. The stop in Moscow is intended by the planners to be held to a minimum length with press coverage to be avoided if possible. From Moscow, the preferred route will be directly to Stockholm where the planners expect to arrive on 24 September at the latest, but possibly as early as late on 23 September.

3. The Swedish planners hope to keep the three Americans in Stockholm for at least 24 hours in order to carry out extensive media coverage of their presence and their statements. The former prisoners are being encouraged by members of the WCC to speak out extensively while in Stockholm. The WCC members are telling the American prisoners that they might achieve a form of insurance against their being taken to the United States and secreted away from their families for long periods of debriefing. The prisoners are being told that the rationale behind such "insurance" is that if everything has been said in Stockholm, then the Pentagon cannot justify secreting the men away and classifying all that they have to report. The men are further being advised by the WCC that if they go to the United States and make remarks critical of U.S. Vietnam policy there, they will be accused by the United States military of being mentally unbalanced, thus prompting ridicule and possibly an additional long and uncomfortable confinement. Stockholm, on the other hand, is considered to be an appropriate "neutral ground" where the Americans will be encouraged and may be willing to speak out, thus leaving the world media with little basis for accusing any participants in the publicity effort of having gotten biased statements from the men in a climate of duress.

4. The arrival in Stockholm is planned to be a quiet and very short affair with little or no press conference activity. It is hoped that the Americans can later be made available to press and media people in a private home or possibly in a hotel.

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5. In conjunction with the presence in Stockholm of the three former prisoners, Hans Goran Franck, Chairman of the WCC, and Jean-Christophe Oberg, Swedish Ambassador to North Vietnam, are attempting to arrange a visit by Senator Edward F. Kennedy to Stockholm. The two hope to have Senator Kennedy in the city at the same time as the three prisoners in order to attempt to arrange a press conference or similar public activity including the Senator and the three former prisoners. Ambassador Oberg and Franck have been in touch with Senator Kennedy and have said they believe that they have a fairly good chance of having him present. The WCC expects that Ramsey Clark will be in Stockholm at the time of the arrival and media coverage of the former prisoners. It is through him that the WCC hopes to draw Senator Kennedy into public involvement in the prisoner exploitation.

6. The above-described flight travel routing remains flexible, since the WCC organizers of the Western media coverage seek the best available surroundings for the event. Thus Paris is considered as an alternate locale for the media exposure of the three Americans. In this connection, Ambassador Oberg is now in Paris laying plans for possible activity there. Oberg, who has recently been in Stockholm for several weeks, has been a key figure in the planning due to his good North Vietnamese contacts in Paris and Hanoi. Swedish radio and television personnel are also being sent to Paris as well as to Hanoi for assurance of the best possible coverage of the events. Should the media exposure take place in Paris, Oberg and Franck will attempt to get Senator Kennedy to visit Paris instead of Stockholm.

7. Ramsey Clark first proposed to the North Vietnamese, while on his recent trip to Hanoi, a system of choosing the three prisoners to be released. Clark's proposal was to have a drawing of lots (among how many prisoners is not known) in front of cameras. Thus it was hoped to prove that the choice was not one dictated by the North Vietnamese. When the plan was rejected, Clark proposed a second which specified that one prisoner from each of three phases of the war be chosen. The latter plan was accepted by the North Vietnamese and hence one prisoner is of the period of the earliest United States bombing of North Vietnam; one from the period of former

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President Johnson's buildup of United States participation in Vietnam; and the third from the latest renewal of the bombing of North Vietnam. Clark proposed this system of choice in order to have former prisoners who could report on conditions faced by all the prisoners in North Vietnam and to prove that treatment had not become worse in the face of continued American bombings.

8. Members of the WCC hope to achieve an impact on American public opinion through publicity of the release of the prisoners and by tying the release to North Vietnamese willingness to deal with the Democratic Party. The WCC members hope in this way to convince the American public that, if the Democratic Party wins the coming Presidential election, all the prisoners can be brought home safely.

9. The only other recipients of this information are Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird.

Richard Helms
Director

[redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

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[redacted]

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Developments in Indochina

Approved for Release
Date APR 1997

[redacted]

Approved for Release
Date DEC 1993

[redacted]

27 September 1972

[redacted]

CIA/OCI DEVIND 72-09-27

[redacted]

DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

(Information as of 1500)

NR [redacted]

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

Peking has handled Hanoi's release of three American airmen gingerly. There was no official reception when their plane landed in Peking, and the Chinese press has not mentioned the stopover.

NR [redacted]

27 September 1972

[redacted]

[redacted]

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

Peking has handled Hanoi's release of three American airmen in a gingerly way. The airmen and their escort party flew to Peking on 26 September aboard a regularly scheduled Chinese flight. There was no official Chinese reception on their arrival in Peking; they were met by a North Vietnamese embassy official and, according to western journalists, hustled past newsmen into waiting buses by Chinese officials. The Chinese press has not mentioned the stopover in Peking and, in fact, has been silent on the entire prisoner-release matter since the initial announcement early this month that Peking repeated without comment.

By maintaining a low profile, Peking has tried to make the best of a bad situation. The Chinese almost certainly would have preferred to stay clear of the prisoner release operation entirely so as to avoid complicating their relationships with both Hanoi and Washington. [redacted]

27 September 1972

[redacted]